LIC-93-0305, Special Rept:On 931129,Fire Protection Impairment Permit (Fpip) 3699 Initiated for Motor Driven Fire Pump FP-1A & on 931203,FPIP 3702 Initiated for FP-1A.Pump Has Since Been Returned to Operable Status & Fpips 3699 & 3702 Closed

Special Rept:On 931129,Fire Protection Impairment Permit (Fpip) 3699 Initiated for Motor Driven Fire Pump FP-1A & on 931203,FPIP 3702 Initiated for FP-1A.Pump Has Since Been Returned to Operable Status & Fpips 3699 & 3702 Closed

ML20059E629
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	01/05/1994
From:	Gates W OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LIC-93-0305, LIC-93-305, NUDOCS 9401120073
Download: ML20059E629 (3)

Text

. . .

o Omaha Public Power District 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247 402/636-2000 January 5, 1994 LIC-93-0305 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station: P1-137 Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

Special Report on Inoperability of Fire Protection Equipment The Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), holder of Operating License DPR-40, submits this report pursuant to the requirements of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)  ;

Unit No. 1, Technical Specification (TS) 2.19, " Fire Protection System."

l Technical Specification 2.19(4) requires that the Fire Suppression Water System be operable, except during system testing, jockey pump maintenance or training (not to exceed seven consecutive days), with both fire pumps, each with a minimum capacity of 1800 gpm, with their discharge aligned to the fire suppression header ,

l and automatic initiation logic for each fire pump. Per TS 2.19(4)a, with less '

than the above required equipment, the inoperable equipment is to be restored to operable status within seven days. If the equipment is not restored within seven days, a report is to be prepared and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to TS 5.9.3 within the next 30 days.

On November 29, 1993, Fire Protection Impairment Permit (FPIP) 3699 was initiated for Motor Driven Fire Pump FP-1A in order to support maintenance on an Intake Structure traveling screen. On December 3, 1993, FPIP 3702 was also initiated for FP-1A, to support installation of a new valve in the fire pump line. The pump has since been returned to operable status, and FPIPs 3699 and 3702 were closed on December 22, 1993.

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e U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-93-0305 Page Two Technical Specification 2.19(7) requires that all penetration fire barriers protectingsafety-relatedareasshallbefunctional(intact). With a penetration fire barrier non-functional, within one hour, either a continuous fire watch is to be established on at least one side of the affected penetration, or the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the penetration is to be verified and an hourly fire watch patrol established. The non-functional penetration is to be restored to functional status within seven days, or a report is to be prepared and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to TS 5.9.3, within an additional 30 days.

The following items address several degraded fire barrier penetration seals that have been identified during the performance of the 18-month fire barrier penetration seal inspection (Surveillance Test SE-ST-FP-0005). The inspection determined that these fire barrier penetration seals were inoperable due to deterioration of grout and/or insufficient depth of foam. These penetration seals have been or were inoperable for greater than seven days due to the penetrations not being easily accessible and/or due to upgrading penetration typical drawings prior to completing repairs. Appropriate compensatory measures were initiated and will remain in place until the penetrations can be returned to functional status.

On October 29, 1993, FPIP 3644 was initiated in order to establish a fire watch for Fire Barrier Penetration Seal 73-F-821, due to a concern about possible insufficient depth of grout. The penetration is not easily accessible, and could not be adequately inspected at the time. Following additional inspection, on December 7, 1993, the penetration was determined to be inoperable. The penetration has since been repaired and FPIP 3644 was closed on December 10, 1993.

- On December 2, 1993, FPIPs 3700 and 3701 were initiated in order to establish fire watches for Fire Barrier Penetration Seals 19-E-57 and 19-E-58, due to concerns about possible inoperability of the seals.

Following additional review, the penetration seals were determined to be inoperable. These penetrations have since been repaired and FPIPs 3700 and 3701 were closed on December 21, 1993.

- On December 8, 1993, FPIP 3708 was initiated to address inoperability of Fire Barrier Penetration Seal 56E-E-31. The penetration is scheduled to be returned to functional status and FPIP 3708 closed by February 1, 1994.

On December 9, 1993, FPIP 3711 was initiated to address inoperability of Fire Barrier Penetration Seal 33-S-2. Initial repair work was performed under FPIP 3711, however, it was determined that the configuration of the penetration was such that additional work was required. FPIP 3730 was then initiated in order to continue to meet fire watch requirements until the 3 additional work was completed. The penetration has since been returned to  !

functional status, and FPIP 3730 was closed on January 4, 1994.

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f U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-93-0305 Page Three

- On December 10, 1993, FPIPs 3714, 3715, 3716 and 3717 were initiated in order to address inoperability of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals 73-F-822, 73-F-823, 56E-F-810 and 56E-F-811. These penetrations have since been returned to functional status. FPIPs 3714 and 3715 were closed on.

December 20, 1993 and FPIPs 3716 and 3717 were closed on December 21, 1993.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely, i

//U.Y Y W. G. Gates Vice President WGG:jrg l

c: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae l J. L. Milhoan, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV i S. D. Bloom, NRC Project Manager R. P. Mullikin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector i