Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Proposed Alternatives Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety. Proposed Alternatives Authorized for Remainder of Third ten- Yr ISI Interval for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1ML20211J932 |
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Fort Calhoun ![Omaha Public Power District icon.png](/w/images/6/6a/Omaha_Public_Power_District_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
09/02/1999 |
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NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
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ML20211J928 |
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NUDOCS 9909070067 |
Download: ML20211J932 (4) |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217B5401999-10-0606 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-40 ML20211J9321999-09-0202 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Proposed Alternatives Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety. Proposed Alternatives Authorized for Remainder of Third ten- Yr ISI Interval for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 ML20210G2181999-07-27027 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-40 ML20210D9951999-07-22022 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-40 ML20206L4241999-05-10010 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Corrective Actions to Ensure That Valves Are Capable of Performing Intended Safety Functions & OPPD Adequately Addressed Requested Actions Discussed in GL 95-07 ML20206M2601999-05-0606 May 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee IPEEE Complete Re Info Requested by Suppl 4 to GL 88-20 & IPEEE Results Reasonable Given FCS Design,Operation & History ML20205Q5831999-04-15015 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 190 to License DPR-40 ML20198S3771998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 189 to License DPR-40 ML20198S4831998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 188 to License DPR-40 ML20154M4881998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 186 to License DPR-40 ML20154N2411998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 187 to License DPR-40 ML20236V4891998-07-30030 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Relating to Response to GL 87-02,suppl 1 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 ML20248C0671998-05-21021 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Exemption from Technical Requirements of 10CFR50,App R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to 790101 ML20217L7201998-03-23023 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 185 to License DPR-40 ML20203M4161998-02-0303 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 184 to License DPR-40 ML20203A4291998-01-26026 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 183 to License DPR-40 ML20199L0711997-11-24024 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 182 to License DPR-40 ML20198Q4031997-10-28028 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Re Control Room Habitability Requirements ML20137L6241997-03-27027 March 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 181 to License DPR-40 ML20134N7751997-02-13013 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 180 to License DPR-40 ML20134M6171997-02-13013 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Request for Approval to Use ASME Section XI Code Case N-416-1 W/Proposed Exception & Code Case N-498-2 as Alternative to Required Hydrostatic Pressure Test ML20133P9161997-01-23023 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Revised Temperature Limits for DG-1 & DG-2 ML20133C2771996-12-30030 December 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 179 to License DPR-40 ML20132F4911996-12-0909 December 1996 Safety Evaluation Related to Individual Plant Evaluation Omaha Power District,Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 ML20134M0871996-11-19019 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request for Relief from Modifying Supports SIH-3,SIS-63,SIS-65 & RCH-13 at Fort Calhoun Station ML20129H3371996-10-25025 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 178 to License DPR-40 ML20128F6441996-10-0202 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 177 to License DPR-40 ML20129G3131996-09-27027 September 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 176 to License DPR-40 ML20059J1831994-01-14014 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 160 to License DPR-40 ML20059J2491994-01-14014 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 159 to License DPR-40 ML20058G9371993-12-0303 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 158 to License DPR-40 ML20058F5951993-11-22022 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 157 to License DPR-40 ML20058C7491993-11-18018 November 1993 Safety Evaluation,Authorizing Alternative,On One Time Basis Only,W/Conditions That Licensee Perform Volumetric Exam of nozzle-to-vessel Welds During First Refueling Outage of Third 10-yr Insp Interval ML20059L7081993-11-10010 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Changes to Low Power Physics Testing Program ML20059G6601993-10-29029 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 156 to License DPR-40 ML20057E3471993-10-0101 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Advising That Based on Determination That Alternative Testing Consistent w/OM-10,paragraph 4.3.2.2. Requirements,No Relief Required ML20056E5411993-08-12012 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 155 to License DPR-40 ML20056E5371993-08-10010 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 154 to License DPR-40 ML20056D6801993-07-26026 July 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 153 to License DPR-40 ML20128B8241993-01-26026 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 149 to License DPR-40 ML20128D4511992-11-30030 November 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting Evaluation of 120-day Response to Suppl 1 to GL 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 ML20062G6621990-11-19019 November 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 134 to License DPR-40 ML20216K0661990-11-14014 November 1990 Safety Evaluation Denying Util 900221 & 0622 Requests for Exemption from App R of 10CFR50 for Fire Area 34B,upper Electrical Penetration Room.Current Level of Fire Protection Does Not Meet Section III.G.2 Requirements ML20062B6161990-10-12012 October 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 133 to License DPR-40 ML20055G0221990-07-0606 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 132 to License DPR-40 ML20246A0741989-08-17017 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves ML20245H9031989-08-15015 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 1), Equipment Classification (Reactor Trip Sys Components). Licensee Program Meets Requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Ltr 83-28 & Acceptable ML20245K3481989-08-11011 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Electrical Isolation Devices for Interfacing Safety & Nonsafety Sys Re Implementation of ATWS Rule ML20247H6421989-07-24024 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Granting 890118 Request for Relief from Hydrostatic Testing Requirements of Section XI of ASME Code ML20248C0851989-06-0202 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 122 to License DPR-40 1999-09-02
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217B5401999-10-0606 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-40 ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data LIC-99-0096, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With ML20211J9321999-09-0202 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Proposed Alternatives Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety. Proposed Alternatives Authorized for Remainder of Third ten- Yr ISI Interval for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 LIC-99-0084, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station.With ML20216E6431999-08-26026 August 1999 Rev 19 to TDB-VI, COLR for FCS Unit 1 ML20210R1961999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1 ML20210G2181999-07-27027 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-40 ML20210D9951999-07-22022 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-40 ML20216E6361999-07-21021 July 1999 Rev 18 to TDB-VI, COLR for FCS Unit 1 ML20210R2081999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1 LIC-99-0065, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20210P5461999-06-0808 June 1999 Rev 0,Vols 1-5 of Fort Calhoun Station 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual, to Be Conducted on 990810. Pages 2-20 & 2-40 in Vol 2 & Page 4-1 in Vol 4 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20195B4581999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to CE NPSD-683, Development of RCS Pressure & Temp Limits Rept for Removal of P-T Limits & LTOP Requirements from Ts ML20207H7401999-05-31031 May 1999 Performance Indicators Rept for May 1999 LIC-99-0053, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 11999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 ML20195B4521999-05-17017 May 1999 Technical Data Book TDB-IX, RCS Pressure - Temp Limits Rept (Ptlr) ML20206L4241999-05-10010 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Corrective Actions to Ensure That Valves Are Capable of Performing Intended Safety Functions & OPPD Adequately Addressed Requested Actions Discussed in GL 95-07 ML20206M2601999-05-0606 May 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee IPEEE Complete Re Info Requested by Suppl 4 to GL 88-20 & IPEEE Results Reasonable Given FCS Design,Operation & History LIC-99-0047, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With ML20195E8621999-04-30030 April 1999 Performance Indicators, for Apr 1999 ML20205Q5831999-04-15015 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 190 to License DPR-40 ML20210J4331999-03-31031 March 1999 Changes,Tests, & Experiments Carried Out Without Prior Commission Approval for Period 981101-990331.With USAR Changes Other than Those Resulting from 10CFR50.59 ML20206G2641999-03-31031 March 1999 Performance Indicators Rept for Mar 1999 LIC-99-0034, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With ML20205J8181999-02-28028 February 1999 Performance Indicators, for Feb 1999 LIC-99-0025, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20207F3291999-01-31031 January 1999 FCS Performance Indicators for Jan 1999 ML20203B0991998-12-31031 December 1998 Performance Indicators for Dec 1998 LIC-99-0026, 1998 Omaha Public Power District Annual Rept. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Omaha Public Power District Annual Rept. with LIC-99-0003, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station.With ML20198S3771998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 189 to License DPR-40 ML20198S4831998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 188 to License DPR-40 ML20196G2251998-12-18018 December 1998 Rev 2 to EA-FC-90-082, Potential Over-Pressurization of Containment Penetration Piping Following Main Steam Line Break in Containment ML20198M3141998-11-30030 November 1998 Performance Indicators Rept for Nov 1998 LIC-98-0172, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With LIC-98-0160, Special Rept:On 981113,MSL RM RM-064 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage Past Isolation Valve HCV-922.Troubleshooting Has Indicated That Leakage Has Stopped & Cause of Leak Continues to Be Investigated1998-11-25025 November 1998 Special Rept:On 981113,MSL RM RM-064 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage Past Isolation Valve HCV-922.Troubleshooting Has Indicated That Leakage Has Stopped & Cause of Leak Continues to Be Investigated ML20203B0721998-11-16016 November 1998 Rev 6 to HI-92828, Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Storage Capacity Expansion ML20196E4981998-10-31031 October 1998 Performance Indicators Rept for Oct 1998 ML20196G2441998-10-31031 October 1998 Changes,Tests & Experiments Carried Out Without Prior Commission Approval. with USAR Changes Other than Those Resulting from 10CFR50.59 LIC-98-0154, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20154M4881998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 186 to License DPR-40 ML20154N2411998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 187 to License DPR-40 LIC-98-0136, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20155G4261998-09-30030 September 1998 Performance Indicators for Sept 1998 ML20154A1251998-08-31031 August 1998 Performance Indicators, Rept for Aug 1998 LIC-98-0122, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With ML20238F7231998-08-17017 August 1998 Owner'S Rept for Isis ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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, *4 UNITED STATES g- ]~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g WASHINGTON D.C. 3000H001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION REQUESTS FOR RELIEF ASSOCIATED WITH THIRD TEN-YEAR INSERVICE INSPECTION INTERVAL i OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT FORT CALHOUN STATION. UNIT NO.1 DOCKET NO, 50-285
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Technical Specifications (TS) for Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1, state that the inservice inspection of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1,2, and 3
- components shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Code) and applicable addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).
Section 50.55a(a)(3) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations states that attematives to the requirements of paragraph (g) may be used, when authorized by the NRC, if (i) the proposed altematives would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety, or (ii) compliance with the specified requirements would result in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4), ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components (including supports) shall meet the requirements, except the design and access provisions and the pre- 1 service examination requirements, set forth in ASME Code,Section XI, " Rules for Inservice 1 Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," to the extent practical within the limitations of design, geometry, and materials of construction of the components. The regulations require that inservice examination of components and system pressure tests conducted during the first ten-year interval and subsequent intervals comply with the requirements in the latest edition and addenda of Section XI of the ASME Code incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a(b) twelve months prior to the start of the 120-month interval, subject to the limitations and modifications listed therein. The applicable edition of Section XI of the ASME Code for Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1, for the third ten-year inservice inspection (ISI) interval is the 1989 Edition.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5), if the licensee determines that conformance with an examination requirement of Section XI of the ASME Code is not practical for its facility, information shall be submitted to the Commission in support of that determination and a request made for relief from the ASME Code requirement. After evaluation of the determination, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), the Commission may grant relief and may impose altemative requirements that are determined to be authorized by law, will not endanger life, !
J property, or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest, giving due consideration to the burden upon the licensee that could result if the requirements were i imposed. j 9909070067 990902 PDR ADOCK 05000285 G PDR 1
2.0 EVALUATION OF RELIEF REQUESTS By letter dated March 1,1999, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) submitted requests for relief related to the third inservice inspection (ISI) interval for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.
2.1 Reauest for Relief - ASME Class 1. 2. and 3 Bolted Connections in Systems Borated for the Purpose of CoiAvl lina Reactivity ASME Code,Section XI, IWA-5242(a) requires that insulation shall be removed from pressure-retaining bolted connections for VT-2 visual examination in systems borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i), the licensee has proposed the
- following alternative to the Code requirement to remove insulation at bolted connections for VT-2 examination during system pressure testing. The licensee stated:
"For ASME Class 1 systems that are borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity, a system inservice leakage test shall be performed in accordance with the frequency required in Table IWB 2500 without the removal of insulation from the bolted connections. The requirements for inservice leak tests shall be augmented with a minimum 4-hour hold time at normal system operating pressure prior to the VT-2 visual examination to allow for leakage propagation from the insulation. Additionally, the insulation shall be removed from insulated Class 1 bolted connections and a VT-2 examination shall be conducted, with the system depressurized. The frequency for these depressurized VT-2 inspections shall be in accordance with the system examination frequencies specified in Table IWB-2500, Category B-P (each refueling outage). The proposed attemative is consistent with the requirements of Code Case N-533 (Reference 7), which was approved for use at Fort Calhoun Station on September 18,1996 (Reference 8). These inspections shall be implemented through the application of the surveillance test program to assure they are performed within the prescribed time periods.
"For ASME Class 2 and 3 systems inside/outside of containment that are borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity, a system pressure test shall be performed in accordance with the frequency required in Table IWC-2500 or IWD-2500 as applicable, without the removal of insulation from the bolted connections. The requirements of system pressure tests shall be augmented with a 4-hour hold time at system normal operating pressure prior to the VT-2 examination to allow for leakage propagation from the insulation.
Additionally, the insulation shall be removed from insulated Class 2 and 3 bolted connections and a VT-2 examination shall be conducted at an increased frequency, with the system depressurized. VT-2 examinations on each component will be performed at a frequency of approximately 36-months to coincide with plant refueling outages, not allowing the period between inspections on individual components to exceed 45-months.
This increased frequency for individual components is more restrictive than the " periodic frequency" presctibed by ASME Section XI for Class 2 and 3 systems described in Table IWC-2500 or IWD-2500.
r - . . ._
"These inspections shall be implemented through the application of the surveillance test program to assure they are performed within the prescribed time period. Regardless of whether a component is scheduled for examination or not, any evidence of leakage from insulated or uninsulated components will result in evaluations for corrective measures in
, accordance with IWA-5250 (as modified for Fort Calhoun Station Unit No.1 by this submittal)."
The Code requires the removal of allinsulation from pressure-retaining bolted connections in systems borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity when performing VT-2 visual examinations during system pressure tests. As an attemative, the licensee has proposed to perform the VT-2 visual examination with the insulation in place after a minimum 4-hour hold time. In addition, the insulation will be removed for direct visual examination according to the frequency requirements (each refueling outage prior to start-up) specified in IWB-2500-1, Category B-P for Class 1, and at approximately 36 month intervals (which coincide with plant refueling outages) not allowing the period between inspections on individual components to exceed 45 months for Class 2 and 3 components.
The licensee's proposed attemative is essentially equivalent to Code Cad N-533, Attemative Requirements for VT-2 Visual Examination of Class 1 Insulated Pressure-Retaining Bolted Connections, Section X/, Division 1, except the proposed attemative was extended to address Code Class 2 and 3 bolted connections.
For Class 1 systems, the licensee's proposed attemative provides a thorough approach to ensuring the leak-tight integrity of systems borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity.
First, the 4-hour hold time allows any leakage to penetrate the insulation, thus provides a means of detecting any significant leakage with the insulation in place. Second, by removing the insulation each refueling outage for Class 1 components and at 36 month intervals for Class 2 and 3 components, the licensee will be able to detect minor leakage indicated by the presence of boric acid crystals or residue. This two-phase approach provides an acceptable level of quality and safety for bolted connections in borated systems. Therefore, the licensee's proposed attemative is authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i) for use on Class 1,2 and 3 systems for the remainder of the third 10-year ISI interval.
2.2 Reouest for Relief - Class 1. 2. and 3 Pressure Retainino Bolted Connections 1 ASME Code,Section XI, IWA-5250(a)(2) requires that if leakage occurs at a bolted connection in ASME Section XI components, the bolting shall be removed, VT-3 examined for corrosion, and evaluated in accordance with IWA-3100. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i), the licensee proposed to 'use attemative requirements regarding corrective actions for leakage at bolted connections in lieu of the examination requirements defined in IWA-5250(a)(2). The licensee stated:
"When leakage is identified at bolted connections by visual VT-2 examination, an evaluation will be performed to determine the susceptibility of the bolting to corrosion and assess the potential for failure. The evaluation will, at a minimum, consider the following factors:
i e
.. .; ~ . . , . - . _.-.-.-- -
- 1. bolting materials,
- 2. corrosiveness of process fluid leaking,
- 3. leakage location,
- 4. leakage history at connection,
- 5. visual evidence of corrosion at connection (connection assembled),
- 6. industry studies and history of similar bolting in similar environment, and
- 7. condition and leakage history of adjacent components.
"If any of the above parameters indicates the need for further evaluation, the bolt closest to the source of leakage will be removed, receive a VT-1 examination, and be evaluated in accordance with IWA-3100(a). If the leakage is identified when the bolted connection is in service, removal of the bolt for VT-1 examination may be deferred to the next refueling outage if the evaluation determines this is acceptable. When the removed bolt shows evidence of degradation, all remaining bolting shall be removed, VT-1 examined, and evaluated in accordance with IWA-3100(a). The additional examinations of IWB-2430 and IWC-2430 will not be performed unless the need is established by the above evaluation."
In accordance with IWA-5250(a)(2), if leakage occurs at a bolted connection, the botting must be removed, VT-3 visually examined for corrosion, and evaluated in accordance with IWA-3100. In lieu of this requirement, the licensee has proposed to evaluate the bolting to determine its susceptibility to corrosion. The proposed evaluation will consider, as a minimum, botting materials, the corrosive nature of the process fluid, the leakage location and history, the service age of the botting materials, visual evidence of corrosion at the assembled connection and plant / industry studies of similar bolting materials in similar environments.
Based on the items included in the evaluation process, the staff determined that the evaluation proposed by the licensee presents a sound engineering approach and provides an acceptable level of quality and safety. In addition, if the initial evaluation indicates the need for a more detailed analysis, the bolt nearest to the source of leakage will be removed, visually examined, and evaluated in accordance with IWA-3100(a). Therefore, the licensee's proposed attemative is authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i) for the remainder of the third 10-year ISI interval.
3.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and concludes that the licensee's proposed alternatives will provide an acceptable level of quality and safety. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i) the proposed attematives are authorized for the remainder of the third 10-year ISI interval.
Principal Contributor: S. Bailey Date: September 2,1999 l