ML20118A366
| ML20118A366 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1992 |
| From: | Gates W OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LIC-92-259S, NUDOCS 9209020003 | |
| Download: ML20118A366 (2) | |
Text
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Omaha Public Power District P.O. Box 399 Hwy. 75 - North of ft. Calhoun Fort Calhoun, NE 680234399 402/636-2000 August 25, 1992 LIC-92-2595 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Document Control Desk Mail Station: P1-137 Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
Docket No. 50-285 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
Special Report on Inoperabil uy of Fire Protection Equipment The Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), holder of Operating License DPR-40, submits this report pursuant to the requirements of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)
Unit No. 1, Technical Specification (TS) 2.19, " Fire Protection System."
Technical Specification 2.19(7) requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas shall be functional (intact).
With a penetration fire barrier non-functional, within one hour, either a continuous fire watch is to be established on at least one side of the affected aenetration, or the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of tie penetration is to be verified and an hourly fire watch patrol established. The non-functional penetration is to be restored to functional status within seven days, or a report is to be prepared and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to TS 5.9.3 within an additional 30 days.
On July 20, 1992, fire barrier penetration seals 81-E-7 and 81-E-8, located in the fire barrier between Room 81 and the Turbine Building, were found to have damaged boots and were declared inoperable. Aparopriace compensatory measures, as required by TS 2.19(7), were instituted at tie time the seals were determined to be inoperable, and remained in place until the seals were repaired.
The seals were repaired on August 13, 1992.
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'LIC-92-2595 Page Two On July 28, 1992, three fire barrier penetration seals, that are not included on fire barrier layout drawings or the fire barrier penetration schedule, were identified.in the fire barrier between Corridor 52 and the Tc:hnical Support Center. These seals were discovered inside wall mounted electrical panels, by Construction Management personnel pulling cable for an Engineering Change Notice.
These seals appear to be a commercially available fire-rated design, but they are not in accordance_with any of the a) proved typical penetration seal configurations used at the Fort Calioun Station, and it cannot be confirmed that they have been correctly maintained.- The penetration seals were conservatively declared inoperable and appropriate compensatory measures, as required by TS2.19(7),wereinstituted.
The compensatory measures will remain in place until the seals are replaced by seals with an approved configuration. Based on the schedule for preparation of an approved seal design and procurement of the required materials, the new seals are expected to be installed by November 30, 1992.
If you have any questions, please contact me.
L Sincerely,
}3 i
W. G. Gates Division Manager
. Nuclear Operations WGG:lah c:
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae J. L. Milhoan, F t _ional Administrator, Region IV
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D. Bloom, Act1ry /RC Project Manager R. P. Mullikin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector l
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