05000272/LER-1983-003, Forwards LER 83-003/04L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-003/04L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20079M588
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	02/16/1983
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20079M590	List: 05000272/LER-1983-003, Forwards LER 83-003/04L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8303030118
Download: ML20079M588 (4)

LER-2083-003, Forwards LER 83-003/04L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2722083003R00 - NRC Website

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O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station February 16, 1983 Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-003/04L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Environmental Technical Specifications, Section 5.6.2.1, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-003/04L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, H. J. Midura l General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks 4[

CC: Distribution Saa as8u'O 888$g S

I The Energy People pW

% 2189 (20A01181

Report Number: 83-003/04L Report Date: 02-09-83 Occurrence Date: 01-21-83 Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCHRRENCE:

Concurrent Shutdown of Salem Generating Station Units 1 and 2.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-017.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit 1 - Mode 5 - RX Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

Unit 2 - Mode 1 - RX Power 52 5 - Unit Load 520 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2028 hours0.0235 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.71654e-4 months <br />, January 21, 1983, a plant shutdown for refueling of Salem Generating Station Unit 2 was commenced. -The shutdown followed a normal power coastdown to 50% power and had been scheduled since early in the previous year, based on the desired level of fuel burnout and to provide a minimum four week period of operation following the Unit 1 refueling shutdown. Unanticipated problems with steam generator eddy current testing and service water piping to No. 12 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger delayed the Unit 1 restart for approximately 7 weeks. Due to the delay, an unintentional concurrent shutdown of both units occurred, resulting in possible thermal stress to the aquatic environment.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRER_GE:

The Unit 1 refueling was set back approximately 16 days when steam generator dams failed to perform satisfactorily. A further delay of 5 weeks involved the discovery of degradation of a number of welds in the Service Water System piping to No. 12 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger. Repair of the system prior to plant startup was necessary to meet safety requirements of the Technical Specifications. The weld degradation apparently involved corrosion of the weld materials in the service water environment.

The Unit 2 coastdown had been planned to separate the shutdowns of the two units. A safety analysis for extended fuel burnup of 16.8 MWD /MTM had been performed; calculation of burnup on January 21, 1983, revealed 16.73 MWD /MTM. Continued oper.ation would have resulted in l

LER 83-003/04L .

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) less conservative peaking factors, putting the core closer to thermal limits and necessitating further analysis. Unit 2 also had several equipmer.t problems which individually were not significant but which overall made continued operation less desirable from the standpoint of safety.

Finally, a number of 18 month surveillance requirements were coming due, several already requiring license changes for continued operation. Overall, timely surveillance of plant safety systems is important to insure that the systems are operable, and to insure no risk to the health and safety of the public is incurred.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Section 2.1.3.2 of the Environmental Technical Specifications (ETS) requires:

Both units shall not be intentionally shut down concurrently during the period of November through April.

The specification is not applicable if the shutdown is required to protect the health and safety of the public. The ETS limit is based on preventing " cold shock" to aquatic organisms of the Delaware River.

The phenomenon has been found to be most severe during the period of low ambient water temperatures. The potential for cold shock is minimized by maintaining one unit in operation.

As noted, the Unit 2 shutdown was necessitated by overall safe operating practice. Problems with Unit 1 were unexpected, and also required keeping the unit shutdown for safety. All reasonable efforts were made to prevent a concurrent shutdown, and the occurrence was not intentional. Since the event further involved protection of the health and safety of the public, no violation of the specification occurred. The ETS limits define adverse impact on the environment; since no limits were exceeded, no adverse impact was involved.

The occurrence constituted an unusual event that affects potential environmental impact from plant operation and that has high potential public interest. The incident is therefore reportable in accordance with ETS Section 5.6.2.1.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

All degraded welds on No. 12 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger were repaired utilizing improved materials. Due to additional delays, Unit 1 is still shutdown and is expected to return to operation on February 18, 1983. The Unit 2 refueling outage is underway and is scheduled to be completed May 10, 1983. Since all reasonable efforts were taken to

LER 83-003/04L .

CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd) prevent the occurrence, and since the problems involved were apparently isolated in nature, no corrective action was deemed.

necessary to prevent recurrence.

FAILURE DATA:

Problems with No. 12 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger are outlined in LER 82-091/01T.

Prepared By R. Frahm / ~

Gen'eral Manager -

SORC Meeting No. 89-15 I

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