ML023250196

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) Revision 34

ML023250196
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	11/08/2002
From:	Salas P Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
EPIP-1, Rev 34
Download: ML023250196 (54)

Text

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-2000 November 8, 2002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket -Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 - EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISION In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the following EPIP:

EPIP Revision Title EPIP-I 34 Emergency Plan Classification Matrix This letter is being sent in accordance with NRC RIS 2001-05.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please telephone me at (423) 843-7170 or J. D. Smith at (423) 843-6672.

.censing and Industry Affairs Manager Enclosure K

Pnnted on recycled paper

ENCLOSURE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)

UNITS 1 and 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 and 50-328 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Revision 34 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY: J. Randy Ford RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: Emergency Preparedness APPROVED BY: Dennis Koehl EFFECTIVE DATE: 11-01-2002 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE REVISION DESCRIPTION: INTENT REVISION: Uodate of Gaseous and Liauid EALs in Tab le 7-1.

I I

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 2 of 52 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides criteria to the Shift Manager (SM) or Site Emergency Director (SED) to be used in classifying and declaring an emergency based on plant conditions. The responsibility for declaring an emergency, based on the criteria in this procedure, belongs to the SM or SED, the designated Unit Supervisor when acting as the SM, or the TSC SED. This responsibility cannot be delegated.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Developmental Documents A. 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.

B. Reg Guide-1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NUMARC Nesp-007, Revision 2, 1/1992 Methodology For Development Of Emergency Action Levels.

KC. Sequoyah Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs),

Functional Restoration Guidelines (FRGs), Technical Instructions (TI),

Surveillance Instructions (SI), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are also referenced in Appendix B of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

D. Letter to Bruce A. Boger, Director of Inspection Program Management, USNRC, December 8, 2001 from Lynnette Hendricks, NEI, Recommended Actions in Response to a Site Specific Credible Threat at a Nuclear Power Plant (1A-01-1).

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this matrix is detected and declared. The REP is not activated based on a reporting of past conditions.

This procedure will be used in conjunction with the Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix B.

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 3 of 52 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

If the event is determined to be one of the four emergency classifications then implement one of the following procedures as applicable:

EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event EPIP-3 Alert EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency EPIP-5 General Emergency 3.2 The criteria in SQN EPIP-1 are given for reference: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM or SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at an appropriate classification for a particular set of circumstances. These criteria apply to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The SED must be aware of the affects of simultaneous events on both units.

3.3 If there is a reason to doubt if a given initiating condition has actually K..> occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications provided. Unless a suspected spurious or otherwise false alarm can be substantiated within an acceptable timeframe (based on potential severity of the event), the SM or SED is to proceed with actions as required by this procedure until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.4 Classification Determination 3.4.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the respective status free criteria that will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.3 Declare the highest emergency class based on events that are in progress at the time that the classification is made.

K-,

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 4 of 52 3.4.4 If, during an ongoing event, investigation shows that a higher classification was previously met, then report that, as information only, to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exit unless it is a noted exception (i.e., EAL 2.3).

3.4.5 If, following termination of an emergency declaration, investigation shows that a higher classification was met, then report that, as information only, to the ODS and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist.

3.4.6 If conditions have returned to a non-emergency state before any emergency can be classified, then the highest emergency class that was appropriate shall be reported, as information only, to the ODS and NRC and shall not be declared unless it is a noted exception (i.e., EAL 2.3).

3.4.7 The NRC shall be notified within one hour of all classifications. Once made and reported, a declaration cannot be canceled or rescinded even if it is later determined to be invalid. If there is reason to doubt that a given condition has occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications and proceed with classification, as required by this procedure, until otherwise proven false.

K.. 3.4.8 The State shall be notified by the ODS within 15 minutes of any declaration and notified, for information only, within one hour of any classification that was met but not declared as allowed above. If the State is notified of a declaration that is invalidated before the NRC is notified, terminate the classification, if not already done, and report the declaration to the NRC.

3.4.9 The ACCEPTABLE timeframe for notification to the ODS of an emergency declaration is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

4.0 RECORDS 4.1 QA Records None.

4.2 Non-QA Records None.

K-)

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 5 of 52 K-I INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier I SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT K-) 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 6 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 7 of 52 K-) DEFINITIONSIACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, which access is controlled.

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

RCS: The RCS pnmary side and its connections up to and including the EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including one or more of the Initiating conditions associated with the event exist Implicit the primary and secondary isolation valves.

in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

RED PATH: Monitonng of one or more CSFs by FR-C which indicates that the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressunzed or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more potentially damage permanent structures or equipment of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electncal load, (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force Safety Injection System Activation, (5) Thermal Power Oscillations Žt10%

"ILTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a

,n or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA The

\...._A'erator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressunzed STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations FIRE: Combustion charactenzed by heat and light Sources of smoke such as TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire skin contact (e g , chlorine, C0 2 , etc )

Observation of flame Is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) procedures are UNPLANNED HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the demands will be met by the site release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned IMMINENT: Within two hours. releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g , alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a discharge of incorrect tank).

reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

Classification.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern area without authorization. regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and blemishes (e g , paint chipping, scratches, etc) should NOT be included as methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and visible damage.

monitor alarmltnp setpoints VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains "ANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or

/*SF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

MODES 1,2,3,4 EPIP-1 SQN Rev 34 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Page 8 of 52 del..-' 1ad!-B6rr er-,... 2*R S .are.--

1. Critical Safety Functi )n Status 11. Critical Safety Function Status Potential LOSS i oPotential LOSS Core Cooling Red Core Cooling Orange Not Applicable. Pressurized Thermal (FR-C.1) (FR-C.2) Shock Red (FR-P.1).

OR OR Heat Sink Red (RHR SD Heat Sink Red (RHR SD cooling not in service) cooling not in service)

(FR-H.1). (FR-H.1).

-OR -OR

2. Primary Coolant Activity Level 2. RCS LeakagelLOCA I Potential LOSS o FPotential LOSS RCS sample activity is Not Applicable. RCS leak results in Non isolatable RCS leak greater than 300 ý.Ci/gm subcooling < 40 OF as exceeding the capacity of dose equivalent Iodine-131 indicated on XI-94-101 OR one charging pump in the 102 (EXOSENSOR). normal charging alignment.

-OR OR

3. Incore TCs Hi Quad Average Potential LOSS RCS Leakage Results in "I'reaterthan 1200 OF on Greater than or equal to Entry Into E-1.

?4-101 OR 102 700 OF on XI-94-101 or

.. OSENSOR). 102 (EXOSENSOR).

-OR

-OR

3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level

• ll*ý-1,,1-11 1 Potential LOSS o, Potential LOSS SGTR that results in a Not Applicable.

Not Applicable. VALID RVLIS level < 40% safety injection actuation.

on LI-68-368 or 371 with OR no RCP running.

Entry into E-3.

-OR

5. Containment Radiation Monitors Potential LOSS -OR VALID reading of Greater Not Applicable. 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level Than: - .Potential LOSS VALID RVLIS level < 40% Not Applicable.

2.8E + 01 Rem/hr On on LI-68-368 or 371 with RM-90-271 and 272. no RCP running.

OR 2 9E + 01 Rem/hr On RM-90-273 and 274.

-OR- -OR Site Emergency Director Judgment 5. Site Emergency Director Judgment nocondition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above. I indicates loss or potential loss of the RCS Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 9 of 52

),

-1:,Cotaimen Bard INSTRUCTIONS 1 1. Critical Safety Function Status NOTE: A condition is considered to be MET if, in the

ýLSS: Potential LOSS judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the Not Applicable. Containment Red condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within (FR-Z 1) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />). The classification shall be made as OR Actions of FR-C 1 (Red Path) soon as this determination is made.

are INEFFECTIVE (i.e.: core TC's trending up) 1. In the matrix to the left, REVIEW the Initiating Conditions in all three barrier columns and CIRCLE the Conditions that are Met

-OR

2. Containment Pressure/Hydrogen 2. In each of the three barriers columns, IDENTIFY if any SI-Potential LOSS Loss or Potential Loss Initiating Conditions have been Rapid unexplained pressure Containment hydrogen Met.

decrease following initial increases to > 4% by volume increase on Pdl-30-44 or 45 on H21-43-200 or 210. 3 COMPARE the number of barrier Losses and Potential I OR OR Losses to the Criteria below and make the appropriate Containment pressure or Pressure > 2 81 PSID (Phase declaration sump level not increasing on B) with no containment spray LI-63-178 or 179 with a LOCA operating when required NOTE: MONITOR the respective status tree criteriaif a CSF in progress. (FR-Z 1) is listed as an Initiating Condition

-OR-

3. Containment Isolation St Potential LOSS EMERGENCY CLASS CRITERIA L

t tainment isolation, when Not Applicable utred, is incomplete and a GENERAL EMERGENCY release path to the environment exists.

LOSS of any two barriers and Potential

-OR- LOSS of third barrier.

4. Containment Bypass 0 Potential LOSS Secondary side release Unexpected VALID increase in SITE AREA EMERGENCY outside containment from a area or ventilation RAD RUPTURED SIG that cannot monitors adjacent to LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two be terminated in < 15 minutes containment (with LOCA in (E-2 and E-3). progress) barriers.

OOR

> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> secondary side ALERT release outside containment from a SIG with a SIG tube Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad leak > T/S limits (AOP-R 01, barrier.

App A).

-OR-OR

5. Sianificant Radioactivity in Containment LOSS Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS LOSS Potential Potential LOSS barrier.

Not Applicable. VALID Reading of greater than:

3 6 E + 02 Rem/hr on RM-90-271 and RM-90-272.

OR UNUSUAL EVENT 2 8 E + 02 Rem/hr on v RM-90-273 and RM-90-274 LOSS or Potential LOSS of Containment

-OR- Barrier.

Kj/Site Emergency Director Judgment Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED. indicates loss or potential loss of the CNTMT Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above. I

MODES 1,2,3,4 EPIP-1 SQN Rev 34 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Page 10 of 52 K)

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK END OF SECTION 1.

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 11 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 1Z LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)

, Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

I EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 12 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site. equipment contained therein The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to CSFs, Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, which access is controlled Integnty (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition Is made that pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including one or rmore of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist Implicit the primary and secondary isolation valves in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in CSF(s) Is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressunzed or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more potentially damage permanent structures or equipment of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Tnp, (4)

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations >_10%

"ILTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a or feed line break) that results In an uncontrolled decrease in steam body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The

" ".erator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire. skin contact (e g , chlorine, C02, etc.)

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) procedures are UNPLANNED HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the demands will be met by the site. release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned IMMINENT: Within two hours. releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g , alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a discharge of incorrect tank) reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH. VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes Classification VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without INTRUSIONAINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected measurements, testing, or analysis Damage is sufficient to cause concern area without authorization. regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistenng. Surface Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and blemishes (e g , paint chipping, scratches, etc ) should NOT be included as methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and visible damage.

monitor alarm/trip setpoints VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains

"*ANGE PATH: Monitonng of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that equipment, systems, devices, or matenal which the failure, destruction, or SF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required. release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 13 of 52 11il tIdlilll I 4.-UIIUItlUII Mode Initiating I Condition Refer to "FissionProductBamerMatnx" (Section 1) and Not Appicable.

"RadiologicalEffluents" (Sectfon7) and Conftnue in This Column.

I ______

On either unit an inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT Not Applicable.

TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4):

1, 1 Loss of > 75% of MCR annunciators and the annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system indications 2, 2. Loss of Plant Computer.

3 Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:

3, Subcnticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory 4 4 SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress I On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of >75% MCR Not Applicable.

annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system indications for > 15 minutes with a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or plant 1, computer unavailable. (1 and 2 and 3):

1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% MCR annunciators and the annunciator printer for >15 minutes or > 75% of safety 2, system indications for > 15 minutes

2. SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is 3, required (> shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

3 (a orb)

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress 4 OR b Loss of plant computer.

-4 I On either unit an UNPLANNED loss > 75% MCR A. UNPLANNED loss of all in-plant communication U

annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75% of capability (land 2 and 3):

NNU safety system indications for > 15 minutes and plant U computer available. (1 and 2 and 3): 1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX phones S 1, A 2 UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones U 1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% of MCR annunciators L 3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios OR AS 44 2, and the annunciator printer for > 15 minutes or > 75% L B. UNPLANNED loss of all offsite communication of safety system indicators for > 15 minutes capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and 6):

2 SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is 3, required (> shift compliment) to safely operate the 1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX phones UU unit. 2. UNPLANNED loss of all radio frequencies V 3 UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system E 4 3 The plant computer is capable of displaying requested 4 UNPLANNED loss of all 1-FB-Bell lines data. 5 UNPLANNED loss of all NRC ENS and HPN phones 6 UNPLANNED loss of all satellite phones

-I

EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 14 of 52 1/2) moale initiating i .;onaition IM ;Reter e Initating / Condition Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID to lission ProductBamer Marnx (TSecrion 7) ana trip signals and loss of core cooling capability. Conbnue in This Column.

(I and 2):

I FR-S 1 entered and immediate operator actions did not result in a reactor power of

• 5% and decreasing I 2. (a or b) a CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red (FR-C.I).

OR

b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H 1)

Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID Refer to "FissionProductBamer Matrix"(Secbon 1) and auto and manual trip signals. Contnue in This Column.

1 NOTE: Although a mode change may occur before classificabonthis event wN sb7l be classifiedand declaredas SAE.

-9 Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID Refer to 'Fission ProductBamer Matnx" (Section 1) and auto trip signal but a manual trip from the Control Conbnue in This Column.

Room is successful. (1 or2)

1. Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing following auto trip signal 2, 2 Manual tnp in the Main Control Room successfully reduces reactor power < 5%.

NOTE: Although a mode change will occur this event will still be classified and declared as an ALERT.

-d Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" (Secton 1). Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to SQN Tech. Spec. 3.4.8):

1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a orb) 1, a Dose equivalent Iodine (1-131)

>0.35 p.Cigm for > 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or in 2$ excess of TIS Figure 3 4-1 with Tave > 500 *F.

3 OR

b. Specific activity> 100/t pCi/gm with Tave _> 500 *F.

EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 15 of 52

- k) moae initiating I tuonaition ModeInitiating / Condition Refer to 'Fission ProductBarrierMatnx" (Section 1) and Refer to 7'lsslon ProductbamerMatrix (S1ection 7) anra Continuein This Column. Continue in This Column.

-b Refer to 'FissionProductBamerMatnx"(Section 1) and Refer to 'Fission ProductBamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Contnue in This Column.

-I Refer to 'Fission ProductBamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Refer to "FissionProductBamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Continuein This Column.

-4 -4 RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage RCS Identified leakage > 25 GPM.

> 10 GPM.

1, 1, 1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech Spec) 1 Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined > 25 GPM as indicated by (a orb) by Tech Spec.) > 10 GPM as indicated by (a orb)*

2, 2, a. SI-OPS-068-137.0 results a SI-OPS-068-137.0 results OR 3, OR 3,

b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM into PRT, RCDT or b With RCS temperature and PZR level stable, the CVCS holdup tank VCT level on LI-62-129 or LI-62-130 is dropping 4 (Refer to TI-28) 4 at a rate > 10 GPM Refer to 'Shutdown Systems Degradation" Refer to 'Shutdown Systems Degradation" (Section 6.3)

(Section 6 3).

EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 16 of 52

2. Tubn Failur mocie initiating i uon on Mode Initiating / Condition Refer to 'Fission Product BamerMatrix"(Section 1) and Refer to 'Fission ProductBamer Matrx' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Continuein This Column.

Refer to 'Fission ProductBamerMatnx" (Section 1) and Refer to 'Fission ProductBamer Matix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Fission ProductBamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Turbine failure has generated projectiles that cause Continue in This Column. visible damage to any area containing safety related 1, equipment.

1. Turbine generated PROJECTILES have resulted in 2, VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following areas:

Control Building Diesel Generator Bldg 3 Auxiliary Building RWST Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station Unit #2 Containment Common Sta Ser. Xfmr's ERCW Pumping Station Condensate Storage Tanks Additional Equipment Bldgs

-. 9.

UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the main Turbine failure results in casing penetration or main steam system resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and generator seal damage.

1, safety injection initiation. (1 and 2):

1 Turbine failure which results in penetration of the

1. Rapid depressurization of any or all steam generators turbine casing or damage to main generator seals 2, or the main steam system to < 600 psig on 2, PI-1 -2A, 2B or 9A ,9B or 20A, 20B or 27A, 27B 3 2. Safety injection has initiated or is required 3 Refer to Hazardsand SED Judgement"(Section 43)

EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 17 of 52 de Not Applicable

- .9 Not Applicable

- I Not Applicable

-'I.

Safety Limits have been exceeded. (1 or 2):

1,1 1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature and RCS pressure > safety limit indicated by SQN Tech Spec Figure 2 1-1 'Reactor Core Safety Limit".

2, OR 2 RCS/Pressunzer pressure exceeds safety limit 3, (> 2735 psig) 1 4

EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 18 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK END OF SECTION 2.

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 19 of 52

,J' INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 3

HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT

• ) Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation "Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 20 of 52 DEFINITIONSIACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the secunty fence and to CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, which access is controlled Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit the primary and secondary Isolation valves in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required which the reactor licenses has the authonty to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more potentially damage permanent structures or equipment of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip, (4)

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 2_10%.

" ULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a m r feed line break) that results In an uncontrolled decrease in steam body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The

\,j erator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressunzed STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or slipping drive belts or overheated electncal components do not constitute a fire skin contact (e g , chlorine, CO 2 , etc.)

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed. UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) procedures are UNPLANNED HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the demands will be met by the site release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned IMMINENT: Within two hours releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g , alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a discharge of incorrect tank) reduction in the level of seventy of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from Identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH. VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Implicit in this definition Is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes Classification VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern area without authorization. regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface Specs that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitonng controls, and blemishes (e g , paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and visible damage.

monitor alarm/trip setpoints VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains

")RANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or CSF(s) is under severe challenge, prompt operator action is required release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

Mode Initiating I Condition Mode Initiating / Condition Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power Not Applicable.

to either unit. (l and 2):

1,

1. Both unit related 6 9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for > 15 minutes 2,

2. (a or b) a Core Cooling Status Tree Red or Orange Path.

3, OR

b. Restoration of either a 6.9 KV shutdown board or a 4 6 9 KV unit board is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the loss Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to either Not Applicable unit for> 15 Minutes.

1, 2,

1. Both unit related 6 9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for> 15 minutes 3,

4 Loss of offsite power to either unit with degraded 5, UNPLANNED loss of all offsite and all onsite AC onsite AC power for > 15 minutes. (Ia andb or 2):

1, 6, power to either unit for

> 15 minutes.

1a. All four (4) 6 9KV unit boards de-energized for > 15 D 1 Both unit related 6 9KV shutdown boards de-energized minutes for > 15 minutes.

2, E b One (1) unit related 6 9 KV shutdown board de F energized for > 15 minutes U

OR E

4 2. Any AC power condition lasting > 15 minutes where a L single additional failure will result in a unit blackout E Also Refer to "Lossof Shutdown Systems" (6.1) and D contnue in this column.

Loss of offsite power to either unit for > 15 minutes. 5, UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power to either unit (1 and 2):

6, for > 15 minutes. (1 and 2):

1 All four (4) 6 9KV unit boards de-energized for > 15 D 1. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for minutes > 15 minutes.

2, E 2 One (1) unit related 6 9KV shutdown board de 3, 2. Both unit related 6 9KV shutdown boards are energized for > 15 minutes U

energized E

4 L E

D

IvIuutI i

Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatnx" (Secbon 1) and "Loss of Communication" (2.2) and Conbnue in This Column Loss of all vital DC power for > 15 minutes.

1i 2, 1. Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V DC vital battery board buses I and IIand III and IVfor > 15 minutes.

3, 4 Also Refer to "FissionProductBramerMatrix" (Section 1),

"Lossof Communicabon' (2.2) and, "Lossof Instrumentahnn"(2 1) and Conhtnue in This Column

...................... END OF SECTION 3.1 Refer to "FissionProduct 3amer Matnx" (Secton 1),

"Loss of Communication" (22), and "Lossof Instrumentabon"(2.1) m i UNPLANNED loss of a reequired train of DC power for

> 15 minutes: (1 or 2).

on 125V dc vital battery board

1. Voltage< 105VDC 5, buses I and Ill for> 15 minutes OR 6

2. Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V dc vital battery board busses II and IV for > 15 minutes

- I IF

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 23 of 52 "U INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flaremable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.4 Toxicc Gas or Smoke 4.6 Security SExplosion Table 4-1 TablIe 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figuire 4-B Table 4-3 Figure 4-C 4

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2

) Figure 7-A

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 24 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS I

BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB integnty of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site equipment contained therein The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, which access is controlled Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition Is made that pressunzer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit the primary and secondary isolation valves in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities Including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more potentially damage permanent structures or equipment of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electncal load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip, (4)

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force. Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations Ž10%

'ILTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA The

\4erator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire. skin contact (e g , chlorine, C0 2 , etc.)

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > thai the LOWER mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the demands will be met by the site. release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned IMMINENT: Within two hours. releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g , alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a discharge of incorrect tank) reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes Classification.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern area without authorization. regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface Specs that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and blemishes (e g , paint chipping, scratches, etc) should NOT be included as methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offslte doses and visible damage monitor alarm/trip setpoints VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains

"%ANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or CSF(s) is under severe challenge, prompt operator action is required release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 25 of 52 4.2 plodsc ernxS Mode Initiating I Condition Mode Initiating I Condition Refer to 'Fission ProductBamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Refer to "FissionProduct Barrer Matnx' (Section 1)and Continue in This Column. Conbinue in This Column.

-4.

Refer to 'Control Room Evacuation,"(4 5) and Fission Refer to 'Fission Product BamerMatnx" (Section 1) and Product BamerMatrix"(Section 1) and Continuein This Continue in This Column.

Column.

-I -

• FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 affecting safety related equipment required to that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 and 2): establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 and 2):

A 1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1. A 1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1.

L L

2. (a or b) 2 (a orb)

L a VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or L a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures or to safety related equipment in the specified area is safety related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE. due to the EXPLOSION.

OR OR b Control room indication of degraded safety system b Control room indication of degraded safety system or component response due to the FIRE. or component response due to the EXPLOSION Refer to 'Secunty' (Section 4 6)

-q -I FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is AREA (Figure 4-A) resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of any permanent structure or equipment.

control room notification or verification of control room alarm A A L L L L Refer to 'Security" (Section 4 6)

.1.

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 26 of 52 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Containment Diesel Generator Building Unit #2 Containment Intake Pumping Station Auxiliary Building ERCW Pumping Station Control Building CSST's RWST Condensate Storage Tanks Additional Equipment Buildings Figure 4-A SEQUOYAH PROTECTED AREA I

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 27 of 52

-4.4 Toxi rex aI-dWi~ rg'i od initiating i uonaition Mode

- - Initiating / Condition Refer to 'Fission ProductBarrierMatnx*(Section 1) and Refer to '-Fssion ProductBramer Matrni (SeciOn 1) ana Contnue in This Column Conbnue in This Column.

-4 Referto 'Fission ProductBamerMatnx" (Secbon 1) and Refer to 'FissionProductBamer Matrix"(Secbon 1) and Continue in This Column. Conitnue in This Column.

-Y i

UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within a Release of TOXIC GAS or smoke within a facility facility structure containing safety related equipment structure which prohibits safe operation of systems or associated with safe operation of the plant. required to establish or maintain Cold SID.

(I and 2 and 3):

A 1. Plant personnel report the average of three (3) readings A 1 Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS or smoke within L taken inan -10 ft Tnangular Area is > 25% Lower L any building listed in Table 4-2 Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring 2 (a orb)

L instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2 L a. Plant personnel report severe adverse health reactions due to TOXIC GAS or smoke (i e, Refer to the MSDS for the LEL. burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness).

OR b Sampling indication > Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) 3 Plant personnel unable to perform actions to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.

Refer to the MSDS for the PEL.

-4 -4 A. UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within A. Safe operations impeded due to access the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY that may affect restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS or smoke normal operations. concentrations within a facility structure listed in Table 4-2.

1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in an -10 ft. Triangular Area is > 25% of the OR Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitonng A instrument within the EXCLUSION AREA A B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) officials that an offsite TOXIC GAS release has L OR L occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4 L B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State L C) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA officials that a large offsite FLAMMABLE GAS BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) in concentrations > the release has occurred within one (1) mile of the Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) causing a site site (Figure 4-C) with potential to enter the evacuation.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) in (Refer to the MSDS for the PEL) concentrations > 25% of Lower Explosive Limit.

(Refer to the MSDS for the LELQ

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 28 of 52

/ TABLE 4-2 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS OR SMOKE EALs Unit #1 Containment Diesel Generator Building Unit #2 Containment Intake Pumping Station Auxiliary Building CDWE Building Control Building ERCW Pumping Station Turbine Building Additional Equipment Buildings Figure 4-B SEQUOYAH EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 29 of 52

________ .1.

Security event resulting in loss of control of the plant.

1. Hostile armed force has taken control of the plant or control room or remote shutdown capacity.

A L

L

- I Security event has or is occurring which results in actual or likely failures of plant functions needed to protect the public.

1. VITAL AREA, other than the control room, has been penetrated by a hostile armed force I

A L

L Confirmed security event which indicates an actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant. (1 or2 or3):

A 1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA.

L OR L 2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A)

OR 3 PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) has been penetrated by a hostile armed force.

Confirmed security event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. (I or 2)

1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A).

A OR L

2 Security Shift Supervisor reports any of the events L listed in Table 4-3

- EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev t4 Page 30 of 52 moae Events are in process or have occurred which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY TABLE 4-3 A (Figure 4-B) SECURITY EVENT EXAMPLES L

L a. SABOTAGEIINTRUSION has occurred or is occurnng within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) b HOSTAGEIEXTORTION situation that threatens to interrupt plant operations Events are in process or have occurred which c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) and the Functions needed for the Protection of the Public. PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A)

Any releases are not expected to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action d Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED Guideline Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA which threatens to interrupt normal plant AREA BOUNDARY operations (judgement based on behavior of strikers A (Figure 4-B) and/or intelligence received)

L e. A credible site-specific security threat notification L

Events are in process or have occurred which involve an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels.

A L

L Events are in Process or have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety System occurs.

A L

L

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 31 of 52 Figure 4-C SEQUOYAH ONE MILE RADIUS

EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 32 of 52 fK THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK I END OF SECTION 4. I

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 33 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC

'AZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT U. Fire 4.3 Flam mable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.6 Security Table 4-1 TableB4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figurre 4-B Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 34 of 52 DEFINITIONSIACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting In damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site. equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to CSFs, Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, which access is controlled Integnty (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist Implicit the primary and secondary isolation valves in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event invoMng one or more potentially damage permanent structures or equipment. of the following, (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electncal load, (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

-EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force. Safety Injection System Activation, (5) Thermal Power Oscillations >10%.

kA ULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a

- team or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA The generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressunzed STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire skin contact (e g , chlorine, CO 2 , etc )

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL). procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the demands will be met by the site release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned IMMINENT: Within two hours. releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a discharge of incorrect tank) reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH. VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes Classification.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected measurements, testing, or analysis Damage is sufficient to cause concern area without authorization. regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface Specs that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and blemishes (e g , paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and visible damage monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains KJANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or

\ CS F(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 35 of 52 5.2 Tornýdo de Initiating I Condition Mode Initiating I Condition Refer to 'FissionProduct BamerMatnx" Refer to "FissionProductBamer Matnx*

(Section 1) and Continuein This Column. (Section 1) and Conbnue in This Column.

-4. -4 Refer to 'Fission ProductBamer Matnx" Refer to *FissionProductBamerMatrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

- * -4 Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation. Tornado or high winds strikes any structure listed in (l and 2): Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE. (1 and 2):

1. Panel XA-55-15B alarm window 30 (E-2) plus window 1. Tornado or high winds (sustained >80 m p h > one 22 (D-1) activated minute on the plant computer) strikes any structure A A listed in Table 5-1.

L 2. (a orb) L 2 (a orb)

L a Ground motion sensed by plant personnel L a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE OR OR

b. National Earthquake Information Center at b Control room indications of degraded safety 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event. system or component response due to event Note: NationalWeather Service Morristown 1-(423)-586-8400, can prowde addibonalinfo.

Earthquake detected by site seismic instruments.

-p Earthquake detected by site seismic instruments. Tornado within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

(I and 2):

1. Panel XA-55-15B alarm window 22 (D-1) activated 1. Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted A A within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY 2 (a orb) (Figure 5-A)

L a Ground motion sensed by plant personnel L L OR L

b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event

-I -i

EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 36 of 52 TABLE 5-1 Plant Structure Associated With Tornado/High Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit #1 Containment Auxliary Building Unit #2 Containment Diesel Generator Bldg Control Building ERCW Pumping Station Intake Pumping Station Turbine Building CDWE Building Common Station Service Transformer's RWST Condensate Storage Tanks Additional Equipment Bldgs

EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 37 of 52

5. Rie - Lee UkO IIIIlldIll y I %.UIIUiILU1I Mode Initiating I Condition Refer to "FissionProductBarrer Matnx" (Section 1) and Conbnue in This Column (Section 1)and Continue in This Column Refer to 'Fission ProductBamer Matnx" Refer to 'FissionProductBamer Matrx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. (Secbon 1) and Continuein This Column.

River reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning as River reservoir level is < 670 Feet as reported by reported by River Operations. River Operations.

A A L L L L River reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning as River reservoir level is < 673 Feet as reported by reported by River Operations. River Operations.

A A L L L L

EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 38 of 52 MVULIu i

Refer to "FissionProductBamerMatrix" (Sect'on 1) and Contnue in This Column.

Refer to 'FissionProductBamer Matnx" (Secbon 1) and Continuein This Column Refer to 'Fission ProductBamer Matnx" (Secton 1) and Contnue in This Column.

Watercraft strikes the ERCW pumping station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). (1 and 2):

1. Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck the ERCW pumping station A 2. (a orb)

L a. ERCW supply header pressure Train A 1(2)-PI-67-493A is < 15 psig OR b ERCW supply header pressure Train B 1(2)-PI-67-488A is < 15 psig

EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 39 of 52 Figure 5-A SEQUOYAH EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 40 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK I END OF SECTION 5

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 41 of 52 1-)-INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5- RCS Unidentified Leakage LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation Y-/i2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 42 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site. equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, which access is controlled.

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

RCS: The RCS primary side and Its connections up to and including the EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit the primary and secondary isolation valves in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes RED PATH: Monitonring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required.

which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of pnmary to secondary leakage Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more potentially damage permanent structures or equipment of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

-XTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force. Safety Injection System Activation, (5) Thermal Power Oscillations ;Ž10%.

(*)ULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a eam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA The generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire skin contact (e g , chlorine, CO 2 , etc)

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed. UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the demands will be met by the site release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned IMMINENT: Within two hours releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g , alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a discharge of incorrect tank) reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes Classification VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern area without authorization. regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface Specs that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc ) should NOT be included as methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and visible damage monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains k>AeNGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or X 1eCSF(s) is under severe challenge, prompt operator action is required release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 SQN SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 43 of 52 Mode Initiating / Condition a%utIipplJILUdu

-4 Complete loss of function needed to achieve or Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain hot shutdown. (1 and 2a or 2b):

1,

1. Hot shutdown required.

2a CSF status tree indicated Core Cooling Red (FR-C 1).

2, OR 3, 2b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H 1)

(RHR shutdown cooling not in service).

4 Note: Refer to 'Reactor ProtecbonSystem Failure" (Section 2 3) and Continue in This Column.

Complete loss of function needed to achieve cold shutdown when cold shutdown required by Tech.

1, Specs. (land2and3):

1. Cold shutdown required by Tech Specs.

2, 2. Loss of RHR shutdown cooling capability 3 Loss of secondary heat sink and main condenser 3,

4 Note, Also refer to 'Faf7ure of Rx Protection"(Section 2.3) and Conbnue in This Column Inability to reach required shutdown within Tech.

Spec. limits.

1. The unit has not been placed in the required mode within the time prescribed by the LCO action 2, statement.

3, 4

EPIP-1 SQN SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 1*4 Page 44 of 52 3

ode Referto 'Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents"(Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.

I END OF SECTION 6 1 Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column Loss of REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM inventory with inadequate makeup. (I and 2 and 3):

1. Reactor coolant system is pressurized above atmospheric pressure

2. Unplanned decrease in RCS or pressurizer level requiring initiation of makeup to the RCS

3. With reactor coolant system temperature stable, the pressurizer level continues to decrease following initiation of RCS makeup

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 45 of 52

._I INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation

• ._ Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A I

7

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 46 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to CSFs, Subcnticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, which access is controlled Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

RCS: The RCS pnmary side and its connections up to and including the EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit the primary and secondary isolation valves in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

which the reactor licenses has the authonty to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more potentially damage permanent structures or equipment of the following- (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip, (4)

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force. Safety Injection System Activation, (5) Thermal Power Oscillations >10%

( ULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a

.feam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire. skin contact (e g , chlonne, CO 2 , etc.)

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed. UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL). procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the demands will be met by the site release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned IMMINENT: Within two hours releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g , alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a discharge of incorrect tank) reduction In the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from Identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an Instrument channel check, or (2) indication on INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or related or redundant Indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes Classification.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected measurements, testing, or analysis Damage is sufficient to cause concern area without authorization regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage Includes deformation due to heat or ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitonng controls, and blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, scratches, etc ) should NOT be included as methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and visible damage.

monitor alarm/trip setpoints.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains RJANGE PATH: Monitonng of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that Sequipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or

\,_-.die CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

I EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 34 Page 47 of 52

7. Liui Eflens.

6VIVU. 111tidli~.it1ay I %.U11UILIU1i Mode Initiating I Condition EAB dose, resulting from an actual or imminent release of Not App/icable.

gaseous radioactivity > 1 Rem TEDE or > 5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of release. (1 or2 or3):

A 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General Emergency in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within L that 15 minutes confirms that the cntenon is not exceeded L OR

2. Field surveys indicate >1 Rem/hr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3

3 9E-06 pCLcm at the EAB (Fig. 7-A)

A qJ OR

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >1 Rem TEDE or >5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Fig* 7-A)

-4 EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Not Applicable gaseous radioactivity >100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem thyroid CDE for actual or projected duration of release. (1 or 2 or 3):

1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Site Area for A > 15 minutes, unless assessment within that 15 minutes confirms L that the critenon is not exceeded.

R OR L 2. Field surveys indicate >100 mrem/hr 3 gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3 9E-07 pCi/cm at the EAB (Fig 7-A)

OR 3 Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >100 mrem TEDE or

>500 mrem thyroid CDE for actual or projected duration of the release (Fig 7-A)

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds IAny UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity 200 times the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit for >15 minutes. that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Section 1.2.1.1 (1 or 2 or 3 or 4) Limit for

>15 minutes. (1 or2)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Alert for >15 A minutes, unless assessment within that 15 minutes confirms that the A 1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Alert for >15 minutes, unless assessment L cnterion is not exceeded OR L within this time period confirms that the criterion is L 2. Field surveys indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma at the EAB for >15 L not exceeded minutes (Fig 7-A). OR OR 3 Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >10 mrem TEDE for the 2. Sample results indicate an ECL >200 times the duration of the release (Fig 7-A). ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of OR liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration 4 Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of gaseous radioactivity >15 minutes in duration.

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 2 Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity times the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit for >60 minutes. to the environment that exceeds 2 times the (1 or 2 or 3 or 4) ODCM Section 1.2.1.1 Limit for >60 minutes.

(I or2)

1. A VAUD rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under UE for >60 A minutes, unless assessment within that 60 minutes confirms that the A 1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under UE for >60 minutes, unless assessment L criterion is not exceeded. OR L within this time period confirms that the criterion is L not exceeded L 2 Field surveys indicate >0.1 mrem/hr gamma at the EAB for >60 minutes (Fig 7-A)

OR OR

3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >0 1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Fig 7-A). 2. Sample results indicate an ECL >2 times the OR ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of

4. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration.

unmonitored release of gaseous radioactivity >60 minutes in duration

EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 34 Page 48 of 52 TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS NOTE. The monitor values below, if met or exceeded, indicate the need to perform the required assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the appropriate emergency classification shall be made based on the VALID reading GASEOUS MONITORS Units(2) UE Alert SAE General Emer Site Total Release Limit jiCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31E+09 U-1 Shield Building 1-RI-90-400 (EFF jLCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31 E+09 LEVEL)

U-2 Shield Building 2-RI-90-400 (EFF piCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31 E+08 1.31 E+09 LEVEL)

Auxiliary Building O-RM-90-101B Limit cpm 1.03E+05 Offscale(1 ) Offscale() Offscale(*)

1 Service Building O-RM-90-132B Limit cpm 2.62E+06 Offscale(*) Offscalef ) Offscale(*'

U-1 Main Steam Line Monitors(2) +/-Ci/cc 1.71 E-01 1.71 E+01 4.58E+01 4.58E+02 1-RI-90-421 thru 424 U-2 Main Steam Line MonitorsfZ) pCi/cc 1.71 E-01 1.71 E+01 4.58E+01 4.58E+02 2-RI-90-421 thru 424 U-1 CondenserVac Exh mR/h 4.1 0E+02 4.10E+04 1.09E+05 1.09E+06 "1-RM-90-255 or 256 Limit U-2 CondenserVac Exh mR/h 4.1OE+02 4.10E+04 1.09E+05 1.09E+06 2-RM-90-255 or 256 Limit RELEASE DURATION minutes >60 >15 >15 >15 LIQUID MONITORS Units UE Alert Site Area General Emer Site Total Release Limit  ;.Ci/ml 6.50E-03 6.50E-01 N/A N/A 1

RM-90-122-RadWaste cpm 1.45E+06 Offscale( ) N/A N/A RM-90-120,121-S/G Bldn cpm 1.07E+06 Offscale(l) N/A N/A RM-90-225-Cond Demin cpm 1.90E+06 Offscale(l) N/A N/A RM-90-212-TB Sump cpm 2.33E+04 2.33E+06 N/A N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes >60 >15 >15 >15 ASSESSMENT METHODS* + Airbome Dose Assessment per SQN EPIP-13 'Dose Assessment"

" ODCM Uquid Release Rate assessment per SQN 0-TI-CEM-030.030 0

"* Integrated Airborne Release Rate assessment per SON 0-TI-CEM-030.030 0 (1) The calculated value is outside of the upper range for this detector. The maximum monitor output which can be read is 100E+07 cpm. Releases in excess of monitor capacity should be evaluated for proper classification by use of Dose Assessment.

(2) These unit values are based on flow rates through one PORV of 890,000 lb/hr at 10787 psia with 0 25% carry over (0 9975 quality). Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing, (e g , PORV)

NOTE 1: These EALs are based on the assumption that an emergency release is restricted to one pathway from the plant. In all cases, the total site EAL is the limiting value Therefore, in the case where there are multiple release paths from the plant, it is the total release EAL (obtained from ICS and/or SQN 0-TI-CEM-030-030, "Manual Calculation of Plant Gas, Iodine, and Particulate Release Rates for Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Compliance"TI-30) that will determine whether an emergency classification is warranted.

"-OTE2: In the case when there is no CECC dose assessment available, the length and relative magnitude of the release is the key in determining the classification For example, in the case of the NOUE EAL of 2 times the Tech Spec limit, the classification is based more on the fact that a release above the limit has continued unabated for more than 60 minutes, than on the projected offsite dose NOTE 3 See REP Appendix B for basis information I

EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 34 Page 49 of 52 Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 34 Page 50 of 52 I Initiating I Condition Mode Initiating I Condition i

Refer to "FissionProductBamerMatnx" Refer to "GaseousEffluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue (Section 1) or 'Gaseous Effluents" (Secton 7.1) and in This Section.

Continue in This Secbon.

-I.

Referto 'Fission ProductBamerMatnx" Refer to "GaseousEffluents" (Secbon 7.1) and Contnue (Secton 1) or "GaseousEffluents" (Section 7.1) and in This Section Continue in This Section.

UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level facility that impedes safe operations or that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the establishment or maintenance of cold shutdown. reactor vessel. (1 and 2):

(I or 2):

1. VALID alarm on RM-90-1 01 or RM-90-102 or A 1. VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results A RM-90-103 or RM-90-130/131 or RM-90-112 exceed 15 mrem/hr in the control room or SAS. AND L OR L 2 (aorb)

L 2. (a and b) L a Plant personnel report damage to irradiated fuel

a. VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed sufficient to rupture fuel rods values listed in Table 7-2.

OR b Access restrictions impede operation of systems b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will necessary for safe operation or the ability to exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel establish cold shutdown (See Note Below) will be uncovered in the spent fuel pool or transfer

-4 canal UNPLANNED increase in radiation levels within the UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or facility. reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered. (I and 2 and 3):

1. A VALID area radiation monitor reading increases by 1000 mrem/hr over the highest reading in the past 24 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel A hours excluding the current peak value A pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal L Note: In either the UE orALERT EAL, the SED must L 2 VALID alarm on RM-90-101 or RM-90-102 or L determine the cause of increase in radiation L RM-90-103 levels and review other inibabng conditions for applicability(e g, a dose rate of 15 mrem/hr in the 3 Fuel remains covered with water controlroom could be caused by a release associatedwith a DBA)

EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 34 Page 51 of 52 Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS Location Meter Monitor No. Area and Elevation Reading I t-r n~urnoses of comnarina the mnete.r/mo~nitor ren*dino v~qhie.* to* this* tnhle, it rn he R..Hn#.md that mR i.* en.uih'le~nt to mrem 1,2-RM-90-1 Spent Fuel Pit ARM El. 734.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-3 Waste Packaging ARM El. 706.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-4 Decontamination 1.5E+03 mR/hr Room ARM El. 690.0 0-RM-90-5 SFP Pumps ARM El. 714.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-6 CCS HXS ARM El. 714.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-7 Sample Rm ARM El. 690.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-8 AFW Pumps ARM El. 690.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-9 Waste Cnds Tks ARM El. 669.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-1 0 CVCS Bd ARM El. 669.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-11 Cntmt Spray and 1.5E+03 mR/hr RHR Pumps Radmon El. 653.0 0-RM-90-102 Spent Fuel Pit 1.5E+03 mR/hr Radmon El. 734.0 0-RM-90-103 Spent Fuel Pit 1.5E+03 mR/hr Radmon El. 734.0 0-RM-90-230 CNDS Demineralizer 1.5E+03 mR/hr ARM El. 685.0 0-RM-90-231 Cnds Demineralizer 1.5E+03 mR/hr ARM El. 706.0 I Note: All of the above monitors have a range of 0.1 to IE+4 mrem/hr. I END OF SECTION 7.

A

EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 34 Page 52 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK