ML23319A245
| ML23319A245 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar, Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/2024 |
| From: | Perry Buckberg NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL2-2 |
| To: | Jim Barstow Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| EPID L-2023-LLA-0106 | |
| Download: ML23319A245 (51) | |
Text
January 31, 2024 Mr. James Barstow Vice President, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs and Support Services Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 4A-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2; WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 366 AND 360; 164 AND 71 REGARDING THE ADOPTION OF TSTF-567, REVISION 1, ADD CONTAINMENT SUMP TS TO ADDRESS GSI-191 ISSUES (EPID L-2023-LLA-0106)
Dear Mr. Barstow:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 366 and 360 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79, for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Units 1 and 2, respectively; and Amendment Nos. 164 and 71 to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-90 and NPF-96 for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to each Plants Technical Specification (TSs) in response to the Tennessee Valley Authority application dated August 2, 2023, as supplemented by letter dated September 20, 2023 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML23214A385 and ML23264A006, respectively).
The amendments revise the TSs to adopt Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF)
Traveler TSTF-567, Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI [Generic Safety Issue]-191 Issues (ML17214A813), which is an approved change to the Standard Technical Specifications, into the SQN and WBN TSs.
J. Barstow A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Perry H. Buckberg, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-327, 50-328, 50-390, and 50-391
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 366 to DPR-77
- 2. Amendment No. 360 to DPR-79
- 3. Amendment No. 164 to NPF-90
- 4. Amendment No. 71 to NPF-96
- 5. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-327 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 366 Renewed License No. DPR-77 1.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated August 2, 2023, as supplemented on September 20, 2023, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 366 are hereby incorporated into the renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION David J. Wrona, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Renewed Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: January 31, 2024 David J.
Wrona Digitally signed by David J. Wrona Date: 2024.01.31 15:24:06 -05'00'
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 366 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77 DOCKET NO. 50-327 Replace page 3 of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 with the attached page 3.
The revised page 3 is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.
Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Insert 3.5.2-3 3.5.2-3 3.5.3-2 3.5.3-2 3.6.16-1 3.6.16-2 Amendment No. 366 Renewed License No. DPR-77 (3)
Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (4)
Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (5)
Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the Sequoyah and Watts Bar Unit 1 Nuclear Plants.
C.
This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
(1)
Maximum Power Level The Tennessee Valley Authority is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3455 megawatts thermal.
(2)
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 366 are hereby incorporated into the renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
(3)
Initial Test Program The Tennessee Valley Authority shall conduct the post-fuel-loading initial test program (set forth in Section 14 of Tennessee Valley Authoritys Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended), without making any major modifications of this program unless modifications have been identified and have received prior NRC approval. Major modifications are defined as:
a.
Elimination of any test identified in Section 14 of TVAs Final Safety Analysis Report as amended as being essential; b.
Modification of test objectives, methods, or acceptance criteria for any test identified in Section 14 of TVAs Final Safety Analysis Report as amended as being essential;
ECCS - Operating 3.5.2 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3.5.2-3 Amendment 334,
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.7 Verify, for each ECCS throttle valve listed below, each mechanical stop is in the correct position.
Charging Pump Injection Throttle Valves Safety Injection Cold Leg Throttle Valves Safety Injection Hot Leg Throttle Valves63-582 63-550 63-542 63-583 63-552 63-544 63-584 63-554 63-546 63-585 63-556 63-548 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
ECCS - Shutdown 3.5.3 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3.5.3-2 Amendment 334,
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1 The following SRs are applicable for all equipment required to be OPERABLE:
SR 3.5.2.3 SR 3.5.2.7 SR 3.5.2.4 In accordance with applicable SRs
Containment Sump 3.6.16 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3.6.16-1 Amendment
3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.16 Containment Sump LCO 3.6.16 The containment sump shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment sump inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits.
A.1 Initiate action to mitigate containment accident generated and transported debris.
AND A.2 Perform SR 3.4.13.1.
AND A.3 Restore the containment sump to OPERABLE status.
Immediately Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 90 days
Containment Sump 3.6.16 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3.6.16-2 Amendment
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Containment sump inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.
B.1
NOTES--------------
- 1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, and LCO 3.5.3, ECCS -
Shutdown, for emergency core cooling trains made inoperable by the containment sump.
- 2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, for containment spray trains made inoperable by the containment sump.
Restore the containment sump to OPERABLE status.
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.
C.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND C.2 Be in MODE 5.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.16.1 Verify by visual inspection, the containment sump does not show structural damage, abnormal corrosion, or debris blockage.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 360 Renewed License No. DPR-79 1.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated August 2, 2023, as supplemented on September 20, 2023, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 360 are hereby incorporated into the renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION David J. Wrona, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Renewed Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: January 31, 2024 David J.
Wrona Digitally signed by David J. Wrona Date: 2024.01.31 15:25:00 -05'00'
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 360 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79 DOCKET NO. 50-328 Replace page 3 of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR 79 with the attached page 3.
The revised page 3 is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.
Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Insert 3.5.2-3 3.5.2-3 3.5.3-2 3.5.3-2 3.6.16-1 3.6.16-2 Amendment No. 360 Renewed License No. DPR-79 (3)
Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (4)
Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (5)
Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the Sequoyah and Watts Bar Unit 1 Nuclear Plants.
C.
This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
(1)
Maximum Power Level The Tennessee Valley Authority is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3455 megawatts thermal.
(2)
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 360 are hereby incorporated into the renewed license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
(3)
Initial Test Program The Tennessee Valley Authority shall conduct the post-fuel-loading initial test program (set forth in Section 14 of Tennessee Valley Authoritys Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended), without making any major modifications of this program unless modifications have been identified and have received prior NRC approval. Major modifications are defined as:
a.
Elimination of any test identified in Section 14 of TVAs Final Safety Analysis Report as amended as being essential;
ECCS - Operating 3.5.2 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3.5.2-3 Amendment 327
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.7 Verify, for each ECCS throttle valve listed below, each mechanical stop is in the correct position.
Charging Pump Injection Throttle Valves Safety Injection Cold Leg Throttle Valves Safety Injection Hot Leg Throttle Valves63-582 63-550 63-542 63-583 63-552 63-544 63-584 63-554 63-546 63-585 63-556 63-548 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
ECCS - Shutdown 3.5.3 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3.5.3-2 Amendment 327,
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1 The following SRs are applicable for all equipment required to be OPERABLE:
SR 3.5.2.3 SR 3.5.2.7 SR 3.5.2.4 In accordance with applicable SRs
Containment Sump 3.6.16 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3.6.16-1 Amendment
3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.16 Containment Sump LCO 3.6.16 The containment sump shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment sump inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits.
A.1 Initiate action to mitigate containment accident generated and transported debris.
AND A.2 Perform SR 3.4.13.1.
AND A.3 Restore the containment sump to OPERABLE status.
Immediately Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 90 days
Containment Sump 3.6.16 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3.6.16-2 Amendment
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Containment sump inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.
B.1
NOTES--------------
- 1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, and LCO 3.5.3, ECCS -
Shutdown, for emergency core cooling trains made inoperable by the containment sump.
- 2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, for containment spray trains made inoperable by the containment sump.
Restore the containment sump to OPERABLE status.
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.
C.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND C.2 Be in MODE 5.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.16.1 Verify by visual inspection, the containment sump does not show structural damage, abnormal corrosion, or debris blockage.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-390 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 164 License No. NPF-90 1.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) dated August 2, 2023, as supplemented on September 20, 2023, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 164 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION David J. Wrona, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: January 31, 2024 David J.
Wrona Digitally signed by David J. Wrona Date: 2024.01.31 15:26:00 -05'00'
ATTACHMENT TO AMENDMENT NO. 164 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90 DOCKET NO. 50-390 Replace page 3 of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 with the attached page 3.
The revised page 3 is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.
Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Insert 3.5-6 3.5-6 3.5-8 3.5-8 3.6-42 3.6-43 3.6-44 5.0-24 5.0-24 Facility License No. NPF-90 Amendment No. 164 (4)
TVA, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required, any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis, instrument calibration, or other activity associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (5)
TVA, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.
C.
This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect, and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below.
(1)
Maximum Power Level TVA is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3459 megawatts thermal.
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 164 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
(3)
Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) (Section 18.2 of SER Supplements 5 and 15)
Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, TVA shall accomplish the necessary activities, provide acceptable responses, and implement all proposed corrective actions related to having the Watts Bar Unit 1 SPDS operational.
(4)
Vehicle Bomb Control Program (Section 13.6.9 of SSER 20)
During the period of the exemption granted in paragraph 2.D.(3) of this license, in implementing the power ascension phase of the approved initial test program, TVA shall not exceed 50% power until the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) and (8) are fully implemented. TVA shall submit a letter under oath or affirmation when the requirements of 73.55(c)(7) and (8) have been fully implemented.
ECCS - Operating 3.5.2 Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.5-6 Amendment 132,
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.6 Verify each ECCS pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.7 Verify for each ECCS throttle valve listed below, each position stop is in the correct position.
Valve Number CCP Discharge SI Cold Leg SI Hot Leg Throttle Throttle Throttle Valves Valves Valves63-582 63-550 63-542 63-583 63-552 63-544 63-584 63-554 63-546 63-585 63-556 63-548 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
ECCS - Shutdown 3.5.3 Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.5-8 Amendment
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not met.
C.1 Be in MODE 5.
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1
NOTE-------------------------------
An RHR train may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned to the ECCS mode of operation.
The following SRs are applicable for all equipment required to be OPERABLE:
SR 3.5.2.1 SR 3.5.2.7 SR 3.5.2.3 SR 3.5.2.4 In accordance with applicable SRs
Containment Sump 3.6.16 Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.6-42 Amendment
3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.16 Containment Sump LCO 3.6.16 The containment sump shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
Containment sump inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits.
A.1 Initiate action to mitigate containment accident generated and transported debris.
AND A.2 Perform SR 3.4.13.1.
AND A.3 Restore the containment sump to OPERABLE status.
Immediately Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 90 days (continued)
Containment Sump 3.6.16 Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.6-43 Amendment
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.
Containment sump inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.
B.1
NOTES -------------
1.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, and LCO 3.5.3, ECCS -
Shutdown, for emergency core cooling trains made inoperable by the containment sump.
2.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, for containment spray trains made inoperable by the containment sump.
Restore the containment sump to OPERABLE status.
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> C.
Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.
C.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND C.2 Be in MODE 5.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours
Containment Sump 3.6.16 Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.6-44 Amendment
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.16.1 Verify by visual inspection, the containment sump does not show structural damage, abnormal corrosion, or debris blockage.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
Procedures, Programs, and Manuals 5.7 (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 5.0-24 Amendment 5, 63, 135, 149,
5.7 Procedures, Programs, and Manuals 5.7.2.18 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)
A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:
a.
A required system redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or b.
A required system redundant to the system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or c.
A required system redundant to the support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.
The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. When a loss of safety function is caused by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions to enter are those of the support system.
5.7.2.19 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J," Revision 3-A, July 2012, and Section 4.1, "Limitations and Conditions for NEI TR 94-01, Revision 2," of the NRC Safety Evaluation Report in NEI 94-01, Revision 2-A, dated October 2008, as modified below:
For containment leakage rate testing purposes, a value of 15.0 psig, which is equivalent to the maximum allowable internal containment pressure, is utilized for Pa to bound a range of peak calculated containment internal pressures from 9.0 to 15.0 psig for the design basis loss of coolant accident.
The maximum allowable containment leakage rate, La, at Pa, is 0.25% of the primary containment air weight per day.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-391 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 71 License No. NPF-96 1.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) dated August 2, 2023, as supplemented on September 20, 2023, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Unit 2 Facility License No. NPF-96 Amendment No. 71 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 71 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION David J. Wrona, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: January 31, 2024 David J.
Wrona Digitally signed by David J. Wrona Date: 2024.01.31 15:27:03 -05'00'
ATTACHMENT TO AMENDMENT NO. 71 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-96 DOCKET NO. 50-391 Replace page 3 of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR 79 with the attached page 3.
The revised page 3 is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.
Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Insert 3.5-5 3.5-5 3.5-7 3.5-7 3.6-37 3.6-38 3.6-39 5.0-25 5.0-25 Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 Amendment No. 71 C.
The license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act, and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect, and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below.
(1)
Maximum Power Level TVA is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3459 megawatts thermal.
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 71 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
(3)
TVA shall implement permanent modifications to prevent overtopping of the embankments of the Fort Loudon Dam due to the Probable Maximum Flood by June 30, 2018.
(4)
FULL SPECTRUM LOCA Methodology shall be implemented when the WBN Unit 2 steam generators are replaced with steam generators equivalent to the existing steam generators at WBN Unit 1.
(5)
By December 31, 2019, the licensee shall report to the NRC that the actions to resolve the issues identified in Bulletin 2012-01, Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System, have been implemented.
(6)
The licensee shall maintain in effect the provisions of the physical security plan, security personnel training and qualification plan, and safeguards contingency plan, and all amendments made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 50.54(p).
(7)
TVA shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The TVA approved CSP was discussed in NUREG-0847, Supplement 28, as amended by changes approved in License Amendment No. 7.
(8)
TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as described in NUREG-0847, Supplement 29, subject to the following provision:
ECCS - Operating 3.5.2 Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.5-5 Amendment 36,
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.7 Verify, for each ECCS throttle valve listed below, each position stop is in the correct position.
Valve Number CCP Discharge Throttle SI Cold Leg Throttle SI Hot Leg Throttle Valves Valves Valves 2-63-582 2-63-550 2-63-542 2-63-583 2-63-552 2-63-544 2-63-584 2-63-554 2-63-546 2-63-585 2-63-556 2-63-548 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
ECCS - Shutdown 3.5.3 Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.5-7 Amendment
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem inoperable.
B.1 Restore required ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem to OPERABLE status.
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not met.
C.1 Be in MODE 5.
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1
NOTE------------------------------
An RHR train may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned to the ECCS mode of operation.
The following SRs are applicable for all equipment required to be OPERABLE:
SR 3.5.2.1 SR 3.5.2.3 SR 3.5.2.4 SR 3.5.2.7 In accordance with applicable SRs
Containment Sump 3.6.16 Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.6-37 Amendment
3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.16 Containment Sump LCO 3.6.16 The containment sump shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment sump inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits.
A.1 Initiate action to mitigate containment accident generated and transported debris.
Immediately AND A.2 Perform SR 3.4.13.1.
Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> AND A.3 Restore the containment sump to OPERABLE status.
90 days (Continued)
Containment Sump 3.6.16 Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.6-38 Amendment
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Containment sump inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.
B.1
NOTES-----------
1.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.5.2, ECCS -
Operating, and LCO 3.5.3, ECCS -
Shutdown, for emergency core cooling trains made inoperable by the containment sump.
2.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, for containment spray trains made inoperable by the containment sump Restore the containment sump to OPERABLE status.
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.
C.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> AND C.2 Be in MODE 5.
36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />
Containment Sump 3.6.16 Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.6-39 Amendment
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.16.1 Verify by visual inspection, the containment sump does not show structural damage, abnormal corrosion, or debris blockage.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
Procedures, Programs, and Manuals 5.7 5.7 Procedures, Programs, and Manuals (continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 5.0-25 Amendment 11, 39, 56,
5.7.2.18 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)
A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:
a.
A required system redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or b.
A required system redundant to the system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or c.
A required system redundant to the support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.
The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. When a loss of safety function is caused by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions to enter are those of the support system.
5.7.2.19 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J," Revision 3-A, July 2012, and Section 4.1, "Limitations and Conditions for NEI TR 94-01, Revision 2," of the NRC Safety Evaluation Report in NEI 94-01, Revision 2-A, dated October 2008, as modified below:
For containment leakage rate testing purposes, a value of 15.0 psig, which is equivalent to the maximum allowable internal containment pressure, is utilized for Pa to bound a range of peak calculated containment internal pressures from 9.0 to 15.0 psig for the design basis loss of coolant accident.
The maximum allowable containment leakage rate, La, at Pa, is 0.25%
of the primary containment air weight per day.
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION AMENDMENT NO. 366 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77 AMENDMENT NO. 360 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79 AMENDMENT NO. 164 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90 AMENDMENT NO. 71 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-96 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NOS. 50-327, 50-328, 50-390, AND 50-391
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated August 2, 2023, as supplemented by letter dated September 20, 2023 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession Nos. ML23214A385 and ML23264A006, respectively), Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) to revise the technical specifications (TSs) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (SQN), and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (WBN).
The amendments would revise SQN and WBN TS 3.5.2, ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] - Operating, SQN and WBN TS 3.5.3, ECCS - Shutdown, and WBN TS 5.7.2.18, Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP). The proposed changes would also add a new SQN and WBN TS, Containment Sump, to section 3.6, Containment Systems. The proposed changes are based on Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF 567, Revision 1, Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI [Generic Safety Issue] 191 Issues, dated August 2, 2017 (ML17214A813), which is an approved change to the standard technical specifications (STS), and the associated U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) final safety evaluation (SE) approving TSTF 567, Revision 1, dated July 3, 2018 (ML18116A606).
The licensee has proposed variations from the TS changes described in TSTF 567, Revision 1.
The variations are described and evaluated in Sections 2.2.5 and 3.5 of this SE, respectively.
The supplemental letter dated September 20, 2023, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, but did change the NRC staffs proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on September 5, 2023 (88 FR 60720). As a result, a revised Federal Register Notice was published on November 28, 2023 (88 FR 83168).
Throughout the LAR, the licensee refers to TSTF-567-A, Revision 1, as a basis for the requested amendment. The NRC staff notes that the -A designation added to TSTF-567 is an industry convention used to indicate that the traveler has been approved by the NRC. TSTF-567 and TSTF-567-A are the same document. However, since TSTF-567-A is not an NRC designation, this SE refers to the technical specification change traveler as TSTF-567.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
2.1 System Description and TS Changes The TSs include limiting conditions for operation (LCOs), which are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.
Specified with each stated condition of the LCO are required action(s) and completion time(s) (CTs) to meet TS requirements.
2.1.1 TS 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating The function of the ECCS is to provide core cooling and negative reactivity to ensure the reactor core is protected after any of the following accidents:
a.
Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), coolant leakage greater than the capability of the normal charging system; b.
Rod ejection accident; c.
Loss of secondary coolant accident, including uncontrolled steam release or loss of feedwater; and d.
Steam generator tube rupture.
The SQN and WBN TS 3.5.2 is applicable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 and requires that two independent ECCS trains be operable to ensure that sufficient ECCS flow is available, assuming a single failure affecting either train.
TS 3.5.2 helps ensure the following acceptance criteria for ECCS, established by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.46, Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-water nuclear power reactors, will be met following a LOCA:
a.
Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is less than or equal to () 2200 degrees Fahrenheit (°F);
b.
Maximum cladding oxidation is 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation; c.
Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is 0.01 times the hypothetical amount generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react; d.
Core is maintained in a coolable geometry; and e.
Adequate long-term core cooling capability is maintained.
TS 3.5.2 also limits the potential for a post-trip return to power following a main steam line break event and ensures that containment temperature limits are met.
2.1.2 TS 3.5.3, ECCS - Shutdown The SQN and WBN TS 3.5.3 is applicable in Mode 4 and requires one of the two independent (and redundant) ECCS trains to be operable to ensure that sufficient ECCS flow is available to the core following a design-basis accident.
2.1.3 TS 5.7.2.18, Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)
The WBN TS 5.7.2.18 establishes the SFDP which implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.
The SFDP ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists.
Additionally, other appropriate actions may be taken as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Condition and Required Actions.
2.2 Proposed Changes to the TSs The proposed changes would revise SQN and WBN TS 3.5.2; SQN and WBN TS 3.5.3; and WBN TS 5.7.2.18. The proposed changes would also add a new SQN and WBN TS to section 3.6. The proposed changes are described below.
2.2.1 Proposed Changes to TS 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating The SQN and WBN TS 3.5.2 currently contains Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.2.8, which requires the following at a frequency of in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP).
Verify, by visual inspection, each ECCS train containment sump suction inlet is not restricted by debris and the suction inlet trash racks and screens show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.
The licensee proposed to modify and move SR 3.5.2.8 from TS 3.5.2 and include it in the new containment sump TS. Conforming changes were made to the TS Bases.
This change is evaluated in section 3.1 of this SE.
2.2.2 Proposed Changes to TS 3.5.3, ECCS - Shutdown The SQN and WBN TS 3.5.3 currently contains SR 3.5.3.1, which refers to applicable SRs under TS 3.5.2. One of those referenced SRs is SR 3.5.2.8, as described in section 2.2.1 of this SE.
Because the licensee proposed to modify and move SR 3.5.2.8 from TS 3.5.2 and include it in the new containment sump TS, the licensee also proposed to delete the reference to SR 3.5.2.8 in SR 3.5.3.1. Conforming changes were made to the TS Bases.
This change is evaluated in section 3.2 of this SE.
2.2.3 Proposed Changes to TS 5.7.2.18, Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)
The licensee proposed to add the following sentence at the end of WBN TS 5.7.2.18:
When a loss of safety function is caused by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions to enter are those of the support system.
This change is evaluated in section 3.3 of this SE.
2.2.4 Proposed Addition of a New Containment Sump TS The licensee proposed to add new SQN and WBN TS 3.6.16 requiring the containment sump to be operable during Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. Condition A specifies that if the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits, then the licensee is required to: (1) initiate action to mitigate the containment accident generated and transported debris immediately, (2) perform SR 3.4.13.1 once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and (3) restore the containment sump to OPERABLE status within 90 days (Required Actions A.1, A.2, and A.3, respectively). SR 3.4.13.1 requires verification that the reactor coolant system (RCS) operational leakage is within limits by performance of an RCS water inventory balance.
TS 3.6.16 Condition B, specifies that if the containment sump is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, then the licensee is required to restore the containment sump to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (Required Action B.1). Required Action B.1 is modified by two notes, which directs entering the applicable conditions and required actions of LCOs 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, for ECCS trains made inoperable by the containment sump and entering the applicable conditions and required actions of LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System [CSS], for CSS trains made inoperable by the containment sump.
TS 3.6.16, Condition C, specifies that if required actions and associated CTs under Condition A and B are not met, then the licensee is required to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (Required Actions C.1 and C.2, respectively).
The licensee proposed to modify and move SR 3.5.2.8 currently located in TS 3.5.2. The new SR 3.6.16.1 requires the licensee to verify, by visual inspection, the containment sump does not show structural damage, abnormal corrosion, or debris blockage, in accordance with the SFCP.
This change is evaluated in section 3.4 of this SE.
2.2.5 Variations from TSTF-567, Revision 1 The SQN and WBN TSs utilize different numbering and titles than the STS on which TSTF-567 was based. Specifically, the TS numbering for the new TS added by TSTF-567, Containment Sump, is TS 3.6.19. For SQN and WBN the new TS is numbered 3.6.16. Also, TSTF-567, Revision 1, identifies the SFDP as TS 5.5.15, whereas for WBN Units 1 and 2 this TS is numbered 5.7.2.18 (no changes are needed to SQN Units 1 and 2 TS 5.5.13, Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)). These differences are editorial and do not affect the applicability of TSTF-567 to the proposed LAR.
The SQN and WBN TSs contain a SFCP. Therefore, the Frequency for SR 3.6.16.1 is In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
2.3 Applicable Regulatory Requirements and Guidance 2.3.1 Regulatory Requirements The regulation at 10 CFR 50.36(a)(1) requires each applicant for a license authorizing operation of a utilization facility to include proposed TSs in the application. That regulation also states, in part, that [a] summary statement of the bases or reasons for such specifications, other than those covering administrative controls, shall also be included in the application, but shall not become part of the technical specifications.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.36(b) requires:
Each license authorizing operation of a utilization facility will include technical specifications. The technical specifications will be derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report, and amendments thereto, submitted pursuant to [10 CFR] 50.34 [Contents of applications; technical information]. The Commission may include such additional technical specifications as the Commission finds appropriate.
The categories of items required to be in the TSs are provided in 10 CFR 50.36(c). As required by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), the TSs will include LCOs, which are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. The regulation at 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i) requires that [w]hen a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specifications until the condition can be met.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) requires TSs to include SRs, which are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5) requires TSs to include administrative controls, which are the provisions relating to organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, review and audit, and reporting necessary to assure operation of the facility in a safe manner.
2.3.2 Guidance The guidance that the NRC staff considered in its review of this LAR included the following:
NUREG-0800, Revision 3, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light-Water Reactor] Edition, Chapter 16.0, Technical Specifications, dated March 2010 (ML100351425), provides guidance on review of TSs.
NUREG-1431, Revision 5.0, Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants, Volume 1, Specifications, and Volume 2, Bases, dated September 2021 (ML21259A155 and ML21259A159, respectively).
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
3.1 Proposed Changes to TS 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating The licensee proposed to modify and move SQN and WBN SR 3.5.2.8 from TS 3.5.2 to the new containment sump TS. Therefore, the licensee proposed deletion of SR 3.5.2.8.
The new SR 3.6.16.1 does not limit the visual inspection to the suction inlet, trash racks and screens as currently required by the TSs, but instead requires inspection of the entire containment sump system. The containment sump system consists of the containment drainage flow paths, any design features upstream of the containment sump that are credited in the containment debris analysis, the containment sump strainers (or screens), and the inlet to the ECCS and CSS piping.
The NRC staff concludes that the proposed change is acceptable since the existing requirements are either unchanged or expanded and continue to ensure the containment sump is unrestricted (i.e., unobstructed) and stays in proper operating condition. The proposed change meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) because it provides an SR to assure the necessary quality of systems and components are maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the LCOs will be met.
3.2 Proposed Changes to TS 3.5.3, ECCS - Shutdown The licensee proposed to delete the reference to SQN and WBN SR 3.5.2.8 in SR 3.5.3.1.
The NRC staff concludes the proposed change is acceptable since SR 3.5.2.8 was modified and moved to the new containment sump TS. The existing SR on the containment sump is augmented (by requiring inspection of additional sump components) and moved to the new specification, and a duplicative requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is removed. The new specification retains or expands the existing requirements on the containment sump and the actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable with the exception of adding new actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The new action provides time to evaluate and correct the condition instead of requiring an immediate plant shutdown. The proposed change meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) because it provides SRs to assure the necessary quality of systems and components are maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the LCOs will be met.
3.3 Proposed Changes to TS 5.7.2.18, Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)
The WBN Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.6 states:
When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCO not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCO ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the supported system.
In this event, additional evaluations and limitations may be required in accordance with Specification 5.7.2.18, Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP). If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.
When a support systems Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
When a loss of safety function is determined to exist, the SFDP requires entry into the appropriate conditions and required actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists. When a loss of function is solely due to a single TS support system the appropriate LCO is the LCO for that support system. When the loss of function is the result of multiple support systems, the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the supported systems.
The licensee proposed to add the following sentence to WBN TS 5.7.2.18:
When a loss of safety function is caused by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions to enter are those of the support system.
The NRC staff finds that the proposed addition to WBN TS 5.7.2.18 clarifies the intent of the allowance (not to enter the Conditions and Required Actions) provided by LCO 3.0.6 and the SFDP for single-train support systems. The NRC staff concludes the proposed change is acceptable since the actions for the support system LCO adequately address the inoperability of that system. Therefore, as required by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5), the proposed change continues to provide adequate administrative controls to assure safe operation.
3.4 Proposed Addition of Containment Sump TS 3.4.1 Evaluation of the New TS The licensee proposed to add a new SQN and WBN TS to address operability requirements of the containment sump. The numbering for this new TS is TS 3.6.16.
The containment sump supports the post-accident operation of the ECCS and CSS. However, only the current ECCS TSs contain SRs related to the containment sump and the TS do not specify required actions that specifically address an inoperable containment sump. If the containment sump were found to be inoperable, as an ECCS and CSS support system, those respective LCOs would not be met. In order to address concerns related to containment sump operability due to debris accumulation described in GSI-191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance, the licensee proposed to add a new specification to address containment sump inoperability and create a condition for when the sump is inoperable due to analyzed containment accident generated and transported debris.
Based on the below evaluation, the NRC staff determined that the proposed SQN and WBN TS 3.6.16 satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i) because the LCO specifies the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. There is reasonable assurance that the required actions to be taken when the LCO is not met can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public.
3.4.2 Evaluation of the Applicability The new SQN and WBN TS 3.6.16 requires the containment sump to be operable during Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The ECCS and CSS TSs currently in the SQN and WBN TSs are applicable during Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The NRC staff finds the proposed applicability is acceptable because the applicability is consistent with the applicability of the ECCS and CSS TS, the containment sump supported systems.
3.4.3 Evaluation of Condition A The licensee has analyzed the susceptibility of the ECCS and CSS to the adverse effects of post-accident debris blockage and operation with debris-laden fluids. The licensee has established limits on the allowable quantities of containment accident generated debris that could be transported to the containment sump based on its current plant configuration. In the current TSs, if unanalyzed debris sources are discovered inside containment, if errors are discovered in debris-related analyses, or if a previously unevaluated phenomenon that can affect containment sump performance is discovered, the containment sump, and the supported ECCS and CSS, may be inoperable, and the TSs would require a plant shutdown with no time provided to evaluate the condition.
In order to address this situation and to provide sufficient time to evaluate the condition, the licensee proposed Condition A, which is applicable when the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits.
Under Condition A, the operability of the containment sump with respect to debris is based on a quantity of debris evaluated and determined to be acceptable by the licensee. Conditions not evaluated under Condition A (containment accident generated and transported debris) and that affect the quantity of analyzed debris will be evaluated using a deterministic process.
Under Condition A, Required Action A.1 mandates immediate action to be initiated to mitigate the condition. The licensees proposed TS Bases for Required Action A.1 provided the following examples of mitigating actions:
Removing the debris source from containment or preventing the debris from being transported to the containment sump;
Evaluating the debris source against the assumptions in the analysis;
Deferring maintenance that would affect availability of the affected systems and other LOCA mitigating equipment;
Deferring maintenance that would affect availability of primary defense-in-depth systems; Briefing operators on LOCA debris management actions; or
Applying an alternative method to establish new limits.
The NRC staff finds the proposed Required Action A.1 and its CT are acceptable because they place urgency on the initiation of the appropriate actions that could mitigate or reduce the impact of the identified conditions.
Concurrently, Required Action A.2 mandates SR 3.4.13.1, the RCS water inventory balance, to be performed at an increased frequency of once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. An unexpected increase in RCS leakage could be indicative of an increased potential for an RCS pipe break, which could result in debris being generated and transported to the containment sump.
The NRC staff finds the proposed Required Action A.2 and its CT are acceptable because the more frequent monitoring allows operators to act in a timely fashion to minimize the potential for an RCS pipe break while the containment sump is inoperable.
In addition, Required Action A.3 requires the inoperable containment sumps to be restored to operable status in 90 days.
The NRC staff finds the proposed Required Action A.3 and its CT are acceptable because they provide a reasonable amount of time to diagnose, plan and possibly reduce the severity of, or mitigate the unanalyzed debris condition and prevent a loss of ECCS and CSS safety function.
In addition, 90 days is adequate given the conservatisms in the containment debris analysis and the proposed compensatory actions required to be implemented immediately by Required Action A.1. Also, as discussed later in this SE section, the new SR will require visual inspection of the containment sump system (including the containment drainage flow paths, any design features upstream of the containment sump that are credited in the containment debris analysis, the containment sump strainers, and the inlet to the ECCS and CSS piping for evidence of structural degradation, potential for debris bypass, and presence of corrosion or debris blockage) to ensure no loose debris is present and there is no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.
3.4.4 Evaluation of Condition B Condition B specifies the required actions for when the containment sump is inoperable for reasons other than containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits.
Required Action B.1 requires restoring the containment sump to operable status and is modified by two notes. These two notes direct entry into the conditions and required actions for the supported systems (ECCS and CSS) upon entering Required Action B.1. Since Required Action B.1 directs entry to the corresponding ECCS and CSS TS, these notes retain the existing TS actions for ECCS or CSS trains made inoperable by an inoperable containment sump for reasons other than containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits.
The proposed CT for Required Action B.1 is 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. This CT is consistent with the CT for a single inoperable ECCS train or CSS train.
The NRC staff finds the proposed change is acceptable since it continues to provide remedial actions for when the containment sump is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A and ensures safe operation of the plant. In addition, the proposed CT is acceptable since it provides a reasonable time for repairs, and there is a low probability of an accident occurring during this period that would require the use of the containment sump.
3.4.5 Evaluation of Condition C If operators are unable to restore the affected containment sump to operable status under Condition A or B, Required Action C.1 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> followed by Mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />, as required by Required Action C.2.
The NRC staff finds that this proposed condition and its required actions are acceptable because the condition is consistent with the STS and the required actions require the operators to place the unit in a condition in which the LCO no longer applies. In addition, the proposed CTs allow a reasonable amount of time to decrease from full power conditions to the required plant conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
3.4.6 Evaluation of the New SR 3.6.16.1 The licensee proposed a new SR in the new containment sump TS. This SR was originally located in TS 3.5.2 and referred to in TS 3.5.3. The numbering for this new SR is SR 3.6.16.1.
The frequency of the new SR is in accordance with the SFCP.
The proposed SR requires verification, by visual inspection, that the containment sump does not show structural damage, abnormal corrosion, or debris blockage.
The new SR is stated in generic terms and expands the scope of the required visual inspection to include the entire containment sump system. The entire containment sump system consists of the containment drainage flow paths, the containment sump strainers (or screens), and the inlet to the ECCS and CSS piping.
The NRC staff finds the proposed new SR is acceptable because it expands the scope of inspection of the original SR. In addition, the proposed frequency is acceptable since it is the same as that currently required by the TSs. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that, as required by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3), the necessary quality of systems will be maintained in accordance with the associated LCOs.
3.4.7 Evaluation of Changes to the TS Bases The licensee submitted TS Bases changes (that corresponded to the proposed TS changes) to provide the reasons for the proposed TSs. The licensee stated that the TS Bases changes are consistent with the Bases changes in the model application.
3.4.8 Conclusion Regarding Proposed Containment Sump TS The new containment sump TS retains and expands the existing TS requirements with the exception of the addition of Condition A. Condition A provides a condition for an inoperable containment sump due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits.
The NRC staff reviewed the proposed changes against the regulations and concludes that the changes continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i) and 50.36(c)(3) for the reasons discussed above, and thus provide reasonable assurance that adoption of these TSs will have the requisite requirements and controls to operate safely. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed TS changes are acceptable.
3.5 Variations All variations are editorial and do not affect the applicability of TSTF-567 to the proposed LAR.
3.6 Technical Evaluation Conclusion
The NRC staff determined that the proposed TS changes meet the standards for TSs in 10 CFR 50.36 and are acceptable. As required by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2), the LCOs specify the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. The proposed changes to the SRs assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the LCOs will be met, and satisfy 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3). In addition, the proposed changes to the administrative controls include provisions to assure safe operation of the facility as required by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5).
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments on November 28, 2023. The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, originally published in the Federal Register on September 5, 2023 (88 FR 60720), and again on November 28, 2023 (88 FR 83168), due to the supplement.
There has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment(s) will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: C. Ashley, NRR Date: January 31, 2024
Amendments: ML23319A245 NRR-058 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPLII-2/PM NRR/DORL/LPLII-2/LA NRR/DSS/STSB/BC OGC - NLO NAME PBuckberg RButler VCusumano (SMehta for) MCarpentier DATE 11/28/2023 11/17/2023 11/1/2023 1/17/2024 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPLII-2/BC NRR/DORL/LPLII-2/PM NAME DWrona PBuckberg DATE 1/23/2024 1/31/2024