ML023250196
| ML023250196 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/2002 |
| From: | Salas P Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response |
| References | |
| EPIP-1, Rev 34 | |
| Download: ML023250196 (54) | |
Text
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-2000 November 8, 2002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority Docket -Nos. 50-327 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT -
UNITS 1 AND 2 -
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISION In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the following EPIP:
Revision 34 Title Emergency Plan Classification Matrix This letter is being sent in accordance with NRC RIS 2001-05.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please telephone me at (423) 843-7170 or J.
D. Smith at (423) 843-6672.
.censing and Industry Affairs Manager Enclosure K
Pnnted on recycled paper EPIP EPIP-I
) )
ENCLOSURE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
UNITS 1 and 2 DOCKET NOS.
50-327 and 50-328 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Revision 34 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY:
J. Randy Ford RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:
Emergency Preparedness APPROVED BY:
Dennis Koehl EFFECTIVE DATE:
11-01-2002 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE REVISION DESCRIPTION:
INTENT REVISION: Uodate of Gaseous and Liauid EALs in Tab le 7-1.
I I
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 2 of 52 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides criteria to the Shift Manager (SM) or Site Emergency Director (SED) to be used in classifying and declaring an emergency based on plant conditions. The responsibility for declaring an emergency, based on the criteria in this procedure, belongs to the SM or SED, the designated Unit Supervisor when acting as the SM, or the TSC SED. This responsibility cannot be delegated.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Developmental Documents A.
10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.
B.
Reg Guide-1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NUMARC Nesp-007, Revision 2, 1/1992 Methodology For Development Of Emergency Action Levels.
KC.
Sequoyah Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs),
Functional Restoration Guidelines (FRGs), Technical Instructions (TI),
Surveillance Instructions (SI), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are also referenced in Appendix B of the Radiological Emergency Plan.
D.
Letter to Bruce A. Boger, Director of Inspection Program Management, USNRC, December 8, 2001 from Lynnette Hendricks, NEI, Recommended Actions in Response to a Site Specific Credible Threat at a Nuclear Power Plant (1A-01-1).
3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this matrix is detected and declared. The REP is not activated based on a reporting of past conditions.
This procedure will be used in conjunction with the Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix B.
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 3 of 52 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)
If the event is determined to be one of the four emergency classifications then implement one of the following procedures as applicable:
EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event EPIP-3 Alert EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency EPIP-5 General Emergency 3.2 The criteria in SQN EPIP-1 are given for reference: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM or SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at an appropriate classification for a particular set of circumstances. These criteria apply to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The SED must be aware of the affects of simultaneous events on both units.
3.3 If there is a reason to doubt if a given initiating condition has actually K..>
occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications provided. Unless a suspected spurious or otherwise false alarm can be substantiated within an acceptable timeframe (based on potential severity of the event), the SM or SED is to proceed with actions as required by this procedure until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.
3.4 Classification Determination 3.4.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the respective status free criteria that will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.
3.4.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.
3.4.3 Declare the highest emergency class based on events that are in progress at the time that the classification is made.
K-,
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 4 of 52 3.4.4 If, during an ongoing event, investigation shows that a higher classification was previously met, then report that, as information only, to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exit unless it is a noted exception (i.e., EAL 2.3).
3.4.5 If, following termination of an emergency declaration, investigation shows that a higher classification was met, then report that, as information only, to the ODS and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist.
3.4.6 If conditions have returned to a non-emergency state before any emergency can be classified, then the highest emergency class that was appropriate shall be reported, as information only, to the ODS and NRC and shall not be declared unless it is a noted exception (i.e., EAL 2.3).
3.4.7 The NRC shall be notified within one hour of all classifications. Once made and reported, a declaration cannot be canceled or rescinded even if it is later determined to be invalid. If there is reason to doubt that a given condition has occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications and proceed with classification, as required by this procedure, until otherwise proven false.
K..
3.4.8 The State shall be notified by the ODS within 15 minutes of any declaration and notified, for information only, within one hour of any classification that was met but not declared as allowed above. If the State is notified of a declaration that is invalidated before the NRC is notified, terminate the classification, if not already done, and report the declaration to the NRC.
3.4.9 The ACCEPTABLE timeframe for notification to the ODS of an emergency declaration is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.
4.0 RECORDS 4.1 QA Records None.
4.2 Non-QA Records None.
K-)
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX SQN EPIP-1 Rev 34 Page 5 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier I
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT K-)
4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A 4.5 4.6 4.7 Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 6.2 6.3 Loss of Shutdown Systems Loss of Shutdown Capability Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 Figure 7-A 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-2 K-I
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 6 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 7 of 52 DEFINITIONSIACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the Initiating conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressunzed or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force "ILTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g,
,n or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam
\\...._A'erator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressunzed FIRE: Combustion charactenzed by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire Observation of flame Is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site IMMINENT: Within two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarmltnp setpoints "ANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that
/*SF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.
RCS: The RCS pnmary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.
RED PATH: Monitonng of one or more CSFs by FR-C which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electncal load, (3) Reactor Trip; (4)
Safety Injection System Activation, (5) Thermal Power Oscillations Žt10%
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine, C0 2, etc )
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches, etc) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation K-)
MODES 1,2,3,4 EPIP-1 SQN Rev 34 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Page 8 of 52 2*R S.are.--
)n Status Potential LOSS Core Cooling Orange (FR-C.2)
OR Heat Sink Red (RHR SD cooling not in service)
(FR-H.1).
-OR
- 2. Primary Coolant Activity Level I
Potential LOSS RCS sample activity is Not Applicable.
greater than 300 ý.Ci/gm dose equivalent Iodine-131
-OR
- 3. Incore TCs Hi Quad Average "I 'reaterthan 1200 OF on
?4-101 OR 102
.. OSENSOR).
Potential LOSS Greater than or equal to 700 OF on XI-94-101 or 102 (EXOSENSOR).
-OR
Potential LOSS Not Applicable.
VALID RVLIS level < 40%
on LI-68-368 or 371 with no RCP running.
-OR
- 5. Containment Radiation Monitors Potential LOSS VALID reading of Greater Not Applicable.
Than:
2.8E + 01 Rem/hr On RM-90-271 and 272.
OR 2 9E + 01 Rem/hr On RM-90-273 and 274.
-OR-Site Emergency Director Judgment no condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.
- 11. Critical Safety Function Status
- 1. Critical Safety Functi
-OR
- 5.
Site Emergency Director Judgment Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the RCS Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.
I Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1) del..-' 1ad!-B6rr er-,...
i oPotential LOSS Not Applicable.
Pressurized Thermal Shock Red (FR-P.1).
OR Heat Sink Red (RHR SD cooling not in service)
(FR-H.1).
-OR
- 2.
RCS LeakagelLOCA o
FPotential LOSS RCS leak results in Non isolatable RCS leak subcooling < 40 OF as exceeding the capacity of indicated on XI-94-101 OR one charging pump in the 102 (EXOSENSOR).
normal charging alignment.
OR RCS Leakage Results in Entry Into E-1.
-OR
- 3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- ll*ý-1,,1-11 1
Potential LOSS SGTR that results in a Not Applicable.
safety injection actuation.
OR Entry into E-3.
-OR
.Potential LOSS VALID RVLIS level < 40%
Not Applicable.
on LI-68-368 or 371 with no RCP running.
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 9 of 52
),
-1:,Cotaimen Bard INSTRUCTIONS Potential LOSS Containment Red (FR-Z 1)
OR Actions of FR-C 1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE (i.e.: core TC's trending up)
-OR
- 2. Containment Pressure/Hydrogen SI-Potential LOSS Rapid unexplained pressure Containment hydrogen decrease following initial increases to > 4% by volume increase on Pdl-30-44 or 45 on H21-43-200 or 210.
OR OR Containment pressure or Pressure > 2 81 PSID (Phase sump level not increasing on B) with no containment spray LI-63-178 or 179 with a LOCA operating when required in progress.
(FR-Z 1)
-OR-NOTE:
A condition is considered to be MET if, in the judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />). The classification shall be made as soon as this determination is made.
- 1.
In the matrix to the left, REVIEW the Initiating Conditions in all three barrier columns and CIRCLE the Conditions that are Met
- 2.
In each of the three barriers columns, IDENTIFY if any Loss or Potential Loss Initiating Conditions have been Met.
3 COMPARE the number of barrier Losses and Potential Losses to the Criteria below and make the appropriate declaration NOTE: MONITOR the respective status tree criteria if a CSF is listed as an Initiating Condition
- 3. Containment Isolation St t
tainment isolation, when utred, is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists.
L Potential LOSS Not Applicable
-OR-
- 4. Containment Bypass 0
-OR-
- 5. Sianificant Radioactivity in Containment LOSS Not Applicable.
Potential LOSS VALID Reading of greater than:
3 6 E + 02 Rem/hr on RM-90-271 and RM-90-272.
OR 2 8 E + 02 Rem/hr on RM-90-273 and RM-90-274 Kj/Site Emergency Director Judgment Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED. indicates loss or potential loss of the CNTMT Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.
1 1. Critical Safety Function Status
ýLSS:
Not Applicable.
Potential LOSS Unexpected VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors adjacent to containment (with LOCA in progress)
Secondary side release outside containment from a RUPTURED SIG that cannot be terminated in < 15 minutes (E-2 and E-3).
OOR
> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> secondary side release outside containment from a SIG with a SIG tube leak > T/S limits (AOP-R 01, App A).
EMERGENCY CLASS CRITERIA GENERAL EMERGENCY LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers.
ALERT Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier.
OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier.
UNUSUAL EVENT LOSS or Potential LOSS of Containment Barrier.
I v
I Potential LOSS
-OR-
MODES 1,2,3,4 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 34 Page 10 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK END OF SECTION 1.
SQN K)
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 11 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 1.2 1.3 Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
, Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion Table 4-1 Figure 4-A 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-2 Figure 4-B 4.5 4.6 4.7 Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 5.5 5.6 River Level High River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 1Z
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 34 Page 12 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs, Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integnty (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition Is made that one or rmore of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressunzed or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force "I LTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, or feed line break) that results In an uncontrolled decrease in steam
".erator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.
Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
IMMINENT: Within two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification INTRUSIONAINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints
"*ANGE PATH: Monitonng of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that SF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that the CSF(s) Is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Tnp, (4)
Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations >_10%
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine, C02, etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank)
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistenng. Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches, etc ) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or matenal which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation I
EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 13 of 52 Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and "Radiological Effluents" (Sectfon7) and Conftnue in This Column.
I On either unit an inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4):
1 Loss of > 75% of MCR annunciators and the annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system indications
- 2. Loss of Plant Computer.
3 Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:
Subcnticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory 4 SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of >75% MCR annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system indications for > 15 minutes with a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or plant computer unavailable. (1 and 2 and 3):
- 1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% MCR annunciators and the annunciator printer for >15 minutes or > 75% of safety system indications for > 15 minutes
- 2. SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is required (> shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.
3 (a orb)
On either unit an UNPLANNED loss > 75% MCR annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system indications for > 15 minutes and plant computer available. (1 and 2 and 3):
- 1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% of MCR annunciators and the annunciator printer for > 15 minutes or > 75%
of safety system indicators for > 15 minutes 2
SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is required (> shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.
3 The plant computer is capable of displaying requested data.
11il tIdlilll I 4.-UIIUItlUII
-4 A
L L
-I Not Applicable.
A. UNPLANNED loss of all in-plant communication capability (land 2 and 3):
- 1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX phones 2 UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones
- 3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios OR B. UNPLANNED loss of all offsite communication capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and 6):
- 1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX phones
- 2. UNPLANNED loss of all radio frequencies 3 UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system 4 UNPLANNED loss of all 1-FB-Bell lines 5 UNPLANNED loss of all NRC ENS and HPN phones 6 UNPLANNED loss of all satellite phones 1,
2, 3,
4 1,
2, 3,
4 1,
2, 3,
4 U
NNU U
S U
AS 44 UU V
E I
I Mode Initiating I Condition Not Appicable.
Not Applicable.
EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 14 of 52 1/2) moale I
1 initiating i.;onaition Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID trip signals and loss of core cooling capability.
(I and 2):
I FR-S 1 entered and immediate operator actions did not result in a reactor power of
- 5% and decreasing
- 2. (a or b) a CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red (FR-C.I).
- b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H 1)
Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID auto and manual trip signals.
NOTE: Although a mode change may occur before classificabon this event wN sb7l be classified and declared as SAE.
Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID auto trip signal but a manual trip from the Control Room is successful. (1 or2)
- 1.
Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing following auto trip signal 2,
2 Manual tnp in the Main Control Room successfully reduces reactor power < 5%.
NOTE: Although a mode change will occur this event will still be classified and declared as an ALERT.
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Secton 1).
IM
- e Initating / Condition
-9
-d Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds 1,
2$
3 Reter to lission Product Bamer Marnx (TSecrion
- 7) ana Conbnue in This Column.
Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matrix" (Secbon 1) and Contnue in This Column.
Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Conbnue in This Column.
Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to SQN Tech. Spec. 3.4.8):
- 1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a orb) a Dose equivalent Iodine (1-131)
>0.35 p.Cigm for > 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or in excess of TIS Figure 3 4-1 with Tave > 500 *F.
- b.
Specific activity> 100/t pCi/gm with Tave _> 500 *F.
EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 15 of 52
-k) initiating I tuonaition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to 'Fission Product BamerMatnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage
> 10 GPM.
1 Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech Spec.) > 10 GPM as indicated by (a orb)*
a SI-OPS-068-137.0 results OR b With RCS temperature and PZR level stable, the VCT level on LI-62-129 or LI-62-130 is dropping at a rate > 10 GPM Refer to 'Shutdown Systems Degradation" (Section 6 3).
ModeInitiating / Condition
-I
-4 1,
2, 3,
4 Refer to 7'lsslon Product bamer Matrix (S1ection 7) anra Continue in This Column.
Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Contnue in This Column.
Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
RCS Identified leakage > 25 GPM.
- 1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech Spec)
> 25 GPM as indicated by (a orb)
- a. SI-OPS-068-137.0 results OR
Refer to 'Shutdown Systems Degradation" (Section 6.3) moae
-b
-4 1,
2, 3,
4
EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 16 of 52
- 2.
Tubn Failur initiating i uon on Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the main steam system resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and safety injection initiation. (1 and 2):
- 1. Rapid depressurization of any or all steam generators or the main steam system to < 600 psig on PI-1 -2A, 2B or 9A,9B or 20A, 20B or 27A, 27B
- 2. Safety injection has initiated or is required Mode Initiating / Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrx' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matix' (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Turbine failure has generated projectiles that cause visible damage to any area containing safety related 1,
equipment.
- 1. Turbine generated PROJECTILES have resulted in 2,
VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following areas:
Control Building Diesel Generator Bldg 3
Auxiliary Building RWST Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station Unit #2 Containment Common Sta Ser. Xfmr's ERCW Pumping Station Condensate Storage Tanks Additional Equipment Bldgs Turbine failure results in casing penetration or main generator seal damage.
1 Turbine failure which results in penetration of the turbine casing or damage to main generator seals 2,
3 Refer to Hazards and SED Judgement" (Section 43) mocie 9.
1, 2,
3
EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 17 of 52 Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Safety Limits have been exceeded. (1 or 2):
- 1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature and RCS pressure > safety limit indicated by SQN Tech Spec Figure 2 1-1 'Reactor Core Safety Limit".
OR 2 RCS/Pressunzer pressure exceeds safety limit
(> 2735 psig) de
.9 I
-'I.
1,1 2,
3, 1 4
EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 18 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK END OF SECTION 2.
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 19 of 52
,J' INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)
Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT
- )
Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas "Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 5.5 5.6 River Level High River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Shutdown Systems Loss of Shutdown Capability Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 Figure 7-A 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-2 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 6.1 6.2 6.3
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 20 of 52 DEFINITIONSIACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authonty to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force
" ULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, m r feed line break) that results In an uncontrolled decrease in steam
\\,j erator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressunzed FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electncal components do not constitute a fire Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site IMMINENT: Within two hours INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of seventy of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from Identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitonng controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints
")RANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that CSF(s) is under severe challenge, prompt operator action is required PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the secunty fence and to which access is controlled RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary Isolation valves RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip, (4)
Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 2_10%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine, CO 2, etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank)
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell Implicit in this definition Is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation
Mode Initiating I Condition Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to either unit. (l and 2):
1,
- 1. Both unit related 6 9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for > 15 minutes 2,
- 2. (a or b) a Core Cooling Status Tree Red or Orange Path.
3, OR
- b. Restoration of either a 6.9 KV shutdown board or a 4
6 9 KV unit board is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the loss Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to either unit for> 15 Minutes.
1, 2,
- 1. Both unit related 6 9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for> 15 minutes 3,
4 Loss of offsite power to either unit with degraded onsite AC power for > 15 minutes. (Ia andb or 2):
1, 1 a. All four (4) 6 9KV unit boards de-energized for > 15 minutes 2,
b One (1) unit related 6 9 KV shutdown board de energized for > 15 minutes OR 4
- 2. Any AC power condition lasting > 15 minutes where a single additional failure will result in a unit blackout Loss of offsite power to either unit for > 15 minutes.
(1 and 2):
1 All four (4) 6 9KV unit boards de-energized for > 15 minutes 2,
3,
- 2. Both unit related 6 9KV shutdown boards are energized 4
Mode Initiating / Condition Not Applicable.
Not Applicable 5,
UNPLANNED loss of all offsite and all onsite AC 6,
power to either unit for > 15 minutes.
D 1 Both unit related 6 9KV shutdown boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.
E F
U E
L E
Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6.1) and D
contnue in this column.
5, UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power to either unit for > 15 minutes. (1 and 2):
6, D
- 1. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for
> 15 minutes.
E 2 One (1) unit related 6 9KV shutdown board de energized for > 15 minutes U
E L
E D
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx" (Secbon 1) and "Loss of Communication" (2.2) and Conbnue in This Column Loss of all vital DC power for > 15 minutes.
- 1. Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V DC vital battery board buses I and II and III and IV for > 15 minutes.
Also Refer to "Fission Product Bramer Matrix" (Section 1),
"Loss of Communicabon' (2.2) and, "Loss of Instrumentahnn" (2 1) and Conhtnue in This Column Refer to "Fission Product "Loss of Communication" Instrumentabon" (2.1)
UNPLANNED loss of a re
> 15 minutes: (1 or 2).
- 1.
Voltage< 105VDC buses I and Ill for> 1 END OF SECTION 3.1 3amer Matnx" (Secton 1),
(2 2), and "Loss of equired train of DC power for on 125V dc vital battery board 5 minutes OR
- 2.
Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V dc vital battery board busses II and IV for > 15 minutes IF IvIuutI 1i 2,
3, 4
5, 6
I i
m i
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 23 of 52 "U
INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flare SExplosion 4.4 Toxic Table 4-1 TablI Figure 4-A Figui mable Gas c Gas or Smoke e 4-2 re 4-B 4.5 4.6 4.7 Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1
)
Figure 7-A 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-2 4
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX SQN EPIP-1 Rev 34 Page 24 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition Is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities Including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
'ILTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam
\\4erator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.
Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > thai the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
IMMINENT: Within two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offslte doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints
"%ANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that CSF(s) is under severe challenge, prompt operator action is required PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integnty of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressunzer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electncal load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip, (4)
Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations Ž10%
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine, C0 2, etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank)
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches, etc) should NOT be included as visible damage VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation I
EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 25 of 52 4.2 plodsc ernxS Initiating I Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to 'Control Room Evacuation," (4 5) and Fission Product Bamer Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 and 2):
- 1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1.
- 2. (a or b) a VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or safety related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE.
OR b Control room indication of degraded safety system or component response due to the FIRE.
FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of control room notification or verification of control room alarm Mode A
L L
-I A
L L
Initiating I Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrer Matnx' (Section 1) and Conbinue in This Column.
Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 and 2):
- 1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1.
2 (a orb)
- a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures or to safety related equipment in the specified area is due to the EXPLOSION.
OR b Control room indication of degraded safety system or component response due to the EXPLOSION Refer to 'Secunty' (Section 4 6)
UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure or equipment.
Refer to 'Security" (Section 4 6)
Mode
-4.
-I A
L L
-q A
L L
.1.
EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 26 of 52 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Containment Diesel Generator Building Unit #2 Containment Intake Pumping Station Auxiliary Building ERCW Pumping Station Control Building CSST's RWST Condensate Storage Tanks Additional Equipment Buildings Figure 4-A SEQUOYAH PROTECTED AREA I
EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 27 of 52 initiating i uonaition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matnx* (Section 1) and Contnue in This Column Referto 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Secbon 1) and Continue in This Column.
UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within a facility structure containing safety related equipment or associated with safe operation of the plant.
- 1. Plant personnel report the average of three (3) readings taken in an -10 ft Tnangular Area is > 25% Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2 Refer to the MSDS for the LEL.
A. UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY that may affect normal operations.
- 1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in an -10 ft. Triangular Area is > 25% of the Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitonng instrument within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B)
OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State officials that a large offsite FLAMMABLE GAS release has occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4-C) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) in concentrations > 25% of Lower Explosive Limit.
(Refer to the MSDS for the LELQ
-4.4 Toxi rex aI-dWi~ rg'i od Mode Initiating / Condition
-4 A
L L
-4 A
L L
Refer to '-Fssion Product Bramer Matrni (SeciOn 1) ana Conbnue in This Column.
Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix" (Secbon 1) and Conitnue in This Column.
Release of TOXIC GAS or smoke within a facility structure which prohibits safe operation of systems required to establish or maintain Cold SID.
(I and 2 and 3):
1 Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS or smoke within any building listed in Table 4-2 2 (a orb)
- a. Plant personnel report severe adverse health reactions due to TOXIC GAS or smoke (i e, burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness).
OR b Sampling indication > Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) 3 Plant personnel unable to perform actions to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.
Refer to the MSDS for the PEL.
A. Safe operations impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS or smoke concentrations within a facility structure listed in Table 4-2.
OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State officials that an offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4 C) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) in concentrations > the Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) causing a site evacuation.
(Refer to the MSDS for the PEL)
-Y A
L L
-4 A
L L
i
HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT EPIP-1 Rev 34 Page 28 of 52
/
TABLE 4-2 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS OR SMOKE EALs Unit #1 Containment Diesel Generator Building Unit #2 Containment Intake Pumping Station Auxiliary Building CDWE Building Control Building ERCW Pumping Station Turbine Building Additional Equipment Buildings Figure 4-B SEQUOYAH EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY SQN
EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 29 of 52
________.1.
A L
L I
A L
L Security event resulting in loss of control of the plant.
- 1. Hostile armed force has taken control of the plant or control room or remote shutdown capacity.
Security event has or is occurring which results in actual or likely failures of plant functions needed to protect the public.
- 1. VITAL AREA, other than the control room, has been penetrated by a hostile armed force Confirmed security event which indicates an actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant. (1 or2 or 3):
A
- 1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA.
L OR L
- 2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A)
OR 3 PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) has been penetrated by a hostile armed force.
Confirmed security event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. (I or 2)
- 1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A).
A OR L
2 Security Shift Supervisor reports any of the events L
listed in Table 4-3 I
EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev t4 Page 30 of 52 moae Events are in process or have occurred which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY A
(Figure 4-B)
L L
Events are in process or have occurred which involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public.
Any releases are not expected to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY A
(Figure 4-B)
L L
Events are in process or have occurred which involve an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels.
A L
L Events are in Process or have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety System occurs.
A L
L TABLE 4-3 SECURITY EVENT EXAMPLES
- a. SABOTAGEIINTRUSION has occurred or is occurnng within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) b HOSTAGEIEXTORTION situation that threatens to interrupt plant operations
- c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) and the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) d Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA which threatens to interrupt normal plant operations (judgement based on behavior of strikers and/or intelligence received)
- e.
A credible site-specific security threat notification
EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 31 of 52 Figure 4-C SEQUOYAH ONE MILE RADIUS
EPIP-1 SQN HAZARDS AND SED JUDGEMENT Rev 34 Page 32 of 52 fK THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK I END OF SECTION 4. I
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 33 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 1.2 1.3 Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC
'AZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT U.
Fire 4.3 Flam 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Table 4-1 Figure 4-A Table Figur mable Gas Gas or Smoke B 4-2 re 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Shutdown Systems Loss of Shutdown Capability Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 Figure 7-A 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-2 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A 6.1 6.2 6.3
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 34 Page 34 of 52 DEFINITIONSIACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs, Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integnty (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.
-EXTORTION:
An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
kA ULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, team or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressunzed FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site IMMINENT: Within two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.
KJANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that
\\
CS F(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting In damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event invoMng one or more of the following, (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electncal load, (3) Reactor Trip; (4)
Safety Injection System Activation, (5) Thermal Power Oscillations >10%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine, CO 2, etc )
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank)
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 35 of 52 Initiating I Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation.
(l and 2):
- 1. Panel XA-55-15B alarm window 30 (E-2) plus window 22 (D-1) activated
- 2. (a orb) a Ground motion sensed by plant personnel OR
- b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.
-p Earthquake detected by site seismic instruments.
Earthquake detected by site seismic instruments.
(I and 2):
- 1. Panel XA-55-15B alarm window 22 (D-1) activated 2 (a orb) a Ground motion sensed by plant personnel OR
- b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event
-4
-4 A
L L
A L
L
-I
-i Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx*
(Section 1) and Conbnue in This Column.
Refer to *Fission Product Bamer Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Tornado or high winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE. (1 and 2):
- 1. Tornado or high winds (sustained >80 m p h > one minute on the plant computer) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1.
2 (a orb)
- a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE OR b Control room indications of degraded safety system or component response due to event Note: National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423)-586-8400, can prowde addibonal info.
Tornado within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.
- 1.
Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 5-A) de
-4.
A L
L A
L L
5.2 Tornýdo Mode Initiating I Condition
EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 36 of 52 TABLE 5-1 Plant Structure Associated With Tornado/High Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit #1 Containment Auxliary Building Unit #2 Containment Diesel Generator Bldg Control Building ERCW Pumping Station Intake Pumping Station Turbine Building CDWE Building Common Station Service Transformer's RWST Condensate Storage Tanks Additional Equipment Bldgs
EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 37 of 52 IIIIlldIll y I %.UIIUiILU1I Refer to "Fission Product Barrer Matnx" (Section 1) and Conbnue in This Column Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
River reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning as reported by River Operations.
A L
L River reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning as reported by River Operations.
A L
L
- 5.
Rie Lee UkO Mode Initiating I Condition (Section 1) and Continue in This Column Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrx" (Secbon 1) and Continue in This Column.
River reservoir level is < 670 Feet as reported by River Operations.
A L
L River reservoir level is < 673 Feet as reported by River Operations.
A L
L
EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 38 of 52 Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matrix" (Sect'on 1) and Contnue in This Column.
Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Secbon 1) and Continue in This Column Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Secton 1) and Contnue in This Column.
Watercraft strikes the ERCW pumping station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). (1 and 2):
- 1. Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck the ERCW pumping station A
- 2. (a orb)
L
- a. ERCW supply header pressure Train A 1 (2)-PI-67-493A is < 15 psig OR b ERCW supply header pressure Train B 1(2)-PI-67-488A is < 15 psig MVULIu i
EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 39 of 52 Figure 5-A SEQUOYAH EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY
EPIP-1 SQN DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON Rev 34 Page 40 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK I END OF SECTION 5
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 41 of 52 1-) -INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5-Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 1 Fire Y-/i2 Explosion Table 4-1 Figure 4-A 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-2 Figure 4-B 4.5 4.6 4.7 Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 Figure 7-A 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-2
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 42 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment
-XTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
(*)ULTED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g, eam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site IMMINENT: Within two hours INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.
k>AeNGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that X
1eCSF(s) is under severe challenge, prompt operator action is required PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.
RCS: The RCS primary side and Its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves RED PATH: Monitonring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of pnmary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip; (4)
Safety Injection System Activation, (5) Thermal Power Oscillations ;Ž10%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine, CO 2, etc)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank)
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc ) should NOT be included as visible damage VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
EPIP-1 SQN SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 34 Page 43 of 52 Mode Initiating / Condition
-4 Complete loss of function needed to achieve or 1,
2, 3,
4 a
%ut IipplJILUdu Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain hot shutdown. (1 and 2a or 2b):
- 1. Hot shutdown required.
2a CSF status tree indicated Core Cooling Red (FR-C 1).
OR 2b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H 1)
(RHR shutdown cooling not in service).
Note: Refer to 'Reactor Protecbon System Failure" (Section 2 3) and Continue in This Column.
Complete loss of function needed to achieve cold shutdown when cold shutdown required by Tech.
1, Specs. (land2and3):
- 1. Cold shutdown required by Tech Specs.
2,
- 2. Loss of RHR shutdown cooling capability 3 Loss of secondary heat sink and main condenser 3,
4 Note, Also refer to 'Faf7ure of Rx Protection" (Section 2.3) and Conbnue in This Column Inability to reach required shutdown within Tech.
Spec. limits.
- 1. The unit has not been placed in the required mode within the time prescribed by the LCO action 2,
statement.
3, 4
EPIP-1 SQN SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 1*4 Page 44 of 52 3
ode Referto 'Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column Loss of REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM inventory with inadequate makeup. (I and 2 and 3):
- 1. Reactor coolant system is pressurized above atmospheric pressure
- 3. With reactor coolant system temperature stable, the pressurizer level continues to decrease following initiation of RCS makeup I END OF SECTION 6 1
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 34 Page 45 of 52
._I INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 4.5 4.6 4.7 Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A I
7
EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 34 Page 46 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs, Subcnticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authonty to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
(
ULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e g,
.feam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.
Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site IMMINENT: Within two hours INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction In the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from Identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitonng controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.
RJANGE PATH: Monitonng of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that
\\,_-.die CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled RCS: The RCS pnmary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following- (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip, (4)
Safety Injection System Activation, (5) Thermal Power Oscillations >10%
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlonne, CO 2, etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank)
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an Instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant Indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnell Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage Includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, scratches, etc ) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains Sequipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS EPIP-1 Rev 34 Page 47 of 52
- 7. Liui Eflens.
6VIVU.
111tidli~.it1ay I %.U11UILIU1i EAB dose, resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity > 1 Rem TEDE or > 5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of release. (1 or2 or3):
A
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General Emergency in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within L
that 15 minutes confirms that the cntenon is not exceeded L
- 2. Field surveys indicate >1 Rem/hr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3 9E-06 pCLcm3 at the EAB (Fig. 7-A)
A qJ OR
- 3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >1 Rem TEDE or >5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Fig* 7-A)
EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity >100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem thyroid CDE for actual or projected duration of release. (1 or 2 or 3):
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Site Area for A
> 15 minutes, unless assessment within that 15 minutes confirms L
that the critenon is not exceeded.
R OR L
- 2. Field surveys indicate >100 mrem/hr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3 9E-07 pCi/cm3 at the EAB (Fig 7-A)
OR 3 Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >100 mrem TEDE or
>500 mrem thyroid CDE for actual or projected duration of the release (Fig 7-A)
Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit for >15 minutes.
(1 or 2 or 3 or 4)
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Alert for >15 A
minutes, unless assessment within that 15 minutes confirms that the L
cnterion is not exceeded OR L
- 2. Field surveys indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma at the EAB for >15 minutes (Fig 7-A).
OR 3 Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Fig 7-A).
OR 4 Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of gaseous radioactivity >15 minutes in duration.
Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit for >60 minutes.
(1 or 2 or 3 or 4)
- 1. A VAUD rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under UE for >60 A
minutes, unless assessment within that 60 minutes confirms that the L
criterion is not exceeded.
OR L
2 Field surveys indicate >0.1 mrem/hr gamma at the EAB for >60 minutes (Fig 7-A)
- 3. Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >0 1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Fig 7-A).
- 4. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of gaseous radioactivity >60 minutes in duration Mode
-4 A
L L
A L
L Initiating I Condition Not App/icable.
Not Applicable Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Section 1.2.1.1 Limit for
>15 minutes. (1 or2)
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Alert for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion is not exceeded OR
- 2. Sample results indicate an ECL >200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Section 1.2.1.1 Limit for >60 minutes.
(I or2)
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under UE for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion is not exceeded OR
- 2. Sample results indicate an ECL >2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration.
SQN I
I
EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 34 Page 48 of 52 TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS NOTE. The monitor values below, if met or exceeded, indicate the need to perform the required assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the appropriate emergency classification shall be made based on the VALID reading GASEOUS MONITORS Units(2)
UE Alert SAE General Emer Site Total Release Limit jiCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31E+09 U-1 Shield Building 1-RI-90-400 (EFF jLCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31 E+09 LEVEL)
U-2 Shield Building 2-RI-90-400 (EFF piCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31 E+08 1.31 E+09 LEVEL)
Auxiliary Building O-RM-90-101B Limit cpm 1.03E+05 Offscale(1)
Offscale()
Offscale(*)
Service Building O-RM-90-132B Limit cpm 2.62E+06 Offscale(*)
Offscalef1 )
Offscale(*'
U-1 Main Steam Line Monitors(2)
+/-Ci/cc 1.71 E-01 1.71 E+01 4.58E+01 4.58E+02 1-RI-90-421 thru 424 U-2 Main Steam Line MonitorsfZ) pCi/cc 1.71 E-01 1.71 E+01 4.58E+01 4.58E+02 2-RI-90-421 thru 424 U-1 Condenser Vac Exh mR/h 4.1 0E+02 4.10E+04 1.09E+05 1.09E+06 "1-RM-90-255 or 256 Limit U-2 Condenser Vac Exh mR/h 4.1OE+02 4.10E+04 1.09E+05 1.09E+06 2-RM-90-255 or 256 Limit RELEASE DURATION minutes
>60
>15
>15
>15 LIQUID MONITORS Units UE Alert Site Area General Emer Site Total Release Limit
- .Ci/ml 6.50E-03 6.50E-01 N/A N/A RM-90-122-RadWaste cpm 1.45E+06 Offscale(1 )
N/A N/A RM-90-120,121-S/G Bldn cpm 1.07E+06 Offscale(l)
N/A N/A RM-90-225-Cond Demin cpm 1.90E+06 Offscale(l)
N/A N/A RM-90-212-TB Sump cpm 2.33E+04 2.33E+06 N/A N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes
>60
>15
>15
>15 ASSESSMENT METHODS* + Airbome Dose Assessment per SQN EPIP-13 'Dose Assessment"
" ODCM Uquid Release Rate assessment per SQN 0-TI-CEM-030.030 0
"* Integrated Airborne Release Rate assessment per SON 0-TI-CEM-030.030 0 (1) The calculated value is outside of the upper range for this detector. The maximum monitor output which can be read is 100E+07 cpm. Releases in excess of monitor capacity should be evaluated for proper classification by use of Dose Assessment.
(2) These unit values are based on flow rates through one PORV of 890,000 lb/hr at 10787 psia with 0 25% carry over (0 9975 quality). Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing, (e g, PORV)
NOTE 1: These EALs are based on the assumption that an emergency release is restricted to one pathway from the plant. In all cases, the total site EAL is the limiting value Therefore, in the case where there are multiple release paths from the plant, it is the total release EAL (obtained from ICS and/or SQN 0-TI-CEM-030-030, "Manual Calculation of Plant Gas, Iodine, and Particulate Release Rates for Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Compliance"TI-30) that will determine whether an emergency classification is warranted.
"-OTE 2: In the case when there is no CECC dose assessment available, the length and relative magnitude of the release is the key in determining the classification For example, in the case of the NOUE EAL of 2 times the Tech Spec limit, the classification is based more on the fact that a release above the limit has continued unabated for more than 60 minutes, than on the projected offsite dose NOTE 3 See REP Appendix B for basis information I
EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 34 Page 49 of 52 Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY
EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 34 Page 50 of 52 Initiating I Condition Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Section 1) or 'Gaseous Effluents" (Secton 7.1) and Continue in This Secbon.
Referto 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx" (Secton 1) or "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Section.
UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the facility that impedes safe operations or establishment or maintenance of cold shutdown.
(I or 2):
- 1. VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results exceed 15 mrem/hr in the control room or SAS.
- 2. (a and b)
- a. VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2.
b Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for safe operation or the ability to establish cold shutdown (See Note Below)
UNPLANNED increase in radiation levels within the facility.
- 1. A VALID area radiation monitor reading increases by 1000 mrem/hr over the highest reading in the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> excluding the current peak value Note: In either the UE orALERT EAL, the SED must determine the cause of increase in radiation levels and review other inibabng conditions for applicability (e g, a dose rate of 15 mrem/hr in the control room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA) i
-I.
A L
L
-4 A
L L
I Mode Initiating I Condition Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Section.
Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Secbon 7.1) and Contnue in This Section Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel. (1 and 2):
- 1. VALID alarm on RM-90-1 01 or RM-90-102 or A
RM-90-103 or RM-90-130/131 or RM-90-112 L
2 (aorb)
AND L
a Plant personnel report damage to irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods OR
- b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered in the spent fuel pool or transfer canal UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered. (I and 2 and 3):
- 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel A
pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal L
2 VALID alarm on RM-90-101 or RM-90-102 or L
RM-90-103 3 Fuel remains covered with water
EPIP-1 SQN RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Rev 34 Page 51 of 52 Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS END OF SECTION 7.
Location Meter Monitor No.
Area and Elevation Reading I t-r n~urnoses of comnarina the mnete.r/mo~nitor ren*dino v~qhie.* to* this* tnhle, it rn he R..Hn#.md that mR i.* en.uih'le~nt to mrem 1,2-RM-90-1 Spent Fuel Pit ARM El. 734.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-3 Waste Packaging ARM El. 706.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-4 Decontamination 1.5E+03 mR/hr Room ARM El. 690.0 0-RM-90-5 SFP Pumps ARM El. 714.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-6 CCS HXS ARM El. 714.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-7 Sample Rm ARM El. 690.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-8 AFW Pumps ARM El. 690.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-9 Waste Cnds Tks ARM El. 669.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 1,2-RM-90-1 0 CVCS Bd ARM El. 669.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-11 Cntmt Spray and 1.5E+03 mR/hr RHR Pumps Radmon El. 653.0 0-RM-90-102 Spent Fuel Pit 1.5E+03 mR/hr Radmon El. 734.0 0-RM-90-103 Spent Fuel Pit 1.5E+03 mR/hr Radmon El. 734.0 0-RM-90-230 CNDS Demineralizer 1.5E+03 mR/hr ARM El. 685.0 0-RM-90-231 Cnds Demineralizer 1.5E+03 mR/hr ARM El. 706.0 I Note:
All of the above monitors have a range of 0.1 to IE+4 mrem/hr.
I A
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