ML17334B065

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Forwards Replacement Pages to Final Draft of Rev 1 to Safe Shutdown Capability Assessment,Proposed Mods & Evaluations (Ssca), Transmitted on 870212.Following Insertion of Pages, Rev 1 Should Be Considered Final
ML17334B065
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 03/20/1987
From: Alexich M
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To: Harold Denton
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17334B066 List:
References
AEP:NRC:0692AZ, AEP:NRC:692AZ, GL-86-10, NUDOCS 8703300159
Download: ML17334B065 (31)


Text

INDIANA 8 M I CHIGAN ELECTRIC COA1 PAN Y P.O. BOX 16631 COLUMBUS, OHIO 43216 March 20, 1987 AEP:NRC:0692AZ Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316 License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74 FINAL SUBMITTAL OF REVISION 1 TO "SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS" U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 ATTN: Mr. Harold R. Denton

Dear Mr. Denton:

In our submittal AEP:NRC:0692AW, dated February 12, 1987, we provided a final draft of Revision 1 to the report entitled "Safe Shutdown Capability Assessment, Proposed Modifications, and Evaluations" (SSCA).

We also indicated in that letter that we would submit a final, approved version of Revision 1 to the SSCA by March 20, 1987. Attachment 1 to this letter contains replacement pages for the draft Revision 1 to the SSCA provided by the February 12, 1987 letter (AEP:NRC:0692AW). Following insertion of these replacement pages, Revision 1 to the SSCA should be considered final.

In addition, based on a request made by Mr. D. L. Wigginton during a teleconference with him and Mr. A. Singh of the NRC staff held on February 24, 1987, Attachment 2 to this letter is a summary of the substantial differences between Revision 1 and Revision 0 to the SSCA, was submitted in our letter AEP:NRC:0692E, dated March 31, 1983. 'hich (Supplements were also submitted in our letter AEP:NRC:0692H, dated August 22, 1983, and AEP:NRC:0692U, dated August 13, 1984.) The changes that are not addressed in this summary are corrections of typographical or grammatical errors or clarifications of information submitted in Revision 0. These changes are indicated by margin bars in Revision l.

We understand that NRC Region III, Office of Inspection and

.E'n'forcement, is planning an audit of D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Appendix R compliance this summer. We request that the basis of this audit be the final, approved version of Revision 1 to the SSCA Report attached to this letter, rather than our March 1983 submittal and later supplements.

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AEP:NRC:0692AZ 2 As stated in our submittal AEP:NRC:0692AM, dated May 30, 1986, we are conducting a review of the proposal to place the entire Fire Protection Program into the upcoming FSAR update. The attached SSCA will eventually be a part of that program if we elect to implement the options in Generic Letter 86-10 to remove fire protection related items from our Technical Specifications. As a first step in this process it is our intent to publish the appropriate portions of the attached SSCA as part of the 1987 Cook Plant Updated FSAR. For this reason we would greatly appreciate your review of the SSCA by June 30, 1987. If it is not practical for this review and approval to be accomplished by June 30, 1987, our intentions are to proceed with the incorporation of the SSCA into the FSAR. We would then indicate in the FSAR that NRC approval of this document is pending.

This document has been prepared following Corporate procedures which incorporate a reasonable set of controls to insure its accuracy and completeness prior to signature by the undersigned.

Very truly your Vice President Attachments MPA/mi cc: John E. Dolan W. G. Smith, Jr. - Bridgman R. C. Callen G. Bruchmann G. Charnoff NRC Resident Inspector - Bridgman (w/attachments)

A. B. Davis - NRC Region III (w/attachments)

Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0692AZ This attachment contains replacement pages for the draft SSCA, Revision 1 submitted with AEP:NRC:0692AW, dated February 12, 1987. Following insertion of these replacement pages in the draft, Revision 1 to the SSCA should be considered final.

TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR F IRE AREAS'IRE MI N I MUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXI STING EX I STING AREA I FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE AREA+ DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER I

i i UNIT 1 QUADRANT 2 CABLE TUNNEL I

I EL. 612 '0" I 1-1/2 31.0 41.288 2, 650 2.2. 2.3, 2.8, 2.9 i 38 7 IONIZATION I AUTOMATIC 4 INFRARED i C02 I (SEE NOTE 40)I UNIT 2 QUADRANT 2 i CABLE TUNNEL EL. 612' 39 7 I ON I ZAT I ON AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 23.0 30,622 2.667 2.2, 2.3. 2.8 ~ 2.9 4 INFRARED C02 (SEE NOTE 40)I I

UNIT 1 4kV SWITCHGEAR ROOMS I EL. 609' I 40A 2 IONI ZAT IDN I AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 15.5 20.616 1,476 2.2, 2.8 i 3 INFRARED C02 ( SEE NOTE 14)I I I 408 2 IONIZATION I AUTOMATIC 13. 6 18, 144 1,440 2.2, 2.8 3 INFRARED C02 TOTAL 14. 6 19, 394 2,916 i UNIT 1 ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS

! AND MCC ROOM EL. 609' 41 i 9 IONI ZATION i AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 20.7 27, 614 3, 096 2.2, 2.4. 2.8~ 2 '

1 i(3 UNDER FLOOR)i C02 I(SEE NOTE 15)

I I 5 INFRARED I i(2 UNDER FLOOR)i EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.

PAGE 22 OF 35

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TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*

MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT F IRE FIRE AREAR'XISTING DETECTION EXI STING SUPPRESSION I AREA BOUNDARIES I FIRE SEVERITY (MINUTES)

LOAD BTU/FT2 AREA FT FIGURE NUMBER UNIT 1 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEMS aREa EL. 609'-0" l

42A 2 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 3.7 5.080 I 1,209 2.2, 2.4. 2.8 2 INFRARED C02 428 2 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 7.3 9,712 922 2.4. 2.8 1 INFRARED COZ I

42C 3 IONIZATION I AUTOMATIC 1.8 2.392 530 2.2. 2.4. 2.8 2 INFRARED I C02 I

420 1 IONIZa~ ION I NONE 33.5 44,583 503 2.2. 2.4. 2.8 TOTAL 9.2 12,258 I 3,164 I

I I UNIT 2 ENGINEERED I

~ SAFETY SYSTEMS AND MCC ROOM I EL. 609' I I 45 I 9 IONIZATION I AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 I 17.6 23,443 2.884 2.2. 2.5. 2,8,2.9 I I(3 UNDER FLOOR)i COZ I(SEE NOTE 16)I 5 INFRARED I(2 UNDER FLOQR)I EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.

PAGE 23 OF 35

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TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS' MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE IRE AREAR'XISTING DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDAR I ES I

(MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER I

I UNIT 2 EMERGENCY I POWER SYSTEMS AREA EL. 609'-0' I 46A 2 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 3.5 4,793 1,209 2.2, 2.6. 2.8 I 2 INFRARED I C02 I I I 468 2 IONI ZAT ION AUTOMATIC 8.3 11.150 922 2.5. 2.8 1 INFRARED I C02 46C 3 I ON I ZAT ION AUTOMATIC 4.0 5,502 530 2.2, 2.5. 2.8 2 INFRARED C02 46D 2 IONIZATION*/ NONE 30. 0 39.973 503 2.2. 2.5. 2.8 TOTAL 9.2 12,356 3.164 I

UNIT 2 4kV I SWITCHGEAR ROOMS I EL. 609' 47A 2 IONIZATION I AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 14. 4 19, 158 1,476 2.2, 2.8 3 INFRARED [ COZ I(SEE NOTE 17)I I I 478 2 IONIZATIUN I AUTOMATIC 12.9 17, 136 1,440 2.2, 2.8 3 INFRAREU C02 TOTAL 13. 6 18, 159 2,916 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZPNFS.

PAGE 24 OF 35

    • A second ionization detector was added after the 1986 Unit 2 refueling outage.

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Control Rooms and in the area of the component cooling water pumps. The following sections provide the details of the safe shutdown systems and fire protection analyses performed; these sections also demonstrate that strict compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R would not enhance fire protection safety above that which is provided by the proposed commitments.

The following exemption requests are contained in this 1

section:

Subsection Descri tion Facae 7.2 Automatic suppression exemption 7-7 request for Fire Zones 1, lA through 1H, 136, 137, 138A through 138C, RHR/CTS pump area, Auxiliary Building, el 573 ft 7.3 Fixed suppression exemption 7-19 request for Fire Area 14, Transformer Room, el 591 ft, Unit 1 7.4 Fixed suppression exemption 7-24 request for Fire Area 20, Transformer Room, el 591 ft, Unit 2 7.5 Fixed suppression exemption 7-29 request for Fire Zones 29A,B,E, Unit 1 ESW pumps and MCCs 7.6 F xed suopression exemption 7-36 request for Fire Zones 29C,D,F, Unit 2 ESW pumps and MCCs 7.7 Automatic suppression exemption 7-43 request for .Fire Zone 29G, Screenhouse Auxiliary MCC Room, el 575 ft, both units Page 7-5

7.8 Fixed suppression exemption 7-52 Fire Zones 33, 33A, 33B, and 105, Unit 1 East Main Steam Valve Enclosure and Contractor Access Control Building 7.9 Fixed suppression exemption 7-58 Fire Zones 34, 34A, 34B, Unit 2 East Main Steam Valve Enclosure 7.10 One-hour-rated enclosure exemp- 7-64 tion request for Fire Zone 44S, Auxiliary Building South, el 609 ft, both units 7.11 Fixed suppression exemption 7-75 request for Fire Area 53, Unit 1 Control Room 7.12 Fixed suppression exemption 7-82 request for Fire Area 54, Unit 2

~Control Room 7.13 Fire-rated damper exemption 7-89 request for Auxiliary Building HVAC Duct Penetrations for Fire Zones 1, 6N, 6S, 44N, 44S, 52 and 69 49,'0, 7.14 Fire-rated seal exemption request 7-107 for Containment Building seismic gaps for Fire Zones 7, 8, 9, 10, 12; 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 33B, ll, 34B, 38, 39, 49, 50, 69, 108 and 109 Page 7-6

B. Safe Shutdown Equipment MPP-210, 211, 212, 240, 241, 242 SG Pressure Transmitters MRV-213, 243 SG Power Operated Relief Valves SV-1, 2, 3, Safety Valves FMO 21 1 g 212 241 I 242 SG Supply MOVs LSI-1 Local Shutdown Station C. Fire Hazards

1. Type of combustibles in area Cable insulation Charcoal Cellulosics Class B solvents Plastics Rubber
2. Total fixed combustible loading considered (or the purpose of the analysis 27,000 Btu/ft
3. Actual quantity of fixed combustibles Cable 25,446,125 Btu Charcoal - 2,145,000 Btu Cellulosics 31,019,871 Btu Class B solvents 3,102,000 Btu Plastics - 18,486,386 Btu Rubbe'r 3,259,875 Btu TOTAL 11,533 Btu/ft D. Existing Fire Protection
1. Fire Detection Systems Thermistor heat detection for the charcoal filter unit
2. Fire Extinguishing Systems Manual deluge water spray for the charcoal filter unit Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers (ABC, Purple-K and CO2) available Automatic wet pipe sprinklers in Fire Zone 105 Page 7-57

7.9 Fire Area 34, 34A, 34B Unit 2 East Main Steam Valve Enclosure EXEMPTION REQUEST Per the provisions of 10 CFR 50.48(c)(6) and 10 CFR 50.12 Indiana and Michigan Electric Company requests exemptions from the specific requirements of Appendix R, 'Section III.G.3, i.e., a"fixed fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.

7.9.1 Fire Area Descri tion Fire Area 34, 34A, 34B is located immediately outside the Containment Building of Unit 2 at an elevation of 612 ft. This fire area is the Unit 2 counterpart to Fire Area 33, 33A, 33B.

The area includes the south area around containment that contains main steam lines and also includes the nonessential service water valve gallery on the west side directly opposite the East Main Steam Valve Enclosure. Pertinent dimensional data is contained in Table 7.9-1, Fire Area 34, 34A, 34B. Evaluation Parameters Summary and Figure 7.9.

7.9.2 Safe Shutdown E ui ment Fire Area 34, 34A, 34B contains all main steam pressure transmitters for steam generators 1 and 4, the electro-pneumatic transmitters for all four Unit 2 generator power operated relief valves, steam generators 1 and 4 auxiliary feedwater inlet valves'FH0-211, 212, 241, 242), the local shutdown indication panel (LSI-1) and the power operated relief valves and safety for steam generators 1 and 4. The main steam valves for steam generators 1 and 4 are also in the area.

Page 7-58

Fire Protection E ui ment Fire Zones 79 and 85 are protected by automatic detection and wet pipe sprinklers .systems. Automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are provided in Fire Zones 77 through 94 and Fi.re Zones 96 through 99. Automatic thermistor, detection and C02 suppression are provided in Fire Zones 83, 88, 95 and 100, with dry pilot preaction sprinkler systems provided in Fir e Zones 95 and 100. The turbines in Fire Zones 129 and 130 are provided with automatic thermistor detection and manual closed head water spray suppression under the appearance lagging, and dry chemical suppression for the turbine bearings. Fire Zone 124, 125, 126, and 127 contain various levels of automatic detection and suppression capabilities.

Fire Hazards Anal sis In order to resolve both the inconsistencies between previously identified fire areas and the impact of the NFZ's, an Appendix R safe shutdown analysis has been performed with respect to combining these locations into a single fire area. The results are the following:

(a) When Unit 1 Main Steam Pipe Tunnel Area (Fire Zones 108 and 110) is combined with Turbine Building Area, Unit 1 can be safely shut down by using Unit 2 East Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. This alternate snutdown action wi'1 be required when a fire propagates between Fire Zones 108 and 79. For a fire to propagate between these fire zones, the fire would have to be of sufficient duration and intensity to engulf* Fire Zones 110 and 80 (Fire Zone 80 is protected by an automatic sprinkler system).

Page 9-83

(b) When Unit 2 Main Steam Pipe Tunnel Area (Fire Zones 109 and 111) is combined vith Turbine Building Area, Unit 2 can be safely shut down by using Unit 1 East Auxiliary 03 Feedvater Pump. This alternate shutdown action will be required vhen a fire propagates betveen Fire Zones 109 and 85. For a fire to propagate between these fire zones, the fire would have to be of sufficient duration and intensity to engulf Fire Zones ill and 84 (Fire Zone 84 is protected by an automatic sprinkler system).

(c) When both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Steam Pipe Tunnel areas are combined together vith the Turbine Building into one fire area, safe shutdown is not impacted for either unit. In the highly unlikely event of a fire involving all of the above mentioned fire zones, both units can be safely shut down using opposite units Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. For this fire scenario, one train of the other safe shutdown systems will be available for each unit. Required manual actions are (1) opening of the AFW Cross-Connect Valves and (2) isolation of the steam supply paths to Unit 1 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump. There would be no requirement for one

.or three hour barriers, additional detection or suppression systems, or exemption requests in order to meet the criteria of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.

As such, the folloving fire zones are now considered to

~g be part of a single fire area: 2, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86,- 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130 and 131.

Conclusion Based on the previous evaluation, the ten fire areas in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Buildings, the entirety of the Serv j,ce'I'9ffice Building the main turbine deck and the Unit I and Unit 2 main steam pipe: tunnels can be combined into a single, fire area. In addition, this evaluation does not adversely impact on other evaluations or exemption requests contained in this report. The bases for this conclusion are summarized as follows:

~i Page 9-84

along the north wall of Fire Area 12. A distance in excess of 250 ft separates the openings, from Fire Area 116 to Fire Area 12 and Fire Zone 33.

Safe Shutdown E ui ment Fire Area 116 contains no safe shutdown equipment. Fire Zone 33 contains the following valves and associated cabling for Steam Generators 1 and 4:

o Safety valves AFW feed regulation valves o Pressure transmitters o MSIVs o PORVs o LSI panel Fire Zone 12 contains the following valves and associated cabling for Steam Generators 2 and 3:

o AFW feed regu'lation valves o Containment sump to RHR pump suction valve o, LSI'panel Should a fire involve both Fire Zone 33 and Fire Area 12, the potential exists to lose power to control the position of the AFW feed regulation valves for all four steam generators.

However, the valves are normally open. Should fire damage the cables to these valves, they fail as is, which is in the open position.

Page 9-141

Fire Protection E ui ment Oj Automatic suppression and automatic detection are not provided in Fire Area 116 or Fire Area 12. Automatic detection

'as proposed for the fire area containing Fire Zone 33 in the March 1983 Appendix R Submittal to support the fixed area suppression exemption request for alternate shutdown. Manual suppression capabilities in the form of portable extinguishers are available for use in these locations with hose station also available for use in Fire Zones 33A, 33B and Fire Area 12. Two hose stations are installed in Fire Area 12.

Fire Hazards Anal sis Fire Area 116 has a fixed combustible loading and resulting equivalent fire severity of under 13,000 Btu/ft2 and 10 minutes respectively. (The actual combustible loading and equivalent fire severity existing at this time are 437 Btu/ft and 0.2 minutes, respectively.) Transient combustibles are not postulated in this area as it is a radiation area with access controlled by Health Physics, and access to the area is via ladders. Maintenance activities are minimal in this area, and it is not a normal access route to any other plant locations.

Reasonable assurance is provided that a fire in Fire Area 116 would not propagate out into either Fire Zone 33 or Fire Area 12.

Therefore, the two manway openings do not adversely impact on the 0

capabilities of the boundaries of Fire Area 116.

0, Page 9. 142

Fire Zone 22 contains the valves and associated cabling for steam generators 2 and 3:

o AFW feed regulation valves o Containment sump to RHR pump suction valve o LSI panel Should a fire involve both Fire Zone 34 and Fire Area 22, the potential exists to lose power to control the position of the AFW feed regulation valves for all four steam generators.

However, the valves are normally open. Should fire damage the cables to these valves, they fail as is, which is in the open position.

Fire Protection E ui ment Automatic suppression and automatic detection are not 0

provided in Fire Area 117 or Fire Area 22. Automatic detection was proposed for the fire area containing Fire Zone 34 in the March 1983 Appendix R submittal to support the fixed area suppression exemption request for alternate shutdown. Manual suppression capabilities in the form of portable extinguishers are available for use in these locations, with hose stations also available for use in Fire Zone 34A, 34B and Fire Area 22. Two hose stations are installed in Fire Area 22.

d ~1 Fire Area 117 has a fixed combustible loading of under 13,000 Btu/ft with a resultant equivalent fire severity of less than 10 minutes. (The actual combustible loading and equivalent Page 9-147

fire severity existing at this tame are 515 Btu/ft2 and 0.4 ~ j:

minutes, respectively.) Transient combustible are not postulated in this area as it is a radiation area with access controlled by Health Physics, and access

. to the area is via ladders.

Maintenance activities are minimal in this area, and it is not a normal access route to any other plant locations. Reasonable assurance is provided that a fire in Fire Area 117 would not propagate out into either Fire Zone 34 or Fire Area 22.

Therefore, the two manway openings do not adversely impact on the capabilities of the boundaries of Fire Area 117.

Fire Area 22 has a combustible loading of under 13,000 Btu/ft for an .equivalent fire severity of under 10 minutes.

(The actual combustible loading and equivalent fire severity existing at this time are 1,022 Btu/ft and 0.6 minutes respectively.) Maintenance activities are minimal in this area, and it is not a normal travel route to any other plant locations.

As such, minimal transient combustibles are postulated in Fire Area 22. Should a fire occur in this area, the products of combustion would tend to rise to ceiling level. As the manway opening to Fire Area 117 is accessed via a ladder to a trench below the normal floor level of Fire Area 22, reasonable assurance is provided that a - fire in Fire Area 22 would not Page 9-148

Fire Protection E ui ment Fire Areas 106 and 107 are each provided with an automatic heat detector. Automatic detection or suppression capability is not provided in Fire Areas 31, 35, 106, 107, and 146.

Fire Zones 32, 48, and 69 are provided with ionization smoke detectors and partial detection coverage is provided in Fire Zone

3. Dry pilot preaction suppression systems are provided in Fire Zone 32 and partial coverage is provided in Fire Zone 3. In addition, Fire Zone 69 is provided with an automatic thermistor detection system and manual deluge system for the HVAC charcoal filter units. Fire Zone 49, 50, 51, and 52 are provided with automatic fire protection features, specifically area ionization smoke detection and each charcoal filter unit is provided with a manual deluge system with an automatic thermistor detection system. An automatic dry pilot preaction suppression system is provided in the normally accessible area of Fire Zones 51 and 52.

Fire Hazards Anal sis The safe shutdown compliance method for the combined fire ar'eas will not change from that identified in the 1983 Appendix R submittal for the fire area containing Fire Zones 3, 31, 32, 35, 36, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 69, 106, 107 and 146 since the safe shutdown cables in Fire Areas 106 and 107 also are contained in Fire Zones 50 and 52.

Page 9-183

Conclusion Based on the results of the previous- evaluation, Fire Areas 31, 35, 106, 107, and 146 can be combined with Fire Zones 3, 32, 36, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, and 69 to form a larger fire area. This evaluation does not adversely impact on other evaluations or exemption requests contained in this report. The basis for this conclusion is that only Fire Areas 106 and 107 contain safe shutdown cables and these cables are also located in the fire area defined by Fire Zones 3, 32, 36, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52 and 69.

Page,9-184

(4) Steam generators 2 and 3 safety relief valves; and

{5) Unit 1 turbine driven AFW pump steam supply isolation valves.

Fire Zone 109 contains the following safe shutdown equipment and their associated cables:

(1) Unit 2 steam generators 2 and 3 PORVs;

{2) Pressure transmitters for steam generators 2 and 3; (3) Steam generators 2 and 3 main steam stop valves (MSSVs);

(4) Steam generators 2 and 3 safety relief valves; and

{5) Unit 2 turbine driven AFW pump steam supply isolation valves.

Redundant safe shutdown capability is available for Fire Zones 108, 109 and 69 outside of the fire area in which they are located. Therefore, fire could involve Fire Zones 69, 108, and 109 without impacting on redundant safe shutdown capability.

Fire Protection E ui ment Fire Zone 69 is provided with automatic detection capability and manual water spray suppression for the AHVs in the zone.

Neither Fire Zone 108 or 109 contain automatic detection or suppression capability.

Fire Hazards Anal sis Fire Zones 108 and 109 have a combustible loading of under 27,000 and 33,000 Btu/ft for an equivalent fire severity of under 20 and 25 minutes, respectively. (The actual combustible loading and equivalent fire severity existing at this time are 10,187 Btu/ft and 7.6 minutes for Fire Zone 108, and 15,872 Page 9-233

Btu/ft2 and 11.8 minutes for Fire Zone 109, respectively.) Should transient combustibles be brought into the zone, the combustible loading could increase to 40,000 Btu/ft for Fire Zone 108, and 47,000 Btu/ft2 for Fire Zone 109. This could result in an equivalent fire severity of 30 and 35 minutes, respectively.

Fire Zone 69 has a combustible loading of under 20,000 Btu/ft. for an equivalent fire severity of under 15 minutes.

(The actual combustible loading and equivalent fire severity existing at this time is less than 2998 Btu/ft and 2.2 minutes, respectively). The area in which this zone is located has an average combustible loading of less than 33,000 Btu/ft for an equivalent fire severity of 25 minutes. (The actual combustible loading and equivalent fire severity existing at this time are 17,283 Btu/ft and 12.9 minutes, respectively).

The seismic gap exemption request contained in Section 7.14 of this report demonstrated that fire could involve Fire Zones 49 and 108 or Fire Zones 50 and 109 without impacting on redundant safe shutdown capability. The evaluation contained in Section 9.9 of this report combined Fire Zones 49, 50, 51, and 52 into a larger fire area that included Fire Zones 3, 32, 36, 48, and 69.

The combination of the seismic gap exemption request and the evaluation contained in Section 9.9 of this report show that a fire originating from Fire Zones 49, 50, 108, or 109 will not jeopardize redundant safe shutdown capability. This is in part due to the modifications that were completed in Fire Zones 51 and Page 9-234

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'lQ/I ORAI COOLERS vb ooM RCIINTION ost I ORAI CCOLCRS 86~ 89 PLANT ARRANGEMENT SECT)ONSAA,B-B 8OC DI 4 - 83 I 81 Mcc VSC 88 8 tstttat UNITS t 82 Pl CL.ST taelc I tots 4 Nst OLICRIC (CALISILCNtt) CONOANsAT'4 CPLFLtttO HEAT)NflBOSLETC VSCIL TVNN CL- tLL F L,577 5 TANK ~ Peel ~ OIL NCEC 2-5 I 61-4 COHO BOOSTER PUMPS CL. 5CT)c2 I 143 CLSIPP 141 I 143 0 CABOOSTCQ PUMPS 1 Naa I CAUSTIC STORAAC TANK SCJNtN RASH CATION

~ CIOWISCR NiAKCTVINCLS ~ lpa .FI DDJJH CAUSTIC PUMP 1 40 'IHTAKC TVNSCLS tSSCNTW.N~

Melt SSPPT ICSCL ANON CIKNUCCR t)ISCH.TUNNEL Figure 2.1 ea Lw Mw att le Ac la SToRAoc. TAIJ)C~ S E CT1ON A-A ANCRKAACLCCTRK PONCR t RRCINSNAT strssft CORP.

ACN PORK I

B O I

0 y

LEGEND E ZONE NUMBER I -

3 I 8 IONIZATION DETECTOR I N"RARED DETECTOR CH3 HER MISTOR DETECTOR l

116 9 .HEAT DETECTOR 8.:.'Q'~: ".- .. 117

~ ~

~ ~ ~ .ISI... ~.  : -WET PIPE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM 66 61 74 HALON SUPPRESSION SYSTEM

':~g q:.8 .26 ~

FILE ROOM, CHART AND RECORDS (3) 8 AND :22 -CO2 SUPPRESSION SYSTEM SECURITY EQUIPMENT ROOM (2) 8 AND I

REMAINING FLOOR AREAS (10) 8 103 75 104 ~

L$ .

-PREAOTION SPRINKLER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM EL 595'.0 REMAINING FLOOR AREAS (3) 9 waaaaal3I SERVICE BLDG- I I I I t I 134 '8 135Ihaaaaa&I I STAIRWAYSUPPRESSION SYSTEM OFFICE BLDG. GAS 6 BOTTLE STCRAGE, AND

- 62 63~ I ROADWAY OVERHANG DELUGE SYSTE)Y(5  :::p 25 I OFFICE BLDG. NECH. 62 EQUIP. ROOIIIS 12 22 23@. NOTE: 1) CABLE TRAY THERMISTOR DETEC-I I I I I I 63G-

.... (3) ~ '

62C TION IS PROVIDED IN FIRE ZONES

.~4 8 5 66, 67, 74, 75, 103 AND 104
13.: 64 6~65 65  :::21:.. MANUALWATER SPRAY SYSTEM I

I 2) 8 A A IS PROVIDED FOR THE CHARCOAL 8 15 8 FILTER UNITS IN FIRE ZONE 5 8 110 814 . r I 20 8 8 6N I I I

8 8 8 6S I

8 8 8 I

I I II I

I 6M I I

I 8 8 8 17C 114 115 17 17 D G 17A 7B 80 85 128 131 77 82 78 89 83 29A 29C PLANT ARRANGEMENT 30 BASEMENT PLAN 29B 29D EL 591' 8 587'NITS1

&2 29E 29F 142 FIG 0 R E. 3 DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS .

3 ~

ggGEhlg 13o IREZONE NUMBER oNIZATION DETECTOR 32 HEAT DETECTOR

~ ONIZATION DETECTOR, ABOVE CEILING Qe34 8 RARED DETECTOR 8 HERMISTOR DETECTOR 8, IONIZATION DETECTOR UNDER FLOOR

(") 8 umllflFOR SERVICE8LDG, 132 69 107 133 48 e NALON SUPPRESSION SYSTEM 67 8 8 75 2' RCP <<=,'& RCP MANUAL WATER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM

( ) '9ANDIIIIFOR MECH EQUIPRM RCP RCP (EXTENSION)

ONLY 120 121 STAIRWAY SUPPRESSION SYSTEM 44a 51 44E t

EL 649'6" (EXTENSION) j REMAINING QC VAULT(2)Q ANDihhh FLOOR AREA(61)

RCP RCP RCP PREAOTION SPRINKLER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM

) Q 8 RCP 50 .WET PIPE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM 4F 8 t

12 4 22 108 109 rtMR~~ 8 I 44Dw NOTE: 1) CABLE TRAY THERMISTOR DETEC-106 TION IS PROVIDED IN FIRE ZONES 44H  ! 67 AND 75

~ 8 ~ 8 ~ 8ee

~ e ~~

eee oe 00 ~ ~ ~ 52 2) MANUALWATER SPRAY SYSTEM IS e ~ 0 ~ ~ eee 8 88 PROVIDED FOR THE CHARCOAL

~ 53 0~ 8 0 ~ 54 FILTER UNITS IN FIRE ZONES 49, 50 8 ~ e QS e 8 88 8888 AND 129

~ eeeeeee 8 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~

~ eo ~ 0 ~ eo oe 8888 8 ~

88 144 COMPUTER ROOM.(4) 8 126 ~125 145 COMPUTER ROOM CONSOLE ROOM<2) 8 CONSOLE ROOM (2) 8 129 CONSULTATION ROOM-(2) 8 CONSOLE ROOM.

Qi REMAININGAREA/9) 8 130 CONSULTATION ROOM-2 25 131 5 "I TURBINE I

e~

DRY CHEMICAL FOR TURBINE BEARING DRY CHEMICAL FOR TURBINE BEARING PLANT ARRANGEMENT TURBINE BUILDING MAIN FLOOR EL 633'NITS1 8 2 DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS. -.- =

FIGURE 3 5

4' I 0