ML19257B936

Forwards LER 80-001/01T-0

ML19257B936
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	01/11/1980
From:	Lessor L NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML19257B937	List: ML19257B936 ML19257B938
References
CNSS800027, NUDOCS 8001210273
Download: ML19257B936 (3)

Text

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COOPER NUCLEAR STATaoN f -

Nebraska Public Power District " " "A"E," 0!'tA'; %".",^n" "

l h:1 CNSS800027 January 11, 1980 Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with Section 6.7.2.A.6 of the Technical Specifications for Cooper Nuclear Station and discusses a reportable occurrence that was discovered on January 2, 1980. Our initial notification was telecopied to your office on January 2, 1980.

A licensee event report form is also enclosed.

Report No.: 50-298-80-01 Report Date: January 11, 1980 Occurrence Date: January 2,1980 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Brownville, Nebraska 68321

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Identification of Occurrence:

Procedural error or procedural inadequacy which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of systems required to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Reactor power was at 86% of rated thermal power.

Description of Occurrence:

On December 31, 1979, at 1334 hours0.0154 days <br />0.371 hours <br />0.00221 weeks <br />5.07587e-4 months <br />, Surveillance Procedure 6.2.2.3.12, HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Monitor, Oil Pressure, and Supervisory Alarm Timer Calibration and Functional Test, was initiated. The purpose of this surveillance procedure is to perform a calibration and functional test of the HPCI auxiliary oil pump low oil pressure sensor, turbine stop valve monitor limit switch, and the supervi-sory alarm actuation timer. A portion of the surveillance test requires placing the HPCI Auxiliary 011 Pump control switch in the control room in the " Pull-To-Lock" position which prevents the HPCI turbine from operating. The instrument technician in the auxiliary relay room with the surveillance procedure data sheet discovered his pen had run out of ink, but decided to continue with the test 1774 303 gA

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Mr. K. V. Seyfrit January 11, 1980 Page 2.

relying on memory for the procedural steps completed. He was in communication with the instrument technician located in the HPCl room and the control room operator in the control room through the station communications system. When the procedural step which places the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump to the " Start" position was reached, the instrument technician called the control room operator and asked if the HPCI Turbine Stop Valve had started to "Open".

The control room operator informed the instrument technician that it had not as the HPCI Auxiliary 011 Pump control switch was still in the " Pull-To-Lock" position. The instrument technician told the control room operator to wait and he would get back with him. The instrument technician in the auxiliary relay room then conferred with the instrument technician in the HPCI room and through a misunderstanding in communication, thought the surveillance pro-cedure was complete. The surveillance procedure was then checked off and signed as completed by the instrument technician, who cleared the " Safety System Status Panel" and returned the procedure to the control room operator. The shift supervisor noted the surveillance procedure as completed and signed off as complete with no discrepancies. As a result of the procedural steps not being properly completed, the HPCI Auxiliary Pump Control Switch remained in the " Pull-To-Lock" position, rendering HPCI inoperable for automatic initiation for a period of approximately 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> until noted by the control room operator at the beginning of the 0000-0800 shift, January 2, 1980.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this occurrence has been attributed to personnel error due to the failure of instrument personnel to perform all proced-ural steps, and to the failure of operations personnel to check HPCI System configuration to ensure the system was returned to normal standby lineup.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The remaining high pressure ECCS System (ADS System), the low pressure ECCS Systems (LPCI Subsystem and Core Spray Subsystems),

and the RCIC System were operable during the period of time the HPCI System was inoperable for automatic initiation.

As a result of this occurrence, the HPCI System would have been unable to meet design requirements in the event of an auto in-itiation signal. HPCI operability could have been obtained through operator action, if required.

Since the remaining ECCS Systems were operable during this period of time, this occurrence presented no adverse consequences from the standpoint of public health and safety.

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0 Mr. K. V. Seyfrit January 11, 1980 Page 3.

Corrective Action:

The HPCI Auxiliary 011 Pump control switch was immediately placed in the proper " Auto" position. Surveillance Procedure 6.2.2.3.12 was performed satisfactorily on January 2,1980 to ensure comple-tion of all procedural steps.

This occurrence has been discussed directly with the personnel involved and indirectly with all the operations and instrument personnel. Operations and instrument personnel have been instruc-ted to check each procedural step as it is completed and that only operations personnel will change the status of the " Safety System Status Panel".

Sincerely, L. C. Lessor Station Superintendent Cooper Nuclear Station LCL:cg Attach.

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