IR 05000324/1989022

Insp Repts 50-324/89-22 & 50-325/89-22 on 890724-28.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Open Items,Especially Issue of Svc Water Lube Water Support Operability

ML20247D724
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	09/06/1989
From:	Blake J, Robert Carrion NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247D711	List: ML20247D706 ML20247D724
References
50-324-89-22, 50-325-89-22, NUDOCS 8909150053
Download: ML20247D724 (6)

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• y kMEP . UNITED STATES

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o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

r[ o . REGION il

.J' .y ,101 MARIETTA STREET, '

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• *. . ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-325/89-22 and 50-324/89-22-Licensee: Carolina Power.and Light Company

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P. O. Box 1551 e Raleigh, NC 27602-

. Docket.Nos.: 50-325'and'50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brun swi ck :1' and ' 2 -

~ Inspection Co ucted: July 24-28, 1989 Inspector: . # # '87 -

' r ior Date Si ed-Approved by: . a J Jf. Blake, Chief

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Date Signed aprials and Processes Section ngineering Branch Division of Reactor' Safety SUMMARY Scope:

This routine announced inspection was conducted in the areas of open items, especially the issue of Service Water Lube Water Support Operability. A total of eight open items were reviewe Results:

In the areas' inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie Of .the open items reviewed, none were closed. However, the technical aspects of the Service Water Lube Water Support Operability issue were satisfactorily resolved. The corrective action / management response to the issue will be

- addressed by the Resident inspector in a forthcoming report 8909150033 890907 PDR ADOCK 05000324 O PDC

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' REPORT DETAILS 1 Persons Contacted?

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. Licensee Employees y

• C. F. Blackmon, Manager of Operations

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S. Boyce, Project Engineer for ECCS

• A.1G..Cheatman, Manager - E&RC R. Cowen, Structural Engineer

• J. Dorman,' Supervisor - Quality Assurance

• J. L. Harness, General Manage *W. ' Rt Hatcher . Supervisor of _ Security

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• R. E. .Helme, Manager of. Technical Support

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• L. E.' Jones, Director of QA/QC

.*H. A. Jones, Director af On-Site Nuclear Safety R. :Knott, Senior Engineer (LED-Civil)

J. A. McKee,_ Quality Control Supervisor

• G. Monroe, Principal Engineer (NED)

• J. O'Sullivan, Manager of Training M. J. Pastva,' Regulatory Compliance Specialist

• R. M. Poulk, . Project Specialist - Reguitory Compliance

• R. 'L. Warden, Manager of Maintenance A. Washburn, System Engineer for_ Service Water H. L. Williams, Principal Engineer (NED)

A. Woods, Service Water Engineering for Outage Management Interrated Scheduling Section_(0MISS)

A. M. Worth, Engineering Supervisor, Technical Support Other ' licensee employees contacted during this inspection included security force members, technicians, and administrative personne NRC Resident Inspectors

• Ruland, Senior Resident Inspector W. Levis, Resident Inspector D. Nelson, Resident Inspector

'* Attended exit interview- Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) Followup on Licensee Identified Violations (LIVs)

(1) (0 pen) LIV 50-325, 324/88-24-05: " Failure to Maintain RHR SW Piping Temperature Below 120 F" The 120 F limit was based on the original stress analysis for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water (SW) piping

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downstream of the RHR heat exchanger. Because the temperature peaked at 215 F, the licensee. prepared Engineering Evaluation Report 88-0365 and re-evaluated. the pipe stress model for -the elevated temperature to determine piping operabilit Additional analysis was done to determir.e. if the piping would have remained operable at 215 F during a Design Basis Earth-quake. Also, a re-analysis of the pipe supports associated with the affected piping was completed to qualify them as operable .during a Design Basis Earthquake coincident with an

. operating temperature of 215 The inspector reviewed Calculation No. 2SW-261-02, Revision F-0, entitled . "Re-analysis of Pipe . Supports on Service Water ISO's D-2846,. Sheets 261, 262, 263, 266, and 267." This calculation includes 32 attachments which contain ' load summaries and other pertinent:informat % as well as individual support evaluation However, the pipe senss re-analysis was not available fo review and there vie no way to verify the loads shown on the summary sheets. Therefore, the pipe stress calculations must be reviewed during a future . routine inspection to evaluate this issue fully. This item remains ope Followup on Unresolved Items (UNRs)

(1) (0 pen) UNR 50-324/88-13-01: "As-Building Drawing Discrepancies for Torus External Piping Systems" The inspector requested a status report on this item from the cognizant licensee engineer and was told that the referenced discrepancies would most probably be resolved in the Phase II As-Built Piping System Walkdown Verification Program, rather than doing it as a separate " stand-alone" effort. This would allow the most ef ficient use of resources. However, it also means that this item will not be closed until the completion of the Walkdown Verification Program, scheduled to be finalized in 1992. Therefore, this item remains ope (2) (0 pen) UNR 50-325,324/88-36-01: " Suppression Pool '

Temperature Monitoring System Adequacy" The inspector held discussions with the cognizant licensee engineer concerning this issue because the information presented i for review was insufficient to close the item. The inspector  !

and the engineer agreed on what information is still needed and the engineer began an effort to procure i This item ,

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'(3) (0 pen) UNR 50-325,'324/88-36-04: " Accuracy of As-Built Phase 'II ,

Piping Walkdown Verification" ]

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The inspector monitored the progress of the Walkdown Verification' Progra This effort is the result of modifying -;

earlier programs 'and is designed to accurately reflect the "

as-installed configuration of the safety-related piping and !

supports. The Quality Control Supervisor informed the inspector .,

that the program is on schedule..with over 40%.of .the walkdown complete. Virtually a'11 of the walkdowns outside the drywells have been completed and currently none are in_ progress. They

.will resume with the upcoming Unit- 2 outage in Septembe Therefore, this item remains ope (4) (0 pen)UNR 50-325,324/89-07-02: " Service Water Lube' Water 1 Operability" J Upon arriving at the site, the inspector reviewed the referenced piping and supports to become familiar with the actual physical I configuration. All ten of the Lube Water Piping Supports had j been repaired by cutting away the corroded portions and replacing 'them with new material. This new material was then i covered by a Belzona surface treatment to act as a corrosion {

barrier against future deterioration. The inspector was told j that this is a temporary fix until Plant Modifications 83-220L I and 82-221-L are implemented. These modifications will convert the Service Water Pumps to " product-lube" pumps, i.e. internal self-lubrication by the fluid being pumped, water in this cas This conversion will allow the removal of all lube water piping, ;

valves, cyclone separators, lube water pumps, and existing ;

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support structur Only two small (less than 1" d) lines, for the motor cooler supply line and its return, will remain to be supporte The new supports are to be " Christmas Tree" type, a i vertical tube steel " trunk" with " branches" consisting of !

structural angles to support the line The tube steel is welded to base plates which are situated on 1" grout pads. The grout pads are utilized to elevate the supports above the general floor level, reducing their exposure to the corrosive environmen j The inspector reviewed Engineering Evaluation Report N , which detailed the test done to determined if a short !

run of Lube Water piping at the Service Water Pump bearing could ;

withstand a deflection of plus of minus 1" for the duration of Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) without failure, 12 seconds based upon Section 3.7.1.2.1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The preliminary analysis results indicated that the .,

fundamental frequency of the system is about 4 Hz. Therefore, the system could expect about 48 cycles during a DBE. The

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a actual test was conducted through 50 cycles. Also, the test specimen was hydrostatically tested to 1-1/2 times of the system's design pressure. The 225 psi hydro produced some slow seepage around the threaded connection at the assembly but none of the other joints showed any signs of leakag Upon .

completion of the test, the specimen was re-examine The j seepage around the threaded connection was slightly increased while the other joints remained water tigh The inspector judged the test to be an accurate, conservative representation of the actual physical configuration under seismic loading condition Upon the successful completion of the test, with its conservative assumptions, a rigorous quantitative analysis, Calculation 0-01534A-148, Revision 0, was done. A finite element model which incorporated the worst conditions of all the structures on the analyzed structure was use The model included the attached piping, and an attached ladder in addition to the pipe support structure itself. All sources of stiffness were utilized, even though they may not have been originally designed as part of the support systems, due to the urgency of the situatio As-found field data was gathered for the corroded support legs, piping configuration, support attach-ments, supports members and their configuration. This informa-tion was used to established nodal coordinates, members sizes, connection fixities, and other model properties. Stiffness associated with 1/2" ( pipe attached to the pump bearing was determined from information from the previously-conducted tes Stiffness associated with the cyclone separator nozzles was determined based on tests conducted previously and documented in Calculation 82-218A-01, Revision F1, dated August 14, 1986. The purpose of that calculation was to seismically age the cyclone separator and qualify it for piping load The computer input was reviewed by the inspector, especially noting and spot checking coordinates of nodes, member materials, member beginning and ending nodes, member releases (as appropriate),

member properties, and support point The output was also reviewed for madal information, especially frequency and related displacements for a given mode, as well as member forces and member stresses under the postulated seismic event. The natural frequency of the analysis piping / support structural system was 5.8 Hz, while the deflection corresponding to the 1 inch assumed deflection used in the laboratory simulation was 0.4 inc The stress levels of some of the members proved to be well above those nomally accepted as allowable, but they did remain in the elastic range, indicating that no plastic deformation should be expected even under the most severe postulated loading conditions. Therefore, from the strictly technical standpaint, operability of the Service Water Pump Lube Water Piping and its

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associated support was maintaine However, it must be emphasized that its success was based on the ability to incorporate structural properties of the piping itself and an attached ladder into the analysis, which is rather unorthodox in general, but most fortuitous in this particular cas Corrective actions and management's response to this issue will be addressed in an upcoming Resident Inspectors Repor Therefore, this issue remains ope Followup on Inspector Following Items (IFIs)

(I) (0 pen) IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-02: " Final Safety Summary Report For IEB 79-02" (2) (0 pen) IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-03: "Hilti Anchor Bolt Allowable Review and Justification Per IEB 79-02, NRC Information Notices 86-94 and 88-25" The inspector discussed these two open items with the cognizant licensee engineer. The final summary report is being prepared and will address the Hilti Anchor Bolt issues as well as those of the original IEB 79-02. Therefore, pending completion of the report, these two items remain ope (3) (0 pen) IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-05: "QA Auditing of the Supports in As-Built Phase II Piping System Walkdown Verification Program and the Modified Systems with QC Inspections" This item is closely associated with UNR 50-325, 324/88-36-04 (See paragraph 2.b.(3)). The inspector spoke to the Director of QA/QC and the QC Supervisor, who said that they preferred to use the term " surveillance" rather than " audit" to describe their on going efforts in reviewing the walkdown Verification Program throughout is life. An audit is usually conducted after the fact and is more formal in natur The surveillance is j proceeding on schedule and no significant breakdowns of the i program were cited. It is scheduled to be continued through the end of the Walkdown Verification Program in 1992. Therefore, this item remains ope . Exit Interview j The inspection scope and results were summarized on July 28, 1989, with

. those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas l l inspected and discussed in detail the inspection re sul t s . Proprieta ry J information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license ___