ML072980432

April/May 2007 Exam Nos. 05000327-07-301, 05000328-07-301 - Draft JPMs and Outlines (Part 1 of 3) (Section 3 of 3)

ML072980432
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	05/09/2007
From:	Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	NRC/RGN-II
References
50-327/07-301, 50-328/07-301 EPIP-1, Rev 39, EPIP-4, Rev 30
Download: ML072980432 (62)

Text

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP - 1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Revision 39 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY: Bill Peggram RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: Emergency Preparedness APPROVED BY: Kevin Wilkes EFFECTIVE DATE: 01/23/2007 Level of Use: Reference l

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

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Revision History Rev Oate Revised Pages Reasonfor Revision 36 02 /10 /2005 9,10 Revision Change : Revised RVLlS equivalent to core damage from 40% to 42% (DCN20591A PER75249 ). Removed duplicate word "exists" in EAL 1.3.3L 37 01/1812006 8,1 0,12,13, Revision Change: EAL 1.3.4 to incorporate huma n factoring 20,24,27,28, wording. EAL 2.1 wording clarification, added annunciator 29, 32, 38, 42, CRT. Changed plant computer to ICS. Rev ised EALs 4.6, 44,47 4.7 of the Event Classification Matrix to incorporate the guidance found in NRC Bulletin 2005-02 (BL2005-02) for security-based EALs. Table 4-3, Security Events was added.

Also , revised EALs in portion 4.7 of the Event Class ification Matrix to capture the new emergency classification definitions. The definitions were revised to add new definitions HOSTILE ACTION , and HOST ILE FORCE to support implementation of BL2005-02. EAL 7.3 to remove 0-RM-90-3 & 0-RM-90-4 from Table 7-2 , DCN # : D-2164 2-A Annual Review. Changed SAS to CAS in EAL 7.3 due to a typo in REP, R56 SON changed EAL 7.3 to match in R30.

38 11/22/20 06 10,46 Ann ual review, changed the "or" to "and" in EAL 1.3.2L "Containment pressure not increasing or sump level not increasing on L1-63-178 and [was or] 179 with a LOCA in progress." EAL1.3.2P: changed 2.81 to 2.8 due to set point changes in DCNE21988; PER 97896:changed PSID to psig to be consistent with CMT status tree; changed CMT spray wording. Values in Table 7-1 changed due to the change out for RM-90-212, Turbine Buiiding Sump [DCN 21837].

39 01/23/2007 46 Plan effectiveness detenmination reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Revised effluent radiation monitor EAL va lues for RM 212.

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I SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX ---'I - EPIP-1 ----JI

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Purpose .4 2.0 References .4 2.1 Developmental References , .4 3.0 Instructions .4 3.1 REP Activation .4 3.2 EAL Interp retation 5 3.3 Validation of Information , 5 3.4 Classificat ion Determination 5 4.0 Records Retention 6 4 .1 Records of Classified Emergencies 6 4.2 Drill and Exercise Records , , 6 EAL Section 1 - FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX 7 EAL Section 2 - SYSTEM DEGRADATION 11 EAL Section 3 - LOSS OF POWER 19 EAL Section 4 - HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT.. 23 EAL Sectio n 5 - DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 31 EAL Section 6 - SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 37 EAL Section 7 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS .4 1 l Revision 39 Page 3 of 47

ISEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX --'-I EPIP-1 --J I

( 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides criteria to the Shift Manager (SM) or Site Emergency Director (SED) to be used in classifying and declaring an emergency based on plant conditions . The responsibility for declaring an emergency, based on the criteria in this procedure, belongs to the SM or SED, the designated Unit Supervisor when acting as the SM, or the TSC SED. This responsibility cannot be delega ted.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Developmental Documents A. 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities .

B. Reg Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endors ing NEI 99-0 1 Methodology For Development Of Emergency Action Levels* Revision 4, January 2003.

C. Sequoyah Techn ical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) , Functional Restoration Guidelines (FRGs), Techn ical Instructions (TI), Surveillance Instructions (SI), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are also referenced in Append ix B of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

D. Letter to Bruce A. Boger, Director of Inspection Program Management, USNRC, December 8, 2001 from Lynnette Hendricks, NEI, Recommended Act ions in Response to a Site Specific Credible Threat at a Nuclear Power Plant (1A-01-1).

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 REP Activation The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when anyone of the cond itions listed in this matrix is detected and declared. The REP is not activated based on a reporting of past conditions. This procedure will be used in conjunction with the REP Appendix B.

If the event is determined to be one of the four emergency classifications then implement EPIP-2, -3, -4, or -5 as applicable.

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I SEQUOYAH 1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 1 EPIP-1 I

( 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 3.2 EAL Interpretation The criteria in SQN EPIP-1 are given for reference : knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken.

In all cases , this logic procedure should be combined with the sound jUdgment of the SM or SED to arrive at an appropriate classification for a particu lar set of circumstances. These criteria apply to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The SED must be aware of the affects of simultaneous events on both units.

3.3 Validation of Information If there is a reason to doubt if a given initiating condition has actually occurred , the SM or SED shall follow indications provided . Unless a suspected spurious or otherw ise false alarm can be substantiated within an acceptable timeframe (based on potential severity of the event), the SM or SED is to proceed with actions as required by this procedure until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.4 Classification Determination 3.4.1 To determine the classification of the emergency , review the Initiating Conditions of the respective status tree criteria that will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.2 If a Critica l Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.3 Declare the highest emergency class based on events that are in progress at the time that the classification is made.

3.4.4 If, during an ongoing event, investigation shows that a higher classification was previously met, then report that, as information only, to the Operat ion Duty Specialist (ODS) and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist unless it is a noted exception (I.e., EAL 2.3).

3.4.5 If. following termination of an emergency declaration, investigation shows that a higher classification was met, then report that, as information only, to the ODS and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist.

3.4.6 If conditions have returned to a non-emergency state before any emergency can be classified , then the highest emergency class that was appropriate shall be reported, as information only, to the ODS and NRC and shall not be declared unless it is a noted exception (l.e., EAL 2.3).

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( 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 3.4.7 The NRC shall be notified within one hour of all classifications. Once made and reported , a declaration cannot be canceled or rescinded even if it is later determined to be invalid. If there is reason to doubt that a given condition has occurred , the SM or SED shall follow indications and proceed with classification, as required by this procedure, until otherwise proven false.

3.4.8 The State shall be notified by the ODS within 15 minutes of any declaration and notified , for information only, within one hour of any classification that was met but not declared as allowed above. If the State is notified of a declaration that is invalidated before the NRC is notified, terminate the classification , if not already done, and report the declaration to the NRC.

3.4.9 The ACCEPTABLE timeframe for initiating notification to the ODS of an emergency declaration is considered to be five (5) minutes . This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and contacting the ODS.

4.0 RECORDS RETENTION 4.1 Records of Classified Emergencies The materials generated in support of key actions during an actual emergency classified as NOUE or higher are considered Lifetime retention Non-QA records.

Materials shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall submit any records deemed necessary to demonstrate performance to the Corporate EP Manager for storage .

4.2 Drill and Exercise Records The materials deemed necessary to demonstrate performance of key actions during drills are considered Non-QA records . These records shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall retain records deemed necessary to demonstrate six-year plan performance for six years . The EP Manager shall retain other records in this category for three years .

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I SEQUOYA H I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.6 2.7 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turb ine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas Table 4-2 Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capabi lity 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage l Revision 39 Page 7 of 47

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1

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Definitions and Abbreviations:

ODCM: Offsil e Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech BOMB : An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION) Specs. that contain Red Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls. and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) Of more persons within the EAB rT'ICIl'litor ererrrstnp setocote.

violently protesting ensue operations or activities at the site.

ORANGE PAT1-I : Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-o which indicates that CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.

BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure ring, and associated welds PROJECTILE: An object ejected. thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient 10 cause concern regarding the integrity of t he CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCllQN tCS Fs): A plant safety fufldion required to affected structure or the operat:ility or reliability of safety equipment contained prevent significant release of core radioac:tlvity to the environment . There are therein. The source of the projectile may be coste or otfsite.

six CSF s; Sutx:riti ca lity, Core Coo ling , Heat Sink, Press urized Thermal $hock.

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (Re S). PROTECTED AREA: The area ercorncessed by the security fence and to which acce ss is controlled.

EVENT; Assess ment of an EVE NT commen ces when recog nition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist . Implicit Res: The RCS primary side and its connections up 10 and ind uding the in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes. pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and ind uding the primary and secondary isolation valves.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAS) : That area surrounding the reactor, In which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities ind uding RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-Owhich indicates that the exd usion or rerrov al of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

Emergency Action Levels. based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calCIJations, the Site Boundary shall be defined RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Exist.enc:eof primary to secondary leakage of a as the EAB. magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, Of a catastrophic failure SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment. or misoperation of plant of pressurized or elecmce t equipment that irnparts energy d sufficient force to equipmerrtwith the intent to render the equipment inoper-able.

potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of EXTORT10N: An attempt 10 cause an action at the site by threat or force. thefollowtng: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)

Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load: (3) Reador Trip; (4) Safety FAULTED : (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g., Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations ~ 1 0% .

steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being oompletely depressurized. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of wor1c:ers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE A RE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as ACTION must. threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not consUMe a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dCVlQerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or smoke and/or heat are observed skin contact (e.g.* chlorine, CO:.r: , etc.)

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the L01JliER UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL). operations. testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that UNPLANNED.

demands will be met by the site.

UNPLANNED RElEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPlANNED if the HOSTlLE ACTlO N: An ad toward a nudear plant or its personnel th ai indudes release has not been authorized by a DiSCharge Permit (CPl. Implicit in this the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intirrld ale definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases the licensee to achieve an end. This ind udes attack by air, land or water; using that exceed a condition specified on the DP. (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum guns, explosives. pro;ectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver dilution flow, minimum release times. maximum release rates. and/or discharge destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included.

at incorrect tank).

HOSTllE ACTlON should NOT be construed to ind ude ads of civil VALID : An indication. report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the cond usively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on nuclear power plant. related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

assault, O'Vertly or by stealth and deception. equipped with suitable weapons VlSlBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without capable 01 killing. maiming, or causing destruction. measurements. testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure.

IMMINENT: Wllh in two hours. system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heal or impact, denting, penetration. rupture, craclOng , or paint blistering. Surface INEFFECTlVE: VVhen the specified restoralion action(s) does not result in a blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches. etc.) should NOT be ind uded as reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within visible damage.

15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains INIT1ATlNG CONDIT10N$: Plant Parameters , radiation monitor readings or equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan release of. could directly or indireclly endanger the public health and safety by Classification. exposure to radiation.

INTRUSlONnNTRUDER: Suscected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.

l ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

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I SEQUOYA H I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

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Function Status Function Status Potential LOSS Potential LOSS Core Cooling Red Core Cooling Orange Pressurized Thermal (FR-C.1) (FR-C.2) Shock Red (FR-P.1)

OR Heat Sink RED (FR-H.1) and RHR Shutdown Heat Sink RED (FR-H.1)

Coolin not in service and RHR Shutdown

-OR- Coolin not in service Coolant Activi==Le",v,.,e::-I-:;,....,-,==_-J -OR-Potential LOSS e I LOCA _-=:--:-....,.,....,..,...==--I Not Applicable RCS leak results in Non Isolatable RCS leak subcooling <40 of as exceeding the capacity

-OR- indicated on XI-94-101 of one charging pump in

3. Incore Thermocouple HI Quad Avera e or 102 (EXOSENSOR) the normal charging

• Potential LOSS alignment Greater than 1200 of on Greater than or equal to XI-94-101 or 102 700 of on XI-94-101 or EXOSENSOR 102 EXOSENSOR

-OR- RCS leakage results in

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level entry into E-1

• ='-==p""o""'te-n"::tl""a'"'lL'"'O=-S=-S=------l

-OR-Not Applicable VAliD RVLiS level

<42% on Li-68-368 or 3. Steam Generator Tube:..;R:..:u::Jp",t:::u.:.:re:"""",.,.,-c-=-=_-l Li-68-371 with no RCP

• Potential LOSS runnin SGTR that results in a Not Applicable

-OR- Safety Injection actuation

5. Containment Radlatlon~M~o:::n~lt~o~r- ::,-,,-,,.,==----I

• Potential LOSS VALID reading of Not Applicable greater than: Entry into E-3 2.8E+01 Rem/hr on

-OR-RM-9Q-271 or -272 4

LOSS Potential LOSS VAliD RVLiS level Not Applicable 2.9E+01 Rem/hr on <42% on Li-68-368 or RM-90-273 or -274 Li-68-371 with no RCP runnin

- OR - -OR-

6. SED Judgment 5. SED Judament Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or Any condition that, in the jUdgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss of potential loss of the Fuel SED, indicates loss of potential loss of the RCS Clad Barrier comparable to the conditions listed Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above. above.

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ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

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INSTRUCTIONS Note: A condition is considered to be Potential LOSS Containment Red MET if, in the judgment of the SED , the (FR-Z.l ) condition will be MET IMMINENTLY (i.e.:

OR with two hours). The classification shall Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) be made as soon as this determination is are INEFFECTIVE (i.e.: core made.

Tes trendtn u

- OR - 1. In the matrix to the left. REVIE W the

2. Conta inment Pressure I HLd=ro=e:;n~==,,=:;;-_ _--I initiating conditions in all three barrier

• Potential LOSS colum ns and circle the conditions that Rapid unexplained pressure Containment Hydrogen are MET.

decrease following initial increases to >4% by volume on increaseon PDI-30-44 or 45 H21-43-200 or 210 2. In each of the three barrier columns, OR OR IDENTIFY if any Loss or Potential Loss Containment pressure or sump Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase B) INITIATING CONDITIONS have been level not increasing on L1 with < one full train of MET.

178 and 179with a LOCA in containment spray pr ress 3. COMPARE the number of barrier

- OR- Losses and Potential losses \0 the

3. Conta inment Isolation Sta:;tu:;s'--;:;:= = = = =,--_ ---j criteria below and make the Containment isolation, when Potential LOSS Not Applicable appropriate decla ration.

require d is incomplete and a release path to the enviro nment Not e: MONITOR the respective status tree exists .

criteria if a CSF is listed as an

- OR - INITIATtNG CONDITION.

Potential LOSS Emergency Class Criteria RUPTURED SIG that is also Unexpected VALID increase in faulted outside containment (E2 area or ventilation RAD General Emergency and E3) monitors adjace nt to OR containment (with LOCA in LOSS of any two barriers and Potential

>4 hour secondary side release progress).

outs ide containment from a LOSS of third barrier SIG with a SIG tube leak >TIS limits AOP R.01 A A) Site Area Eme rgency

- OR-

5. Si nificant Rad iation in Co::.n:.:.t",a:.:.in:.:.m

.;;:e~n:.:.t====:-_-I LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two

• Potential LOSS barriers Not Applicable VALID reading of greate r than:

36E+02 Remlhr on RM-90-271 Alert and 272 Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad OR 2.8E+02 Remlhr on RM-90-273 barrier and 274 OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS

-OR- barrier

6. SED Judament Any condition that. in the judgmentof the SM or SED. Unusual Event indicates loss of pote ntial loss of the Conta inment Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.

LOSS or Potential LOSS of Conta inment barrier l Page 100f47 Revisio n 39

[SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 [

( FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.6 2.7 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4- 1 4 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas Table 4-2 Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5 5.2 Tornado 5.3 AircrafUProjectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage l Page11of47 Revision 39

I SEQUOYA H EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1

( Definitions and Abbreviations :

ODCM: Offs ite Dose Ca lculation Man ual is a supporti ng docume nt to the Tech BOMB : An explosive de vice . (See EXPLOS ION) Specs. that contain Red Effl uent Cootro ls, Environs MOOitori ng controls, and methodologyfO( calcula ting routine gaseou s and liqUid effluent offsit e do ses and CIVIL DISTURBAN CE: A g roup of twenty (20) or more persons withi n the EAB monit or alarm'trip setpoi nts.

'Iiolerrtl y protesting ensile operations or act ivities at the site .

ORA NGE PATH: Mo rVIoring of one or more CS Fs by FR-O w hich indi cates that CON FIN EM ENT BOUNDA RY: Spent Fuel Sto rage Cask CONFI NEM ENT the CS F(s) is under sev ere ch allenge; prom pt operator act ion is requ ired .

BOUNDARY con sists 01 MPC shell, bott om baseplate , MPC tid (including the vent an d drain port co ver plate s) , MPC clos ure ring, and associated weld s. PROJECTILE: An Object eject ed , throw n o r launch ed towa rds a plant struct ure resulting in dam age sufficie nt to cau se conce rn regar ding th e integ rity of t he CRI11CA L*$ A FETY FUN CnON ICSFsj = A plant safety function req uired 10 aff ected stru cture o r the operability or reliability of safety equip ment cont ained prevent sign ifica nt releas e of core radioad ivrty to the e nviro nment. There are therei n. The source of the projectile may be o nsile or off sile .

six CS Fs ; Subcritica litV, Co re Cool ing , Heat Sink. Pressurized Th erma l Shock ,

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (Re S). PROTEC TED AREA: The area encompa ssed by the security fence and to wtli<:h access is controlled .

EV ENT : Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognitionis made that one or more of the initiati ng conditions eescc e ted wit h the even t es tst. Implicit RCS: The RCS prima ry side and its connecti ons up to and inducing t he in th is defi nition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes . pressurizer safety and relief valves , and other connections up to and Including tha primary and second ary isolation valves .

EXCLUS ION AR EA BO UNDARY (EAB) : Tha t area surroun ding the react or, in which t he reac tor licen se s has the autho rity to determine all activities ind uding REO PATH : Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-Owhi ch indicate s that t he exctuston or removal of personn el and prop erty fro m the area. For purpo ses of CS F(s) is under ext reme challenge; prompt op erator acti on is required .

Eme rgency Actio n Level s, bas ed on radiological field measurements a nd dos e asses sments, and for de sign calcu lations, the Site Boundary shal l be defined RUPTU RED : (Steam Generato r) Existence of prima ry to secondary leakag e of a as the EAB. mag nitude greater than the capaci ty one chargi ng pum p.

EXP LOS IO N: Rapid , viol ent , unconfine d com bustioo . or a cat astrophic failure SABOTAGE: Del iberat e da mage. rri salignme nt. Of misoperation of plant of pres suriz ed or electJiCal equipm ent that imparts energy d sufficient force to equip ment with the intent to render the equipme nt inoperable.

potenti ally dam age permanent structures or equipme nt.

SIGNIFICA NT TRA NSIE NT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of EXTORTI ON : An at tempt to cause an action at t he site by th reat or force . the following: ( 1) An automati c turtli ne runback >15% therm al reactor pow er; (2)

Electrical load reject ion >25% fu ll elect rical load ; (3) Reactor Trip ; (4) Safety FAULTED: (S team Generato r) Existence of seco ndary side leak age (e.g ., Injectio n System Activat ion; (5) Ther mal Pow er Osci llati ons ?:1 0%.

steam or feed line break) tha t results in an uncontro lled decrease in steam generator pressure or the ste am genera tor bei ng compl etel y depre ssurized . STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTE CTED AREA by a body of work ers to enfo rce compliance wit h dem ands made on TVA . The STRIKE FIRE : Co mbu stion cha ract erized by heat and light. So urces of smoke such as ACTION must th reaten to interrupt nonn al plant operatio ns.

slipping drive belts or ov ertreated electrical com ponents do I"IOt constitute a fire Obs erv ation of name is prefe rred but is NOT required if larg e quantities Of TOXIC GAS: A gas thai is dangerous to life or li mb by rea son of inhal ation or smok e and/or heat are observed. skin contact (e .g. , chlorine , C ~ , etc.)

FLA MMABLE GAS : Co mb ustibl e gases at concentrations > t ha n the LO WER UN PlANNED : An even t or ecnon that is not the expected result of nonnal EXPLOSN E LIM IT (LEl). ope rations , testi ng or main tena nce . Eve nts that res ult in ccrrecnve or mitigative act io ns bein g take n in accord ance with abn ormal or emergency procedu res are HOSTAGE: A person(s) he ld as leve rage against the site to ensure that UNPLANNED.

demands will be met by the site .

UNPlANNED RELEASE: A relea se of radioad ivity is UN PLANNED if the HOSTILE ACTION: An ad tow ard a nudear plant or its pel"SOI'lnei that inc ludes release has not bee n authorized by a Disc harge Permit (DP). Implicit in this the use d viole nt force to de stroy equipme nt, take hostages. and/or intimidale definition are unintentional releases. unmonitore d releas es, or planned releases the lice nsee to achieve an en d . This includes attack by air, land or wa ter; using that exceed a condition specified on the DP. (e.g ., alarm setpoints . minim um guns. explosi ves, pro;eetil es, vehid es, or other devices used to deliver dilution flow , minimum rel ease ti mes, maximum rel ease rates, and/or discharge of incorr ect tank).

destructive force . Ot her act s t hat satisfy the overall int ent may be included.

HO STIL E ACTI ON shoul d NO T be consuuec 10 inclu de acts of e vil VA LID : An indication, report or condition is consid ered to be VAllO when it is disobedien ce or felonious acts that are not pan of a con certed attack 00 the oondusivel y verified by ( 1) an inst rument chan nel check, or (2) ind ication on nudear po wer plan t. related or redundant indicators, or (3) by d irect o bservat ion by plant person nel.

Implicit In thi s definit ion is the need for timely asses sme nt within 15 minu tes .

HOSTILE FORCE: One o r more individuals who are engaged in a determined ass ault, overtly or by stea lth and deception, equipped with suitable weap ons VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is read ily observable without capable of killi ng , ma iming . or causing destruct ion. measureme nts, tes ting . or analysis. Damage is suffi cie nt to cau se conce rn regarding the cont inued ope rability or reliability d aff ected safety structure, IMMINENT: Wllhin two ho urs . system. or componen t. Exa mple damage includes defonna tioo due to he at or impact dentin g, pe netration. rupture, cracking . or paint blisteri ng. Surf aoe INEFFECTIVE : When th e speci fied rest oration adion(s ) does not resu lt in a blemishes (e ,g., pa int chipping, scr atches. et c.) shou ld NOT be ioo ud ed as red uction in th e level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH concfrtion with in visibl e dama ge.

15 minutes f rom ident ification of the CS F Statu s Tree REO 0( ORA NGE PATH .

VITA L AREA: Any area within the PROTE CTED AREA which contains INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Paramet ers , radiation monitor readings or equipment , systems. devices, or materi al which the fa ilure, destruction, or personnel observ ations that ident ify an Even t for purposes of Emergency Plan releas e of, could direct ly or indirectly endanger the public health and saf ety by Classification. expo sure to radiation.

INTRUS10N /INTRUCER: Sus pected hostile individu al present in the protected are a without authorization.

ISF SI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation .

l Page 12 of 47 Revision 39

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Initlatin I Condition Refer to *Fission Product Bam"erMatrix * (Section 1) and "Radiological Effluents* (Section7) and Continue in This Column.

On either unit an Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT Nor Applicable.

TRANS IENT In progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4):

1. Loss of> 75% of MeR annunciator win dows AND the annunciator printer AND the annunciator CRT in the 1, horseshoe OR > 75% of safety system indicati ons.

2. Loss of ICS.

2, 3 . Inability to directly mon itor any of the following CS Fs :

3, Subcriticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory 4 4 . SIGNIFICAN T TRA NSIENT in progress.

On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of >75% of the Not Applicable.

MeR annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75%

of safety system Indications for> 15 minutes with a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS unavailable.

1, (1 and 2 and 3):

1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% of both channels of MCR 2, annunciator windows AND the annuncia tor printer AND the annunciator CRT in the horseshoe for::> 15 minutes OR ::> 75% of safety system indicators lor >

3, 15 min utes .

2. SM/S ED judgm ent that increased surveillance is 4 required (> shift complement) to safely operate the unit.

3. (a orb)

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.

OR

b. Loss of ICS.

On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of > 75% of the Significant Loss of Communications (1 or 2)

MeR annunciators or > 75% of safety system 1. UNPLANNED loss of allin-plant communication indications for > 15 minutes and ICS ava ilable. capabilities listed below (a and b and c ):

(1 and 2 and 3): a. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX phones.

1, b. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones .

c. UNPLANNED loss of all in-plant radio frequencies.

1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% of both channels of MeR 2, annunciator windows AND the annunciator printer AND the annunciator CRT in the horseshoe for > 15 minutes OR > 75% of safety syste m indicators for 2. UNPLANNED loss of all offsite communication 3, > 15 minutes. capabilities listed below: (a and band c and d and

2. SM/SED judgme nt that increased surveilla nce is .andQ 4 required (> shift complement) to safely operate the a. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX pho nes unit. b. UNPLANNED Joss of all offsite radio frequencies

c. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microw ave) system

3. The ICS is capable of displaying requested data .

d. UNPLANNED loss of all 1-FB*BeIi lines

e. UNPLANNED kiss of all NRC ENS and HPN lines

1. UNPLANNED loss of all satellite phones Page 130f47 Revision 39

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Initiatin I Condition Reactor power> 5% and not decreasing after VALID Initiatin I Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix ~ (Section 1) and trip signals and loss of co re coo ling capability. Continue in This Column.

(1 and 2):

1. FR-S.l entered and immedia te operator acti ons did not result in a reactor power of s 5% and decreasing.

1 2. (a or b)

a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red (FR-C.l).

b . C SF status tree indicate s Heat Sink Red (FR-H.l)

Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and auto and manual trip signals. Continue in This Column.

1 NO TE: Although a mode change may occur before classification this event will still be classified and declared as SAE.

Reactor power> 5% and not decreasing after VALID Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix* (section 1) and auto trip signal but a manual trip from the Control Continuein This Column.

Room Is su ccess ful. (1 or 2)

1. Reactor powe r > 5% a nd not decrea sing following auto trip sig nal.

1, 2 . Manual trip in the Ma in Co ntrol Room succ essfully redu ces reactor power 5 5%.

2 NOTE: Alth ough a mode cha nge will occur, this event will still be d assified and declared as an ALERT.

Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matnx ~ (Section 1). Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds LeO (Ref. r to SQN Tech. Spec. 3.4.8):

1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a or b):

a. Dose equivalent Iodine (1-131) >0.35 .... Cilg m for

> 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or in exce ss of TIS Figu re 3.4-1 with Tave ~ 500 of.

3

b. Specific actNity > 1DOtE ....Cilgm with Tave ~500 D F .

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Initiatin I Condition Initiatin I Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix * (Section 1) and Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Continue in This Column.

Refer to ~Fission Product Barrier Matrix * (Section 1) and Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Refer to -Fission Product Barrier Matrix- (section 1) and Continue in This Column. Continue in This Column.

Res unid entified or pressure boundary leakage Res Identi fied leakage > 25 GPM.

> 10 GPM.

1. Identified ReS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined 1, > 25 GPM as Indicated by (a or b):

1, by Tech. Spec.) > 10 GPM as indicated by (a or b):

2, a. SI-QPS-Q6ll-137.0 results.

a. SI-O PS-068-137 .0 results .

2, 3,

3, b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM into PRT, RCDT or

b. With ReS temperature and PZR level stable. the 4 eves holdup tank (Refer to TI-28).

Ve T level on 1I-62-129 or 1I-62-130 is dropping at a 4 rate > 10 GPM.

Refer to *Shutdown Systems Degradation" (Section 6.3).

Refer to ' Shutdown Systems Degradation" (section 8.3).

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Inilialin I Condilion

• • • • Iniliatin I Condilion Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix* (Section 1) and Continuein This Column. Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Bam"er Matrix ~ (Section 1) and Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Continue in This Column.

Refer to *Fission Product Barrier Matrix ~ (Section 1) and Turbine failure has gen erated projectiles that cause Continue in This Column. visible damage to any area contain ing sa fety related equi p me nt.

1, 1. Turbine generated PROJECTILES have resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following areas:

Contro l Building Diesel Genera tor Bldg.

Auxiliary Building RWST 3 Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station Unit #2 Containment Comrron Sta. ServoXfmr's ERCW Pumping Station Condensate Storage Tanks Addl Equipment Bldgs.

UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the main Tu rbine failure results In cas ing penetration or main steam system resu lting in a rapid ReS cooldown and generator sea l damage.

safety injecti on InJtlatl o n. (1 and 2):

1. Turbine failure which results in penetra tion of the 1, 1. Rapid depressurization of any or all steam generators turbine casing or damage to main generator seals.

or the main steam system to < 600 psig on PI*1-2 A , 28 or 9A ,96 or 20A. 208 or 27A , 276 .

2,

2. Safety injection has initiated or is required.

3 3 Refer to "Hazards and SED Judgment" (Section 4.3) l Revision 39 Page 16 of 47

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Inltlatin I Condition Not Applica ble.

Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

Safety Limits have been exceeded. (1 or 2) :

1. The cc mbinaton of thermal power, Res temperature 1, and ReS press ure > safety limit indicated by SON Tech. Spec . Figure 2.1-1 "Reactor Core Safety limit",

2, 3, 2. ReS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit

(> 27 35 psig).

4 l

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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.6 2.7 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas Table 4-2 Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED JUdgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIO LOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiatio n Levels Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage l

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( Definitions and Abbreviations:

ODCM: Off site Dose Ca lculati on Manua l is a suPPOrting dOOJmerTI to the Tech BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXP LOS ION) Specs. th at contai n Red Effluent Controls, Enviro ns Monitoring controls, and methodology fo r ca lClJlating routine gaseous and liquid e ffluent otfsite doses and CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of tw enty (20) or more persons within the EAB mo nito r ala rmtt rip set points.

viole ntly protesting cnslte operations or activities at th e site.

ORANGE PATH: Mon itoring of one or more CS Fs by FR-o which indicates that CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Ca sk CON FINEMENT the CSF (s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is requi red BOUNQARY consists of MPC shell , bottom baseplate. MP C lid (ind uding the ve nt and drai n port cov er plates). MPC closure ring, and associated welds . PROJECTILE: An ObjeCt eject ed, th rown or lau nched toward s a plan t structu re res Liting in damage suffICient to cause coocem regarding th e integrity of the CRInCAL-SAFETV FUNCTION (CSFs ): A plant safety function req l.i red to affected struct ure or the operabi lity or reliabi lity 01 sa fety eq uipment oontained prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are the rein. Th e source of the projeclil e ma y be onsite or off site .

six CS Fs; Su bc rilica lily. Core Cooling , Heat Sink., Pressuri zed Thermal Shock ,

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (Re S) . PROTECTE.D AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to whid'l acc ess is co ntrolled.

EVENT: Assessment of an EVE NT commences when recogn ition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions assodated with the event exist. Implicit RCS : The ReS prim ary side and its connections up to and ind uding the in thi s defi nition is the need for timely assessment wit hin 15 minutes. pressurizer safety and relief valv es, and ot her connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolatioo valves.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EA B) : That area surround ing t he reactor, in which t he reacl.or licenses has the auth orit y 10determil'le all acti vities inclu ding RED PATH: Monitoring cI one or more CSFs by FR- O which indicates that the e xd usi on or remo val of person nel and property from the area . For purposes of CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prom pt ope rato r ecnco is requ ired .

Eme rgency Action Le vels, based 00 radiological field measurements and dose assess ments, and fo r desig n ca lc ulatio ns , the Site Boundary shall be defi ned RUPTURED: (Steam Gen erator) Existence of primary 10 seco ndary lea kage of a as the EAB. magn itude grea ter than the ca paci ty on e charging pump.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, ¥iden!. unconfi ned combustion. or a catastrophic failu re SABOTAGE: De liberate damage, misa lignment, or misoperalion Of pla nt d pres surized o r el ectri ca l equ ipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to eql.i pment with the inte nt to render th e eq uipment inop erable .

potentia lly dam ag e pernenent structures or eq uipment.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event invdving one or more of EXTORnON: An anempt to cause an act ion at the site by t hreat or force. the fo llowing : (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2)

Electrica l load rejection >25% fun elect rical load ; (3) Reactor Tri p; (4) Safety FAULTE.D: (Steam Ge nerato r) Existence of secondary side lea kage (e,g ., Inje ction System Act ivat ion; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations ?:10%.

ste am or fee d line break) th at results in an uncontrolled decrea se in steam generator pressure or the steam ge nerator being completely depressurized. STRIKE ACTION: A wo rk stoppage within the PROTE CTE D AREA by a body of wor1o:ers 10 enforce compliance w ith dema nds made on TVA. The STR IKE FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and lig ht. So urces of smoke such as ACTION must th reaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

sli ppin g drive be lts or over heated elect rical components do not con stitute a fire O bse rvation of name is prefe rred but is NOT required if large quan tities of TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerou s to life or limb by reason of inhalation or smoke an dlor heat are observed. skin contact (e .g., d1Iorine, CO:: , et c.)

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at co ncentrations> th an th e LO'vVER UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal EXPLOS IVE LI M IT (LE L). opera tions, testing or maintena nce . Eve nts that result in co rrect ive or mitigative actions being taken in accord ance Voith ab norma l or em ergency procedures are HOSTAGE; A pe rsorqs} held as lev erage against the site to ensure that UN PLANNED.

demand s will be met by the site UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release d radioactivit y is U NPLA NNED if t he HOSTILE ACTION: An act tow ard a nudear plant or its per sonnel that incl udes relea se nee not been authori zed by a Discha rge Permit (D P). Im plicit in this the use of viol ent for ce to dest roy equ ipment, take host ages, an d/or intimdate defi nition are unintentional releases, unmonitored rel eas es , or planned releases the licensee to achieve an end . Thi s indudes attack by air , land or water; using that exceed a co nditi on specified on th e DP, (e.g ., alarm setpoinl.s, minimu m dilu tion now , m inim um release limes, maximum rele ase rates , and/or discharge guns, explosives , projectiles, vehicl es , or other devices use d to deliver of incorrect tank).

de structive fo rce. Other acts that satis fy the ove rall intent may be induded.

HosnLE ACTION shou ld NOT be construed to includ e acts of civil VALID: An indication, repo rt or cond ition is considered to be VALI D w hen it is disobedience or felonious ads tha t are not part of a concerted attack on the co ndusively verified by ( 1) an inst rume nt cha nl'lel check, or (2) indicali oo on nuclear power plant. related or redunda nt indicatcn, or (3) by d irect observation by plan t person nel .

Implicit in this de fin ition is th e need for ti mely asse ssment within 15 min utes.

HOSnLE FORCE: On e or more indivi duals who are engaged in a dete rrrined assault , overtly or by ste alth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons VIS IBLE OAMAGE: Damage to equ ipment tha t is readily observable without capable of killing, maiming, or causing des truction. measureme nts, testing , or ana lysis . Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding t he continued oper ability or reliability of aff ect ed safely structure, IMMINENT: Within two hours . syst em, or com ponent. Examp le damage includes def ormatio n due to heat or im pact , dent ing, penetration , rupt ure, crack ing , or pai nt blistering. S urface INEFFECTIVE: Wlen the specifi ed restor ation acncnts) does not resu lt in a blemishes (e .g., paint chi pping, scratches, et c.) shou ld NOT be included as red uct ion in the level of seven ty of the RED or ORAN GE PATH condition wit hin visible damage.

15 minutes f rom identification of the CSF St atu s Tree RED or ORANGE PATH .

VITAL AREA: Arty area wi thin th e PROT ECTED AR EA which cont ains INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters. rad iation monitor readi ngs or equipment, systems, devices, or mat erial wh ich the fai lure , de structi on , or personnel observations that ide ntify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan release of, coul d direclly or indirectly endanger the publ ic he alth and safety by Classifi cati on. exposure to radiation.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual prese nt in the protected area wit hou t aut ho rizat ion.

ISFSI: Ind ependent Spent Fuel Storage Installat ion l Revision 39 Page 20 of 47

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3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops ) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdow n)

Initiatin I Condition Initiatin I Condition Prolonged loss of all offsite and all ans lte AC power Not ApphcabJe to either unit. (1 and 2):

1, 1. Both un it related 6 .9 KV shu tdown boards G de-energized for > 15 minutes. E 2, N

2. la or b)

E 3, a . Core Coo ling Status Tree Red Of Orange Path . R A

4 L b . Restoration of either a 6 .9 KV shutdow n boa rd or a 6.9 KV unit board is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the IOS5 .

loss of all offslte and all cnelte AC pOWGr to either S Not Applicable.

unit for> 15 Minutes.

I 1, 1. Both unit related 6 .9 KV shutdown boards T de-energized for > 15 minutes. E 2,

A 3, R E

4 A Loss of cttaite power to entler unit with degraded UNPLANNED loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power onelte AC power for> 15 minutes. ([1a and 1b] or 2) :

5, to either unit for> 15 minutes.

la. All four (4) 6 .9KV unit boards de-energized for > 15 1. Both unit related 6.9KV shutdown boards de-energized 1, minutes . 6, for> 15 minutes.

A 2, lb. One ( 1) unit related 6.9 KV shutdown boa rd de- L

• energ ized for > 15 minutes.

E 3, R T

2. Any AC power condition lasting > 15 minutes where a 4 single add itiona l failu re will result in a unit blacko ut. Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown System s" (6. 1) and continue in this column.

Loss of off51te power to either unit for> 15 minutes. UNPLANNED loss of all offslte power to either unit for (1 and 2):  ::0 15 m inutes. (1 and 2):

1. A ll fou r (4) 6 .9KV unit boards de-energized for > 15 1. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for 1, minutes. N > 15 minutes.

2. Both unit related 6.9KV shutdownboardsare a 2 . One (1) unit related 6.9KV shutdown board de-2, energized. u D energized for > 15 min utes.

E E 3, F U

4 E L

E D

l Page 21 of 47 Revision 39

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II!I~

3.3 Loss of DC Power Inilialin / Condllion Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix {Section 1)- and n

"Loss of Communication" (2.2) and Continue in This Column. G E

N E

R A

L Loss of all vital DC power for> 15 minutes.

1. Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V DC vital battery board 1, buses I S!ill! II and III and IV for > 15 minutes. S I

2, T E

3, A

4 Also Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1), R "Loss of communceuon: (2.2) and, "Loss of 6

E Instrumentation (2.1) and Continue in This Column. A Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix* (Section 1J, "Loss of Communication" (2.2), and "Loss of Instrumentation"

/2.1) .

A L

E R

T UNPLANNED loss of a requi red trai n of DC power for

> 15 minutes: (1 or 2).

t. Voltage < '05 V DC on 125Vde vital battery board buse s I and III for > 15 minutes.

N 5, o

2. Vo ltage < 105 V DC on 125V de v ital battery board U busses II and IV fop 15 minutes.

6 E l

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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reacto r Protection 2.6 2.7 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas Table 4-2 Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage l Page 23 of 47 Revision 39

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Definitions and Abb reviation s:

ODeM: Offs ite Dose Calculation Manual is a support ing document to the Tech BOMB: An explosive devi ce . (See EXPLOSION) Specs. that contain Red Effluent Controls, Envi ron s Monitoring co ntrols, and me thodology for ca laJlat ing routine gaseous and liqui d effluent Offsite ocses and CM L DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB mon ito( a1arm'trip setpoints.

viol ently protes ting on site operations or activities at the site.

ORANGE PATH : Mon itorin g of one or more CSFs by FR-o which indicat es that CON FIN EM ENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CON FINEM ENT the CSF {s ) is under severechallenge; prom pt operator act ion is required.

BOUNDARY oonsists of MPC shell , bottom baseplate , MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates). MPC closure ring, and associatedwelds. PROJECTILE: A n object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structu re resulting in dama ge sufficient to ca use co ncern regar ding th e integrity of the CRmCAL*SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFsl: A plant safety functio n required to affected struct ure or th e operability or reliabi lity of safety equipment contained prevent sig nifica nt rele ase of core radioact ivity 10th e enviro nment. There are therei n. The scarce of the projectile may be onstteor offsite.

six CSFs; Subcri tical ity , C ore Cooling, Heat Si nk, Press urized Thermal Shock, Integ rity (C ontainme nt) and InventOfy (Re S). PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the secu rity fence and to which access is controlled .

EVE NT: As sessment of an EVENT commences when recogn ition is made that one or mo re of the initiati ng conditions as soci ated wi th the event exist . Implicit RCS : Th e RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the in this definition is th e need fo r timely as se ssme nt wit hi n 15 min utes . pres surize r safety and relief valves, and ot her con necti ons up to and including the primary and serondary is olation vaves.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY l EA B ): That area surro und ing the reactor, in which t he reactor licenses has the authority to det ermine all activities incl uding RED PATH; Mo nito ring of one or more CSFs by FR-O whi ch indicat es that the exclusion or removal of personne l an d property from the area. For purposes of CSF(s) is under extre me cha lle nge; prompt op erator actio n is requi red .

Emergency Act ion Le vels. based on rad iol ogical fie ld measureme nts and dose assessments, and for desi gn calculations, the Site Boundary sha ll be defined RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a as the EAB. mag nitude greater than th e capaci ty one ch argi ng pump.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, rri salignm eot, or misoperalion of plant of pressurized or electrical eq uipment th at impa rts energ y of suffICient force to equ ipme nt with t he intent to render th e equipme nt inoperable .

potentially damage permanent structures or eq uipment .

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPlANNED eve nt invol ving one or more of EXTORll0N: An attempt to cause an action 81 the site by threat or force . the followi ng: (1) A n automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2)

Electrical load rejecti on >25% f un electrical loa d ; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety FAULTED; (St eam Generator) Exist ence of seco ndary side leakage (e.g ., Inj ecti on System Activation; (5) Th ermal Power Oscillations ;:0:10%.

steam or feed line break) that resu lts i n an uncont rolled decrease in steam generato r pressu re or the steam gen er ator being completely depressurized . STRIKE ACTION: A wOl'k stop page w ithin the PROTECTE D AR EA by a body of workers to enforce com pliance with demands made on TV A . Th e STRIK E FIRE~ Com bus tion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as ACTI ON must threaten to interru pt normal plant operatio ns .

sli pping drive belts Or over heat ed electrical component s do not constitute a fire .

Obs ervation of name is pref erred but is NOT required if la rge quantit ies of TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to lif e or limb by reason of inhal ation or smoke and/or heat are observed. ski n co ntact (e. g., chl orin e , CO:z , etc.)

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at con cen tratio ns> than the LOweR UNPlANNED: An event or action that is nat th e expected result of normal EXPLOSIVE LIMI T (LE L). operations, testi ng o r ma inte nance . Eve nts that res ult in corecnve or rritigative actions being tak en in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leve rage against the sil e 10 ensure that UNPLANNED .

de ma nds w ill be mel by th e sit e.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the HOSllLE ACTlON: An act tCF-Nard a nuclear plant or its personne l lhat includes release has not been aut horized by a Discharge Permit (DP) . Im plicit in this the use cl viol ent force to dest roy equipment, take hostag es, and/or intimidate definition are unintent ional releases, unmonito red releases, or planned releases the lice nsee to achieve an end . Th is incl udes attack by air , land or water; uSing that exceed a condi tion specified on t he OP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, m inim um gu ns, expl osi ves , proje ctiles , vehicle s, or oth er devices used to delive r dilution now , m inim um release ti mes, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

dest ruct ive force. Other act s that sat isfy the overall int ent ma y be inclu ded .

HOSTILE ACllON sholAd NOT be oonstrued to indude acts of civil VAUO: An indication, report or condition is co nsidered to be V AllO wh en it is disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the con d uSively veri fied by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2 ) ind icat ion on nucle ar power plant. related or redun dant indicators, or (3 ) by direct observatio n by plant personnel .

Impli cit in this definilion is the nee d for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

HOSTILE FORCE: One or mo re ind ividuals w ho are engaged in a determined ass ault, overt ly or by stea lth and deception , equipped wi th suitable weap ons VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage 10 eq uipment that is readily observable without capabl e of killi ng , maiming, or caus ing dest ruct ion . measurements, testing. or analysis. Da mage is suffi cient to cause concern regard ing the cont inued operabi lity or reliab ility of affected safe ty structure ,

IMM INENT: Wrthin two hou rs system. or component. Exa mple damage includes deformation due to heat or im pact, de nting , penetration , ru pture , aacki ng , or paint blistering. Surface INEFFECTIVE: lMlen the specified rest oration adion(s) does not result in a blemi shes (e .g ., paint ctl ippi ng, samches , etc .) shou ld NOT be ind uded as red uction in t he level of severit y c:J1he RED or ORANGE PATH eonlition withi n visible damage.

15 min utes from ide ntificat ion of the CSF Stat u s Tree RED or ORANGE PATH VITAL AREA: Any are a within the PROTECTED AREA which contains INlnATlNG CONDITIONS: Plant P arameters, radiation monitor read ings or equipment, systems, de vices , or materiel wh ictl the failu re , des tructi on , or personnel observations that identify an Eve nt for purposes of Emergency Plan rele ase of, co uld di rect ly or indirect ly endanger the publi C health and safely by Classi ficat ion . exposure to rad iation .

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without aut ho rization.

ISFSI : Independent Spe nt Fuel Storag e Instal lation.

Page 24 of 47 Revision 39

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION _ MATRIX EPIP-1 I c

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 Inltlalln 'Condition Inillalln 'Condition Refer fa 'Fission Produc t Barrier Matrix ~ (Section 1) and Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix." (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Continue in This Column.

Refer to 'Control Room Evacuation, (4.5) and Fission U Refer to wFission Product Barrier Matrix* (Section 1) and Product Barrier Matrix * (Section 1) and Continue in This Continue in This Column.

Column .

FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4~1 that Is EXPLOSION In any of the areas listed In Table 4-1 affecting safety related equipment required to that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or ma intain safe shutdown. (1 and 2): establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 Bnd 2):

1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1. 1. EXPLOSION in any afthe areas listed in Table 4-1.

2. (a or b) 2 . (a or b}

A A L a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structureor L a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures or to L safety related equipment in the specified area is L safety related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE. due to the EXPLOSION.

OR

b. Control room indication of degraded safety system b. Control room indication of degraded safety system or component response due to the FIRE. or component response due to the EXPLOSION .

Refer to *Security" (Section 4.6).

FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED threatening any of th e areas listed in Table 4-1 that is AREA (Figure 4-A) resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of any permanent structure Q.! equ ipment.

control room notification or verification of control room alarm .

A L

L Refer to "Security" (Section 4.6) .

l Page 25 of 47 Revision 39

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1

(

Initlatln f Condition Initiatln f Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix* (Section 1) and Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx ~ (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Refer to 'Hssion Product Barrier Matrix- (Section 1) and Continuein This Column. Continue in This Column.

UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within a Release of TOXIC GAS or smoke within a facility facility structure containing safety related equipment structure which prohibits safe operation of systems or associated with safe operation of the plant required to establish gr maintain Cold SID.

(1 and 2 and 3):

1. Plant personnel reportthe averageof three (3) 1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS or smoke within readingstaken in an - 10 ft. Triangular Area is > 25% any building listed in Table 4-2.

Lower Explosive Limit as indicated on the monitoring A instrumentwithin any building listed in Table 4-2. 2. (a or b)

L a. Plant personnel report severe adverse health L reactions due to TOXIC GAS or smoke (l.e..

Refer rc the MSDS for the LEL. burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness).

OR

b. Sampling indication> Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL).

3. Plant personnel unabe to perform actions to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.

Refer to the MSDS for the PEL.

A. UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS withIn A. Safe op erations impeded du e to access restrict ions the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY that may affect caused by TOXIC GAS or smoke con centrations normal operations. within a facility structure listed in Table 4-2.

1. Plant personnel report the averageof three readings taken in an - 10 ft. Triangular Area is >

A 25% of the Lower Explosive Limit, as indicatedon A B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State L the monitoring instrument within the EXCLUSION L officials that an offaite TOXIC GAS release has L AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B). L occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4-B) w ith potentia l to enter the EXCLUS ION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-8) in concentrations > the Permissible Exposure limit (PEL) caus ing a site B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State evacuation .

officials that a large offslte FLAMMABLE GAS release has occurred within one (1) mile of the site Refer to the MSDS for the PEL.

(Figure 4-B) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Flgur. 4-B) In concentrations> 25% of Lower Explosive Limit.

Refer 10 the MSDS for the LEL.

l Page 26 of 47 Revision 39

I SEQUOYA H EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1

(

_ _4 .5 Control Room  :!'I Initiatin f Condition Evacuation_

Refe r to "Fission Product Barrier Ma trix ~ (Secb'on 1) and Continue in This Column.

G E

-- 4.6 Security Initiatin f Condition Security Event Resulting In Loss of Physical Control of the Plant: (1 or 2):

1. A HOSTILE FORCE has tak en control of plant N A equipment such that plant personnel are unable to E L operate equipment required to maintain CRITICAL R L SAFETY FUNCTIONS.

A 2. Loss of physical control of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling systems due to HOSTILE ACTION such that L

imminent fuel damage is likely.

Evacuation of the control room has been initi ate d and Notification that HOSTlLE ACTlON is occurring or has control of all necessary equ ipment has not been occurred within the Pla nt PROTECTED AREA (PA l:

established within 15 minutes of staffing the auxiliary S (1 or 2 or 30r 4) control room. (1 and 2): I T A 1. Air attack (large fram e aircra ft impacting the PA.)

A 1. AOP-C.04 "Shutdown from Aux Control Room- E L 2. Land based attack entered. L (HOSTILE FORCE penetrating the PA .)

L L 2. Co ntrol has not been esta blished wtthin 15 minutes of A 3. \Naterbome attack staffing the auxiliary control room and completing R (HOSTIL E FORCE on water penetrating the PA l transfe r of switch es on panels L11A and L11B to the AUX pos ition . E 4 . BOMB expk>sionbreachi ng the PA or with in the PA.

A Refer to Figure 4-A For B Drawing of PROTECTED AREA.

Evacuation of the Control Room Is Required. Notification that HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the Owner Controlled Area (OCA Is

1. AO P-C .04 "Shutdown fro m Aux Contro l Room" has that area between the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY been en tered . and tho PROTECTEO AREA) : (lor 2)

A 1. A validated notification from NRC of a large frame A L aircraft threat le ss tha n 30 minutes away .

2. An y of the following :

L E

• Air attack (large frame aircraft impacting the OC A.)

L R Land based attack T (HOSTilE FORCE progressing across OCA or directing projectiles at the site .)

Waterborne attack (HOSTIL E FORCE on water attempt ing forced entry or directing projectiles at the site .)

BOMB(s) discovered or explod ing within the OCA.

Refer to Figure 4-A For a Drawing of PROTECTED AREA and Figure 4-8 for a Drawi ng of EXCLUSION AREA BOUNOARY Not Applicable. Confirmed security event which Indicates a potential degradation In the level of safety of the plant:

( l or 2)

1. Security Shift Supervisor reports one Q!: more of the events listed in Table 4-3.

N A a L

2. A validated notification from NRC providing u L infonnation of any aircraft threat .

E l Page 27 of 47 Revision 39

I SEQUOYAH _ _ EMERGENCY

_ __ PLAN CLASSIFICATION

__ _ __ MATRIX _ 1 EPIP-1 I

-~ Events are In process 4.7 SED Judgment

~

Initlalin I Condition Q[ have occurred which involve Actual Q[ Imminent Substantial Core Degradation Q[.Melting Wrth Potential for Lossof ContainmentIntegrityor HOSTilE A CTI ON that results in an ad ualloss of physical control of G the facility. Releasescan be reasonably expected to exceed E A EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels N outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUND ARY. refer to L Figure 4-8 . E L R A

L Events are in process Q[ have occurred whidl involve Actual Q!: Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public or HOSTILE ACTION that result in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward S site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevents effective access to I A equipment needed for the Protection of the Public. Any T releases are not expected to result in ExposureLevels L which Exceed EPA Plume ProtectiveAction Guidelines E

L Exposure Levels beyondthe EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY . Refer to Figure 4-6 . A R

E A

Events are in process Q!: have occurred which involve Actual Q[ Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant or a Security Event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases A A are expected to be limited to small fractons ofthe EPA L Plume ProtectiveAction Guidelines Exposure Levels.

L E L R T

Events are in process Q[ have occurred which indicate a PotentialDegradationof the Level of Safety of the Plant or indicate a Security Threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response Q!.Monitoring are expected unless further N A degradation of Safety Systems occurs. o L U L E l Revision 39 Page 28 of 47

ISEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment Auxiliary Building Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station ERCW Pumping Station Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings CSSTs RWST Condensate Storaoe Tanks TABLE 4-2 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS OR SMOKE EALs Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containme nt Auxiliary Building Turbine Building Diesel Generator BUilding Intake Pumping Station ERCW Pumping Station Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings CDWE Buildino TABLE 4*3 SECURITY EVENTS

a. SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has occurred or is occurring within the PROTECTED AREA

b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION situation that threatens to interrupt plant operations

c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the EXCLUS ION AREA BOUNDARY and PROTECTED AREA

d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA w hich threatens to interrupt normal plant operations fjudgm ent based on behavior of strikers and/or intelligence received)

e. Security force STRIKE ACTION or unavailability of security force that threatens to interrupt plant ope rations.

f. A credible site-spec ific security threat notification .

l Page 29 of 47 Revision 39

ISEQUOYAH

_ _ I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 1 EPIP-1 I

( Figure 4-A Protected Area Figure 4-B Exclusion Area Boundary Exclusion Area Boundary l

Page 30 of 47 Revision 39

ISEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

(

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.6 2.7 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradat ion 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3 3.2 Loss 3.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas Table 4-2 Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Waterc raft Crash Table 5-1 5.4 River Level Hiqh Fioure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage l

Page 31 of 47 Revision 39

! SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1

( Definitions and Abbreviatio ns:

ODeM: Offsite Dose Calcul ation M anual is a supporting document to th e Tech BOMB : An explOSive device. (Se e EXPLOSION) Specs . that contain Rad Effluen t Controls, Environs Mon itori ng corrtroIs, and meth odology for calculating rout ine gaseous and liquid effl uent otfsite dos es and CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons wi thin the EAB monitor alarml1rip setpoinls.

violently protesting ensile operations or activities at the site.

ORANGE PATH: Monitori ng of one or mo re CS Fs by FR-O which indicat es that CONFINEMENT BO UNDARY : Spent Fuel Stor age Cask CO NFINEMENT the CSF(s ) is under seve re challenge; prompt operato r actio n is requ ired .

BOUN DARY consists of M PC shell. bottom baseplate. MPC lid (induding the vent and dra in port cover plates). M PC dcsure ring , and associated welds. PRO JECTILE: An object ejected. thrown or launch ed towards a plant structure resulting in damag e sufficient to ca use concern rega rding 1he int egrity of the CRmC A L~FETY FUNCTION (CSFsl : A plant safety function required to affect:ed structure or the operability or reliability of saf ety equ ipment contained prevent significant release of core radi oacti\lity to th e envi ronment . There are therein . The source of the proj ectile may be oos ite or offsite.

six CS Fs; Subcriticality , Core Cool in g, Hea t Sink . Pre ss urized Th erm al Shoc k, Integ rity (Contain ment) and Inve ntory (Re S). PROTECTED A REA : The area enco mpas sed by the secu rity fe nce and 10 w hich access is co ntrolled .

EV ENT: Asse ssment of an EVENT comm ences when recog nition is made th at one or mor e of the Initiati ng conditio ns associ ated with the ev ent exist. Irnplidt RCS : The RCS primary side and its co nnection s up to and ind uding the in this defi nit ion is the need for time ly assessment wit hin 15 minut es . pre ssurizer saf ety and relief valves, and other co nnections up to and induding the primary and secondary isolatio n valves.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EA B) : That area surrounding the reactor, in which t he reactor licenses has th e authority to cIe1erm ine all activities indudi ng RED PATH: Mon itoring Of one or mo re CSFs by FR* O which indicates th at the exdusion or re moval of personnel and properly from the area . For purpos es of CSF(s ) is under extreme chall eng e; prom pt operator action is req uired .

Eme rgen cy Action Levels, based on rad iolog ical fie ld measur ement s en d dose assessments, and fo r des ign calculation s, the Site Boundary shall be defined RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of prima ry to seco ndary lea kage of a as 1he EAB. magn itude greater than the ca pacity one cha rgin g pump.

EXPLOSION : Rapi d, violent, unconfined com bustion, or a catastrophic failure SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalig nment. or misop eration Of plant d pressurized or electrical equipment that imp arts energy d sufficient force to equipment with the intent to rende r the equ ipment inoperable.

polentially damage pe rmanent structures or equ ipmen t.

SIGNIACANT TRANSIENT : An UNPLANNED event involvi ng one or more of EXTORTION: An attempt to ca use a n action at th e site by threat or force . the fol lowi ng: ( 1) A n automatic turtine runback > 15% 1he nna l react or powe r; (2)

Elect rical load rejection >25% fun erectrtceuced: (3) React or Trip; (4) Safety FAULTED: (St ea m Gen erator) Existence of secon dary side leakage (e.g., Inject ion System Activat ion; (5) Th ermal Power Osci llatio ns ~ 1 0 % .

steam or feed line brea k) that res ults in an uncontrolled dec rease in steam gen er ator pressure or the stea m generator being com pletely de press urized . STRIKE ACTION: A wor k stop page w ithin the P ROTE CTED AR EA by a bOdy of wo rkers 10 enforce com pliance with demands made 00 TVA. The STR IKE FIRE: Combustion characteriz ed by heat and light . Sources of smoke such as ACTIO N m ust threaten to interru pt normal plant operations .

slipping drive belts or overheated e1edrical components do not constitute a fire .

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT requ ired if large qua ntities 0( TOXl C GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or lim b by reason of inhalatio n 0(

smoke andfor heat are obs erved. skin cont act (e.g ., chl orine , CCh, etc }

FLAMMABLE GAS: Com bustible ga ses at concentrations > t han the LOVV'ER UNPLANNED: An event or action 1hat is not the ex pected result of norma l EXPLOSIVE LIM IT (L EL). op erations . testing or maintena nce . Eve nts that result in co rrecti ve or m itigat ive actio ns bei ng tak en in acco rdance with abn or mal or emergen cy proced ures are HOS TAGE: A pers oo(s) he ld as leverage against 1he site to ens ure that UN PLA NNED.

demand s wi ll be met by the site UNPlANNED R ELEASE: A rele ase of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the HOS TILE ACTION: An ad toward a nudear plant or its personnel that includes release has not been authori zed by a Disd1arge Permit (D P) . Impl icit in this th e use Of violent force to destroy eqUipment. take hostages, and/or inti midate definition ar e unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases the licensee 10 ac hieve an end . Thi s includes atta ck by eir. land or wate r; using that exceed a co ndition specifi ed on the OP, (e .g., alann set points , minimum dilut ion flow , minimum release ti mes, maxi mum release rates, and/or dis char ge guns, explosive s, projectiles , vehides , or other devices used to delive r of inco rrect tank).

de structive for ce . Ot her act s t hat satisfy th e overall inten t may be lnduded .

HO STIL E ACllON should NOT be co ns1rued to indude acts of civi l VALID: A n indicat ion, report or con dition is consid ered to be VA LID when it is dis obed ie nce 0( feloniou s act s tha t are not part of a concerted attack on t he coocIusively veri fied by (1) an instrum ent chan nel check , or (2) indication on nucl ear power plant. related or redund ant indicators , or (3) by direct observatioo by plant personnel.

Impli cit in this definition is the need for timely assessment wit hin 15 m inut es .

HOS TILE FOR CE : One Of more individuals 'Nho are engaged in a deterrrined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weepcos V ISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equ ipment that is read ily observable without ca pable of killi ng , m aiming, or causing destruction. meas ureme nts , testing, or analysis . Damage is suffi cient to ca use con cern reg arding the conti nued operability or reli ability of affected safety structu re ,

IMMINENT: Within two hours. syst em , or com pon ent. Exa mple damage includes defo rmation due to heat or impad , de nting, penetr ation , ruptu re , cracking , or pa int bli stering . Surface INEFFECTIVE: When the specifi ed res torati on action(s) does not result in a blemi shes (e. g., paint chippin g, scratches , et c.) shou ld NOT be induded as red uction in t he level of severity of the RED 0( ORA NG E PATH condition with in visible dam age .

15 mi nutes from id entif ication of the CSF Status Tree R EO or ORANGE PAT H.

VITAL AREA: Any area wit hin the PROT ECTED AR EA which contains INInA TIN G CONDITIONS: Plant Pa ra meters, rad iation rron ftor readings or equi pmen t. syst ems, devices , or material wh ich the failure, destruction, or pe rson nel observations that identify an Event for purpo ses Of Emergency Plan release Of, cou ld diredly or indirect ly endang er th e pu blic health and safety by Clas sificati o n. exposure to radiat ion .

INTR USION/IN TRU D ER : Suspected hos1ile individual present in the protecte d area with out auth orizat ion.

ISFS t Independent Spent F uel Storage Insta llatio n Page 32 of 47 Revision 39

ISEQUOYAH __ EMERGENCY

__ PLAN

_CLASSIFICATION

____ MATRIX _ _1 EPIP-1 1

(

_ _ 5.1 Earthquake l!ll Initialin I Condilion Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

G E

.. 5.2 Tornado Inilialin I Condilion Refer to "Fission ProductBam"erMattix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

N E

R A

L Refer to -Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to -FisskNl Product Barner Matrix*

(Section 1) and COntinue in This Column. (section 1) and Continuein This Column.

S I

T E

A R

E A

Earthquake detected by site seismic Inst rumentation. Tornado or high winds strikes any structure listed In (1 and 2) : Table 5-1 and results In VISIBLE DA MAGE. ( 1 and 2):

1. Pane l XA 15B alarm window 30 (E-2) plus window 1. Tornado or high wind s (sus taine d >80 rn.p .h.> one A 22 (D-l) act ivated . A minute on the plant com puter) strikes any structu re L A L listed in Table 5-1 .

2. (a orb)

L L L 2. (aorb)

a. Ground motion sensed by plant personnel. E R a . Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE.

T

b. National Earthquake Informa tion Center at 1-(303) 273--8500 can confirm the event. b . Co ntrol room indicatio ns of degraded safety system or component response due to event.

Note: National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423)-586-8400, can provide additional info.

Earthquake detected by site seism ic Instru ments . Tornado within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

(1 and 2) :

1. Plant person nel report a tornado has been sig hted

1. Panel XA 15B ala rm window 22 (0.1) activated. within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY A A (Figure 5-A)

L 2. (a or b) N L L a . Ground motion sensed by plant personnel.

o L U

E

b. National Earthquake Infonna tion Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.

Page 33 0147 Revision 39

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

(

Initiatin I Condition Initiatin I Condition Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix ~ (section 1). Refer to "Fission Product Barrier MatTix*

(section 1) and Continuein This Column.

Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix- (se ction 1). Refer to "Fission Product Bam"er Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

A ircraft o r PROJECTILE im pacts (strikes) any plant River reservoir level is at Stage 11 Flood Warning as structure listed in Table 5-1 res ult ing in VISIBLE reported by River OperatIon s.

DAMAGE. II and 2) :

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECnLE has A impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1. A L 2. (8 orb) L L L

8. Co nfirmed report ol VISIBLE DAMAGE.

b. Control Room indications of degraded safety system or component response due to the event within any structu re listed in Table 5-1.

A ircraft crash or projectile impact (strik es) within the River reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning as EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY. reported by River Operations.

1. Plant personnel report aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 5-A) .

A A L L L L Page 34 of 47 Revision 39

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I r

I SEQUOYAH Initlatln / Condition Init iatin / Condition Refer to -Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Re fer to "Fission Produ ct Barrier Matrix*

(Section 1) and Continue in This Column. (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Ma trix ~ Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix*

(Section 1) and Continue in This Column. (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Rtver reservoir leve l Is < 670 Feet as repo rte d by Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Rtver Operations. (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

A L

L River reservoir level is < 673 Feet as reporte d by Watercraft st rikes th e ERCW pumping station Riv er Operations. resulting In a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). (1 and 2):

A A 1. Plant personne l report a watercraft has struck the ERCW pumping statio n.

L L L L 2. (a orb/

a. ERCW supply header pressure Train A 1(2}-PI-67-493A is < 15 psig.

OR

b. ERCW supply header pressure Train B 1(2}-PI-67-488A is < 15 psig .

l Page 35 of 47 Revis ion 39

I SEQUOYA H I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

(

TABLE 5-1 Plant Structure Associated With Tornado/Hiah Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit #1 Containment Auxiliary Building Turbine Building RWST Unit #2 Containment Diesel Generator Bldg.

CDWE Building Condensate Storage Tanks Control Building ERCW Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs Intake Pumping Station Common Station Service Transformer's Figure 5-A SEQUOYAH EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY Exclusion Area Boundary l Revision 39 Page 36 of 47

I SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.6 2.7 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turb ine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWE R 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3 3.2 Loss 3.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas Table 4-2 Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-8 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOM ENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/P rojecti le 5.6 Waterc raft Crash Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYST EM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOG ICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Leveis Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage l Revision 39 Page 37 of 47

I SEQUOYA H EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1

( Definitions and Abb reviations:

OD CM: Offsite Dose cetcoretcn Manual is a supporti ng document to th e Tech BOMB: An exp losive device. (See EXPLOSIO N) Specs . that co ntain Rad Efflue nt Controls, Enviro ns Monitoring controls. and methodologyfor calcu lating rout ine gase ous and liquid effluent offsi te do ses an d CIVIL DISTUR BANC E: A group of twenty (20) or mo re perso ns within the EAB mon itor alarmltrip setpoin ts .

vio lently prot esting onslte operations or activities at the site.

ORA NGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CS Fs by FR-Ow hich indicates that CON FINEMENT B OU NDA RY : Spent Fuel S10rage Cask CONF INEMENT t he CSF (s ) is under severe cha llenge ; prompt operator action is required .

BOUNDARY co nsists of MPC sh ell , bottom baseplate. MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cov er plates), MPC closure ring , and associated we lds . PROJ ECn LE : All object ejected, th rown or lau nched towa rds a plant structure resulting in damage suffici ent to ca use co ncern reg ard ing t he integ rity of th e CRITICAl*SAF ETY FUNCTlON (CSFs): A plant safety function required to affected structur e or the opera bility or relia bility aI safety eq uip ment cont ained prevent signifICant release d core radioactivity to the environment. T her e are therein. The source al the projectile may be onsite or offsi te .

six C SFs ; Subcrrticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pre ssurized Thermal Shock, Integ rity (Containment) and Inventory (Re S). PROTECTED A REA : The area encompassed by the sac urity fence and to which access is controlled .

EVENT; Assessment of an EVENT comm ence s wh en recognition is mad e that one o r more of the initiating conditions associated wit h the event ex ist . Implici1 Re s : Th e Re S primary side and its conn ections up to and including the in this definition is the need lor timely assessment withi n 15 min utes , pressurtzer safety and relie f valves , and ot her con nections up to and including the primary and secondary isolati on valves.

EXCLUSION AR EA BOUN DA RY (EA B ): That area su rroullCling the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the auth ority to determine al l activitie s induding R ED PATH: Monitori ng of one o r more CSFs by FR-owhi ch indicat es that the exd usion or removal of personnel and property from the area . For purposes of CS F(s ) is unde r extreme ch allenge; prompt operator action is reqUired .

E mer gency Acti on Levels , bas ed on radiological fiel d mea surements and dose as sessment s, and for design calculation s, th e Site Boundary shall be defin ed RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a as the EA B. magnitude greater than the ca pac ity o ne charging pump.

EXPLOSION : Rapid, violent. unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure SABOTAG E: Deliberate damage , misalignment , or misoperation of plant of pressurized or electrical eq uipment that Im parts energy of sufficien t force to equ ipment 'Nilh the int ent to rende r the equip ment inoperable.

potentially damage permanent structures or equ ipment .

SIGNIACANT TRANSIENT: An UNPlANNED event invol ving one or more Of EXT ORnON: An attempt t o cause an act ion at th e site by threat or force . the followi ng: ( 1) An automatic turbi ne runback >15 % thermal reactor power; (2)

Electrical load rejection >25% fuJi etectncenoac. (3) Rea ctor Trip; (4) Safety FAULTED: (Steam Gen erator) Exis tence of secondary side leakage (e .g., Injection System Act ivatio n: (5) Thermal Pow er Osci llations ~ 1 0% .

stea m or feed line break ) that resu lts in an uncont rolle d dec rease in steam generato r pressure or th e stea m generat or being completely depressurized. STRl KE AC n ON : A work sto ppag e within t he PRO TECTED AR EA by a body Of workers to enforce com pliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE FIR E: Com bustion characterized by heal and rtght. Sources of smoke such as ACTION must threate n 10 interrupt nannal plant operations.

sli pping drive be lts or o verheated elect rica l co mpon ents do not COflstil ute a fire .

Observatio n of fl ame is preferred but is NO T requ ired if large quantities of TOXIC GA S: A gas that is dange rous to life or limb by reason of in halatiOn o r smoke andfor heat are obs erved. skin contac1 (e.g ., chlori ne , C O r , et c.)

FLAM MABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations> than the LOIAER UNPLANNED: An even t or action that is not the e xpect ed result cl normal EXP LOSIVE LIM IT (LEl). operation s. tes ting or m ainte nance . Events th at result in corrective or m itigat ive actions being tak en in acc ordance with abnormal or eme rgency proc edures a re HOS TAGE : A person(s) held as leve rage against t he site to ensure that UNPLANNED.

demands wil l be met by the site .

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactMty is U NPlANNED if the HO STl L E A CnON : An act toward a nudear plant or its personnel th at ird udes release has not been aut hori zed by a Discharge Per mit (DP ). lfll)licit in t his the use cl violent force to destroy equ ipment. take hostages. and/or intimidate definition are uni ntent ional relea ses, unmo nitorect releases, or pla nned releases the licensee to ach ieve an end. Th is indudes attack. by air, la nd or wate r; using that e xceed a cooclition specifi ed o n the DP, (e .g ., alarm setpoints , minimum diluti on flow , minimum release times, max imum release rates, and/or discharge guns, explosives , projecl:iles, vehicles, or other devices u sed to de liver of incorrect tan k).

destructive force. Ot her act s th at satis fy th e overall intent ma y be includ ed HOSnLE ACnON should NO T be co nstru ed to inctude acts of civil VAUD: An indication, report or co ndit ion is conetcered to be VALID wh en it is disobedience or felonious ads that are not part of a concerted attack on th e co ndusively verified by (1) an instrument cha nnel check, or (2) indication on nucreer power plant. related or redundan t indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plan t pe rsonnel.

Implicit in this defi nition is the need for ti mely assessment within 15 mi nutes.

HO Sn LE FORCE: One or more in dividuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suita ble weapons VISI B LE DAMAGE: Damag e to equ ipment that is read ily observable without capable of ki lling . maimi ng , or causing dest ruction . measurements, testing , or analysis. Damage is suffici ent to ca use co ncern regarding the conti nue d ope rability or reliability of affected safety structure, IM MIN ENT: 'vVithin two hours. system, or co mpo nent. Examp le damage includes deform ati on due to heat or impact, de nting , pe net rat ion, rupture , cracking, or paint blistering . Surface INE FFE cnvE: VVhen the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a blemishes (e .g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as reduction in the le vel of severity of the R ED or ORANGE PATH cond ition wit hin visible damage.

15 minutes from identification of the CSF Sta tus Tree RED or ORANGE PAT H .

VITAL A REA : Any area wit hin the PROTECTED AREA wh ich contains INITl AnNG C ON OmONS: P la nt Pa rameters , radiat ion rTKX'Iitor read ings or eq lipment. system s. de vices , or mat erial which the fa ilure, destrucl:ion , or personnel obse rvat ions that identify an Event for pu rposes cl Emergency Plan release of, co uld directly or indirectly endangel'the pu blic health and safety by Classificatio n. exposure to radiation .

INTRUSION IINTRUDER: Suspected ho stile individual present in th e protected are a wit hout authorizatio n.

IS FSI : Independent Spe nt Fuel Storage Installation.

Page 38 of 47 Revision 39

I SEQUOYA H EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

(

_r----6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems This Column.

mmnI Inltlatin Condition -

• Refer to "Gaseou s Effluents" (section 7.1) and Continue in G

E

.. 6.2 Loss of SID Capab ility Not i'pp(/C8bJe Initlatln I Condition N

E R

A L

loss of water leve l in the reactor vessel that has or Complete loss of function needed to ach ieve or will uncover active fuel in the reactor vesse l. maintain hot shutdown. (1 and [2a or 2b] ):

(1 and 2 and 3):

S 1. Hot shutdown requi red .

1. Loss of RH R capa bility.

I 1, 2a. CSF status tree indicated Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1).

5, 2. VALID indication that reactor vesselwater lelJel T

< el. 695'. E 2, OR 6 3 . Incore TCs (if available) indicate Res temperature 2b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H.1)

> 200 of. A 3, (RHR shutdownroofing not in service).

R Note: If containment is open refer to *Gaseous Effluents*

E 4 Note: Refer to "Reactor Protection System Faifure ~

(Section 7.1) and continue in this column.

(Section 2.3) and Continue in This Column.

A Inab ility to maintain unit in cold shutdown when Compiete loss of function needed to ach ieve cold required (1 and 2): shutdown when co ld shutdow n requ ired by Tech.

Specs. (1 and 2 and 3):

1. Cold shutdown req uired by Technical Spe cs.

1. Cold shutdownrequired by Tech. Specs.

2. lncore 'r e s (if available) indicate core exit temperature 5, > 200 of . A 2. Loss of RHR shutdown cooling capability.

L 3. Loss of secondary heat sink and main condenser 6 E R

T Note: If containment is open refer to "Gaseous Effluents* Note: Also refer to "Faifure of Rx Protection" (section 2.3)

(Section 7. 1) and continue in this column. 4 and Continue in This Column.

Not Applicable. Inability to reach required shutdown within Tech.

Spec. IImtts.

1. The unit has not been placed in the requi red mode within the time prescribed by the Le O action N statement.

o U

E 4

l Page 39 0147 Revision 39

I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSI FICATION MATRIX

(

Inltiatin I Condit ion Refer to ~Gaseous Efflu ents* (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.

Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Con tinue in This Column .

Refer to "Ga seous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.

Loss of REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM inventory with Inadequate mak eup. (1 and 2 and 3) :

1. Reactor coo lant syst em is pressurizedabove afmospbenc pressure.

5,

2. Unplanned decrease in ReS or pressurizer level requiring initiation of makeup to the ReS .

6

3. With reactorcoolant system temperaturestable, the pressurizer level continues to decreasefollowing initiation of Re S makeup.

l Page 40 of 47 Revision 39

I SEQUOYAH 1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 1 EPIP-1 I

(

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2 2.2 2.3 Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection 2.6 2.7 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4 4.2 4.3 Explosion Flammable Gas Table 4-2 Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED JUdgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5 5.2 5.3 Tornado Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 41 of 47 Revision 39

ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1

( Definitions and Abbreviations:

ODCM : Offsite Dose Calcul atio n Manual is a supporti ng docu ment to t he Te ch BOMB: An exposive device. (See EXPL OS ION) Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring control s, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effl uent offsite doses and CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A gro up ottwenty (20) or more persons with in the EAB monitor alar m/trip setpoin ts .

viole ntly protesting onsite ope ratio ns Of activi ties at the site.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of on e or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel S10rage Cask CONFINEMENT the CSF(s) is under se vere challenge; prompt o perato r actio n is required.

BOUNDARY consists of MP C shell , bottom basep late. MPC lid (ind ucling the vent a nd d rain port co ver plat es). MPC closure ring , and eesoctetec welds. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structur e resUtin g in dam age suffici ent to cause concern regarding the int egrity of t he CRl TlCAL-5AFETY FUNCTION ICSFsl: A plant safety functioo required to affect ed struct ure or the operability' or reliability of safety equipm ent contained prevent significant release d core radi oadMty to the envi ronment. Th ere are therei n. The source 01the projectile may be en sue or offs ite.

six CS Fs ; SUbcriticality, Core Coo ling . Heat Sin k, Pressu rized Th ermal Shock ,

Integ rity (Containmen t) and Inventory (Re S). PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to w hich acc ess is controlled .

EVENT: Assessment of an EVE NT commences whe n recog nit ion is made that one or more d the initia ting ccodmons associated with the eve nt exist. Imp licit RCS: Th e RCS primary side and its connecti ons up to and ind uci ng the in this definitio n is the need fO( time ly assessme nt within 15 minutes. pressu rizer safety and relief valves . and othe r connections up to and induding the primary and secondary isolatiOn valve s.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EA B): That area surrounding the reactor, in wtJch t he reect cr u ceoses has the authority to eetermre all activities induding REO PA TH: Monitoring Of one Of more CSF s by FR-o whi ch indicates that the exclusio n or remova l of pe rsonnel and prope rty from the area . For purposes of CS F(s) is under extreme chall enge; prompt operator action is required .

Em ergency Action Le vels , based on radi a ogical field mea surem ents and dose assessments, a nd for desi gn calcul ation s, the Site Bound ary shall be defined RUPTURED: (Steam Generato r) Existence of primary to second ary leakage of a as the EAB. magnitUde greater tha n t he cap acity one Chargi ng pump .

EXPl0$10N: Ra pid, viol ent, uncon fined combu stion , or a cetasirco hc failure SABOTAGE: Delibe ra1edamage, mi salignmerrt. Of misoperation of pla nt of pr essuri zed or electri cal eq uipment that imparts energy of suffICient force to equipment INith the int ent to render the equ ipme nt inoperable.

potentially damage pe rma nent structures or equipment.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNE D eve nt involving one Of more of EXTO RTION: A n att empt to cau se an action at the site by threat Of force. the followin g: ( 1) An automati c turbine nmback >15% thermal reactor powe r; (2)

Electrical load rejection >25% full electri cal loa d; (3) R eactor Trip; (4) Safety FAULTED; (Stea m Generator) Existence of seconda ry side leakage (e.g., Injection System Activati on ; (5) Ther mal Power Oscillatio ns :l:10%.

steam or feed line brea k) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generato r pressure or the stea m ge nerator being completely depre ssurize d. STRIKE ACTION: A wo rk stop page within the PR OTECTED AREA by a bcxly Of workers to enfo rce com pliance with demands made on TVA . The STRIKE FIRE : Combustion char act eriz ed by heat and lig ht. Sources of smoke such as ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal pant opera tions .

slipping dri ve belts or overtleat ed electrical compcoerte do not:constitute a fire.

Observation d name is prefe rred but is NOT requir ed if large quantit ies 0( TOXl C GAS : A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalatio n or smoke and lor heat are observed. skin cont act (e.g ., chlori ne, C0:2 , etc )

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations> tha n the LO'M:. R UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result Of normal EXPLOS IVE LIMIT (LEL). o perations, test ing or maintenan ce. Events that result in corrective o r mitigative acti ons being taken in acc ordance with abnormal or em ergenc y procedu res are HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage aga inst the Site to ensure that UNPLANNED.

dema nds will be met by the sit e.

UNPlANNED RELEASE: A release or rad ioactivity is UNPlANNED if the HOSTILE A CTION: An ad tow ard a nuclear plant or its personnel that inclu des relea se has not bee n eutho rized by a Disch arge Perm it (OP). Implicit in thi s the use of violent for ce to destroy equ ipment. lake hostages , andlor intimidate definition a-e urintentional release s, unmo ritored releases, Of planned releases the licensee to ach ieve an end . Thi s indudes attack by air, land or wate r; using that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., a larm sel point s, minimum dilution flow , minim um release time s, maximum release rate s, and/or discharge guns, expl osive s, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver of incorr ect lank).

destructive force . Other acts that sat isfy the ove rall intent may be included .

HOSTILE ACTION sho uld NO T be con strued to include acts of civ il VAllO: An indicati on, report or condit ion is considered to be VALID when it is disobed ience or felo niou s ad s that are not part of a concerted attack on the conclu sivel y verified by (1) an instrume nt chann el check, or (2) indicat ion on nuclear power plant. related or redundant indicators , or (3) by dired. observation by plant personnel .

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment w ithin 15 mi nut es.

HOSTILE FOR CE : On e or more individuals who are engag ed in a deterrrined ess eut. overtly or by ste alth and dece ption , equ ipped with suitable we apons VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damag e to equ ipment that is readily o bservabl e without capa ble d killing , maiming, or causing destruct ion. measurements, testing , or analysis. Dama ge is sufficie nt to cause concern regarding the conti nued op erability or relia bility of affect ed safety structu re, IMMINENT: Wrthin two hours. system , or component. Exampl e damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, de nting, penetration, rupture, cracking , or paint blistering. Surface INEFFECTIVE: \lVhen the specified restoration aclion{s) does not resu lt in a blemishes (e.g., paint chipping , scratch es, etc .) should NOT be included as reduct ion in the lev el of severity dthe RED or ORANG E PATH cond ition with in visible damage.

15 minutes from identffi catiorl of the CS F Status Tree REO or O RAN GE PATH.

VITAL AREA : Any area with in the PR OTECTED AREA whi ch contains INIT1ATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monit or readings or equip ment , system s, de vices , or material wtJch the failure , destruction, or personnel observations that id entify a n Even t for purposes d Emergency Plan release of, could directl y or indirectly endanger the public health and safet y by Classification . expos ure 10 radiation.

INTRUSIONIINTRUOER: Suspected ho stile individual prese nt in the protected area witho ut auth orizatio n.

ISFSI: Independ ent Spe nt Fuel Sto rage Installation Page 42 of 47 Revision 39

[SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1

(

III 7.1 Gaseous Effluents Inltlatin I Condition EAB dose, resulting from an actual or imm inent release of gaseous radioactivity> 1 Rem TEDE or

> 5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected

• I!!!!I Not 7.2 Liquid Effluents llcable Initiatin I Condition duration of rel ease. (1 or 2 or 3): G E

1. A VA U D fad monitor reading e xce eds the values under A General Eme rgency in Table 7-1 for >15 min. unless N

L as sessmen t withi n t hat 15 min confi rms t hai the criterion is E not exce eded.

L Q!l R

2. Field surveys indicat e >1Reml hr 9amma or an 1-131 A concentration of 3.9E-06 ).le i/em at the EAB (Fig. 7-A) L Q!l 3 . Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose > 1 Rem TE D E or >5 Rem thy roid C OE for the actual or projected durat ion of the release (FIQ. 7-A ).

EAB dose resulting from an actual or Imminent Not Applicable.

release of gaseous radioactivity >100 mrem TEDE or

>500 mrem thyroid COE for actual or projected S

duration of releas e. (1 or 2 or 3) : I T

1. A VA LID rad moo itor reading > Tabl e 7- 1 values under Site A Area for > 15 m n, unless assessment within that 15 min E L confirms that the criterion is not exceeded OR L 2. Field surveys indicate > 100 mremfhr gamma or an A

1-131 cone of 3.9E-07 j.1Cilcm 3 et the EAB(Fig. 7-A). R OR E

3. Dose assessmen t results indicate EAB dose >100 mrem TE DE or >500 mrem thyroid GDE for adual or projected A duration of the release (Fig, 7.A).

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous rad ioactivity Any UNPLANNED release of liquid rad ioac tivity that that exceeds 200 ti mes the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 exceeds 200 times the aDCM Section 1.2.1.1 Limit for limit for >15 minutes. (1 or 2 or 3 or 4) >15 minutes. (1 or 2)

1. A VALID red monitor reading> Ta ble 7* 1 values under Alert 1. A VAllO rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under for >15 minutes , unless asse ssment wit hin that 15 minut es Alert for > 15 minutes. unless assessment within this A confirms that the criterion is not exceeded. A time period confirms that the criterion is not exceeded .

L Q!l L OR

2. Field surveys indicate >10 mremlhr gamma at the EAB for L >15 minut es (Fig 7*A). E OR R 2, Sample results indicate an Eel >200 times the

3. Dose ass essme nt results indicate EAB dose >10 mrem ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid TEDE for t he dura tion of t he release (Fig. 7*A).

T radioactivity > 15 minutes in duration OR

4. Sample resul ts exceed 200 time s the aDCM limit value for an unmondored release of gaseou s radioactivity >15 minutes in duration .

Any UNPLANNED releas e of gaseous I1Idioacttvlty Any UNPLANNED release of liquid rad ioactivity to t he t hat exce eds 2 times the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit environment that excee ds 2 ti mes the aDeM Section for >60 minutes. (1 or 2 or 3 or 4) 1.2.1.1 L1mtt for >60 m inutes.

(lor 2)

1. A VALID rad monitor read ing > Table 7- 1 verues unde r UE fo r >60 minutes , unles s assessment within that 60 minutes 1. A VAUD rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values uncle r A confirms that the criterion is not exceeded. N A UE for > 60 minutes, unless assessment within this L

2.

OR Field surveys indicate >0. 1n;remlhr gamma at t he EAB for o L lime period confirms that the aiterion is not exceeded.

L >60 rrsrctes (Fig 7*A ) U L Q!l E

3. Dose ass essme nt result s indicate EAB dose >0 .1 mre m TEDE for the durat ion of the relea se (Fig. 7*A) . 2. Sample results indicate an EeL >2 times the aDeM OR limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid

4. Sample results exceed 2 t imes t he aDCM limit vene for an radioactivity >60 minutes in duration.

unrroretcred release of ga seous radioacti vity >60 minutes in duration l Page 43 of 47 Revision 39

EPIP-1 r ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX

_ _- -.. 7.3 Radiation B'IIm]-

Initiatin 'Condition Refer to "Fission Product Bam"af Matrix ~

Levels_

(Section 1) or "Gaseous Effluents ~ (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Section. G E

-_. . 7.4 Fuel Handling in This Section.

Initiatin 'Condition Refer to -Gaseous Effluents* (SectJ'on 7.1) and Continue N

E R

A L

Refer to "Fission Product BalTier Ma trix ~ Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (section 7. 1) and Continue (Section 1) or "Gaseous Effluents (Section 7.1) and R

in This section.

Continue in This section. S I

T E

A R

E A

UNPLANNED Inc reases in radiation levels within the Major damage to Irrad iated fuel or loss of wa ter level facility that impedes safe operations or establishment th at has or will uncover irrad iated fuel outside the or mainten ance of cold shutdown. reactor v ess el. (1 and 2):

(l or 2):

1. VALIO alarm on RM*90-101 or RM-9O-102 or A 1. VA UD area radiation monitor readings or survey A A RM-90-103 or RM-90-130/131 or RM-90-112.

results exceed 15 mremlhr in the controlroom or CAS.

L L L 2 la orb):

L E L

2. (a and b): R a. Plant personnel report damage to irradiated fuel sufficie nt to rupture fuel rods .

a. VALID area radiation monitorreadings exceed T

values listed in Table 7-2 .

b. Access restrictions impede operation of system s b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will neces sary for safe operatio n or the ability to exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel estab lish co ld shutdown (See Note Below). will be uncovered in the spent fuel pool or transfer canal.

UNPLANNED increase i n rad iation levels within th e UNPLAN NED loss of water level In spent fuel pool or facility. reacto r cav ity o r t ra nsfer can al with fu el re maining covered. (1 an d 2 and 3) :

1. A VAUO area radiation monitor reading increases by 1000 mre mlhr over the highest reading in the past 24 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel hours excluding the current peak value. pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal.

A N L Note: In either the UE or ALERT EAL, the SED must o 2. VALID alarm on RM-90-101 or RM 102 or L detennine the cause of increase in radiation levels U RM 103.

and review other initiating condmons for applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 mremlhr in the E

3. Fuel remains covered with water.

control room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA).

l Revision 39 Page 44 of 47

I SEQUOYA H EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I

(

Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

Damage to a lo ad&d cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY from: (1 or 2 or 31

1. Natural phenomena (e.g., seismicevent, tornado, flood .

lightning, snowsce accu mulation . etc).

A L

L 2. Acc ident (e .g: dropped cask, tipped over cask ,

explosion, missile damage, fire damage, burial under debri s , etc).

3. Judgmen t of the Site Emergency Director that the CONANEMENT BOUNDARY damage is a degradation in the level of safety of the ISFSI Page 45 of 47 Revision 39

ISEQUOYAH _ _ EMERGENCY

__PLAN __ CLASSIFICATION

___ MATRIX__ 1 EPIP-1 I

( TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS NOTE: The monitorvalues below. if met or exceeded, indicate the needto perform the required assessment. If the assessmentcan not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the appropriate emergency classification shall be made based on the VALID reading.

GASEOUS MONITORS Units(21 UE Al ert SAE General Site Total Release LImit ~C ~s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31 E+09 1-RI-90 400 (EFF LEVEL) - U-1 Shield Bldg ~C~s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31E+09 2-RI-90400 (EFF LEVEL) - U-2 Shield Bldg ~C ~s 4.90E+05 4.90E +07 1.31 E+08 1.31E+09 0-RM-90*1 01B - Auxiliary Bldg cpm 1.03E+05 Offscale(' ) Offscale(1) Offscale (1) 0-RM-90 -132B - s ervice Bldg cpm 2.62E+06 Offscale(l) Offsca lel ll Offsca le(1 )

1-RI-90421 th ru 424 - U-1 MSL Monitors(2) ~C ~cc 1.71 E-Q1 1.71E+0 1 4.58E+01 4.58E+ 02 2-RI-90421 thru 424 - U-2 MSL Monitors(2) ~C~cc 1.71 E-Q1 1.71E+01 4.58E+0 1 4.58E+02 1-RM-90-255 or 256 - U-1 eVE mR/h 4.10E+02 4.10E+04 1.09E+05 1.09E+06 2-RM-90-255 or 256 - U-2 eVE mR/h 4.10E+02 4.10E+04 1.09E+05 1.09 E+06 RELEASE DURATION minutes >60 >15 >15 >15 LIQUID MO NITORS Un its UE Al ert Site Area General Site Total Releas e LImit ~Ci /m l 6.50E-03 6.50 E-01 NiA N/A RM-90-122 - RadWaste cpm 1.45E+06 Offscale(l ) N/A N/A RM 120 ,121 - SIG Bldn cpm 1.07E+06 Offsca le (1) NiA NIA RM 225 - Co nd Demin cpm 1.90E+06 Offscale(1) N/A NIA RM 212 - TB Sump cpm 3.28E+03 3.28E+05 NIA N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes >60 >15 >15 >15 ASSESSMENT METHODS: + Ai_ ne Dose Assessment per SON EPIP-13 "Dose Assessment"

• aDeM Liquid Release Rate assessment per SON O-TI-CEM"{)30.030.0

• Integrated Airborne Release Rate assessment per SON 0-TI-GEM-Q30.030.0 (1) The calculated value is out side of the upper range for this detector. The maximum monitor output which can be read is 1.0E+07 cprn. Releases in excess of monitor capacity should be evaluated for proper classification by use of Dose Assessment.

(2) These unit values are based on now rates through one PORVof 890,000 Ib/hr at 1078.7 psia with 0.25% carry over (0.9975 qua lity). Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongo ing, (e.g., PORV).

NOTE 1: These EALs are based on the assumption that an emergency release is restricted to one pathway from the plant. In all cases, the total site EAL is the limi ting value. Therefore , in the case where there are mu ltiple release paths from the pl ant, it is the total release EAL (obtained from ICS andlo r SON 0-TI-CEM-03Q-030, "Manual Calculation 01 Plant Gas , Iod ine, and Particulate Release Rates for Offsit e Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Compli ance ") that will determine whether an emergency class ification is wa rranted.

NOT E 2: In the case when there is no CECC dose assessment available , the length and relative rnaqn itude of the release is the key in determ ining the class ificat ion. For example, in the case of the NOU E EAL of 2 times the Tech Spec limit, the classificat ion is based more on the fact that a release above the limit has continued unabated for more than 60 minutes, than on the projected offsite dose .

NOTE 3: See REP Appen dix B for basis informati on.

l Page 46 of 47 Revision 39

[SEQUOYAH [ EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 1 EPIP-1 [

( Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS For purposesof rom >aring the meter/monitor readina valuesto this table, it can be assumed that mR is equivalent to mrem.

Monitor No. Location - Area and Elevation Meter Read in!!

1.2-RM-90-1 Spent Fuel Pit ARM EI. 734 .0 1.5E+03 mRlh r 0-RM-90-5 SFP Pumps ARM EI. 714.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 1.2-RM-90-6 CCS HXS ARM EI. 714.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 1.2-RM-9Q-7 Sample Rm ARM EI.690.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 1,2-RM 8 AFW Pumps ARM EI. 690.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-9 Waste Cnds Tks ARM EI. 669.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 1,2-RM-90-10 CVCS BdARM EI. 669.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-11 CS and RHR Pumps Radmon EI. 653.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 0-RM-90-102 Spent Fuel Pit Radman EI. 734.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 0-RM l03 Scent Fuel Pit Radman EI. 734.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 0-RM-90-230 CNDS Demineralizer ARM EI. 685.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 0-RM-90-23l Cnds Demineralizer ARM EI. 706.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr Note. All of the above monitors have a range of 0,1 to 1E+4 mremlhr ,

Figure 7-A EXCL USION AREA BOUNDARY Exclusion Area Boundary Page 47 of 47 Revision 39

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY c SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-4 SITE AREA EMERGENCY REVISION 30 QUALITY-RELATED PREPARED BY: BILL PEGGRAM RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS APPROVED BY: KEVIN WILKES EFFECTIVE DATE: ..!.!1/~23~/2~0~07!....-- _

LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE USE l

ISEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4 Revision History Roy Date Pages Reason fo r Revision Effec ted 21 03130/2001 Revised references 10 EPIP-14 for Dose Assessment to the new EPIP-13 for Dose Assessment.

Added EPIP. 13 to references. Reformatted substantialtyfor clarity. Updated Notitca t tcn and Follow-Up forms to Pentagen standard content 22 0713012002 Substantialformat modifICation for standardization with BFNM'BN was implemented in this revision. Reformatted and repaginated as necessary. Reordered actions to be consistent with EPIPs 2. 3, 5. Changed reference of PHYSI-32 to 851-1. Added section 5.0, lltustrations and Appendices Section to the body of the procedure. Added caution concerning conducting assembly and accountability if it will present a danger to employees. Clarified use of 5- and 9- telephone prefixes. Added what Infonnation is to be provided by the Shift Manager to Chemistry when requesting Dose Assessment: t .Type of Event, 2. Release Path. 3. ExpectedDuration. Clarified how to check ERQ pager response. EPIP-4was revised to implement actions to support the NRC SecurityOrder including adding "Two Person Une-of-Sight" rule when deemed necessary by security . Clarified what MET Data elevation is to be induded on the initial notification form and the fonowup form for Site Area Emergency.

23 08/2612002 Added Step 2 to section 3.1 to speed implementation if EPS has already been activated.

Condensed steps in 3.1 and 3.2 on assembly and accountability. Implement ability to Stage TSCtOSC personnel near-site when it is unsafe to immediately enter the site due to security oonditions. Corrected title of CECC EPIP-9 in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. This is a intent revision.

24 0412212003 General Revision to restructure EPIP for better flow. Moved ODS notification earlier in procedure.

Intent Change.

25 06/2512003 9 Non intent change. Phone number correction.

26 1012312003 4, 8,1 2 Intent dlange. Added step to record time of declaration upon entry into the procedure. Split step that had two actions in one step. Specified Security implement EPIP-ll 27 412212004 3, 6,1 3 Intent Change: Corrected TOC. Clarified thai MSSN/INM in the OSC is verifying ERO response and that 8M is to ENSURE that this is in progress. Added SED's Initials to Sec. 3.2. Added guidance to utilizeEPIP-6 Apdx B to initially brief NRC using ENS line.

28 912312004 6,7,9, 13 Intent Change: Removed satellite phone numbers. added validationstep to Sec. 3.2. added announcement to Staff the TSC and OSC to AppA, 29 0412612006 4,14,1 5 Revision Change: replaced SSI-l with 5$1-7.1. Changed App.B, Slep 9 from being the time and date into was provided to the ODS to faxing App. B to the ODS. Made App. C consistent with App.

B by putting 'THISISADRILL' before 'THISISAREAL EVENr .

Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do 30 1123/2007 8, 12, 13 not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure of REP:

Annual review. Changed to current org titles, clarified making Site Area Emergency announcement on Did plant PA and the x4800 bridge. Revised responsibility of dose assessment from Chemistrv to RP.

FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURETO PAGE 2 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

! SEQUOYA H SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4 Table of Contents 1.0 PURPOSE 4

2.0 REFERENCES

4 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4 3.1 Site Area Eme rgency Declaration by the Main Control Room 4 3.2 Site Area Emergency Decla ration by the TSC 7 3.3 Monitor Conditions 8 3.4 Term ination of the Event. 10 4.0 RECORDS RETENTION 11 4.1 Records of Class ified Emergencies 11 4.2 Drill and Exercise Records 11 5.0 ILLUSTRATIONS AND APPENDiCES 11 5.1 Appendix A, Notifications and Announcements 12 5.2 Appe ndix S , TVA Initial Notifica tion for Site Area Emergency 14 5.3 Appe ndix C , Site Area Emergency Follow-up Information 15 FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 3 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MAN AGER

I SEQUOYA H SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4

( 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To provide a method for timely notifications of appropriate individuals or organizations when the Shift Manager (SM)/Site Emergency Director (SED) has determined by EPIP-1 that events have occurred that are classified as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE).

1.2 To provide the SED/SM a method for periodic reanalysis of current conditions to determine whether the SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be terminated or continued .

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Interface Documents

[1] SPP-3.5 "Regulatory Reporting Requirements"

[2] EPIP-5, "General Emergency"

[3] EPIP-6, "Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center"

[4] EPIP-7, "Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center (OSC)"

(5) EPIP-8, "Personnel Accountability and Evacuation" (6) EPIP-10, "Emergency Medical Response" (7) EPIP-13, "Dose Assessment"

[8] EPIP-14, "Radiation Protection Response"

[9] EPIP-16, "Termination and Recovery"

[10] CECC EPIP-9, "Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures"

[11] SSI-7.1, "Post Requirements and Responsibilities, Central and Secondary Alarm Stations" 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE: IF there are personnel injuries, THEN IMPLEMENT EPIP-10. "Emergency Medical Response."

NOTE: IF there are immediate hazards to plant personnel. THEN consider immediately implementing EPIP-8 "Personnel Accountability and Evacuation" in parallel with this procedure 3.1 SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARATION BY THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM Upon classifying events as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY the SM/SED shall:

[1] IF TSC is OPERATIONAL , (SED transferred to TSC), THEN GO TO Section 3.2 (Page 7). o

[2] RECORD time of Declaration.

Time FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 4 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

ISEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4 C' 3.1 SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARATION BY THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM (Continued)

[3] ACTIVATE Emergency Paging System (EPS) as follows:

[a] IF EPS has already been activated, THEN GO TO Step 4. o

[b] IF ongoing onsite Security events may present risk to the emergency responders , THEN CONSULT with Security to determine if site access is dangerous to the life and health of emergency responders . o

[c] IF ongoing events makes site access dangerous to the life and health of emergency responders , THEN SELECT STAGING AREA button on the terminal INSTEAD of the EMERGENCY button. o

[d] ACTIVATE EPS using touch screen terminal. IF EPS fails to activate, THEN continue with step 4. o

[4] COMPLETE Appendi x B, TVA Initial Notification for Site Area Emergency. 0 NOTE: ODS should be notified within 5 minutes after declaration of the event.

[5] NOTIFY ODS.

Initial Time ODS: Ringdown Line or 5-751-1 700 or 5-751-2495 or 9-785-1700

[a] IF EPS failed to activate from SQN when attempted THEN DIRECT ODS to activate SQN EPS. 0

[b] IF ODS is also unable to activate EPS, THEN continue with step [5] [b]. 0

[c] READ completed Appendix B to ODS. 0

[d] FAX completed Appendix B to ODS. 0 5-751-8620 (Fax)

[e] MONITOR for confi rmation call from ODS that State/Local notifications comp lete: RECORD time State notified.

Notification Time FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 5 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

I SEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4

( 3.1 SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARATION BY THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM (Continued)

[6] IF ODS CANNOT be contacted within 10 minutes of the declaration, THEN

[a] CONTACT Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) AND READ Completed Appendix B.

Initial Time 9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-615-741-0001

[b] FAX completed Append ix B to TEMA. o 9-1-615-242-9635 (Fax)

[7] ENSURE MSSIVVWM in the OSC ( x6428 ) is monitoring Emergency Response Organiza tion (ERO ) responses using printed report available in the OSC .

[a] IF any ERO positions are not responding , THEN DIRECT MSS to CALL personnel to staff TSC/OSC positions. (Use REP Duty Roster and Call List.) o

[8] PERFORM Appendix A, Notifications and Announcements.

(De legate as needed.) o

[9] GO TO Section 3.3.

l FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 6 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

ISEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4 r 3.2 SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARATION BY THE TSC Upon classifying events as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY the SED shall :

NOTE: CECC Director should be notified within 5 minutes after declaration of the event.

[1] RECORD Time of Declaration _

[2] RECORD EAL(s) _

[3] VALIDATE time and EAL numbers with the Ops Mgr, Site VP or EP Mgr. 0

[4] CALL CECC Director and inform of esca lation, time of declaration, EAL(s) declared, and description of events.

SED's Initials Time Ringdown Line or 5-75 1-1614 or 5-751-1680

[5] IF CECC Director CANNOT be contacted within 10 minutes of the declaration, THEN

[a] COMPLETE Append ix B (Initial Notification for SAE) o

[b] NOTIFY TEMA AND READ completed Appendix B.

SED 's Initials Time 9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-6 15-741-0001

[c] FAX completed Appendix B to TEMA. o 9-1-615-242-9635 (Fax)

[6] IF not previously implemented , THEN PERFORM notifications using Appendix A. o FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 7 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

ISEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4

( 3.3 MONITOR CONDITIONS

[1] MONITOR radiation monitors.

[2] WHEN indication exists of an unplanned radiolog ical release ,

THEN ENSURE Dose Assessme nt is performed. o

[a] IF the CECC has not assumed Dose Assessment responsibility, THEN NOTIFY Radiation Protection to perform a dose assessment using EPIP-13, "Dose Assessment" AND PROVIDE the following information :

1. Type Of Event (SGTR/L , LOCA, WGDT , Cntmt Bypass)

2. Release Path (SG/PORV, Aux, Shld, Turb, Serv, Cond)

3. Expected Duration (If unknown assume 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> duration) o 7865 (RP Lab) or 6417 (RP Lab) or Use REP Call List to contact a qualified individual in RP, who is onsite, to perform the dose assessment.

CAUTION: Assemb ly should NOT be initiated IF Assembly will present a danger to employees - For examp le:

A severe weathercondition exists or is imminent (such as a Tornado)

An onsite Security risk condition exists (Consult with Nuclear Security)

[3] IF person nel accountability has not been previously initiated, THEN ACTIVATE assembly and accountability using EPIP-8, Appendi x C (may be delegated ). o

[4] MONITOR plant conditions:

[a] EVALUATE conditions using EPIP-1:

[1] IF conditions satisfy criteria of GENERAL EMERGENCY(s) THEN initiate EPIP-5. o FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 8 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

I SEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4

( . 3.3 MONITOR CONDITIONS (Continued)

[2] IF additional conditions satisfy criteria of other SITE AREA EMERGENCY(s) THEN Complete Appendix C. 0

[3] IF conditions warrant a need for follow-up information, THEN Complete Appendix C. 0

[b) IF Appendix C completed , THEN

[1] REPORT to CECC for State notification:

Initial Time CECC Director: Ringdown Line or 5-751- 1614 or 5-751-1680 OR ODS: Ringdown Line or 5-75 1-1700 or 5-751-2495 or 9-785-1700

[2] FAX completed Appendix C to CECC o o CECC : 5-751- 1682 (Fax) OR ODS: 5-751-8620 (Fax)

[3] IF neithe r the CECC or ODS can be reached , THEN

[a] NOTIFY TEMA AND READ Append ix C.

Initial Time 9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-6 15-741-000 1

[b) FAX completed Appendix C to TEMA. o 9-1-615-242-9635 (Fax)

FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 9 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

ISEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4

( 3.4 TERMINATION OF THE EVENT

[1] WHEN situation no longer exists , THEN

[a] TERMINATE emergency per EPIP-16, "Termination and Recovery". D

[b] COMPLETE Append ix C including Time and Date Event Terminated.

[e] FAX completed Appendix C to CECC Director. D CECC: 5-75 1-1682 (Fax) OR ODS: 5-751-8620 (Fax) (Backup)

[2] COLLECT all forms and appendices and FORWARD all documentation to Emergency Preparedness. D FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 10 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

ISEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4

( 4.0 RECORD RETENTION 4.1 Records of Classified Emergencies The materials generated in support of key actions during an actual emergency classified as NOUE or higher are considered Lifetime retention Non-QA records. Materials shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall submit any records deemed necessary to demonstrate performance to the Corporate EP Manager for storage.

4.2 Drill and Exercise Records The materials deemed necessary to demonstrate performance of key actions during drills are considered Non-QA records. These records shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall retain records deemed necessary to demonstrate six-year plan performance for six years . The EP Manager shall retain other records in this category for three years .

5.0 ILLUSTRATIONS AND APPENDICES 5.1 Appendix A - Notifications and Announcements Append ix A, Notifications and Announcements , provides guidance for security threats, and for prompt notification of the NRC Resident and plant personnel.

5.2 Appendix B - TVA Initial Notification for Site Area Emergency Appendix S, TVA Initial Notification for Site Area Emergency, is used to initially notify the Operations Duty Specialist who notifies the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency.

5.3 Appendix C

• Site Area Emergency Follow-up Information Appendix C, Site Area Emergency Follow-up Information, is used to provide additional information concerning other Site Area Emergencies or other information concerning additional conditions to the ODS for State notification and event termination .

l FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 11 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

I SEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4

( APPENDIX A NOTI FICATIONS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS (Page 1 of2)

[1] IF there is a security threat , THEN

[a] NOTIFY Security Shift Supervis or to implement SSI-1, "Security Instructions For Members Of The Security Force" and EPIP-11 "Security and Access Control ".

Initial Time 6144 or 6568

[b) DETERMINE if Security recommends implementing the "Two Person Line of Sight" Rule. D

[c) IF Nuclear Security recommends establish ins the "Two Person Line of Sight" RUle , THEN INF RM the SM/SED. ("Two Person Line of Sight" requires use of EPIP-8).

Initial Time

[2] NOTIFY Radiation Protection :

[a] STATE: "A SITE AREA EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED, BASED UPON (Describe the conditions),

AFFECTING UNIT(s) _."

Initial Time 7865 (RP Lab) or 64 17 (RP Lab)

[b) DIRECT Radiati on Protection to implement EPIP-14 ,

"Radiological Control Response ". D

[c) DIRECT Radiation Protection to implement CECC EPIP-9 , "Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures" which includes activation of the radiological monitoring van. D

[3] NOTIFY personnel in the Chemistry Lab:

[a] STATE: "A SITE AREA EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARE D, BASED UPON (Describe the conditions),

AFFECTING UNIT(s) _ ."

Initial Time 7285 (Lab) or 6348 (Lab) or 20126 (Pager)

[b) DIRECT Chem istry to implement EPIP-14 ,

"Radiological Control Response ". D l PAGE 12 of 15 REVISION 30 FORWARD COMPLETE D PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

I SEQUOYA H SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4

( APPENDIX A NOTIFICATIONS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS (Page 20(2)

[4] ANNOUNCE to plant personnel on the old plant PA and the x4800 bridge:

[a] "ATIENTION PLANT PERSONNEL. ATIENTION PLANT PERSONNEL. A SITE AREA EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED BASED ON ( Describe the condition >, AFFECTING UNIT(s) . (if not already staffed, add) STAFF THE TSC AND OSC." 0

[b) REPEAT Announcement. 0

[5] NOTIFY Plant Management in accordance with SPP-3.5 AND PROVIDE SAE Information.

Initial Time

[6] NOTIFY the "On Call" NRC Resident AND PROVIDE SAE Information.

Initial Time NOTE: NRC ENS notification should be made as soon as practicable, but within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of "SITE AREA EMERGENCY" declaration. Whenever NRC requests, a qualified person must provide a continuous update to NRC Operations Center. Use EPIP-6, Appendix B as a briefing guide.

[7] NOTIFY NRC of plan activation using ENS phone.

Initial Time 9-1-(301 ) 816-5100 (Main) 9-1-(301) 951-0550 (Backup) 9-1-(301) 816-5151 (Fax)

[8] NOTIFY the SM/SED that notifications are complete.

Initial Time FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 13 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

I SEQUOYA H SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4 APPENDIXB TVA INITIAL NOTIFICATION FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY TVA INITIAL NOTIFICATION FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. 0 Th is is a Drill o This is an Actual Event

• Repeat - This is an Actuai Event

2. This is SED , Sequoyah has declared a SITE AREA EMERGENCY affecting: o Unit 1 o Unit2 o Both Unit 1 and Unit 2

3. EAL Designator(sl :

4 . Brief Description of the Event:

5. Radiological Cond itions: (Check one box under each Airborne A ND Liquid column .)

Airborne Release s Offsite Liquid Releases Offsite o Minor releases within federaily approved limits' o Minor releases wit hin federally approved limits 1 o Releases above federaily approved limits' o Releases above federaily approved limits' o Release information not known o Release information not known

( 'Tech Specs) ( ' Tech Specs)

6. Event Declared : Time: Date:

7. Provide Protective Action Recommendation: 0 None

8. Please repeat back the information you have received to ensure accuracy. 0

9. When completed , FAX t h is information to t he ODS. 0 FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 14 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENC Y PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

I SEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4

( APPENDIXC SITE AREA EMERGENCY FOLLOW*UP INFORMATION

1. 0 THIS IS A DRill o THIS IS A REAL EVENT

2. There has been a SITE AREA EMERGENCY declared at Sequoyah affecting:

o Unit 1 0 Unit 2 0 Both Unit 1 and Unit 2

3. Reactor Status: Unit 1: 0 Shut Down o At Power o Refueling D N/A Unit 2: 0 Shut Down o At Power o Refueling DN/A

4. Additional EAL Designators

5. Sign if icant Changes in Plant Conditions:

6. Signif icant Changes in Radiolog ical Cond itions:

7. Oftsite Protec tive Action Recommendation : o None

8. Onsite Protective Act ions: Assembly and Accountability o No 0 Initiated 0 Completed Site Evacuation o No 0 Initiated 0 Completed

9. The Meteorological Conditions are: Wind Speed: m.p.h, (Use 46 meter data on the Met Tower) Wind Direction is from: degrees

10. Event Term inated: DatelTime _

11. Please repeat back the information you have received to ensure accuracy. 0

12. FAX to ODS at 5-751-8620 or CECC Director at 5-751-1682 after completing the notification. 0 Completed by: _ Dmemme ~ _

FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE150f15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPARED NESS MANAGER