ML15126A421
ML15126A421 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Sequoyah |
Issue date: | 05/06/2015 |
From: | NRC/RGN-II |
To: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
References | |
Download: ML15126A421 (275) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Sequoyah Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Candidates: SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: 100% MOL, EOOS risk green, FT-1-3A is in MAINT BYPASS, RTS 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Turnover: Maintain 100% power, swap Condenser Vacuum pumps.
Critical Tasks CT-22 Manually close any open PZR PORV before completing step 6 of ECA-0.0.
CT-24 Manually energize at least one 6.9 kv Shutdown Board before placing safeguards equipment hand switches in the pull to lock position during ECA-0.0 (Step 10).
Event Event Type Event Description No.
1 (N)BOP/SRO The BOP will swap Condenser Vacuum pumps using 1-S0-2-9.
A low pressure FW heater String Isolation occurs, the BOP reduces turbine 2 ANOV179 (C)BOP/SRO load to maintain 10 minute average power less than 3455 MWt. (Adm in Limit).
The crew reduces turbine load to less than 86% to comply with plant power 3 (R) ATC limitations.
(C) ATC #2 RCP #1 Seal fails, the ATC manually adjusts seal injection flow to 4 CV17B maintain > 9 gpm for RCP #4.
(C) SRO Power range Instrument N-44 fails high, the ATC takes immediate action to (I) ATC 5 N107D place rod control in manual. The SRO declares power range instrument N-(l,TS) SRO 44 INOPERABLE.
ED05 (C) BOP A grid disturbance occurs resulting in excessive VAR loading on the main 6 generator, the BOP adjusts the main generator voltage regulator to bring EDR74 (C) SRO reactive load within limits.
The Transmission Operator informs the crew that the offsite power is 7 (TS) SRO DISQUALIFIED. The SRO will declare two offsite circuits INOPERABLE.
The grid continues to degrade and loss of offsite power occurs resulting in a 8 ED01 (M) ALL Reactor Trip. The crew responds using E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
EG02B The B EDG trips and the A EDG fails to AUTO-START. The SRO 9 (C) BOP transitions to ECA-0.0.The BOP manually starts the 1A EDG by resetting EG03A the lockout relay to restore power to the 1A 6.9 Shutdown Board.
A power operated relief valve (PORV) will fail open; the ATC will isolate the 10 RCO?A (C) ATC PORV using Prudent Operator Actions.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
SUMMARY
Event 1 - The BOP will swap Condenser Vacuum pumps using 1-S0-2-9.
Event 2 - When directed by the Lead Examiner the "A" Low Pressure Feedwater Heater string isolation occurs. The crew will respond using AOP-S.04, Condensate or Heater Drains Malfunction. The BOP Reduces turbine load to maintain 10 minute average power less than 3455 MWt. (Administrative Limit)
Event 3 - The will perform a plant power reduction to <86% power using AOP-C.03, Rapid Shutdown or Load Reduction for the LP heater string isolation.
Event 4 - When directed by the Lead Examiner the #4 Reactor Coolant pump (RCP) The ATC will manually adjust RCP seal water supply flow> 9 gpm for RCP #4 using AOP-R.04 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MALFUNCTIONS.
Event 5 -When directed by the Lead Examiner a power Range instrument Channel IV (N-44) fails high. The ATC places rod control in manual due to inadvertent insertion using immediate operator actions and AOP-C.01, ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS. The crew will transition to AOP-l.01NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTION. The ATC will defeat the failed channel and place rod control to automatic. The SRO addresses Tech Specs and determines the power range instrument to be INOPERABLE and enters LCO 3.3.1.1 Action 2 and 6.
Event 6 - When directed by the Lead Examiner a grid disturbance occurs resulting in excessive VAR loading on the main generator, the BOP adjusts the main generator voltage regulator to bring reactive load within limits using AOP-P.07 DEGRADED GRID CONDITIONS OR GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION, APPENDIX D MVAR LIMITS FOR UNIT 1 GENERATOR STABILITY.
Event 7 - When directed by the Lead Examiner the Transmission Operator informs the crew that the offsite power is DISQUALIFIED. The SRO will enter AOP-P.07 DEGRADED GRID CONDITIONS OR GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION, APPENDIX A GENERIC ACTIONS FOR OFF-SITE POWER SOURCES INOPERABLE and enter LCO 3.8.1.1 Action D.
Event 8 - When directed by the Lead Examiner the grid continues to degrade and loss of offsite power occurs resulting in a Reactor Trip. The crew responds using E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Event 9 - The "B" EOG trips and the "A" EOG fails to AUTO-START. The SRO transitions to ECA-0.0 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER. The BOP manually starts the "A" EOG by resetting the lockout relay to restore power to the 1A 6.9 Shutdown Board. (Credit sought for a post trip component malfunction for the BOP. The verifiable action is an action that only the BOP will perform.)
Event 10 - When the Reactor trips a power operated relief valve (PORV) will fail open; the ATC will isolate the PORV using Prudent Operator Actions. (Credit sought for a post trip component malfunction for the ATC. The verifiable action is an action that only the ATC will perform.)
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 1
Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Swap Condenser Vacuum pumps.
e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior No malfunctions are inserted for this event.
No alarms for the current event 6.1 Starting/Swapping Condenser Vacuum Pumps (continued)
[5] START selected Condenser Vacuum Pump(s) using associated handswitch(s) (NIA Others)
PUMP HANDSWITCH INITIALS 1A 1-HS-2-171A 1B 1-HS-2-176A 1C 1-HS-2-181A
[6] VERIFY associated suction valve(s) OPEN: (N/A Others)
PUMP VALVE NUMBER INITIALS 1A 1-FCV-2-171 18 1-FCV-2-176 1C 1-FCV-2-181 When the B Condenser Vacuum pump is started direct the facility operator to insert Event 2 LP Feedwater String Isolation.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
LP Feedwater String Isolation.
Ti111~ : i':;:;;~ion I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Indications/Alarms Annunciators:
1-M-2
- 1-XA-55-2-C E-1, "LS-6-138A HEATER NO A6 LEVEL ABNORMAL" Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:
1-M-3
- 1-Pl-2-129, MFP INLET PRESS indicator trending down
- 1-Pl-2-77, CBP SUCTION PRESS indicator trending down
- A Train LP Feedwater Heater Valve Position indicate shut.
LS-6-138A HEATERNOA6 LEVEL ABNORMAL BOP Refers to ARP for annunciator M2C E-1
[1] DISPATCH operator to heater to determine if level is high or low via sightg!ass.
[2] VERIFY proper operation of LCV's and controllers.
[3] IF leve4 is high, THEN BOP [4] IF heaters A-5, A-6, and A-7 isolate, THEN GO TO AOP-S.04, Condensate or Heater Drains Ma{function.
SRO Transitions to AOP-S.04, Condensate or Heater Drains Malfunction.
SRO Directs actions from AOP-S.04, Condensate or Heater Drains Malfunction.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
LP Feedwater String Isolation .
..... - Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
'l. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF ...
SECTION PAGE Feedwater Heater String Isolation 2.3 15
- L ENSURE affected heater string ISOLATED:
- Condensate inlet isolation valve CLOSED.
- Condensate outlet isolation valve CLOSED.
- Extraction steam isolation valve(s)
CLOSED. (NOT applicable for low pressure heater strings)
- 2. MONITOR condensate flowpath:
- a. CHECK for isolation of all three heater a. GO TO Caution prior to Step 3.
strings.
CAUTION: Feedwater temperature changes may impact core thermal power.
- 3. MONITOR Steam generator levels returning to program_ [M-4]
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
LP Feedwater String Isolation.
CAUTION: Reducing turbine load too rapidly could result in further drop in condensate pressure due to reduction in heater drain flow. Recommended load rate is 1% per minute if turbine load reduction is needed.
NOTE: Severe MFW pump cavitation is likely if inlet pressure is less than 250 psfg_
- 4. MONITOR Feedwater pump inlet pressure greater than 320 psig. [l"v1-3, Pl-2-'12~1]
- 5. MONITOR Condensate Booster pump suction pressure greater than *100 psig. [fv1-3, Pl-2-77]
- 6. MONITOR reactor power:
- a. CHECK !CS thermal power indication AVAILABLE.
- 6. b. VERIFY 10 minute average power b. IF instantaneous thermal power less than or equal to applicable limit (U2118 or u*11 *18) is greater than applicable limit,
VERIFY ICS point U2'l '!SRA is less than or equal to 3455 lv1WL *1) ENSURE load rate set at *1 %
per minute.
- 2) LOWER turbine setter by '!%1 THEN from current value.
VERIFY ICS point u-1-1 '!SRA is less than or equal to 34-1*1 !v1Wt 3) INITIATE turbine load reduction by depressing GO pushbutton.
- 4) IF instantaneous thermal power remains greater than 100% after
- 1% load reduction completed, THEN REPEAT Substeps 2) and 3)
Power reduction is required based on LP turbine !imitations. Recommended load rate is 1 % per minute rf turbine load reduction is needed.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
LP Feedwater String Isolation.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 7. IF Low Pressure Heater String has isolated, THEN INITIATE turbine load reduction to less than 86% (Unit 1) or 90% (Unit 2)
USING one of the fo!!owing:
- O-G0-5, Normal Pmver Operation OR
- AOP-C.03, Rapid sfwtdoivn or Load Reduction.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
- 1. ENSURE crew has been briefed on reactivity SRO management expectations USING Appendix A.
APPENDIX A REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT BRIEFING NOTE This appendix should be used in addition to event-based brief.
[1] ENSURE crew has been briefed on the foUowing:
- Reason for Rapid Shutdo'vvn or Load Reduction
- Load Reduction Rate:_ _ __
- Desired final power level:_ __
- Reactivity Management expectations:
- Unit Supervisor shall concur with all reactivity manipulations
- Ensure reactor responding as expected using diverse indications
- Tavg-Tref Mismatch requirements:
- 3"F control band
- 5"F reactor trip criteria
- crew focus wm be on reducing power in a controiled .
and conservative manner.
- OATC will monitor rod insertion limits and AFO limit
- Boration source: - - - - -
- Crew will monitor reactor trip and turbine trip criteria using App. B
- CRO wm stop secondary plant equipment using App. c.
- Termination Criteria (conditions requiring Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, or condition no longer requiring rapid load reduction):
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 2. MONITOR reactor/turbine trip NOT required USING Appendix B, Reactor and Turbine CREW Trip Criteria. (two extra copies provided for UOs)
- 3. CHECK VALVE POSITION Llfv11T light CREW DARK on EHC panel. [l'v1-2]
Examiner note: Appendix B reactor and turbine trip criteria see page.
NOTE: Step 4 should be handed off to opposite unit or extra operator (if available).
If NO operator is available, notifications should be perfom1ed concurrently with subsequent steps (when time pem1its).
- 4. ENSURE following personnel notified of rapid shutdown or load reduction: [C.1]
- Balancing Authority (Load Coordinator)
(751-7547).
CREW
- Chemistry
- Radiation Protection
- Plant Management CREW Makes notifications as required.
NOTE: Boration volumes and nowrates listed in this procedure are recommendations and may be adjusted as necessary.
- 5. INITIATE boration:
- a. CHECK rod control AVAILABLE:
- Control Bank o rods capable of being moved
- NO dropped or misaligned rods in Control Bank D.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 5. b. CHECK Control Bank D group position greater than 200 steps_
ATC c_ CHECK boration capability from BAT AVAILABLE d_ DETERMINE recommended boration volume from BAT:
- -800 gal to reduce power from 100% to 20%
- 10 gal for each *1-010 power reduction (from current power revel)
- volume recommended by Reactor Engineering_
5_ e. DETERMINE recommended boration flowrate from table below or from Reactor Engineering:
LOAD REDUCTION BORATION SRO RA TE(%/min) FLOWRATE
'1% -15 gpm 2% --30 gpm 3% --45 gpm 1- ENSURE concurrence obtained from ATC STA for boration volume and flowrate.
5_ g_ CHECK status of charging and letdown:
- nomml letdown flow ATC ESTABLISHED
- charging flow control H lC-62-93A in AUTO.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- h. DETERMINE if normal boratlon will be used:
- desired load reduction rate is ATC less than 4% per minute
- time is available for normal boration.
- i. INITIATE normal boration A TC USING Appendix H_
APPENDIXH NORMAL BORATION
[1] RECORD desired boration volume and flowrate:
ATC Volume (gal}
Flowrate (gpm)
NOTE Boric Acid controller setting is twlce the desired flow rate_
Maximum Boric Acid flow is -45 gpm_
[4] ADJUST [FC-62-139] BA flow controller setpoint ATC for desired flow rate_ D 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[6] PLACE fHS-62-140AJ Makeup Control Switch mode ATC selector switch to START.
[71 ENSURE boric acid transfer pump aligned to blender ATC in FAST speed_ 0
[8] IF desired boric acid flow rate NOT obtained, THEN ADJUST one or both of the following as necessary:
- [FC-62-1391 BA flow controller D
- recirculation valve for BAT aligned to blender. D
[10] RECORD time when boration flow established: D ATC Time:
[11] WHEN required boric acid volume has been added AND control rods are above low-low insertion limit, THEN ATC PERFORM the following:
[a] PLACE [HS-62-140A], Makeup Control to STOP position. D
[b] ENSURE [FC-62-1421, Primary Water to Blender F!ow ATC Controller in AUTO with dial indicator set at 35%. D
[c] ADJUST fFC-62-1391, Boric Acid Flow Controller to ATC desired blend solution USING Tl-44 Boron Tables. D 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior D
J. CONTROL boration flow as required to inject desired boric acid volume.
Examiner Note: The crew continues actions to lower plant power using AOP-C.03 RAPID SHUTDOWN OR LOAD REDUCTION here.
- 5. INITIATE boration:
J. CONTROL boration flow as required to inject desired boric acid volume.
CAUTION: If borating from the RWST, Turbine Load Reduction Rate greater than 2°/o per minute could result in violating Rod Insertion Limit.
- 6. INITIATE load reduction as follows:
- b. ADJUST load rate to desired value:
- between 1% and 3% per minute if borating via normal boration (App. H)
- 2% per minute if borating from RWST.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
- 6. c. ADJUST setter for desired power level:
DESIRED RECOMMENDED BOP RX POWER LEVEL SETTER VALUE 90% 76 80% 56
- d. VERIFY boration flow established.
- e. INITIATE turbine load reduction by depressing GO pushbutton.
- f. CONTROL turbine load reduction BOP as necessary to reduce power to desired level.
7_ MONITOR T-avg/T-ref mismatch:
- a. CHECK T-ref indication AVAILABLE.
7_ b. MONITOR automatic rod control maintaining T-avg/T-ref mismatch less than 3°F_
- 9. STOP secondary plant equipment BOP USING Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment 12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: If LEFM thermal power (U2118) is inoperable, rod insertion limit curve must be raised by 3 steps. Rod insertion limit alarms and ICS display are NOT automatically adjusted when LEFM is inoperable.
- 10. MONITOR control rods above CREW low-low insertion limit USING ICS or COLR.
NOTE: Initiating plant shutdown required by Tech Specs requires 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> NRC notification per NPG-SPP-03.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements.
- 11. EVALUATE Tech Specs/TRM for applicability:
- 3.2.1, Axial Flux Difference
- 3.1.1.1, Shutdown Margin SRO
- 3.1.3.6, Rod Insertion Limits
- TRM 3.1.2.2, Boration Flowpaths
- 3.5.5, RWST.
- 12. EVALUATE EPIP-1, Emergency Plan CREW Initiating Conditions Matrix.
- a. CHECK at least one normal spray valve AVAILABLE.
- b. ENSURE at least one backup heater group ENERGIZED.
- c. ENSURE spray valve(s) responds to control RCS pressure.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
11 .... irne
, .. :1 t-~'u:osition I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 14. WHEN reactor power change exceeds 15% within one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate sampling as required by the following:
CREW
- O-Sl-CEM-000-050.2
- O-Sl-CEM-030-407.2
- O-Sl-CEM-030-415.0 .
Examiner Note: Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment starts at page 16.
Examiner Note: Additional AOP-C.03 steps not included as required power reduction should be complete at or around this step.
Examiner Note: When the crew has sufficiently reduced power the Lead Examiner may go to the
,, next event starting at page 22.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
11 ~,,,;,m,,,..,,,,-,
11 1l*i'1-1osition I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIX B REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA REACTOR TRIP CRITERIA TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA Turbine trip required or imminent Turbine vibration exceeding H mils with reactor power greater than P-9 (50%) with one of the foilowing:
UncontroUed rod movement which CANNOT be
- high vibration on multiple bearings stopped by placing rods in l\t1ANUAL {AOP-Cm} OR Loss of S/G level control:
- abnormal noise/vibration apparent level dropping or rising toward trip setpoint and revel CANNOT be restored (AOP-so1)
£\fore than one dropped rod (AOP-e_o1)
T-avg/T-ref mismatch CANNOT be maintained less than 5°F (refer to Step 7 or App_ E)
~ 30% turbine load: < 30% turbine load:
Condenser Pressure> 2_7 psia AND CANNOT Condenser Pressure > 1 -72 psia be restored within 5 minutes (AOP-s_o2i {AOP-S,02)
Any automatic reactor trip setpoint reached Any automatic turbine trip setpoint reached OR automatic trip imminent: OR automatic trip imminent:
- Turbine trip above P-9 (50%)
- High Stator Cooling Water temp 90°C
- Power Range high flux 109%
- Both MFPT's tripped
- Power Range flux rate +/- 5% in 2 seconds
- Low Auto Stop Oil pressure 45 psig
- Pressurizer high level 92%
- High SIG level 81% narrow range
- Pressurizer pressure low 1970 psig
- Main Turb Bearing Oil low pressure 7 psig
- Pressurizer pressure high 2385 psig
- Thrust Bearing Oil high pressure 60 psig
- RCS low flow 90%
- Turbine Overspeed '!980 rpm
- RCP undervoltage 5_022 kilovolts
- Loss of EHC pressure
- RCP underfrequency 56_0 Hz
- Unit 1 Only:
- OT~T 1*15% (variable) Generator Circuit Breaker (GCB) tripped OR 500kV bkrs 5034 and 5038 tripped_
- OPAT '108.7% (variable)
- Unit 2 Onlv:
- S/G low level 10-7% [15% EAMI Generator Circuit Breaker (GCB} tripped
- SSPS general warning in both trains OR '16'1 kV bkrs 924 and 928 tripped.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
I ..,...
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIXC SECONDARY PLANT EQUIPMENT
[1] ENSURE plant armouncement(s) made on the following:
- starting rapid shutdown (or load reduction) due to {reason) 0
- stopping secondary plant equipment 0 NOTE 1 If reactor power will be reduced below 50%, AUO should be on station at #3 heater drain tank (if possible) when 60% power is reached_
NOTE2 Dispatching of AUO in Steps [2] and [3] may be performed out of sequence.
[2] IF reactor power will be reduced below 50%,
THEN DISPATCH AUO with Appendix J {Unit 1) or K (Unit 2) to #3 Heater Drain Tank. D
[3] IF one MFP will be shutdown using this appendix, THEN DISPATCH AUO to OPEN MFWP recirc manual Isolation valve for MF\VP to be removed from service: (NIA valves NOT opened)
UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION OPEN..J 1 1A 1-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Northeast comer of 1A condenser D 1B 1-VLV-3-577 TB eL 706, Northeast comer of 1A condenser D 2 2A 2-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Southeast comer of 2A condenser D 2B 2-VLV-3-577 TB eL 706, Southeast comer of 2A condenser D 16
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
Time J Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIXC
[4] IF BOTH of the following conditions are met
- power is being reduced as directed by AOP-S.01 (Main Feedwater Malfunctions) or AOP-S.04 {Condensate or Heater Drain Malfunctions)
- leaving secondary pumps in service is desired, THEN GO TO Step [8]_
[5] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 80% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] ENSURE one Cond Demin Booster Pump STOPPED_
[b] ENSURE associated suction valve CLOSED:
COND DEMIN SUCTION VALVE CLOSED.../
BOOSTER PUMP A FCV-2-290 D OR B
OR I FCV-2-285 D I
~ c I FCV-2-280 D I
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[6] WHEN turbine Impulse pressure is approximately 70-75%,
THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] ENSURE one Condensate Booster Pump STOPPED.
(b] ENSURE associated CBP suction valve CLOSED:
CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSED ..J A FCV-2-94 D OR
[ B I FCV-2-87 D OR c
I FCV-2-81 D I
[c] PERFORM applicable procedure to adjust seal injection water pressure on stopped CBP to prevent water intrusion in oil:
(may be assigned to another operator or delayed if necessary}
- 1-S0-2/3-1 Section 7.2 D OR
- 2-S0-2/3-1 Section 7.3 D 18
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[7] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 65% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] STOP remaining two Cond Demin Booster Pumps simultaneously_ D
[b] ENSURE suction valves CLOSED:
COND DEMJN BOOSTER PUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSED "1 A FCV-2-290 B FCV-2-285 c FCV-2-280 I ;
[c] STOP one No_ 3 Heater Drain pump. D
[d] STOP one No. 7 Heater Drain pump. D 19
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[8] IF reactor power will be maintained greater than 50%,
THEN GO TO Notes prior to Step [11]. D CAUTION Isolation of an three intermediate heater strings could occur if turbine is tripped prior to fully opening LCV-6-105A and B using Appendix J or K.
[9] WHEN reactor power is fess than 60%
AND AUO with App. J (Unit 1) or K (Unit 2} is on station at #3 Heater Drain Tank, THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] STOP #3 Heater Drain Tank Pumps_
[b] NOTIFY AUO to perform App. J (Unit 1) or App. K (Unit 2),
Fully Opening #3 Heater Drain Tank Bypass Valves. D
[c] CLOSE isolation valves from #3 Htr Drain Pumps to heater strings:
VALVE DESCRIPTION CLOSED ..J FCV-6-108 Htr Drain Tk Pump 3 to Htr String A D FCV-6-109 Htr Drain Tk Pump 3 to Htr String B D FCV-6-110 Htr Drain Tk Pump 3 to Htr String C D 20
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
~*
" "' J Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE 1 The following step ensures that MFW Bypass valves are available to control feedwater flow at low power.
NOTE2 If any MFW Reg valve is in MANUAL, the associated MF\1\1 Bypass valve controller should remain in MANUAL to prevent undesired opening of bypass valve_
[10] WHEN Reactor power is less than 50°/o, THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] IF all MFW Reg Valves are in AUTO, THEN PLACE MFW Bypass Reg Valve controllers in AUTO_
[b] IF any MFW Reg Valve is in MANUAL, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 2) PLACE MFW Bypass Reg Valves in AUTO for remaining S/Gs_ D 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE1 If performing this AOP to reduce power to allow shutting down one MFW pump, the affected MFWP may be removed from service at power level less than 55% (Unit 1) or 65% (Unit 2).
NOTE2 AFW start function on loss of both MFW pumps is inoperable when a MFW pump is RESET but NOT pumping forward. LCO 3.32.1 (Unit 1) or 3.3.2 (Unit 2) allows AFW start channel to be inoperable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when shutting down a MFWP_
[11] WHEN it is desired to remove one MFW pump from service AND power level is less than applicable limit
- turbine impulse pressure less than approximately 45%
- reactor power less than value specified in Note 1 THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] ENSURE MFWP Recirc Manual Isolation valve OPEN for MFWP to be removed from service: (NIA valves NOT opened)
UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION OPEN .J 1A 1-VLV-3-576 TB el. 70£, Northeast comer of *1A condenser D
- 1 1B *t-VLV-3-577 TB el. 706, Northeast comer of 1A condenser D 2A 2-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Southeast comer of 2A condenser D 2
2B 2-VLV-3-577 TB eL 70£, Southeast comer of 2A condenser D
[b] THROTTLE OPEN redrc valve in MANUAL (30-50% OPEN}
for MFWP to be removed from service_ D
[c] PLACE speed controller in MANUAL for MFWP to be removed from service. D
[d] REDUCE speed gradually on MFWP to be removed from service. D 22
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
- 2 RCP #1 Seal Failure.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to insert Event 4, #2 RCP #1 Seal Failure.
Indications/Alarms Annunciators:
1-M-5
- M5B-B3, "FS-62-11 REAC COOL PMPS SEAL LEAKOFF HIGH FLOW" Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:
1-M-5
- 1-FR-62-24 trending up FS-62-11 REAC COOL PMPS SEAL LEAKOFF HIGH FLOW
[1] VERIFY High Leakoffflow condition on affected RGP(s} with the following instruments_
Pump Leakoff Instrumentation RCP *1 *1-FR-62-24 RCP2 1-FR-62-24 RCP3 'l-FR-62-50 RCP4 *1-FR-62-50
[2] GO TO AOP-R04, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions.
VERIFY High Leakoff flow condition on RCP #2.
23
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
- 2 RCP #1 Seal Failure.
Time I Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION 1 RCP should NOT be tripped when reactor power is greater than 5% (FR-S.1 or when RCP operation is required by FR-C.1 (Inadequate Core Cooling) or FR-C.2 {Degraded Core Cooling).
CAUTION 2 Exceeding any of the following limits requires tripping the affected RCP, except as described in Caution 1:
- RCP #1 Seal Temperature greater than 230°F
- RCP Lower Bearing Temperature greater than 230°F
- RCP Upper Motor Bearing Temperature greater than 200°F
- RCP Lower Motor Bearing Temperature greater than 200°F
- RCP Motor Voltage less than 5940V or greater than 7260V
- RCP Motor Amps greater than 608 amps
- RCP Vibration greater than 20 mils on any axis (x and/or y) [C.3]
NOTE: RCP trip criteria is also located in Appendix B.
'l. DIAGNOSE the failure:
IF ... GOTO SECTION PAGE I #1 Seal Leakoff high flow (high flow Alarm) on ANY RCP 2.2 7 2.2 #1 Seal Leakoff High Flow on ANY RCP CAUTION 1: RCP bearing damage may occur if temperature exceeds 230°F.
CAUTION 2: IF any RCP must be stopped due to high seal leakoff flow, the seal return valve on the affected RCP(s) must be closed within 5 minutes.
This action is addressed in Section 2.1.
24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
- 2 RCP #1 Seal Failure.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior A TC 1_ MONITOR #*J sea! [eakoff less than 6 gprn per pump:
- FR-62-24 [RCP 1 & 2J
- FR-62-50 [RCP 3 & 4J ATC Answers step 1 no and transitions to step 1b RNO.
A TC IF #'l seal leakoff flow less than 8 gpm, THEN PERFORM the following:
'1) CONTROL RCP seal injection flow for the affected RCP greater than or equal to 9 gpm.
- 2) CONTACT Engineering for recommendations WHILE continuing with this procedure
- 3) IMPLEMENT Engineering recommendations to address specific RCP seal conditions OR COMPLETE normal plant shutdown within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> USING appropriate plant procedure_
- 4) WHEN reactor is shutdown or tripped, THEN GO TO Sect 2. 'I, ANY RCP Tripped or RCP Shutdown Required. [C.1]
- 2. MONITOR RCP lower bearing and seal water temperatures less than 230°F.
25
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
- 2 RCP #1 Seal Failure.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 3. MONITOR #1 seal 11.P greater than 220 psid:
- PDl-62-8A
- PDl-62-21A
- PDl-62-34A
- PDl-62-47A
- 4. ENSURE RCP seal water supply flow 6-10 gpm per pump:
- F!-62-1A
'
- Fl-62-14A
- F!-62-27A
- Fl-62-40A Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
At discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event.
26
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
PR Instrument N44 Fails High.
Time Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to initiate Event 5, NIS Power Range Channel 4 (N44) OUTPUT Signal Failure High Indications available:
M-4
- Control Rods Inserting
- Xl-92-5008A ramps to full scale
- M4B-E-3, NC-468 NIS POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION NC-468 NIS POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION
[1] IF dropped rod, THEN SRO GO TO AOP-C.0'1, Rod Control System f!v1alfunctions.
[2] IF Power Range channel failed, THEN SRO GO TO AOP-1_0,1, Nuclear lnstrurnent f\,1faffunction.
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF. .* SECTION PAGE Uncontrolled rod bank movement 4
(rod movement NOT due to actual T-avg!T-ref mismatch or change in reactor/turbine power)
NOTE: Step 1 is an immediate action sl:ep.
27
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
PR Instrument N44 Fails High.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. STOP uncontrolled rod motion:
- a. PLACE rod control in MAN.
ATC b_ CHECK rod motion STOPPED.
CAUTION: Control Rods should NOT be manually withdrawn during a plant transient.
- 2. CHECK for plant transient:
- a. CHECK reactor power and T-avg STABLE.
- 2. b. CHECK ICS thermal power indication AVAILABLE.
- c. VERIFY 10 minute average power less than or equal to applicable limit ATC
- 3. CHECK for instrumentation malfunction:
- a. CHECK all Vital Instrument Power Boards ENERGIZED:
DARK
28
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
PR Instrument N44 Fails High.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
IF ... GOTO SECTION PAGE Power Range Failure 2.3 16
- 1. PLACE rod control in MAN.
- 2. IF power rise is in progress, ATC THEN STABILIZE reactor power at current level.
- 3. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for applicability:
.. 3.3. i .1 (3.3.1 ). Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
- 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown SRO Instrumentation
- 3.3.3.7, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation
- 4.2.4.2, QPTR with one PR Charmer Inoperable LIMmNG CONDITION FOR OPERAT!Oi'll 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, 1he reactor !rip system instrumentation cham1as and intenocls of Table 3 .3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPUCABI! ITY* As shown in Table 3.3-1.
As shol'l'!l in Table 3.3--1.
29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
PR Instrument N44 Fails High.
2 Powe: Range. Neutron Fl!.ix 4 2 2 2
- 3. ?~Range. Neutron Ru:>: 4 2 3 1,2 2 High Positive Rate T Ovenemperature :iT Four 4 2 2 Loop Opera!i:on
- 3. Ov~ .:ff Foor Loop 4 2 3 2 Ooera!Yon
- 5. PLACE following switches located on Detector current Comparator drawer
[M-13, N50l in position corresponding to failed Power Range Channel:
- Upper section CREW
- Lower Section
- Appropriate Rod Stop Bypass switch
- Appropriate Power Mismatch Bypass switch
- 6. DEFEAT failed Power Range channel USING Comparator Channel Defeat switch:
CREW
- Comparator and Rate Drawer
[M-13. N37J CAUTION: Control rods should NOT be manually withdrawn during a plant transient.
NOTE: Tavg is required to be within *1°F of Tref when restoring automatic rod control.
30
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
PR Instrument N44 Fails High.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 7. RESTORE Tavg as necessary USING one of the following:
- turbine load reduction
- 8. IF reactor power is greater than P-6 (1 o-4 %)
THEN ENSURE OPERABLE Power Range channel selected on the foflowing:
- NR-45 Recorder [M-4]
- RCS Temp b.T recorder - (green pen)
[M-5, XS-68-2B]
9_ IF auto rod control is desired, THEN ATC RESTORE roo control to AUTO.
- 10. CHECK reactor power CREW greater than 75%.
11 _ NOTIFY Reactor Engineering to perform O-Sl-NUC-000-011.0, CREW Moveable Detector Determination of Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.
31
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
PR Instrument N44 Fails High.
-* i'~~ition Applicant's Actions or Behavior i2_ NOTIFY l&C to remove failed power range channel from service USING appropriate Appendix:
POWER RANGE PROT CHANNEL CH APPENDIX N-41 I A N-42 II B CREW N-43 m c N-44 rv D 13_ GO TO appropriate plant procedure_
END OF SECTION Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
When technical specifications have been identified or at discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event 32
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Grid Disturbance.
Time Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to insert Event 6, Grid Disturbance.
Indications/Alarms Annunciators:
1-M-2
- 1-El-57-8 MEGAVARS trending up
- 1El-57-9, 10, & 11 MAIN GEN AMPS trending up Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:
ICS ALARMS
- GEN MVAR
- H2 Cooler Discharge Gas Temp High NOTE1 Entry into this AOP is NOT required for abnormal voltage or reactive load conditions which are immedlately corrected by tap changer or voltage regulator adjustments.
NOTE 2 lf grid frequency and voltage are both a!mom1al, the frequency condition should be addressed first, UNLESS ttie voltage condition is clearly worse.
- 1. DIAGNOSE the abnormal condition:
GOTO IF ... PAGE SECTION
- Low 500 kV switchyard voltage (voltage CANNOT be maintained greater than or equal to 510 kV) OR
- Unit 1 reactive load CANNOT be maintained within limits specified 2.3 13 in Appendix D (also contained in GOl-6 and 1-Pl-OPS-000-020.1) OR
- Unit 1 voltage regulator malfunction (loss of auto voltage control with generator tied to grid).
33
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Grid Disturbance.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 1. MONITOR for loss of off-site power:
- IF off-site power is lost at any time, THEN GO TO AOP-P.01, Loss of Off-Site Power.
BOP 2. CHECK Unit 1 main generator TIED TO GRID.
BOP 3. MONITOR Unit 1 generator load within capability curve:
- a. REFER TO Appendix C, Main Generator Capability Curve.
- b. CHECK Unit 1 main generator load within generator capability curve.
BOP A~~~c MAIN GENERATOR CAPABILITY CURVE CAUTION Operation in excess of 500 MVARS incoming may cause trip from loss of field or generator backup 1 II 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 5 5 1 a 9 10 100 200 ltOO 300 400 *oo 800 600
"::e m
ITI 700 700 ~
800 800
"'s:
900: OOG "'~
1000 ~
100 1100 ;;t 121)!1 1200 l3l)\I 1300 1400 1400 500 1500 9 $ 1 6 s 4 3 2 1 0 1 z 3 4 5 s 1 s 9 10 m;ACTIVE l.IVA x 100 REACTIVE MVA x 100 UHDEREXCITED OVEREXCITED 34
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Grid Disturbance.
me Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP b. ADJUST exciter voltage auto adjuster as necessary to restore MVARs within capability curve.
IF MVARs CANNOT be restored to within capability curve with voltage regulator in ON (auto),
THEN
- 1) ENSURE voltage regulator in OFF (manual).
At discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event 35
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Offsite Power Grid Disqualified.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to call the examinee and inform them the "Grid is disqualified."
SRO Transitions to AOP-P.07 DEGRADED GRID OR ABNORMAL VOLTAGE CONDITIONS 2.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE1 Entry into this AOP is NOT required for abnormal voltage or reactive load conditions which are immediately corrected by tap changer or voltage regulator adjustments.
NOTE2 If grid frequency and voltage are both abnormal, the frequency condition should be addressed first, UNLESS the voltage condition is dearly worse.
- 1. DIAGNOSE the abnormal condition:
GOTO IF ... PAGE SECTION
- Transmission Operator reports off-site power is DISQUALIFIED with normal frequency and voltage OR
- Off-site power source(s) declared INOPERABLE (other than 2.1 4 planned activities) with normal frequency and voltage.
SRO 1. MONITOR if this section should be exited:
- a. IF off-site power is lost at any time, THEN GO TO AOP-P .01, Loss of Ott-s;te Power.
- b. IF grid frequency or voltage is abnormal OR generator reactive loading is abnormal, THEN RETURN TO Section 2.0 to determine applicable section.
36
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Offsite Power Grid Disqualified.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO 2. PERFORM Appendix A, Generic Actions for Off-Site Power Sources inoperable.
SRO Transitions to AOP-P.07, Appendix A GENERIC ACTIONS FOR OFF-SITE POWER SOURCES INOPERABLE SRO APPENDIX A Page 1of4 GENERIC ACTIONS FOR OFF-SITE POWER SOURCES INOPERABLE NOTE Steps in this appendix may be performed out of order or concurrently.
- 1. ENSURE applicable action of LCO 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2 entered. D 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electricat power soun::es shall be OPERABLE:
- a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission oetwork and the onsite Class 1 E distribution system@, and
- b. Four separate and independent diesel generator sets each with:
- 1. Two diesels dr'wlng a oommon generator
- 2. Two engine-mounted fuel tanks containing a minimum volume of 250 gallons of fuel. per tank
- 3. A separate fuel stora9e system containin9 a minimum vo4ume of 62,000 gallons of fuel,
- 4. A separat~ fuel ttaMfer pump, and
- 5. A separate 125*volt D.C. distribution panel, 125*volt D.C.
battery bani<: and associated Charger.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
- d. Wllh two of 111e above required offsite AC. circuits inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of4 diesel generator sets by performing Survemaoce Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, unless the diesel generator sels are already operating; reslore at least one of the inoperable offsiie sources lo OPERABL. E. status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
When technical specifications have been identified or at discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event 37
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power/Reactor Trip/ Station Blackout ECA-0.0/0pen PORV Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to initiate Event 8 Loss of Offsite Power Indications available:
- RPI for all control rods at 0
- Reactor trip alarms lit [M-4D] .
- Rapid drop in neutron level.
- Simulator Lights reduced to minimum .
SRO Enter and Direct performance of E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.
Examiner Note: following IOA performance, prior to Steps 1-4 immediate action verification, A TC/BOP surveys MCBs for any expected automatic system response that failed to occur.
Upon discovery, they may take manual action(s) to align plant systems as expected for the event in progress. (Ref. EPM-4, Prudent Operator Actions)
Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via ICS. When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).
CREW Performs the first four steps of E-0 unprompted.
SRO Directs performance of E-0 NOTE1 Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.
NOTE2 This procedure has a foldout page.
'l. VERIFY reactor TRIPPED:
. Reactor trip breakers OPEN
. Reactor trip bypass breakers DISCONNECTED or OPEN ATC
. Rod bottom lights UT
. Rod position indicators less than or equal to 12 steps.
. Neutron flux DROPPING 38
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power/Reactor Trip/ Station Blackout ECA-0.0/0pen PORV Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 2. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:
BOP Turbine stop valves CLOSED.
- 3. VERIFY at least one 6.9KV shutdown ATTEMPT to start D/Gs.
board ENERGIZED on this unit.
IF power CANNOT be immediately restored to at least one shutdown board BOP on this unit.
THEN GO TO ECA-0.0. Loss of All AC Power.
Examiner Note: The crew may attempt to recover the 1A EOG using AOP-P.01 in parallel with ECA-0.0. Steps for AOP-P.01 start on page 44.
SRO Directs actions of ECA-0.0, Loss Of All AC Power.
NOTE Steps 1, 2, and 3 are immediate action steps.
- 1. SUSPEND FRP implementation and CREW MONITOR status trees for information only.
- 2. VERIFY reactor TRIPPED:
- Reactor trip breakers OPEN ATC
- Reactor trip bypass breakers OPEN or DISCONNECTED
- Neutron flux DROPPING
- 3. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:
ATC ALL turbine stop valves CLOSED
[SSPS status lights on M-6].
39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power/Reactor Trip/ Station Blackout ECA-0.0/0pen PORV Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC 4. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.
NOTE Step 5 should be handed off to a Unit Operator.
- 5. PERFORM the following notifications:
- a. NOTIFY four AUOs to report to MCR immediately to be available as necessary for DC load shed and ATC local operation of TD AFW LCVs.
- b. NOTIFY Site Security to station officers at key vital doors USING SSl-1, Security Instructions for Members of the Security Force.
- 6. CHECK RCS ISOLATED:
- a. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED. a. IF pressurizer pressure ATC less than 2335 psig, THEN CLOSE pressurizer PORVs.
40
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power/Reactor Trip/ Station Blackout ECA-0.0/0pen PORV Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 6. CHECK RCS ISOLATED:
- b. Letdown isolation valves CLOSED: b. CLOSE valves.
- FCV-62-69 ATC
- FCV-62-70
- FCV-62-72
- FCV-62-73
- FCV-62-74
- 6. CHECK RCS ISOLATED:
- c. Excess letdown isolation valves ATC CLOSED:
- FCV-62-54
- FCV-62-55
- 6. CHECK RCS ISOLATED:
- d. Reactor vessel head vents CLOSED:
- FSV-68-394 ATC
- FSV-68-395 FSV-68-396 FSV-68-397 41
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power/Reactor Trip/ Station Blackout ECA-0.0/0pen PORV Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE On loss of auxiliary control air, TD AFW LCVs fail open.
- Auxiliary air compressors are powered from 480V C&A Vent Boards 2A1-A and 281-B.
- 7. MONITOR AFW flow:
- a. CHECK TD AFW pump RUNNING.
- 7. MONITOR AFW flow:
BOP b. CONTROL TD AFW pump USING EA-3-1, MGR Operation of TDAFW Pump.
- 7. MONITOR AFW flow:
- c. MONITOR Aux Control Air AVAILABLE:
- BOTH Unit 2 Shutdown Boards ENERGIZED
- Train A and B Aux Control Air pressure on 1-M-15 (prior to DC load-shedding).
42
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power/Reactor Trip/ Station Blackout ECA-0.0/0pen PORV
~* - Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 7. MONITOR AFW flow:
in at least one SIG.
- 7. MONITOR AFW flow:
- e. CONTROL intact or ruptured S/G narrow range levels between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.
CAUTION DO NOT attempt to start D/Gs if both trains of ERCW are unavailable due to catastrophic event.
- 8. ATTEMPT to restore power to any shutdown board on this unit:
- a. CHECK for any of the following:
- any DIG on this unit potentially available (capable of supplying power to shutdown board)
- availability of any DIG on this unit is UNKNOWN.
43
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power/Reactor Trip/ Station Blackout ECA-0.0/0pen PORV I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 8. ATTEMPT to restore power to any shutdown board on this unit:
- b. RESET D/G start lockout relays for D/G(s) to be started. [O-M-26]
- c. EMERGENCY START diesel BOP generators. [M-1 switch and M-26 pushbutton]
- d. VERIFY at least one shutdown board BOP ENERGIZED from DIG on this unit
- f. CHECK at least one shutdown board on this unit ENERGIZED.
- g. RESUME FRP implementation.
- 8. ATTEMPT to restore power to any shutdown board on this unit:
- h. RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.
Examiner Note: Lead Examiner may terminate the scenario when the 1A EOG has been reset and energizes Shutdown Board 1A.
44
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power/Reactor Trip/ Station Blackout ECA-0.0/0pen PORV I~*
I ""'""
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: AOP-P.01 steps begin here.
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF ... SECTION PAGE Complete loss of off-site power 2.1 4 NOTE: Steps 1 and 2 are immediate actions.
- 1. CHECK Diesel Generators RUNNING EMERGENCY START available D/Gs.
BOP and supplying shutdown boards.
- 3. MONITOR BOTH 6900V shutdown IF NO 6900V shutdown board is ENERGIZED boards on this unit ENERGIZED. on this unit.
THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. IF unit is in Mode 1-4, THEN ENSURE ECA-0.0, loss of All AC Power has been entered.
- c. IF any D/G is available (capable of starting),
BOP THEN PERFORM Appendix S, Manually Energizing Shutdown Board from DIG.
Examiner Note, Appendix S actions start here.
- 1. SELECT shutdown board to be energized: D
- 1A-A_ _
- 18-B- -
- 2A-A_ _
- 28-B_ _
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power/Reactor Trip/ Station Blackout ECA-0.0/0pen PORV Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION If differential lockout relay is tripped, the 6.9KV Shutdown Board should NOT be energized until the cause is determined and corrected.
NOTE 6.9KV Shutdown Bd differential relay actuation trips normally-dosed 6.9KV transformer breakers. Transformer breakers CLOSED indicates differential relay NOT actuated.
- 2. VERIFY differential relay NOT actuated on affected 6.9KV shutdown bd.
BOP [M-1 or O-M-26] D BOP 3. RESET DIG start lockout relay for affected DIG. [O-M-26] D
- 6. IF affected D/G is running AND DIG breaker did NOT auto close.
THEN PERFORM the following: [O-M-26]
- 7. ENSURE ERCW supply valve OPEN for DIG. D Examiner Note: Lead Examiner may terminate the scenario when the 1A EOG has been reset and energizes Shutdown Board 1A.
46
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Sequoyah Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Candidates: ATC SRO BOP Initial Conditions: 4% BOL, EOOS risk green FT-1-3A is in MAINT BYPASS, RTS 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Turnover: Continue the Reactor Startup, raise power to 13%
Critical Tasks CT-28 Manually align ECCS pump containment sump valves FCV-63-72 and FCV-63-73 to the Containment Sump prior to transition to ECA-1.1.
ES-1.3-PRA-2 Manually stop one of two Containment Spray Pumps while in ES-1.3 within 2 minutes of an RWST low level alarm of 27% during a SBLOCA or LBLOCA Event Event Type Event Description No.
1 (R) ATC Continue Power Increase from -4%.
1a (N)BOP/SRO Place feed regulating valves in AUTO using O-G0-4.Section 5.1 Step 4.
(C) BOP The A Hotwell pump develops a high current condition; the BOP will 2 CN01A (C)SRO manually start the C Hotwell pump.
CC09B (C) BOP The 1A CCS Pump trip coupled with a failure of the 1B-B CCS pump to auto start. The BOP will manually start the 1B CCS pump using AOP-M.03. The 3
SRO will address Tech Specs and determines the 1A CCS pump is CC10A (C TS)SRO INOPERABLE.
CV40 (C) ATC The Letdown Temperature Control valve fails to control in AUTO, the ATC 4
AUTO (C)SRO will control Letdown temperature in MANUAL.
(C) ATC A Small RCS Leak will develop. The ATC will raise charging flow using 5 TH01C AOP-R.05. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determine that RCS (C TS) SRO Leakage is in excess of TS requirements.
The RCS leak increases to a LBLOCA, the crew will initiate a Reactor trip 6 TH01C (M) ALL and Safety Injection and transitions to E-0.
The crew will transition from E-0 to E-1 and ultimately ES-1.3 to align RHR to the Containment Sump. During the alignment to the Containment sump, 7 RH02 (C) ATC a failure of sump AUTO swapover occurs. The ATC will manually align the suction of the ECCS pumps to the Containment Sump.
The A RHR pump trips and the B RHR pump will not start. The crew will 8 RH01 (C) ATC transition to ECA-1.1.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
SUMMARY
Event 1 - The crew will assume the shift, place the feed regulating valves in AUTO using O-G0-4.Section 5.1 Step 4 and continue the power increase.
Event 2 - When directed by the Lead Examiner the "A" Hotwell pump current increases, the BOP will manually start the "C" Hotwell pump The crew may choose to use the guidance in either the ARP, AOP-S.04 or 1-S0-2/3-1 to start the "C" Hotwell pump.
Event 3 - When directed by the Lead Examiner the "A" CCS Pump trip coupled with a failure of the "B" CCS pump to auto start. The BOP will manually start the 1B-B CCS pump using prudent operator actions and AOP-M.03 LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines the "A" CCS pump is INOPERABLE and enters LCO 3.7.3.
Event 4 - The Letdown Temperature Control valve fails to control in AUTO, the ATC will control Letdown temperature in MANUAL.
Event 5 - When directed by the Lead Examiner a small unisolable RCS leak will develop. The ATC will raise charging flow to control pressurizer level. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determine that RCS Leakage is in excess of LCO requirements. The SRO will enter LCO 3.4.6.2.a orb action a.
Event 6 - The RCS leak increases to a LBLOCA, the crew will initiate a Reactor trip and Safety Injection and transitions to E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION to trip the reactor and initiate Safety Injection and transition to E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT. During the transition to E-1, status tree monitoring will occur. The crew will identify red path condition and implement FR-Z.1 for High Containment Pressure and potentially FR-P.1 for Pressurized Thermal Shock RED Path.
Event 7 - When the RWST depletes the crew will align ECCS to the Containment sump using ES-1.3 TRANSFER TO RHR CONTAINMENT SUMP. During the alignment to the Containment sump, a failure of sump AUTO swapover occurs. The A TC will manually align the suction of the ECCS pumps to the Containment Sump. (Credit sought for a post trip component malfunction for the ATC. The verifiable action is a Prudent Operator Action that only the ATC will perform.)
Event 8 - The "A" RHR pump trips and the "B" RHR pump will not start. The crew will transition to ECA-1.1 LOSS OF ECCS SUMP RECIRCULATION.
2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 8 Event
Description:
Power Increase From 4%
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior No action required for event 1 Examiner Note: The crew will shift Feed Reg Valves to AUTO using O-G0-4, Section 5.1 Actions To Be Performed Prior To Raising Reactor Power.
5.1 Actions To Be Performed Prior To Raising Reactor Power (continued)
NOTES
- 1) MFW Bypass valves will be using single element control, which means the desired SG level setpoint will be compared to the actual SG level until adequate steam and feedwater flow are available. Single Element to Three Element control transition occurs at -13% RTP (.494E6 LBM/HR steam flow per loop).
- 2) MFW Reg valves may have a positive deviation if reactor power is in the upper range of the control band (1-4%) in the following step.
[4] PERFORM the following:
[4.1] ENSURE four MFW Bypass Reg valves in AUTO. D
[4.2] ENSURE MFW Reg. valves have minimal controller deviation. D BOP {4.3] ENSURE MFW Reg. valves are CLOSED D
[4.4] PLACE MFW Reg. valves in AUTO. D
[4.5] ENSURE MFW valve control mode in "3 Element Enabled" (click target located in the center of each screen under the appropriate "Loop# Control" button) D Direct a load increase in accordance with O-G0-4, Reactor Power SRO Ascension To Between 13% And 15% RTP, Section 5.2, and O-S0-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.1 or Section 6.2.
NOTES
- 1) Actions effecting reactivity are directed in the following step. O-S0-62-7 requirements shall be adhered to for reactivity changes (i.e. reactivity balance, amounts of boric acid or water). AH appropriate verifications and peer checks shall be utilized during performance.
2} Recommended dilution rate is 50 to 75 gallon batches every 12 to *15 minutes for a steady power rise. Rod movement should be limited to 1/2 step increments approximately every 1 112 minutes. Dilution and rod movement rates may be adjusted depending on SG level control stability.
- 3) Control Rod withdrawal and I or dilution requirements may be significantly impacted by the change in core reactivity due to changing Xenon concentration.
1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 8 Event
Description:
Power Increase From 4%
-- Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[41 INITIATE a methodical and deliberate reactor power ascent by CREW manual adjustment of the control banks or by diluting the RCS. D Examiner Note: The following Steps are from O-S0-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.2, Dilute CAUTION1 When making an RCS dilution of 2: 3000 gallons, it should be done in batches with an RCS boron concentration verification at the halfway point {e.g., 1500 gallons). Allow at least 15 minutes between batches. [C.5] [C.7]
CAUTION2 Returning the Boric Acid Blender to service after unplugging, cleaning, or maintenance on the Boric Acid System could introduce debris, sludge, air or chunks of solidified boron into the CCP suction resulting in pump damage. Extreme care must be exercised to properly flush the Boric Acid Blender system foUowing an outage. [C.2]
NOTE1 lf an excessive amount of dilution is required (plant startup), the pressurizer heaters should be energized to cause pressurizer spray operation for equalizing boron concentration in RCS and pressurizer.
NOTE2 Dilute mode will be used anytime a long-term positive reactivity addition is desired_ The operator should use the normal dilute mode whenever conditions permit_
Examiner Note: Dilutions will be performed based on the Reactor Engineering provided Reactivity Spreadsheet; based on O-G0-4 Notes, recommended dilution rate is 50 to 75 gallon batches every 12 to 15 minutes for a steady power increase. During subsequent power escalation, large volume dilutions will be divided evenly over each hour as determined by the crew [i.e.: one-third, one-quarter of the volume over each hour's period (e.g.: -60 gallons, 4 times per hour for 240 gallons for the first hour)].
ATC [1] IF [CTS] is applicable, THEN ENSURE unit is NOT in a Tech Spec or TRM action that prohibits positive reactivity additions. [C.1]
NOTE HUT level rise of 1% is equal to 1380 gallons (T!-28 Figure 34).
ATC [2] ENSURE sufficient capacity available in the HUT selected to receive expected amounts of eves letdown: (NIA if NOT used)
HUT LEVEL INITIALS A %
B %
2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 8 Event
Description:
Power Increase From 4%
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[3] ENSURE makeup system is aligned for AUTO operation in accordance with Section 5.1.
A TC [4] RECORD the quantity of dilution water required to achieve desired boron concentration using Appendix D. (NIA for minor power changes) gallons NOTE Due to eyeball interpolation the verified calculation may slightly differ from the initial calculation. The following signoff indicates that any differences in the two results have been discussed and are close enough to be considered validated.
NOTE Due to eyeball interpolation the verified calculation may slightly differ from the initial calculation. The following signoff indicates that any differences in the two results have been discussed and are close enough to be considered validated.
ATC [5] PERFORM Appendix I Independent Verification of Calculation for Amount of Boric Acid or Primary Water.
(NIA if App. D was performed by SRO to verify data from Rx Engineering)
(Step not required provided in shift turnover package)
NOTE Primary Water Flow Controller [FC-62-1421 receives its reference signal (70 gpm) from setpoint potentiometer (dial indicator) located on panel M-6. A setpoint of 35%
corresponds to a 70 gpm primary water flow rate.
3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 8 Event
Description:
Power Increase From 4%
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE Flow oscillations and/or erratic controller response may require manual operation of Primary Water Flow Controller [FC-62-1421 until stable conditions exist ATC [12] VERIFY the following;
[a] Inlet to top of VCT [FCV-62-128] is OPEN.
[b] Primary Water flow by [Fl-62-142A] OR [FQ-62-142].
NOTE Alternate dilution in small amounts is acceptable on a regular basis, provided no significant changes in seal water temperature or seal leakoff are indicated. Batches of 5 to 1O gallons may be added through FCV-62-144 on a frequency NOT to exceed once per 30 minutes.
ICS points for No. 1 seal leakoffs and seal water temperatures on the RCPs should be monitored during and after dilution.
ATC [13] IF primary water addition to the bottom of the VCT [FCV-62-144]
is desired, THEN ATC [a] CLOSE [FCV-62-128] with [HS-62-128].
ATC [b] OPEN [FCV-62-144] with [HS-62-144].
A TC [c] VERIFY Primary Water flow by [Fl-62-142A] OR [FQ-62-142].
NOTE It may take approximately 15 minutes before any changes to reactivity are indicated on nuclear instrumentation or RCS temperature indication.
ATC [14] MONITOR nuclear instrumentation and reactor coolant temperature to ensure the proper response from dilution.
ATC [15] IF [Ll-62-129], Volume Control Tank Level, increases to 63 percent, THEN ENSURE [LCV-62-118], Volume Control Tank Divert Valve. OPENS to divert excess water to the Holdup Tanks.
ATC [16] WHEN dilution is complete, THEN ATC [b] IF [FCV-62-144] was previously OPENED, THEN CLOSE
[FCV-62-144] with [HS-62-144].
A TC [c] VERIFY no primary water flow on either [Fl-62-142A] OR
[FQ-62-142).
4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 8 Event
Description:
Power Increase From 4%
Time I Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC [d] ENSURE [FCV-62-128] is CLOSED ATC [17] IF power increase in progress and additional dilutions will be required, THEN use this table to re-perform steps [4] through [18]
(next page)
(17] IF power ascension in progress and additional dilutions will be required, THEN use this table to re-perform steps 6.2[4]
through 6.2[17].
STEP 1st 2nd 3rd
[4] RECORD the quantity of dilution water required to achieve desired boron concentration using Appendix D. Quantity Quantity Quantity
[5] PERFORM Appendix I, IV of Calculation for amount of BA or PW.
[6) PLACE [HS-62-140AJ, Boric Acid Supply to Blender Flow Control Switch to the STOP position. D D D
[7] PLACE CHS-62-1408], CVCS Makeup Selector Switch to the DILUTE position. D D D
[8] ENSURE [HS-62-14001 Boric Acid Valve to Blender is CLOSED (Green light LIT). D D D
[9] SET [FQ-62-142], Batch Integrator for the desired quantity. D D D
[10] ADJUST [FC-62-1421, Primary Makeup Water Flow Controller for the desired flow rate. D D D
[11] PLACE [HS-62-140AJ, BA Supply to Blender Flow Control Switch to START. D D D
[12] VERIFY the following:
D D D
[a] Inlet to top of VCT (FCV-62-128] is OPEN.
[b] Primary Water flow by [Fl-62-142A] or [FQ-62-142]. D D D
[13) IF PW addition to top of VCT [FCV-62-1281 is NOT warranted, but PW addition to the bottom of the VCT [FCV-62-1441 is desired, THEN D D D
[a] CLOSE [FCV-62-128] with [HS-62-128]
5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 8 Event
Description:
Power Increase From 4%
I
'~ I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior STEP 1st 2nd 3rd (b] OPEN [FCV-62-144] with [HS-62-144]. D D D
[c] VERIFY Primary Water flow by [Fl-62-142A] or [FQ-62-142]. D D D
[14] MONITOR nuclear instrumentation and reactor coolant temperature to ensure the proper response from dilution. D D D (15] IF [Ll-62-1291, VCT level, rises to 63 percent, THEN ENSURE CLCV-62-1181, VCT Divert Valve, OPENS to divert excess water to the HUTs. D D D (16] WHEN dilution is complete, THEN
[a] PLACE fHS-62-140Al, Boric Acid to Blender Flow Control Switch to STOP D D D
[b] IF CFCV-62-1441 was previously OPENED, THEN CLOSE
[FCV-62-144] with [HS-62-144]. D D D (c] VERIFY no primary water flow on either [Fl-62-142Al or
[FQ-62-142]. D D D
[d] ENSURE [FCV-62-128] is CLOSED. D D D (17] IF Step 6.2[17] will be repeated, THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] PLACE [HS-62-140Bl, CVCS Makeup Selector Switch to the AUTO position D D D
[b] PLACE CHS-62-140AJ, BA to Blender Flow Control Switch to START position. D D D
[c] ENSURE dilution is logged in Unit Narrative Log. D D D
[18] REALIGN the blender controls for AUTO makeup to the CVCS in accordance with Section 5.1.
[19] ENSURE dilution(s) is logged in Unit Narrative Log. D NOTE It may take approximately 15 minutes before any changes to reactivity are indicated on nuclear instrumentation or RCS temperature indication.
ATC [20] IF RCS boron sample is required, THEN NOTIFY Chem Lab to obtain RCS boron sample.
6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 8 Event
Description:
Power Increase From 4%
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior O-G0-4, Section 5.2 Reactor Power Ascension To Between 13% And 15% RTP Examiner Note: Crew will coordinate control rod withdrawal and dilutions based on the Reactor Engineering provided Reactivity Spreadsheet and would coordinate rod withdrawal and dilutions observing the guidance of Step 3 NOTES above on page 2.
MODE1 Examiner Note: Mode change call is made using Loop ~ T indications on the MCB and ICS, not Nls; Nls may be referred to during the MODE change determination Refer to O-G0-4 Section 3.1, Precaution C, specifically bullets 2 & 3 (below):
C. During startup, NIS power range indication may be reading significantly higher than true power until calibration adjustments are made. The following should be used to determine the most accurate indication for comparison with NIS:
- When reactor power is less than or equal to 15%, use average loop AT (U0485).
- When reactor power is greater than 15°/o, use LEFM core thermal power indication (U2118}. If LEFM is NOT available,. then continue using average loop AT up to 40%. (U1118 will be used above 40% with LEFM unavailable).
[5] WHEN reactor power is above 5%, THEN ATC LOG Mode 1 entry in the Unit Narrative Log.
A TC would be monitoring the mode change; any crew member may make the initial identification however the SRO should announce transition to MODE 1 based on Loop~ T indication. Normally, both MCB SRO and ICS indications are reviewed for MODE transition verification.
Crew member replaces the MODE 2 sign with MODE 1 sign on 1-M-4 under the clock.
[6] MAINTAIN the SG levels on program by periodically adjusting the MFW Bypass controller level setpoints using Appendix B and 1, 2-S0-98-1, Distributed Control System (DCS).
7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 8 Event
Description:
Power Increase From 4%
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[7] IF Turbine roll in parallel with power ascent is desired, THEN N/A PERFORM Section 5.3 in parallel with the remainder of this section.
When the crew has sufficiently raised power the Lead examiner may proceed to Event 2.
8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
"A" Hotwell Pump High Current Condition Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to insert Event 2 "A" Hotwell Pump High Current Condition Indications/Alarms Annunciators:
1-M-1
- 18 E-4 MOTOR OVERLOAD PANEL 1-M-1THRU1-M-6 Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:
1-M-3
- El-2-33 Hotwell Pump 1A Amps increasing.
- White light above HS-2-33A ON.
MOTOR OVERLOAD PANEL 1-M-1 THRU 1-M-6 I'I] IF Pump trips automatically OR is tripped by operator action, THEN GO TO response for window E-3, MotorTripout PNL 1-1\/1-'l thru 'l-M-6_
[2] CHECK Panel 1-l'vt-1thru1-M-6 to determine overloaded pump (indicated by white light muminated on handswitch)_
[3} CHECK amps on affected equipment to verify overload condition.
[4] CHECK voltage on 6900V Shutdown Bd_
[SJ EVALUATE shutdown of overloaded equipment or corrective action to reduce loading_
Examiner note: The crew may choose to use the guidance in either the ARP, AOP-S.04 or 1-S0-2/3-1 to start the 1C Hotwell Pump.
9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
"A" Hotwell Pump High Current Condition Ti~-
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
At discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event.
10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
1A CCS Pump Trip with Auto Start Failure of 1B CCS Pump Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I Direct the Simulator Operator to initiate Event 3, 1A CCS Pump Trip.
Alarms:
1-M-278-A
- O-AR-M27-B-A, E4, ERCW/CCS PUMP MOTOR TRIP
ERCW/CCS PUMP MOTOR TRIP
[2] IF CCS motor tr!p, THEN GO TO AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water_
[3] DETERMINE which motor tripped_
[4] TURN control switch to OFF position to reset alarm_
[5] DISPATCH operator to investigate cause of alarm_
£61 EVALUATE LCO 3.7.3 {CCS) or 3.7.4 (ERCW)_
CCS REAC BLDG SUPPLY HEADER FLOW LOW 11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
1A CCS Pump Trip with Auto Start Failure of 1B CCS Pump
[1] IF Phase B isolation, THEN CONTINUE with emergency procedure(s) in progress.
[2] CHECK reactor building supply header flow by observing
[1-Fl-70-1421.
[3) ENSURE CCS heat exchanger aligned properly in accordance with 1-S0-70-1 Component Cooling Water System Train A.
[4] IF pump problem exists with inservice pump, THEN START standby CCS pump if available.
[5] IF loss of component cooling water is suspected, THEN GO TO AOP-IVL03, Loss of Cornponent Cooling Water.
Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.
Responds to ARP O-AR-M27-B-A, A 1 or E4.
Transitions to AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF ... SECTION PAGE CCS Pump trip OR 2.1 4 CCS Pump failure (running pump NOT pumping forward)
Determine section 2.1 applies (CCS Pump Trip or Failure) 2.1 CCS Pump Trip or Failure CAUTION
- If Train A CCS flow is lost and CANNOT be restored promptly OR if RCP motor thrust bearing temp alarm (M-58, E-3) is received, then RCPs must be stopped in Step 3 to prevent damage.
- If any Containment Spray Pump is running with NO CCS cooling, spray pump may experience bearing failure after 10 minutes.
12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
1A CCS Pump Trip with Auto Start Failure of 1B CCS Pump Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP
- 1. IDENTIFY and LOCK OUT failed ccs Pump. [O-M-278]
CHECK affected pump aligned to supply TrainACCS.
NOTE If reactor must be tripped. the CRO or an extra UO should be assigned to continue with this AOP.
- 4. CHECK Train A CCS Heat Exchanger inlet pressure NORMAL for present plant conditions.
[1-Pl-70-24A, 1A1/1A2 CCS HX]
[2-Pl-70-17A, 2A1/2A2 CCS HX]
- Between 87 psig and 110 psig NOTE
- When Train A CCS is out of service, the affected unit's Train A CCPs, SI Pumps, and RHR Pumps are INOPERABLE for ECCS purposes due to not being able to fulfill their design function for sump recirculation (due to loss of CCS to RHR Hx).
- If necessary, the affected CCPs, SI Pumps, and RHR Pumps can be operated without CCS cooling water to mechanical seal HXs. [C.4]
- 5. EVALUATE Tech Specs and EPIP-1 SRO USING Appendix H.
13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
1A CCS Pump Trip with Auto Start Failure of 1B CCS Pump Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3I3 At least two independent component rooiing water loops shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and4.
ACTION:
With onf'f one component cooling -water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERA.BLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLO SHUTDOVVN within the foUowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- 6. IF standby Thermal Barrier Booster Pump{s) running, BOP THEN ENSURE one pump in standby USING 1(2)-80-70-1, Component Cooling Water System.
7.2.1 Shutdown of CCS (Thermal Barrier) Booster Pump 1A-A
[11 IF U-1 Thermal Barrier HXs are to remain in service, THEN ENSURE CCS Booster Pump 1B-B running per Section 5.2. (NIA if HXs are to be taken out of BOP service)
[2} STOP CCS Booster Pump 1A-A with
£1-HS-70-131Al AND PLACE [1-HS-70-131Al in A-P AUTO.
1st IV 14
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
1A CCS Pump Trip with Auto Start Failure of 1B CCS Pump Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 7.2.2 Shutdown of CCS (Thermal Barrier) Booster Pump 1B-B
[1] IF U-1 Thermal Barrier HXs are to remain in seNice, THEN ENSURE ccs Booster Pump 1A-A running per Section 5.2. (NIA if HXs are to be taken out of service)
[2] STOP CCS Booster Pump 1B-B with
£1-HS-70-130A1 AND PLACE [1-HS-70-130Al in A-P AUTO.
1st IV (3] IF pump is to be taken out of seNice, THEN
- 7. GO TO Step 15.
CREW
- 15. NOTIFY SM to evaluate OPDP-9.
Emergent Issue Response.
- 16. INITIATE Maintenance on failed pump.
CREW
- 17. GO TO appropriate plant procedure.
END OF SECTION Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
When technical specifications have been identified or at discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event.
15
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Letdown TCV fails to control in automatic.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Examiner note: Event is loaded at the scenario start and will manifest itself when the CCS pump trips during the prior event.
Indications/Alarms Annunciators:
1-M-6
['!] CHECK letdown temperature on [1-Tl-62-78]_
[2] ENSURE letdown demins bypassed at ?::137°F to prevent resin damage.
[3J ENSURE proper valve alignment in accordance with 'l-S0-62-'l, Cflemicaf and Volume Control System.
NOTE Position of 1-TCV-70-192 is normally controlled by '!-H!C-62-78A. *J-TIS-62-798/A fails valve open at greater than 124°F.
[4] IF [1-HIC-62-781 not operating properly in AUTO, THEN PLACE in MANUAL, AND ATTEMPT temperature control.
When technical specifications have been identified or at discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event.
16
Appendix D , Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
RCS Leak Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct the Simulator Operator to initiate Event 5, RCS Leak.
Alarms:
1-MSA
1-M-5
- 1-LR-68-339, RCS PZR LEVEL actual level deviating low from program level indication
- 1-Fl-62-93A, CHARGING HOR FLOW increasing flow 1-M-6
- 1-Ll-62-129, VCT LEVEL decreasing
- 1-PDIR-30-133, CNTMT increasing trend O-M-12
- 1-RR-90-106A, CNTMT LOWER COMPT PARTICULATE RADMON recorder shows increasing trend
- 1-Rl-90-1068, CNTMT LOWER COMPT RADMON-TOTAL GAS increasing counts
- 1-RM-90-1128, CNTMT UPPER COMPT RADMON-TOTAL GAS increasing counts Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.
Identifies Pzr below program, Charging flow increasing w/ VCT level ATC decreasing.
Checks rad monitors, determines increasing trend on containment BOP monitors 17
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
RCS Leak
- 1. IF leak results in radiological hazard or safety hazard, THEN EVACUATE unnecessary personnel from affected areas.
- 2. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO II 1F... SECTION PAGE ANY of the fol!owing indications with RCS temperature greater than 375"'F:
- Pressurizer level dropping unexpectedly
- Charging flow rising unexpectedly with stable pzr level 2_*1 4
- VCT level dropping with Aux Bldg or Containment radiation rising
- High Energy Une Break recorder indicating unexpected rise in temperature
- 1. CONTROL charging flow using one CCP:
- ADJUST FCV-62-93 and FCV-62-8£J as necessary to maintain pzr level A TC on program.
- MAINTAIN seal injection flow at least 6 gpm to each RCP.
Examiner Note: Crew may implement RNO at this time to isolate letdown; Crew may return to perform RNO for Trip Rx and initiate SI later when Leak increases.
Examiner Note: Since this is a "MONITOR" step, the crew may continue in the procedure while developing a Pzr/RCS level trend. If so, steps 3, 4 or 5 could be the decision point and therefore initiate the reactor trip and E-0 implementation. If a loss of Pzr level is imminent, the crew may decide to trip the reactor and transition to E-0 based on this step.
18
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
RCS Leak Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 2. MONITOR pressurizer level STABLE IF sufficient time is available, or RISING. THEN ISOLATE normal and excess letdown:
- a. ENSURE FCV-62-72, 73, and 74 CLOSED.
- b. CLOSE FCV-62-69 and 70.
C. ENSURE FCl/-62-54 and 55 CLOSED.
IF loss of pressurizer level is imminent ATC OR low pressure reactor trip {1970 psig) is Imminent, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. TRIP the reactor .
- b. INITIATE Safety Injection.
C. GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
- 3. MONITOR containment pressure IF containment pressure ls STABLE or DROPPING. approaching 1.5 psig, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. TRIP the reactor.
- b. INITIATE Safety Injection.
- c. GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
CAUTION: If Unit is in Mode 3 with low pressurizer pressure SI NOT blocked, SI should NOT be manually blocked to prevent safety injection.
19
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
RCS Leak Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 5. MAINTAIN VCT level greater than 13%
ATC USING automatic or manual makeup.
NOTE 1: Appendix J (ICS Short Term Leak Rate Calculation) and/or Appendix I (Manual Leak Rate Calculation) may be used to estimate RCS leak rate.
NOTE2: If letdown was isolated in Step 2, the leak rate may have exceeded capacity of one CCP in the normal charging alignment (EAL 1.2.2P).
- 6. EVALUATE EPIP-*1. Emergency Plan Classification Matrix.
- 7. EVALUATE Tech SpedTRM LCOs USING Appendix K, Evaluating Tech Specs and TRM.
3.4.62 Reactm CoolantSystan leakage shalli be limited to:
a No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,
- b. 1 GPM UNIDENTlFIED LEAKAGE.
cc 150 gallcns per day ofprimaiy-to-serondary leakage through anyone steam generator. and
- d. 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactoc Coolant System.
SRO APPL JCABIUTY* MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4 ACTION:
- a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE or with primary-to-se::ond3ry leakage not vJithin limi:s, be a< fea5' HOT STANDBY *m":hin 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the fu<lowing 2*J hours.
- b. With any Reactor Cooi3!1t System lea.~age gre~er tha.n any one of the above limits.
excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE or primary-to-secondary leakage, reduce ihe* leakage rate to within limks wilf!in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be at t.east HOT STANDBY
~hin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within :he rollowi.ng 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
20
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
RCS Leak i'c~:!ion
~*
lllllC Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 8. CHECK secondary side radiation NORMAL
- SIG blowdown rad monitor BOP
- Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitor
- l\-1ain steam line rad monitors .
Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
When technical specifications have been identified or at discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event.
21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 , Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
LBLOCA/Reactor Trip Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 6 LBLOCA-To Require Rx Trip and Safety Injection.
Indications available:
1-M-4:
- 1-Ll-68-339A, 335A, 320A, RCS PZR LEVEL indicators trending down (<5%)
1-M-5:
- 1-PR-68-340, RCS PZR PRESS Recorder trending down;
- 1-LR-68-339, RCS PZR LEVEL Recorder trending down; 1-M-6:
- 1-PDl-30-42, 43, 44, 45, CNTMT PRESSURE WIDE RANGE Indicators trending up (1.5 psi-SI Actuation)
Enter and Direct performance of E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.
Examiner Note: following IOA performance, prior to Steps 1-4 immediate action verification, A TC/BOP surveys MCBs for any expected automatic system response that failed to occur.
Upon discovery, they may take manual action(s) to align plant systems as expected for the event in progress. (Ref. EPM-4, Prudent Operator Actions)
Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via ICS.
When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).
CREW Performs the first four steps of E-0 unprompted.
SRO Directs performance of E-0 NOTE1 Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.
NOTE2 This procedure has a foldout page.
22
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
LBLOCA/Reactor Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1 - VERIFY reactor TRIPPED:
Reactor trip breakers OPEN Reactor trip bypass breakers DISCONNECTED or OPEN ATC Rod bottom lights LIT Rod position indicators less than or equal to 12 steps.
Neutron flux DROPPING
- 2. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:
BOP Turbine stop valves CLOSED.
- 3. VERIFY at least one 6.9KV shutdovm BOP board ENERGIZED on this unit
- 4. DETERMINE if SI actuated:
- ECCS pumps RUNNING.
- Any SI alarm LIT [M-40].
5_ PERFORM ES-0.5, Equipment BOP Verlficatlons WHlLE continuing in this procedure_
Continue with the performance of E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY SRO/ATC INJECTION BOP Performs ES-0.5, Equipment Verifications go to page 41 for details SRO Addresses foldout page, see next page for details.
23
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
LBLOCA/Reactor Trip T;-:: I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:
- Phase B isolation, THEN STOP all RCPs.
EVENT DIAGNOSTICS
- IF any S/G pressure is dropping uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:
- b. IF any S/G pressure continues to drop uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) ENSURE SI actuated.
- 2) _IF at least one SIG is intact (SIG pressure controlled or rising), THEN ISOLATE AFW to faulted S/G(s):
- CLOSE AFW level control valves for faulted S/G(s).
- IF any AFW valve for faulted SIG CANNOT be CLOSED, THEN REFER TO Appendix E to stop AFW flow to faulted SIG.
- 3) ENSURE at least one of the following conditions met:
- Narrow Range level greater than 10% [25% ADV] in at least one intact SIG.
- IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.
TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS
24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
LBLOCA/Reactor Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 6. DETERMINE if secondary heat sink available:
- a. CHECK total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm.
- b. CHECK narrow range level b. MAINTAIN total feed flow ATC greater than 10% [25% ADVJ greater than 440 gpm in at least one SIG. UNTIL narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADV]
in at least one S/G.
- c. CONTROL feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%
in intact or ruptured S/Gs.
- 7. CHECK if main steam lines should be isolated:
- a. CHECK if any of the following a_ GO TO step 8.
conditions have occurred:
- Any SIG pressure dropping UNCONTROLLED OR
- Phase B actuation.
- 8. CHECK RCP trip criteria:
- a. CHECK the following:
- b. STOP RCPs.
25
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
LBLOCA/Reactor Trip
- 9. MONITOR RCS temperatures: IF temperature less than 547°F and dropping,
- IF any RCP running, THEN THEN PERFORM the following:
CHECK T-avg stable at or trending to between 547°F and 552°F. a. ENSURE steam dumps and atmospheric reliefs CLOSED.
- b. IF cooldown continues, THEN
- IF RCPs stopped, THEN CONTROL total feed flow:
CHECK T-cold stable at or trending ATC/BOP 1) ENSURE total AFW flow to between 547°F and 552°F.
less than or equal to 600 gpm
- 2) MAINTAIN total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL narrow range level is greater than 10% [25% ADV]
in at least one S/G.
- c. IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves. =====
- 10. CHECK pressurizer PORVs, safeties, and spray valves:
- a. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED.
- b. Pressurizer safety valves CLOSED.
ATC c. Normal spray valves CLOSED.
- d. Power to at least one block valve AVAILABLE.
- e. At least one block valve OPEN.
- 11. DETERMINE lf SIG secondary pressure boundaries are INTACT:
CHECK all SIG pressures ATC.
CONTROLLED or RISING.
CHECK all SIG pressures greater than 140 psig.
26
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
LBLOCA/Reactor Trip Time Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 12. DETERMINE if SIG tubes are INTACT:
- All SIG narrow range levels CONTROLLED or DROPPING ATC
- Secondary radiation NORMAL USING Appendix A. Secondary Rad Monitors. (App. A performed in ES-0.5).
- 13. DETERMINE if RCS is INTACT: PERFORM the following:
- Containment pressure NORMAL
- a. INITIATE ES-0.5 Appendix D,
- LOWER COMPT TEMP HIGH alami b. MONITOR status trees.
DARK. [M-5C, 81]
- Containment radiation NORMAL c. GO TO E-1 , Loss of Reactor or USING Appendix B, Containment Secondary Coolant Rad Monitors. (App. B perfomied in ES-0.5}
Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via SPDS. When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).
When an ORANGE Path for Containment is evident on SPDS, the SRO will transition to FR-Z.1, go to page 37 for details When a RED Path is for PTS evident on SPDS, the SRO will transition to FR-P.1, go to page 40 for details E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT NOTE This procedure has a foldout page.
- 1. CHECK RCP trip criteria:
- a. CHECK the following: a. GO TO Step 2.
- RCS pressure less than 1250 psig.
- b. STOP RCPs.
27
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
LBLOCA/Reactor Trip
, -:-: ... ~ I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:
- Phase B isolation, THEN STOP all RCPs.
SI REINITIATION CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:
- Pressurizer level CANNOT be maintained greater than 10%, [20% ADV],
THEN RAISE EGGS flow by performing one or both of the following as necessary:
- ESTABLISH CCPIT flow USING Appendix C
EVENT DIAGNOSTICS
- IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.
- IF any SIG pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner or less than 140 psig AND S/G NOT isolated, THEN GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
- IF any SIG has level rising in uncontrolled manner or has abnormal radiation, THEN:
- a. RAISE ECCS flow by performing one or both of the following as necessary:
- ESTABLISH CCPIT flow USING Appendix C
- START CCPs or Sl pumps manually.
- b. GO TO E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS
- IF CST level less than 5%,
THEN ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW.
- IF RWST level less than 27%,
THEN GO TO ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump.
28
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
LBLOCA/Reactor Trip
- 2. CHECK SIG secondary pressure boundaries INTACT:
- SIG pressures CONTROLLED or RISING
- S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.
- 3. MAINTAIN Intact S/G narrow range levels:
- a. Greater than 10% [25% ADV].
- b. Between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.
- 4. VERIFY secondary radiation NORMAL:
- a. CHECK secondary radiation NORMAL USING Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitors.
- b. NOTIFY Chem Lab to take SIG activity samples.
- c. WHEN Chem Lab is ready to sample S/Gs, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) ENSURE FCV-15-43 Blowdown Flow Control valve CLOSED.
- 2) ENSURE Phase A RESET.
- 3) OPEN blowdown isolation valves.
- d. NOTIFY RADCON to survey main steam lines and SIG blowdown.
- e. WHEN SIG samples completed.
THEN CLOSE blowdown isolation valves.
29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
LBLOCA/Reactor Trip Time Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION Any time a pressurizer PORV opens, there is a possibility that it may stick open.
- 5. MONITOR pressurizer PORVs and block valves:
- a. Power to block valves AVAILABLE.
- b. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED.
- c. At least one block valve OPEN.
- 6. MONITOR SI termination criteria:
ATC a. RCS subcooling based on core exit TICs a. GO TO Step 7.
~
greater than 40"F.
Examiner Note: When alarm M6E-E4 is on the crew will transition to ES-1.3 Transfer To RHR Containment Sump LS-63-50A RWST LVLLO Corrective [1] IF SIS has occurred with RWST !eve! decreasing to - 27%, THEN Actions PERFORM ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump, as applicable.
I SRO I Transitions to ES-1.3 Transfer To RHR Containment Sump.
30
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2
- Event
Description:
Shift ECCS to Cold Leg Recirculation.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW 1. SUSPEND FRP lmplementation.
- 2. DETERMINE if containment spray should be stopped:
- a. CHECK any containment spray pump RUNNING.
- b. ENSURE the following:
- one Cntmt Spray pump in PULL-TO-LOCK
- remaining Cntmt Spray pump RUNNING.
- d. MONITOR one cntmt spray pump RUNNING and del!vering flow.
Examiner Note: If Containment pressure is less 2.0 psig than then go to step 2c RNO.
Examiner Note: If Containment pressure is still greater than 2.0 psig, then go to step 2 d
- 2. DETERMINE if containment spray should be stopped:
- c. CHECK containment pressure C. PERFORM the following:
greater than or equal to 2.0 psrg.
1 ) RESET containment spray signal.
- 2) ENSURE both cntmt spray pumps STOPPED and ATC PLACE in A-AUTO.
- 3) CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves FCV-72-39 and FCV-72-2.
-=---
- 4) GO TO Step 3.
31
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Shift ECCS to Cold Leg Recirculation.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 2. DETERMINE if containment spray should be stopped:
ATC d. MONITOR one cntmt spray pump RUNNING and delivering flow.
- 3. MONITOR RHR automatic switchover:
- a. CHECK containment sump revel greaterthan *1 *1%.
- b. CHECK containment sump valves FCV-63-72 and FCV-63-73 OPEN.
- c. CHECK RHR suction valves FCV-74-3 and FCV-74-2'1 CLOSING.
MONITOR RWST supply to ECCS pumps:
ATC RWST l Vl LO-LO alarm DARK
[M-6E, E4].
RWST level greater than 8°/o.
Direct facility operator to insert Event 8, RHR Pump failure Transition to ECA-1.1 32
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Shift ECCS to Cold Leg Recirculation.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 5. MONITOR RHR pumps RUNNING. IF NO RHR pump running AND CCPs or SI pumps have lost suction, THEN STOP affected CCPs and SI pumps.
START RHR pumps.
IF NO RHR pump can be started, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. RESUME FRP implementation.
33
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
RHR Pump failure Transition to ECA-1.1 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION Continued ECCS or spray pump operation following loss of suction source will result in pump damage.
NOTE If orange path exists on containment status tree, FR-Z.1 may be performed concurrently with this procedure.
A TC 1. MONITOR for containment sump blockage:
- a. CHECK at least one train of ECCS a. GO TO Step 2.
aligned for sump recirculation.
~
A TC 2. DETERMINE if Containment Spray should be stopped:
- a. CHECK containment pressure a. GO TO Step 3.
less than 9.5 psig.
~
- b. CHECK containment spray suction a. GO TO Step 3.
aligned to RWST.
~
- c. ENSURE Containment Spray pumps placed in PULL TO LOCK.
A TC 3. MONITOR sump recirculation capability:
- WHEN sump recirculation capability restored, THEN RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.
34
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
RHR Pump failure Transition to ECA-1.1 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC 4. CHECK ECCS sump recirculation equipment AVAILABLE:
- Power to RHR pumps AVAILABLE
- RHR pumps AVAILABLE
- Cntmnt sump valves FCV-63-72 and FCV-63-73 AVAILABLE
- 5. MONITOR shutdown boards continuously energized.
- 6. RESET SI signal.
- HS-63-720
- HS-63-730.
- 8. MONITOR RWST level greater than 8%.
- 9. DETERMINE cntmnt spray requirements:
- a. CHECK containment spray pump suction ALIGNED to RWST.
- b. DETERMINE number of spray pumps required from table below:
35
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
RHR Pump failure Transition to ECA-1.1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RWST LEVEL CONTAINMENT PRESSURE NUMBER OF CONTAINMENT
(%) {PSIG) SPRAY PUMPS REQUIRED Greaterthan 12.0 2 Greater than 8 Between 9.5 and 12.0 1 Less than 9.5 0 Less than 8 ------ 0 C. CHECK number of spray pumps running with hdr isol valve OPEN equal to number required.
- d. ENSURE spray header isol valve CLOSED for stopped pump(s):
- FCV-72-39 (Train A)
- FCV-72-2 (Train B)
- 10. MONITOR if containment spray should be aligned for sump recirculation:
- a. CHECK all of the following conditions a. IF containment pressure is met: greater than 2.8 psig THEN
- Any spray pump RUNNING NOTIFY TSC to evaluate restoring with suction aligned to RWST normal containment cooling USING EA-30-4, Restoring Containment
- Containment sump level Coolers.
greater than 18% [22% ADV}
GO TO Step 11.
- At least one containment sump
~
valve FCV-63-72 or FCV-63-73 OPEN or capable of opening.
- 11. INITIATE RWST makeup:
Examiner Note: Terminate the scenario when the crew initiates EA-63-2 or earlier, at the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
36
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
FR-Z.1 and P.1 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior FR-Z.1 Actions NOTE If this procedure has been entered for an orange path and performance of ECA-1. *1 (Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation) is required, FR-Z.1 may be performed concurrently with ECA-1.1.
- 1. MONITOR RWST level ATC/BOP greater than 27%.
- 2. VERIFY Phase B valves CLOSED:
ATC/BOP
. Panel 6K PHASE B GREEN
. Panel 6l PHASE B GREEN .
- 3. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.
ATC/BOP
- 4. DETERMINE if this procedure should be exited:
- a. CHECK for faulted SIG: a. GO TO Step 5.
- Any SIG pressure DROPPING ATC/BOP in an uncontrolled manner OR
- Any SIG pressure less than 140 psig.
- 5. VERIFY containment spray operation:
- 1) OPERATE containment spray as directed by ECA-*1.1.
- 2) GO TO Step 6.
ATC/BOP
- b. VERIFY containment spray pumps RUNNING.
C. CHECK RWST level greater than 27%.
37
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
FR-Z.1 and P.1 I
Time I Posi
- I nnlir~nt's Actions or Behavior
- 5. d. VERIFY containment spray suction ALIGNED to RWST:
. FCV-72-22 OPEN
. FCV-72-21 OPEN .
- e. VERIFY containment spray discharge valves OPEN:
- FCV-72-39 ATC/BOP
- FCV-72-2 .
- f. VERIFY containment spray recirc valves CLOSED:
- FCV-72-34
- FCV-72-13.
- g. VERIFY containment spray flow greater than 4750 gpm on each train.
- 6. MONITOR containment air return fans:
- WHEN at least 10 minutes ATC/BOP have elapsed from Phase B, THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING.
- 7. VERIFY containment ventilation dampers CLOSED:
ATC/BOP . Panel 6K CNTMT VENT GREEN
. Panel 6L CNTMT VENT GREEN .
8_ VERIFY Phase A valves CLOSED:
ATC/BOP . Panel GK PHASE A GREEN
. Panel GL PHASE A GREEN .
- 9. VERIFY cntmnt vacuum relief isolation valves CLOSED: [Pnl 6K MANUALJ ATC/BOP . FCV-30-46
. FCV-30-47
. FCV-30-48.
38
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
FR-Z.1 and P.1 I~*
- J :"" ~~:.:~ , J r'\pplicant's Actions or Behavior
- 10. VERIFY MSlVs and MSIV bypass valves ATC/BOP CLOSED.
- 11. DETERMINE if any SfG Intact:
- a. CHECK at least one SIG pressure:
ATC/BOP
- CONTROLLED or RISlNG AND
- Greater than 140 psig.
CAUTION Isolating all S/Gs will result in a loss of secondary heat sink.
- 12. DETERMINE if any SIG Faulted:
- a. CHECK SIG pressures: a. GO TO step 13.
- Any SIG pressure DROPPING ATC/BOP in an uncontrolled manner OR
- Any SIG pressure less than 140 psig.
- 13. MONITOR if RHR spray should be placed in service:
ATC/BOP a. CHECK the following: a. GO TO step 14.
. Containment pressure greater than 9.5 psig
- 14. MONITOR if containment spray should be stopped:
- a. CHECK any containment spray pump a. GO TO Step 15.
RUNNING.
ATC/BOP
- b. CHECK containment pressure b. GO TO step *15_
less than 2.0 psig.
- 15. RETURN TO procedure and step in effect ATC/BOP END 39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
FR-Z.1 and P.1 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior FR-P.1 Actions
- 1. MONITOR RWST level ATC/BOP greater than 27%.
ATC/BOP 2. MONITOR CST level greater than 5°/o.
- 3. CHECK RCS pressure IF any of the following conditions exist:
greater than 300 psig.
- both RHR pumps STOPPED ATC/BOP AND sump recirc capability has been lost THEN RETURN TO procedure and step in effect 40
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications ES-0.5 I~* - I ~ . *-- I . it's Actions or Behavior
- I --,**-
-* 0 inn Applicant's Actions or Behavior ES-0.5 Actions BOP 1. VERIFY D/Gs RUNNING.
BOP 2. VERIFY DIG ERCW supply valves OPEN.
BOP 3. VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps RUNNING.
- 4. VERIFY ccs pumps RUNNING:
. Pump "lA-A {2A-A)
. Pump C-S .
BOP 5_ VERIFY EGTS fans RUNNING.
BOP 6. VERIFY generator breakers OPEN.
7_ NOTIFY at least two AUOs to report BOP to MCR to be available for local actions.
- 8. VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:
- a. MDAFWpumps
- b. IDAFWpump_
NOTE AFW level control valves should NOT be repositioned if manual action has been tal<en to control SIG levels, to establlsh flow due to failure, or to isolate a faulted SIG.
41
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications ES-0.5 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 9_ CHECK AFW valve alignment:
BOP b. VERIFY TD AFW LCVs OPEN.
"10. VERIFY MFW Isolation:
- a. CHECK MFW pumps TRIPPED.
- b. ENSURE the following:
BOP MFW regulating valves CLOSED MFW regulating bypass valve controllers in MANUAL with output ZERO MFW isolation valves CLOSED.
- 11. MONITOR ECCS operation:
- a. VERIFY ECCS pumps RUNNING:
- RHR pumps
- SI pumps
- b. VERIFY CCP ftow through CCPlT 42
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FormES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications ES-0.5
-r;--: I Position j Applicant's Actions or Behavior I 111,,.. Applicant's Actions or Behavior C. CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.
- d. VERIFY SI pump flow.
- e. CHECK RCS pressure e. GO TO Step 12.
Jess than 300 psig.
- f. VERIFY RHR pump flow.
- 12. VERlFY ESF systems ALIGNED:
- a. Phase A ACTUATED:
- PHASE A TRAIN A alann LIT
[M-6C, 85]_
- PHASE A TRAIN B alann LIT
[f\i1-6C, 86].
- b. Cntmt Vent Isolation ACTUATED:
- CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, C5].
- CNTt\IT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-6C, C6].
BOP C. status monitor panels:
. 6CDARK
. 6DDARK
. 6E LIT OUTSIDE outlined area
. 6HDARK
. 6J UT.
- d. Train A status panel 6K:
. CNTMT VENT GREEN
. PHASE A GREEN 43
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications ES-0.5
~* _ : Position I Applica=n=t='s=A=c=t=io=n=s=o=r=B=e=h=a=v=io=r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tim.- Pos~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- e. Train 8 status panel GL:
- CNTMT VENT GREEN
- PHASE A GREEN
- 13. MONITOR for containment spray and Phase B actuation:
- a. CHECK for any of the following:
- Phase B ACTUATED OR
- Containment pressure greater than 2.8 psig.
- b. VERIFY containment spray INITIATED:
- 1) Containment spray pumps RUNNING.
- 2) Containment spray header isolation valves FCV-72-39 and FCV-72-2 OPEN.
- 3) Containment spray recirculation valves to RWST FCV-72-34 and FCV-72-13 CLOSED.
- 4) Containment spray header flow greater than 4750 gpm per train.
- 5) Panel 6E LIT.
- c. VERIFY Phase B ACTUATED:
- PHASE B TRAIN A alarm LIT
[M-6C, A5].
- PHASE B TRAIN B alarm LIT
[M-6C, A6].
- d. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.
- e. VERIFY Phase B valves CLOSED:
- Panel 6K PHASE B GREEN.
- Panel 6L PHASE B GREEN.
44
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications ES-0.5
' ~* - ~u;::.;L;u,, I A1-11-11;1...ant's Actions or Behavior
~ Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- f. WHEN 10 minutes have elapsed.
THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING.
NOTE The continuous action in Sl:ep 14 remains applicable if containment pressure rises above 1_5 psig after ES-0_5 is completed.
- 14. MONITOR if containment vacuum relief Isolation valves should be closed:
BOP a. CHECK containment pressure a. GO TO step 15.
greater than 1.5 pslg.
- 15. CHECK secondary and containment rad monitors USING the following:
- Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitors
- Appendix B, Containment Rad Monitors_
APPENDIX A SECONDARY RAD MONITORS 1_ IF SI occurred on Unit 1 .
THEN CHECK following rad monitors including available trends prior to isolation:
- Condenser exhaust recorder 1-RR-90-119
- S/G blowdown recorder 1-RR-90-120
- Unit *1 Main steam line rad monitors [1-M-30J
- Post-Accident rad recorder 1-RR-90-2688 points 3 (blue), 4 (violet), 5 {black), and 6 (turquoise).
[1-M-31 {back of'l-M-30)]
3_ NOTIFY Unit Supervisor whether secondary radiation is NORMAL or HIGH.
45
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications ES-0.5 Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Pos1uv11 Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIX B CONTAlNMENT RAO MONITORS
- 1. IF SI occurred on Unit 1.
THEN CHECK following rad monitors:
- Upper containment post-accident rad monitors 1-RM-90-271A and *J-RM-90-272A NORMAL {1-M-30]
- Lower containment post-accident rad monitors 1-RM-90-273A and 1-RM-90-274A NORMAL [1-M-30]
- Containment rad recorders 1-RR-90-112 and *1-RR-90-*106 NORl'v1AL [O-M-12] (prior to isolation).
- 17. CHECK pocket sump pumps STOPPED:
[M-15, upper left comer]
- HS-77-411, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump 8.
18- DISPATCH personnel to perform BOP EA-0-1, Equipment Checks Following ESF Actuation.
"19. ENSURE plant announcement has been BOP made regarding Reactor Trip and SI.
- 20. PERFORM Appendix E, Spent Fuel BOP Cooling Actions, as time permits.
46
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications ES-0.5 II l..,..ii"me:i i l~=>osition :1 J.\i,)D,lica1n-.1~t<:.s ,A';ctions or Behavior APPENDIXD HYDROGEN MITIGATION ACTIONS NOTE This appendix should only be performed when directed by step in E-0.
- 1. DISPATCH AUO to open ice condenser AHU breakers USING EA-201-1, 480V Board Room Breaker Alignments. D
- 2. PLACE hydrogen analyzers in service:
- a. ENSURE the following switches in ANALYZE position: [M-1 O]
- HS-43-200A, Cntmt H2 Analyzer Fan A D
- HS-43-210A, Cntmt H2 Analyzer Fan B. D
- b. RECORD time: _ _ _ _ __ D CAUTION If inadequate core cooling (red path) has occurred, hydrogen igniters should NOT be energized until containment hydrogen concentration is determined to be less than 6%. Hydrogen analyzers require 5 minute warmup after being placed in ANALYZE.
- 3. WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers have been opened, THEN PLACE hydrogen igniters switches in ON position: (M-10]
- HS-268-73, H2 lgniters Group A . D
- HS-268-74, H2 lgniters Group B . D
- 4. WHEN hydrogen igniters and analyzers have been placed in service, THEN NOTIFY Unit Supervisor. D END OF TEXT 47
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 48
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Sequoyah Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Candidates: ATC SRO BOP Initial Conditions: 100% BOL, EOOS risk green, FT-1-3A is in MAINT BYPASS, RTS 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Turnover: Maintain 100% power Critical Tasks CT-18 Manually isolates feed water flow into and steam flow from the ruptured S/G before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.
CT-19 Manually establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either of the following conditions:
. Too high to maintain < 60 degrees GET sub cooling .
. RED path on PTS Status Tree CT-20 Manually depressurize RCS to meet and maintain SI termination criteria while in E-3 prior to exceeding 100% SIG dome level on the simulator during a SGTR of 430 gpm or less (TH05 9.15%).
Event Event Type Event Description No.
A small Steam Generator Tube Leak develops on the #1 SG; the ATC will (C) ATC 1 TH05A raise Charging flow to maintain Pressurizer Level on program. The SRO will (TS,C)SRO enter the RCS Leakage LCO.
The SGBD isolation valve fails to close; the BOP will manually isolate 2 RC13 (C)BOP/SRO SGBD flow by closing the SGBD flow control valve.
(R) ATC 3 The crew will reduce power in response to the SGTL.
(N)BOP/SRO TC10RLY2 The# 3 Heater Drain Tank level control valve fails open resulting in a 4 (C)BOP/SRO runback signal with a failure of the Main Turbine. The BOP will initiate a HD06A Main Turbine runback using the valve position limiter.
Following the manual runback, a malfunction causes the control rods (C) ATC continue to insert beyond the normal position, the ATC places control rods 5 RD17 (C,TS) SRO in manual using Immediate Operator Actions and will initiate emergency boration. The SRO enters the Rod Insertion Limit LCO.
The tube leak will degrade to a SGTR; the crew will trip the reactor, initiate 6 TH05A (M) ALL Safety Injection and enter E-0. The crew will transition to E-3 to, isolate and cool down the ruptured SG and depressurize the RCS.
The #1 SG Atmospheric Dump fails open when the reactor trips. The BOP 7 MS12A (C) BOP manually closes the Atmospheric Dump using prudent operator actions.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aior 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
SUMMARY
Event 1 - When directed by the lead examiner, SG Tube Leak develops on the #1 SG. The ATC will manually increase charging flow and subsequently isolate letdown using AOP-R.01 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK. The SRO will enter LCO 3.4.6.2.c Action a.
Event 2 - Blow down Isolation valve 15-44 fails to auto-isolate, the BOP will isolate Blow down flow by closing the SG Blow down Flow Control valve.
Event 3 -The crew will reduce power in response to the SGTL using AOP-C.03 RAPID SHUTDOWN OR LOAD REDUCTION.
Event 4 - When directed by the Lead Examiner, the# 3 Heater Drain Tank level control valve fails open resulting in a runback signal. The BOP initiates a Main Turbine runback using the valve position limiter using AOP-S.04 CONDENSATE OR HEATER DRAINS MALFUNCTION.
Event 5 - Following the manual runback, a malfunction causes the control rods continue to insert beyond the normal position; the ATC places control rods in manual using Immediate Operator Actions and AOP-C.01 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS to stop the excessive insertion. The SRO enters the Control Bank Rod Insertion Limit LCO. The ATC will initiate emergency boration to aid in compliance with the LCO.
Event 6 - The tube leak will degrade to a SGTR; the crew will trip the reactor, initiate Safety Injection and enter E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. The crew will isolate and cool down the ruptured SG and depressurize the RCS using E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
Event 7 - The #1 SG Atmospheric Dump fails open when the reactor trips. The BOP manually closes the Atmospheric Dump using prudent operator actions. (Credit sought for a post trip component malfunction for the BOP. The verifiable action is a Prudent Operator Action that only the BOP will perform.)
2
I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1/2 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube leak SGBD Isolation Valve Failure.
Time Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct the Simulator Operator to initiate Event 3, #1 SG Tube Leak Indications available:
O-M-12
- O-XA-55-12A Window 8-6, "1-RA-120A/121A, STM GEN BLDN LIQ SAMP MON HI RAD" (20 minutes later)
Indications available:
Deviations or unexpected indications on any of the following may indicate a steam generator tube leak:
- 1. Charging flow rises to maintain Pressurizer level.
- 2. Rise in makeup to VCT.
- 3. Rising activif'l on:
- Condenser Vacuum Exhaust Radiation Monitor
- SIG Slowdown Liquid Radiation Monitor
- Main Steam Line Monitor
- 4. SJG sample results indicating gre.ater than or equal to 5 gallons per day (gpd) on any S/G.
1-RA-90-99A CNDS VAC PMP LO RNG AIR EXH MON HIGH RAD
I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1/2 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube leak SGBD Isolation Valve Failure.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[1J CHECK 1-RR-90-99 rate meter and 'l-RR-90-'f rn on panel O-fv1-'12 for indications of increased radiation_
NOTE Alarm validity may be determined based on absence of instrument malfunction alarm, indicated response of the rad monitor, and, if possible, other indications such as b!owdown monitor (recognizing the difference in response time due to blowdown transport time)_
[2] IF alarm is valid, THEN NOTIFY RCL to perform 'l-CEM-068-137.5 Primary to Secondary Leakage via Steam Generators_
[3] IF alarm is valid, THEN GO TO AOP-R.01, Steam Generator Tube Leak. [C.2]
Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
SRO High Secondary Radiation AND 2.1 4 Pressurizer level dropping OR Charging flow rising
- 1. MONITOR if Pressurizer level can be maintained:
- a. CONTROL charging flow USING FCV-62-93 and FCV-62-89 ATC as necessary to maintain pzr level on program.
- b. MONITOR pressurizer level STABLE or RISING.
I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1/2 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube leak SGBD Isolation Valve Failure.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- b. MONITOR pressurizer level STABLE b. PERFORM the following:
or RISING.
- 1) ENSURE letdown isolated:
- FCV-62-72 CLOSED
- FCV-62-73 CLOSED
- FCV-62-74 CLOSED Examiner Note: As the leak degrades, the A TC may take the RNO actions listed above, go to page 44 for additional details.
NOTE1 Appendix G (ICS Short Term Leak Rate Calculation) and/or Appendix H (Manual Leak Rate Calculation) can be used to estimate leak rate.
NOTE2 If letdown was isolated in Step 1, the leak rate may have exceeded the capacity of one CCP in the normal charging alignment (EAL 1.2.2P).
Examiner note; Appendix F starts on page 8
- 2. EVALUATE EPIP-1, Emergency Plan SRO Classification Matrix.
- 3. MONITOR VCT level:
- MAINTAIN VCT level greater than 13%
ATC USING auto or manual makeup
- CHECK VCT makeup capability adequate to maintain level.
- 4. MONITOR indications of leaking SIG:
CREW a. PERFORM Appendix E, Chemistry Notifications.
- b. NOTIFY Radiation Protection to monitor Turbine Building and site environment:
CREW
- Steam lines
- S/G blowdown
I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1/2 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube leak SGBD Isolation Valve Failure.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- c. IDENTIFY leaking S/G(s)
USING any of the following:
- Unexpected rise in any S/G narrow range level OR
- SIG sample results CREW OR
- Radiation Protection survey of main steamlines and SIG blowdown lines OR
- High radiation on any main steamline radiation monitor.
NOTE Time limits for shutdown in Step 5 (based on Chemistry Action Level 3 requirements in Appendix B) are more restrictive than Tech Specs.
- 5. INITIATE shutdown:
- a. ANNOUNCE SIG tube leak on PA system.
- b. CHECK reactor power greater than 50%.
- c. INITIATE rapid shutdown USING AOP-C.03 WHILE continuing in this section.
- d. ENSURE power reduced to less than 50% within one hour from initial indication of leak rate greater than or equal to 100 gpd.
- e. ENSURE unit in Mode 3 within the following 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
NOTE If Tech Spec leakage limit (150 gallons per day of primary-to-secondary leakage through any SIG) is exceeded, initiating shutdown requires 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> NRC notification per NPG-SPP-03.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements.
- 6. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs SRO for applicability:
I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1/2 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube leak SGBD Isolation Valve Failure.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 3.4.6-2, Operational Leakage
- 3.7.1.4, Secondary Coolant Activity UMITIOOCONDITION F<lf< OPERATION 3.4.6.2 Reactor COO:ant Sys!Em !eo:ikag:E shall bE limitEd to:
- a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.
- b. 1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEA.KAGE.
- o. 150 gallons pE<r d;;y of primary-to-secondary leako:ige throogh any ooe steam generator. and
- d. 10 GPM LDENTIF!ED LEAKAGE from me Reactor Coolant Sys;em.
APPLICABllllY: MOD=~ 1. 2. 3 anci 4 ACTION*
- b. With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of me above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE or primar}'-to-secondary leakage, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOVVN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- 7. MINIMIZE Spread of contamination:
- a. IF tube leak identified on SIG #1 AND S/G #4 is intact, THEN PERFORM the following to isolate TDAFW steam supply from SIG #1:
- 1) EVALUATE [CTS] LCO 3.7.1.2 or
[ITS] LCO 3.7.5.
CREW
- 2) CLOSE FCV-1-15.
- 3) ENSURE FCV-1-16 OPEN.
- b. PERFORM EA-0-3, Minimizing Secondary Plant Contamination.
I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1/2 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube leak SGBD Isolation Valve Failure.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 3. 7.1.2 Three auxiliary foodwater trains shall be OPERABLE.'
APPLfCA$1LJJY; MODES 1, 2. and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heal removal.
ACTrON:.
- a. With one AFW train inoper.able in MOOE 1, 2. or S, rasiO(e the inoperable AFW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within too next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the followi11g 12 Mum.
Examiner note alarm 1-RA-120A/121A STM GEN BLDN LIQ SAMP MON HI RAD provides the BOP with a cue to perform actions for event 4. See below for details.
1-RA-120A/121 A STM GEN BLDN LIQSAMP MON HI RAD Probable A_ High radioactivity in SIG b!owdown system due to SIG tube leak.
Cause:
Corrective [1] ENSURE [1-FCV-15-441 CLOSED to isolate release.
Action:
BOP Dispatches operator to locally close [1-FCV-15-44]
Examiner Note: the crew continues with AOP-R.01
I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1/2 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube leak SGBD Isolation Valve Failure.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- d. IF S/G blowdown is aligned to the river.
THEN TERMINATE S/G Slowdown to river:
- 1) ENSURE FCV-15-43 S/G blowdown flow control CLOSED.
- 2) DISPATCH operator to perform EA-15-1, Realigning SIG Slowdown to Cond DI.
- 3) CHECK blowdown valves for leaking SIG CLOSED.
- 4) WHEN EA-15-1 completed AND blowdown flow is desired, THEN a) ALIGN SIG blowdown isol valves as necessary.
b) ADJUST FCV-15-43 to establish desired blowdown flow.
- e. WHEN notified by TSC or Chemistry to bypass Condensate DI, THEN DISPATCH AUO to bypass polishers on affected unit: [Cond DI Bldg]
- Unit 1 Only:
PLACE 1-HS-14-3, Condensate BOP Polisher Bypass Valve to OPEN.
- Unit 2 Only:
PLACE 2-HS-14-3, Condensate Polisher Bypass Valve to OPEN.
- f. REFER TO Appendix C, Contingency Plan for Control and Processing of Large Volumes of Contaminated Water. [C.5]
I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1/2 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube leak SGBD Isolation Valve Failure.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SQN STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK AOP-R.01 Rev. 26 Page *1 of 1 APPENDIX F ESTIMATING RCS LEAK RATE USING eves FLOW BALANCE NOTE 1 This method is recommended when leak requires rise in charging floi.v greater than -10 gpm.
Appendix G is more accurate for smaller leak rates.
NOTE2 This appendix assumes RCS temperature and charging flow are approximately constant INITJAL FINAL CHANGE PZR Leve! [1]
(negative for level decrease)
Time Charging Flow [3]
letdown Flow [4]
Total RCP Seal Return Flow [5J Pressurizer Level Conversion Pressurizer fevel conversion Time Change Pzr Level Rate of Change change factor (positive for level rising)
% x 62 gal/% min = gpm step [1] above step [2} above [6J Leak Rate Calculation Charging Flow Letdown Flow Seal Return Pzr Level Instrument error RCS Leak Flow Rate of Change correction factor Rate step [3] above step [4J above step [5] above step [6} above
+ 3gpm
= gpm Page 64 of6B
I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1/2 Page 1 of 9 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube leak SGBD Isolation Valve Failure.
~*
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior AOP-R.01 SQN STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK Rev. 26 Page 1of1 APPENOIXG ESTIMATING RCS LEAK RATE USING VCT AND PZR LEVEL CAUTION This appendix CANNOT be used during vcr makeup, borntion, or dilution.
NOTE This appendix assumes RCS temperature is approximately constant.
VCT LEVEL ((l/o} PZR LEVEL(%) TIME {min)
INITIAL FINAL CHANGE [1] [2] [3]
{posru*1e for !eve! decrease} (positive for !eve[ decrease)
VCT Lever Conversion VCT level change conversion Time Change VCT Level factor Rate of Change (positive for level lowering}
% x 20gai/% min gpm step [1] a!Jove step [3] above [41 Pressurizer Level Conversion Pressurizer level conversion Time Change Pzr Level change factor Rate of Change (positive for !eve! lowering}
% x 62 gal f % min gpm step [2] above step [3] above [5]
Leak Rate Calculation VCT Level PzrLevel RCS Leak Rate Rate of Change Rate of Change
+ - gpm step [4] above step [51 above Page 65 of68
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior No action required for Event 5, Rapid Power reduction 1_ ENSURE crew has been briefed on reactivity SRO management expectations USING Appendix A APPENDIX A REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT BRIEFING NOTE This appendix should be used in addition to event-based brief.
[1] ENSURE crew has been briefed on the following:
- Reason for Rapid Shutdown or Load Reduction
- Load Reduction Rate:- - -
- Desired final power level:_ __
- Reactivity Management expectations:
- Unit Supervisor shall concur with all reactivity manlpulations
- Ensure reactor responding as expected using diverse indications
- Tavg-Tref Mismatch requirements:
- 3"F control band
- 5"F reactor trip criteria
- Crew focus wm be on reducing power in a controlled and conservative manner.
- OATC will monitor rod insertion limits and AFD limit
- Boration source: - - - - -
- Crew will monitor reactor trip and turbine trip criteria using App. 8
- CRO wm stop secondary plant equipment using App_ C.
- Termination Criteria (conditions requiring Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, or condition no longer requiring rapld load reduction):
10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction J Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 2. MONITOR reactor/turbine trip NOT required USING Appendix B, Reactor anci TurfJine CREW Trip Criteria. (two extra copies provided for UOs)
- 3. CHECK VALVE POSITION U!VUT light CREW DARK on EHC panel. [M-2]
Examiner note: Appendix B reactor and turbine trip criteria see page 24 NOTE: Step 4 should be handed off to opposite unit or extra operator (if available).
If NO operator is available, notifications should be perfonned concurrently with subsequent steps (when time pem1its).
- 4. ENSURE following personnel notifred of rapid shutdown or load reduction: [C.1 J
- Balancing Authority (Load Coordinator)
(751-7547).
CREW
- Chemistry
- Radiation Protection
- Plant Management CREW Makes notifications as required.
NOTE: Boration volumes and flowrates listed in this procedure are recommendatiOns and may be adjusted as necessary.
- 5. INITIATE boration:
- a. CHECK rod control AVAILABLE:
- Control Bank D rods capable of being moved
- NO dropped or misaligned rods in Control Bank D.
11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- b. CHECK Control Bank D group position b. IF petiorming shutdown or power greater than 200 steps. reduction following turbine runback, THEN ATC 1) PERFORM Appendix G, Partially Restoring Control Bank D Following Turbine Runback.
- 2) DO NOT CONTINUE UNTIL Appendix G has been completed.
[2J MAINTAIN T-avg on program:
[a] IF T-ref indication is available, ATC THEN MAINTAIN T-avg within 3°F of T-ref USING auto or manual rod control. D
[3] DETERMINE power change which occurred due to runback: LJ ATC Power Level{%) Current Power Power Changa (%)
Prior to Runback Level(%) Due to Runback
[4] IF boration capability from BAT is available, THEN PERFORM the following:
SRO [aJ DETERMINE total amount of boration required from BAT: D x 10 gallons/%
Power Change(%) Total Required due to runback Boration Volume
[b] IF boration from BAT is already in progress, THEN GO TO Substep [4][fJ. 0
~
[f] WHEN required boration volume from Substep [a] or [c]
is completed AND control rods are above insertion limit, THEN
- 1) ENSURE boration terminated. D
- 2) RECORD clock time. - - - - - D
- 3) WAIT at least 20 minutes for boron transport time. D Examiner Note: The SRO returns to step Sc 12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction
- 5. c. CHECK boration capability from BAT AVAILABLE.
- d. DETERMINE recommended boration volume from BAT:
- -800 gal to reduce power from 100% to 20%
- 10 gal for each 1% power reduction (from current power level)
- volume provided by Rx Engineering (data sheet or reactivity control plan).
- 5. e. DETERMINE recommended boration flowrate from table below or from Reactor Engineering:
LOAD REDUCTJON BORATION SRO RA TE(%/min) FLOWRATE 1% --'15 gpm 2% -~30 gpm JO/o --45 gpm
13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- g. CHECK status of charging and g. IF auto VCT makeup capability is letdown: needed due to RCS leakage or loss of letdown,
- nonna! letdown flow THEN ESTABLISHED I ) INITIATE emergency boration ATC
- charging flow control HIC-62-93A USING Appendix L in AUTO.
- 2) GO TO Substep 5.J (AER column).
-=---
Examiner Note: If the SRO addresses step 5g RNO as required, Emergency Boration using Appendix I will be implemented, and the crew will go to step SJ go to page 16 for details.
- h. DETERMINE if normal boration will be used:
- desired load reduction rate is ATC less than 4% per minute
- time is available for normal boration.
- i. INITIATE nom1al boration A TC USING Appendix H.
Examiner note: Appendix H Actions are listed in the following steps.
APPENDIXH NORMAL BORATION
[1] RECORD desired boration volume and flowrate:
ATC Volume {gal)
Rowrate (gpm)
(3} PLACE [HS-62-1408] Makeup mode selector switch ATC in BORATE position.
14
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction NOTE Boric Acid controller setting is twice the desired flow rate.
Maximum Boric Acid flow is -45 gpm.
[4] ADJUST [FC-62-139] BA flow controller setpoint ATC for desired flow rate.
[7] ENSURE boric acid transfer pump aligned to blender ATC in FAST speed.
[8] IF desired boric acid flow rate NOT obtained, THEN ADJUST one or both of the following as necessary:
- [FC-62-1391 BA flow controller 0
- recirculation valve for BAT aligned to blender. 0 ATC [9] ENSURE desired boric acid flow indicated on Fl-62-139. 0
[10] RECORD time when boration flow established: 0 ATC Time:
[111 WHEN required boric acid volume has been added AND control rods are above low-low insertion limit, THEN A TC PERFORM the following:
[a] PLACE fHS-62-140A], Makeup Control to STOP position. 0 15
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction
[b] ENSURE CFC-62-1421, Primary Water to Blender Flow ATC Controller in AUTO with dial indicator set at 35%.
[c] ADJUST CFC-62-1391, Boric Acid Flow Controller to ATC desired blend solution USING Tl-44 Boron Tables.
APPENDIX I EMERGENCY BORATION
[1] RECORD desired boration volume and ilowrate:
A TC Volume (gal) 16
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction
[4] RECORD the following:
A TC Boration flow: _ _ _ _ __
Time:
A TC [5] NOTIFY Unit Supervisor when boration flow established.
[6] IF Unit Supervisor directs changing boration ftmvrate, THEN RECORD the following:
ATC BoraUon flow:
Time:
Examiner Note: The crew continues actions to lower plant power using AOP-C.03 RAPID SHUTDOWN OR LOAD REDUCTION here.
- 5. INITIATE boration:
J. CONTROL boration flow as required to inject desired boric acid volume.
CAUTION: If borating from the RWST, Turbine Load Reduction Rate greater than 2% per minute could result in violating Rod Insertion Limit.
17
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 6. INITIATE load reduction as follows:
- a. ADJUST load rate to desired value:
- between 1% and 3% per minute if borating via normal boration (App. H)
- 2% per minute if borating from RWST.
- b. ADJUST setter for desired power level:
DESIRED RECOMMENDED BOP RX POWER LEVEL SETTER VALUE 20% or less 15
- 6. c. VERIFY boration flow established.
BOP cl. INJTIATE turbil1 load reduction by depressing GO pushbutton.
- e. CONTROL turbine load reduction BOP as necessary to reduce power to desired level.
18
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 7. MONITOR T-avgrr-ref mismatch:
- a. CHECK T-ref indication a. PERFORM the following:
AVAILABLE.
- 1) MONITOR Program T-avg lor current reactor power USING Tl-28 Figure 3 or ICS (NSSS I BOP. Program Reactor Average Temperature}.
- 2) USE program T-avg in place of T-ref.
- 3) MAINTAIN T-avg v.itt1in 3°F of program T-avg USING manual rod ATC control.
- 4) ADJUST tur1Jine load rate as necessary.
- 5) IF mismatch between T-avg and program value CANNOT be maintained less than 5°F.
THEN TRIP the reactor and GO TO E-0. Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
- 7. b. MONITOR automatic rod control b. IF auto rod control is functional maintaining T-avgff-1ef mismatch AND situation allows slowing down less than 3°F. load reduction, THEN PERFORM the following:
I) REDUCE turbine load rate to allow auto rod control to restore T-avg/T-ref mismatch.
- 2) WHEN T REF T AUCT HIGH LOW alarm (M-5A, C-6) is clear.
THEN RESTORE turbine load rate lo desired value.
IF any of the following conditions met*
- auto rod control NOT functional OR turbine load rate adjustment is NOT effective in reducmg mismatch OR
- situation does NOT allow slowing down load reduction, THEN RESTORE T-avg to within 3°F of T-ref USING manual rod control as necessary.
IF T-avg/T-ref mismatch CANNOT be maintained less than 5°F, THEN TRIP the reactor and GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 19
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction
-* Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 9. STOP secondary plant equipment BOP USING Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment.
Examiner Note: Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment starts at page 25.
NOTE: If LEFM thermal power {U2118) is inoperable, rod insertion limit curve must be raised by 3 steps. Rod insertion limit alarms and lCS display are NOT automatically adjusted when LEFM is inoperable.
- 10. MONITOR control rods above CREW low-low insertion limit USING ICS orCOLR NOTE: Initiating plant shutdown required by Tech Specs requires 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> NRC notification per NPG-SPP-03.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements.
- 11. EVALUATE Tech Specs!TRM for applicability:
- 3.2.1, Axial Flux Difference CREW
- 3. 1.1.1, Shutdown Margin
- 3.1-3.6, Rod Insertion Limits
- TRM 3.1.2.2, Boration Flowpaths
- 3-5.5, RWST_
- 12. EVALUATE EPIP-1, Emergency Plan CREW Initiating Conditions Mattix_
20
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- a. CHECK at least one normal spray valve AVAILABLE ATC
- b. ENSURE at least one backup heater group ENERGIZED.
- c. ENSURE spray valve(s) responds to control RCS pressure.
- 14. WHEN reactor power change exceeds 15% within one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemisfiy to initiate sampling as required by the following:
CREW
- O-Sl-CEM-000-050.2
- O-Sl-CEM-030-407.2
- O-Sl-CEM-030-415.0.
21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 15. MONITOR ifturbine load reduction can be stopped:
- a. CHECK the following conditions met
- reactor shutdown is NOT needed
- turbine shutdown is NOT needed
- turbine load at desired power [evel (further load reduction NOT needed)
- b. ENSURE turbine load reduction STOPPED.
C. WHEN control rods are above the low-low insertion limit, THEN ENSURE boration flow STOPPED.
- e. MAINTAIN T-avg within 3"f ofT-ref USING one of the following:
- AUTO or MANUAL rod control OR
- dilution or boration USING O-S0-62-7 OR
- additional turbine load reduction .
22
Appendix D Required OperatorActions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 15. f. CHECK reactor prn.*.1er greater than 50%.
- g. DETERMINE Tech Spec AFD limits for current power level USING ICS (Primaiy Mimics, Doghouse Display) or GOLR
- h. CHECK AFD within Tech Spec limits on at least three operabfe power range NIS channels.
- 1. IF AFD is outside target band, THEN INfflATE O-Sl-NUC-000-044.0, Axial Flux Difference.
- 15. J. INITIATE perfom1ance of O-SJ-OPS-092-078.0, Power Range Neutron Flux Channel Calibration By Heat Balance Comparison.
le CHECK C-7 LOSS OF LOAD INTERLOCK [M-4Awindow E-5]
DARK NOTE: Time in core fife, expected Xenon changes, and planned pm'ler changes should be considered when evaluating need for boration or dilution.
If dilution is required, Reactor Engineering Data Sheet provides recommended dilution volume for first hour following dmvnpower.
23
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior L CONSULT Reactor Engineering and STA regarding Al control and compensating for Xe changes.
- m. PERFORM the follm'.ljng as necessary to control Al and maintain T-avg on program:
- ADJUST control rod position as necessary.
- 15. n. CHECK at least one normal pzr spray valve OPERABLE
- o. DETERMINE appropriate procedure based upon power level and cause of rapid shutdown:
- Other applicable A.OP OR
- O-G0-5, Normal Power Operation (if greater than approximately 30% power}
- O-G0-4, Power Ascension from Less than 5% to 30% Power (if less than approximately 30% :1
- p. GO TO appropriate plant instruction.
Examiner Note: When the crew has sufficiently reduced power the Lead Examiner may go to the next event starting at page 33.
24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIX B REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA REACTOR TRIP CRITERIA TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA Turbine trip required or imminent Turbine vibration exceeding *14 mils with reactor power greater than P-9 (50%) with one of the following:
Uncontrolled rod movement which CANNOT be
- high vibration on multiple bearings stopped by placing rods in rv1ANUAL (AOP-c.011 OR Loss of SlG level control:
- abnormal noise/vibration apparent level dropping or rising toward trip setpoint and level CANNOT be restored (AOP-s.01) rvlore than one dropped rod (AOP-c.01i T-avgiT-ref mismatch CANNOT be maintained less than 5°F {refer to Step 7 or App. E)
~ 30% turbine load: < 30% turbine load:
Condenser Pressure > 2.7 psia AND CANNOT Condenser Pressure > *1. 72 psia be restored within 5 minutes (AOP-s.02) {AOP-S.02)
Any automatic reactor trip setpoint reached Any automatic turbine trip setpoint reached OR automatic trip imminent OR automatic trip imminent
- Turbine trip above P-9 (50!!10)
- High Stator Cooling Water temp 90°C
- Power Range high flux "!09%
- Both MFPT's tripped
- Power Range flux rate +/- 5% in 2 seconds
- Low Auto Stop Oil pressure 45 psig
- Pressurizer high level 92%
- High SiG level 81% narrow range
- Pressurizer pressure low *1970 psig * !v1ain Turb Bearing Oil low pressure 7 psig
- Pressurizer pressure high 2385 psig
- Thrust Bearing OH high pressure 60 psig
- RCS !ow flow 90%
- Turbine Overspeed 1980 rpm
- RCP undervoltage 5.022 kifovo!ts
- Loss of EHC pressure
- RCP underfrequency 56.0 Hz
- Unit 1 Only:
- OTL\T 1*153 (variable) Generator Circuit Breaker (GCB) tripped OR 500kV bkrs 5034 and 5038 tripped.
- OP8.T 108. 7% (variable)
- Unit 2 Onlv:
- SIG low !eve! W.7% [15% EAMJ Generator Circuit Breaker (GCB) tripped
- SSPS general warning in both trains OR "!61 kV bkrs 924 and 928 tripped.
25
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction 1
T;"'"'"" I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIXC SECONDARY PLANT EQUIPMENT
[1] ENSURE plant announcement(s) made on the following:
- starting rapid shutdown (or load reduction) due to (reason)
- stopping secondary plant equipment D NOTE 1 If reactor power will be reduced below 50%, AUO should be on station at #3 heater drain tank (if possible) when 60% power is reached.
NOTE2 Dispatching of AUO in Steps [2] and [3] may be performed out of sequence.
[2] IF reactor power will be reduced below 50%,
THEN DISPATCH AUO with Appendix J (Unit 1) or K (Unit 2) to #3 Heater Drain Tank. D
[3] IF one MFP will be shutdown using this appendix, THEN DISPATCH AUO to OPEN MFWP recirc manual Isolation valve for MFWP to be removed from seivice: (NIA valves NOT opened)
UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION OPEN../
l 1A 1-VLV-3-576 TB el. 706, Northeast comer of 1A condenser D 1B 1-VLV-3-577 TB el. 706, Northeast comer of *1A condenser D 2 2A 2-VLV-3-576 TB et 706, Southeast comer of 2A condenser D 28 2-VLV-3-577 TB eL 706, Southeast comer of 2A condenser D 26
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction
! -r-:~--
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIXC
[4] IF BOTH of the following conditions are met
- power is being reduced as directed by AOP-S_01 (Main Feedwater Malfunctions) or AOP-S.04 (Condensate or Heater Drain Malfunctions)
- leaving secondary pumps in service is desired, THEN GO TO Step [8]_ D
~
[5] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 80%1 or less, THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] ENSURE one Cond Oemin Booster Pump STOPPED_ D
[b] ENSURE associated suction valve CLOSED:
COND DEMIN SUCTION VALVE CLOSED" BOOSTER PUMP A FCV-2-290 D' OR B FCV-2-285 D OR c I FCV-2-280 D I
27
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction
~*
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[6] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 70-75%,
THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] ENSURE one Condensate Booster Pump STOPPED.
[b] ENSURE associated CBP suction valve CLOSED:
CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSED,/
A FCV-2-94 D OR B FCV-2-87 D OR c FCV-2-BJ D
[c] PERFORM applicable procedure to adjust seal injection water pressure on stopped CBP to prevent water intrusion in oil:
(may be assigned to another operator or delayed if necessary}
- 1-S0-213-1 Section 7.2 D OR
- 2-S0-213-1Section7.3 D 28
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction Ti~~ I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[7] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 65% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:
[aJ STOP remaining two Cond Demin Booster Pumps simultaneously_ D
[bJ ENSURE suction valves CLOSED:
COND DEMIN BOOSTER PUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSED v A FCV-2-290 D B FCV-2-285 D c FCV-2-280 D
[c] STOP one No. 3 Heater Drain pump_ D
[dJ STOP one No. 7 Heater Drain pump_ D 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction
~*
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIXC
[8] IF reactor power wlll be maintained greater than 50%,
THEN GO TO Notes priorto Step [11]. D
~
CAUTION Isolation of all three intermediate heater strings could occur if turbine is tripped prior to fully opening LCV-6-105A and 8 using Appendix K or L.
[9] WHEN reactor power is less than 60%
AND AUO with Appendix K {Unit 1) or l (Unit 2) is on station at #3 Heater Drain Tank, THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] STOP #3 Heater Drain Tank Pumps. D
[b] NOTIFY AUO to perfonn App_ K (Unit *1) or App_ l (Unit 2),
Fully Opening #3 Heater Drain Tank Bypass Valves_ D
[cl CLOSE isolation valves from #3 Htr Drain Pumps to heater strings:
VALVE DESCRIPTION CLOSED v FCV-6-108 Htr Drain Tk Pump 3 to Htr String A LJ FCV-6-109 Htr Drain Tl< Pump 3 to Htr String B D FCV-6-110 Htr Drain Tk Pump 3 to Htr String c D 30
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction
~* -
""" I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIXC NOTE 1 The following step ensures that MFW Bypass valves are available to control feedwater flow at low power.
NOTE2 If any MFW Reg valve is in MANUAL, the associated MFW Bvpass valve controller should remain in MANUAL to prevent undesired opening of bypass valve.
[10} WHEN Reactor power is less than 50%,
THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] lF all MFW Reg Valves are in AUTO, THEN PLACE MFW Bypass Reg Vafve controllers in AUTO. D
[b] JF any MFW Reg Valve is in MANUAL, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) MAINTAIN MFW Bypass Reg Valve in MANUAL for SIG with MFW Reg valve in MANUAL. D 2} PLACE MFW Bypass Reg Valves in AUTO for remaining S/Gs. D 31
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 24 Event
Description:
Plant Power Reduction I ition I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
NOTE 1 If performing this AOP to reduce power to allow shutting down one MFW pump, the affected MFWP may be removed from service at power level less than 55% (Unit 1) or 60% (Unit 2).
NOTE2 AFW start function on loss of both MFW pumps is inoperable when a MFW pump is RESET but NOT pumping forward. LCO 3.3.2.1 (Unit 1) or 3.3.2 (Unit 2) allows AFW start channel to be inoperable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when shutting down a MFWP.
[11] WHEN it is desired to remove one MFW pump from service AND pO\ver level is less than applicable limit:
- turbine impulse pressure less than approximately 45%
- reactor power less than value specified in Note 1, THEN PERFORM the following:
[aJ ENSURE MFWP Recirc Manual Isolation valve OPEN for MFWP to be removed from service: (NIA valves NOT opened)
UNIT MFWP _ VALVE LOCATION OPEN i l
"lA *1-VLV-3-576 TB el. 706, Northeast comer of 1A condenser D
- m 1-VLV-3-577 TB eL 706, Northeast comer of 1A condenser D 2
2A 2-VLV-3-576 TB el. 706, Southeast comer of 2A condenser D 28 2-VLV-3-577 TB el. 706, Southeast comer of 2A condenser D
[b] THROTTLE OPEN recirc valve in MANUAL (30-50% OPEN) for MFWP to be removed from service. D
[c] PLACE speed controller in MANUAL for MFWP to be removed from service. D
[d] REDUCE speed gradually on MFWP to be removed from service. D (step continued on next page) 32
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
- 3 HOT LCV Failure Manual Runback Required.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to insert Event 1, #3 HOT LCV Failure Manual Run back Required.
Indications/Alarms Annunciators:
1-M-2
- M2C 8-7 ZS-6-105A & B NO 3 HTR DR TK BYPASS TO COND Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:
1-M-3
- FR-6-107 Channel one #3 HOT Flow trending down.
ZS-6-105A & B NO 3 HTR DRTK BYPASS TO COND BOP Refers to ARP for annunciator M2C B-7 BOP [1] VERIFY LCV-6-105A or LCV-6-1058 shown OPEN OR THROTTLED by indicating lights ('1-XX-6-'1, M-2).
BOP [2] IF> 8'1 % load AND FR-6-'l07 indicates< 5500 gpm AND LCV-6-105A OR 1058 not fully closed, after *10 seconds time delay, THEN VERIFY turbine nm back to less than 77%.
BOP [3] IF reactor trips, THEN GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection.
[4] MONITOR #3 Heater Drain Tank System parameters on f\11-2.
33
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
- 3 HOT LCV Failure Manual Runback Required.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP [5] DISPATCH operator to turbine building to perform the following:
[a] CHECK local level indication {srghtglass).
[b] ENSURE LCV-6-106A and 1068 OPEN and LCV-6-'!05A and
'l05B THROTTLED controlling level.
[c] CHECK #3 Heater Drain Pumps operation.
[6] IF #3 Heater Drain Pump(s) tripped OR #3 Heater Drain Tank flow is lost, THEN GO TO AOP-S.04, Condensate or Heater Drains Ma/function.
SRO Transitions to AOP-S.04, Condensate or Heater Drains Malfunction.
SRO Directs response using, Condensate or Heater Drains Malfunction.
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF ...
SECTION PAGE Total or Partial Loss of #3 Heater Drain Tank Pump flow 2.6 31 BOP 1. MONITOR the following:
- at least one #3 Heater Drain Tank Pump RUNNING AND
- #3 Heater Drain Tank Pump flow greater than zero 34
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
- 3 HDT LCV Failure Manual Runback Required.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 2. MONITOR for turbine runback conditions:
- a. Turbine load greater than 81% (Unit 1) or 82% (Unit 2).
- b. #3 HOT bypass valve LCV-6-105A or -1058 OPEN. [M-2]
- c. #3 Heater Drain Tank Outlet Flow less than 5500 gpm [M-2, FR-6-107]
for at least 1O seconds.
BOP 3. VERIFY turbine runback to less than IF #3 HOT flow less than 5500 gpm or equal to 77%, turbine load AND LCV-6-105A or 1058 is open.
(approximately 940 MWE). THEN
- a. INITIATE turbine runback USING valve position limiter.
BOP 4. CHECK rods controlling in AUTO.
NOTE: If LEFM thermal power (U2118) is inoperable, rod insertion limit curve must be raised by 3 steps. Rod insertion limit alarms and ICS display are NOT automatically adjusted when LEFM is inoperable.
ATC 5. MONITOR control rods above !ow-low INITIATE boration USING Appendix A.
insertion limit using JCS or COLR.
EVALUATE Tech Spec LCO 3.1.3.6 and3.1.1.1.
CAUTION: Feedwater temperature changes may impact core thermal power.
BOP 6. MONITOR Steam generator levels returning to program. [M-4]
NOTE 1: Recommended load rate is 1% per minute if turbine load reduction is needed.
NOTE 2: Severe MFW pump cavitation is likely if inlet pressure is less than 250 psig.
35
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
- 3 HOT LCV Failure Manual Runback Required.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 7. MONITOR Feedwater pump inlet pressure greater than 320 psig. [M-3, Pl-2-129]
BOP 8. MONITOR Condensate Booster pump suction pressure greater than 100 psig.
[M-3, Pl-2-77]
BOP 9. MONITOR reactor power:
- a. CHECK !CS thermal power indication AVAILABLE.
- 9. b. VERIFY 10 minute average power fess than or equal to applicable limit:
- 10. ENSURE operators dispatched to investigate cause for loss of #3 heater drain tank pump flow:
- CHECK LCV-6-106A and -1068 functioning properly.
- CHECK position of LCV-6-105A and 105B
- CHECK #3 heater drain tank pumps functioning properly.
- 11. CHECK VALVE POSITION LIMIT light DARK on 1(2)-XX-47-2000, EHC DISPLAY.
36
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
- 3 HDT LCV Failure Manual Runback Required.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP APPENDIX B TURBINE RUNBACK RESTORATION NOTE This appendix is used to remove turbine from valve position limiter prior to starting load reduction following a BOP runback.
[1] IF normal turbine load control is available (OPER AUTO light LIT),
THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] ENSURE governor valve tracking meter centered close to ZERO. D
[b] DEPRESS [TURB MANUAL] mode selector pushbutton. D
[c] VERIFY [TURB MANUAL] lamp LIT. D
[d] VERIFY reference and setter counters stabilize. 0
[e] ENSURE governor valve tracking meter centered close to ZERO. 0
[f] DEPRESS [OPER AUTO] mode selector pushbutton. D
[g] VERIFY [OPER AUTOJ lamp LIT. D
[h] VERIFY reference and setter counters stabilize. D
[i] REDUCE turbine load reference using SETTER UNTIL VALVE POS LIMIT light is DARK. D aminer Note: The next event is already occurring, proceed to the next event.
37
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6.
Event
Description:
Control Rods Continuously Auto Insert.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Malfunction is active at the scenario start.
Indications available:
1-M-4
- M4B B-7 ZB-412B ROD CONTROL BANKS LIMIT LOW-LOW Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:
- Control rods continuing to insert without sufficient Tave-Tref mismatch.
ZB-412B TS 68 2M/N ROD CONTROL RC LOOPS T AVG BANKS LIMIT /AUCT T AVG DEVN LOW-LOW HIGH-LOW ATC Refers to ARP for annunciator M4B B-7 or M5A-A7 ATC [1] IF alarm has been verified as being valid {!CS and/or COLR),
AND unit is in l'v1ode 1 or Mode 2 with reactor critical, THEN IMMEDIATELY INITIATE boration by performing the following:
[a] PLACE BA transfer pump aligned to blender in FAST speed.
[b] ADJUST FCV-62-138 as necessary to establish boration flow greater than or equal to 35 gpm from BAT (at least 6120 ppm).
[c] IF required flow via FCV-62-138 CANNOT be established, THEN PERFORM one of the following:
- INITIATE normal boration of greater than or equal to 35 gpm from BAT (at least 6'!20 ppm)
USING O-S0-62-7 Sect 6.4_
38
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Control Rods Continuously Auto Insert.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
['IJ CHECK 1-XX-55-5., Trip status panel for any bistables t11at may be !it, AND EVALUATE Reactor Trip criteria with SRO by comparison with redundant instrumentation_
[21 IF reactor trips, THEN GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
[3] IF Tavg channel failed, THEN GO TO AOP-1.02, RCS LOOP RTD fNSTRUMENT MALFUNCTION.
[4] IF rod control system is malfunctioning, THEN GO TO AOP-c.0*1. Rod Control
.t:;;v.c;fp_m lu1:::i!ftmdinn<::
ATC [d] RECORD the following:
Boration start time: _ _ _ _ gpm
- - - - - Boration ftow:
A TC [2] IF rod insertion continues and cannot be explained, THEN GO TO AOP-C.01, Rod Control System 114alfunctions.
SRO [7] REFER TO Technical Specification LCOs 3. 'L 'I. *1, 3.'l.3.5 and 3_'L3_6_
3.1.3.6 The control banks shall be limited in physical inserticn as specified in !he GOLR.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*#.
ACTION:
- a. With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except ror S\Jrveilarn:;e testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3. t.2 ocwhen complying with ACTION b of this specification, ellher:
- 1. Rest~e the control banks to within the limits within two hours, or
- 2. Reduce THERMAL POWER within two hours to less than or !MjLJal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which i:s allowed by the group position using the insertion limits specified in the GOLR, or
- 3. Be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SRO Transitions to AOP-C.01, ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS.
SRO Directs actions from AOP-C.01, ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS.
39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Control Rods Continuously Auto Insert.
Time Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF ... SECTION PAGE Uncontrolled rod bank movement 2.1 4 (rod movement NOT due to actual T-avg/T-ref mismatch or change in reactor/turbine power)
NOTE: Step 1 is an immediate action step.
A TC *1. STOP uncontrolled rod motion:
- a. PLACE rod control in MAN.
- b. CHECK rod motion STOPPED.
CAUTION: Control Rods should NOT be manually withdrawn during a plant transient.
A TC 2. MONITOR for plant transient
- a. CHECK reactor power and T-avg STABLE.
- 2. b. CHECK ICS thermal power indication AVAILABLE.
c_ VERIFY *10 minute average power less than or equal lo applicable limit
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Control Rods Continuously Auto Insert.
Ti~~
- Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC 3. CHECK for instrumentation malfunction:
a_ CHECK all Vital Instrument Power Boards ENERGIZED:
- VITAL POWER BOARD UV OR BREAKER TRIP alarms [M-'JC windows A-7, B-7, C-7, and D-71 DARK b_ CHECK nuclear instrumentation OPERABLE.
d_ CHECK turbine impulse pressure channels OPERABLE.
e_ CHECK T-ref OPERABLE USING TR-68-28.
f_ CHECK Auctioneered T-avg OPERABLE USING TR-68-28_
41
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Control Rods Continuously Auto Insert.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior A TC 4. CHECK for inadvertent RCS dilution:
- a. CHECK evidence of dilution INDICATED:
- T-avg rising unexplained with stable turbine load.
A TC 5. CHECK for inadvertent boration flow:
- a. CHECK evidence of boration flow a. GO TO Step 6.
INDICATED:
- Batch counters flow indication ~
- T-avg dropping unexplained.
NOTE: When adjusting T-avg, reactivity changes should be accomplished by only one method at a time_
ATC 6. RESTORE T-avg to within 1.5°F of T-ref
- POSITION control rods OR
- ADJUST turbine load OR
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Control Rods Continuously Auto Insert.
7_ EVALUATE the following Tech Specs/TRM for applicability:
- 3.1.1.1, Shutdown l\:1argin - T-avg_
Greater than 200°F
- 3.1.1.4, Minimum Temperature for Criticality
- 3.1.3.1, Movable Control Assemblies, Group Height
- 3.1.3.5, Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit
- 3.1.3.6, Control Rod Insertion Limits
- 3.2, Power Distribution Limits (entire section)
When technical specifications have been identified or at discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event.
43
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
-r-:.__ -
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior n: ___ .. ~-cility operator to insert Event 6 SGTR Indications available:
1-M-3:
- RCS Pzr LEVEL Chs, 1-Ll-68-339A, 335A & 320 going down slowly initially; 1-M-5:
- RCS PZR LEVEL 1-LR-68-339 shows Pzr level trending down initially.
- CHARGING HOR FLOW 1Fl-62-93A indicating above normal flow to maintain Pzr level on program.
1-M-6:
- 1-Pl-68-66A, HL Pressure LOOP 3 indicator trending down.
Examiner Note: The following steps come from AOP-R.01, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK and may be performed as the SGTL degrades.
- 1. MONITOR if Pressurizer revel ATC can be maintained:
44
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- b. MONITOR pressurizer level STABLE b. PERFORM the foi!owing:
or RISING.
- 1) ENSURE letdown isofated:
- FCV-62-72 CLOSED
- FCV-62-73 CLOSED
- FCV-62-74 CLOSED
- 2) IF pzr level continues to drop.
THEN START additional CCP as necessary.
IF pzr level CANNOT be maintained greater than 5%
OR loss of pzr !eve! is imminent, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) TRIP the reactor.
- 2) WHEN reactor is tripped, THEN INITIATE Safety Injection.
- 3) GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safely Injection.
45
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE1 Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.
NOTE2 This procedure has a foldout page.
- 1. VERIFY reactor TRIPPED:
Reactor trip breakers OPEN Reactor trip bypass breakers DISCONNECTED or OPEN ATC Rod bottom lights UT Rod position indicators less than or equal to 12 steps.
Neutron flux DROPPING
- 2. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:
BOP Turbine stop valves CLOSED.
- 3. VERIFY at least one 6.9KV shutdown BOP board ENERGIZED on this unit
- 4. DETERMINE if SI actuated:
- ECCS pumps RUNNING.
- 5. PERFORM ES--0.5, Equipment BOP Verifications WHILE continuing in this procedure.
Continue with the performance of E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY SRO/ATC INJECTION BOP Performs ES-0.5, Equipment Verifications go to page 64 for details SRO Addresses foldout page.
46
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior.
FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:
- Phase B isolation, THEN STOP all RCPs.
EVENT DIAGNOSTICS
- IF any SIG pressure is dropping uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:
- b. IF any SIG pressure continues to drop uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:
1} ENSURE SI actuated.
- 2) IF at least one SIG is intact (S/G pressure controlled or rising), THEN ISOLATE AFW to faulted S/G{s):
- CLOSE AFW level control valves for faulted S/G(s).
- IF any AFW valve for faulted SIG CANNOT be CLOSED, THEN REFER TO Appendix E to stop AFW flow to faulted SIG.
- 3) ENSURE at least one of the following conditions met:
- Narrow Range level greater than !0% [25% ADV] in at least one intact S/G.
- IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.
TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS
47
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 6. DETERMINE if secondary heat sink available:
- a. CHECK total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm.
- b. CHECK narrow range level b. MAINTAIN total feed flow ATC greater than 10% [25% ADV] greater than 440 gpm in at least one SIG. UNTIL narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADV]
in at least one SIG.
- c. CONTROL feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%
in intact or ruptured S/Gs.
- 7. CHECK if main steam lines should be isolated:
- a. CHECK if any of the following conditions have occurred:
- Any SIG pressure less than 600 psig OR
- Phase B actuation.
- c. ENSURE applicable Foldout Page actions COMPLETED.
Examiner Note: The crew may take action using the Foldout Page (FOP) to isolate the #1 Steam Generator now.
48
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 8. CHECK RCP trip criteria:
- a. CHECK the following:
- b. STOP RCPs.
- 9. MONITOR RCS temperatures: IF temperature less than 54 7°F and dropping,
- IF any RCP running, THEN THEN PERFORM the following:
CHECK T-avg stable at or trending to between 547°F and 552°F. a. ENSURE steam dumps and atmospheric reliefs CLOSED.
- b. IF cooldown continues,
- IF RCPs stopped, THEN THEN CONTROL total feed flow:
CHECK T-cold stable at or trending ATC/BOP 1) ENSURE total AFW flow to between 547°F and 552°F.
less than or equal to 600 gpm.
- 2) MAINTAIN total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL narrow range level is greater than 10% [25% ADV]
in at least one SIG.
- 10. CHECK pressurizer PORVs, safeties, and spray valves:
- a. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED.
49
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- b. Pressurizer safety valves CLOSED.
- 10. C. Normal spray valves CLOSED.
- d. Power to at least one block valve AVAILABLE.
- e. At least one block valve OPEN.
- 11. DETERMINE if SIG secondary pressure PERFORM the following:
boundaries are INTACT:
- a. MONITOR status trees.
CHECK all SIG pressures ATC CONTROLLED or RISING. b. GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
CHECK all SIG pressures greater than 140 psig.
- 12. DETERMINE if SIG tubes are INTACT: IF any SIG has level rising in an uncontrolled manner
- All SIG narrow range levels OR has high radiation, CONTROLLED or DROPPING THEN PERFORM the following:
- Secondary radiation NORMAL USING Appendix: A, Secondary Rad a. MONITOR status trees.
Monitors. (App. A perfom1ed in ES-0.5). b. GO TO E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via SPDS.
When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).
NOTE This procedure has a foldout page.
50
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT PAGE SI REINITIATION CRITERIA IF SI has been terminated AND either of the following conditions occurs:
- Pressurizer level CANNOT be maintained greater than 10% [20% ADV],
THEN
- a. ESTABLlSH ECCS flow by performing one or both of the following:
- ESTABLISH CCPIT flow as necessary USING Appendix c
- START CCPs or Sl pumps manually as necessary.
- b. GO TO ECA-3.'l, SGTR and LOCA-Subcooled Recovery.
EVENT DIAGNOSTICS
- IF both trains of shutdown boards deenerglzed, THEN GO TO ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power_
- IF any SIG pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner or less t11an '140 psig AND SIG NOT isolated AND SIG NOT needed for RCS cooldown, THEN GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator rsotation.
- IF any Intact SIG has level rising in an uncontrolled manner OR has abnormal radiation, THEN STOP any deliberate RCS cooldown or depressurlzation and GO TO E-3 step 1.
TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS
- IF CST level less than 5%;
THEN ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW.
- IF RWST level less Ulan 27%,
THEN GO TO ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump.
51
AppendixD Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Time I Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC MONITOR at least one RCP RUNNING.
- 2. MONITOR RCP trip criteria:
- a. CHECK the following: a. GO TO Step 3.
- b. STOP RCPs.
- 3. MONITOR indications of Ruptured S/G(s):
- a. IDENTIFY Ruptured S/G(s) as indicated by any of the following:
- Unexpected rise in any SIG narrow range level.
- High radiation from any SIG Crew sample.
- RADCON survey of main steam lines and SIG blowdown lines.
- High radiation on any main steamline radiation monitor.
CAUTION ff the TD AFW pump is the onty source of feed flow, isolating both steam supplies wm result in loss of secondary heat sink.
52
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 4. ISOLATE flow from Ruptured S/G{s):
ATC/BOP a. ADJUST Ruptured S/G(s) atmospheric relief controller setpoint to 87% in AUTO. (1040 psig)
- b. CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) b. WHEN Ruptured SIG(s) pressure atmospheric relief hand switch in less than 1040 psig, P-AUTO and valve(s) CLOSED. THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) VERIFY atmospheric relief CLOSED.
- 2) IF atmospheric relief NOT closed, ATC/BOP THEN CLOSE atmospheric relief.
IF Ruptured SIG(s) atmospheric relief CANNOT be closed, THEN DISPATCH personnel to close atmospheric relief USING EA-1-2, Local Control of SIG PORVs.
- 4. c. CHECK S/G #1 or #4 ruptured.
- d. CLOSE TD AFW pump steam supply from Ruptured S/G FCV-1-15 (S/G #1) or FCV-1-16 (S/G #4).
ATC/BOP e. VERIFY Ruptured S/G{s) blowdown isolation valves CLOSED.
53
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 5. MONITOR Ruptured S/G(s) !evet
- a. CHECK ruptured S/G narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADV].
- b. ISOLATE AFW to ruptured S/G:
- 6. VERIFY Ruptured SIG !SOLATED from Intact StG(s}:
- a. CHECK either of the following conditions SATlSF!ED:
CLOSED on Intact S/G(s) to be ATC/BOP used for RCS cooldown.
- b. CHECK S/G #1 or #4 ruptured.
- c. CHECK TDAFW pump steam supply from ruptured SIG ISOLATED:
- FCV-1-15 (S/G #1) or FCV-1-16 (S/G #4) CLOSED 54
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 7_ CHECK Ruptured SIG pressure ATC/BOP greater than 550 psig (Unlt 1) or 425 psig (Unit 2).
NOTE Blocking low steamline pressure SI as soon as pressurizer pressure is less than 1960 psig will prevent an inadvertent MS!V closure and keep the condenser available for steam dump.
- After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded_
- The 1250 psig RCP trip criterion is NOT applicable after RCS cooldown is initiated in the following step_
- 8. INITIATE RCS cooldown:
- a. DETERMINE target core exit TIC temperature based on Ruptured SIG pressure:
ATC/BOP Lowest Ruptured Target Core Exit SIG pressure (psig) TIC Tem °F 1000-1049 486 950-999 I 480 8_ b. WHEN RCS pressure less than 1960 psig, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) BLOCK low steamline pressure SI.
- 2) CHECK STEAMUNE PRESS ISOUSI BLOCK RATE ISOL ENABLE permissive UT.
[M-4A; A4]
55
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior C. DUMP steam to condenser from Intact S/G(s) at maximum achievable rate:
- 1) CHECK condenser available:
- C-9 condenser interlock permissive UT. [rv1-4A, E6]
- Intact SIG MSlVs OPEN .
- 2) PLACE steam dumps in OFF.
- 3) ENSURE steam dumps in steam pressure mode with demand less than 25~10_
- 4) PLACE steam dumps in ON.
- 5) ADJUST steam dump demand to FULLY OPEN three cooldown valves.
- 6) WHEN T-avg is less than 540°F, THEN BYPASS steam dump interlock.
- 7) RAISE AFW flow to intact S/Gs as necessary to support coo!down.
56
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 8- ct WHEN core exit T/Cs less than target temperature determined in Substep 8.a, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) CLOSE steam dumps or SIG atmospheric reliefs.
- 2) R.EDUCE total AFVV flow to less than 600 gpm to stop coo!down.
MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL revel greater than 10% [25% ADV]
in at least one Intact SIG.
- 3) MAINTAIN core exit TICS less than target temperature USING steam dumps or atmospheric reliefs.
57
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Po .. *cant's Actions or Behavior
- 9. MAINTAIN Intact SIG narrow range levels:
- a. Greater than 10% [25°/o ADV]
- b. Between 20% [25% ADV] and 50~/o_
- 10. MONITOR pressurizer PORVs and block valves:
- a. Power to block valves AVAILABLE ATC
- b. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED
- c. At least one block valve OPEN.
BOP 12. MONITOR AC busses energized from start busses.
ATC 13. ENSURE Phase A and Phase B RESET 58
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
'14. CHECK control air established to containment: [Panel 6K and 6LJ
- *1-FCV-32-80 {2-FCV-32-81)
Train A essential air OPEN ATC
- *t-FCV-32-102 (2-FCV-32-103)
Train B essential air OPEN
- 1-FCV-32-110 (2-FCV-32-*11 *1) non-essential air OPER
- 15. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:
- b. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 300 psig.
- c. STOP RHR pumps and PLACE in A-AUTO.
- d. MONITOR RCS pressure greater than 300 psig.
59
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
me Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 16. CHECK if RCS cooldown should be stopped:
- a. CHECK core exit T/Cs fess than target temperature determined in Substep 8.a.
- b. CLOSE steam dumps or atmospheric reliefs.
- c. REDUCE total AFW flow to less than 600 gpm to stop cooldown.
MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL level greater than 10% [25% ADV}
in at least one Intact S/G.
- d. MAINTAIN core exit T/Cs less than target temperature USING steam dumps or atmospheric reliefs.
MONITOR Ruptured S/G(s) pressure BOP STABLE or RlSlNG.
ATC 18. CHECK RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs greater than 60°F.
60
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Time J Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 19. DEPRESSURIZE RCS to minimize break flow and to refill pressurizer:
- a. CHECK normal pressurizer spray AVAILABLE.
- b. INITIATE maximum available pressurizer spray.
- c. CHECK clepressurization rate ADEQUATE.
- d. REDUCE RCS pressure UNTIL any of the following conditions (also listed on handout page) are met
- Both of the fonowing:
- 1) RCS pressure less than Ruptured S!G(s) pressure AND
- 2) Pressurizer level greater than 10% [20% AO\/].
- Pressurizer level greater than 65%.
- RCS subcooling based on core exit TfCs less than 40"'F.
61
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- e. CLOSE spray valve(s):
- 1) Normal spray valves.
- 2) Auxiliary spray valve.
- f. GO TO Caution prior to Step 22.
CAUTION Any delay in terminating SI after termination criteria are met may cause Ruptured S/G(s) overfill.
- 22. CHECK jf ECCS flow should be terminated:
- a. RCS subcooHng based on core exlt T/Cs greater than 40"'F.
- b. Secondary heat sink:
- Narrow range level in at least one Intact SIG greater than 10% [25% ADV]
- Total feed flow to StGs greater than 440 gpm AVAILABLE.
C. RCS pressure STABLE or RISING.
- d. Pressurizer level greater than 10% [20% ADV].
62
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 7 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failed Open Atmospheric Dump.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 23. STOP the following ECCS pumps:
ATC b. CHECK offsite power supplying shutdown boards.
C. STOP all BUT one CCP and Pl.ACE in A-AUTO.
- 24. !SOI.ATE CCPIT:
- a. CLOSE inlet isolation valves FCV-63-39 and FCV-63-40.
- b. CLOSE outlet isolation valves FCV-63-26 and FCV-63-25.
Scenario may be terminated when the CCPIT is isolated or earlier, at discretion of Lead Examiner 63
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications.
I I
' II 11'-' Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 1- VERIFY D/Gs RUNNING.
BOP 2. VERIFY DIG ERCW supply valves OPEN.
BOP 3. VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps RUNNING.
- 4. VERIFY ccs pumps RUNNING:
. Pump *1 B-B (2B-B)
. Pump C-S .
BOP 5. VERIFY EGTS fans RUNNING.
BOP 6. VERIFY generator breakers OPEN.
- 8. VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:
- a. MDAFW pumps
- b. TDAFWpump.
NOTE AFW level control valves should NOT be repositioned if manual action has been taken to control SIG levels, to establish ftow due to failure, or to isolate a faulted SIG.
64
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications.
- ~
I Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 9. CHECK AFW valve alignment:
BOP b. VERIFY TD AFW LCVs OPEN.
C. VERIFY MD AFW pump recirculation valves FCV-3-400 and FCV-3-401 CLOSED.
- 10. VERIFY MFW lsolation:
- a. CHECK fv1FW pumps TRIPPED.
- b. ENSURE the following:
. fv1FW regulating valves CLOSED
. MF\iV regulating bypass valve controllers in MANUAL with output ZERO
. MFW Isolation valves CLOSED.
'11. MONITOR ECCS operation:
- a. VERIFY ECCS pumps RUNNING:
. RHRpumps
. SI pumps
- b. VERIFY CCP flow through CCPlT 65
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications.
~*
I p __ *_:_ I I
- -ant's Actions or Behavior C. CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.
- d. VERIFY SI pump flow.
- e. CHECK RCS pressure e. GO TO Step 12.
less than 300 psig.
~
- f. VERIFY RHR pump now.
- 12. VERIFY ESF systems ALIGNED:
- a. Phase A ACTUATED:
- PHASE A TRAIN A alam1 LIT
[M-6C, 85].
- PHASE A TRAIN B aram1 LIT
[M-6C, 86].
- b. Cntmt Vent Isolation ACTUATED:
- CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, C5].
- CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN 8 alarm LIT [M-6C, C6].
BOP C. status monitor panels:
. 6GDARK
. 6DDARK
. 6E UT OUTSIDE outlined area
. 6H DARK
. 6J UT.
- d. Train A status panel 6K:
. CNTMT VENT GREEN
. PHASE A GREEN 66
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications.
...... ,...... Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- e. Train B status panel 6L
. CNTrvff VENT GREEN
. PHASE AGREEN
- 13. MONITOR for containment spray and Phase B actuation:
- a. CHECK for any of the following:
. Phase B ACTUATED OR
. Containment pressure greater than 2.8 psig.
- b. VERIFY containment spray INITIATED:
- 1) Containment spray pumps RUNNING.
- 2) Containment spray header isolation valves FCV-72-39 and FCV-72-2 OPEN.
- 3) Containment spray recirculation valves to RWST FCV-72-34 and FCV-72-13 CLOSED.
- 4) Containment spray header flow greater than 4750 gpm per train.
- 5) Panel 6E LIT.
67
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- c. VERIFY Phase B ACTUATED:
- PHASE B TRAIN A alarm LIT
[M-6C, A5].
- PHASE B TRAIN B alarm LIT
[M-6C, A6].
- d. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.
- e. VERIFY Phase B valves CLOSED:
. Panel 6K PHASE B GREEN .
. Panel 6l PHASE B GREEN .
- f. WHEN 10 minutes have elapsed, THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING.
NOTE The continuous action in step 14 remains applicable if containment pressure rises above *1 _5 psig after ES-0.5 is completed.
"14. MONITOR if containment vacuum relief isolation valves should be closed:
BOP a. CHECK containment pressure a. GO TO Step 15.
greater than 1.5 pslg.
~
- 15. CHECK secondary and containment rad monitors USING the following:
- Appendix A Secondary Rad Monitors
- Appendix B, Containment Rad Monil:ors.
68
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIX A SECONDARY RAD MONITORS 1_ IF s I occurred on Unit 1 THEN CHECK following rad monitors including available trends prior to isolation:
. Condenser exhaust recorder 1-RR *t *19 BOP
. S/G blowdown recorder *1-RR-90-120
. Unit *1 Main steam line rad monitors ["1-M-30J
. Post-Accident rad recorder 1-RR-90-268B points 3 (blue), 4 {violet), 5 (black), and 6 (turquoise)_
[1-M-31 {back of *1-M-30)]
3_ NOTIFY Unit Supervisor whether secondary radiation is NORMAL or HIGH.
APPENDIX B CONTAINMENT RAD MONITORS 1_ IF SI occurred on Unit 1 _
THEN CHECK following rad monitors:
- Upper containment post-accident rad monitors
- t-RM-90-271A and 1-R[V1-90-272A NORMAL ["1-M-30]
- Lower containment post-accident rad monitors 1-RM-90-273A and 1-RM-90-274A NORMAL l"l-M-30]
- Containment rad recorders 1-RR-90-112 and *1-RR-90-rn6 NORMAL [O-l'v1-12] (prior to isolation).
69
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verifications.
I II""' Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 17. CHECK pocket sump pumps STOPPED:
[M-15, upper lefi comer]
- HS-77-410, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump A
- HS-77-411 , Rx B!dg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump B.
18- DISPATCH personnel to perform BOP EA-0-1, Equipment Checks Following ESF Actuation.
- 19. ENSURE plant announcement has been BOP made regarding Reactor Trip and s I.
- 20. PERFORM Appendix E, Spent Fuel BOP Cooling Actions, as time permits.
I END OF TEXT I
70
71 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Sequoyah Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Candidates: ATC SRO BOP Initial Conditions: 95% BOL, EOOS risk green, FT-1-3A is in MAINT BYPASS, RTS 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Turnover: Raise power to 100%
Critical Tasks CT-7 Manually start at least one required high-head (Safety Injection) ECCS pump prior to transition out of E-0 during a SBLOCA when RCS pressure is less than 1500 psig.
CT-16 Manually trip all Reactor Coolant Pumps given the following conditions:
One Safety Injection pump is not functioning.
AND One of the following malfunctions is inserted:
. A 2" RCS Cold Leg break (TH02 0.529%) for greater than 33 minutes .
. A 3" RCS Cold Leg break (TH02 1.19%) for greater than 1O minutes but less than 13.5 minutes.
AND The RCP's automatically trip after the above times has elapsed.
Event Event Type Event Description No.
(R) ATC Raise Reactor power to 100%
1 (N)BOP/SRO ED120B1B 120 V vital power breaker to lower Containment radiation monitor 1-RM 2 TS-SRO 007 106 trips. The SRO declares the radiation Monitor INOPERABLE.
The 3A Heater Drain Pump trips which results in a Main Turbine runback; 3 RD09 (C) ATC/SRO the ATC manually inserts control rods due to a failure of the Rod Control system.
A Pressurizer Level instrument failure occurs resulting in a loss of Letdown.
(I) ATC/SRO 4 RX06A The ATC will de-select the affected instrument and restore Letdown. The (TS) SRO SRO declares the instrument INOPERABLE.
(C) BOP A failure will occur on #1 SG Steam Flow Instrumentation. The BOP will 5 RX09VE (C) SRO place the Feed Reg Valve to #1 SG in MANUAL and control SG level.
A leak will develop in the Condenser Cooling water system in the Turbine (C) BOP 6 ANOV699 Building. The crew will trip the Reactor. The BOP will stop all Unit 1 CCW (C)SRO pumps and isolate all Unit 1 Main Condenser Waterboxes to stop the leak.
A SBLOCA will develop. The crew will respond using E-0 to initiate Safety 7 TH02A (M) ALL Injection and ultimately transition to E-1.
During the safety Injection, the A SI pump will trip and the B SI pump will fail 8 Sl13B (C) ATC to AUTO start, the ATC will manually start the B SI pump.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivitv, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aior 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
SUMMARY
Event 1 - The crew raises plant power using G0-5 section 5.1 from 95% to 100% power Event 2 - When directed by the lead examiner, 120 V vital power breaker to lower Containment radiation monitor 1-RM-90-106 trips. The SRO will enter LCO 3.3.3.1 action 27 and LCO 3.4.6.1 action b.
Event 3 - When directed by the lead examiner, the 3A Heater Drain Pump trips resulting in a Main Turbine runback. The ATC manually inserts control rods due to a failure of the Rod Control system using prudent operator actions.
Event 4 - When directed by the lead examiner, the pressurizer level channel LT 68-339 will fail low resulting in letdown isolation and de-energizing Pressurizer heaters. The A TC will remove the channel from service and restore Letdown using AOP-1.04, PRESSURIZER INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS. The SRO will enter LCO 3.3.1.1 Action 6 and LCO 3.3.3.7 Action 2.
Event 5 - When directed by the lead examiner a failure will occur on #1 SG Steam Flow Instrumentation. The BOP will place the Feed Regulating Valve to #1 SG in MANUAL and control SG level using AOP-S.01 MAIN FEEDWATER MALFUNCTIONS.
Event 6 - A leak will develop in the Condenser Cooling water system in the Turbine Building.
The crew will trip the Reactor. The BOP will stop all Unit 1 CCW pumps and isolate all Unit 1 Main Condenser Water boxes to stop the leak using AOP-M.08 INTERNAL FLOODING.
Event 7 - When directed by the lead examiner, a SBLOCA will develop. The crew will respond using E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION to initiate Safety Injection and ultimately transition to E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Event 8 - During the safety Injection, the A SI pump will trip and the B SI pump will fail to AUTO start, the ATC will manually start the B SI pump. (Credit sought for a post trip component malfunction for the ATC. The verifiable action is a Prudent Operator Action that only the ATC will perform.)
2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
Plant Power Increase.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: No actions required for Event 1 Examiner Note: The following Steps are from O-S0-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.2, Dilute CAUTION 1 When making an RCS dilution of~ 3000 gallons, it should be done in batches with an RCS boron concentration verification at the halfway point (e.g., 1500 gallons). AUow at least 15 minutes between batches. [C.5] [C.7]
CAUTION2 Returning the Boric Acid Blender to service after unplugging, cleaning, or maintenance on the Boric Acid System could introduce debris, sjudge, air or chunks of solidified boron into the CCP suction resulting in pump damage. Extreme care must be exercised to properly flush the Boric Acid Blender system following an outage. [C.2]
NOTE1 If an excessive amount of dilution is required (plant startup), the pressurizer heaters should be energized to cause pressurizer spray operation for equalizing boron concentration in RCS and pressurizer.
NOTE2 Dilute mode will be used anytime a long-term positive reactivity addition is desired_ The operator should use the normal dilute mode whenever conditions permit.
Examiner Note: Dilutions will be performed based on the Reactor Engineering provided Reactivity Spreadsheet SRO [1] ENSURE unit is NOT in a Tech Spec or TRM action that prohibits positive reactivity additions_ [C.1]
NOTE HUT level rise of 1% is equal to 1380 gallons (Tl-2B Figure 34)_
[2] ENSURE sufficient capacity available in the HUT selected to receive expected amounts of CVCS letdown: {NIA if not used)
ATC HUT LEVEL INITIALS A %
B %
[3] ENSURE makeup system ]s aligned for AUTO operation in ATC accordance vv-ith Section 5_ 1 _
1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
Plant Power Increase.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[4] RECORD the quantity of dilution water required to achieve desired boron concentration using Appendix (NIA for minor A TC power changes)
_ _ _ _ _ gals NOTE Due to eyeball interpolation the verified calculation may slightly differ from the initial calculation. The following signoff indicates that any differences in the bNo results have been discussed and are close enough to be considered validated.
[5] PERFORM Appendix I Independent Verification of Calculation for Amount of Boric Acid or Primary Water_
SRO (NIA if App_ D was performed by SRO to verify data from Rx Engineering)
NOTE Primary Water FIO\"- Controller [FC-62-142] receives its reference signal {70 gpm) from setpoint potentiometer {dial indicator) located on panel M-6. A setpoint of 35°/o corresponds to a 70 gpm primary water flov,1 rate.
[1 OJ ADJUST [FC-62-142], Primary Makeup Water Flov*l Controller for the desired flow rate.
2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
Plant Power Increase.
Time Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[11] PLACE [HS-62-140A], Boric Acid Supply to Blender Flmv Control Switch to the START position.
NOTE Flow oscillations and/or erratic controller response may require manual operation of Primary Water Flow Controller [FC-62-142]
until stable conditions exist
[12] VERIFY the follovving:
ATC [a] Inlet to top of VCT [FCV-62-128] is OPEN.
[b] Primary Water flow by [Fl-62-142AJ OR [FQ-62-142].
NOTE Alternate dilution in small amounts is acceptable on a regular basis, provided no significant changes in seal "Nater temperature or seal leakoff are indicated. Batches of 5 to 1O gallons may be added through FCV-62-144 on a frequency not to exceed once per 30 minutes. ICS points for No. 1 seal leakoffs and seal water temperatures on the RCPs should be monitored during and after dilution.
ATC [13] IF primary water addition to the bottom of the VCT [FCV-62-144] is desired, THEN NOTE It may take approximately 15 minutes before any changes to reactivity are indicated on nuclear instrumentation or RCS temperature indication.
[141 MONITOR nuclear instrumentation and reactor coolant ATC temperature to ensure the proper response from dilution.
[15] IF [Ll-62-129], Volume Control Tank LeveL rises to 63 percent, THEN ENSURE [LCV-62-118], Volume Control Tank Divert Valve OPENS to divert excess water to the Holdup Tanks.
3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
Plant Power Increase.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[16] WHEN dilution is complete. THEN
[a] PLACE [HS-62-140A], Boric Acid to Blender FIO\.v Control S\*Vitch to the STOP position.
[b] IF [FCV-62-144] was previously OPENED. THEN CLOSE [FCV-62-144] with [HS-62-144].
[c] VERIFY no primary water flow on either
[Fl-62-142A] OR [FQ-62-142].
[d] ENSURE [FCV-62-128] is CLOSED.
Lead Examiner may cue the next event when power has been sufficiently raised 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Containment Radiation Monitor Breaker 1-RM-90-106 Trips I Time I Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to insert Event 2 Containment Radiation Monitor Breaker 1-RM-90-106 Trips Indications available:
- 12A, A-4 "1-RA-90-106A CNTMT BLDG LWR COMPT AIR MON HIGH RAD"
- 12A, A-5 "1-RA-90-106B CNTMT BLDG LWR COMPT AIR MON GAS INSTR MALF"
- 12A, A-6 "1-RA-90-106C CNTMT BLDG LWR COMPT AIR MON PART INSTR MALF"
- Flow light Dark on Rl-90-106A (M-12)
Examiner Note: Primary response is contained in two Annunciator Response Procedures.
One is for the Breaker trip the other is for the radiation monitor instrument malfunction.
Applicable steps from each are listed below.
Refer to Annunciator Response Procedures for Vital Board I Breaker Crew Trip.
[1] DISPATCH personnel to CHECK 120V AC Vital Power Bd 1-1 for the following:
[a] Local voltmeter indicating power available.
[b] Voltage potential lamps (amber) ILLUrv11NATED
[c] Tripped or open breakers on panel.
[d] Any blown fuses in rear of board.
1-RA-90-106C CNTMT BLDG LWR COMPT AIR MON PART INSTR MALF Refer to Annunciator Response Procedures for Rad Monitor Gas or BOP Particulate Instrument Malfunction.
BOP [1] CHECK *1-Rl-90-106 on O-M-12 for indication of malfunction_
5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Containment Radiation Monitor Breaker 1-RM-90-106 Trips
~* - I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[3] DISPATCH operator to 1-RE-90-'!06 to check following:
[3.1] Valves aligned properly
[3.2] Low flow indication on *t-FIS-90-'I06
[3.3] Pump failure
[3.4] [1-HS-90-106] Heat Trace circuit handswitch, (Heat Trace Control station adjacent to 1-RM-90-106, -'112) in ON position_
[8] [CTS] EVALUATE Technical Specifications 3.3.3.*l, 3.4.6_'! and 3.4.6.2.
[ITS] EVALUATE Technical Specifications 3.3.6, 3.4.15, and 3.4.13.
3.3.3.1 The radiation monitorir.g l11strumentalioo channll-ls shovm in Tabre 3.3--6 shall be OPERABLE wifrl their alarm/trip se!points within the specified limits.
APPLICABILITY: A:s shown In Table 3.3--6.
- a. With a radiation monitoring channel alarm/trip ~.etpolnt excee<fing the value shown in Table 3.3*6, adjust the Sfltpoint to within the limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or declare the channel inoperable:.
- b. With one or more radiation moniloring channels inoperable. lake the ACTION shown in Tal>le 3.3-6.
C. The provisklns of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
- 2. PROCESS MONiiORS 7
,; 8.5x 10-3µ 10* 10 c;:im a, COOtai!lment Purge 1 1, 2, 3,4&6 28 Clfoc Alt
- b. Containment I. Deleted ii. Particulate Activity 7 27 RCS Leakage 1 1, 2, 3 &4 NIA 10-10 cpm Detection 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Containment Radiation Monitor Breaker 1-RM-90-106 Trips Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior 3.4.6.1 The followlr1g Reactor Cooiant System ieaka~ detection mstrumentatian shall oo OPERABLE:
- a. One lower oontainme11t atmosphere particulate radioactivity mooitoring channel, aFl(f
- b. One cootaklmenl pocket sl!mp level monitor.
Af'f'UGABIUTY: MODES 1. 2, 3 aM 4.
~'.
- a. With both containment pocket sump monitors inoperable. operation may continua ror up to 30 days provided SR 4-4.8.2:.1 is performed ooce per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s*;
otherwise, oo In at k:tast HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and ho COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hoors.
- b. With the particulate lovrer containment at1nosphflfe radiooctillily monitor iOCJl)erable, operation may wntirme for up to 30 days provided grab samples of ttle lower ooolainment atmosphere are analyzed once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or SR4A62.1 is pertooned oooe per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s*: otherwise. be in al least HOT STANDBY within too next 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the fallowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- c. Wittl both containment pocke! sump monitors and the lower containment atmosphere radioactiviiy monitor inoperable, be 1n at least HOT STANDBY YA'lhin lht:1 next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and In COLD SHUTDOWN vlit.h1n the: following 30 houre.
[9] IF '1-RE-90-'!06 [CTS] inoperable [ITS] nonfunctional, THEN ALIGN 1-RE-90-*1 *12 to lower containment in Crew accordance with *1-S0-90-2, Gaseous Process Radiation Monitoring System.
Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
When technical specifications have been identified or at discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event.
7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Main Turbine Runback Failure of Control Rods to Auto Insert.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to insert Event 3 Main Turbine Runback failure of Control Rods to Auto Insert.
Indications available:
- 3 Heater Drain Tank Pump A Trip:
- White light on associated handswitch HS-6-112A (M-2) and Buzzer
- Alarm XA-55-18, E-3 "MOTOR TRIPOUT PANEL 1-M-1THRU1-M-6
- Alarm XA-55-2C, B-7 "ZS-6-105A & B NO 3 HTR DR TK BYPASS TO COND Run back:
- Alarm XA-55-2A, B-1 "TURBINE RUNBACK BOP
- Generator Megawatts decreasing Auto Rod Failure:
- Megawatts decreasing with no rod insertion Examiner Note: Runback does not occur immediately when #3 HOT pump trips. Bypass valve failure will eventually result in reducing #3 HOT discharge flow to less than 5500 gpm as #3 HOT level decreases due to excessive bypass flow. The Runback will be delayed 2-3 minutes from the time of the pump trip.
Examiner Note: SRO will begin in AOP-S.04 however when Runback occurs and rods do not insert, he may transition to AOP-C.01 during the performance of AOP-S.04 and delegate completion of (Hand off) AOP-S.04 to another operator. Steps from AOP-S.04 immediately follow in this event guide. Steps from AOP-C.01 follow and begin on page 10 of this event guide.
Examiner Note: Manual rod insertion may result in receiving the ROD CONTROL BANKS LIMIT LOW-LOW alarm XA-55-48, B-7. If this occurs emergency boration may be established in accordance with the ARP. Steps from the ARP are included on the page 7 of this event guide where the alarm is checked in AOP-S.04.
Transitions to AOP-S.04 CONDENSATE OR HEATER DRAINS SRO MALFUNCTION Directs actions from AOP-S.04 CONDENSATE OR HEATER DRAINS SRO MALFUNCTION 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Main Turbine Runback Failure of Control Rods to Auto Insert.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF ...
SECTION PAGE
- 3 Heater Drain Tank Pump Trip while pumping forward 2.1 4 BOP
- 1. MONITOR at least one #3 HDT pump RUNNING.
- 2. MONITOR for turbine runback conditions:
- a. Turbine load greater than 81 % (Unit 1) or 82% (Unit 2).
BOP b. #3 HDT bypass valve LCV-6-105A or -105B OPEN. [M-2]
- c. #3 Heater Drain Tank Outlet Flow less than 5500 gpm [M-2, FR-6-107]
for at least 10 seconds.
- 3. VERIFY turbine runback to less than BOP or equal to 77% turbine load (approximately 940 MWE).
- 4. CHECK rods controlling in AUTO. PERFORM the following:
- a. ENSURE control rods in MANUAL.
- b. INSERT rods as necessary to restore T-avg within 3°F of T-ref.
9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Main Turbine Runback Failure of Control Rods to Auto Insert.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: If LEFM thermal power (U2118) is inoperable, rod insertion limit curve must be raised by 3 steps. Rod insertion limit alarms and ICS display are NOT automatically adjusted when LEFM is inoperable.
- 5. MONITOR control rods above low-low INITIATE boration USING Appendix A.
insertion limit using !CS or COLR.
ATC EVALUATE Tech Spec LCO 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.1.1.
CAUTION: Feedwater temperature changes may impact core thermal power.
BOP 6. MONITOR SIG levels returning to program.
NOTE: An auto valve closure for LCV-6-106B exists if any one of three #3 Heater Drain Tank Pumps trip and turbine load is greater than 8'1% (Unit 1) or 820/ii (Unit 2).
- 7. CHECK LS-6-iii #3 HEATER DRAIN TANK BOP LEVEL ABNORMAL alarm, DARK.
[M-2C, A1]
CAUTION: Reducing turbine load too rapidly could result in further drop in condensate pressure due to reduction in heater drain flow. Recommended load rate is 1% per minute if turbine load reduction is needed.
- 9. MONITOR Condensate Booster pump BOP suction pressure greater than 100 psig.
[M-3, Pl-2-77]
- 10. MONITOR reactor power:
- a. CHECK ICS thermal power indication AVAILABLE.
10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Main Turbine Runback Failure of Control Rods to Auto Insert.
~*
I II l l v Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 10. b. VERIFY 10 minute average power less than or equal to applicable limit:
- 11. ENSURE operator dispatched to investigate CREW cause of#3 Heater Drain Tank Pump trip.
- 12. NOTIFY Maintenance to investigate and CREW repair pump malfunction as necessary.
- 13. CHECK VALVE POSITION LIMIT light RESTORE turbine controls to normal BOP DARK on 1(2)-XX-47-2000, USING Appendix B, Turbine Runback EHC DISPLAY. Restoration.
I Examiner Note: See next page for APPENDIX B TURBINE RUNBACK RESTORATION details.
11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Main Turbine Runback Failure of Control Rods to Auto Insert.
TURBINE RUNBACK RESTORATION This appendix is used to remove turbine from valve position limiter prior to starting load reduction following a BOP runback.
[1] IF normal turbine load control is available (OPER AUTO light LIT),
THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] ENSURE governor valve tracking meter centered close to ZERO.
[b] DEPRESS [TURB MANUAL] mode selector pushbutton. D
[c] VERIFY [!URB MANUAL] lamp LIT. D
[d] VERIFY reference and setter counters stabilize.
[e] ENSURE governor valve tracking meter centered close to ZERO.
[f] DEPRESS [OPER AUTO] mode selector pushbutton.
[g] VERIFY COPER AUTO] lamp LIT. D
[h] VERIFY reference and setter counters stabilize. D
[i] REDUCE turbine load reference using SETTER
......... D NOTE: Steam dump load rejection circuit may require several minutes decay time before C-7 can be reset 12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Main Turbine Runback Failure of Control Rods to Auto Insert.
RESET Load Rejection Signal:
PLACE HS-1-103Aand 1038, Steam Dump Control, in OFF.
PLACE HS-1-1030, Steam Dump Control, in RESET and VERIFY spring return to TAVG.
VERIFY C-7, LOSS OF LOAD INTERLOCK alarm, DARK.
[M-4A, SE]
ENSURE Steam Dump demand is ZERO.
PLACE HS-1-103A and 1038, Steam Dump Control, in ON.
A TC 15. CHECK reactor power less than 95 %.
SRO Crew 16.
GO TO appropriate plant procedure.
Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
When technical specifications have been identified or at discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event.
13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Level Instrument Fails Low I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct the Simulator Operator to initiate Event 4, PLCS Transmitter Fails Low.
Indications/Alarms Alarms:
1-M-5A
- C-3, "PRESSURIZER LEVEL HIGH-LOW"
- E3, "PRZR LVL LOW HEATER OFF & LETDOWN SECURED" Indications:
1-M-4
- 1-Ll-68-339 RCS PZR LEVEL indicates 'O' level Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:
1-M-6
- 1-Fl-62-82, LETDOWN HX OUTLET FLOW indicates 'O' flow O-M-278-B
- A-5, "LETDOWN HX OUTLET FLOW/TEMP ABNORMAL" LS-68-335DIE PRESSURIZER LEVEL HIGH-LOW
[1] CHECK pressurizer level (1-ll-68-339A, 335A, 320}
[2} If level is high, THEN EHSURE backup heaters ON.
[31 ENSURE level control system is attempting to return levet to program with letdown and charging.
[41 If level channel failed, THEN GO TO AOP-l.04, Pressurizer Instrument Malfunction.
I BOP I Responds to ARP 1-AR-M5A C-3.
Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.
14
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Level Instrument Fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF ... SECTION PAGE Pressurizer Level Instrument Malfi.mction 2.4 20 2.4 Pressurizer Level Instrument Malfunction CAUTION Chemistry sampling of PZR Liquid Space may result in additional bistables actuating due to impact on 1-LT-68-320 or 2-LT-68-335.
NOTE Appendix M shows layout of PZR level control for operator reference.
- 1. CHECK U-68-339 NORMAL. PERFORM the following:
- a. ENSURE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL SELECTOR switch XS-68-339E in LT-68-335 & 320.
- c. GO TO Step 4.
~
- 4. CHECK letdown IN SERVICE. PERFORM the following:
- a. EVALUATE manual control of charging fiow USING the following:
- HIC-62-93A, Charging Flow Control ATC
- HIC-62-89A. Charging Seal water Flow Control.
- b. RESTORE letdown USING EA-62-5, Establishing Normal Charging and Letdovm.
15
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Level Instrument Fails Low e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior aminer note: The following are from EA-62-5, go to page 13 for AOP-1.-4 actions.
EA-62-5 ESTABLISHING NORMAL CHARGING AND LETDOWN actions
- 2. IF normal letdown flow is to be established, THEN ATC GO TO Section 4.3.
4.3 Establishing Norm.al Letdown Flow NOTE EA-62-3, Establishing Excess Letdown, may be utilized if Nonna! Letdown cannot be established.
- 1. IF charging flow NOT established, ATC THEN PERFORM Section 4.2.
ATC 2. VERIFY pressurizer level greater than 17%.
- 3. ENSURE letdown orifice !sola!ion valves CLOSED:
CLOSED LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION VALVES \f ATC FCV-62-72 D FCV-62-73 D FCV-62-74 D
- 4. OPEN letdown isolation valves:
OPEN LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVES ATC FCV-62-69 D FCV-62-70 D FCV-62-77 D NOTE Placing cooling water on the Letdown Heat Exchanger prior to restoring letdown flow should prevent TIS-62-79B/A from actuating and fully opening TCV-70-192.
16
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Level Instrument Fails Low Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 5. PLACE (HIC-G2-7SJ in MANUAL, AND ATC OPEN [TCV-70-192] to ~ 50%.
- 7. ADJUST charging flow as necessar;1 to prevent flashing in the ATC letdown line.
- 8. OPEN letdown orifice isolation valves as needed:
LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION VALVES OPEN ATC It FCV-62-73 D NOTE Normal letdown pressure is 325 psig at normal operating temperature_
9_ ADJUST letdown pressure controller .[PCV-62-81] output to obtain desired pressure.
NOTE Normal letdown temperature Is ~1 OOF.
17
AppendixD Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Level Instrument Fails Low Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC
- 12. ADJUST [HIC-62-78AJ to obtain desired letdown temperature, as indicated on [Tl-62-78].
Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.
Examiner Note: Letdown temperature may swing due to repeated actuation of TIS-62-798/A, which causes letdown temperature control valve TCV-70-192 to fully open.
Examiner note: AOP-1.04 actions recommence here.
J. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for applicability:
- 3.3. *1.1 (3.3.1 ), Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
- 3.3.3.7 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation LlMfflNG COND!TIC*l FOR OPERATION 3.3. 1.1 As a minimum. ihe reactor trip S)'Slem mstrumentatfoe"l channels arid interioc;;.;s of Table 3 .3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPL!CABll !TY* As shown in Table 3.3-t.
As shown mTable 3.l-1.
ii. Pressurizer Wa1er Leve!- 3 2 High ACTlON6- W:m me number oi O?ERA3LE channels one less than me Total Number of Channels. STARTUP arn:lior POWER OPERATION may prnoi:ed provided 1he fulfoving conditions are saesf1ed:
- a. The inoperable channel fs placed the niµp:.d condimon w'11l'n 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
3.3.3.7 The aooident mooi!OO"ng instrumentation channels shO'im in Table 3.3-10 shall be C?ERABLE.
APP! !f;AB!I 1ry: MODES 1. 2 and 3.
A0Qtt As sho11m in Table 3.3-m 18
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Level Instrument Fails Low Tim A J Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 7. Pressurizer Level (Wfde Rangec) 3 2 i Instrument Loops68-320 .-335.-339)
ACTION 2 - NOTE: Also refer !o the appl~cal::~e act:on ri:quirem;;nts from Tabl;;s 3 .3-1 since it may contain me<e restric:i,;e actions.
- a. With !he numb;;r crf d1.annels ooe less ;han the minimum channels r;;quired, restore th;: inoperable channel 1D OPEi'<AB!..!:: status within 30 days oc be in at leas:; HOT STAh\JDBY *,v::tdn th;: next 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and HOT SHu"TDOWN wittrn
!he next 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
- 6. ENSURE pressurizer heaters restored ATC to service_
CAUTION RCS pressure changes and changes in RCS boron concentration (due to differences between pzr and RCS boron) may impact core reactivity.
- 7. MONITOR reactor power:
a_ CHECK reactor in Fv1ode 1 or 2.
ATC b_ MONITOR core thermal power for unexpected changes_
NOTE:
If performing AOP in conjunction with AOP-1.11 for an Eagle LCP failure, then actions to hard trip bistables should be delayed until Eagle system reset is attempted. Actions to hard trip bistables must be completed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> UNLESS affected loop is restored to operable status by resetting Eagle rack.
8_ NOTIFY !&C to remove failed pressurizer level
- channel from service USING appropriate ATC Appendix:
L-68-339 Ap endix I Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
When technical specifications have been identified or at discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event.
19
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
SG Steam Flow Failure Time Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct the Simulator Operator to initiate Event 6 SG Steam Flow failure Indications/Alarms Alarms:
1-M-38
- C-1: MAIN FEEDWATER DIGITAL CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL 1-M-SA
- B-7: LS-3-42D STEAM GEN LVL HIGH-LOW DEVIATION Indications:
1-M-4
- SG-1 FW FLOW trending down
- SG-1 STEAM FLOW trending down
- SG-1 LEVEL trending down LS-3-420 STEAM GEN LVL HIGH-LOW DEVIATION
[1] CHECK steam generator levels to see which has level deviation.
[2] IF automatic !eve! control is NOT controlling to maintain SIG level, THEN GO TO AOP-S.01. Loss of Normal Feedwater.
BOP Responds to ARP 1-AR-M5A-B-7.
Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.
Evaluator Note: For this event, crew may respond per the Annunciator Response Procedure directly enter AOP-S.01 Section 2.2. Section 2.2 Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step; the BOP may perform the action(s) associated with Step 1 from memory without direction.
20
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
SG Steam Flow Failure Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF ... PAGE SECTION Failure of Autornatic SIG level Control 2.*1 4 NOTE Step 1 is an U111MEDIATE ACTION
- 1. RESTORE steam generator level(s):
- a. PLACE affected feedvvater reg valve controller(s) and/or bypass reg valve controller(s) in MANUAL.
- b. CONTROL feedwater flow on affected S/G(s) to restore level to program.
- 2. CHECK the following:
- SIG pressure instruments NORMAL
- SIG level instruments NORMAL 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
SG Steam Flow Failure Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 3. CHECK Steam Flow and Feed Flow IF DCS has NOT bypassed failed channel, instruments NORMAL USING the THEN following: PERFORM the following:
- control board indicators [M-4] a. SELECT applicable "'SG # Detail" window on DCS Operator Display Monitor.
- DCS Operator Display Monitor.
- b. SELECT '"Steam Flow"' OR "Feed Flow" overlay window on DCS Operator Display Monitor for affected loop.
- c. SELECT flow channel to be bypassed.
- d. SELECT appropriate "MAINT BYP SIGNAL" button.
- e. CONFIRM "MAINT BYP SIGNAL" button changes from gray to red.
- f. VERIFY the appropriate flow column has yellow "BYP" displayed.
CAUTION: Feed flow transients may impact core thermal power.
NOTE ICS point U1118 (Megawatt thermal indication) may be impacted by feed ffmv instrument failure. U2118 (LEFM calorimetric power) should remain reliable.
- 4. MAINTAIN Steam Generator level(s)
BOP on program.
CREW 5. INITIATE repairs on failed equipment.
22
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
SG Steam Flow Failure I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 6. WHEN automatic control of affected MFW reg valve{s) is available and reliable, THEN PLACE controller(s) in AUTO USING 1,2-S0-98-1, Distributed Control System.
SRO NOTE: Instructions for restoring bypassed instrument channels are contained in 1,2-S0-98-1.
- 7. GO TO appropriate plant procedure.
Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
END OF SECTION Lead Examiner may cue the next event when plant is stable with FIC-3-35 in manual.
23
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Condenser Cooling Water Rupture.
Time J Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to insert Event 6 Condenser Cooling Water Rupture Indications/Alarms Alarms:
1-M-158
BOP [1] DISPATCH operator to flood alarm pane! on elevation 734' in "A" 6900V Shutdown Board Room to determine flooded area.
[3] IF Turbine Bldg is being flooded due to CCW or RCW break, THEN GO TO AOP-M.08, fntemaf Flooding.
SRO Transitions to AOP-M.08 INTERNAL FLOODING.
SRO Directs response using AOP-M.08 INTERNAL FLOODING.
CAUTION To minimize damage to equipment, flooding in safety-related areas should be identified and isolated as soon as possible (within one hour from initiation).
NOTE The following procedures take priority over AOP-M.08:
- AOP-M.06, Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling If any of these procedures are applicable, AOP-M.08 should be performed as time permits.
24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Condenser Cooling Water Rupture.
-* Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF internal flooding located in ...
SECTION PAGE Turbine Building 2.6 42 I - - --- ---- -- - - -- I I I CAUTION: Rising water level and wetted electrical equipment may result in safety hazard which prevents access to Turbine Bldg basement.
BOP 1. ENSURE personnel dispatched with radio to determine flooding source and exact location.
BOP 2. MONITOR if source of flooding is from CCW or Amertap systems:
- a. CHECK for any of the following:
- severe flooding from unknown source.
BOP 2. b. IF flooding requires isolating all CCW flow on Unit 1, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) NOTIFY unit operator to perform Appendix C, Isolating Unit 1 CCW.
Examiner Note: The BOP will perform APPENDIX C ISOLATING UNIT 1 CCW, see next page for details. The SRO and A TC will trip the Reactor, go to page 27 for details.
25
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Condenser Cooling Water Rupture.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE 1 This appendix should be pertormed by one UO while the US and OATC trip the reactor and pertorm E-0.
NOTE2 CCW pump will immediately trip when CCW pump control power DC-AC handswitch [1-M-15] is placed to STOP position. Discharge valve will remain open.
BOP [1] STOP all Unit 1 CCW pumps by placing the following switches in STOP position: [1-M-15 bottom center]
- CCW Pump 1A Control Power DC-AC D
- CCW Pump 1B Control Power DC-AC D
- Unit 1 condenser waterbox isolation valves D
- 1-HS-1-103A, Steam Dump A FSV D
- 1-HS-1-1038, Steam Dump B FSV. D 26
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct the Simulator Operator to initiate Event 7, SBLOCA with Failure of AUTO SI.
Indications/Alarms:
Indications 1-M-4:
- RCS PZR LVL, decreasing level value 1-M-5:
- RCS PZR PRESS Recorder 1-PR-68-340 shows a decreasing pressure trend; Annunciators 1-M-5C:
- 8-1: TS-30-31 LOWER COMPT TEMP HIGH
- 8-3: TS-30-241 LOWER COMPT MOISTURE HI
- 8-4: TS-30-240 LOWER COMPT MOISTURE HI 1-M-6E:
- C-6: "ZS-61-186 ICE CONDENSER LOWER INLET DOOR OPEN" Examiner Note: following IOA performance, prior to Steps 1-4 immediate action verification, ATC/BOP surveys MCBs for any expected automatic system response that failed to occur. Upon discovery, they may take manual action(s) to align plant systems as expected for the event in progress. (Ref. EPM-4, Prudent Operator Actions)
Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via SPDS.
When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES.
Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).
NOTE1 Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.
NOTE2 This procedure has a foldout page_
27
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1_ VERIFY reactor TRIPPED:
Reactor tlip breakers OPEN Reactor trip bypass breakers DISCONNECTED or OPEN ATC Rod bottom lights UT Rod position indicators less than or equal to 12 steps.
Neutron flux DROPPING
- 2. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:
BOP Turbine stop valves CLOSED.
- Any SI alarm LIT [f\*1-40].
SRO/AT Continue with the performance of E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY C INJECTION BOP Performs ES-0.5, Equipment Verifications go to page XX for details SRO Addresses foldout page, see next page for details.
28
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:
- Phase B isolation, THEN STOP all RCPs.
EVENT DIAGNOSTICS
- IF any S/G pressure is dropping uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. CLOSE MS!Vs and MSIV bypass valves.
- b. IF any S/G pressure continues to drop uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) ENSURE SI actuated.
- 2) IF at least one S/G is intact (S/G pressure controlled or rising), THEN ISOLATE AFW to faulted S!G(s):
- CLOSE AFW level control valves for faulted S/G(s).
- IF any AFW valve for faulted S/G CANNOT be CLOSED, THEN REFER TO Appendix E to stop AFW flow to faulted S/G.
- 3) ENSURE at least one of the following conditions met:
- Narrow Range level greater than 10% [25% ADV] in at least one intact S/G.
- IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-0.0. Loss of All AC Power.
TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS
29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 6. DETERMINE if secondary heat sink available:
- a. CHECK total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm.
- b. CHECK narrow range level b. MAINTAIN total feed flow ATC greater than 10% [25% ADV] greater than 440 gpm in at least one S/G. UNTIL narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADV]
in at least one SIG.
- c. CONTROL feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%
in intact or ruptured S/Gs.
- 7. CHECK if main steam lines should be isolated:
- a. CHECK if any of the following conditions have occurred:
- Any S/G pressure dropping UNCONTROLLED OR
- Phase B actuation .
- b. ENSURE MSIVs and MS!V bypass valves CLOSED.
- c. ENSURE applicable Foldout Page actions COMPLETED.
30
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 8. CHECK RCP trip criteria:
- a. CHECK the following:
- b. STOP RCPs.
- 9. MONITOR RCS temperatures: IF temperature less than 547°F and dropping,
- IF any RCP running, THEN THEN PERFORM the following:
CHECK T-avg stable at or trending to between 547°F and 552°F. a. ENSURE steam dumps and atmospheric reliefs CLOSED.
- b. IF cooldown continues,
- IF RCPs stopped, THEN THEN CONTROL total feed flow:
CHECK T-cold stable at or trending ATC/BOP 1) ENSURE total AFW flow to between 547°F and 552°F. less than or equal to 600 gpm.
- 2) MAINTAIN total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL narrow range level is greater than 10% [25% ADV]
in at least one S/G.
- 10. CHECK pressurizer PORVs, safeties, and spray valves:
A TC a. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED.
- b. Pressurizer safety valves CLOSED.
- c. Normal spray valves CLOSED.
31
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
- d. Power to at least one block valve AVAILABLE.
- e. At least one block valve OPEN.
- 11. DETERMINE if SIG secondary pressure boundaries are INTACT:
CHECK all SIG pressures ATC CONTROLLED or RISING.
CHECK all SIG pressures greater than 140 psig.
- 12. DETERMINE if SIG tubes are INTACT:
- All SIG narrow range levels CONTROLLED or DROPPING ATC
- Secondary radiation NORMAL USING Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitors. (App. A performed in ES-0.5).
- 13. DETERMINE if RCS is INTACT:
- Containment pressure NORMAL
- LOWER COMPT TEMP HIGH alarm DARK. [M-5C, B1]
- Containment radiation NORMAL USING Appendix B, Containment Rad Monitors. (App. B performed in ES-0.5)
Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via ICS. When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).
- When a RED Path for Containment is evident on ICS, the SRO will transition to FR-Z.1, go to page 52 for details.
1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT 32
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE This procedure has a foldout page.
See next page for details
- 1. CHECK RCP trip criteria:
- a. CHECK the following: a. GO TO Step 2.
- RCS pressure less than 1250 psig.
- b. STOP RCPs.
- 2. CHECK SIG secondary pressure boundaries INTACT:
ATC/BOP
- SIG pressures CONTROLLED or RISING
- SIG pressures greater than 140 psig.
- 3. MAINTAIN Intact S/G narrow range levels:
- a. Greater than 10% [25% ADV].
ATC/BOP
- b. Between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%1.
33
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:
- Phase B isolation, THEN STOP all RCPs.
SI REINITIATION CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:
- Pressurizer level CANNOT be maintained greater than 10% [20% ADV],
THEN RAISE ECCS flow by performing one or both of the following as necessary:
- ESTABLISH CCPIT flow USING Appendix C
EVENT DIAGNOSTICS
- IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.
- IF any S/G pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner or less than 140 psig AND S/G NOT isolated, THEN GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
- IF any SIG has level rising in uncontrolled manner or has abnormal radiation, THEN:
- a. RAISE ECCS flow by performing one or both of the following as necessary:
- ESTABLISH CCPIT flow USING Appendix C
- b. GO TO E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS
- IF CST level less than 5%,
THEN ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW.
- IF RWST level less than 27%,
THEN GO TO ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump.
34
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 4. VERIFY secondary radiation NORMAL:
- a. CHECK secondary radiation NORMAL USING Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitors.
- b. NOTIFY Chem Lab to take SIG activity samples.
- c. WHEN Chem Lab is ready to sample S/Gs, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) ENSURE FCV-15-43 Slowdown Flow Control valve CLOSED.
- 2) ENSURE Phase A RESET.
- 3) OPEN blowdown isolation valves.
- d. NOTIFY RADCON to survey main steam lines and SIG blowdown.
- e. WHEN SIG samples completed, THEN CLOSE blowdown isolation valves.
CAUTION Any time a pressurizer PORV opens, there is a possibility that it may stick open.
- 5. MONITOR pressurizer PORVs and block valves:
- a. Power to block valves AVAILABLE. a. DISPATCH personnel to restore power to block valves USING EA-201-1, 480V Board Room Breaker Alignments.
ATC b. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED. b. IF pressurizer pressure less than 2335 psig, THEN '
CLOSE pressurizer PORVs.
IF pressurizer PORV CANNOT be closed.
THEN CLOSE its block valve.
35
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 6. MONITOR SI termination criteria:
ATC a. RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs a. GO TO Step 7.
~
greater than 40°F.
- 7. MONITOR if containment spray should be stopped:
- a. CHECK any containment spray pump a. GO TO Step 8.
RUNNING.
ATC ~
- b. CHECK containment pressure b. GO TO Step 8.
less than 2.0 psig.
~
- 8. MONITOR shutdown boards continuously energized.
- 9. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:
- a. CHECK RCS pressure:
- 1 ) Greater !ban 300 psig
- FCV-70-156 OPEN
- FCV-70-153 OPEN.
-=----
GO TO Notes prior to Step 10.
ATC b CHECK RHR pump suction b. GO TO Noles prior to Step *10.
aligned from RWST.
C. ENSURE SI signal RESET.
- 9. d. STOP RHR pumps and PLACE in A-AUTO.
- e. MONITOR RCS pressure greater than 300 psig.
36
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
1 T;...., 0 I Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE 1 SIG pressures dropping slowly during a LOCA with no faulted S/G should be considered "stable" in the following step.
NOTE2 RCS pressure rising slightly during a LOCA which is NOT isolated should be considered "stable" in the following step.
- 10. DETERMINE if SI termination criteria should be checked again:
- a. CHECK pressure in all S/Gs ATC STABLE or RISING.
- b. CHECK RCS pressure STABLE or DROPPING.
- 11. DETERMINE if diesel generators should be stopped:
- a. VERIFY shutdown boards ENERGIZED from start busses.
- b. ENSURE SI signal RESET.
- c. STOP any unloaded diesel generators and PLACE in standby USING EA-82-1, Placing D/Gs in Standby.
37
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
~* I~ . ,_
A.pi;.J1i...," n;:, A1...Liu11;:, or Behavior I --***- I
- 12. MONITOR if hydrogen igniters and recombiners should be turned on:
- a. ENSURE ice condenser AHU breakers opened USING EA-201-1, 480 V Board Room Breaker Alignments.
- b. CHECK hydrogen concentration measurement AVAILABLE:
- Hydrogen analyzers have been in ANALYZE for at least 5 minutes.
ATC 12. c. CHECK containment hydrogen concentration less than 6%.
- d. WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers have been opened, THEN ENSURE hydrogen igniters ENERGIZED USING Appendix D.
- e. CHECK containment hydrogen concentration less than 0.5%. [M-10]
38
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 13. MONITOR if containment vacuum control should be returned to normal:
- a. CHECK containment pressure less than 1.0 psig.
- b. VERIFY containment vacuum relief isolation valves OPEN: [Panel 6K]
- FCV-30-46
- FCV-30-47
- FCV-30-48 .
- 14. INITIATE evaluation of plant status:
- a. ENSURE cold leg recirculation capability:
- 1) Power to at least one RHR pump AVAILABLE.
- 2) Capability to operate the following valves AVAILABLE:
- FCV-63-72 and FCV-74-3 (for RHR Pump A-A).
- FCV-63-73 and FCV-74-21 (for RHR Pump B-B).
- b. CHECK Auxiliary Building radiation:
- 1) Area Radiation Monitors RR-90-1A and RR-90-1 B NORMAL.
- 2) Aux Bldg Vent monitor recorder O-RR-90-101 NORMAL (prior to isolation).
39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
~*
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 14. c. MONITOR containment sump level less than 68%.
- d. NOTIFY TSC to initiate post-accident sampling as necessary.
- e. EVALUATE plant equipment status USING EA-0-4, Evaluation of Equipment Status.
- 15. DETERMINE if RCS cooldown and depressurization is required:
- a. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 300 psig.
Scenario may be terminated when the SRO transitions to ES-1.2 or earlier, at discretion of Lead Examiner.
FR-Z.1 Actions NOTE If this procedure has been entered for an orange path and perfom1ance of ECA-1.1 (Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation) is requlred, FR-Z.1 may be performed concurrently with ECA- *1. 1.
MONITOR RWST level BOP greater than 27%.
- 2. VERIFY Phase B valves CLOSED:
- Panel 6K PHASE B GREEN
- Panel 6L PHASE B GREEN.
40
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 3. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.
- 4. DETERMINE if this procedure should be exited:
- a. CHECK for faulted SIG: a. GO TO step 5.
~
Any SIG pressure DROPPING BOP in an uncontrolled manner OR
. Any SIG pressure less than *140 psig.
- 5. VERIFY containment spray operation:
- 1) OPERATE containment spray as directed by ECA-1.1.
- 2) GOT0Step6.
~
- b. VERIFY containment spray pumps RUNNING.
C. CHECK RWST level greater than 27%.
41
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
I ..,...
-- Positiu11 r\f.Jf-i"'c:111L;:, Actions or Behavior
- 5. d. VERIFY containment spray suction ALIGNED to RWST:
. FCV-72-22 OPEN
. FCV-72-21 OPEN .
- e. VERIFY containment spray discharge valves OPEN:
. FCV-72-39 BOP
- FCV-72-2.
- f. VERIFY containment spray recirc valves CLOSED:
- FCV-72-34
- FCV-72-13 .
- g. VERIFY containment spray flow greater than 4750 gpm on each train.
- 6. MONITOR containment air return fans:
- WHEN at least 10 minutes BOP have elapsed from Phase B, THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING.
- 7. VERIFY containment ventilation dampers CLOSED:
BOP . Panel 6K CNTMT VENT GREEN
. Panel 6L CNTMT VENT GREEN .
- 8. VERIFY Phase A valves CLOSED:
BOP . Panel 6K PHASE A GREEN
. Panel 6l PHASE A GREEN .
- 9. VERIFY cntmnt vacuum relief Isolation valves CLOSED: [Pnl 6K MANUALj BOP
. FCV-30-46
. FCV-30-47
. FCV-30-48 .
42
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7, 8 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
SBLOCA/Failure of Auto SI.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 11. DETERMINE if any SIG lntact:
- a. CHECK at least one SIG pressure:
- CONTROLLED or RISING AND
- Greater than "140 psig.
CAUTION Isolating all S/Gs will result in a loss of secondary heat sink.
- 12. DETERMINE if any SIG Faulted:
- a. CHECK SIG pressures: a. GO TO Step 13.
BOP Any SIG pressure DROPPING in an uncontrolled manner ~
. Any SIG pressure less than 140 psig.
!3. MONITOR if RHR spray should be placed in service:
BOP a. CHECK the following: a. GO TO Step 14.
~
Containment pressure greater than 9.5 psig
- 14. MONITOR if containment spray should be stopped:
- a. CHECK any containment spray pump a. GO TO Step 15.
RUNNING.
BOP ~-
- b. CHECK containment pressure b. GO TO Step 15.
less than 2.0 psig.
~
- 15. RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.
BOP END 43
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verification ES-0.5
..,... I_ ..
- I 1 vv1LIUll Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 1. VERIFY D/Gs RUNNING.
BOP 2. VERIFY DIG ERCW supply valves OPEN.
3_ VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps BOP RUNNING.
- 4. VERIFY ccs pumps RUNNING:
. Pump "lA-A (2A-A)
. Pump *tB-B (2B-B)
. Pump C-S_
BOP 5. VERIFY EGTS fans RUNNING.
6 CHECK main generator output breaker(s):
BOP a. Unit 1 Only:
VERIFY main generator PCBs OPEN. [M-1]
7_ NOTIFY at least two AUOs to report BOP to MCR to be available for local actions.
- 8. VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:
- a. MDAFWpumps
- b. TDAFWpump.
NOTE AFW level control valves should NOT be repositioned if manual action has been taken to control SIG levels, to establish flow due to failure, or to isolate a faulted S/G_
44
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verification ES-0.5
~*
,_ Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 9_ CHECK AFW valve alignment
BOP b_ VERIFY TD AFW LCVs OPEN_
C. VERIFY MD AFl.r./ pump recirculation valves FCV-3-400 and FCV-3-40*1 CLOSED_
10_ VERIFY MFW' Isolation:
a_ CHECK MFVV pumps TRIPPED.
- b. ENSURE the following:
. MFW regulating valves CLOSED
. MFW regulating bypass valve controllers in MAN UAL with output ZERO
. MFW isolation valves CLOSED_
11_ MONITOR ECCS operation:
a_ VERIFY ECCS pumps RUNNING:
. RHR pumps
. SI pumps b_ VERIFY CCP flow through CCP!T C. CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.
45
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verification ES-0.5 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ct VERIFY Sf pump flow.
- e. CHECK RCS pressure e. GO TO Step 12.
less than 300 psig.
- f. VERIFY RHR pump flow."
- 12. VERIFY ESF systems ALIGNED:
- a. Phase A ACTUATED:
- PHASE A TRAIN A alamr UT
[M-6C, B5].
- PHASE A TRAIN B alamr LIT
[M-6C, B6].
- b. Cntmt Vent Isolation ACTUATED:
- CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN A alam1 LIT [M-6C, C5J.
- CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN B alamr UT [M-6C, C6}.
C. Status monitor panels:
. 6CDARK
. 60 DARK
. 6E UT OUTSIDE outlined area
. 6H DARK
. 6J UT.
- d. Traln A status panel 6K:
. CNTMT VENT GREEN
. PHASE A GREEN
- e. Train B status panel 6l:
. CNTMT VENT GREEN
. PHASE A GREEN 46
Appendix D Required Open:itor Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verification ES-0.5 I ...,...
1 *II l l v Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 13. MONITOR for containment spray and Phase B actuation:
- a. CHECK for any of the following:
. Phase B ACTUATED OR
. Containment pressure gre~ter than 2.8 psig.
- b. VERIFY containment spray INITIATED:
- 1) Containment spray pumps RUNNING.
- 2) Containment spray header isolation valves FCV-72-39 and FCV-72-2 OPEN.
- 3) Containment spray recirculation valves to RWST FCV-72-34 and FCV-72-13 CLOSED.
- 4) Containment spray header flow greater than 4750 gpm per train.
- 5) Panel 6E LIT.
- c. VERIFY Phase B ACTUATED:
- PHASE B TRAIN A alarm LIT
[M-6C. A5].
- PHASE B TRAIN B alarm LIT
[M-6C, A6].
- d. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.
- e. VERIFY Phase 8 valves CLOSED:
. Panel 6K PHASE 8 GREEN .
. Panel 6L PHASE 8 GREEN .
47
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verification ES-0.5 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- f. WHEN 10 minutes have elapsed, THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING.
NOTE The continuous action in step *14 remains applicable if containment pressure rises above 1.5 psig after ES-0.5 is completed.
- 14. MONITOR if containment vacuum relief isolation valves should be closed:
BOP a. CHECK containment pressure a. GO TO Step 15.
greater than *1.5 psig.
l5. CHECK secondary and containment rad monitors USING the folloWing:
- Appendix A Secondary Rad Monitors
- Appendix B, Containment Rad Monitors.
APPENDIX A SECONDARY RAD MONITORS
- 1. IF SI occurred on Unit 1 .
THEN CHECK following rad monitors including available trends prior to isolation:
- Condenser exhaust recorder 1-RR *t *19
- SIG blowdovm recorder 1-RR-90-120
- Unit 1 Main steam line rad monitors [t-M-30]
- Post-Accident rad recorder *1-RR-90-2688 points 3 {blue), 4 (violet), 5 (black), and 6 (turquoise).
[1-M-31 (back of 1-M-30)]
48
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verification ES-0.5 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 3_ NOTIFY Unit Supervisor whether secondary radiation is NORMAL or HlGH_
APPENDIXB CONTAINMENT RAD MONITORS 1_ IF SI occurred on Unit 1, THEN CHECK following rad monitors:
- Upper containment post-accident rad monitors
- t-RM-90-271A and *1-RM-90-272A NORMAL [*J-M-30]
- Lower containment post-accident rad monitors 1-RM-90-273A and *1-Rtl/1-90-274A NORMAL ['1-rv1-30]
- Containment rad recorders 1-RR-90-112 and *t-RR *106 NORl\11\L [O-M-12] (prior to isolation).
See next page H. CHECK pocket sump pumps STOPPED:
[M-15, upper left comer]
- HS-77-411 , Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump B_
- 19. ENSURE plant announcement has been BOP made regarding Reactor Trip and SL 49
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: ES-0.5 Page 1 of 7 Event
Description:
Equipment Verification ES-0.5
~*
.. -- In * ::-- n I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
- 20. PERFORM Appendix E, Spent Fuel BOP Cooling Actions, as time permits.
APPENDIXD HYDROGEN MITIGATION ACTIONS NOTE This appendix should only be performed when directed by step in E-0.
- 1. DISPATCH AUO to open ice condenser AHU breakers USING EA-201-1, 480V Board Room Breaker Alignments. D
- 2. PLACE hydrogen analyzers in service:
- a. ENSURE the following switches in ANALYZE position: [M-10]
- HS-43-200A, Cntmt H2 Analyzer Fan A D
- HS-43-21 OA, Cntmt H2 Analyzer Fan B. D
- b. RECORD time: _ _ _ _ __ D CAUTION If inadequate core cooling (red path) has occurred, hydrogen igniters should NOT be energized until containment hydrogen concentration is determined to be less than 6%. Hydrogen analyzers require 5 minute warmup after being placed in ANALYZE.
- 3. WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers have been opened, THEN PLACE hydrogen igniters switches in ON position: [M-1 OJ
- HS-268-73, H2 lgniters Group A. D
- HS-268-74, H2 lgniters Group B. D
- 4. WHEN hydrogen igniters and analyzers have been placed in service, THEN NOTIFY Unit Supervisor. D END OF TEXT 50
51 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Sequoyah Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Candidates: ATC SRO BOP Initial Conditions: 48% BOL, EOOS risk green, FT-1-3A is in MAINT BYPASS, RTS 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Turnover: Start the B Main Feed Pump, then raise% power to 100%.
Critical Tasks CT-13 Manually trip the main turbine before a Pressurized Thermal Shock (P) CSF or before transition to ECA-2.1, whichever happens first.
CT-45 Manually establish at least 440 gpm feed water flow rate to the SGs while in FR-H .1 before any three SG wide range levels are less than 23% [43% ADV].
Event Event Type Event Description No.
Injection Water Pump A Trips with a failure of the B Injection Water pump to CN12B (C) BOP 1 AUTO Start. The BOP manually starts the B Injection Water pump using the (C)SRO ARP.
Impulse pressure transmitter PT-1-73 fails high resulting in rod withdrawal.
RX11B (I) ATC 2 The ATC places control rods in manual using Immediate Operator Actions.
(TS,I) SRO The SRO declares PT-1-73 INOPERABLE.
Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 Fails low, the crew will enter AOP 3 RX16C TS-SRO 1.06. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines the instrument is INOPERABLE.
AN_OV_59 (R) ATC An Exciter Insulation Resistance Low alarm is received. The crew will 4
(N)BOP/SRO reduce power in response to the Main Generator alarm.
Upon the initiation of the reduction in power, normal boration controller FIC-CV38 (C) ATC 5 62-139 fails closed, the ATC initiates Emergency Boration to facilitate the (C)SRO reduction of power.
During the of the reduction in power, Feed Regulating valve FCV-3-48 fails FW16B (C) BOP 6 to control in AUTO, the BOP places FIC-3-48 in MANUAL to control SG (C)SRO level on program.
7 FWR13A (M) ALL The A Main Feed water Pump trips, the crew manually trips the Reactor.
TC11ALL The Main Turbine fails to AUTO trip; the BOP manually trips the Main 8 TC12ALL (C) BOP Turbine during Immediate Operator Actions.
FW07 All Auxiliary Feed water pumps fail. The SRO transitions to FR-H.1 and 9 (C) BOP establishes Feed water using a Main Feed water pump.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aior 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
SUMMARY
Event 1 - When directed by the Lead Examiner, Injection Water Pump A Trips with a failure of the B Injection Water pump to AUTO Start. The BOP manually starts the B Injection Water pump using the ARP.
Event 2 - When directed by the Lead Examiner, turbine first stage pressure transmitter, PT 73, will fail low. The ATC will place control rods to MANUAL to stop the continuous rod withdrawal using Immediate Operator Actions of AOP-C.01, Rod Control System Malfunctions.
The crew will transition to AOP-1.08, Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrument Malfunction to address the RCS temperature control, feed water control and steam dump realignment. The SRO will enter LCO 3.3.1.1 Action 8.b.
Event 3 - Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 fails low, the SRO will enter AOP 1.06 AOP-1.06 STEAM GENERATOR INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTION. The SRO will enter Enters LCO 3.3.1.1Action9, LCO 3.3.2.1Action17, Action 22c, and Action 36 and enters LCO 3.3.3.7.
Action 1.
Event 4 -An Exciter Insulation Resistance Low alarm is received. The crew will reduce power in response to the Main Generator alarm using AOP-C.03 RAPID SHUTDOWN OR LOAD REDUCTION.
Event 5 - Upon the initiation of the reduction in power, normal boration controller FIC-62-139 fails closed; the ATC initiates Emergency Boration using AOP-C.03 RAPID SHUTDOWN OR LOAD REDUCTION, APPENDIX I EMERGENCY BORATION to facilitate the reduction of power.
Event 6 - During the of the reduction in power, Feed Regulating valve FCV-3-48 fails to control in AUTO, the BOP places FIC-3-48 in MANUAL to control SG level on program using the Immediate Operator Actions of AOP-S.01 MAIN FEEDWATER MALFUNCTIONS.
Event 7 - The "A" Main Feed water pump trips, the crew manually trips, the Reactor and enters E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
Event 8 - The Main Turbine fails to AUTO trip; the BOP manually trips the Main Turbine during Immediate Operator Actions of E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. (Credit sought for a post trip component malfunction for the BOP. The verifiable action is an Immediate Operator Action that only the BOP will perform.)
Event 9 - All Auxiliary Feed water pumps fail. The SRO transitions to FR-H.1 LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK and establishes Feed water using a Main Feed water pump. (Credit sought for a post trip component malfunction for the BOP. The verifiable action is an action that only the BOP will perform.)
2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Injection Water Pump A Trip Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to insert Event 1, Injection Water Pump Trip.
Alarms/Indications Annunciator:
1-M-2
- 38 E-1, "MFPT 1A & 18 INJECTION SEAL WATER PRESS LOW MFPT 1A & 18 INJECTION SEAL WATER PRESS LOW Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
1ST Stage Pressure Transmitter Fails High Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to insert Event 2, 15 T Stage Pressure Transmitter Fails High Alarms/Indications Annunciator:
1-M-5
- SA C-6, "TS-68-2P/Q REAC COOL LOOPS T REF T AUCT HIGH-LOW"
- 38 C-1, "MAIN FEED SYS MALF" Indications 1-M-4
- Automatic Control Rod withdrawal
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF ... SECTION PAGE Uncontrolled rod bank movement 2.1 4 (rod movement NOT due to actual T-avg/T-ref mismatch or change in reactor/turbine power)
NOTE: Step 1 is an immediate action step.
A TC Takes Immediate action to place HS-85-5110 ROD CONTROL MODE SELECTOR in manual when rods are withdrawing.
A TC 1. STOP uncontrolled rod motion:
- a. PLACE rod control in MAN.
- b. CHECK rod motion STOPPED.
2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
1ST Stage Pressure Transmitter Fails High CAUTION: Control Rods should NOT be manually withdrawn during a plant transient.
A TC 2. MONITOR for plant transient:
- a. CHECK reactor power and T-avg STABLE.
- 2. b. CHECK ICS thermal power indication AVAILABLE.
- c. VERIFY 1O minute average power less than or equal to applicable limit
A TC 3. CHECK for instrumentation malfunction:
- a. CHECK all Vital Instrument Power Boards ENERGIZED:
DARK
- b. CHECK nuclear instrumentation OPERABLE.
ATC d. CHECK turbine impulse pressure d. GO TO AOP-1.08, Turbine Impulse channels OPERABLE. Pressure Instrument Malfunction.
3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
1ST Stage Pressure Transmitter Fails High
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF ... SECTION PAGE Failure of P-1-73 2.1 4 (based on Pl-1-73, DCS Monitor, or ICS indication)
NOTE: Turbine impulse pressure instruments which input into feedwater DCS (PT-1-72, PT-1-73, and PT-47-13) have median signal selector. On failure of one channel, DCS software will BYPASS bad signal and remaining channels will be averaged to determine output signal.
BOP 2. VERIFY PT-1-73 bypassed on DCS: IF DCS has NOT placed PT-1-73 in BYPASS,
- a. SELECT 'Turbine Impulse Pressure Overlay" by clicking on Turbine Impulse Pressure button on DCS Operator Display Monitor.
- b. SELECT impulse pressure instrument to be bypassed (PT-1-73)
- c. SELECT "MAINT BYP SIGNAL" button for PT-1-73.
- d. VERIFY indication for PT-1-73 has yellow "BYP" displayed on overlay screen.
- e. VERIFY overlay screen is indicating "USING AVERAGE" on upper right hand comer.
- f. IF S!G level controls in AUTO, THEN MONITOR feed flow and SIG level.
4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
1sT Stage Pressure Transmitter Fails High BOP 3. PLACE steam dumps in steam pressure mode:
- a. PLACE steam dump FSV handswitches in OFF.
- b. PLACE steam dump mode selector in STEAM PRESS mode.
- c. ENSURE zero output (demand).
- d. PLACE steam dump FSV handswitches in ON.
- e. ENSURE steam dump controller setpoint at 1005 psig.
SRO 4. EVALUATE the following Tech Spec for applicability
- 3.3.1.1, (3.3.1 ), Reactor Trip System Instrumentation ATC 5. DETERMINE Program T-avg for current reactor power USING Tl-28 Figure 3 or ICS (NSSS I BOP, Program Reactor Average Temperature).
5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
1sT Stage Pressure Transmitter Fails High Time J Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC 6. RESTORE T-avg to within 1°F of program value USING one of the following:
- POSITION control rods OR
- ADJUST turbine load OR
NOTE: If performing this AOP in conjunction with AOP-1.11 for Eagle LCP failure, then actions to hard trip bistables should be delayed until Eagle system reset is attempted. Actions to hard trip bistables must be completed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> UNLESS affected loop is restored to operable status by resetting Eagle rack.
Crew 7. PERFORM the following for applicable unit:
[a] IF performance is for UNIT 1, THEN NOTIFY l&C to perform Appendix A, Removing Unit 1 Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrument Loop 1-P-1-73 from Service.
Crew 8. INITIATE Maintenance on P-1-73.
Crew 9.
GO TO appropriate plant procedure.
Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
When technical specifications have been identified or at discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event.
6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
SG Level Transmitter Fails Low.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 11 u1n**ect facility operator to insert Event 3, SG Level Transmitter Fails Low.
Indications available:
Annunciator:
1-M-6
- 1-Ll-3-94 indicates 0% gpm [M-4]
LS-3-93B STEAM GENERATOR LOOP 3 LOW LOW WATER LEVEL ATC Responds to ARP 1-AR-M6B C-4
{1] CHECK steam generator revel, indications £1-U-3-911, (1-U-3-941 and [1-ll-3-931 .
ATC 121 IF level channel failed, THEN GO TO AOP-t06, Steam Generator Instrument Malfunction.
Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
~SIG level instrument malfunction 2-2 8 ~
1.. VERIFY DCS ls maintaining BOP SIG level on program.
7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
SG Level Transmitter Fails Low.
Time
- 2. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for applicability:
- 3.3.1.1 (3.3.1 ), Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
- 3.3.2.1 {3.3.2), Engineered Safety SRO Feature Actuation System Instrumentation
- 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation
- 3.3.3-7, Accident fv1onitarlng Instrumentation LIMfflNG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, lhE reacterr trip S'/S!em insmunentatoo channels and intErloc1':s of Tai:!IE 3.3-1 shaTI bE O?ERABJ....E.
APPUCABJI !TY* Ass!iO'MI in Tak>le 3.3-1..
As shown fn Table 3.3- i.
- 14. Main Steam Generator Water tevelr-Low-low A. steam Genera;or Waler 3!Strn. Gen. 2.IStrn. Ge"l:. 2FStm.G~n.
Levei-l..ow-low any in each (Adverse} operafog Operating S;:m. Gen Strn. Gen.
SRO S. Steam Genera,orWa~er 3JS1m. Gen~ 218trn~ Gen:. 2iStm.Gen. 12 g LEVel--Low-low (EAf.11} in any in each opera fog operating Sim. Gen. S;m. Gen.
AC110Ng- Wlth 1hE number ofOPERASLE channels one less than 1he Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and.lor POWER OPERATION may proceed provided lhE following oondiuoos are sa1isiied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed the tripped condi'licn wm1fn 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- b. For the aff-o:eted pro!Ed:ion set the Trip TirnE Delay i\::c cn.e affECted steam gen.erator {Te} is adjuste-d :o ma!ch the Tr,p Time Delay for multiple affECted steam generators (T .,.) witnin 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
- c. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirsnem i:s me-::
howlE'Jer, thE inoperable charm.el may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> i\::c survEillance !esmg cf olhEr charmEls per Specfficadcn 4.2" 1.1.i.
8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
SG Level Transmitter Fails Low.
I~*
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior LIMmNG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The IEngineere,d Safety Feature Actua~'°n System (ESFAS} instrumen;afon charmels and in~riocks shovm in Table 3.3-::> shall be OPERASLE with ;heir trip setpoints s'2': Y.MJ.sis~t ""'th the *talues sho~m in the Nom.inal Trip Setpoint column cl Table 3.3-4.
APPL IC:ABIUTY* As shovm in Tahle 3.3-3.
- a. Wilh an ESFAS ins:nimentafon channel er interlock !Tip setpoint less conservatve than the value shown in the Al!cw1able Values column of Table 3.3-*t declare the roannel inoperai:,fe and ap!JIY the applfca!Jle ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until ;he d1 annel is restored lo OPIERABlE status wi;h 1he tri'p setpoint adjusted ronsistffitw:~h the Nom'nal Trip Setpoint value.
CL With an ESFAS insm1mentafon channel er interlock inoperable. ;ake ;he ACTION shown Table 3.3-3.
- 5. TURBINE TRIP &
FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Steam Genera1or 3Jloop 2*loop any 2i1oop ~n each 17
'*'later tevB-- opera.ling loop opera:ing loop High-l-ligh ACTION 17 - Wmh 1he; number cf O?ER.A.SLE Channels one less than 1he Total Number oi Channels, STARTIJP and/crPOVvER OPERATION may procet<d provided the tooovring conditions are satisfied:
SRO a. The inoperable channel is placed ;n the 1ripped ccndhion w'th'n 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.
- b. The MEnimum Channels OPERABLE r;:quiremems is met; hcYl'l?ller, the inoperable channel may be bypassed fur up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> fer surveillance :estng oi oiher channels per Specification 4.32 i .1.
5 AUX1UARY FEEDWATER
- c. Main Stm. Gen.
Water Level-Low-Low
- i. Start Motor-Driven Pumps
- a. S!eam &nerator 2JStm~ Gen_ 2fStrn. Gen.. 2iStrn. Gen. !. 2, 3 Water Level-l.ow- in any in each Lew (Adverse;) opera'.ing opera:ing Stm.~. Stm .. GEn
- b. Steam GJEn 2rsmi. Gen. 1, 2, 3 Wa~rteve! in any in EaM Low-LOIN (EAM) operao'ling opera1ing S1:m. Gen. Sim. Gen.
- c. Main Stm. Gel.
Water level-Low-Low Start Turlline Dri'11en Pump 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
SG Level Transmitter Fails Low.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- a. s;eam Generator 2iStrn. Gen. 2i'Strn. Gen. 2.fStrn. Gen. 2,3 35 Wat!:r levef_,l_ow- in any tneach Low (Adverse,) opera'!ing operaling Strn~ Ga1. StrrL Gai
- b. Steam Ge-n 3,/S:m. Gen 2.i:Stm. Gen. 2/S:rr1. Gen. 1,2, 3 ~5 11*/ar;:,r levef- in any in each Low-Lew (EAM) opera::ing opera1ing Stm. C"n. Stm. Gai.
ACT!ON30c - W1~h me number of OPERABLE cha'lne!s one less than me Totat Numl:fer ot Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION m.ay proceed prwced :he follawing conditions are sat;sfied:
- a. The inoperable channel :CS placed the tripped ccnd:ion w'lh'n B hours.
- b. For 1he affected protection set. the Trip Trme Delay for ooe affecied s"eam
~nerator {T2 } is adlusted !o m.a1ch :he Trip Time Delay fur rnultii;~e a-:l'Ected steam gene.ratO'rs (T,,J within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
- o. The r.1:nirnum Channels OPERABLE requirement Ls rne1; however, the
- noperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for survei!lar1ce <estng ot olhe-r channas per Specification 4 .:::...2.1. 1.
S. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM rNTERLOCKS
- c. Steam Generator Level 2/Joopany t2 22c P-14 loop ACTION22 - WiUJ Jess 1han the Minimum Numbe of Channels OPERABLE, declare the intertcd:
inoperal:fle and verify fuat al! affected ohanne:!s of fue- functoos Es1ed be:low are OPERABLE or apply the apprcpc.ate- ACTION statement(s) for those fono-:ions.
Functions to be e11aluated are:
LIMfflNG CONDITION FOR OPERATiQN 3.3.3.7 The accident moo itoriJJg fnstrumentatioo channels shown in Table- 3 .3-1 (}shall be OPERABLE.
APPL!CABll lTY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.
- 10. Ste-am Gene-raror Level - (NarroY1 Range) 2/s.ieam 2.isitiam
{lns1rumeni Loops a-039.-042.-052.-055.-0B4,- genera<or general or 097,-t07,-110)
SRO ACTION 1 - NOTE: Also refer to lhe applicable- action requirements from Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-3, and LCO ?L3.3.5 since 1he-y rnay contain more reS1rictfve actions.
- a. With the number cf channels one less ihan !he minimum channels required.
restore 1he- inope-rable channel 1o OPERABI ;:: stams within 2*0 days Cl" be in at le-a.st HOT STANDBY vi'fr'iin 1i1e nex! 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in HOT SHUTDOWN W::1hin
!he next 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
- b. With the number cf channels ~o fess than me minimum channels reqwred, restore at least one- inoperable dlannel to OPERABLE stams within 7 days, -or be in HOT STANDBY within me nex! 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN vsi'ihin ihe next 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
SG Level Transmitter Fails Low.
NOTE 1: Failure of ONE out of three narrow range level channels i.vill result in DCS averaging the tvvo remaining good signals.
NOTE 2: Failure of TWO level channels on any SIG will result in associated loop MFW reg valve and bypass valve control transferring to MANUAL.
- 3. VERIFY failed channel bypassed for affected loop:
- "SIG # Detail" screen on DCS indicates failed transmitter bypassed.
NOTE: If performing AOP in conjunction with AOP-1.1 *1 for Eagle LCP faHure, then actions to hard trip bistables should be delayed until Eagle system reset is attempted.
Actions to hard trip bistables must be completed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> UNLESS affected loop is restored to operable status by resetting Eagle rack.
- 4. NOTIFY !&C to remove failed S/G level instrument from service USING appropriate Appendix:
SIG INSTRUMENT PROT APPENDIX NUMBER CH L-3-38 (L-519) II M 1 L-3-39 (L-518) Ill N L-3-42 (L-517) IV 0 L-3-51 (L-529) I p BOP 2 L-3-52 (L-528) Ill Q L-3-55 (L-527) IV R L-3-93 (L-539) I s 3 L-3-94 (l-538) m T l-3-97 (L-537) IV u L-3-106 {l-549) H v 4 L-3-107 (l-548) Ill w L-3-110(l-547) IV x NOTE: 1 ,2-S0-98-1 contains instructions for restoration of bypassed instrument loop i,vhen repairs are complete.
11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
SG Level Transmitter Fails Low.
Time Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 5. INITIATE maintenance on failed instrument BOP
- 6. CHECK affected loop S/G level control inAUTG_
- 7. GO TO appropriate plant procedure.
- END OF SECTION Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
Lead Examiner may cue the next event when Tech Specs have been addressed.
12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
Main Generator Alarm/Plant Power reduction.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 11 u11rect facility operator to insert Event 4, Main Generator Alarm/Plant Power reduction.
EXCITER INSULATION RESISTANCE LOW
[1] DISPATCH AUO to the exciter cubicle to verify ground detectorvi.ihite light
[2] NOTIFY SM.
[3} MONITOR the following indications for unexpected or unexplained changes:
[3. 1] Generator megavars
[32] Generator voltage
[3-3] Main exciter voltage
[3.4] l\/lain exciter amps
[3.5] Generator bearings #9 and #*10 vibration
[4] IF an unexpected or unexplained change occurs for any of the above indications, THEN INITIATE AOP-C.03, Emergency Slwtdown.
[5] NOTIFY System Engineer immediately.
No action required for Event 5, Rapid Power reduction
- 1. ENSURE crew has been briefed on reactivity SRO management expectations USING Appendix A.
13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
Main Generator Alarm/Plant Power reduction.
I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIX A REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT BRIEFING NOTE This appendix should be used ln addition to event-based brtet
[1] ENSURE crew has been briefed on the foUowing:
- Reason for Rapid Shutdown or Load Reduction
- Load Reduction Rate: _ __
- Desired final power level:_ __
- Reactivity Management expectations:
- Unit Supervisor shall concur with all reactivity manipulations
- Ensure reactor responding as expected using diverse indications
- Tavg-Tref Mismatch requirements:
- 3"F control band
- 5"F reactor trip criteria
- Crew focus will be on reducing power in a controlled and conservative manner.
- OATC will monitor rod insertion limits and AFD Hmit
- Boration source: - - - - -
- Crew will monitor reactor trip and turbine trip criteria using App_ 8
- CRO wm stop secondary plant equipment using App_ c_
- Tennination Criteria (conditions requiring Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, or condition no longer requiring rapid load reduction):
- 2. MONITOR reactor/turbine trip NOT required USING Appendix B, Reactor and Turbine CREW Trip Criteria. (two extra copies provided for UOs) 14
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
Main Generator Alarm/Plant Power reduction.
~*
J Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior 3_ CHECK VALVE POSITION UIV11T light CREW DARK on EHC panel. [M-2]
Examiner note: Appendix B reactor and turbine trip criteria see page 27 NOTE: Step 4 should be handed off to opposite unit or extra operator (if available}.
If NO operator is available, notifications should be performed concurrently with subsequent steps (when time pem1its).
- 4. ENSURE follm'.sing personnel notified of rapid shutdown or load reduction: [C.1]
- Balancing Authority (load Coordinator)
(751-7547).
CREW
- Chemistry
- Radiation Protection
- Plant Management CREW Makes notifications as required.
NOTE: Boration volumes and flowrates listed in this procedure are recommendations and may be adjusted as necessary_
- 5. INITIATE boratlon:
a_ CHECK rod control AVAILABLE:
- Control Bank D rods capable of being moved
- NO dropped or misaligned rods in Control Bank D.
- b. CHECK Control Bank D group position b. IF performing shutdown or power greater than 200 steps. reduction following turbine runback, THEN ATC c_ CHECK boration capability from BAT AVAILABLE 15
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
Main Generator Alarm/Plant Power reduction.
- d. DETERMINE recommended boration volume from BAT:
- ~aoo gal to reduce power from 100% to 20%
- 1o gal for eadl 1% power reduction (from current power level)
- volume recommended by Reactor Engineering_
- r~~~~~iR9Y{~kir2'Jf~~ef&:t8?g~~~~:* *
- 5. e_ DETERMINE recommended boration f!owrate from table below or from Reactor Engineering:
LOAD REDUCTION BORATION SRO RATE(%/min) FLOWRATE
'l% 5gpm 2 4:>/o -~30 gpm 3% -45 gpm
- g. CHECK status of charging and letdown:
- normal letdown flow ATC ESTABLISHED
- charging flow control HIC-62-93A in AUTO.
16
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
Main Generator Alarm/Plant Power reduction.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- h. DETERMINE if norma! boration will be used:
- desired load reduction rate is less than 4% per minute
- time is available for normal boration.
L INITIATE normal boration ATC USING Appendix H.
17
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time I p __ *_:_ : M.pplicant's Actions or Behavior Examiner note: Appendix H Actions are listed in the following steps.
APPENDIXH NORMAL BORATION
[1] RECORD desired boration volume and flowrate:
A TC Volume (gal)
F!owrate (gpm)
NOTE Boric Acid controller setting is twice the desired ftow rate.
Maximum Boric Acid flow is ~45 gpm.
{41 ADJUST [FC-62-139] BA flow controlfer setpoint ATC for desired flow rate.
[7J ENSURE boric acid transfer pump afigned to blender ATC in FAST speed.
18
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[SJ IF desired boric acid flow rate NOT obtained, THEN ADJUST one or both of the following as necessary:
- CFC-62-1391 BA flow controller D
- recirculation valve for BAT aligned to blender. D APPENDIX I EMERGENCY BORATION
[1J RECORD desired boration volume and flowrate:
A TC Volume {gal)
[4] RECORD the following:
A TC BoraUon flow: _ _ _ _ __
Time:
[5} NOTIFY Unit Supervisor when boration flow established.
19
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[6] IF Unit Supervisor directs changing boration flowrate.
THEN RECORD the following:
ATC Boration flow:
Time:
.Examiner Note: The crew continues actions to lower plant power using AOP-C.03 RAPID SHUTDOWN OR LOAD REDUCTION here.
- 5. lNITIATE boration:
J. CONTROL boration flow as required to inject desired boric acid volume.
CAUTION: If borating from the RWST, Turbine Load Reduction Rate greater than 2a10 per minute could result in violating Rod Insertion Limit.
- 6. INITIATE load reduction as follows:
- a. CHECK OPER AUTO light LIT on EHC panel. [M-2]
- b. ADJUST load rate to desired value:
- between 1% and 3% per minute if borating via normal boration (App. H)
- 2% per minute if borating from RWST.
- c. ADJUST setter for desired power level:
DESIRED RECOMMENDED BOP RX POWER LEVEL SETTER VALUE 20% or less 15 20
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- d. VERIFY boration flow established.
- e. INITIATE turbine load reduction by depressing GO pushbutton.
- f. CONTROL turbine load reduction BOP as necessary to reduce power to desired level.
- 7. MONITOR T-avgff-refmismatch:
- a. CHECK T-ref indication a. PERFORM the following:
AVAILABLE I) MONITOR Program T-avg for curren!
reactor power USING Tl-28 Figure 3 or ICS (NSSS I BOP, Program Reactor Average Temperature}.
- 2) USE program T-avg in place ofT-ret 3} MAINTAIN T-avg INithin 3°f of program T-avg USING manual rod ATC control.
- 4) ADJUST turbine load rate as necessary.
- 5) IF mismatch between T-avg and program value CANNOT be maintained less than 5°F.
THEN TRIP the reactor and GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 7. b. MONITOR automatic rod control b. IF auto rod control is functional maintaining T-avg!T-ref mismatch AND situation allows slowing down less than 3°F. load reduction, THEN PERFORM the follow1ng:
- 1) REDUCE turbine load rate to allow auto rod control to restore T-avgff-ref mismatch.
- 2) WHEN T REF T AUCT HIGH LOW alarm (l'v1-5A, C-6) is clear, THEN RESTORE turbine load rate to desired value.
IF any of the following conditions met:
- auto rod control NOT functional OR
- turbine load rate adjustment is NOT effective in reducing mismatch OR
- situation does NOT allow slowing down load reduction, THEN RESTORE T-avg to wilhm 3°F of T-ref USING manual rod control as necessary.
IF T-avgiT-ref mismatch CANNOT be maintained less than 5°F, THEN TRIP the reactor and GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
- 9. STOP secondary plant equipment BOP USING Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment Examiner Note: Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment starts at page 28.
NOTE: If LEFM thermal power (U2118) is inoperable, rod insertion limit curve must be raised by 3 steps. Rod insertion limit alarms and ICS dispk:iy are NOT automatically adjusted when LEFM is inoperabfe_
22
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time I Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 10. MONITOR control rods above CREW lowc-low insertion limit USING !CS orCOLR NOTE: Initiating plant shutdown required by Tech Specs requires 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> NRC notification per NPG-SPP-03.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements.
1L EVALUATE Tech SpecslTRM for applicability:
- 32.1, Axial Flux Difference
- 3 .1.1.1, Shutdown Margin CREW
- 3.1.3.6, Rod Insertion limits
- TRM 3.122, Boration Flowpaths
- 3.5.5, RWST_
- 12. EVALUATE EPlP-1, Emergency Plan CREW Initiating Conditions Matrix.
- a. CHECK at least one normal spray valve AVAILABLE ATC b_ ENSURE at least one backup heater group ENERGIZED.
c_ ENSURE spray valve(s) responds to control RCS pressure.
23
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Borati.on Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 14. WHEN reactor power change exceeds 15% within one hour.
THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate sampling as required by the following:
CREW
- O-Sl-CEM-000-050.2
- O-Sl-CEM-030-407 .2
- O-Sl-CEM-030-4 '15.0.
- 15. MONITOR ifturbine load reduction can be stopped:
a_ CHECK the follm.'ling condftions met
- reactor shutdown is NOT needed
- turbine shutdown is NOT needed
- turbine load at desired power level (further load reduction NOT needed) b_ ENSURE turbine load reduction STOPPED.
CREW C. WHEN control rods are above the low-low insertion limit, THEN ENSURE boration flow STOPPED_
d_ NOTIFY Chem lab to sample RCS for boron concentration.
- e. MAINTAIN T-avg within 3<<F of T-ref USING one of the following:
- AUTO or MANUAL rod control OR
- dilution or boration USING O-S0-62-7 OR
- additional turbine load reduction .
24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 15. f_ CHECK reactor power greater than 50%.
- g. DETERMINE Tech Spec AFD limits for current power level USING ICS (Primary Mimics, Doghouse Display) or COlR
- h. CHECK AFD within Tech Spec l.imits on at feast three operable power range NIS channels.
- 1. IF AFD is outside target band, THEN INfflATE O-Sl-NUC-000-044.0, Axial Flux Difference.
- 15. J. INITIATE performance of O-Sl-OPS-092-078.0, Power Range Neutron Flux Channel Calibration By Heat Balance Comparison.
- k. CHECK C-7 LOSS OF LOAD INTERLOCK [M-4A window E-5]
DARK.
NOTE: Time in core life, expected Xenon changes, and planned power changes should be considered when evaluating need for boration or dilution.
If dilution is required, Reactor Engineering Data Sheet provides recommended dilution volume for first hour foHowing downpower.
25
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
"T -
I Ill°' I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior L CONSULT Reactor Engineering and STA regarding ~I control and compensating for Xe changes.
- m. PERFORM the following as necessary to control Al and maintain T-avg on program:
- ADJUST control rod position as necessary.
- 15. n. CHECK at least one normal pzr spray valve OPERABLE.
- o. DETERMINE appropriate procedure based upon power level and cause of rapid shutdown:
- O-G0-5, Normal Power Operation (if greater than approximately 30% power)
- O-G0-4, Power Ascension from Less than 5% to 30% Pov1ler (if less than approximately 30%)
- p. GO TO appropriate plant instruction.
Examiner Note: When the crew has sufficiently reduced power the Lead Examiner may go to the next event starting at page 35.
26
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time J Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIXB REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA REACTOR TRIP CRITERIA TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA Turbine trip required or imminent Turbine vibration exceeding '14 mils with reactor power greater than P-9 (50':1/o) with one of the following:
Uncontrolled rod movement which CANNOT be
- high vibration on multiple bearings stopped by placing rods in l'vlANUAL {AOP-c.01) OR Loss of SIG level control:
- abnormal noise/vibration apparent level dropping or rising toward trip setpoint and level CANNOT be restored (AOP-s on l\'1ore than one dropped rod (AOP-c.01 J T-avg/T-ref mismatch CANNOT be maintained less than 5°F (refer to Step 7 or App. E) 2:: 30% turbine load: < 30% turbine load:
Condenser Pressure> 2.7 psia AND CANNOT Condenser Pressure> 1.72 psia be restored within 5 minutes (AOP-s.02) (AOP-S.02)
Any automatic reactor trip setpoint reached Any automatic turbine trip setpoint reached OR automatic trip imminent OR automatic trip imminent:
- Turbine trip above P-9 (50<3'<>)
- High Stator Cooling Water temp 90°C
- Power Range high flux 109%
- Both MFPT's tripped
- Power Range flux rate +/- 5% in 2 seconds
- Low Auto Stop Oil pressure 45 psig
- Pressurizer high level 92%
- High SIG level 81% narrow range
- Pressurizer pressure low 1970 psig
- Main Turb Bearing Oil low pressure 7 psig
- Pressurizer pressure high 2385 psig
- Thrust Bearing OH high pressure 60 psig
- RCS low flow 90%
- Turbine Overspeed "1980 rpm
- RCP undervoltage 5.022 kilovolts
- Loss of EHC pressure
- RCP undertrequency 56.0 Hz
- Unit 1 On!y:
- OP.6.T '!08.7% (variable)
- Unit 2 On!v:
- S/G low level rn-7% [15% EAM] Generator Circuit Breaker (GCB) tripped
- SSPS general warning in both trains OR '161kV bkrs 924 and 928 tripped.
27
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIXC SECONDARY PLANT EQUIPMENT
[1] ENSURE plant announcement(s) made on the following:
- starting rapid shutdown (or load reduction) due to (reason)
- stopping secondary plant equipment NOTE1 If reactor power will be reduced below 50%, AUO should be on station at #3 heater drain tank (if possible) when 60% power is reached.
NOTE2 Dispatching of AUO in Steps [2] and [3] may be performed out of sequence.
[2] IF reactor power will be reduced below 50%,
THEN DISPATCH AUO with Appendix J (Unit 1) or K {Un1t 2}
to #3 Heater Drain Tank. D
[3] IF one MFP wm be shutdown using this appendix, THEN DISPATCH AUO to OPEN MFWP recirc manual Isolation valve for MFWP to be removed from service: (NIA valves NOT opened}
UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION OPEN-.J
- 1 1A 1-VLV-3-576 TB el. 706, Northeast comer of *JA condenser D 1B 1-VlV-3-577 TB el. 706, Northeast comer of 'IA condenser D 2 2A 2-VlV-3-576 TB el. 706, Southeast comer of 2A condenser D 2B 2-VLV-3-577 TB el. 706, Southeast comer of 2A condenser D
28
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time J Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIXC
[4] IF BOTH of the following conditions are met
- power is being reduced as directed by AOP-S.01 (Main Feedwater Malfunctions) or AOP-S.04 (Condensate or Heater Drain Malfunctions)
- leaving secondary pumps in service is desired, THEN GO TO Step [8]. D
~
[5] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 80°/o or less, THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] ENSURE one Cond Demin Booster Pump STOPPED. D
[b] ENSURE associated suction valve CLOSED:
COND DEMIN SUCTION VALVE CLOSED-,/
BOOSTER PUMP A FCV-2-290 D OR B FCV-2-285 D OR
[ c I FCV-2-280 D 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time Position* J Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[6] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 70-75%,
THEN PERFORM the following:
[a} ENSURE one Condensate Booster Pump STOPPED. 0
[b] ENSURE associated CBP suction valve CLOSED:
CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSED ..J A FCV-2-94 D OR B FCV-2-87 D OR c FCV-2-81 D
[c] PERFORM applicable procedure to adjust seal injection water pressure on stopped CBP to prevent water intrusion in oil:
(may be assigned to another operator or delayed if necessary)
- 1-S0-2/3-1 Section 72 D OR
- 2-S0-2/3-1Section7.3 D 30
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[7J WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 65% or less_
THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] STOP remaining two Cond Demin Booster Pumps simultaneously_ D
[b] ENSURE suction valves CLOSED:
CONDDEMIN BOOSTER PUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSED../
A FCV-2-290 I B FCV-2-285 [J c FCV-2-280 [J
[c] STOP one No_ 3 Heater Drain pump. D
[d] STOP one No. 7 Heater Drain pump. D 31
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENOIXC
[8] IF reactor power will be maintained greater than 50%,
THEN GO TO Notes prior to Step [11]. D CAUTION
=---
Isolation of all three intermediate heater strings could occur if turbine is tripped prior to fully opening LCV -S-105A and B using Appendix K or L.
[9] WHEN reactor power is less than 60%
AND AUO with Appendix K {Unit *1) or l (Unit 2) is on station at #3 Heater Drain Tank, THEN PERFORM the foUowing:
[a] STOP #3 Heater Drain Tank Pumps. D
[b] NOTIFY AUO to perform App. K (Unit '1) or App. l (Uni1 2),
Fully Opening #3 Heater Drain Tank Bypass Valves. D
[cJ CLOSE isolation valves from #3 Htr Drain Pumps to heater strings:
VALVE DESCRIPTION CLOSED../
FCV-6-108 Htr Drain Tl< Pump 3 to Htr String A LJ FCV-6-109 Htr Drain Tl< Pump 3 to Htr String B LJ FCV-6-110 Htr Drain Tl< Pump 3 to Htr String c n 32
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
Time J Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior APPENDIXC NOTE 1 The following step ensures that MFW Bypass valves are available to control feedwater ftow at low power_
NOTE2 If any MFW Reg valve is in MANUAL. the associated MFW Bypass valve controller should remain in MANUAL to prevent undesired opening of bypass varve.
[10] WHEN Reactor power is less than 50%,
THEN PERFORM the following:
[aJ IF all MFW Reg Valves are in AUTO, THEN PLACE MFW Bypass Reg Valve controllers in AUTO. 0
[b] IF any MFW Reg Valve is in MANUAL THEN PERFORM the folfowing:
- 2) PLACE MFW Bypass Reg Valves in AUTO for remaining S/Gs. 0 33
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 17 Event
Description:
Normal Boration Failure/Emergency Boration Required.
I Time J Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE 1 If peliorming this AOP to reduce power to allow shutting dovm one MFW pump, the affected MFWP may be removed from service at power level less than 55% {Unit 1} or 60°/o (Unit 2).
NOTE2 AFW start function on loss of both MFW pumps is inoperable when a MFW pump is RESET but NOT pumping forv11ard. LCO 3.3.2.1 (Unit 1) or 3.3.2 (Unit 2) allows AFW start channel to be inoperable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when shutting down a MFWP.
[11] WHEN it is desired to remove one MFW pump from service AND power level is less than applicable limit:
- turbine impulse pressure less than approximately 45%
- reactor pov.;er less than value specified in Note 1.
THEN PERFORM the following:
[a] ENSURE MFWP Recirc Manual Isolation valve OPEN for MFWP to be removed from service: (NIA valves NOT opened)
UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION OPEN--./
- 1A 'P/LV-3-576 TB eL 706, Northeast comer of 1A condenser D
- 1 18 *J-VLV-3-577 TB eL 706, Northeast comer of 1A condenser D 2
2A 2-VLV-3-576 TB el. 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser D 28 2-VLV-3-577 TB el. 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser D
[b] THROTTLE OPEN recirc valve in MANUAL (30-50% OPEN) for MFWP to be removed from service. D
[c] PLACE speed controller in MANUAL for MFWP to be removed from service. D
[d] REDUCE speed gradually on MFWP to be removed from service. D (step continued on next page) 34
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Feed Reg Control Auto Failure.
I T!~-.
" '~ J Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct the Simulator Operator to initiate Event 6, FRV LCV-3-48 Fails to respond in AUTO.
Indications/Alarms Indications:
1-M-4
- SIG #2 Level above the other three SIG
- SIG #2 Feed Flow above the other three SIG Evaluator Note: For this event, crew may respond per the Annunciator Response Procedure directly enter AOP-S.01 Section 2.2. Section 2.2 Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step; the BOP may perform the action(s) associated with Step 1 from memory without direction.
- 1. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO IF... PAGE SECTION Failure of Automatic SJG level Control 2_1 4 NOTE: Step *1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION_
- 1. RESTORE steam generator level{s):
- a. PLACE affected feedwater reg valve controller(s) and/or bypass reg valve controller{s) in MANUAL.
BOP b_ CONTROL feedwater ftow on affected S/G(s) to restore level to program.
35
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Feed Reg Control Auto Failure.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 2. CHECK the folfowing:
- SIG pressure instruments NORrv1Al
- SIG level instruments NORMAL
- 3. CHECK Steam Flow and feed flow instruments NOR!V1Al USING the following:
- control board indicators [M-4}
- DCS Operator Display Monitor.
CAUTION: Feed flow transients may impact core thermal power.
NOTE !CS point U1118 (Megawatt thermal lndlcation} may be impacted by feed flow instrument failure_ U21 "l8 (LEFM calorimetric power) should remain reliable.
- 4. MAINTAIN Steam Generator levei{s)
BOP on program.
5_ INITIATE repairs on failed equipment CREW
- 6. WHEN automatic control of affected MFW reg valve{s) ls available and reliable, BOP THEN PLACE controner(s) in AUTO USING 1,2-S0-98-1, Distributed Control System.
NOTE: Instructions for restoring bypassed instrument channels are contained in 12-S0-98-1.
CREW Crew 7.
GO TO appropriate plant procedure.
Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.
Lead Examiner may cue the next event when plant is stable with #2 SIG control in manual.
36
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Main Feed Pump Trips/Reactor Trip/Main Turbine Trip Failure.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct the facility operator to insert Event 7, A MFP Trip.
Indications available:
Annunicators:
1-M-4
- 4C F-1, "PS-46-13MFPT1A & 18 TRIPPED TURBINE TRIP" Indicators:
1-M-4
- ALL NR SG LEVEL: trending down.
PS-46-13 MFPT 1A & 18 TRIPPED TURBINE TRIP
[1] IF reactor trips, THEN GO TO E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection_
7 Examiner Note: following IOA performance, prior to Steps 1-4 immediate action verification, A TC/BOP surveys MCBs for any expected automatic system response that failed to occur.
Upon discovery, they may take manual action(s) to align plant systems as expected for the event in progress. (Ref. EPM-4, Prudent Operator Actions)
CREW Performs the first four steps of E-0 unprompted.
SRO Directs performance of E-0 NOTE1 Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.
NOTE2 This procedure has a foldout page.
37
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Main Feed Pump Trips/Reactor Trip/Main Turbine Trip Failure.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. VERIFY reactor TRIPPED:
Reactor trip breakers OPEN Reactor trip bypass breakers DISCONNECTED or OPEN ATC Rod bottom lights UT Rod position indicators less than or equal to *12 steps.
Neutron flux DROPPING
- 2. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:
BOP Turbine stop valves CLOSED.
- 3. VERIFY at least one 6.9KV shutdown BOP board ENERGIZED on this unit.
ECCS pumps RUNNING. a. IF any of the following conditions exists:
Any SI alarm LIT [M-40].
SIG* pressure less than 600 psi(
OR RCS pressure less than 1870 psig, OR Containment pressure ATC greater than 1.5 psig, THEN ACTUATE SI.
- b. IF SI is NOT required, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1) MONITOR status trees.
- 2) GO TO ES-0.1. Reactor Trip Response.
38
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Main Feed Pump Trips/Reactor Trip/Main Turbine Trip Failure.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Crew should recognize Loss of Heat Sink entry conditions, total AFW flow less than 440 gpm due to a loss of all AFW pumps, and implement 1-FR-O verification and transitions to FR-H.1.
I SRO I Transitions to FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, go to next page.
Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via ICS. When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).
39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 10 Event
Description:
AFW Failure/FR-H.1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION Feeding an Intact or Ruptured SIG is preferred to feeding a Faulted SIG.
Thermal stresses from feeding a Faulted SIG could rupture tubes, resulting in a Faulted-AND-Ruptured SIG.
- 1. DETERMINE procedure app!icability:
- a. CHECK the following: a. GO TO Step 2.
- Total feed flow less than 440 gpm due to operator action ~
SRO directed by another procedure.
AND
- Total feed flow capability of greater than 440 gpm AVAILABLE.
3_ CHECK if secondary heat sin!< required:
- a. RCS pressure greater than any non-Faulted SIG pressure_
ATC b_ RCS temperature greater than 350"'F.
ATC 4_ MONITOR at least one CCP available.
NOTE Pressurizer pressure greater than or equal to 2335 psig with rising RCS temperature and a low loop delta-T indicates loss of heat removal capability.
40
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 10 Event
Description:
AFW Failure/FR-H.1
~*
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 5. MONITOR RCS feed and bleed criteria:
- a. CHECK the following: a. GO TO Step 6.
- Any three S/G wide ranae levels ATC less than 23% [43~+, ADV]
- Pressurizer pressure greater than or equal to 2335 psig due to loss of secondarv heat removal.
BOP 6. MONITOR CST !eve! greater than 5%.
7_ ATTEMPT to establish AFW flow to at least one SiG in the following order of priority-- Intact, Ruptured, Faulted a_ CHECK SIG blowdown isolation valves CLOSED.
- b. CHECK control room indications for cause of AFW failure:
- CST level
- AFW pump power supply
- AFW valve alignment 41
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 10 Event
Description:
AFW Failure/FR-H.1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- REFER TO EA-3-lO, Establishin RUNNING. Motor Driven AFW Flow.
as necessaiy
- 2) ENSURE AFW level control
- DISPATCH personnel to restore valves OPEN.
3} ENSURE MD AFW recirculation valves FCV-3-400 and FCV-3-40"1 CLOSED.
- 1) ENSURE turbine steam supply
- REFER TO EA-3-9. Establisl1ing valves OPEN: Turbine Driven AFW Flow.
as necessary
- Either FCV+*15 or FCV-*l-"16
- DISPATCH personnel to restore TD AFW pump flow
- FCV-1-17 and FCV-"l-'18
- Trip and throttle valve, FCV-*1-51.
- 2) ENSURE AFW level control valves OPEN.
3} RAISE TD AFW pump speed as necessary.
NOTE Continuous actions in Step 8 are NOT applicable after RCS feed and bleed is initiated in Step *17_
- 8. MONITOR for AFW flow:
BOP *1) ENSURE personnel dispatci1ed to locally restore AFW flow
- 2) GOTO Step9.
-:a..-
1 Q_ MONITOR shutdown boards BOP continuously energized_
42
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 10 Event
Description:
AFW Failure/FR-H.1 I II
__II._,
I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1 *1 _ ATTEMPT to establish IV1FW flow to at least one S/G:
- a. CHECK at least one main feedwater pump available:
- MSlVopen
- condenser vacuum established
- containment pressure less than 1 _5 psig
- MFW pump availabfe.
- b. CHECK condensate system IN SERVICE:
- Hotwell pumps
- Condensate booster pumps
43
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 10 Event
Description:
AFW Failure/FR-H.1 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 11. i. CHECK FW isolation valves OPEN. i. PERFORM the following:
- 1) ENSURE MFW reg valve controllers in MANUAL and output ZERO.
- 2) ENSURE MFW bypass reg valve controllers in MANUAL and output ZERO.
- 3) CYCLE reactor trip breakers.
- 4) RESET FW Isolation signal. [M-3]
- 5) OPEN FW isolation valves for intact S/Gs.
IF NO FW isolation valve can be opened, THEN GO TO Step 16.
J. ESTABLISH MFW flow to at least one SIG USING EA-2-2. Establishing Secondary Heat Sink Using Main Feedwater or Condensate System.
Examiner Note: The following steps are from EA-2-2, ESTABLISHING SECONDARY HEAT SINK USING MAIN FEEDWATER OR CONDENSATE SYSTEM 44
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 10 Event
Description:
AFW Failure/FR-H.1 I
....... ~---
I , ~_,1L10n
""' I Applicant's Actions or Behavior 4.1 Section Applicability NOTE Steps 1 and 2 apply when this procedure has been entered directly from ES-0.1 or E-3 (without entering FR-H.1 ).
- 1. IF directed by ES-0.1. Reactor Trip Response.
to establish main feedwater flow, THEN PERFORM Section 4.2. D BOP
- 2. IF directed by E-3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to establish main feedwater or condensate fiow, THEN PERFORM Section 4.3. D
- 3. IF directed by FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, to establish main feedwater flow (MFP available),
THEN PERFORM Section 4.4 to establish main feedwater flow to S/Gs. D 4.4 Establishing Main Feedwater Flow to S/Gs NOTE Removal of fuses should be performed in parallel with subsequent steps.
- 1. DISPATCH operator to pertorm Appendix E, Part I to remove fuses BOP to disable intermediate heater string isolation. D
- 2. ENSURE Condensate inlet and outlet valves for at least one LP heater BOP string are OPEN. [M-3] D CAUTION Condensate flowpath through at least one LP heater string must be established prior to starting a Condensate Booster Pump.
- 3. ENSURE the following condensate pumps RUNNING:
- At least two Hotwell pumps D BOP
- At least one Condensate Booster Pump (with suction valve OPEN) D
- At least one Injection water pump . D
- 4. ENSURE MFPT Recirc Valves in MANUAL and CLOSED:
BOP * {FIC-3-70] MFPT A D
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 10 Event
Description:
AFW Failure/FR-H.1
- 6. ENSURE MFW bypass reg valve controllers in MANUAL and BOP output ZERO. 0 NOTE Condensate isolation valves for intermediate pressure heater strings may have closed due to high-high level condition.
- 7. IF a flowpath is NOT available through at least one intermediate heater string, BOP THEN NOTIFY personnel to PERFORM Appendix E Part II to establish a flow path. 0
- 8. ENSURE Inlet and Outlet valves for at least one string of Intermediate and High pressure heaters OPEN:
- High Pressure Feedwater Heaters 0
- Intermediate Pressure Feedwater Heaters. 0 iO. IF starting MFW pump B.
THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. ENSURE MFW pump B drain handswitch [HS-46-41]
in OPEN position. [M-3] 0
- b. ENSURE the following valves OPEN:
BOP VALVE DESCRIPTION OPEN./
FCV-2-211 MFPT condenser B inlet isol [M-2] 0 FCV-2-216 MFPT condenser B outlet isol [M-3] 0 FCV-2-224 MFWP "B" inlet valve [M-2] 0 FCV-3-81 MFWP "B" outlet valve [M-3] 0 NOTE HP steam to MFW pump may be isolated if O-G0-12, Appendix A has been performed or MFW pump was out of service at time of trip.
- c. DISPATCH operator to perform the following: [TB el. 706]
- 2) IF [VLV-1-6121 MFW Pump BHP steam isolation valve CLOSED, THEN OPEN [VLV-1-6121. 0 BOP d. RESET MFPT B USING [HS-46-36A]. 0 46
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 10 Event
Description:
AFW Failure/FR-H.1 D
,~9:~0~1rlf1~~g~w~t;tTR~**
~S?~H!R~~oy-~r~~~iri~s.. t Jl;)e;conJ(ollete,rtn~s ;. *
- h. ENSURE [VLV-3-577] FDWTR Pmp Min lsol Valve OPEN. D BOP k. VERIFY MFPT governor valve positioner is indicating CLOSED. D I. IF MFPT governor valve positioner is NOT indicating CLOSED, THEN BOP 1) IF MCR operation of governor valve positioner is available, THEN PLACE [HS-46-40AJ to LOWER to close the steam chest valves. D NOTE MFPT speed controller should take over speed control when MFPT accelerates to approximately 3300 rpm.
47
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 10 Event
Description:
AFW Failure/FR-H.1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- n. RAISE MFPT B speed by performing one of the following:
BOP i) IF MCR operation of governor vvalve positioner is available.
THEN
- 0. WHEN MFPT speed controller controlling MFPT speed, BOP THEN ENSURE governor valve positioner is fully RAISED. 0
- p. ADJUST MFPT speed USING master controller [PC-46-201 BOP UNTIL feedwater header pressure is approximately 80 psid greater than steam header pressure. 0
CAUTION Restoration of feedwater flow will result in an RCS cooldown.
FW Isolation will occur if FWI signal is not defeated by depressing FWI reset pushbuttons prior to RCS temperature falling below 550°F.
i 2. IF RCS temperature is greater than 550°F AND Feedwater Isolation Valves are OPEN.
THEN PERFORM the following when feedwater is established:
- a. WHEN Tavg approaches 550°F, BOP THEN DEPRESS and HOLD both FWI reset pushbuttons {M-3]. 0
- b. WHEN T-avg is less than 550°F, THEN RELEASE FWI reset pushbuttons. 0 48
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 10 Event
Description:
AFW Failure/FR-H.1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION If automatic SI signals are NOT blocked, feed flow should be carefully controlled to prevent rapid cooldown which could result in low steam line pressure SI actuation (and subsequent feedwater isolation}.
NOTE 0.2 x 106 lbm/hr feed flow is equivalent to approximately 440 gpm.
Due to inaccuracy of flow indication at low end of scale, feed flow should be determined based on a rise in indicated flow.
ADJUST MFW regulating bypass valve controller to establish required feed flow.
The scenario may be terminated when the crew establishes at least 440 gpm feedwater flow or earlier, at the discretion of the Lead examiner.
49