ML072980432
| ML072980432 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/2007 |
| From: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | NRC/RGN-II |
| References | |
| 50-327/07-301, 50-328/07-301 EPIP-1, Rev 39, EPIP-4, Rev 30 | |
| Download: ML072980432 (62) | |
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l TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP - 1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Revision 39 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY: Bill Peggram RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: Emergency Preparedness APPROVED BY:
Kevin Wilkes EFFECTIVE DATE:
01/23/2007 Level of Use: Reference
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ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Revision History I EPIP-1 I l
Rev Oate Revised Pages Reasonfor Revision 36 02/10/2005 9,10 Revision Change: Revised RVLlS equivalent to core damage from 40% to 42% (DCN20591A PER75249). Removed duplicate word "exists" in EAL 1.3.3L 37 01/1812006 8,1 0,12,13, Revision Change:
EAL 1.3.4 to incorporate human factoring 20,24,27,28, wording. EAL 2.1 wording clarification, added annunciator 29, 32, 38, 42, CRT. Changed plant computer to ICS. Revised EALs 4.6, 44,47 4.7 of the Event Classification Matrix to incorporate the guidance found in NRC Bulletin 2005-02 (BL2005-02) for security-based EALs. Table 4-3, Security Events was added.
Also, revised EALs in portion 4.7 of the Event Classification Matrix to capture the new emergency classification definitions. The definitions were revised to add new definitions HOSTILE ACTION, and HOSTILE FORCE to support implementation of BL2005-02. EAL 7.3 to remove 0-RM-90-3 & 0-RM-90-4 from Table 7-2, DCN #: D-21642-A Annual Review. Changed SAS to CAS in EAL 7.3 due to a typo in REP, R56 SON changed EAL 7.3 to match in R30.
38 11/22/2006 10,46 Annual review, changed the "or" to "and" in EAL 1.3.2L "Containment pressure not increasing or sump level not increasing on L1-63-178 and [was or] 179 with a LOCA in progress."
EAL1.3.2P: changed 2.81 to 2.8 due to set point changes in DCNE21988; PER 97896:changed PSID to psig to be consistent with CMT status tree; changed CMT spray wording. Values in Table 7-1 changed due to the change out for RM-90-212, Turbine Buiiding Sump [DCN 21837].
39 01/23/2007 46 Plan effectiveness detenmination reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.
Revised effluent radiation monitor EAL values for RM 212.
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I EPIP-1 I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Purpose
.4 2.0 References
.4 2.1 Developmental References
.4 3.0 Instructions
.4 3.1 REP Activation
.4 3.2 EAL Interpretation 5
3.3 Validation of Information 5
3.4 Classification Determination 5
4.0 Records Retention 6
4.1 Records of Classified Emergencies 6
4.2 Drill and Exercise Records 6
ISEQUOYAH I
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EAL Section 1 - FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX 7
EAL Section 2 - SYSTEM DEGRADATION 11 EAL Section 3 - LOSS OF POWER 19 EAL Section 4 - HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT..
23 EAL Section 5 - DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 31 EAL Section 6 - SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 37 EAL Section 7 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS
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1.0 PURPOSE I EPIP-1 I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX ISEQUOYAH I
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This procedure provides criteria to the Shift Manager (SM) or Site Emergency Director (SED) to be used in classifying and declaring an emergency based on plant conditions. The responsibility for declaring an emergency, based on the criteria in this procedure, belongs to the SM or SED, the designated Unit Supervisor when acting as the SM, or the TSC SED. This responsibility cannot be delegated.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Developmental Documents A.
10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.
B.
Reg Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NEI 99-01 Methodology For Development Of Emergency Action Levels* Revision 4, January 2003.
C.
Sequoyah Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Functional Restoration Guidelines (FRGs), Technical Instructions (TI), Surveillance Instructions (SI), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are also referenced in Append ix B of the Radiological Emergency Plan.
D.
Letter to Bruce A. Boger, Director of Inspection Program Management, USNRC, December 8, 2001 from Lynnette Hendricks, NEI, Recommended Actions in Response to a Site Specific Credible Threat at a Nuclear Power Plant (1A-01-1).
3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 REP Activation The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when anyone of the conditions listed in this matrix is detected and declared. The REP is not activated based on a reporting of past conditions. This procedure will be used in conjunction with the REP Appendix B.
If the event is determined to be one of the four emergency classifications then implement EPIP-2, -3, -4, or -5 as applicable.
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EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 3.2 EAL Interpretation The criteria in SQN EPIP-1 are given for reference: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken.
In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound jUdgment of the SM or SED to arrive at an appropriate classification for a particular set of circumstances. These criteria apply to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The SED must be aware of the affects of simultaneous events on both units.
I SEQUOYAH 1
1 EPIP-1 I
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3.3 Validation of Information If there is a reason to doubt if a given initiating condition has actually occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications provided. Unless a suspected spurious or otherwise false alarm can be substantiated within an acceptable timeframe (based on potential severity of the event), the SM or SED is to proceed with actions as required by this procedure until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.
3.4 Classification Determination 3.4.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the respective status tree criteria that will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.
3.4.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.
3.4.3 Declare the highest emergency class based on events that are in progress at the time that the classification is made.
3.4.4 If, during an ongoing event, investigation shows that a higher classification was previously met, then report that, as information only, to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist unless it is a noted exception (I.e., EAL 2.3).
3.4.5 If. following termination of an emergency declaration, investigation shows that a higher classification was met, then report that, as information only, to the ODS and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist.
l 3.4.6 If conditions have returned to a non-emergency state before any emergency can be classified, then the highest emergency class that was appropriate shall be reported, as information only, to the ODS and NRC and shall not be declared unless it is a noted exception (l.e., EAL 2.3).
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3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 3.4.7 The NRC shall be notified within one hour of all classifications. Once made and reported, a declaration cannot be canceled or rescinded even if it is later determined to be invalid. If there is reason to doubt that a given condition has occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications and proceed with classification, as required by this procedure, until otherwise proven false.
3.4.8 The State shall be notified by the ODS within 15 minutes of any declaration and notified, for information only, within one hour of any classification that was met but not declared as allowed above. If the State is notified of a declaration that is invalidated before the NRC is notified, terminate the classification, if not already done, and report the declaration to the NRC.
3.4.9 The ACCEPTABLE timeframe for initiating notification to the ODS of an emergency declaration is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and contacting the ODS.
4.0 RECORDS RETENTION
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ISEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
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4.1 Records of Classified Emergencies The materials generated in support of key actions during an actual emergency classified as NOUE or higher are considered Lifetime retention Non-QA records.
Materials shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall submit any records deemed necessary to demonstrate performance to the Corporate EP Manager for storage.
4.2 Drill and Exercise Records The materials deemed necessary to demonstrate performance of key actions during drills are considered Non-QA records. These records shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall retain records deemed necessary to demonstrate six-year plan performance for six years. The EP Manager shall retain other records in this category for three years.
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I SEQUOYA H I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2
2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3
3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4
4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5
5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5.2 Tornado 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6
6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7
7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling l
7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 7 of 47 Revision 39
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I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 l
Definitions and Abbreviations:
BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) Of more persons within the EAB violently protesting ensue operations or activities at the site.
CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure ring, and associated welds CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCllQN tCSFs): A plant safety fufldion required to prevent significant release of core radioac:tlvity to the environment. There are six CSF s; Sutx:riti cality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Press urized Thermal $hock.
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (Re S).
EVENT; Assess ment of an EVENT commen ces when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAS) : That area surrounding the reactor, In which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities ind uding exd usion or rerroval of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels. based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calCIJations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, Of a catastrophic failure of pressurized or elecmcet equipment that irnparts energy d sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.
EXTORT10N: An attempt 10 cause an action at the site by threat or force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being oompletely depressurized.
A RE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not consUMe a fire.
Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the L01JliER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
HOSTlLE ACTlON: An ad toward a nudear plant or its personnel thai indudes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intirrldale the licensee to achieve an end. This indudes attack by air, land or water; using guns, explosives. pro;ectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included.
HOSTllE ACTlON should NOT be construed to ind ude ads of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power plant.
HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, O'Vertly or by stealth and deception. equipped with suitable weapons capable 01killing. maiming, or causing destruction.
IMMINENT: Wllhin two hours.
INEFFECTlVE: VVhen the specified restoralion action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INIT1ATlNG CONDIT10N$: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSlONnNTRUDER: Suscected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
ODCM: Offsil e Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Red Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls. and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and rT'ICIl'litor ererrrstnp setocote.
ORANGE PAT1-I: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-owhich indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected. thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient 10 cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure orthe operat:ility or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be coste or otfsite.
PROTECTEDAREA: The area ercorncessed by the security fence and to which acce ss is controlled.
Res: The RCS primary side and its connections up 10 and induding the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and ind uding the primary and secondary isolation valves.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-Owhich indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Exist.enc:eof primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment. or misoperation of plant equipmerrtwith the intent to render the equipment inoper-able.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of thefollowtng: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)
Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load: (3) Reador Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations ~ 1 0%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of wor1c:ers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must. threaten to interrupt normalplant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dCVlQerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.* chlorine, CO:.r:, etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations. testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RElEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPlANNED if the release has not been authorized by a DiSCharge Permit (CPl. Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, orplanned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP. (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times. maximum release rates. and/or discharge atincorrect tank).
VALID: An indication. report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is condusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
VlSlBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements. testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure.
system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heal or impact, denting, penetration. rupture, craclOng, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches. etc.) should NOT be ind uded as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of. could directly or indireclly endanger the public health and safety by exposureto radiation.
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I SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I RCS leakage results in entry into E-1 Non Isolatable RCS leak exceeding the capacity of one charging pump in the normal charging alignment Pressurized Thermal Shock Red (FR-P.1)
OR Heat Sink RED (FR-H.1) and RHR Shutdown Coolin not in service
-OR-
-OR-Function Status Potential LOSS e I LOCA _-=:--:-....,.,....,..,...==--I
- 3. Steam Generator Tube:..;R:..:u::Jp",t:::u.:.:re:"""",.,.,-c-=-=_-l Potential LOSS SGTR that results in a Not Applicable Safety Injection actuation Entry into E-3 RCS leak results in subcooling <40 of as indicated on XI-94-101 or 102 (EXOSENSOR)
Not Applicable Core Cooling Orange (FR-C.2)
Heat Sink RED (FR-H.1) and RHR Shutdown Coolin not in service
-OR-
-OR-
-OR-Function Status Potential LOSS Coolant Activi==Le",v,.,e::-I-:;,....,-,==_-J Potential LOSS
-OR-
- 5. Containment Radlatlon~M~o:::n~lt~o~r-::,-,,-,,.,==----I Potential LOSS VALID reading of Not Applicable greater than:
='-==p""o""'te-n"::tl""a'"'lL'"'O=-S=-S=------l Not Applicable VAliD RVLiS level
<42% on Li-68-368 or Li-68-371 with no RCP runnin
- 3. Incore Thermocouple HI Quad Avera e Potential LOSS Greater than 1200 of on Greater than or equal to XI-94-101 or 102 700 of on XI-94-101 or EXOSENSOR 102 EXOSENSOR Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1) 2.8E+01 Rem/hr on RM-9Q-271 or -272
-OR-4 LOSS Potential LOSS 2.9E+01 Rem/hr on RM-90-273 or -274 VAliD RVLiS level
<42% on Li-68-368 or Li-68-371 with no RCP runnin Not Applicable
- OR -
- 6. SED Judgment Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss of potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.
-OR-
- 5. SED Judament Any condition that, in the jUdgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss of potential loss of the RCS Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.
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EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX
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ISEQUOYAH Potential LOSS Containment Red (FR-Z.l )
OR Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE(i.e.: core Tes trendtn u
I EPIP-1 I INSTRUCTIONS Note:
A condition is considered to be MET if, in the judgment of the SED, the condition will be MET IMMINENTLY (i.e.:
with two hours). The classification shall be made as soon as this determination is made.
-OR-Note:
MONITOR the respective status tree criteria if a CSFis listed as an INITIATtNG CONDITION.
3.
COMPARE the number of barrier Losses and Potential losses \\0 the criteria below and make the appropriate declaration.
2.
In each of the three barrier columns, IDENTIFY if any Loss or Potential Loss INITIATING CONDITIONS have been MET.
1.
In the matrix to the left. REVIEW the initiating conditions in all three barrier columns and circle the conditions that are MET.
Emergency Class Criteria General Emergency LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier Site Area Emergency LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers Alert Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier Unusual Event LOSS or Potential LOSS of Containment barrier Potential LOSS Not Applicable Potential LOSS Unexpected VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors adjace nt to containment (with LOCA in progress).
- OR-
- OR -
- 6. SED Judament Any condition that. in the judgmentof the SM or SED.
indicates loss of potential loss of the Containment Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.
RUPTURED SIG that is also faulted outside containment (E2 and E3)
>4 hour secondary side release outside containment from a SIG with a SIG tube leak >TIS limits AOP R.01A A)
- 5. Si nificant Rad iation in Co::.n
- .:.t",a:.:.in:.:.m
- .;;:e~n:.:.t====:-_-I Potential LOSS Not Applicable VALID reading of greater than:
36E+02 Remlhr on RM-90-271 and272 OR 2.8E+02 Remlhr on RM-90-273 and 274
- 3. Containment Isolation Sta:;tu:;s'--;:;:= ====,--_
---j Containment isolation, when require d is incomplete and a release path to the enviro nment exists.
- OR -
- OR-
- 2. Containment Pressure I HLd=ro=e:;n~==,,=:;;-__--I Potential LOSS Rapid unexplained pressure Containment Hydrogen decrease following initial increases to >4% by volume on increaseon PDI-30-44 or 45 H21-43-200 or 210 OR OR Containment pressure or sump Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase B) level not increasing on L1 with < one full train of 178 and 179with a LOCAin containment spray pr ress l
Page 100f47 Revision 39
[SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1
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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2
2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3
3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4
4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5
5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5.2 Tornado 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 AircrafUProjectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6
6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7
7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage l
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Definitions and Abbreviations:
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I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 l
BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBAN CE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB
'Iiolerrtly protesting ensile operations or activities at the site.
CON FINEMENT BOUNDA RY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY con sists 01MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC tid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC clos ure ring, and associated welds.
CRI11CAL*$ AFETY FUNCnON ICSFsj= A plant safety function required 10 prevent significant release of core radioad ivrty to the environment. There are six CSFs ; Subcritica litV, Core Cooling, Heat Sink. Pressurized Therma l Shock,
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (Re S).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commenceswhen recognitionis made that one or more of the initiati ng conditions eescce ted wit h the event es tst. Implicit in this defi nition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUS ION AR EA BOUNDARY (EAB) : That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reac tor licenses has the authority to determine all activities ind uding exctuston or removal of personnel and property fro m the area. For purpo ses of Eme rgency Actio n Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose asses sments, and for design calcu lations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, viol ent, unconfined combustioo. or a catastrophic failure of pressuriz ed or electJiCal equipm ent that imparts energyd sufficient force to potenti ally damage permanent structures or equipment.
EXTORTI ON : An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion cha racterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overtreated electrical components do I"IOt constitute a fire Observation of name is prefe rred but is NOT required if large quantities Of smok e and/or heat are observed.
FLA MMABLE GAS: Combustibl e gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSN E LIMIT (LEl).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
HOSTILE ACTION: An ad toward a nudear plant or its pel"SOI'lnei that includes the use d viole nt force to destroy equipme nt, take hostages. and/or intimidale the lice nsee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land or water; using guns. explosives, pro;eetiles, vehides, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included.
HOSTIL E ACTION shoul d NOT be consuuec 10 inclu de acts of e vil disobedience or felonious acts that are not pan of a concerted attack 00 the nudear power plant.
HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weap ons capable of killing, maiming. or causing destruction.
IMMINENT: Wllhin two hours.
INEFFECTIVE : When the specified restoration adion(s) does not resu lt in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH concfrtion within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Statu s Tree REO 0( ORA NGE PATH.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Paramet ers, radiation monitor readings or personnel observ ations that ident ify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUS10N/INTRUCER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Red Effluent Cootrols, Environs MOOitori ng controls, and methodologyfO( calcula ting routine gaseous and liqUid effluent offsit e doses and monitor alarm'trip setpoints.
ORANGE PATH: MorVIoring of one or more CSFs by FR-Owhich indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.
PROJECTILE: An Object ejected, throw n or launched towa rds a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause conce rn regar ding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equip ment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsile or offsile.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to wtli<:h access is controlled.
RCS: The RCS primary side and its connecti ons up to and inducing the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and Including tha primary and secondary isolation valves.
REO PATH : Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-Owhich indicate s that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTU RED: (Steam Generato r) Existence of prima ry to secondary leakag e of a magnitude greater than the capacity one chargi ng pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage. rri salignment. Of misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipme nt inoperable.
SIGNIFICA NT TRA NSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automati c turtli ne runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)
Electrical load reject ion >25% full electrical load ; (3) Reactor Trip ; (4) Safety Injection System Activat ion; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations ?:10%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance wit h demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt nonnal plant operatio ns.
TOXIC GAS: A gas thai is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhal ation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, C~, etc.)
UNPlANNED: An event or ecnon that is not the expected result of nonnal ope rations, testi ng or maintenance. Events that result in ccrrecnve or mitigative actions being take n in accord ance with abnormal or emergency procedu res are UNPLANNED.
UNPlANNED RELEASE: A release of radioad ivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases. unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP. (e.g., alarm setpoints. minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VA LID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VAllO when it is oondusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observat ion by plant personnel.
Implicit In this definition is the need for timely assessme nt within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measureme nts, testing. or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cau se concern regarding the continued operability or reliability d affected safety structure, system. or componen t. Example damage includes defonna tioo due to heat or impact dentin g, penetration. rupture, cracking. or paint blisteri ng. Surfaoe blemishes (e,g., paint chipping, scratches. etc.) should NOT be ioo uded as visibl e damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems. devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Page 12 of 47 Revision 39
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 1 EPIP-1 I
ISEQUOYAH
(
2.
UNPLANNED loss of all offsite communication capabilities listed below: (a and band c and d and
.andQ
- a. UNPLANNED loss ofall EPABX phones
- b. UNPLANNED Joss of all offsite radio frequencies
- c. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system
- d. UNPLANNED loss of all 1-FB*BeIi lines
- 1. UNPLANNED loss of all satellite phones NotApplicable.
Significant Loss of Communications (1 or 2) 1.
UNPLANNED loss of allin-plant communication capabilities listed below (a and b and c):
- a. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX phones.
- b. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones.
- c. UNPLANNED loss of all in-plant radio frequencies.
Nor Applicable.
Initlatin I Condition 3.
The ICS is capable of displaying requested data.
On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of >75% of the MeR annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75%
of safety system Indications for> 15 minutes with a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS unavailable.
(1 and 2 and 3):
1.
UNPLANNED loss of >75% of both channels of MCR annunciator windows AND the annunciator printer AND the annunciator CRT in the horseshoe for::> 15 minutes OR ::> 75% of safety system indicators lor >
15 minutes.
2.
SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is required (> shift complement) to safely operate the unit.
On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of > 75% of the MeR annunciators or > 75% of safety system indications for > 15 minutes and ICS ava ilable.
(1 and 2 and 3):
3.
(a orb) a.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.
OR b.
Loss of ICS.
1.
UNPLANNED loss of >75% of both channels of MeR annunciator windows AND the annunciator printer AND the annunciator CRT in the horseshoe for > 15 minutes OR > 75% of safety system indicators for
> 15 minutes.
- 2. SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is required (> shift complement) to safely operate the unit.
3.
Inability to directly monitor any of the following CS Fs:
Subcriticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory
- 4. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.
- 2. Loss of ICS.
3, 2,
4 2,
2, Refer to *Fission ProductBam"erMatrix* (Section 1) and "Radiological Effluents* (Section7) and Continuein This Column.
4 4
1, 3,
3, 1,
On either unit an Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANS IENT In progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4):
1.
Loss of> 75% of MeR annunciator windows AND the annunciator printer AND the annunciator CRT in the 1,
horseshoe OR > 75% of safetysystem indications.
Page 130f47 Revision 39
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX ISEQUOYAH EPIP-1 Initiatin I Condition b.
Specific actNity > 1DOtE....Cilgm with Tave ~500 D F.
- 1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a or b):
a.
Dose equivalent Iodine (1-131) >0.35....Cilg m for
> 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or in excess of TIS Figure 3.4-1 with Tave ~ 500 of.
Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds LeO (Ref. r to SQN Tech. Spec. 3.4.8):
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix* (section 1) and Continuein This Column.
Referto "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix ~ (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
3 Initiatin I Condition 1.
Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing following auto trip signal.
Reactor power> 5% and not decreasing after VALID auto trip signal but a manual trip from the Control Room Is successful. (1 or 2) 2.
Manual trip in the Main Control Room successfully reduces reactor power 5 5%.
Refer to"Fission Product Bamer Matnx ~ (Section 1).
NOTE:
Although a mode change will occur, this event will still be d assified and declared as an ALERT.
b.
CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H.l) a.
CSF status tree indicatesCore Cooling Red (FR-C.l).
2.
(a or b) 1.
FR-S.l entered and immediate operator actions did not result in a reactor power of s 5% and decreasing.
NOTE:
Although a mode change may occur before classification thisevent will stillbe classified and declared as SAE.
Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID auto and manual trip signals.
Reactor power> 5% and not decreasing after VALID trip signals and loss of core coo ling capability.
(1 and 2):
2 1
1 1,
(
Page 140147 Revision 39
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I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 l
1, 2,
3, 4
Initiatin I Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix* (Section 1) and Continue in ThisColumn.
Refer to ~Fission Product Barrier Matrix * (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Res unid entified or pressure boundary leakage
> 10 GPM.
1.
Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.) > 10 GPM as indicated by (a or b):
a.
SI-O PS-068-137.0 results.
b.
With ReS temperature and PZR level stable. the VeT level on 1I-62-129 or 1I-62-130 is dropping at a rate > 10 GPM.
Referto 'Shutdown Systems Degradation" (section 8.3).
1, 2,
3, 4
Initiatin I Condition Refer to "Fission ProductBarrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" (Section 1)and Continue in This Column.
Refer to -FissionProduct Barrier Matrix- (section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Res Identified leakage > 25 GPM.
1.
Identified ReS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)
> 25 GPM as Indicated by (a or b):
a.
SI-QPS-Q6ll-137.0 results.
b.
Level rise in excess of 25 GPM into PRT, RCDT or eves holdup tank (Refer to TI-28).
Refer to *Shutdown Systems Degradation" (Section 6.3).
Page 15 of 47 Revision 39
(
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Diesel Generator Bldg.
RWST Intake Pumping Station Comrron Sta. ServoXfmr's Condensate Storage Tanks Iniliatin I Condilion Control Building Auxiliary Building Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment ERCW Pumping Station Addl Equipment Bldgs.
Turbine failure results In cas ing penetration or main generator sea l damage.
1.
Turbine failure whichresults in penetration of the turbine casing or damage to main generator seals.
Refer to "Hazards and SED Judgment" (Section 4.3)
Turbine failure has gen erated projectiles that cause visible damage to any area containing safety related equipment.
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to "Fission ProductBarrier Matrix* (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
1.
Turbine generated PROJECTILES have resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following areas:
3 3
1, Inilialin I Condilion 2.
Safety injection has initiated or is required.
UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the main steam system resulting in a rapid ReS cooldown and safety injecti on InJtlatlon. (1 and 2):
1.
Rapid depressurization of any or all steam generators or the main steam system to < 600 psig on PI*1-2A, 28 or 9A,96 or 20A. 208 or 27A, 276.
Refer to "Fission Product Bam"er Matrix ~ (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to "Fission ProductBarrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continuein This Column.
Refer to *Fission Product Barrier Matrix ~ (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
3 2,
1, l
Page 16 of 47 Revision 39
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I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I l
1, 2,
3, 4
Inltlatin I Condition Not Applica ble.
Not Applicable.
Not Applicable.
Safety Limits have been exceeded. (1 or 2):
1.
The ccmbinaton of thermal power, Res temperature and ReS pressure > safety limit indicated by SON Tech. Spec. Figure 2.1-1 "Reactor Core Safety limit",
2.
ReS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit
(> 2735 psig).
Page 17 of 47 Revision 39
(
l ISEQUOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX This Page Intentionally Blank Page 18 of 47 I EPIP-1 I Revision 39
I SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
(
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2
2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3
3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4
4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED JUdgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5
5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5.2 Tornado 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6
6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7
7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage l
Page 19 of47 Revision 39
Definitions and Abbreviations:
(
ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 l
BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB viole ntly protesting cnslte operations or activities at the site.
CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CON FINEMENT BOUNQARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate. MP C lid (ind uding the vent and drai n port cov er plates). MPC closure ring, and associated welds.
CRInCAL-SAFETV FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function reql.ired to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. Thereare six CSFs; Subcrilicalily. Core Cooling, Heat Sink., Pressuri zed Thermal Shock,
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (Re S).
EVENT: Assessmentof an EVE NT commenceswhen recogn ition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions assodated with the event exist. Implicit in this defi nition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB) : That area surround ing the reactor, in which the reacl.or licenses has the auth orit y 10determil'le all acti vities including exd usion or remo val of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based 00 radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and fo r desig n calculatio ns, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, ¥iden!. unconfined combustion. or a catastrophic failu re d pres surized or electri cal equ ipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially dam age pernenent structures or equipment.
EXTORnON: An anempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
FAULTE.D: (Steam Generato r) Existence of secondary side lea kage (e,g.,
steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrea se in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not con stitute a fire Observation of name is prefe rred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke andlor heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at co ncentrations> than the LO'vVER EXPLOS IVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE; A persorqs} held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site HOSTILE ACTION: An act tow ard a nudear plant or its per sonnel that includes the use of violent force to dest roy equ ipment, take hostages, and/or intimdate the licensee to achieve an end. Thi s indudes attack by air, land or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive fo rce. Other acts that satis fy the overall intent may be induded.
HosnLE ACTION shou ld NOT be construed to includ e acts of civil disobedience or felonious ads that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power plant.
HOSnLE FORCE: One or more indivi duals who are engaged in a dete rrrined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing des truction.
IMMINENT: Within two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: Wlen the specifi ed restoration acncnts) does not resu lt in a reduction in the level of seven ty of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition wit hin 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters. rad iation monitor readings or personnel observations that ide ntify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classifi cati on.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual prese nt in the protected area wit hout authorization.
ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculati on Manual is a suPPOrting dOOJmerTI to the Tech Specs. that contai n Red Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calClJlating routine gaseous and liquid effluent otfsite doses and monitor alarmttrip setpoints.
ORANGE PATH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-o which indicates that the CSF (s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is requi red PROJECTILE: An ObjeCt eject ed, th rown or launched towards a plan t structure resLiting in damage suffICientto cause coocem regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliabi lity 01 safety eq uipment oontained the rein. The source of the projeclile ma y be onsite or off site.
PROTECTE.D AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to whid'l acc ess is controlled.
RCS: The ReS prim ary side and its connections up to and ind uding the pressurizer safety and relief valv es, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolatioo valves.
RED PATH: Monitoring cI one or more CSFs by FR-Owhich indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt ope rato r ecnco is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary 10 seco ndary leakage of a magn itude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperalion Of plant eql.ipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event invdving one or more of the fo llowing : (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2)
Electrical load rejection >25% fun elect rical load; (3) Reactor Tri p; (4) Safety Injection System Activat ion; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations ?:10%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTE CTE D AREA by a body of wor1o:ers 10 enforce compliance with dema nds made on TVA. The STR IKE ACTION must th reaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., d1Iorine, CO::, etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintena nce. Events that result in co rrective or mitigative actions being taken in accord ance Voith abnorma l or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release d radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release nee not been authorized by a Discha rge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releas es, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoinl.s, minimum dilution now, minim um release limes, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication, report or cond ition is considered to be VALI D when it is condusively verified by (1) an inst rume nt cha nl'lel check, or (2) indicali oo on related or redundant indicatcn, or (3) by direct observation by plant person nel.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely asse ssment within 15 min utes.
VISIBLE OAMAGE: Damage to equ ipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or ana lysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safely structure, system, or com ponent. Examp le damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, dent ing, penetration, rupture, crack ing, or paint blistering. S urface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Arty area within the PROTECTED AR EA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the fai lure, de structi on, or release of, could direclly or indirectly endanger the publ ic health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Page 20 of 47 Revision 39
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I SEQUOYAH
(
1, 2,
3, 4
3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)
Initiatin I Condition Prolonged loss of all offsite and all anslte AC power to either unit. (1 and 2):
1.
Both unit related 6.9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.
2.
la or b) a.
Core Cooling Status Tree Red Of Orange Path.
b.
Restoration of either a 6.9 KV shutdown board or a 6.9 KV unit board is not likely within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />sof the IOS5.
G E
N E
R A
L EPIP-1 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
Initiatin I Condition Not ApphcabJe loss of all offslte and all cnelte AC pOWGr to either unit for> 15 Minutes.
1, 1.
Both unit related 6.9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.
2, 3,
4 S
I T
E A
R E
A Not Applicable.
1, 2,
3, 4
Loss of cttaite power to entler unit with degraded onelte AC power for> 15 minutes. ([1a and 1b] or 2):
la. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.
lb. One (1) unit related 6.9 KV shutdown board de-energized for > 15 minutes.
2.
Any AC power condition lasting > 15 minutes where a single additional failure will result in a unit blackout.
Loss of off51te power to either unit for> 15 minutes.
(1 and 2):
5, 6,
A L
E R
T UNPLANNED loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to either unit for> 15 minutes.
1.
Both unit related 6.9KV shutdown boards de-energized for> 15 minutes.
Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6.1) and continue in this column.
UNPLANNED loss of all offslte power to either unit for
- 015 m inutes. (1 and 2):
l 1,
2, 3,
4 1.
All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for > 15 minutes.
2.
Both unit related 6.9KV shutdownboardsare energized.
N a
u E
D E
F U
E L
E D
- 1. All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de-energized for
> 15 minutes.
- 2. One (1) unit related 6.9KV shutdown board de-energized for > 15 minutes.
Page 21 of 47 Revision 39
(
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX G
E N
E R
A L
Inilialin
/ Condllion Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix n {Section 1) and "Loss of Communication" (2.2) and Continue in This Column.
3.3 Loss of DC Power II!I~
1, 2,
Loss of all vital DC power for> 15 minutes.
1.
Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V DC vital battery board buses IS!ill! II and III and IV for > 15 minutes.
S I
T E
3, 4
Also Refer to"Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1),
"Loss of communceuon: (2.2) and, "Loss of Instrumentation 6 (2.1) and Continue in This Column.
A R
E A
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix* (Section 1J, "Loss of Communication" (2.2), and "Loss of Instrumentation"
/2.1).
A L
E R
T UNPLANNED loss of a requi red train of DC power for
> 15 minutes: (1 or 2).
t.
Voltage < '05 V DC on 125Vde vitalbatteryboard buse s I and III for > 15 minutes.
5, 6
2.
Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V de vital battery board busses II and IV fop 15 minutes.
No U
E l
Page 22 of 47 Revision 39
I SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
(
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2
2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3
3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4
4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5
5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5.2 Tornado 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6
6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7
7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage l
Page 23 of 47 Revision 39
ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Definitions and Abb reviations:
BOMB: An explosive devi ce. (See EXPLOSION)
CML DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or morepersons within the EAB violently protes ting onsite operations or activities at the site.
CON FINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY oonsists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain portcover plates). MPC closure ring, and associatedwelds.
CRmCAL*SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFsl: A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity 10the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Press urized Thermal Shock, Integ rity (Containment) and InventOfy (Re S).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recogn ition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is th e need fo r timely assessment wit hin 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY lEAB): That area surro unding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities incl uding exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels. based on radiological field measureme nts and dose assessments, and for desi gn calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical eq uipment that imparts energ y of suffICient force to potentially damage permanent structures or eq uipment.
EXTORll0N: An attempt to cause an action 81the site by threat or force.
FAULTED; (Steam Generator) Existence of seco ndary side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed line break) that resu lts in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generato r pressu re orthe steam gen erator being completely depressurized.
FIRE~ Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts Or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.
Obs ervation of name is preferred but is NOT required if la rge quantit ies of smoke and/or heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at con cen trations> than the LOweR EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the sile 10ensure that de mands will be mel by th e site.
HOSllLE ACTlON: An act tCF-Nard a nuclear plant or its personne l lhat includes the use cl violent force to dest roy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land or water; uSing guns, expl osives, proje ctiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destruct ive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included.
HOSTILE ACllON sholAd NOT be oonstrued to indude acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nucle ar power plant.
HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined ass ault, overt ly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weap ons capable of killing, maiming, or caus ing dest ruct ion.
IMM INENT: Wrthin two hou rs INEFFECTIVE: lMlen the specified restoration adion(s) does not result in a red uction in the level of severit y c:J1he RED or ORANGE PATH eonlition withi n 15 min utes from identificat ion of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH INlnATlNG CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classi ficat ion.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ISFSI : Independent Spe nt Fuel Storag e Installation.
ODeM: Offs ite Dose Calculation Manual is a support ing document to the Tech Specs. that contain Red Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calaJlating routine gaseous and liquid effluent Offsite ocses and monito( a1arm'trip setpoints.
ORANGE PATH : Monitorin g of one or more CSFs by FR-o which indicates that the CSF{s) is under severechallenge; prompt operator action is required.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structu re resulting in dama ge sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected struct ure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therei n. The scarce of the projectile may be onstteor offsite.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the secu rity fence and to which access is controlled.
RCS : The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pres surize r safety and relief valves, and other con necti ons up to and including the primary and serondary isolation vaves.
RED PATH; Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-Owhi ch indicat es that the CSF(s) is under extreme cha llenge; prompt operator actio n is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a mag nitude greater than the capaci ty one chargi ng pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, rri salignmeot, or misoperalion of plant equ ipme nt with the intent to render the equipme nt inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPlANNED eve nt involving one or more of the followi ng: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)
Electrical load rejecti on >25% fun electrical loa d; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injecti on System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations ;:0:10%.
STRIKE ACTION: A wOl'k stop page within the PROTECTE D AREA by a body of workers to enforce com pliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIK E ACTION must threaten to interru pt normal plant operatio ns.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhal ation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO:z, etc.)
UNPlANNED: An event or action that is nat the expected result of normal operations, testi ng or mainte nance. Events that result in corecnve or rritigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonito red releases, or planned releases that exceed a condi tion specified on the OP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution now, minim um release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VAUO: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VAllO when it is con d uSively veri fied by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indicat ion on related or redun dant indicators, or (3) by direct observatio n by plant personnel.
Implicit in this definilion is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage 10 equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing. or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regard ing the cont inued operability or reliab ility of affected safety structure, system. or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, de nting, penetration, rupture, aacking, or paint blistering. Surface blemi shes (e.g., paint ctl ippi ng, samches, etc.) should NOT be ind uded as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or materiel whictl the failu re, destructi on, or release of, could di rectly or indirectly endanger the publi C health and safely by exposure to radiation.
Page 24 of 47 Revision 39
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 1 EPIP-1 I ISEQUOYAH c
l A
L L
A L
L Inltlalln
'Condition Refer fa 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix ~ (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to 'Control Room Evacuation, U (4.5) and Fission Product Barrier Matrix* (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4~1 that Is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 and 2):
1.
FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1.
2.
(a or b) a.
VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structureor safety related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE.
OR b.
Control room indication of degraded safety system or componentresponse due to the FIRE.
FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of control room notification or verification of control room alarm.
A L
L Inillalln
'Condition Refer to"Fission Product Barrier Matrix." (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to wFission Product Barrier Matrix* (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
EXPLOSION In any of the areas listed In Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 Bnd 2):
1.
EXPLOSION in any afthe areas listed in Table 4-1.
2.
(a or b}
a.
VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures or to safetyrelated equipment in the specifiedarea is due to the EXPLOSION.
- b. Controlroom indication of degraded safety system or componentresponse due to the EXPLOSION.
Refer to *Security" (Section 4.6).
UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure Q.! equ ipment.
Refer to"Security"(Section 4.6).
Page 25 of 47 Revision 39
(
ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 l
A L
L A
L L
Initlatln f Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix* (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continuein This Column.
UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within a facility structure containing safety related equipment or associated with safe operation of the plant
- 1. Plant personnel reportthe averageof three (3) readingstakenin an - 10 ft. TriangularArea is > 25%
LowerExplosive Limit as indicated on the monitoring instrumentwithin any building listedin Table 4-2.
Refer rc the MSDS for the LEL.
A.
UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS withIn the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY that may affect normal operations.
1.
Plant personnel reporttheaverageof three readingstaken in an - 10 ft. Triangular Area is >
25% of the LowerExplosive Limit, as indicatedon the monitoring instrument within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B).
B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State officials that a large offslte FLAMMABLE GAS release has occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4-B) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Flgur. 4-B) In concentrations> 25% of Lower Explosive Limit.
Refer 10 the MSDS for the LEL.
A L
L Initiatln f Condition Refer to "Fission ProductBarrier Matnx ~ (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Referto'Hssion Product Barrier Matrix- (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Release of TOXIC GAS or smoke within a facility structure which prohibits safe operation of systems required to establish gr maintain Cold SID.
(1 and 2 and 3):
1.
Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS or smoke within any building listed in Table 4-2.
2.
(a or b) a.
Plant personnel report severe adverse health reactions due to TOXIC GAS or smoke (l.e..
burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness).
OR b.
Sampling indication> Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL).
3.
Plant personnel unabe to perform actions to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.
Refer to the MSDS for the PEL.
A. Safe operations impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS or smoke con centrations within a facility structure listed in Table 4-2.
B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State officials that an offaite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4-B) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-8) in concentrations > the Permissible Exposure limit (PEL) caus ing a site evacuation.
Refer to the MSDSfor the PEL.
Page 26 of 47 Revision 39
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Ma trix ~ (Secb'on 1) and Continue in This Column.
EPIP-1 4.6 Security Initiatin f Condition Security Event Resulting In Loss of Physical Control of the Plant: (1 or 2):
1.
A HOSTILE FORCE has taken control of plant equipment such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS.
2.
Loss of physical control of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling systems due to HOSTILE ACTION such that imminent fueldamageis likely.
A L
L--
G E
N E
R A
L Initiatin f Condition 4.5 Control Room Evacuation
- !'I I SEQUOYAH
(
A L
L Evacuation of the control room has been initi ated and control of all necessary equ ipment has not been established within 15 minutes of staffing the auxiliary control room. (1 and 2):
1.
AOP-C.04 "Shutdown from Aux Control Room-entered.
2.
Control has not been established wtthin 15 minutes of staffingthe auxiliary control room and completing transfe r of switches on panels L11A and L11B tothe AUX position.
S I
T E
A R
E A
Notification that HOSTlLE ACTlON is occurring or has occurred within the Plant PROTECTED AREA (PAl:
(1 or 2 or 30r 4)
A 1.
Air attack (large frame aircraft impacting the PA.)
L 2.
Land based attack L
(HOSTILE FORCE penetrating the PA.)
3.
\\Naterbome attack (HOSTILE FORCE onwater penetrating the PA l 4.
BOMB expk>sionbreaching the PA orwithin the PA.
Referto Figure 4-A For B Drawing of PROTECTED AREA.
A L
L Evacuation of the Control Room Is Required.
1.
AOP-C.04 "Shutdown from Aux Control Room" has been en tered.
A L
E R
T Notification that HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the Owner Controlled Area (OCA Is that area between the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY and tho PROTECTEO AREA): (lor 2) 1.
A validated notification fromNRC of a large frame aircraftthreat less than 30 minutes away.
2.
Any of the following:
Air attack (large frame aircraft impacting the OCA.)
Land based attack (HOSTilE FORCE progressing across OCAor directing projectiles at the site.)
Waterborne attack (HOSTILE FORCE on water attempting forced entry or directing projectiles at the site.)
BOMB(s) discovered or exploding within the OCA.
Refer to Figure 4-A For a Drawing of PROTECTED AREA and Figure 4-8 for a Drawing of EXCLUSION AREA BOUNOARY Not Applicable.
Confirmed security event which Indicates a potential degradation In the level of safety of the plant:
(l or 2)
N a
u E
A L
L 1.
Security Shift Supervisor reports one Q!: more of the events listed in Table 4-3.
2.
A validated notification from NRC providing infonnation of any aircraft threat.
l Page 27 of 47 Revision 39
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 1 EPIP-1 I
I SEQUOYAH G
E N
E R
A L
Initlalin I Condition Events are In process Q[ have occurred which involve Actual Q[ Imminent Substantial Core Degradation Q[.Melting Wrth Potential for Lossof ContainmentIntegrityor HOSTilE ACTION that results in an ad ualloss of physical control of the facility. Releasescan be reasonablyexpected to exceed EPA Plume ProtectiveActionGuidelines ExposureLevels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUND ARY. refer to Figure 4-8.
A L
L 4.7 SED Judgment
-~
~
A L
L Events are in process Q[ have occurredwhidl involve Actual Q!: Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public or HOSTILE ACTION that result in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipmentthat could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevents effective access to equipment needed for the Protection of the Public. Any releases are not expectedto result in ExposureLevels which Exceed EPA Plume ProtectiveAction Guidelines ExposureLevelsbeyondthe EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY. Refer to Figure 4-6.
S I
T E
A R
E A
A L
L Events are in process Q!: haveoccurred which involveActual Q[ Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safetyof the Plant or a Security Event that involves probable life threatening risk tosite personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited tosmall fractons ofthe EPA Plume ProtectiveAction Guidelines Exposure Levels.
A L
E R
T A
L L
Events are in process Q[ have occurred which indicate a PotentialDegradationof the Level of Safetyof the Plant or indicate a SecurityThreat to facility protectionhas been initiated. No releases of Radioactive Materialrequiring Offsite Response Q!.Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.
N o
U E
l Page 28 of 47 Revision 39
l ISEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment Auxiliary Building Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station ERCW Pumping Station Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings CSSTs RWST Condensate Storaoe Tanks TABLE 4-2 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS OR SMOKE EALs Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment Auxiliary Building Turbine Building Diesel Generator BUilding Intake Pumping Station ERCW Pumping Station Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings CDWE Buildino TABLE 4*3 SECURITY EVENTS
- a. SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has occurred or is occurring within the PROTECTED AREA
- b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION situation that threatens to interrupt plant operations
- c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY and PROTECTED AREA
- d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA which threatens to interrupt normal plant operations fjudgm ent based on behavior of strikers and/or intelligence received)
- e. Security force STRIKE ACTION or unavailability of security force that threatens to interrupt plant operations.
f.
A credible site-specific security threat notification.
Page 29 of 47 I EPIP-1 I Revision 39
Figure 4-A Protected Area EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 1 EPIP-1 I ISEQUOYAH I
(
Figure 4-B Exclusion Area Boundary l
Exclusion Area Boundary Page 30 of 47 Revision 39
ISEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
(
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2
2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3
3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4
4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5
5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5.2 Tornado 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level Hiqh Fioure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6
6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7
7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage l
Page 31 of 47 Revision 39
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX
(
! SEQUOYAH Definitions and Abbreviations:
BOMB: An explOSive device. (Se e EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty(20) or more personswithin the EAB violently protesting ensile operations or activities at the site.
CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUN DARY consists of MPC shell. bottom baseplate. MPC lid (induding the vent and drain portcover plates). M PC dcsure ring, and associated welds.
CRmC A L~FETY FUNCTION (CSFsl: A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioacti\\lity to the envi ronment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cool ing, Heat Sink. Pressurized Therm al Shock, Integ rity (Containment) and Inventory (Re S).
EVENT: Asse ssment of an EVENT commences when recog nition is made that one or more of the Initiating conditions associ ated with the event exist. Irnplidt in this defi nition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB) : That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to cIe1erm ine all activities induding exdusion or removal of personnel and properly from the area. For purpos es of Emergen cy Action Levels, based on radiolog ical field measur ements end dose assessments, and fo r design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as 1he EAB.
EXPLOSION : Rapi d, violent, unconfined com bustion, or a catastrophic failure d pressurized or electrical equipment that imp arts energy d sufficient force to polentially damage permanent structures or equ ipmen t.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
FAULTED: (Steam Gen erator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed line brea k) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam gen erator pressure or the steam generator being com pletely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characteriz ed by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated e1edrical components do not constitute a fire.
Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large qua ntities 0(
smoke andfor heat are obs erved.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Com bustible gases at concentrations > than the LOVV'ER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOS TAGE: A persoo(s) held as leverage against 1he site to ens ure that demands wi ll be met by the site HOS TILE ACTION: An ad toward a nudear plant or its personnel that includes the use Of violent force to destroy eqUipment. take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee 10 achieve an end. This includes atta ck by eir. land or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehides, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be lnduded.
HOSTIL E ACllON should NOT be cons1rued to indude acts of civil disobed ience 0( felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nucl ear power plant.
HOS TILE FORCE: One Of more individuals 'Nho are engaged in a deterrrined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weepcos capable of killi ng, maiming, or causing destruction.
IMMINENT: Within two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: When the specifi ed restorati on action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED 0( ORANG E PATH condition with in 15 minutes from identif ication of the CSF Status Tree REO or ORANGE PATH.
INInA TIN G CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation rronftor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes OfEmergency Plan Clas sificati on.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hos1ile individual present in the protected area without authorizat ion.
ISFSt Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installatio n EPIP-1 ODeM: Offsite Dose Calcul ation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring corrtroIs, and methodology for calculating rout ine gaseous and liquid effluent otfsite dos es and monitor alarml1rip setpoinls.
ORANGE PATH:
Monitori ng of one or more CSFs by FR-Owhich indicat es that the CSF(s ) is under severe challenge; prompt operator actio n is required.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected. thrown or launch ed towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern rega rding 1he integrity of the affect:ed structure or the operability or reliability of safety equ ipment contained therein. The sourceof the projectile may be oosite or offsite.
PROTECTED AREA : The area encompas sed by the secu rity fe nce and 10 which access is controlled.
RCS : The RCS primary side and its connection s up to and ind uding the pre ssurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and induding the primary and secondary isolation valves.
RED PATH: Monitoring Ofone or more CSFs by FR*Owhich indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challeng e; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to seco ndary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one cha rging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment. or misop eration Ofplant equipment with the intent to render the equ ipment inoperable.
SIGNIACANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involvi ng one or more of the followi ng: (1) An automatic turtine runback > 15% 1henna l react or powe r; (2)
Electrical load rejection >25% fun erectrtceuced: (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activat ion; (5) Thermal Power Osci llatio ns ~ 1 0%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a bOdy of wo rkers 10 enforce com pliance with demands made 00 TVA. The STR IKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXl C GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalatio n 0(
skin cont act (e.g., chlorine, CCh, etc }
UNPLANNED: An event or action 1hat is not the expected result of norma l operations. testing or maintena nce. Eve nts that result in correcti ve or mitigative actio ns being taken in acco rdance with abn ormal or emergen cy proced ures are UNPLANNED.
UNPlANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authori zed by a Disd1arge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specifi ed on the OP, (e.g., alann setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maxi mum release rates, and/or discharge of inco rrect tank).
VALID: An indicat ion, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is coocIusively verified by (1) an instrument chan nel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observatioo by plant personnel.
Impli cit in this definition is the need for timely assessment wit hin 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equ ipment that is readily observable without meas ureme nts, testing, or analysis. Damage is suffi cient to cause con cern regarding the conti nued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or com ponent. Exa mple damage includes defo rmation due to heat or impad, de nting, penetr ation, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chippin g, scratches, etc.) should NOT be induded as visible dam age.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AR EA which contains equi pment. syst ems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release Of, cou ld diredly or indirectly endanger th e public health and safety by exposure to radiat ion.
Page 32 of 47 Revision 39
5.2 Tornado Inilialin I Condilion Referto"Fission ProductBam"erMattix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
G E
N E
R A
L EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX
___________1 EPIP-1 1
Initialin I Condilion Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
5.1 Earthquake l!ll ISEQUOYAH
(
Refer to -Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and COntinue in This Column.
S I
T E
Refer to -FisskNl Product Barner Matrix*
(section 1) and Continuein This Column.
A R
E A
Earthquake detected by site seismic Instrumentation.
(1 and 2):
Tornado or high winds strikes any structure listed In Table 5-1 and results In VISIBLE DAMAGE. (1 and 2):
A L
L 1.
Panel XA-55-15B alarm window 30 (E-2) plus window 22 (D-l) activated.
2.
(a orb)
- a. Ground motion sensed by plant personnel.
A L
E R
T A
L L
1.
Tornado or high wind s (sustained >80 rn.p.h.> one minute on the plant com puter) strikes any structu re listed in Table 5-1.
2.
(aorb) a.
Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE.
b.
National Earthquake Informa tion Center at 1-(303) 273--8500 can confirm the event.
- b. Control room indications of degraded safety system or component response due to event.
Note:
National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423)-586-8400, can provide additional info.
A L
L Earthquake detected by site seismic Instru ments.
(1 and 2):
1.
Panel XA-55-15B alarm window 22 (0.1) activated.
- 2. (a orb) a.
Ground motion sensed by plant personnel.
No U
E A
L L
Tornado within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.
1.
Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted withinthe EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 5-A) b.
National Earthquake Infonnation Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.
Page 33 0147 Revision 39
(
ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I A
L L
A L
L Initiatin I Condition Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix ~ (section 1).
Refer to the "Fission Product Barrier Matrix- (section 1).
Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) any plant structure listed in Table 5-1 res ulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE. II and 2):
1.
Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECnLE has impactedany structure listed in Table 5-1.
2.
(8 orb) 8.
Confirmed report ol VISIBLE DAMAGE.
b.
Control Room indications of degraded safety system or component response due to the event within any structure listed in Table 5-1.
Aircraft crash or projectile impact (strikes) within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.
1.
Plant personnel report aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 5-A).
A L
L A
L L
Initiatin I Condition Refer to "FissionProduct Barrier MatTix*
(section 1) and Continuein ThisColumn.
Referto "Fission ProductBam"er Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in ThisColumn.
River reservoir level is at Stage 11 Flood Warning as reported by River OperatIons.
River reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning as reported by River Operations.
Page 34 of 47 Revision 39
r I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I l
A L
L A
L L
Initlatln
/ Condition Refer to -Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continuein This Column.
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Ma trix ~
(Section 1) and Continue in ThisColumn.
Rtver reservoir level Is < 670 Feet as repo rted by Rtver Operations.
River reservoir level is < 673 Feet as reported by River Operations.
A L
L Page 35 of 47 Initiatin
/ Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix*
(Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix*
(Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Watercraft strikes the ERCW pumping station resulting In a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). (1 and 2):
1.
Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck the ERCW pumping station.
2.
(a orb/
a.
ERCW supply header pressure Train A 1(2}-PI-67-493A is < 15 psig.
OR b.
ERCW supply header pressure Train B 1(2}-PI-67-488A is < 15 psig.
Revision 39
(
I SEQUOYAH I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX TABLE 5-1 Plant Structure Associated With Tornado/Hiah Wind and Aircraft EALs I EPIP-1 I Unit #1 Containment Auxiliary Building l
Turbine Building RWST Unit #2 Containment Diesel Generator Bldg.
CDWE Building Condensate Storage Tanks Control Building ERCW Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs Intake Pumping Station Common Station Service Transformer's Figure 5-A SEQUOYAH EXCLUSIONAREA BOUNDARY Exclusion Area Boundary Page 36 of 47 Revision 39
I SEQUOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2
2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3
3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4
4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-8 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5
5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5.2 Tornado 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6
6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7
7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Leveis Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage l
Page 37 of 47 Revision 39
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX
(
I SEQUOYAH Definitions and Abb reviations:
BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSIO N)
CIVIL DISTUR BANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more perso ns within the EAB violently prot esting onslte operations or activities at the site.
CON FINEMENT BOUNDA RY: Spent Fuel S10rage Cask CONF INEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate. MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cov er plates), MPC closure ring, and associated we lds.
CRITICAl*SAFETY FUNCTlON (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent signifICant release d core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs ; Subcrrticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pre ssurized Thermal Shock, Integ rity (Containment) and Inventory (Re S).
EVENT; Assessment of an EVENT comm ence s when recognition is mad e that one or more of the initiating conditions associated wit h the event exist. Implici1 in this definition is the need lor timely assessment withi n 15 minutes,
EXCLUSION AR EA BOUN DARY (EAB): That area surroullCling the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the auth ority to determine all activities induding exd usion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Acti on Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defin ed as the EA B.
EXPLOSION : Rapid, violent. unconfined combustion, ora catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that Imparts energy of sufficien t force to potentially damage permanent structures or equ ipment.
EXTORnON: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,
stea m or feed line break ) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generato r pressure or the stea m generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heal and rtght. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or o verheated elect rical co mponents do not COflstilute a fire.
Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT requ ired if large quantities of smoke andfor heat are obs erved.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations> than the LOIAER EXP LOSIVE LIM IT (LEl).
HOS TAGE : A person(s) held as leve rage against the site to ensure that demands wil l be met by the site.
HO STlL E ACnON : An act toward a nudear plant or its personnel that irdudes the use cl violent force to destroy equ ipment. take hostages. and/or intimidate the licensee to ach ieve an end. This indudes attack. by air, land or wate r; using guns, explosives, projecl:iles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be includ ed HOSnLE ACnON should NO T be constru ed to inctude acts of civil disobedience or felonious ads that are not part of a concerted attack on the nucreer power plant.
HOSn LE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing. maimi ng, or causing destruction.
IMMINENT: 'vVithin two hours.
INE FFE cnvE: VVhen the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH cond ition wit hin 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INITl AnNG CONOmONS: Plant Parameters, radiation rTKX'Iitor read ings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes cl Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected are a wit hout authorizatio n.
ISFSI : Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
EPIP-1 OD CM: Offsite Dose cetcoretcn Manual is a supporti ng document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls. and methodologyfor calculating routine gase ous and liquid effluent offsite doses and mon itor alarmltrip setpoin ts.
ORA NGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-Owhich indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe cha llenge ; prompt operator action is required.
PROJ ECn LE : All object ejected, th rown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage suffici ent to ca use co ncern regarding the integrity of the affected structure orthe opera bility or reliability aIsafety equipment cont ained therein. The source al the projectile may be onsite or offsi te.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the sac urity fence and to which access is controlled.
Re s : The Re S primary side and its conn ections up to and including the pressurtzer safety and relief valves, and other con nections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-owhich indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is reqUired.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equ ipment 'Nilh the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SIGNIACANT TRANSIENT: An UNPlANNED event involving one or more Of the following: (1) An automatic turbi ne runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)
Electrical load rejection >25% fuJietectncenoac.(3) Rea ctor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation: (5) Thermal Power Osci llations ~ 1 0%.
STRl KE ACn ON: A work stoppage within the PRO TECTED AREA by a body Of workers to enforce com pliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten 10interrupt nannal plant operations.
TOXIC GA S: A gas that is dange rous to life or limb by reason of inhalatiOn or skin contac1 (e.g., chlori ne, COr, et c.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result cl normal operation s. testing or mainte nance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in acc ordance with abnormal oremergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactMty is UNPlANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Per mit (DP ). lfll)licit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitorect releases, or planned releases that exceed a cooclition specifi ed on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, max imum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tan k).
VAUD: An indication, report or condition is conetcered to be VALID when it is condusively verified by (1) an instrument cha nnel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
VISI BLE DAMAGE: Damag e to equ ipment that is read ily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is suffici ent to cause concern regarding the conti nued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Examp le damage includes deform ation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA : Any area within the PROTECTED AREA wh ich contains eqlipment. systems. devices, or mat erial which the fa ilure, destrucl:ion, or release of, could directly or indirectly endangel'the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Page 38 of 47 Revision 39
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.
I EPIP-1 I 6.2 Loss of SID Capability Initlatln I Condition Not i'pp(/C8bJe G
E N
E R
A L
Inltlatin I Condition 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems
_r----
mmn I SEQUOYAH
(
5, 6
loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover active fuel in the reactor vessel.
(1 and 2 and 3):
1.
Loss of RHR capability.
2.
VALID indicationthat reactor vesselwater lelJel
< el. 695'.
3.
Incore TCs (if available) indicate Res temperature
> 200 of.
Note: If containment is open refer to *Gaseous Effluents*
(Section 7.1) and continue in this column.
S I
T E
A R
E A
1, 2,
3, 4
Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain hot shutdown. (1 and [2a or 2b] ):
1.
Hot shutdown required.
2a. CSF status treeindicated Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1).
OR 2b. CSF status tree indicates Heat SinkRed (FR-H.1)
(RHR shutdownroofing not in service).
Note: Refer to "ReactorProtection System Faifure ~
(Section 2.3) and Continue in This Column.
5, 6
Inability to maintain unit in cold shutdown when required (1 and 2):
1.
Cold shutdown required by Technical Specs.
2.
lncore'r es (if available) indicate core exit temperature
> 200 of.
Note: If containment is open refer to "Gaseous Effluents*
(Section 7.1) and continue in this column.
A L
E R
T 4
Compiete loss of function needed to ach ieve cold shutdown when cold shutdown requ ired by Tech.
Specs. (1 and 2 and 3):
- 1. Cold shutdownrequired by Tech. Specs.
- 2. Loss of RHR shutdown cooling capability.
- 3. Loss of secondary heat sink and maincondenser Note: Also refer to "Faifure of Rx Protection" (section 2.3) and Continue in This Column.
Not Applicable.
Inability to reach required shutdown within Tech.
Spec. IImtts.
N o
U E
1.
The unit has not been placed in the required mode within the time prescribed by the LeO action statement.
4 l
Page 39 0147 Revision 39
(
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX l
5, 6
Inltiatin I Condition Refer to ~Gaseous Effluents* (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.
Referto "Gaseous Effluents" (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.
Loss of REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM inventory with Inadequate makeup. (1 and 2 and 3):
1.
Reactor coolant system is pressurizedabove afmospbenc pressure.
2.
Unplanned decrease in ReS or pressurizer level requiring initiation of makeup to the ReS.
- 3. With reactorcoolant system temperaturestable, the pressurizer level continues to decreasefollowing initiation of Re S makeup.
Page 40 of 47 Revision 39
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I SEQUOYAH 1
1 EPIP-1 I
(
1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier (Modes 1-4) 2 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit 3
LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 4
HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED JUdgment Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 5
DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 River Level High 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A 6
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory 7
RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A Page 41 of 47 Revision 39
Definitions and Abbreviations:
(
ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 BOMB: An exposive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A gro up ottwenty (20) or more persons with in the EAB viole ntly protesting onsite ope ratio ns Of activi ties at the site.
CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: SpentFuel S10rageCask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate. MPC lid (ind ucling the vent and drain port cover plates). MPC closure ring, and eesoctetec welds.
CRl TlCAL-5AFETY FUNCTION ICSFsl: A plant safety functioo required to prevent significant release d core radioadMty to the environment. There are six CSFs; SUbcriticality, Core Cooling. Heat Sink, Pressu rized Thermal Shock,
Integ rity (Containment) and Inventory (Re S).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVE NT commences when recognition is made that one or more d the initiating ccodmons associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need fO(timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in wtJch the reect cr uceoses has the authority to eetermre all activities induding exclusion or remova l of personnel and prope rty from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radia ogical field mea surem ents and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPl0$10N: Rapid, violent, unconfined combu stion, or a cetasircohc failure of pressurized or electri cal eq uipment that imparts energy of suffICient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat Of force.
FAULTED; (Stea m Generator) Existence of seconda ry side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam ge nerator being completely depressurized.
FIRE : Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overtleat ed electrical compcoerte do not:constitute a fire.
Observation d name is prefe rred but is NOT required if large quantities 0(
smoke andlor heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations> tha n the LO'M:. R EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage aga inst the Site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
HOSTILE ACTION: An ad toward a nuclear plant or its personnel that inclu des the use of violent force to destroy equipment. lake hostages, andlor intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This indudes attack by air, land or water; using guns, explosive s, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included.
HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civ il disobedience or felo nious ad s that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power plant.
HOSTILE FORCE : One or more individuals who are engaged in a deterrrined esseut. overtly or by stealth and dece ption, equipped with suitable weapons capable d killing, maiming, or causing destruction.
IMMINENT: Wrthin two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: \\lVhen the specified restoration aclion{s) does not result in a reduct ion in the level of severity dthe RED or ORANG E PATH condition within 15 minutes from identfficatiorl of the CS F Status Tree REO or ORANGE PATH.
INIT1ATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes d Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSIONIINTRUOER: Suspected hostile individual prese nt in the protected area without authorizatio n.
ISFSI: Independ ent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ODCM : Offsite Dose Calcul ation Manual is a supporting docu ment to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring control s, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-Owhich indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator actio n is required.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structur e resUtin g in damage suffici ent to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability' or reliability of safety equipm ent contained therei n. The source 01the projectile may be ensue or offs ite.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.
RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and ind ucing the pressu rizer safety and relief valves. and other connections up to and induding the primary and secondary isolatiOn valve s.
REO PATH: Monitoring Ofone Of more CSFs by FR-o which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme chall enge; prompt operatoraction is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitUde greater tha n the capacity one Charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Delibe ra1edamage, misalignmerrt. Of misoperation of plant equipment INith the intent to render the equipme nt inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one Of more of the followin g: (1) An automati c turbine nmback >15% thermal reactor powe r; (2)
Electrical load rejection >25% full electri cal load; (3) ReactorTrip; (4) Safety Injection System Activati on; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations :l:10%.
STRIKE ACTION: A wo rk stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a bcxly Of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal pant opera tions.
TOXlC GAS : A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlori ne, C0:2, etc )
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result Ofnormal operations, testing or maintenan ce. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedu res are UNPLANNED.
UNPlANNED RELEASE: A release or radioactivity is UNPlANNED if the relea se has not been euthorized by a Disch arge Permit (OP). Implicit in this definition a-e urintentional release s, unmoritored releases, Of planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm selpoints, minimum dilution flow, minim um release time s, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect lank).
VAllO: An indication, report or condit ion is considered to be VALID when it is conclu sively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by dired. observation by plant personnel.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damag e to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficie nt to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affect ed safety structu re, system, or component. Exampl e damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, de nting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA : Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material wtJch the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safet y by exposure 10radiation.
Page 42 of 47 Revision 39
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 7.1 Gaseous Effluents EAB dose, resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity> 1 Rem TEDE or
> 5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of release. (1 or 2 or 3):
1.
A VAU D fad monitor reading exceeds the values under General Emergency in Table 7-1 for >15 min. unless assessment within that 15 min confi rms thai the criterion is notexce eded.
Q!l 2.
Field surveys indicate >1Reml hr 9amma or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-06 ).lei/em at the EAB (Fig. 7-A)
Q!l 3.
Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >1 Rem TEDE or >5 Rem thy roid COE for the actual or projected duration of the release (FIQ. 7-A).
EPIP-1 Initiatin I Condition 7.2 Liquid Effluents Not llcable I!!!!I G
E N
E R
A L
I Condition Inltlatin I
A L
L III_.
[SEQUOYAH
(
A L
L EAB dose resulting from an actual or Imminent release of gaseous radioactivity >100 mrem TEDE or
>500 mrem thyroid COE for actual or projected duration of release. (1 or 2 or 3):
1.
A VALID rad mooitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Site Area for > 15 m n, unless assessment within that 15 min confirms that the criterion is not exceeded OR 2.
Field surveys indicate >100 mremfhr gamma or an 1-131 cone of 3.9E-07 j.1Cilcm3et the EAB(Fig. 7-A).
OR 3.
Dose assessment results indicate EABdose >100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem thyroid GDE for adual or projected duration of the release (Fig, 7.A).
S I
T E
A R
E A
NotApplicable.
Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 200 ti mes the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 limit for >15 minutes. (1 or 2 or 3 or4)
Any UNPLANNED release of liquid rad ioactivity that exceeds 200 times the aDCM Section 1.2.1.1 Limit for
>15 minutes. (1 or 2)
A L
L 1.
A VALID red monitor reading> Table 7* 1 values under Alert for >15 minutes, unless assessment within that 15 minutes confirms that the criterion is not exceeded.
Q!l 2.
Field surveys indicate >10 mremlhr gamma at the EABfor
>15 minutes (Fig 7*A).
OR 3.
Dose assessme nt results indicate EAB dose >10 mrem TEDE for the dura tion of the release (Fig. 7*A).
OR 4.
Sample results exceed 200 times the aDCM limit value for an unmondored release of gaseous radioactivity >15 minutes in duration.
A L
E R
T
- 1. A VAllO rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Alert for >15 minutes. unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion is not exceeded.
OR 2,
Sample results indicate an Eel >200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration l
A L
L Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous I1Idioacttvlty that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit for >60 minutes. (1 or2 or3 or 4) 1.
A VALID rad monitor read ing > Table 7-1 verues under UE for >60 minutes, unless assessment within that 60 minutes confirms that the criterion is notexceeded.
OR 2.
Field surveys indicate >0. 1n;remlhr gamma at the EABfor
>60 rrsrctes (Fig 7*A )
Q!l 3.
Dose assessme nt results indicate EAB dose >0.1 mrem TEDE for the durat ion of the release (Fig. 7*A).
OR 4.
Sample results exceed 2 times the aDCM limit vene for an unrroretcred release of gaseous radioactivity >60 minutes in duration N
o U
E A
L L
Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 2 ti mes the aDeM Section 1.2.1.1 L1mttfor >60 minutes.
(lor 2) 1.
A VAUD rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values uncler UE for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this lime period confirms that the aiterion is notexceeded.
2.
Sample results indicate an EeL >2 times the aDeM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration.
Page 43 of 47 Revision 39
r ISEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Initiatin
'Condition Refer to -Gaseous Effluents* (SectJ'on 7.1) and Continue in This Section.
. 7.4 Fuel Handling G
E N
E R
A L
Initiatin
'Condition Refer to "Fission Product Bam"af Matrix ~
(Section 1) or "Gaseous Effluents ~ (Section 7.1) and Continuein ThisSection.
7.3 Radiation Levels
__--.. B'IIm]- _
Refer to "Fission Product BalTierMa trix ~
(Section 1) or "Gaseous Effluents R (Section 7.1) and Continue in This section.
S I
T E
Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (section 7.1) and Continue in This section.
A R
E A
A L
L UNPLANNED Inc reases in radiation levels within the facility that impedes safe operations or establishment or maintenance of cold shutdown.
(l or 2):
1.
VA UD arearadiation monitorreadings or survey results exceed 15 mremlhr in thecontrolroom or CAS.
2.
(a and b):
a.
VALID area radiation monitorreadings exceed values listed in Table 7-2.
A L
E R
T A
L L
Major damage to Irradiated fuel or loss of water level th at has or will uncover irrad iated fuel outside the reactor v ess el. (1 and 2):
1.
VALIO alarm on RM*90-101 or RM-9O-102 or RM-90-103 or RM-90-130/131 or RM-90-112.
2 la orb):
a.
Plant personnel report damage to irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods.
b.
Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for safe operation or the ability to establish cold shutdown (See Note Below).
b.
Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered in the spent fuel pool or transfer canal.
A L
L UNPLANNED increase in rad iation levels within th e facility.
- 1. A VAUO area radiation monitor reading increases by 1000 mremlhr over the highest reading in the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> excluding the current peak value.
Note:
In either the UE or ALERT EAL, the SED must detennine the cause of increase in radiation levels and reviewother initiating condmons for applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15mremlhr in the control room could be causedby a release associated witha DBA).
No U
E UNPLANNED loss of water level In spent fuel pool or reacto r cavity or transfer can al with fu el remaining covered. (1 and 2 and 3):
1.
Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal.
2.
VALID alarm on RM-90-101 or RM 102 or RM-90-103.
3.
Fuel remains covered with water.
l Page 44 of 47 Revision 39
(
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I A
L L
Not Applicable.
Not Applicable.
Damage to a load&d cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY from: (1 or 2 or 31 1.
Natural phenomena (e.g., seismicevent,tornado, flood.
lightning, snowsce accumulation. etc).
2.
Acc ident (e.g: dropped cask, tipped over cask, explosion, missile damage, firedamage, burialunder debris, etc).
3.
Judgment of the Site Emergency Director that the CONANEMENT BOUNDARY damage is a degradation in the level of safety of the ISFSI Page45 of 47 Revision 39
TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 1 EPIP-1 I
ISEQUOYAH
(
NOTE: The monitorvalues below. if met or exceeded, indicatethe needto perform the required assessment. Ifthe assessmentcan not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the appropriate emergencyclassification shall be made based on the VALID reading.
GASEOUS MONITORS Units(21 UE Alert SAE General Site Total Release LImit
~C ~s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31E+09 1-RI-90 400 (EFF LEVEL) - U-1 Shield Bldg
~C~s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31E+09 2-RI-90400 (EFF LEVEL) - U-2 Shield Bldg
~C ~s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.31E+08 1.31E+09 0-RM-90*1 01B - Auxiliary Bldg cpm 1.03E+05 Offscale(' )
Offscale(1)
Offscale(1) 0-RM-90-132B - service Bldg cpm 2.62E+06 Offscale(l)
Offscalelll Offsca le(1) 1-RI-90421 th ru 424 - U-1 MSL Monitors(2)
~C ~cc 1.71 E-Q1 1.71E+01 4.58E+01 4.58E+02 2-RI-90421 thru 424 - U-2 MSL Monitors(2)
~C~cc 1.71 E-Q1 1.71E+01 4.58E+01 4.58E+02 1-RM-90-255 or 256 - U-1 eVE mR/h 4.10E+02 4.10E+04 1.09E+05 1.09E+06 2-RM-90-255 or 256 - U-2 eVE mR/h 4.10E+02 4.10E+04 1.09E+05 1.09E+06 RELEASE DURATION minutes
>60
>15
>15
>15 LIQUID MONITORS Units UE Alert Site Area General Site Total Releas e LImit
~Ci/m l 6.50E-03 6.50E-01 NiA N/A RM-90-122 - RadWaste cpm 1.45E+06 Offscale(l)
N/A N/A RM-90-120,121 - SIG Bldn cpm 1.07E+06 Offscale(1)
NiA NIA RM-90-225 - Co nd Demin cpm 1.90E+06 Offscale(1)
N/A NIA RM-90-212 - TB Sump cpm 3.28E+03 3.28E+05 NIA N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes
>60
>15
>15
>15 ASSESSMENT METHODS: + Ai_
ne Dose Assessment per SON EPIP-13"Dose Assessment"
- aDeM Liquid Release Rate assessment per SON O-TI-CEM"{)30.030.0 Integrated Airborne Release Rate assessment per SON 0-TI-GEM-Q30.030.0 (1) The calculated value is outside of the upper range for this detector. The maximum monitor output which can be read is 1.0E+07 cprn. Releases in excess of monitor capacity should be evaluated for proper classification by use of Dose Assessment.
(2) These unit values are based on now rates through one PORVof 890,000 Ib/hr at 1078.7 psia with 0.25% carry over (0.9975 qua lity). Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing, (e.g., PORV).
NOTE 1:
These EALs are based on the assumption that an emergency release is restricted to one pathway from the plant.
In all cases, the total site EAL is the limiting value. Therefore, in the case where there are multiple release paths from the plant, it is the total release EAL (obtained from ICS andlor SON 0-TI-CEM-03Q-030, "Manual Calculation 01 Plant Gas, Iodine, and Particulate Release Rates for Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Compli ance ") that willdetermine whether an emergency class ification is warranted.
NOTE 2:
In the case when there is no CECC dose assessment available, the length and relative rnaqnitude of the release is the key in determining the class ification. For example, in the case of the NOUE EAL of 2 times the Tech Spec limit, the classification is based more on the fact that a release above the limit has continued unabated for more than 60 minutes, than on the projected offsite dose.
NOTE 3:
See REP Appen dix B for basis informati on.
l Page 46 of 47 Revision 39
Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX
[SEQUOYAH
[
1 EPIP-1 [
(
For purposesof rom >aring the meter/monitor readina valuesto thistable, it can be assumed that mR is equivalent tomrem.
Monitor No.
Location - Area and Elevation Meter Read in!!
1.2-RM-90-1 Spent Fuel Pit ARM EI. 734.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 0-RM-90-5 SFP Pumps ARM EI. 714.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 1.2-RM-90-6 CCS HXS ARM EI. 714.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 1.2-RM-9Q-7 Sample Rm ARM EI.690.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 1,2-RM-90-8 AFW Pumps ARM EI. 690.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-9 Waste Cnds Tks ARM EI. 669.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 1,2-RM-90-10 CVCS BdARM EI. 669.0 1.5E+03 mR/hr 0-RM-90-11 CS and RHR Pumps Radmon EI. 653.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 0-RM-90-102 Spent Fuel Pit Radman EI. 734.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 0-RM-90-l03 Scent Fuel Pit Radman EI. 734.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 0-RM-90-230 CNDS Demineralizer ARM EI. 685.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr 0-RM-90-23l Cnds Demineralizer ARM EI. 706.0 1.5E+03 mRlhr Note.
All of the above monitors have a range of 0,1to 1E+4 mremlhr, Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY Exclusion Area Boundary Page 47 of 47 Revision 39
c l
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-4 SITE AREA EMERGENCY REVISION 30 QUALITY-RELATED PREPARED BY:
BILL PEGGRAM RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS APPROVED BY:
KEVIN WILKES EFFECTIVE DATE:
..!.!1/~23~/2~0~07!....--
LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE USE
ISEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY Revision History EPIP-4 Roy Date Pages Reason fo r Revision Effec ted 21 03130/2001 Revised references 10 EPIP-14 for Dose Assessment to the new EPIP-13 for Dose Assessment.
Added EPIP.13to references. Reformatted substantialtyfor clarity. Updated Notitcat tcn and Follow-Up forms to Pentagen standard content 22 0713012002 Substantialformat modifICation for standardizationwith BFNM'BN was implemented in this revision. Reformatted and repaginated as necessary. Reordered actionsto be consistent with EPIPs2. 3, 5. Changed reference of PHYSI-32 to 851-1. Added section 5.0, lltustrations and Appendices Section to the body of the procedure. Added caution concerning conducting assembly and accountability if it will present a dangerto employees. Clarified use of 5-and 9-telephone prefixes. Added what Infonnation is to be provided by the Shift Manager to Chemistry when requesting DoseAssessment: t.Type of Event, 2. Release Path. 3. ExpectedDuration. Clarified how to check ERQ pagerresponse. EPIP-4was revisedto implement actions to support the NRC SecurityOrder including adding "Two Person Une-of-Sight" rule when deemed necessary by security. Clarified what MET Data elevationis to be induded on the initial notification form and the fonowup form for Site AreaEmergency.
23 08/2612002 Added Step 2 to section 3.1 to speed implementationif EPS has already been activated.
Condensed steps in 3.1 and 3.2 on assembly and accountability. Implement abilityto Stage TSCtOSC personnel near-site when it is unsafe to immediately enterthe site due to security oonditions. Corrected titleof CECC EPIP-9 in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. This is a intent revision.
24 0412212003 General Revisionto restructure EPIP for better flow. Moved ODS notification earlier in procedure.
Intent Change.
25 06/2512003 9
Non intent change. Phone number correction.
26 1012312003 4, 8,12 Intent dlange. Added step to record time of declaration uponentry into the procedure. Split step that had two actions in one step. SpecifiedSecurityimplement EPIP-ll 27 412212004 3, 6,13 Intent Change: Corrected TOC. Clarified thai MSSN/INM in the OSC is verifying ERO response and that 8M is to ENSUREthat this is in progress. Added SED's Initials to Sec. 3.2. Added guidance to utilizeEPIP-6Apdx B to initially brief NRC using ENS line.
28 912312004 6,7,9, 13 Intent Change: Removed satellitephone numbers. addedvalidationstep to Sec. 3.2.added announcement to Staff theTSC and OSC to AppA, 29 0412612006 4,14,15 Revision Change: replaced SSI-l with 5$1-7.1. Changed App.B, Slep 9 from being the time and date into was provided to the ODS to faxing App. B to the ODS. Made App. C consistent with App.
Bby putting'THISISADRILL' before 'THISISAREAL EVENr.
30 1123/2007 8, 12, 13 Plan effectiveness determinationsreviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure of REP:
Annual review. Changed to current org titles, clarified making Site Area Emergency announcementon Did plant PA and the x4800 bridge. Revised responsibility of dose assessmentfrom Chemistrv to RP.
FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURETO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 2 of 15 REVISION 30
! SEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4 Table of Contents 1.0 PURPOSE 4
2.0 REFERENCES
4 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4
3.1 Site Area Emergency Declaration by the Main Control Room 4
3.2 Site Area Emergency Declaration by the TSC 7
3.3 Monitor Conditions 8
3.4 Term ination of the Event.
10 4.0 RECORDS RETENTION 11 4.1 Records of Classified Emergencies 11 4.2 Drill and Exercise Records 11 5.0 ILLUSTRATIONS AND APPENDiCES 11 5.1 Appendix A, Notifications and Announcements 12 5.2 Appendix S, TVA Initial Notification for Site Area Emergency 14 5.3 Appendix C, Site Area Emergency Follow-up Information 15 FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 3 of 15 REVISION 30
EPIP-4 SITE AREA EMERGENCY I SEQUOYAH
(
1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To provide a method for timely notifications of appropriate individuals or organizations when the Shift Manager (SM)/Site Emergency Director (SED) has determined by EPIP-1 that events have occurred that are classified as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE).
1.2 To provide the SED/SM a method for periodic reanalysis of current conditions to determine whether the SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be terminated or continued.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Interface Documents
[1]
SPP-3.5 "Regulatory Reporting Requirements"
[2]
EPIP-5, "General Emergency"
[3]
EPIP-6, "Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center"
[4]
EPIP-7, "Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center (OSC)"
(5)
EPIP-8, "Personnel Accountability and Evacuation" (6)
EPIP-10, "Emergency Medical Response" (7)
EPIP-13, "Dose Assessment"
[8]
EPIP-14, "Radiation Protection Response"
[9]
EPIP-16, "Termination and Recovery"
[10]
CECC EPIP-9, "Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures"
[11]
SSI-7.1, "Post Requirements and Responsibilities, Central and Secondary Alarm Stations" 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE:
IF there are personnel injuries, THEN IMPLEMENT EPIP-10. "Emergency Medical Response."
NOTE:
IF there are immediate hazards to plant personnel. THEN consider immediately implementing EPIP-8 "Personnel Accountability and Evacuation" in parallel with this procedure 3.1 SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARATION BY THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM Upon classifying events as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY the SM/SED shall:
[1]
IF TSC is OPERATIONAL, (SED transferred to TSC), THEN GO TO Section 3.2 (Page7).
o
[2]
RECORD time of Declaration.
Time FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 4 of 15 REVISION 30
ISEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4 C'
3.1 SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARATION BY THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM (Continued)
[3]
ACTIVATE Emergency Paging System (EPS) as follows:
[a]
IF EPS has already been activated, THEN GO TO Step 4.
[b]
IF ongoing onsite Security events may present risk to the emergency responders, THEN CONSULT with Security to determine if site access is dangerous to the life and health of emergency responders.
[c]
IF ongoing events makes site access dangerous to the life and health of emergency responders, THEN SELECT STAGING AREA button on the terminal INSTEAD of the EMERGENCY button.
[d]
ACTIVATE EPS using touch screen terminal. IF EPS fails to activate, THEN continue with step 4.
o o
o o
[4]
COMPLETE Appendix B, TVA Initial Notification for Site Area Emergency.
0 NOTE:
ODS should be notified within 5 minutes after declaration of the event.
[5]
NOTIFY ODS.
Initial Time ODS: Ringdown Line or 5-751-1 700 or 5-751-2495 or 9-785-1700
[a]
IF EPS failed to activate from SQN when attempted THEN DIRECT ODS to activate SQN EPS.
0
[b]
IF ODS is also unable to activate EPS, THEN continue with step [5] [b].
0
[c]
READ completed Appendix B to ODS.
0
[d]
FAX completed Appendix B to ODS.
0 5-751-8620 (Fax)
[e]
MONITOR for confirmation call from ODS that State/Local notifications complete: RECORD time State notified.
Notification Time FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 5 of 15 REVISION 30
I SEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4
(
3.1 SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARATION BY THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM (Continued)
[6]
IF ODS CANNOT be contacted within 10 minutes of the declaration, THEN
[a]
CONTACT Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) AND READ Completed Appendix B.
Initial Time 9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-615-741-0001 l
[b]
FAX completed Append ix B to TEMA.
9-1-615-242-9635 (Fax)
[7]
ENSURE MSSIVVWM in the OSC ( x6428 ) is monitoring Emergency Response Organiza tion (ERO) responses using printed report available in the OSC.
[a]
IF any ERO positions are not responding, THEN DIRECT MSS to CALL personnel to staff TSC/OSC positions. (Use REP Duty Roster and Call List.)
[8]
PERFORM Appendix A, Notifications and Announcements.
(Delegate as needed.)
[9]
GO TO Section 3.3.
o o
o FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 6 of 15 REVISION 30
SITE AREA EMERGENCY ISEQUOYAH r
3.2 SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARATION BY THE TSC Upon classifying events as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY the SED shall :
EPIP-4 NOTE:
CECC Director should be notified within 5 minutes after declaration of the event.
[1]
RECORD Time of Declaration
[2]
RECORD EAL(s)
[3]
VALIDATE time and EAL numbers with the Ops Mgr, Site VP or EP Mgr.
0
[4]
CALL CECC Director and inform of escalation, time of declaration, EAL(s) declared, and description of events.
SED's Initials Time Ringdown Line or 5-75 1-1614 or 5-751-1680
[5]
IF CECC Director CANNOT be contacted within 10 minutes of the declaration, THEN
[a]
COMPLETE Appendix B (Initial Notification for SAE)
[b]
NOTIFY TEMA AND READ completed Appendix B.
o SED's Initials Time 9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-6 15-741-0001
[c]
FAX completed Appendix B to TEMA.
9-1-615-242-9635 (Fax)
[6]
IF not previously implemented, THEN PERFORM notifications using Appendix A.
o o
FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 7 of 15 REVISION 30
SITE AREA EMERGENCY ISEQUOYAH
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3.3 MONITOR CONDITIONS
[1]
MONITOR radiation monitors.
EPIP-4
[2]
WHEN indication exists of an unplanned radiological release, THEN ENSURE Dose Assessment is performed.
[a]
IF the CECC has not assumed Dose Assessment responsibility, THEN NOTIFY Radiation Protection to perform a dose assessment using EPIP-13, "Dose Assessment" AND PROVIDE the following information:
- 1. Type Of Event (SGTR/L, LOCA, WGDT, Cntmt Bypass)
- 2. Release Path (SG/PORV, Aux, Shld, Turb, Serv, Cond)
- 3. Expected Duration (If unknown assume 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> duration) 7865 (RP Lab) or 6417 (RP Lab) or Use REP Call List to contact a qualified individual in RP, who is onsite, to perform the dose assessment.
CAUTION:
Assembly should NOT be initiated IF Assembly will present a danger to employees - For example:
A severe weathercondition existsor is imminent (such as a Tornado)
An onsite Security riskcondition exists (Consult with NuclearSecurity)
[3]
IF personnel accountability has not been previously initiated, THEN ACTIVATE assembly and accountability using EPIP-8, Appendix C (may be delegated).
[4]
MONITOR plant conditions:
[a]
EVALUATE conditions using EPIP-1:
o o
o
[1]
IF conditions satisfy criteria of GENERAL EMERGENCY(s) THEN initiate EPIP-5.
o FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 8 of 15 REVISION 30
I SEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4
(
3.3 MONITOR CONDITIONS (Continued)
[2]
IF additional conditions satisfy criteria of other SITE AREA EMERGENCY(s) THEN Complete Appendix C.
0
[3]
IF conditions warrant a need for follow-up information, THEN Complete Appendix C.
0
[b)
IF Appendix C completed, THEN
[1]
REPORT to CECC for State notification:
Initial Time CECC Director: Ringdown Line or 5-751-1614 or 5-751-1680 OR ODS: Ringdown Line or 5-751-1700 or 5-751-2495 or 9-785-1700
[2]
FAX completed Appendix C to CECCo CECC: 5-751-1682 (Fax) OR ODS: 5-751-8620 (Fax)
[3]
IF neither the CECC or ODS can be reached, THEN
[a]
NOTIFY TEMA AND READ Appendix C.
o Initial Time 9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-615-741-0001
[b)
FAX completed Appendix C to TEMA.
9-1-615-242-9635 (Fax) o FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 9 of 15 REVISION 30
SITE AREA EMERGENCY ISEQUOYAH
(
3.4 TERMINATION OF THE EVENT
[1]
WHEN situation no longer exists, THEN
[a]
TERMINATE emergency per EPIP-16, "Termination and Recovery".
[b]
COMPLETE Append ix C including Time and Date Event Terminated.
EPIP-4 D
[e]
FAX completed Appendix C to CECC Director.
CECC: 5-751-1682 (Fax) OR ODS: 5-751-8620 (Fax) (Backup)
D
[2]
COLLECT all forms and appendices and FORWARD all documentation to Emergency Preparedness.
D FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 10 of 15 REVISION 30
(
ISEQUOYAH 4.0 RECORD RETENTION SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4 l
4.1 Records of Classified Emergencies The materials generated in support of key actions during an actual emergency classified as NOUE or higher are considered Lifetime retention Non-QA records. Materials shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall submit any records deemed necessary to demonstrate performance to the Corporate EP Manager for storage.
4.2 Drill and Exercise Records The materials deemed necessary to demonstrate performance of key actions during drills are considered Non-QA records. These records shall be forwarded to the EP Manager who shall retain records deemed necessary to demonstrate six-year plan performance for six years. The EP Manager shall retain other records in this category for three years.
5.0 ILLUSTRATIONS AND APPENDICES 5.1 Appendix A - Notifications and Announcements Appendix A, Notifications and Announcements, provides guidance for security threats, and for prompt notification of the NRC Resident and plant personnel.
5.2 Appendix B - TVA Initial Notification for Site Area Emergency Appendix S, TVA Initial Notification for Site Area Emergency, is used to initially notify the Operations Duty Specialist who notifies the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency.
5.3 Appendix C
- Site Area Emergency Follow-up Information Appendix C, Site Area Emergency Follow-up Information, is used to provide additional information concerning other Site Area Emergencies or other information concerning additional conditions to the ODS for State notification and event termination.
FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 11 of 15 REVISION 30
I SEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4
(
APPENDIX A NOTIFICATIONS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS (Page 1 of2)
[1]
IF there is a security threat, THEN
[a]
NOTIFY Security Shift Supervisor to implement SSI-1, "Security Instructions For Members Of The Security Force" and EPIP-11 "Security and Access Control".
Initial Time 6144 or 6568
[b)
DETERMINE if Security recommends implementing the "Two Person Line of Sight" Rule.
D
[c)
IF Nuclear Security recommends establish ins the "Two Person Line of Sight" RUle, THEN INF RM the SM/SED. ("Two Person Line of Sight" requires use of EPIP-8).
Initial Time
[2]
NOTIFY Radiation Protection :
[a]
STATE: "A SITE AREA EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED, BASED UPON (Describe the conditions),
AFFECTING UNIT(s)_."
Initial Time 7865 (RP Lab) or 6417 (RP Lab)
[b)
DIRECT Radiation Protection to implement EPIP-14, "Radiological Control Response".
D
[c)
DIRECT Radiation Protection to implement CECC EPIP-9, "Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures" which includes activation of the radiological monitoring van.
D
[3]
NOTIFY personnel in the Chemistry Lab:
[a]
STATE: "A SITE AREA EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARE D, BASED UPON (Describe the conditions),
AFFECTING UNIT(s) _
Initial Time 7285 (Lab) or 6348 (Lab) or 20126 (Pager)
[b)
DIRECT Chemistry to implement EPIP-14, "Radiological Control Response".
D l
FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO PAGE 12 of 15 REVISION 30 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER
(
I SEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY APPENDIX A NOTIFICATIONS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS (Page 20(2)
EPIP-4
[4]
ANNOUNCE to plant personnel on the old plant PA and the x4800 bridge:
[a]
"ATIENTION PLANT PERSONNEL. ATIENTION PLANT PERSONNEL. A SITE AREA EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED BASED ON (
Describe the condition
>, AFFECTING UNIT(s)
(if not already staffed, add) STAFF THE TSC AND OSC."
0
[b)
REPEAT Announcement.
0
[5]
NOTIFY Plant Management in accordance with SPP-3.5 AND PROVIDE SAE Information.
Initial Time
[6]
NOTIFY the "On Call" NRC Resident AND PROVIDE SAE Information.
Initial Time NOTE:
NRC ENS notification should be made as soon as practicable, but within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of "SITE AREA EMERGENCY" declaration. Whenever NRC requests, a qualified person must provide a continuous update to NRC Operations Center.
Use EPIP-6, Appendix B as a briefing guide.
[7]
NOTIFY NRC of plan activation using ENS phone.
Initial Time 9-1-(301 ) 816-5100 (Main) 9-1-(301) 951-0550 (Backup) 9-1-(301) 816-5151 (Fax)
[8]
NOTIFY the SM/SED that notifications are complete.
Initial Time FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 13 of 15 REVISION 30
I SEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY EPIP-4 APPENDIXB TVA INITIAL NOTIFICATION FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY TVA INITIAL NOTIFICATION FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY 1.
0 This is a Drill o This is an Actual Event
- Repeat - This is an Actuai Event
- 2. This is SED Sequoyah has declared a SITE AREA EMERGENCY affecting: o Unit 1 o Unit2 o Both Unit 1 and Unit 2
- 3. EAL Designator(sl:
- 4. Brief Description of the Event:
- 5. Radiological Conditions:
(Check one box under each Airborne AND Liquid column.)
Airborne Release s Offsite Liquid Releases Offsite o Minor releases within federaily approved limits' o Minor releases within federally approved limits1 o Releases above federaily approved limits' o Releasesabovefederaily approved limits' o Release information not known o Release information not known
( 'Tech Specs)
( 'Tech Specs) 6.
Event Declared:
Time:
Date:
7.
Provide Protective Action Recommendation:
0 None 8.
Please repeat back the information you have received to ensure accuracy.
0 9.
When completed, FAX this information to the ODS.
0 FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENC Y PREPAREDNESS MANAGER PAGE 14 of 15 REVISION 30
(
I SEQUOYAH SITE AREA EMERGENCY APPENDIXC SITE AREA EMERGENCY FOLLOW*UP INFORMATION EPIP-4
- 1. 0 THIS IS A DRill o THIS IS A REAL EVENT
- 2. There has been a SITE AREA EMERGENCYdeclared at Sequoyah affecting:
o Unit 1 0
Unit 2 0
Both Unit 1 and Unit 2
- 3. Reactor Status:
Unit 1: 0 Shut Down Unit 2: 0 Shut Down o At Power o At Power o Refueling o Refueling D N/A DN/A
- 8. Onsite Protective Actions:
Assembly and Accountability Site Evacuation
- 4. Additional EAL Designators
- 5. Significant Changes in Plant Conditions:
- 6. Significant Changes in Radiological Cond itions:
- 7. Oftsite Protec tive Action Recommendation:
o None o No 0 Initiated 0 Completed o No 0 Initiated 0 Completed
- 9. The Meteorological Conditions are:
(Use 46 meter data on the Met Tower)
Wind Speed:
m.p.h, Wind Direction is from:
degrees
- 10. Event Terminated: DatelTime
- 11. Please repeat back the information you have received to ensure accuracy.
0
- 12. FAX to ODS at 5-751-8620 or CECC Director at 5-751-1682 after completing the notification. 0 Completed by:
Dmemme
~
FORWARD COMPLETED PROCEDURE TO EMERGENCY PREPARED NESS MANAGER PAGE150f15 REVISION 30