ML19290C497

Comments on Proposed Rule 10CFR73:improper to Use Sabotage Threat as Basis for Applying Reporting Requirements to Facility Security Systems

ML19290C497
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	12/21/1979
From:	Mathews E WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP.
To:	Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-44FR60743, RULE-PR-73, TASK-OS, TASK-SG-902-1 44FR60743-9, NUDOCS 8001220008
Download: ML19290C497 (3)

Text

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WISCONSIN P U B LIC S E RVIC E CO R PO R ATIO N P.O. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305 0C :1I t;J :3ER agema aul.s P L.93(wom ,, ,

a, q December 21, 1979 op

{ M V g Mr. S. J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission @

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6 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission g\\ g?

' Washington, D. C. 20555 co g

Dear Mr. Chilk:

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Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Comments on Proposed 10 CFR Part 73 Amendment The comments of Wisconsin Public Service Corporation relative to the proposed amendment to 10 CFR Part 75 (44 FR 60743, October 22, 1979) are provided below.

Subj ect: Applicability of 10 CFR Part 21 I. A " substantial safety hazard" is defined in Section 21.2 of 10 CFR Part 21 as:

"a loss of safety function to the extent that there is a major reduction in the degree of protection provided to public health and safety for any facility or activity licensed, other than for export, pursuant to Parts 30, 40, 50, 70 and 71."

By this definition, it is evident that the requirements of Part 21 are intended to apply only to Engineered Safeguards Systems, other plant process systems affecting safety, or instrumentation systems directly involved with attaining a safe shutdown condition or preventing an uncontrolled release of radioactive material. Facility security systems and components have no direct ef feet on the performance of safety related activities; therefore, it is not consistent with the Part 21 definition of a substantial safety hazard to include security systems and components within the scope of Part 21.

II. The supplementary information published with the proposed 10 CFR Part 73 amendment provides a discussion intended to show that 10 CFR Part 21 is applicable to defects or compliance failures in security safeguards systems. This discussion is strongly based on the threat of sabotage to a facility. Since a final determination has not yet been made of the true magnitude of the threat posed to nuclear power generating plants by sabotage, it is improper to use the sabotage threat as the basis for applying 10 CFR Part 21 reporting requirements to facility security systems. -

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Mr. S . J . Chilk December 21, 1979 Page 2 III. The purpose of 10 CFR Part 21 is to identify previously unanticipated generic defects or failures that directly compromise public safety. The equipment and components used in security systems have recognized limitations in reliability, i.e. some failures of equipment or components are expected; therefore, compensatory measures or contingency actions have been included in the security programs in anticipation of such failures.

Since 10 CFR Part 21 is concerned with unanticipated failures that have a wide-ranging impact on public safety, expected and planned-for failures of security equipment or components do not fall within the scope of Part 21.

Subiect: Content of Proposed Amendment I. Section 73.71 (b) of 10 CFR Part 73 currently requires that:

"Each licensee shall report immediately to the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A, by telephone, any incident in which an attempt has been made, or is believed to have been made, to commit a thef t or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material which he is licensed to possess, or to commit an act of industrial sabotage against his plant. The initial report shall be followed within a period of fif teen (15) days by a written report . . ."

In this context "immediately, by telephone" is generally interpreted to mean "within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />" and as dictated by the nature of the event.

This interpretation is consistent with accepted guidance for 24-hour reporting of potentially serious failures of Engineered Safeguards Systems or components with the follow-up written report required within 14 days.

The proposed Section 73.71 (c) would require:

"Each licensee either under a specific or general license shall report to the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of this part, by telephone, immediately and in no case later than one hour af ter an authorized individual knows of its occurrence, any event which significantly threatens or lessens the effectiveness of a safeguards system as established by regulations in this Chapter, or by the licensee's approved physical security, contingency, security personnel qualification and training plans and fundamental nuclear material control programs and procedures or by both. The licensee shall submit a written report to the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix A of this Part describing the event in detail within 5 days af ter an authorized individual knows of its occurrence."

This proposed amendment to 10 CFR Part 73 would place-more stringent reporting requirements on events of lesser consequence than the events 1787 190

Mr. S. J. Chilk December 21, 1979 Page 3 addressed in Section 73.71(b). This fact alone demonstrates the lack of consistency involved in the preparation of this proposed amendment when compared to other regulations of more fundamental importance.

In summary, the proposed 10 CFR Part 73 amendment is unjustified and unnecessary for the following reasons:

• A deficiency in a security system or component has not been proven to be a substantial safety hazard, therefore, 10 CFR Part 21 does not apply.

• The imagined threat of sabotage to a nuclear power plant is insufficient basis for including security system defects or security program compliance failures within the scope of 10 CFR Part 21.

• Security equipment and components are expected to fail at some time and security programs plan for such failures; therefore, it is inappropriate to include security system failures under 10 CFR Part 21 which is directed toward unanticipated failures that affect public safety and are generic in nature.

• The proposed amendment would place more severe reporting requirements on events of less significance than those events considered in the existing reporting requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 (b) .

We fear that such broad use of 10 CFR Part 21 as attempted by this proposed revision to 10 CFR Part 73 will interfere with the effectiveness of Part 21 and have detrimental effects on overall safety.

Very truly yours,

. A.k E. R. thews, Vice President Power Supply & Engineering snf i787 l91