IR 05000313/2019003

Integrated Inspection Report 05000313/2019003 and 05000368/2019003 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200013/2019001

ML19310H020
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	11/05/2019
From:	John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
To:	Dinelli J Entergy Operations
References
IR 2019001, IR 2019003
Download: ML19310H020 (32)

Text

ber 5, 2019

SUBJECT:

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2019003 AND 05000368/2019003 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT 07200013/2019001

Dear Mr. Dinelli:

On September 30, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2. On October 3, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000313, 05000368, and 07200013 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000313, 05000368, and 07200013 License Numbers: DPR-51 and NPF-6 Report Numbers: 05000313/2019003, 05000368/2019003, and 07200013/2019001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-003-0005 and I-2019-001-0084 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Location: Russellville, AR Inspection Dates: July 1, 2019 to September 30, 2019 Inspectors: L. Brookhart, Senior Spent Fuel Storage Inspector T. DeBey, Resident Inspector N. Fields, Health Physicist M. Hayes, Operations Engineer S. Hedger, Emergency Preparedness Inspector C. Henderson, Senior Resident Inspector J. Kirkland, Senior Operations Engineer T. Sullivan, Resident Inspector Approved By: John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection and an independent spent fuel storage installation inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Install Correct Component and Perform Post Maintenance Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.14] - 71111.19 NCV 05000368/2019003-01 Conservative Open/Closed Bias The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Technical Specification 6.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to properly pre-plan and perform maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to install the correct diodes for control element assembly hold bus 2C70 and to perform post-maintenance testing to demonstrate component functionality.

Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [P.2] - 71152 NCV 05000368/2019003-02 Evaluation Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances.

Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct damage to Unit 2s reactor coolant pump C controlled bleed off piping in 2011, 2015, and 2017, when insulation was removed making the piping available for inspection.

Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000313/2018-004-01 Reactor Trip Due to the Loss 71153 Closed of a Non-Vital 4160 Volt Bus.

LER 05000368/2019-001-00 Reactor Trip Due to a 71153 Closed Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Failure.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at full power where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor reductions in power to support scheduled surveillances.

Unit 2 began the inspection period in shutdown for Forced Outage 2F19-01, as a result of a fault in reactor coolant pump motor B, which started on May 26, 2019. On July 28, 2019, Unit 2 commenced a reactor startup and the reactor was made critical. The unit was returned to full power on July 30, 2019, where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor reductions in power to support scheduled surveillances and for degraded condenser vacuum conditions.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2 train A chemical and volume control system with charging pump C operating on August 6, 2019

(2) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 2 fuel oil system with emergency fuel oil bunker T-57A on recirculation on August 16, 2019

(3) Unit 2 train A 4160 volt safety-related switchgear room coolers D and C on August 29, 2019

71111.05A - Fire Protection (Annual) Annual Inspection (IP Section 03.02)

(1) Unit 2 fire drill for a main generator hydrogen fire, Fire Zone 2200-M, Fire Area B-2, on August 26, 2019

71111.05Q - Fire Protection Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 fire risk management actions for common feedwater pump B unavailability for Fire Areas 2200-MM turbine building 372 feet nonvital switchgear area and Unit 2 transformer yard on August 15, 2019

(2) Unit 1 fire impairment for reverse osmosis unit installation in the drumming station for Fire Zones 34-Y, 2026-Y, and 20-Y-2 on August 16, 2019

(3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 alternate AC diesel generator building Fire Zone 3040 on September 3, 2019

(4) Unit 2 control room safety-related panels for Fire Zone 2002 and 2199-G, Fire Area G, on September 12, 2019

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Inspection Activities - Underground Cables (IP Section 02.02c.)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 manhole 10 flood seals for the emergency diesel generator fuel oil vault on September 9, 2019

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance Annual Review (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) Unit 2 train A 4160 volt safety-related switchgear room cooler D replacement on September 5, 2019

71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03)

(1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam administered on August 15, 2019.

71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04)

(1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on July 8, 2019.

Annual Requalification Operating Tests The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees annual requalification operating test.

Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2), and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.

Requalification Examination Security The inspectors evaluated the ability of the licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.

Remedial Training and Re-examinations The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.

Operator License Conditions The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.

Control Room Simulator The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.

Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 2 short notice downpower to 96.6 percent reactor power for degraded main condenser A vacuum on August 7, 2019 Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 licensed operator training scenario on September 12, 2019

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 common feedwater system and alternate AC emergency diesel generator availability during a loss of the 13.8 kV London line on July 9, 2019

(2) Unit 1 emergent work for train B turbine driven emergency feedwater pump steam admission valve failure to return to automatic during surveillance testing on August 1, 2019

(3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 planned emergency diesel generator pump maintenance with common feedwater pump B unavailable due to emergent corrective maintenance on August 7, 2019

(4) Unit 2 emergent work for train B main steam and feedwater isolation solid state relay failure for Channel 1 on August 27, 2019

(5) Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergent work for the auto transformer on August 29, 2019

(6) Unit 1 emergent work for emergency diesel generator 2 trip on high crankcase pressure during surveillance testing on September 9, 2019

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 2 shutdown cooling system operability on July 18, 2019

(2) Unit 2 service water pump A high temperature winding operability on August 28, 2019

(3) Unit 2 containment cooling fan B mode restraint operability on August 29, 2019

(4) Unit 2 train B emergency feedwater system discharge valves to steam generators A and B failed to open operability on September 18, 2019

(5) Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency cooling pond operability during service water bay B maintenance with a leaking sluice gate on September 19, 2019

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing Post Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) Unit 2 reactor coolant pump A, B, C, and D control bleed off line replacement on July 22, 2019

(2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 common feedwater pump post maintenance testing following bearing replacement on August 16, 2019

(3) Unit 2 train B main steam and feedwater isolation solid state relay replacement for Channel 1 on August 27, 2019

(4) Unit 1 and Unit 2 alternate AC diesel generator temperature and pressure control valve replacement on September 3, 2019

(5) Unit 2 lowering control element assembly hold bus C2 voltage and two control element assemblies dropped on September 5, 2019

(6) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 2 repair of the high crankcase pressure switch on September 9, 2019

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 2 Forced Outage 2F19-01, as a result of a fault on reactor coolant pump motor B, on July 29, 2019

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 2 control element assemblies drop time testing for operating for an extended period of time on the lower gripper and the hold bus on July 19, 2019

(2) Unit 1 engineering safeguards actuation system analog Channel 1, 2, and 3 monthly surveillance testing on August 16, 2019

71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system between April 1, 2017, and August 24, 2019.

71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Response Organization between April 1, 2017, and August 24, 2019. Inspectors also evaluated the licensees ability to staff their emergency response facilities in accordance with emergency plan commitments.

71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the 10 CFR 50.54(q) emergency plan change process and practices between April 1, 2017, and August 24, 2019. The evaluation reviewed screenings and evaluations documenting the implementation of this process. The reviews of the change process documentation do not constitute NRC approval.

71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program between April 1, 2017, and August 24, 2019. The evaluation reviewed activations of the emergency plan, the conduct of drills and exercises, licensee audits and assessments, and the maintenance of equipment important to emergency preparedness.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Unit 2 resin leak in the drumming station with a reactor coolant pump shaft shear and loss of coolant accident on August 23,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (IP Section 02.12) ===

(1) (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)

EP02: ERO Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)

(1) (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)

EP03: Alert & Notification System Reliability (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)

(1) (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2018 - Jun 30, 2019)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Unit 2 containment air cooler B auxiliary contact high resistance and C breaker trip due to relay failures on September 5, 2019

(2) Unit 2 reactor coolant pump C control bleed off line through wall leak on September 12, 2019

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Followup (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 2 lowering level in the spent fuel pool due to a failed air seal between the spent fuel pool and cask loading pit on August 29, 2019

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000313/2018-004-01, Reactor Trip Due to the Loss of a Non-Vital 4160 Volt Bus, (ADAMS Accession No. ML19238A058)

The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in Inspection Report 05000313/2019001 and 05000368/2019001 as FIN 05000313/2019001-03 and NCV 05000313/2019001-04.

(2) LER 05000368/2019-001-00, Reactor Trip Due to a Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Failure (ADAMS Accession No. ML19204A311)

The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct, and therefore, was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

60855 - Operation of an ISFSI Operation of an ISFSI

(1) The ANO independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) consisted of four ISFSI pads containing two different cask designs. ANO had loaded 24 canisters of the Energy Solutions ventilated storage cask (VSC) VSC-24 design (Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1007) from 1996 to 2003. Since that time, ANO had been loading HI-STORM 100S Version C overpacks containing either a multi-purpose canister (MPC)-24 or MPC-32 design. At the time of the routine inspection, the HI-STORM-100 ISFSI pads contained a total of 67 overpacks and the licensee was in the process of loading canister 68. ANO was currently loading canisters to the Holtec CoC No. 1014, Amendment 13, and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),

Revision 18.

The inspectors evaluated the licensees ISFSI cask loading from July 22 through July 26, 2019. Specifically, the inspectors observed the following activities:

• Forced helium dehydration and helium backfill

• Heavy load lift by the vertical cask transporter (VCT) of the storage cask (HI-STORM) into the cask transfer facility (CTF) in preparation for stack-up operations.

The inspectors also evaluated the licensee's operational response and recovery actions associated with the small amount of helium leakage encountered when attempting to remove the removable valve operating assemblies from the MPC following initial helium backfill.

The inspectors performed a walkdown of all ISFSI radiologically controlled areas, including performing independent radiation surveys, a walkdown of the CTF, and a walkdown of the ISFSI haul path. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of the spent fuel floor for both Unit 1 and Unit 2, and a walkdown of the location of radiation monitors 2RITS-8750-1A and 2RITS-8750-1B. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the low profile transporter (LPT) in the turbine building train bay.

The inspectors evaluated the following:

• Spent fuel selection for the four Unit 1 casks and the four Unit 2 casks in this loading campaign (HI-STORMs 61-68)

• Compliance with the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 72.104 for calendar years 2017 and 2018

• Fire hazards analyses and control of combustibles for ISFSI operations

• Conditions for use of the cask supplemental cooling system

• Selected radiological surveys of the ISFSI and dry fuel storage casks

• Selected ISFSI condition reports

• Quality assurance (QA) program implementation, including recent QA audits, surveillances, receipt inspection, and quality control activities

• Compliance to technical specification for operational surveillance activities and FSAR required annual maintenance activities

• Documentation of annual maintenance activities for heavy lifting components, which included special lifting devices, the sites cask handling crane (Auxiliary Building L-3 crane), and the sites VCT

60857 - Review of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations Review of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations

(1) The inspectors reviewed a list of 10 CFR 72.48 screenings performed by the licensee since October 2017. During this time period the licensee did not perform any 10 CFR 72.48 evaluations. The inspectors evaluated the following:

• Selected licensee 10 CFR 72.48 screenings and associated changes, tests, or experiments

• The process by which the licensee evaluates 10 CFR 72.48 screenings and evaluations performed by the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) holder

• The licensee's change in CoC loading amendment from Amendment 5 to Amendment 13

• Changes made to the licensees 10 CFR 72.212 Report (Revisions 11 and 12)since October

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Install Correct Component and Perform Post Maintenance Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.14] - 71111.19 NCV 05000368/2019003-01 Conservative Open/Closed Bias The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Technical Specification 6.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to properly pre-plan and perform maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to install the correct diodes for control element assembly hold bus 2C70 and to perform post-maintenance testing to demonstrate component functionality.

Description:

In November 2018, during Refueling Outage 2R26, Work Order 52770071 was issued for replacement/refurbishment of the Unit 2 control element assembly (CEA) hold bus 2C70. The hold bus is designed to provide DC voltage to hold a CEA subgroup in a fixed reactor core location when the normal CEA power supply is unavailable. During the performance of the hold bus work, two diodes of the wrong type were installed. The postmaintenance testing (PMT) in Work Order 52770071, step 4.2, Section 6 (Attachment 1)required verification that the hold bus would hold a CEA subgroup. The PMT was not performed, but a note was added to the work order to indicate that it would be done during a potential forced outage and that the maintenance work order was updated to have a scheduled task prior to reactor startup. However, the testing was not done before the Unit 2 reactor startup following Refueling Outage 2R26. The presence of the two incorrect diodes ensured that transfer of CEA subgroups 1 through 10 to hold bus 2C70 would have resulted in a dropped CEA during power operations. This would have required immediate operator action to reduce power by 28 percent or greater in accordance with technical specifications and Procedure OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction, Revision 25, and the potential recovery of the dropped CEA or the performance of a reactor shutdown to meet technical specification requirements.

On January 7, 2019, the licensee documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-00041 that preventive maintenance on hold bus 2C70 was not fully completed. The condition report referenced two work orders that had not been completed, including Work Order 52770071.

This condition report was closed on January 14, 2019, with no additional corrective actions taken for hold bus 2C70.

On July 27, 2019, during Unit 2s Forced Outage 2FP19-01, the licensee performed a voltage adjustment to lower hold bus 2C70 voltage due to concerns with CEA drop times. The PMT for this maintenance was to place a CEA subgroup onto hold bus 2C70 as a functional test.

When the CEA subgroup was transferred to hold bus 2C70, two CEAs inserted into the reactor core. The licensees troubleshooting of the event determined two incorrect diodes were installed during Refueling Outage 2R26. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-02163 and performed a human performance analysis.

The licensees human performance analysis identified two causal factors:

• Inadequate work instruction: Work Standard T23467 had vague open-ended repair instructions without materials identified for the repairs

• Inadequate verification and validation practices: Craft performing the work did not verify that the parts being installed were the correct ones for that component/application The human performance evaluation focused on why the incorrect diodes were installed, but did not determine why the licensee failed to perform the required post-maintenance test prior to reactor startup from Refueling Outage 2R26 and why no additional actions were taken when it was identified in Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-00041. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-02607 and performed an adverse condition analysis.

Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced the incorrect diodes and performed the required post maintenance testing prior to reactor startup from Forced Outage 2FP19-01. Additionally, the licensee revised the work standard for the hold bus refurbishment to include instructions and materials for the refurbishment.

Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-ANO-2-2019-00041, CR-ANO-2-2019-02163, CR-ANO-2-2019-02150, and CR-ANO-2-2019-02607

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to properly pre-plan maintenance activities to ensure the correct components were installed and to perform the required post-maintenance testing was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have adversely impacted the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and would have affected the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, if a control element assembly subgroup was transferred to hold bus 2C70 during power operations, it would have resulted in one control element assembly dropping into the reactor core.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision-making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, the licensee failed to consider the risk-significance of the proposed action to defer postmaintenance testing following hold bus 2C70 diode replacement to ensure equipment functionality. Additionally, the licensee failed to consider the risk-significance of the proposed action to close Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-00041 with no additional actions to verify hold bus 2C70 functionality.

Enforcement:

Violation: Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33. Appendix A, Section 9.a, states, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Work Order 52770071, step 4.1, provides instructions to refurbish the hold bus 270 power supply, and step 4.2, Section 6 (Attachment 1), provides instructions to perform the post maintenance testing of the hold bus 2C70 power supply.

Contrary to the above, on November 2018, the licensee failed to properly preplan and implement maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment.

Specifically, the licensee failed to have adequate work instructions in Work Order 52770071, step 4.1, to install the correct diodes for hold bus 2C70 and implement step 4.2 to perform Section 6 (Attachment 1), post maintenance testing. This condition resulted in the installation of the incorrect diodes and the failure to perform post maintenance testing for hold bus 2C70.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [P.2] - 71152 NCV 05000368/2019003-02 Evaluation Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances.

Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct damage to Unit 2s reactor coolant pump C controlled bleed off piping in 2011, 2015, and 2017, when insulation was removed making the piping available for inspection.

Description:

In May 2019, during full power operations, Unit 2 operators observed an unexplained rise in the containment sump level which was not commensurate with the existing plant conditions. This prompted the operators to commence a reactor coolant system leak investigation. Prior to completion of the online leak investigation, Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip and entered Forced Outage 2FP19-01, as a result of a fault in reactor coolant pump motor B. During Forced Outage 2FP19-01, the licensee discovered that reactor coolant pump C controlled bleed off (CBO) piping was leaking due to a through wall crack in a socket weld. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-01365 and performed an adverse condition analysis.

The licensees adverse condition analysis determined the direct cause associated with the through wall leak on the CBO piping was a crack initiated from external damage from a thin cutting tool. The CBO piping was also subjected to vibration loads, which resulted in the propagation of a through wall crack due to cyclic fatigue. The causal factor was poor maintenance work practices that led to significant CBO piping damage which likely took place during 2008 when the removal/replacement of fibrous insulation on various lines was authorized due to damaged insulation. During the insulation removal/replacement, which occurred multiple times since 2008, the licensee did not document any observed damage to the CBO piping.

The licensee documented damage to reactor coolant pump C CBO piping insulation three times since 2011 (Condition Reports CR-ANO-2-2011-00567, CR-ANO-2-2015-03185, and CR-ANO-2-2017-01735), which provided them the opportunity to identify and correct the damage. In each instance, the licensee only addressed the replacement of the insulation, and no instructions were incorporated into the work orders which replaced the insulation to also inspect the underlying CBO piping. The licensee stated that damage to the CBO piping most likely occurred during 2008 when the removal/replacement of fibrous insulation on various lines was authorized due to damaged insulation; however, damage to the CBO piping could also have occurred when the insulation was replaced in 2011 and 2015, and during the permanent removal of the insulation in 2017. The licensees focus was the vibration-induced insulation damage, and the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the issue to determine if the CBO piping was also damaged. Specifically, the licensee did not use its internal and external operating experience to thoroughly review the vibration-induced insulation damage to identify the CBO piping damage in 2011, 2015, or 2017.

The inspectors noted that NRC Information Notice (IN) 2007-21, Pipe Wear Due to Interaction of Flow Induced Vibration and Reflective Metal Insulation, provided operating experience to licensees that significant wear marks were observed on the outside wall of chemical and volume control system stainless steel piping due to interaction between the piping base metal and the installed reflective metal insulation. The NRC IN stated that the most probable cause of the abrasive wear was flow induced vibration combined with end cap to piping interaction. The NRC IN recommended that licensees review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to identify and address similar problems, up to and including the periodic removal of insulation to allow visual inspection for piping degradation. Additionally, the licensee had its own internal operating experience associated with damage identified on piping that interfaces with the reactor coolant system. In 1989, 1994, and 2009, the licensee identified cuts on piping (Condition Reports CR-ANO-1-1989-00110, CR-ANO-2-1994-00183, and CR-ANO-2-2009-02680) and, in 2014, gouges were noted during ASME inspections of charging piping to the reactor coolant pump B discharge cold leg (Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2014-01157).

Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced reactor coolant pump A, B, C, and D CBO lines and performed an extent of condition that identified one additional location that required replacement.

Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-01365

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality when removing reactor coolant pump CBO insulation was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to promptly identify and correct the damage on the reactor coolant pump CBO piping resulted in a failed socket weld and a reactor coolant leak, which degraded the safety-related ASME Class II boundary.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because the finding after a reasonable assessment of degradation

(1) did not result in exceeding the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small loss-of-coolant accident; and

(2) likely did not affect other systems used to mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident resulting in a total loss of their function.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate CBO piping for damage, using internal and external operating experience, when insulation was removed due to vibration induced damage in 2011, 2015, and 2017.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, between February 2011 and September 2017, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct damage to reactor coolant pump C control bleed off line piping which eventually led to a failure of the line and subsequent reactor coolant leak requiring a forced shutdown to make repairs in May 2019.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On July 11, 2019, the inspectors presented the Unit 1 biennial requalification inspection results to Mr. D. Pehrson, Senior Manager, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On July 25, 2019, the inspectors presented the independent spent fuel storage installation inspection results to Mr. R. Anderson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On August 15, 2019, the inspectors presented the Unit 1 biennial requalification inspection results to Mr. R. Martin, Superintendent, Operations Training, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On August 15, 2019, the inspectors presented the Unit 2 annual requalification inspection results to Mr. R. Martin, Superintendent, Operations Training, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On August 29, 2019, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness program inspection technical debrief was conducted with Mr. J. Toben, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On September 26, 2019, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness program inspection telephonic exit with Mr. B. Patrick, Director, Regulatory Assurance and Performance Improvement, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On October 3, 2019, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

60855 Calculations HI-2125213 Evaluation of MPC Lid Temperature under HI-TRAC Operation 0

at ANO

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2017-0355, 2-2019-02041, 2-2019-02065, C-2017-04091, 07/24/2019

Documents C-2017-04221, C-2017-04585, C-2017-04833, C-2018-00313,

C-2018-02422, C-2018-03438, C-2019-00149, C-2019-01006

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-02142, 1-2019-02404, C-2019-03052

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Miscellaneous 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report ANO Independent Spent 12

Fuel Storage Installation

Unit 2 Station Log, Tuesday July 23, 2019 07/23/2019

Procedures 1601.305 Radiation Monitoring Requirements for Loading and Storage 013

of the HI-STORM

203.012H Annunciator 2K08 Corrective Action 039

3305.003B Unit 2 Operations Rounds Required Readings 0

EN-DC-215 Fuel Selection for Holtec Dry Cask Storage 11

EN-RP-105 Radiological Work Permits 18

OP-1015.003B Unit Two Operations Logs 80

OP-2104.007 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning and Ventilation 076

OP-3403.005 HI-STORM 100 System Loading Operations 044

OP-3406.005 HI-STORM and HI-TRAC Transport Operations Using LPT, 018

VCT, and Holtec Railcar

OP-3406.006 Forced Helium Dehydration System Operations 011

Radiation Surveys ANO-1906-00461 Map Number DFS-H8 Location Hi-Storm Work Order #454379 06/24/2019

ANO-1907-00290 Map Number DFS-H8 Location Hi-Storm Work Order #515364 07/17/2019

ANO-1907-00291 Map Number DFS-H9 Location Hi-Storm Work Order #515364 07/17/2019

Radiation Work RWP 2017-1061 Load Dry Fuel Storage MPC and Store in Hi-Storm with Unit 1 10/18/2017

Permits (RWPs) Fuel (Includes DFS support activities)

RWP 2017-1063 Dry Fuel Storage Unit 1 03/07/2018

Work Orders WO 502367600, 52702275, 52800723

60855

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

60857 Engineering 72.48 Screening EN-DC-2015-008, EN-DC-215-009, EN-DC-215-010, EN-DC- 07/24/2019

Changes and Applicability 215-011, EC 46581, EC-ANO-000074974-0000,

Determinations

Procedures EN-LI-100 Process Applicability Determination 25

71111.04Q Calculations CALC-91-E-0090- ANO-2 Switchgear, Battery, DC, Corridor 2104 Emergency 7

(Post-Accident) Temperature Evaluation

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-02012, 2-2019-01429, 2-2019-01430, 2-2019-01432,

Documents 2-2019-01881, 2-2019-01887

Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2019-02993

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings M-217, Sheet 1 Piping and Instrument Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator 90

Fuel Oil Storage

Engineering EC 20198 ANO-2 Switchgear, Battery, DC, Corridor 2104 Emergency 0

Changes (Post-Accident) Temperature Evaluation

EC 69053 2VUC-2C Cooling Coil Casing Configuration Changes 0

EC 83577, 2VUC-2D Cooling Coil Replacement - Vendor Flange Material 4

Sheet 1 Change 2HCC-259-3

Procedures EN-OP-102 Protective and Caution Tagging 23

OP-1104.023 Diesel Oil Transfer Procedure 38

OP-1104.036 Emergency Diesel Generator Operation 82

OP-1203.012A Annunciator K01 Corrective Action 46

OP-2104.035 Ventilation System Operations 45

OP-2203.012U Annunciator 2E12 Corrective Action 23

OP-2305.018 Underground EDG F.O. Tank 2T-57A/B Recirculation and 16

Cleanup

71111.05A Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2019-03123

Documents

Fire Plans PFP-U2 Unit 2 Prefire Plans

Miscellaneous FBDRL-2019-14 Fire Drill

Procedures OP-1903.010 Emergency Action Level Classification 57

OP-2203.034 Fire or Explosion 23

71111.05Q Calculations CALC-95-R- Basis Requirements for the Component Database on Station 16

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

00024-01 Doors and Hatches

Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2019-02986

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Fire Plans FZ-3040 Fire Zone Detail Alternate Generator Building - Area AGB 4

354

FZ-2002 Fire Zone Detail Control Room, Area G, Fire Zone 2199-G

PFP-U1 Unit 1 Prefire Plan 21

Miscellaneous ER-ANO-2004- Add Reverse Osmosis Unit to Fire Zone 2026-Y 0

230-011

ER-ANO-2004- RO Unit Watch Requirements 0

0619-001

Fire Impairments 8395, 8396, 8397

Procedures COPD-024 Risk Assessment Guidelines 68

OP-1000.120 ANO Fire Impairment Program 25

Work Orders WO 52842614

71111.06 Calculations CALC-ANOC-CS- ANO Flood Protection Design Basis 8

15-0003

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2009-02250, 1-2019-00521, 1-2019-00911, 1-2019-01310,

Documents 1-2019-01581, C-2019-00907, C-2019-01773, C-2019-01976

Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2019-03310

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Engineering EC 33613 Conduit Internal Water Seal 0

Changes EC 57218 External Flooding Protection Design Basis 0

Miscellaneous CFSD-100 BDBEE/ELAP Emergency Response 3

CFSG-005 Initial Assessment and Flex Equipment Staging 4

Procedures OP-1203.025 Natural Emergencies 68

OP-2203.008 Natural Emergencies 52

ULD-0-TOP-17 ANO Flooding 1

Work Orders WO 374472, 521304, 525350, 525777

71111.07A Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2016-02844, 2-2017-01145, 2-2017-03648, 2-2019-00486,

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Documents 2-2019-01881, 2-2019-01887,

Engineering EC 69053 2VUC-2C Cooling Coil Casing Configuration Changes 0

Changes EC 83577, 2VUC-2D Cooling Coil Replacement - Vendor Flange Material 4

Sheet 1 Change 2HCC-259-3

Miscellaneous Cooling Coil Casing Configuration 0

Procedures EN-MA-145 Maintenance Standard for Torque Applications 9

Work Orders WO 528032

71111.11A Miscellaneous Unit 2 Annual Exam Results

71111.11B Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2018-01260, 1-2018-03238, 1-2018-03611, 1-2018-04206,

Documents 1-2018-04957, 1-2019-00756, 1-2019-01164, 1-2019-01480,

1-2019-01635

Miscellaneous ANO1 Cycle 28 Core Reload Test

ANO1 Cycle 28 Simulator Operability Test

Unit 1 Licensed Operator 2018-2019 Requalification Cycle

Curriculum (Sample Plan

Week 3 ANO Unit 1 2019 RO Biennial Requalification Exam

Week 3 ANO Unit 1 2019 SRO Biennial Requalification Exam

ANO Unit 1 Annual and Biennial Exam Results

A1JPM-RO- Perform RO #1 Follow-up Actions for Remote Shutdown, Aux 9

AOP01 Feedwater Pump Available

A1JPM-RO- Respond to Loss of Instrument Air Pressure 0

AOP39

A1JPM-RO- Perform Actions for an Inadvertent Actuation of ESAS 1

AOP41

A1JPM-RO- Fire Affecting Safe Shutdown: Outside AO Actions (Fire 0

AOP42 Area C)

A1JPM-RO- Perform Transfer of D11 from Normal Supply to Emergency 6

ED017 Supply Using Local Controls at D01

A1JPM-RO- Reset Emergency Diesel Generator #2 Overspeed Trip 10

EDG11 Mechanism

A1JPM-RO- Perform EFW Pump (P-7A or P7B) Suction Transfer to 13

EFIC2 Service Water

A1JPM-RO- Perform Actions Required to Correct Inadequate Core Cooling 6

EOP10

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

A1JPM-RO- Emergency and Abnormal Operations 8

EOP13

A1JPM-RO- Respond to Degraded Power (Verify both EDGs supplying 3

EOP22 associated ES buses with proper voltage, frequency and

loading)

A1JPM-SRO- Classify an Emergency Event 6

EAL09

A1JPM-SRO- Classify an Emergency Event 3

EAL14

ANSI/ANS-3.4- Medical Certification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring

1983 Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants

SES-1-007 Dynamic Simulator Scenario Week 5 2

SES-1-030 Dynamic Simulator Scenario Week 4 1

SES-1-036 Dynamic Simulator Scenario Week 4 4

SES-1-047 Dynamic Simulator Scenario Week 5 2

TQF-214-71111 Assessment Plan for Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR)

Program Pre-71111.11 Assessment

Procedures 1063.008 Operations Training Sequence 46

DG-TRNA-015- Simulator Exam Security Guidelines 18

EXAMSEC

EN-TQ-114 Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program 12

Description

EN-TQ-201-04 SAT - Implementation Phase 8

EN-TQ-202 Simulator Configuration Control 10

TQF-201-IM05 Remedial Training Plan 1

71111.11Q Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2019-02295

Documents

Procedures EN-OP-115 Conduct of Operations 26

OP-1202.008 Blackout 18

OP-1202.012 Repetitive Tasks 21

OP-1203.045 Rapid Plant Shutdown 20

71111.13 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2017-02104, 1-2019-01847, 1-2019-02219, 2-2019-02477,

Documents C-2017-04125, C-2019-01042, C-2019-02108, C-2019-02428,

C-2019-02429, C-2019-02430, C-2019-02431, C-2019-02452,

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

C-2019-02485, C-2019-02486

Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2019-02877

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings E-4, Sheet 2 Single Line and Relay Metering Diagram Common Feed 1

Water 4.16 kV Switchgear Bus A-15

E-4, Sheet 3 Single Line and Relay Metering Diagram Common Feed 1

Water 4.16 kV Switchgear Bus A-19

M-217, Sheet 2 P&ID EDG K-4A (DG-1) 44

M-217, Sheet 3 P&ID EDG K-4B (DG-2) 25

Engineering EC 70658 K-4A and K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device 0

Changes Isolation Valve

EC 70659 K-4A EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve 0

EC-70864 K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve 0

Procedures COPD-024 Risk Assessment Guidelines 58, 68

EM-MA-125 Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities 24

EN-DC-128 Fire Protection Impact Reviews 12

EN-OP-119 Protected Equipment Postings 11

EN-WM-104 On Line Risk Assessment 20

OP-1104.036 Emergency Diesel Generator Operations 82

OP-1106.007 Common Feedwater System 5

OP-1107.001 Electrical System Operations 123

OP-1203.046 Loss of Load Center 15

OP-2104.037 Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations 34

OP-2202.010 Standard Attachments 29

OP-2203.012D Annunciator 2K04 Corrective Action 40

OP-2203.012L Annunciator 2K12 Corrective Action 52

OP-2203.012Z Annunciator 2C435 Corrective Action 8

OP-2203.054 Abnormal Grid 3

Work Orders WO 530402, 531004, 5283255, 52798239,

71111.15 Calculations CALC-93-D-5015- Unit 1 Intake Structure Natural Convection-GOTHIC Model 2

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CALC-93-R-1006- Unit 1 Intake Structure Environmental Temperature Study 2

CALC-M-3600- Intake Structure Critical Ambient Temperature 0

139

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2018-02614, 1-2019-01897, 1-2019-02029, 1-2019-02304,

Documents 2-2018-00949, 2-2019-01372, 2-2019-01373, 2-2019-01374,

2-2019-01687, 2-2019-01861, 2-2019-01875, 2-2019-01887,

C-2019-00310

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-01903

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings E-2014, Sheet 3 Single Line Diagram 480 Volt Motor Control Centers 2B53 42

E-2361 Sheet 1A Schematic Diagram Containment Cooling Fan 2VSF1B 9

M-217, Sheet 2 P&ID EDG K-4A (DG-1) 44

Engineering EC 83577

Changes EC 83885 P-4A SW Winding Temp 0

Procedures OP-1015.008 Unit 2 SDC Control 61

OP-1015.048 Shutdown Operations Protection Plan 25

OP-2104.029 Service Water System Operations 115

OP-2106.006 Emergency Feedwater Operations

OP-2305.003 ESF Response Time Test 40

OP-2305.062 SW System Flow Testing

Work Orders WO 484566, 527146, 528032-01, 531004, 527962, 501701,

2813296

71111.19 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-02219, 2-2019-01374, 2-2019-01743, 2-2019-02104,

Documents 2-2019-02136, 2-2019-02260, 2-2019-02477

Miscellaneous Flowserve Memo 06/27/2017

Procedures OP-1104.036 Emergency Diesel Generator Operations 82

OP-1106.007 Common Feedwater System 6

OP-2104.037

OP-2304.037 Unit 2 Plant Protection System Channel A Test 54

OP-2304.112 Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel A 31

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Work Orders WO 487977-02, 525408, 527621, 527622, 52836554-01, 530402,

28622. 531004

71111.20 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2019-01365

Documents

71111.22 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-01956 Rev. 5, 2-2019-00328, 2-2019-01374, 2-2019-

Documents 01743,

Engineering EC 82959

Changes

Miscellaneous 741007 Combustion Engineering Test Report

STM 1-65 Engineered Safeguards Actuation System

Procedures OP-1304.049 Unit 1 ESAS Analog Channel 1 Test 28

OP-1304.052 Unit 1 ESAS Analog Channel 1 Calibration 28

Work Orders WO 527621, 527622, 2790774, 52673734

71114.02 Miscellaneous Design Report Update, Upgraded Public Alert and Notification May 2016

System (ANS), Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO)

Design Report Update, Upgraded Public Alert and Notification February

System (ANS), Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Supplement (1) 2017

EP-002 Early Warning System 15

71114.03 Miscellaneous Form 1903.062C, Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test; 06/29/2017

Change 31 Date: 06/27/2017

Form 1903.062C, Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test; 10/04/2017

Change 32 Date: 09/29/2017

Form 1903.062C, Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test; 11/13/2017

Change 32 Date: 10/31/2017

Form 1903.062C, Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test; 03/17/2018

Change 34 Date: 03/03/2018

Form 1903.062C, Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test; 07/09/2018

Change 34 Date: 06/17/2018

Form 1903.062C, Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test; 08/16/2018

Change 35 Date: 08/09/2018

Form 1903.062C, Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test; 01/02/2019

Change 35 Date: 12/21/2018

Form 1903.062C, Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test; 02/04/2019

Change 35 Date: 01/26/2019

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Form 1903.062C, Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test; 05/10/2019

Change 35 Date: 05/05/2019

Procedures 1903.011 Emergency Response/Notifications 57

EN-EP-310 Emergency Response Organization Notification System 8

71114.04 Miscellaneous Attachment 9.1, Procedure/Document Number: 1903.010, Revision: 055 04/09/2018

CFR

50.54(q)(2)

Review

9.1, Procedure/Document Number: 1903.011, Revision: 056 10/25/2018

CFR

50.54(q)(2)

Review

9.1, Procedure/Document Number: 1903.062, Revision: 033 12/08/2017

CFR

50.54(q)(2)

Review

9.1, Procedure/Document Number: 1904.002, Revision: 042 09/21/2017

CFR

50.54(q)(2)

Review

9.1, Procedure/Document Number: 1903.011, Revision: 54 04/24/2017

CFR

50.54(q)(2)

Review

9.2, Procedure/Document Number: 1903.069, Revision: 007 09/13/2017

CFR

50.54(q)(3)

Screening

9.2, Procedure/Document Number: OP-1903.011, OP-1903.011-Y, 10/25/2018

CFR OP-1903.011-Z; Revisions: 056, 048, 047

50.54(q)(3)

Screening

9.2, Procedure/Document Number: 1903.010, Revision: 056 06/13/2018

CFR

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

50.54(q)(3)

Screening

9.2, Procedure/Document Number: OP-1903.010, Revision: 054 03/20/2018

CFR

50.54(q)(3)

Screening

9.3, Procedure/Document Number: 1903.010, Revision: 054 03/20/2018

CFR

50.54(q)(3)

Evaluation

9.3, Procedure/Document Number: OP-1903.010, Revision: 056 06/13/2018

CFR

50.54(q)(3)

Evaluation

9.3, Procedure/Document Number: 1903.069, Revision: 007 09/13/2017

CFR

50.54(q)(3)

Evaluation

Procedures 1604.051 Eberline Radiation Monitoring System 33

1903.010 Emergency Action Level Classifications 52, 54, 55,

56, 57

1903.062 Communications System Operating Procedure 35

1904.047 Offsite Dose Projections 47

203.012K Annunciator 2K11 Corrective Action 50

EN-EP-305 Emergency Planning 10CFR50.54(q) Review Program 4, 5, 6

71114.05 Corrective Action CR- HQN-2018-00961

Documents CR-ANO- C-2017-00961, C-2017-01742, C-2017-01851, C-2017-01972,

C-2017-02758, C-2017-02938, C-2017-02950, C-2017-04431,

C-2018-00456, C-2018-00525, C-2018-01424, C-2018-01658,

C-2018-01783, C-2018-01851, C-2018-01882, C-2018-01890,

C-2018-01947, C-2018-02809, C-2018-02810, C-2018-02879,

C-2018-03597, C-2018-03686, C-2018-04572, C-2019-01825,

C-2019-01851, C-2019-01890, C-2019-03166, C-2019-03203,

C-2019-03621

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Miscellaneous Arkansas Nuclear One ERO Team "Green" Site Drill Report, 06/02/2019

September 5, 2018

Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance 06/06/2018

Report, Site: Arkansas Nuclear One

Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance 02/08/2018

Report, Site: ANO

Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance 02/25/2019

Report, Site: Arkansas Nuclear One

Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance 10/17/2018

Report, Site: Arkansas Nuclear One

Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance 06/07/2017

Report, Site: Arkansas Nuclear One

Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance 10/19/2017

Report, Site: ANO

Arkansas Nuclear One Blue Team Site Drill Report, 06/12/2019

May 15, 2019

Arkansas Nuclear One Radiological Monitoring Drill Report, 05/16/2019

April 17, 2019

Arkansas Nuclear One HP/Post Accident Drill Report, 05/17/2019

April 17, 2019

Arkansas Nuclear One Red Team Site Drill Report, 02/28/2019

February 6, 2019

Arkansas Nuclear One ERO Red Team Drill Report, 08/31/2017

August 2, 2017

Arkansas Nuclear One 2018 NRC Exercise Report, 08/10/2018

July 17, 2018

Arkansas Nuclear One Radiological Monitoring Drill Report, 02/20/2019

December 4, 2018

Arkansas Nuclear One HP/Post Accident Drill Report, 02/19/2019

December 4, 2018

Arkansas Nuclear One Health Physics Drill 2018-01 Drill 05/20/2019

Package

Arkansas Nuclear One Blue Team Drill Report, May 30, 2018 05/30/2018

EP-2017-027 2017 Medical Drill with Pope County EMS and UAMS 12/06/2017

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

EP-2018-001 December 20, 2017 Pass Drill 01/18/2018

EP-2018-002 December 14 and 19, 2017 Environmental Sampling Drill 01/18/2018

Form 1903.004-G EAL State and Local Agreement 12/11/2018

Form 1903.004-N Annual LOA/Contracts Review 12/18/2018

Form 1903.004N Annual LOA/Contracts Review 05/08/2018

Form 1903.004M ETE Update 08/22/2017

Form 1903-004-C Quarterly Emergency Telephone Directory Review 06/28/2019

KLD TR-1022 Arkansas Nuclear One, 2018 Population Update Analysis 09/22/2018

KLD TR-938 Arkansas Nuclear One, 2017 Population Update Analysis 09/23/2017

MS-1 Drill Report 2018 Medical Drill with Pope County EMS and Saint Mary's 12/06/2018

EP-2018-20158 Regional Medical Center (September 27, 2018)

NQ-2017-009 Emergency Preparedness Audit Package for QA-7-2017-ANO- 07/11/2017

NQ-2018-008 QA Audit Report QA-7-2018-ANO-1, 2018 QA Audit of 05/10/2018

Emergency Preparedness at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO)

QA-07-2019- Quality Assurance Audit Report 05/20/2019

ANO-1

NDE Reports Form 1903.004-G EAL State and Local Agreement 12/05/2017

Procedures 1903.004 Admin. & Maintenance of the Emergency Plan & Implementing 35

Procedures

1903.011 Emergency Response/Notification 54

1903.060 Emergency Supplies and Equipment 46

1903.069 Equipment Important to Emergency Response 9

EN-EP-306 Drills and Exercises 9

EN-EP-308 Emergency Planning Critiques 5

EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Program 36

EN-TQ-110 Emergency Response Organization Training 12, 13

Work Orders WO 00439733, 00481018, 00481536, 00494038, 004388830,

2610089, 52610090, 5263126

71114.06 Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2019-03055, C-2019-03063, C-2019-03064, C-2019-03065,

Documents C-2019-03066, C-2019-03092, C-2019-03094, C-2019-03095

Procedures OP-1903.010 Emergency Action Level Classification 57

71151 Calculations CALC-ANO1-SA- ANO-1 Mitigating System Performance Index Basis 1

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

16-00001

CALC-ANO2-SA- ANO-2 Mitigating System Performance Index Basis 3

06-00001

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-01658

Documents

Miscellaneous Communicator Scenario HU6 11/13/2018

A1SPG-SRO-EAL Emergency Action Level Classification 3

A1SXMLOR1902 Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, Performance Evaluation 0

Scenario

SES-2-007 Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Dynamic Exam Scenario 7

SES-2-013 Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Dynamic Exam Scenario 8

SES-2-031 Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Dynamic Exam Scenario 8

Procedures 1903.057 Emergency Action Level Classification 57

EN-LI-114 Regulatory Performance Indicator Process 15

71152 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2019-01365, 2-2019-01445, 2-2019-01687, 2-2019-01746,

Documents 2-2019-01820, 2-2019-02033, 2-2019-02118,

71153 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2019-02506

Documents

Drawings M-2235, Sheet 1 P&ID Fuel Pool System 76

Procedures OP-2104.006 Fuel Pool Systems 60

OP-2203.002 Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies 18

OP-2203.012K Annunciator 2K11 Corrective Action 50

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