IR 05000313/2021011

Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000313/2021011 and 05000368/2021011

ML21263A012
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	09/23/2021
From:	Vincent Gaddy Region 4 Engineering Branch 1
To:	Dinelli J Entergy Operations
References
IR 2021011
Download: ML21263A012 (17)

Text

September 23, 2021

SUBJECT:

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2021011 AND 05000368/2021011

Dear Mr. Dinelli:

On August 4, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One. On September 13, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.

A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)

consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Signed by Gaddy, Vincent on 09/23/21 Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000313 and 05000368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000313 and 05000368 License Numbers: DPR-51 and NPF-6 Report Numbers: 05000313/2021011 and 05000368/2021011 Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-011-0003 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One Location: Russellville, AR Inspection Dates: June 14, 2021 to July 2, 2021 Inspectors: R. Deese, Senior Reactor Analyst J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector D. Reinert, Reactor Inspector W. Sifre, Senior Reactor Inspector T. Steadham, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By: Vincent G. Gaddy Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71111.21M.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams) The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)

=

(1) Service Water Motor Operated Valve MOV CV-3823 (Unit 1)

Valve testing procedures and performance history were reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry standards Monitoring programs, health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis Valve and actuator design drawings and vendor specifications System operating procedures used in emergency conditions

(2) Service Water Motor Operated Valve MOV 2CV-1541 (Unit 2)

Valve testing procedures and performance history were reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry standards Monitoring programs, health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis Valve and actuator design drawings and vendor specifications System operating procedures used in emergency conditions

(3) Common Feedwater Pumps and Valves Pump and valve testing procedures and performance history were reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry standards System monitoring programs, health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis, pump performance curves, maximum expected differential pressures, and available condensate water inventory calculations Pump, valve and actuator design drawings and vendor specifications System operating procedures used in emergency conditions

(4) Essential Feedwater Pump 2P7A (Unit 2)

Pump testing procedures and performance history were reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry standards Monitoring programs, health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis, pump performance curves, maximum expected differential pressures, and available inventory calculations Pump design drawings and vendor specifications System operating procedures used in emergency conditions

(5) Borated Water Storage Tank Outlet Isolation Valve MOV CV-1408 Valve testing procedures and performance history were reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry standards Monitoring programs, health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis.

Valve and actuator design drawings and vendor specifications System operating procedures used in emergency conditions

(6) Main Steam Isolation Valve 2CV-1060 (Unit 2)

Component maintenance history, system health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation Preventive maintenance bases to ensure activities conform to vendor requirements Inservice testing and system-level design bases documents Procedures for full stroke inservice testing Completed surveillance tests to ensure acceptance criteria have been met Calculations for air accumulator pressure drop operability criteria

(7) 480 Volt Motor Control Center 2B61 (Unit 2)

System health reports, component maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring and correction of potential degradation.

Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that electrical equipment capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits.

The protective device settings and circuit breaker ratings to ensure adequate selective protection coordination of connected equipment during worst case short-circuit conditions.

Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance.

Results of completed preventative maintenance on load centers, motor control centers, and breakers

(8) 4KV Buss 2A1 (Unit 2)

System health reports, component maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring and correction of potential degradation.

Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that bus capacity and voltages remained within the minimum acceptable limits.

The protective device settings and feeder circuit breaker ratings to ensure adequate selective protection coordination of connected equipment during worst-case short circuit conditions.

Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance, including the cable aging management program.

Results of completed preventative maintenance on switchgear and breakers, including breaker tracking.

(9) Operator Actions - The inspectors observed the following simulator scenarios which demonstrated the ability to perform critical actions in a timely manner consistent with the design of the units:

Unit 1 control room operator actions to start and align the common feedwater system resulting from a loss of the main feedwater pumps, the auxiliary feedwater pump, and the emergency feedwater pumps within 27.5 minutes.

Unit 1 control room operator actions to close the service water piping header crossover valves on a flow diversion condition caused by a loss of one loop of service water within 30 minutes.

Unit 2 control room operator actions to establish flow to the steam generators with the common feedwater system resulting from a loss of the main feedwater pumps, the auxiliary feedwater pump, and the emergency feedwater pumps within 29 minutes.

Unit 2 control room operator actions to trip reactor coolant pumps following a loss of component cooling water within 20 minutes.

Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Borated Water Storage Tank System health reports, component maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring and correction of potential degradation.

Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis.

System chemistry control and monitoring, as well as chemical excursion effects and corrective actions.

Component modifications and associated evaluations.

Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)

(1) Engineering Change 58842, NFPA 805 Common Feedwater Tie-In to Unit 2 Emergency Feedwater System

(2) Engineering Change 83739, Revise Calculation and Drawing for Pipe Support 2CCA-16-H21 to Resolve CR-ANO-2-2019-01487

(3) Engineering Change 61853, Design Specification Evaluation for Replacement of Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 2E-35A and 2E-35B

(4) Engineering Change 60179 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger ASME Code Repairs

(5) Engineering Change 00364 Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Governor Upgrade

Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

(1) OE-NOE-2018-00204: CR-WF3-2017-09953 - NCV GREEN Waterford failure to follow procedural guidance when performing periodic maintenance on the main transformer isophase buses. CR-WF3-2017-05844

INSPECTION RESULTS

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.21M This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Violation: During performance of IP 71111.21M, Design Bases Assurance Inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee had identified in 2019 that they were not performing inspections/testing adequate to ensure the service water piping would perform satisfactorily in service. Through document review, the inspectors determined that the service water piping between the emergency cooling pond (ECP) and the units was safety-related, seismic Class 1 piping that provided the ability to transfer decay heat from the reactor core to the ultimate heat sink. It was noted by the inspectors that the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, were applicable to the service water piping because the requirements apply to all activities affecting the safety-related functions of structures, systems, and components. The inspectors also identified that the NRC has issued a number of guidance documents describing service water systems and acceptable testing programs, including NUREG-75/087, Standard Review Plan, and NRC Generic Letter 89-13 "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment",

July 18, 1989.

The licensee noted that both unit's buried ECP supply pipes have not been monitored for degradation either by the Buried Pipe Program or by the Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) Program. The Buried Pipe Program identifies them for opportunistic inspections; however, no opportunities have occurred and the section of pipe between the emergency cooling pond and the units was not included in regular testing and evaluations performed under the MIC Program. The inspectors noted that the last thickness testing that the licensee was able to provide was for the return line for Unit 1 performed in April 2010.

The report identified 68 locations that were 40 percent to 50 percent thru wall. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, requires, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that systems, structures, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Contrary to the above, from May 31, 2008, to the present, the licensee failed to establish and implement an adequate test program to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that the service water piping between the emergency cooling pond and the units will perform satisfactorily in service was identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, the licensee did not establish testing requirements and acceptance limits to detect degradation of the service water piping, which could result in the piping being rendered inoperable and unable to meet its safety-related function due to undetected cracks or other types of degradation.

Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors determined that the failure to perform adequate testing of the service water piping between the emergency cooling pond and the units is a performance deficiency. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the issue is more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform examinations required to demonstrate that the piping can perform its intended function during design basis seismic events, and therefore maintain the ability to provide cooling for the reactor. The inspectors evaluated the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems. The inspectors determined the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic initiating event.

Corrective Action References: CR-ANO-C-2019-010150, CR-ANO-C-2019-1633, CR-HQN-2019-0645, CR-ANO-1-2429, CR-ANO-2-1204

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On September 13, 2021, the inspectors presented the Design Basis Assurance Inspection results to John Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.21M Calculations 84-E-0103-01 General Criteria for Safety Buses 11

84-E-0103-61 Breaker 152/102 plant protective study 0

84-E-0103-62 Breaker 152/103 plant protective study 0

84-E-0103-70 Breaker 152/112 plant protective Study 0

84-E-0103-71 Breaker 152/113 plant protective study 0

88-E-0200-06 P-T Calculation for Unit 2 Emergency Feedwater System 4

CALC-09-E-0002- ANO-1 Start-Up 2 Fast and Manual Transfer Capability 5

CALC-09-E-0016- ANO-1 Start-up #1 & Unit Aux Millstone Studies 2

CALC-2CCA-16- Qualification of Support 2CCA-16-H21 10/25/1993

H21

CALC-82-D-2086- Volume of CST T41B Requiring tornado missile protection 4

CALC-85-E-0055 ASME Class 1 & 2 Analysis for Pressurizer Piping 2CCA-13 4

thru 2CCA-16, 2CCA-38, and 2CCA-47

CALC-88-E-0035- Seismic Analysis of the EFW Pumps 2P7A and B 0

CALC-90-E-0013- Qualification of the EFW Pump 2P7A FOR Operation During 0

and After DBE

CALC-91-E-0091- Design Control Logic Review of ANO-1 MOV 4

CALC-92-E-0009- AC-Motor Operated Valve Terminal Voltage 12

CALC-92-E-0077- CFW Unit 1 and 2 Hydraulic Calculation 0

CALC-92-E-0078- Unit 2 EFW System Pump Performance Requirements 4

CALC-93-SQ- Seismic Qualification Package for EFW Pumps P7A & 2P7A 0

0002-163

CALC-94-E-0018- GL-89-10 MOV Power Cable Breaker and Thermal Overload 4

Device Evaluation

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CALC-95-E-0079- ANO-2 Feedwater Line Break for RSG and Power Uprate 0

CALC-95-E-0082- ANO-2 Loss of Feedwater Analysis for RSG and Power 0

Uprate

CALC- EFW Turbine Exhaust Stack Capacity Following Tornado 1

991883N201-01

CALC-P-28 High Energy Line Break Analysis Outside Containment 0

CALC-V-1011 Pressure Analysis for CV-1408 3

CALC-V-CV- Seismic Qualification of Valve Assembly CV1408 6

1408-05

CALC-V-CV- MOV Torque Switch Setpoints for CV-1408 10

1408-10

Corrective Action CR-ANO-2-2018-04514, CR-ANO-2-2019-01778, CR-ANO-

Documents 2-2019-02100,CR-ANO-2-2020-01595, CR-ANO-2-2020-

01979, CR-ANO-2-2015-03642, CR-ANO-C-2018-00298,

CR-ANO-2-2019-00874, CR-ANO-2-2020-03035, CR-ANO-

2-2015-04404 CR-ANO-2-2015-04239, CR-ANO-2-2019-

2103, CR-ANO-C-2018-00718, CR-ANO-C-2018-00298,

CR-ANO-2-2015-04244, CR-ANO-C-2018-02728, CR-ANO-

2-2011-01559, CR-ANO-2-2008-02601, CR-ANO-2-2015-

2361, CR-ANO-1-2015-02193, CR-ANO-C-2019-01633,

CR-ANO-C-2019-010150, CR-ANO-C-01633, CR-ANO-

HQN-00645

CR-C-2021-01565, CR-C-2021-01623, CR-C-20201-01635,

CR-ANO-2-2015-02849, CR-ANO-2-02879, CR-ANO-2-

2909, CR-ANO-2-03430, CR-ANO-1-1999-00158, CR-

ANO-1-2004-01230, CR-ANO-1-2008-02183, CR-ANO-1-

2016-03851, CR-ANO-1-2018-01775, CR-ANO-1-2019-

03062, CR-ANO-1-2021-01090, CR-ANO-1-2017-00661,

CR-ANO-1-2017-02789, CR-ANO-1-2018-00124, CR-ANO-

1-2018-00129, CR-ANO-1-2018-03003, CR-ANO-1-2018-

04564, CR-ANO-1-2020-00261, CR-ANO-1-2020-00900,

CR-ANO-1-2020-01791, CR-ANO-C-2017-00280, 4. CR-

ANO-1-2017-00602, 5. CR-ANO-1-2017-00848, 7. CR-ANO-

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

1-2005-02741, 2. CR-C-1996-0194, 3. CR-C-1996-0325, 4.

CR-C-1997-0315, 5. CR-C-1998-0115, 6. CR-C-1999-0033,

CR-ANO-1-1207-00324, CR-ANO-1-2005-000329, CR-

ANO-1-2017-00270, CR-ANO-1-2017-00270, CR-ANO-1-

2017-01750, CR-ANO-1-2021-01572, CR-ANO-1-2021-

210, CR-ANO-2-2015-00526, CR-ANO-2-2015-00604,

CR-ANO-2-2015-4851, CR-ANO-2-2019-01487, CR-ANO-C-

20-00604, CR-ANO-2-2020-02598, CR-ANO-2-2020-

1700, CR-ANO-2-2021-00536, CR-ANO-2-2021-00857, CR-

ANO-2-2021-00960, CR-ANO-C-2021-00614, CR-ANO-C-

21-01703

Corrective Action CR-ANO-2-2021-01115, CR-ANO-2-2021-01106, CR:2021-

Documents 02330, CR: 2021-00993, CR: 2021-01653, CR: 2021-01735,

Resulting from CR: 2021-01751

Inspection

Drawings 2CCA-16-1 Small Pipe Isometric Chemical And Volume Control System 22

2CCA-16-H21 Pipe Support Detail Chemical and Volume Control 3

CFW-M-115 Flowserve Pump Curve 0

E-2004, Sh. 1 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 Volt System, Main 19

Supply

E-2005, Sh. 1 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 Volt System 031

Engineered Safety Features

E-2008, Sh. 1 Single line Meter & Relay Diagram 480 Volt Load Centers 31

Engineered Safety Features & Main Supply

E-2008. Sh. 1 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 480 Volt Load Centers 31

Engineered Safety Features & Main Supply

E-2015, Sh. 1 Single Line Diagram 480 Volt Motor Control Centers 2B61 48

E-2039, Sh. 1 Logic Diagram, 4160 ACBs, lockout and Under voltage 03

E-2039, Sh. 2 Logic Diagram, 4160 ACBs, lockout and Undervoltage 03

E-2076, Sh. 1. Schematic Diagram, Typical Circuit Breaker 6900V AND 16

4160V Switchgear

E-2081, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram Typical 480V Load Center Breaker 10

E-2092, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram Startup Transformer Number 2 4160V 028

Air circuit Breakers

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

E-2306, Sh. 2 Schematic Diagram Condensate Pump 2P-2B 17

E-2306, Sh. 3 Schematic Diagram Condensate Pump 2P-2C 19

E-2306, Sh. 3 Schematic Diagram, Condensate Pump 2P-2C 19

E-2306, Sh. 5 Schematic Diagram Condensate Pumps 12

E-2366, Sh. 1A Schematic Diagram Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan 2VSF34B 03

E-8, Sh. 1 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 480 Volt Load Centers 31

Engineered Safety Features & Main Supply

M-2231, Sh. 1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical and Volume 148

Control System

Engineering 0000000364 UNIT 2 EDG GOVERNOR UPGRADE (BASE EC)

Changes DCP 88-1090 MOV Modifications for Decay Heat Removal Valves CV- 1

1407 and CV-1408

EC-58224 NFPA 805 Common Feedwater Parent EC 2R25 1

EC-58247 Installation of Common Feedwater System 0

EC-58842 ANO NFPA 805 Common Feed Water Tie-In to Unit 2 EFW 0

System

EC-702451 EFW Pump Suction Transient Hydraulic Analysis 0

EC-79976 EFW Terry Turbine Oil Addition, Filtration, and Quality 10/21/2018

EC-83739 Revise Calculation And Drawing For Pipe Support 2CCA-16- 0

H21 to Resolve CR-ANO-2-2019-01487

EC47254 Design Input ANO-2 Common Feedwater Simulator Timing 06/25/2014

EC51036 Design Input ANO-1 Common Feedwater Simulator Timing 06/25/2014

Engineering 134464 Procurement Engineering Evaluation for Chevron GST ISO 3/2/2015

Evaluations 32 Turbine Oil

Miscellaneous 1407.38 Work Plan: EQ Inspection of Limitorque Actuators Outside 0

Containment

M-2018 EFW Pump Purchase Specification 6

OE-NOE-2018- NCV GREEN Waterford did not follow procedural guidance 0

244: when performing periodic maintenance on the main

transformer isophase buses.

PM Template ANO Load Center Transformer PM Template 1

PMEE-004 Preventive Maintenance Engineering Evaluation for 6900 14

and 4160-Volt Circuit Breakers

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

PO 6600-2 Emergency Feedwater Pump 4/7/1977

PO 6600-M-2018- Emergency Feedwater Pumps 2/29/1972

AC

Q4-2020 ANO Common Feedwater System Health Report 6/2/2021

SIPD-9329 Replace Limit Switches 2ZS-1060-2 for MSIV 2CV-1060-2 6/24/2021

SPEC-ANO-C- Technical Specification for the Design of Q/Non-Q Pipe 0

2443 Supports for ANO 1&2

SPEC-ANO-M- Technical Specification for Pipe Hangers, Supports, and 5

2119 Restraints

SPEC-ANO-M- Procurement of Lisega Series 30 Hydraulic Snubbers 3

2455

SPEC-ANO-M- Technical Specification for the Design of Piping for ANO 1&2 2

2514

SPEC-ANO-M- Unit 2 Piping Class Sheets 4

2555

TC# 9045 Dissolved Gas Analysis for Transformer 2X-02 05/24/21

TD 1005.0120 Installation and Maintenance Instructions Gas Sealed 0

Transformers Unit Substation Transformers

TD 1005.0120 Installation and Maintenance Instructions Gas Sealed 0

Transformers Unit Substation Transformers

TD 1005.0150 General Instructions Motor Control Center Series 5600 1

TD 1005.0190 Description Molded-Case Circuit Breakers 0

TD 1005.0200 Product Selection and Application Molded Case Circuit 7/10/86

Breakers

TD H313.002 Instruction Manual Sluice Gates, Glydaseal Gates And Slide 07/15/1986

Gates

TDB455 0010 FIELD SERVICE Instruction Booklet IB 8203 Procedure for 1

Field Testing/Calibration I-T-E-K line Circuit Breaker

Overcurrent Trip Devices I-T-E Types OD-3 Through OD-82

(K-225 Through K-2000) OD-300 Through OD-800 (K-3000

AND K-4000) ABB - Asea Brown Broveri

TDL3290090 Vendor Manual: Disassembly/Reassembly Procedure for 1

Lisega Hydraulic Shock Absorbers, Series 30

TDS459X0090 Installation Instructions for Siemens Energy & Automation, 8/8/00

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Inc Shunt Trip Under Voltage Trip and Auxiliary Switch Unit

Use with I-T-E Breaker & Switch

ULD-0-TOP-02-A Fire Protection NFPA 805 Topical 2

Procedures 1106.007 Common Feedwater System 9

202.004 Overheating 13

1403.179 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing 37

1412.057 480V Load Center Switchgear Cleaning and Inspection 013

1416.040 Mange-Blast Circuit Breaker Maintenance 025

1416.042 K-LINE Circuit Breaker PM 016

1416.051 Unit 1 & 2 12IAC53A Relay Test Instructions 005

1416.38 Siemens Vacuum Circuit Breaker Preventive Maintenance 022

2107-002 ESF Electrical System Operation 043

2107.001 Electrical System Operations 133

202.006 Loss of Feedwater 13

2307.008 Unit 2 Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protective 043

Device Testing.

2412.074 UNIT 2 AC Motor Control Centers 024

2416.001 2A1 Bus Switchgear Inspection 19

EN-DC-303 Lubrication Program 3

EN-DC-310 Predictive Maintenance Program 009

EN-DC-324 Preventive Maintenance Program 025

EN-DC-335 PM Basis Template 009

EN-DC-357 NFPA 805 Monitoring Program 3

EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Program 044

EN-OP-115-01 Control Room and Field Operator Rounds 004

EN-OP-123 Time Critical Action/Time Sensitive Action Program standard 4

OP-1104.004 Decay Heat Removal Operating Procedure 135

OP-1106.006 Emergency Feedwater Pump Operation 116

OP-1107.001 Electrical System Operations 129

OP-2106.006 Emergency Feedwater System Operation 104

OP-2411.104 EFW Pump Turbine Lubrication and Inspection 11

PMEE-057 EFW Pump Turbine Speed Control Adjustment 10

SEP-ANO-1-IST- ANO-1 Inservice Testing Bases Document 6

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

SEP-ANO-2-IST- ANO-2 Inservice Testing Bases Document 8

Work Orders 52775096, 52735794, 52800470, 52916322, 52861286,

2734749, 52734751, 00317571, 00528623, 51641017,

00551274, 52274894, 52573226, 00429121, 00526798,

00510218, 52816109, 52921163, 530107, 544679,

2852469, 5298474, 52865304, 52828164-01, 00301122,

51511812, 51799085, 52272017, 52509048, 52612474,

2734890, 52914122, 50285555, 50983353, 51031140,

00409632, 00409632, 00428945, 00506259, 00180790,

00466061, 00501925, 00516395, 00518402, 00518404,

00487877, 50011135, 50240089, 50440331, 50454926,

50526641, 52372803, 52490677, 52609431, 52785361,

2800100, 52848928, 52853631, 52856740, 52865039,

2865698, 52888453, 52899930, 52911021, 52917871,

2953209, 00549374

14