IR 05000313/2021011
| ML21263A012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear |
| Issue date: | 09/23/2021 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy Region 4 Engineering Branch 1 |
| To: | Dinelli J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2021011 | |
| Download: ML21263A012 (17) | |
Text
September 23, 2021
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2021011 AND 05000368/2021011
Dear Mr. Dinelli:
On August 4, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One. On September 13, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000313 and 05000368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000313 and 05000368
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000313/2021011 and 05000368/2021011
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2021-011-0003
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One
Location:
Russellville, AR
Inspection Dates:
June 14, 2021 to July 2, 2021
Inspectors:
R. Deese, Senior Reactor Analyst
J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector
N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector
D. Reinert, Reactor Inspector
W. Sifre, Senior Reactor Inspector
T. Steadham, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Vincent G. Gaddy
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71111.21M.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams) The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)
=
- (1) Service Water Motor Operated Valve MOV CV-3823 (Unit 1)
Valve testing procedures and performance history were reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry standards
Monitoring programs, health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis
Valve and actuator design drawings and vendor specifications
System operating procedures used in emergency conditions
- (2) Service Water Motor Operated Valve MOV 2CV-1541 (Unit 2)
Valve testing procedures and performance history were reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry standards
Monitoring programs, health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis
Valve and actuator design drawings and vendor specifications
System operating procedures used in emergency conditions
- (3) Common Feedwater Pumps and Valves
Pump and valve testing procedures and performance history were reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry standards
System monitoring programs, health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis, pump performance curves, maximum expected differential pressures, and available condensate water inventory calculations
Pump, valve and actuator design drawings and vendor specifications
System operating procedures used in emergency conditions
- (4) Essential Feedwater Pump 2P7A (Unit 2)
Pump testing procedures and performance history were reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry standards
Monitoring programs, health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis, pump performance curves, maximum expected differential pressures, and available inventory calculations
Pump design drawings and vendor specifications
System operating procedures used in emergency conditions
- (5) Borated Water Storage Tank Outlet Isolation Valve MOV CV-1408
Valve testing procedures and performance history were reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry standards
Monitoring programs, health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis.
Valve and actuator design drawings and vendor specifications
System operating procedures used in emergency conditions
- (6) Main Steam Isolation Valve 2CV-1060 (Unit 2)
Component maintenance history, system health reports, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
Preventive maintenance bases to ensure activities conform to vendor requirements
Inservice testing and system-level design bases documents
Procedures for full stroke inservice testing
Completed surveillance tests to ensure acceptance criteria have been met
Calculations for air accumulator pressure drop operability criteria (7)480 Volt Motor Control Center 2B61 (Unit 2)
System health reports, component maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring and correction of potential degradation.
Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that electrical equipment capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits.
The protective device settings and circuit breaker ratings to ensure adequate selective protection coordination of connected equipment during worst case short-circuit conditions.
Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance.
Results of completed preventative maintenance on load centers, motor control centers, and breakers (8)4KV Buss 2A1 (Unit 2)
System health reports, component maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring and correction of potential degradation.
Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that bus capacity and voltages remained within the minimum acceptable limits.
The protective device settings and feeder circuit breaker ratings to ensure adequate selective protection coordination of connected equipment during worst-case short circuit conditions.
Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance, including the cable aging management program.
Results of completed preventative maintenance on switchgear and breakers, including breaker tracking.
- (9) Operator Actions - The inspectors observed the following simulator scenarios which demonstrated the ability to perform critical actions in a timely manner consistent with the design of the units:
Unit 1 control room operator actions to start and align the common feedwater system resulting from a loss of the main feedwater pumps, the auxiliary feedwater pump, and the emergency feedwater pumps within 27.5 minutes.
Unit 1 control room operator actions to close the service water piping header crossover valves on a flow diversion condition caused by a loss of one loop of service water within 30 minutes.
Unit 2 control room operator actions to establish flow to the steam generators with the common feedwater system resulting from a loss of the main feedwater pumps, the auxiliary feedwater pump, and the emergency feedwater pumps within 29 minutes.
Unit 2 control room operator actions to trip reactor coolant pumps following a loss of component cooling water within 20 minutes.
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Borated Water Storage Tank
System health reports, component maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring and correction of potential degradation.
Design basis calculations including system hydraulic analysis.
System chemistry control and monitoring, as well as chemical excursion effects and corrective actions.
Component modifications and associated evaluations.
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)
- (1) Engineering Change 58842, NFPA 805 Common Feedwater Tie-In to Unit 2 Emergency Feedwater System
- (2) Engineering Change 83739, Revise Calculation and Drawing for Pipe Support 2CCA-16-H21 to Resolve CR-ANO-2-2019-01487
- (3) Engineering Change 61853, Design Specification Evaluation for Replacement of Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 2E-35A and 2E-35B
- (4) Engineering Change 60179 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger ASME Code Repairs
- (5) Engineering Change 00364 Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Governor Upgrade
Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) OE-NOE-2018-00204: CR-WF3-2017-09953 - NCV GREEN Waterford failure to follow procedural guidance when performing periodic maintenance on the main transformer isophase buses. CR-WF3-2017-05844
INSPECTION RESULTS
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.21M This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: During performance of IP 71111.21M, Design Bases Assurance Inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee had identified in 2019 that they were not performing inspections/testing adequate to ensure the service water piping would perform satisfactorily in service. Through document review, the inspectors determined that the service water piping between the emergency cooling pond (ECP) and the units was safety-related, seismic Class 1 piping that provided the ability to transfer decay heat from the reactor core to the ultimate heat sink. It was noted by the inspectors that the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, were applicable to the service water piping because the requirements apply to all activities affecting the safety-related functions of structures, systems, and components. The inspectors also identified that the NRC has issued a number of guidance documents describing service water systems and acceptable testing programs, including NUREG-75/087, Standard Review Plan, and NRC Generic Letter 89-13 "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment",
July 18, 1989.
The licensee noted that both unit's buried ECP supply pipes have not been monitored for degradation either by the Buried Pipe Program or by the Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) Program. The Buried Pipe Program identifies them for opportunistic inspections; however, no opportunities have occurred and the section of pipe between the emergency cooling pond and the units was not included in regular testing and evaluations performed under the MIC Program. The inspectors noted that the last thickness testing that the licensee was able to provide was for the return line for Unit 1 performed in April 2010.
The report identified 68 locations that were 40 percent to 50 percent thru wall. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, requires, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that systems, structures, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Contrary to the above, from May 31, 2008, to the present, the licensee failed to establish and implement an adequate test program to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that the service water piping between the emergency cooling pond and the units will perform satisfactorily in service was identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, the licensee did not establish testing requirements and acceptance limits to detect degradation of the service water piping, which could result in the piping being rendered inoperable and unable to meet its safety-related function due to undetected cracks or other types of degradation.
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors determined that the failure to perform adequate testing of the service water piping between the emergency cooling pond and the units is a performance deficiency. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the issue is more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform examinations required to demonstrate that the piping can perform its intended function during design basis seismic events, and therefore maintain the ability to provide cooling for the reactor. The inspectors evaluated the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems. The inspectors determined the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic initiating event.
Corrective Action References: CR-ANO-C-2019-010150, CR-ANO-C-2019-1633, CR-HQN-2019-0645, CR-ANO-1-2429, CR-ANO-2-1204
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On September 13, 2021, the inspectors presented the Design Basis Assurance Inspection results to John Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
84-E-0103-01
General Criteria for Safety Buses
84-E-0103-61
Breaker 152/102 plant protective study
84-E-0103-62
Breaker 152/103 plant protective study
84-E-0103-70
Breaker 152/112 plant protective Study
84-E-0103-71
Breaker 152/113 plant protective study
88-E-0200-06
P-T Calculation for Unit 2 Emergency Feedwater System
CALC-09-E-0002-
ANO-1 Start-Up 2 Fast and Manual Transfer Capability
CALC-09-E-0016-
ANO-1 Start-up #1 & Unit Aux Millstone Studies
CALC-2CCA-16-
H21
Qualification of Support 2CCA-16-H21
10/25/1993
CALC-82-D-2086-
Volume of CST T41B Requiring tornado missile protection
CALC-85-E-0055
ASME Class 1 & 2 Analysis for Pressurizer Piping 2CCA-13
thru 2CCA-16, 2CCA-38, and 2CCA-47
CALC-88-E-0035-
Seismic Analysis of the EFW Pumps 2P7A and B
CALC-90-E-0013-
Qualification of the EFW Pump 2P7A FOR Operation During
and After DBE
CALC-91-E-0091-
Design Control Logic Review of ANO-1 MOV
CALC-92-E-0009-
AC-Motor Operated Valve Terminal Voltage
CALC-92-E-0077-
CFW Unit 1 and 2 Hydraulic Calculation
CALC-92-E-0078-
Unit 2 EFW System Pump Performance Requirements
CALC-93-SQ-
0002-163
Seismic Qualification Package for EFW Pumps P7A & 2P7A
Calculations
CALC-94-E-0018-
GL-89-10 MOV Power Cable Breaker and Thermal Overload
Device Evaluation
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CALC-95-E-0079-
ANO-2 Feedwater Line Break for RSG and Power Uprate
CALC-95-E-0082-
ANO-2 Loss of Feedwater Analysis for RSG and Power
Uprate
CALC-
991883N201-01
EFW Turbine Exhaust Stack Capacity Following Tornado
CALC-P-28
High Energy Line Break Analysis Outside Containment
CALC-V-1011
Pressure Analysis for CV-1408
CALC-V-CV-
1408-05
Seismic Qualification of Valve Assembly CV1408
CALC-V-CV-
1408-10
MOV Torque Switch Setpoints for CV-1408
CR-ANO-2-2018-04514, CR-ANO-2-2019-01778, CR-ANO-
2-2019-02100,CR-ANO-2-2020-01595, CR-ANO-2-2020-
01979, CR-ANO-2-2015-03642, CR-ANO-C-2018-00298,
CR-ANO-2-2019-00874, CR-ANO-2-2020-03035, CR-ANO-
2-2015-04404 CR-ANO-2-2015-04239, CR-ANO-2-2019-
2103, CR-ANO-C-2018-00718, CR-ANO-C-2018-00298,
CR-ANO-2-2015-04244, CR-ANO-C-2018-02728, CR-ANO-
2-2011-01559, CR-ANO-2-2008-02601, CR-ANO-2-2015-
2361, CR-ANO-1-2015-02193, CR-ANO-C-2019-01633,
CR-ANO-C-2019-010150, CR-ANO-C-01633, CR-ANO-
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-C-2021-01565, CR-C-2021-01623, CR-C-20201-01635,
CR-ANO-2-2015-02849, CR-ANO-2-02879, CR-ANO-2-
2909, CR-ANO-2-03430, CR-ANO-1-1999-00158, CR-
ANO-1-2004-01230, CR-ANO-1-2008-02183, CR-ANO-1-
2016-03851, CR-ANO-1-2018-01775, CR-ANO-1-2019-
03062, CR-ANO-1-2021-01090, CR-ANO-1-2017-00661,
CR-ANO-1-2017-02789, CR-ANO-1-2018-00124, CR-ANO-
1-2018-00129, CR-ANO-1-2018-03003, CR-ANO-1-2018-
04564, CR-ANO-1-2020-00261, CR-ANO-1-2020-00900,
CR-ANO-1-2020-01791, CR-ANO-C-2017-00280, 4. CR-
ANO-1-2017-00602, 5. CR-ANO-1-2017-00848, 7. CR-ANO-
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1-2005-02741, 2. CR-C-1996-0194, 3. CR-C-1996-0325, 4.
CR-C-1997-0315, 5. CR-C-1998-0115, 6. CR-C-1999-0033,
CR-ANO-1-1207-00324, CR-ANO-1-2005-000329, CR-
ANO-1-2017-00270, CR-ANO-1-2017-00270, CR-ANO-1-
2017-01750, CR-ANO-1-2021-01572, CR-ANO-1-2021-
210, CR-ANO-2-2015-00526, CR-ANO-2-2015-00604,
CR-ANO-2-2015-4851, CR-ANO-2-2019-01487, CR-ANO-C-
20-00604, CR-ANO-2-2020-02598, CR-ANO-2-2020-
1700, CR-ANO-2-2021-00536, CR-ANO-2-2021-00857, CR-
ANO-2-2021-00960, CR-ANO-C-2021-00614, CR-ANO-C-
21-01703
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-2-2021-01115, CR-ANO-2-2021-01106, CR:2021-
2330, CR: 2021-00993, CR: 2021-01653, CR: 2021-01735,
CR: 2021-01751
Small Pipe Isometric Chemical And Volume Control System
Pipe Support Detail Chemical and Volume Control
CFW-M-115
Flowserve Pump Curve
E-2004, Sh. 1
Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 Volt System, Main
Supply
E-2005, Sh. 1
Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 Volt System
Engineered Safety Features
031
E-2008, Sh. 1
Single line Meter & Relay Diagram 480 Volt Load Centers
Engineered Safety Features & Main Supply
E-2008. Sh. 1
Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 480 Volt Load Centers
Engineered Safety Features & Main Supply
E-2015, Sh. 1
Single Line Diagram 480 Volt Motor Control Centers 2B61
E-2039, Sh. 1
Logic Diagram, 4160 ACBs, lockout and Under voltage
E-2039, Sh. 2
Logic Diagram, 4160 ACBs, lockout and Undervoltage
E-2076, Sh. 1.
Schematic Diagram, Typical Circuit Breaker 6900V AND
4160V Switchgear
E-2081, Sh. 1
Schematic Diagram Typical 480V Load Center Breaker
Drawings
E-2092, Sh. 1
Schematic Diagram Startup Transformer Number 2 4160V
Air circuit Breakers
28
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
E-2306, Sh. 2
Schematic Diagram Condensate Pump 2P-2B
E-2306, Sh. 3
Schematic Diagram Condensate Pump 2P-2C
E-2306, Sh. 3
Schematic Diagram, Condensate Pump 2P-2C
E-2306, Sh. 5
Schematic Diagram Condensate Pumps
E-2366, Sh. 1A
Schematic Diagram Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan 2VSF34B
E-8, Sh. 1
Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 480 Volt Load Centers
Engineered Safety Features & Main Supply
M-2231, Sh. 1
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical and Volume
Control System
148
0000000364
UNIT 2 EDG GOVERNOR UPGRADE (BASE EC)
DCP 88-1090
MOV Modifications for Decay Heat Removal Valves CV-
1407 and CV-1408
NFPA 805 Common Feedwater Parent EC 2R25
Installation of Common Feedwater System
ANO NFPA 805 Common Feed Water Tie-In to Unit 2 EFW
System
EFW Pump Suction Transient Hydraulic Analysis
EFW Terry Turbine Oil Addition, Filtration, and Quality
10/21/2018
Revise Calculation And Drawing For Pipe Support 2CCA-16-
H21 to Resolve CR-ANO-2-2019-01487
Design Input ANO-2 Common Feedwater Simulator Timing
06/25/2014
Engineering
Changes
Design Input ANO-1 Common Feedwater Simulator Timing
06/25/2014
Engineering
Evaluations
134464
Procurement Engineering Evaluation for Chevron GST ISO
Turbine Oil
3/2/2015
1407.38
Work Plan: EQ Inspection of Limitorque Actuators Outside
Containment
M-2018
EFW Pump Purchase Specification
OE-NOE-2018-
244:
NCV GREEN Waterford did not follow procedural guidance
when performing periodic maintenance on the main
transformer isophase buses.
PM Template
ANO Load Center Transformer PM Template
Miscellaneous
PMEE-004
Preventive Maintenance Engineering Evaluation for 6900
and 4160-Volt Circuit Breakers
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
PO 6600-2
Emergency Feedwater Pump
4/7/1977
PO 6600-M-2018-
Emergency Feedwater Pumps
2/29/1972
Q4-2020
ANO Common Feedwater System Health Report
6/2/2021
SIPD-9329
Replace Limit Switches 2ZS-1060-2 for MSIV 2CV-1060-2
6/24/2021
SPEC-ANO-C-
2443
Technical Specification for the Design of Q/Non-Q Pipe
Supports for ANO 1&2
SPEC-ANO-M-
2119
Technical Specification for Pipe Hangers, Supports, and
Restraints
SPEC-ANO-M-
2455
Procurement of Lisega Series 30 Hydraulic Snubbers
SPEC-ANO-M-
2514
Technical Specification for the Design of Piping for ANO 1&2
SPEC-ANO-M-
2555
Unit 2 Piping Class Sheets
TC# 9045
Dissolved Gas Analysis for Transformer 2X-02
05/24/21
TD 1005.0120
Installation and Maintenance Instructions Gas Sealed
Transformers Unit Substation Transformers
TD 1005.0120
Installation and Maintenance Instructions Gas Sealed
Transformers Unit Substation Transformers
TD 1005.0150
General Instructions Motor Control Center Series 5600
TD 1005.0190
Description Molded-Case Circuit Breakers
TD 1005.0200
Product Selection and Application Molded Case Circuit
Breakers
7/10/86
TD H313.002
Instruction Manual Sluice Gates, Glydaseal Gates And Slide
Gates
07/15/1986
TDB455 0010
FIELD SERVICE Instruction Booklet IB 8203 Procedure for
Field Testing/Calibration I-T-E-K line Circuit Breaker
Overcurrent Trip Devices I-T-E Types OD-3 Through OD-82
(K-225 Through K-2000) OD-300 Through OD-800 (K-3000
AND K-4000) ABB - Asea Brown Broveri
TDL3290090
Vendor Manual: Disassembly/Reassembly Procedure for
Lisega Hydraulic Shock Absorbers, Series 30
TDS459X0090
Installation Instructions for Siemens Energy & Automation,
8/8/00
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Inc Shunt Trip Under Voltage Trip and Auxiliary Switch Unit
Use with I-T-E Breaker & Switch
ULD-0-TOP-02-A
Fire Protection NFPA 805 Topical
1106.007
Common Feedwater System
202.004
Overheating
1403.179
Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing
1412.057
480V Load Center Switchgear Cleaning and Inspection
013
1416.040
Mange-Blast Circuit Breaker Maintenance
25
1416.042
K-LINE Circuit Breaker PM
016
1416.051
Unit 1 & 2 12IAC53A Relay Test Instructions
005
1416.38
Siemens Vacuum Circuit Breaker Preventive Maintenance
2
2107-002
ESF Electrical System Operation
043
2107.001
Electrical System Operations
133
202.006
Loss of Feedwater
2307.008
Unit 2 Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protective
Device Testing.
043
2412.074
UNIT 2 AC Motor Control Centers
24
2416.001
2A1 Bus Switchgear Inspection
Lubrication Program
Predictive Maintenance Program
009
Preventive Maintenance Program
25
PM Basis Template
009
NFPA 805 Monitoring Program
Corrective Action Program
044
EN-OP-115-01
Control Room and Field Operator Rounds
004
Time Critical Action/Time Sensitive Action Program standard
OP-1104.004
Decay Heat Removal Operating Procedure
135
OP-1106.006
Emergency Feedwater Pump Operation
116
OP-1107.001
Electrical System Operations
29
OP-2106.006
Emergency Feedwater System Operation
104
OP-2411.104
EFW Pump Turbine Lubrication and Inspection
PMEE-057
EFW Pump Turbine Speed Control Adjustment
Procedures
SEP-ANO-1-IST-
ANO-1 Inservice Testing Bases Document
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SEP-ANO-2-IST-
ANO-2 Inservice Testing Bases Document
Work Orders
2775096, 52735794, 52800470, 52916322, 52861286,
2734749, 52734751, 00317571, 00528623, 51641017,
00551274, 52274894, 52573226, 00429121, 00526798,
00510218, 52816109, 52921163, 530107, 544679,
2852469, 5298474, 52865304, 52828164-01, 00301122,
51511812, 51799085, 52272017, 52509048, 52612474,
2734890, 52914122, 50285555, 50983353, 51031140,
00409632, 00409632, 00428945, 00506259, 00180790,
00466061, 00501925, 00516395, 00518402, 00518404,
00487877, 50011135, 50240089, 50440331, 50454926,
50526641, 52372803, 52490677, 52609431, 52785361,
2800100, 52848928, 52853631, 52856740, 52865039,
2865698, 52888453, 52899930, 52911021, 52917871,
2953209, 00549374