IR 05000313/2023420
| ML24009A100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/2024 |
| From: | Clark J Security Performance Evaluation Branch |
| To: | Pehrson D Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2023420 | |
| Download: ML24009A100 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2 - SECURITY BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2023420 AND 05000368/2023420
Dear Doug Pehrson:
On December 14, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Brad Wertz, General Manager of Plant Operations and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Jefferson K. Clark, Chief Security Performance Evaluation Branch Division of Security Operations Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response Docket Nos. 05000313 and 05000368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000313 and 05000368
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000313/2023420 and 05000368/2023420
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-420-0019
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Russellville, AR
Inspection Dates:
November 13, 2023, to December 15, 2023
Inspectors:
J. Berry, Team Leader, NSIR
P. Coughlin, Senior Physical Security Inspector, NSIR
T. Eck, Physical Security Inspector, NSIR
T. Weir, Physical Security Inspector, RIV
Approved By:
Jefferson K. Clark, Chief
Security Performance Evaluation Branch
Division of Security Operations
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a security baseline inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2201, Security Inspection Program for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
SAFEGUARDS
71130.03 - Contingency Response - Force-On-Force Testing
Contingency Response - Force-On-Force Testing (1 Sample)
- (1) NRC inspectors completed the Contingency Response - Force-on-Force (FOF)
Testing inspection procedure by evaluating the licensees performance in implementing the physical protection program to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats up to, and including, the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. Two NRC-evaluated FOF exercises were conducted for the evaluation.
REPORT ATTACHMENTS
Supplemental Information for the report is considered Safeguards Information and is located separately within the NRCs Safeguards Information Local Area Network and Electronic Safe database, under NS125962.
INSPECTION RESULTS
No findings were identified.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On December 14, 2023, the inspectors presented the security baseline inspection results to Mr. Brad Wertz, General Manager of Plant Operations and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
03847
Protective Strategy briefing exceeded the allotted timeframe
provided.
CR-ANO-C-2023
03851
NRC observed that multiple alternate Push to Talk (PTT)
phones, located at a security position were not charged,
preventing them from functioning.
CR-ANO-C-2023
03852
NRC observed that the volume level for multiple PTT
phones, located at multiple security positions appeared to be
very low compared to the environmental background noise at
the positions.
CR-ANO-C-2023
03853
NRC observed that multiple cell phones, located at a security
position were not charged, preventing them from functioning.
CR-ANO-C-2023
03854
NRC observed that a delay gate near the discharge channel
was not locked as demonstrated by another delay gate in the
same vicinity.
CR-ANO-C-2023
03857
During tabletop exercises, an opportunity for improvement
was identified regarding Operations support. The opportunity
for improvement suggests having support personnel
knowledgeable Unit 1 and Unit 2 operations as tabletop drill
players.
CR-ANO-C-2023
03872
NRC observed that a gun port located as a security position
appeared to be hesitant to open smoothly.
CR-ANO-C-2023
03885
NRC identified that the required Security patrols of a specific
area should be evaluated for potential changes needed to
meet regulatory requirements.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04078
Exercise 1, it was identified there is an area near the MAC 8
where additional delay features can be added.
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-C-2023
04079
Exercise 1, a Security code was called too early.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04080
04080 Badge Action Requests submitted via Illuminate for
two NextEra Joint Composite Adversary Force members,
supporting ANOs NRC Evaluated Force on Force
Inspection, failed to trigger the creation of Entergy
MyLearning accounts for each individual. Without the
Entergy MyLearning accounts, the individuals were initially
unable to be badged for Unescorted Access at
ANO.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04081
Exercise 1, it was identified that there are inconsistencies
with building nomenclature and how they are communicated
between response force members.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04082
Exercise 1, several responders deployed to defensive
positions without direction from the RTL.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04083
Exercise 1, it was identified that the adversary controller
briefing needs to contain additional detailed information.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04084
Exercise 1, the NRC observed a player & controller go to a
personal vehicle after receiving their drill equipment from the
SAAB trailer which is contrary to expectations.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04085
Exercise 1, it was identified that plant personnel were moving
throughout the plant during drill play which resulted in an
unplanned admin hold.
03782
Exercise 1, it was identified that plant personnel were moving
throughout the plant during drill play.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04086
Exercise 1, it was identified that an adversary controller
called out the incorrect gun port when communicating
suppressive fire.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04088
Exercise 1, it was identified that simulating the use of ballistic
window shields in the BREs was not consistent.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04089
Exercise 1, it was identified that there were missed
opportunities for the response force to declare a security
code.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04090
Exercise 1, it was identified that the on site warehouse dock
roof top may impact responders field of view.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04091
Exercise 1, a responder was neutralized by the adversary
team.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04092
Exercise 1, it was identified that the control measures for
vehicle engagement were not implemented correctly.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04093
Exercise 1, it was identified that additional delay should be
placed at the on-site warehouse dock.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04094
Exercise 1, it was identified that the blue door on the South
side of the on-site warehouse should be evaluated for
modifications.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04098
Exercise 2, it was identified that there was a missed
opportunity during the controller briefing to identify that
additional clarifying information involving a simulated
explosion could have been provided to the alarm station
operators during drill play.
CR-ANO-C2023
04099
Exercise 2, it was identified that there was a missed
opportunity to perform a scenario matrix review with the
adversary controllers to ensure that all relevant information is
provided in controller injects.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04100
Exercise 2, it was identified that a responder failed to retrieve
a part of their response gear upon their initial deployment.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04101
Exercise 2, it was identified that there were two Kubotas
parked by the train bay which could have impacted Security
response.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04102
Exercise 2, it was identified that there are response positions
that are experiencing communications issues during drill play
when communicating via handheld to handheld.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04103
NRC had comments on the Target Sets procedure and made
the following observation: After review of the Target Set 1
India, it was identified that the licensee could clarify the
language within Target Set 1 India to aid an end user in
understanding the as written actions necessary to reduce
ambiguity and inference of actions.
CR-ANO-C-2023
04104
NRC had comments on the Target Sets procedure and made
the following observation: After review of Target Set 2 Hotel,
it was identified that the licensee could clarify the language
within Target Set 2 Hotel to better identify components of
interest within the Target Set. The verbiage associated with
this Target Set is difficult to understand when identifying
specific components associated with this Target Set.
Engineering
Evaluations
Revised ANO BRE Blast Analysis
09/25/2023
2/15/2022
Arkansas Nuclear One Table of Security Personnel
06/07/2021
ASLP-AO-DUTYS
Auxiliary Operator Duties
Rev 28
ASLP-RO-SEC
Station Security Requirements
Rev 10
Miscellaneous
06/26/202
23 Annual Vehicle Barrier System Field Inspection Report
06/26/2023
Arkansas Nuclear One Physical Security, Safeguards
Contingency and Training & Qualification Plan
Rev 20,
01/12/2022
ANOSF-014-01
Protected Area Patrol
Rev 2
Arkansas Nuclear
One, EN-ES-229
General Security Strategies
Rev 1,
2/14/2019
Arkansas Nuclear
One, OP-
1043.004
Compensatory Measures for Security System Component
Outages
Rev 50,
05/17/2022
Arkansas Nuclear
One, OP-
1043.042
Response to Contingencies
Rev 22
Arkansas Nuclear
One, OP-
1043.047
Defensive Strategy
Rev 29,
05/17/2022
Arkansas Nuclear
One, OP-
1043.048
Law Enforcement Response Plan
Rev 4
Procedures
Arkansas Nuclear
One, OP-
Target Sets
Rev 13,
03/20/2023
1043.049
Conduct of Security Force Exercises and Drills
Rev 21
EN-NS-215-03
Triennial Force-on-Force Exercises
Rev 0
Controller Responsibility Guidelines
Rev 13
Force-on-Force Mock Adversary Program
Rev 3
Deliberate Acts Against Plant Equipment
Rev 0
OP-1043.014
Patrols and Inspection
Rev 48
OP-1043.014
Patrols and Inspections
Rev. 48
OP-1043.015
Testing Intrusion Detection Systems
Rev 57
OFFICE
NSIR/DSO/SPEB
/ETB
R-IV/DRS/PSB1
NSIR/DSO/SPEB
/ETB
NSIR/DSO/SPEB
/ETA
NAME
PCoughlin
AWeir
JBerry
JClark
DATE
Jan 10, 2024
Jan 10, 2024
Jan 10, 2024
Jan 10, 2024