IR 05000313/2020404
| ML20267A403 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/2020 |
| From: | John Monninger NRC Region 4 |
| To: | Dinelli J Entergy Operations |
| Clark D | |
| References | |
| 4-2019-009, EA-20-018 IR 2020404 | |
| Download: ML20267A403 (13) | |
Text
September 23, 2020
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NOTICE OF VIOLATION; NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2020404 AND 05000368/2020404 AND NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2019-009
Dear Mr. Dinelli:
This letter refers to the investigation completed on February 27, 2020, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) at Arkansas Nuclear One. The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether several contractor employee supervisors willfully failed to notify security after discovering prohibited items, unauthorized ammunition, within the protected area.
In a telephonic exit briefing on June 23, 2020, Mr. Ray Kellar of my staff informed Ms. Stephenie Pyle, Fleet Director, Regulatory Compliance, and other members of your staff that the NRC was considering escalated enforcement for an apparent violation involving the deliberate failure of several contractor employee supervisors to notify security upon discovering prohibited items in the protected area. Mr. Kellar also informed you that we had sufficient information regarding the apparent violation and your corrective actions to make an enforcement decision without the need for a predecisional enforcement conference or a written response. On June 25, 2020, Ms. Pyle indicated that Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) did not believe that a predecisional enforcement conference or written response was needed and that Entergy accepted the violation.
Based on the information developed during the investigation, the NRC determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is cited in Enclosure 1, Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding the violation are described in the factual summary (Enclosure 2) and in the inspection report (Enclosure 3). In total, four contractor employee supervisors deliberately chose not to inform security of the discovery of prohibited items, unauthorized ammunition, in the protected area. This caused Entergy to be in violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 73.55(a)(3). This violation has been categorized in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy as a Severity Level III violation.
The Enforcement Policy can be found on the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $150,000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation.
Because the Severity Level III violation was associated with a willful violation, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section 2.3.4 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRC determined that Identification credit is warranted because your staff identified the violation while interviewing one of the individuals involved in the willful violation about an unrelated matter. The NRC determined that Corrective Action credit is warranted based on the prompt and comprehensive corrective actions you implemented. The corrective actions to address the violation are documented in Enclosure 3.
Therefore, to encourage identification and prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.
In Section V of the Confirmatory Order, EA-17-132/153, issued to Entergy on March 12, 2018, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No.
ML18072A191), the NRC indicated it would consider enforcement discretion for violations that meet the criteria for discretion under Section 3.3 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Although the violation was identified by Entergy, the NRC is not exercising discretion in this instance because it was not identified as part of the corrective action for a previous enforcement action.
The NRC has concluded that information regarding: (1) the reason for the violations; (2) the corrective actions that have been taken and the results achieved; and (3) the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in Enclosure 3.
Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice (Enclosure 1).
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room and in ADAMS, accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Ray Kellar of my staff at 817-200-1527.
Sincerely, John D. Monninger
Deputy Regional Administrator
Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation 2. Factual Summary 3. Inspection Report 05000313/2020404 and 05000368/2020404
John D.
Monninger Digitally signed by John D.
Monninger Date: 2020.09.23 14:37:27-05'00'
ML20267A403 SUNSI Review:
ADAMS:
Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By: CAJ Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002 OFFICE SES/ACES TL:ACES C:DRS/PSB1 RC C:DRP/D OE NAME JKramer JGroom RKellar DCylkowski JDixon GWilson SIGNATURE
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/RA/ E DATE 08/21/20 08/21/20 08/24/20 08/27/20 08/21/20 09/17/20 OFFICE NSIR OGC D:DRS DRA
NAME TKeane NMoron RLantz JMonninger
SIGNATURE
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DATE 09/17/20 09/15/20 09/17/20 09/23/20
Enclosure 1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368 Arkansas Nuclear One License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6 EA-20-018
During an NRC investigation completed on February 27, 2020, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In a
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000313 and 05000368
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000313/2020404 and 05000368/2020404
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-404-0000
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Russellville, Arkansas
Inspection Dates:
February 27, 2020, to June 23, 2020
Inspectors:
A. Meyen, Physical Security Inspector
D. Hostetter, Physical Security Inspector
Approved By:
Ray L. Kellar, P.E., Chief
Plant Support Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One in accordance with the
Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for
overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified and
self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Notify Security of Prohibited Items in the Protected Area
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-cutting
Aspect
Inspection
Procedure
Not
Applicable
NOV 05000313/2020404 and
Open
Not
Applicable
Not
Applicable
Based on the information developed in Investigation 4-2019-009, the NRC identified a Severity
Level III violation of 10 CFR 73.55(a)(3) involving the failure of four contract supervisors to
notify security of the presence of prohibited items (unauthorized ammunition) inside the
protected area in accordance with site procedures.
MISCELLANEOUS - TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT
On November 29, 2018, a licensee security manager notified the NRC resident inspector
assigned to Arkansas Nuclear One that the swing shift general foreman had discovered
prohibited items (unauthorized ammunition) in his belongings while within the protected area,
had notified his supervisors, and had disposed of the ammunition without informing security with
his supervisors consent.
Based on the licensees initial reporting of this issue to the NRC, the NRC Office of
Investigations (OI) performed an investigation of actions of the licensee contractor staff involved
in this event. The inspectors independently reviewed the licensees and OIs investigations.
The inspectors also reviewed long term corrective actions (CR-HQ-2019-02897) intended to
address deliberate misconduct. The inspectors reviewed the licensees Confirmatory Order
EA-17-132/152 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML18072A191).
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Notify Security of Prohibited Items in the Protected Area
Cornerstone
Significance/Severity
Cross-cutting
Aspect
Inspection
Procedure
Not Applicable
NOV 05000313/2020404 and
Open
Not
Applicable
Not
Applicable
Based on the information developed in Investigation 4-2019-009, the NRC identified a
Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 73.55(a)(3) involving the failure of four contract
supervisors to notify security of the presence of prohibited items (unauthorized ammunition)
inside the protected area in accordance with site procedures.
Description: On or about October 10, 2018, a licensee contract supervisor working inside the
Arkansas Nuclear One protected area identified, within their personal backpack, unauthorized
ammunition rounds, which are considered prohibited items at the site. The licensee contract
supervisor then reported or discussed the discovery of the unauthorized ammunition with two
other contract supervisors. Rather than report the unauthorized ammunition to security, the
three contract supervisors collectively decided to remove the ammunition from the protected
area and dispose of it at a private residence. A fourth contract supervisor was contacted at
their residence about the issue and was informed of the decision to dispose of the
ammunition; this supervisor did not follow up with security to report the issue. On November
29, 2018, the licensee became aware of this event and took immediate corrective action to
suspend the site access for all the individuals suspected of failing to report the prohibited
items. The licensee also initiated Condition Report CR-HQN-2019-02897 and notified the
NRC resident inspector.
From February 21, 2019 through February 27, 2020, OI investigated this event and concluded
that the failure to report the prohibited items to security is contrary to Entergy Fleet procedure
EN-NS-232, General Employee Security Responsibilities. Following subsequent review of
this issue, the NRC concluded that the licensees corrective actions were prompt and
comprehensive. In addition to the access authorization decisions made by a reviewing
official, licensee corrective actions included sharing of operating experience related to this
event with Entergy fleet peers to reinforce expectations and warn of the potential
consequences of failing to make proper notifications. This information was issued to the
senior project managers responsible for oversight and management of the contract craft
employees on February 25, 2020.
The NRC also noted that corrective actions required by Confirmatory Order EA-17-132/153
remain in effect at ANO through the remainder of 2020. This Order was issued as a result of
a successful Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session resulting in a settlement
agreement related to apparent violations involving deliberate misconduct that occurred at a
different Entergy fleet site. The Order confirmed licensee commitments made by the licensee
to deter and detect deliberate misconduct at all power reactor licensees owned and operated
by Entergy, which included ANO. The NRC determined that the corrective actions required
by Confirmatory Order EA-17-132/153 were in the implementation phase during the
October 10, 2018 event involving prohibited items and would provide a high likelihood of
deterring a similar event.
Enforcement:
Significance: The Reactor Oversight Processs significance determination process does not
specifically consider willfulness in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is
necessary to address this violation which involves willfulness using the traditional
enforcement process.
Notice of Violation:
Title 10 CFR 73.55(a)(3), states, in part, that the licensee is responsible for maintaining the
onsite physical protection program in accordance with Commission regulations through the
implementation of written security implementing procedures.
Entergy Fleet Procedure EN-NS-232, General Employee Security Responsibilities,
Revision 1, Section 5.0, Definitions defines Prohibited Items as Items that the licensee
has determined not appropriate for introduction into the Protected Area. Alcohol, illegal
drugs, drug paraphernalia and unauthorized ammunition are some examples of prohibited
items.
Entergy Fleet Procedure EN-NS-232, Section 6.0.11 requires, in part, that plant employees
must continuously be aware and alert for unauthorized activities and/or personnel in the
protected area and notify Security as soon as possible.
Entergy Fleet Procedure EN-NS-232, Section 7.21, requires, in part, that all plant personnel
report to security prohibited items found in their area of work or suspected on the person of
any individual in the protected area.
Contrary to the above, on or about October 10, 2018, the licensee failed to maintain the
onsite physical protection program in accordance with Commission regulations through the
implementation of written security implementing procedures. Specifically, several licensee
contract plant employees failed to notify security of a prohibited item, namely unauthorized
ammunition, located in the licensee protected area.
Enforcement Actions: This violation is categorized in accordance with the NRC Enforcement
Policy as a Severity Level III violation.
The staff determined that the licensee should receive credit for identification of the problem.
The licensee took prompt action to escort the individuals involved from the protected area and
removed their protected area access, notified the NRC, and worked with the contractor to
perform an investigation.
The staff determined that the licensee should receive credit for corrective actions for the
violation. The staff determined that licensee took substantive corrective action, including
initiating a Condition Report (CR-HQN-2019-02897) intended to deter future misconduct, and
implemented those actions at each site in the Entergy fleet.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
On July 23, 2020, the NRC staff presented the inspection results to Ms. Stephenie Pyle, Fleet
Director, Regulatory Compliance, and other members of the licensee staff in a telephonic exit
meeting. The NRC staff verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this
report.