IR 05000313/2019003
| ML19310H020 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/2019 |
| From: | John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Dinelli J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2019001, IR 2019003 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML19310H020 (32) | |
Text
November 5, 2019
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2019003 AND 05000368/2019003 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT 07200013/2019001
Dear Mr. Dinelli:
On September 30, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2. On October 3, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000313, 05000368, and 07200013 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000313, 05000368, and 07200013
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000313/2019003, 05000368/2019003, and 07200013/2019001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-003-0005 and I-2019-001-0084
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Russellville, AR
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2019 to September 30, 2019
Inspectors:
L. Brookhart, Senior Spent Fuel Storage Inspector
T. DeBey, Resident Inspector
N. Fields, Health Physicist
M. Hayes, Operations Engineer
S. Hedger, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
C. Henderson, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Kirkland, Senior Operations Engineer
T. Sullivan, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief
Reactor Projects Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection and an independent spent fuel storage installation inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Install Correct Component and Perform Post Maintenance Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000368/2019003-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.19 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Technical Specification 6.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to properly pre-plan and perform maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to install the correct diodes for control element assembly hold bus 2C70 and to perform post-maintenance testing to demonstrate component functionality.
Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000368/2019003-02 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71152 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances.
Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct damage to Unit 2s reactor coolant pump C controlled bleed off piping in 2011, 2015, and 2017, when insulation was removed making the piping available for inspection.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000313/2018-004-01 Reactor Trip Due to the Loss of a Non-Vital 4160 Volt Bus.
71153 Closed LER 05000368/2019-001-00 Reactor Trip Due to a Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Failure.
71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at full power where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor reductions in power to support scheduled surveillances.
Unit 2 began the inspection period in shutdown for Forced Outage 2F19-01, as a result of a fault in reactor coolant pump motor B, which started on May 26, 2019. On July 28, 2019, Unit 2 commenced a reactor startup and the reactor was made critical. The unit was returned to full power on July 30, 2019, where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor reductions in power to support scheduled surveillances and for degraded condenser vacuum conditions.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 train A chemical and volume control system with charging pump C operating on August 6, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 2 fuel oil system with emergency fuel oil bunker T-57A on recirculation on August 16, 2019
- (3) Unit 2 train A 4160 volt safety-related switchgear room coolers D and C on August 29, 2019
71111.05A - Fire Protection (Annual)
Annual Inspection (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 fire drill for a main generator hydrogen fire, Fire Zone 2200-M, Fire Area B-2, on August 26, 2019
71111.05Q - Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 fire risk management actions for common feedwater pump B unavailability for Fire Areas 2200-MM turbine building 372 feet nonvital switchgear area and Unit 2 transformer yard on August 15, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 fire impairment for reverse osmosis unit installation in the drumming station for Fire Zones 34-Y, 2026-Y, and 20-Y-2 on August 16, 2019
- (3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 alternate AC diesel generator building Fire Zone 3040 on September 3, 2019
- (4) Unit 2 control room safety-related panels for Fire Zone 2002 and 2199-G, Fire Area G, on September 12, 2019
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Underground Cables (IP Section 02.02c.) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 manhole 10 flood seals for the emergency diesel generator fuel oil vault on September 9, 2019
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) Unit 2 train A 4160 volt safety-related switchgear room cooler D replacement on September 5, 2019
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam administered on August 15, 2019.
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations
The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on July 8, 2019.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2), and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security
The inspectors evaluated the ability of the licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions
The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
Problem Identification and Resolution
The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 short notice downpower to 96.6 percent reactor power for degraded main condenser A vacuum on August 7, 2019
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 licensed operator training scenario on September 12, 2019
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 common feedwater system and alternate AC emergency diesel generator availability during a loss of the 13.8 kV London line on July 9, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 emergent work for train B turbine driven emergency feedwater pump steam admission valve failure to return to automatic during surveillance testing on August 1, 2019
- (3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 planned emergency diesel generator pump maintenance with common feedwater pump B unavailable due to emergent corrective maintenance on August 7, 2019
- (4) Unit 2 emergent work for train B main steam and feedwater isolation solid state relay failure for Channel 1 on August 27, 2019
- (5) Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergent work for the auto transformer on August 29, 2019
- (6) Unit 1 emergent work for emergency diesel generator 2 trip on high crankcase pressure during surveillance testing on September 9, 2019
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2 shutdown cooling system operability on July 18, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 service water pump A high temperature winding operability on August 28, 2019
- (3) Unit 2 containment cooling fan B mode restraint operability on August 29, 2019
- (4) Unit 2 train B emergency feedwater system discharge valves to steam generators A and B failed to open operability on September 18, 2019
- (5) Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency cooling pond operability during service water bay B maintenance with a leaking sluice gate on September 19, 2019
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) Unit 2 reactor coolant pump A, B, C, and D control bleed off line replacement on July 22, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 common feedwater pump post maintenance testing following bearing replacement on August 16, 2019
- (3) Unit 2 train B main steam and feedwater isolation solid state relay replacement for Channel 1 on August 27, 2019
- (4) Unit 1 and Unit 2 alternate AC diesel generator temperature and pressure control valve replacement on September 3, 2019
- (5) Unit 2 lowering control element assembly hold bus C2 voltage and two control element assemblies dropped on September 5, 2019
- (6) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 2 repair of the high crankcase pressure switch on September 9, 2019
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 Forced Outage 2F19-01, as a result of a fault on reactor coolant pump motor B, on July 29, 2019
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Unit 2 control element assemblies drop time testing for operating for an extended period of time on the lower gripper and the hold bus on July 19, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 engineering safeguards actuation system analog Channel 1, 2, and 3 monthly surveillance testing on August 16, 2019
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system between April 1, 2017, and August 24, 2019.
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Response Organization between April 1, 2017, and August 24, 2019. Inspectors also evaluated the licensees ability to staff their emergency response facilities in accordance with emergency plan commitments.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the 10 CFR 50.54(q) emergency plan change process and practices between April 1, 2017, and August 24, 2019. The evaluation reviewed screenings and evaluations documenting the implementation of this process. The reviews of the change process documentation do not constitute NRC approval.
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program between April 1, 2017, and August 24, 2019. The evaluation reviewed activations of the emergency plan, the conduct of drills and exercises, licensee audits and assessments, and the maintenance of equipment important to emergency preparedness.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Unit 2 resin leak in the drumming station with a reactor coolant pump shaft shear and loss of coolant accident on August 23,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (IP Section 02.12)===
(1)
(July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)
EP02: ERO Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
(1) (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)
EP03: Alert & Notification System Reliability (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
(1) (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2018 - Jun 30, 2019)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Unit 2 containment air cooler B auxiliary contact high resistance and C breaker trip due to relay failures on September 5, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 reactor coolant pump C control bleed off line through wall leak on September 12, 2019
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Followup (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Unit 2 lowering level in the spent fuel pool due to a failed air seal between the spent fuel pool and cask loading pit on August 29, 2019
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000313/2018-004-01, Reactor Trip Due to the Loss of a Non-Vital 4160 Volt Bus, (ADAMS Accession No. ML19238A058)
The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in Inspection Report 05000313/2019001 and 05000368/2019001 as FIN 05000313/2019001-03 and NCV 05000313/2019001-04.
- (2) LER 05000368/2019-001-00, Reactor Trip Due to a Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Failure (ADAMS Accession No. ML19204A311)
The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct, and therefore, was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855 - Operation of an ISFSI Operation of an ISFSI
- (1) The ANO independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) consisted of four ISFSI pads containing two different cask designs. ANO had loaded 24 canisters of the Energy Solutions ventilated storage cask (VSC) VSC-24 design (Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1007) from 1996 to 2003. Since that time, ANO had been loading HI-STORM 100S Version C overpacks containing either a multi-purpose canister (MPC)-24 or MPC-32 design. At the time of the routine inspection, the HI-STORM-100 ISFSI pads contained a total of 67 overpacks and the licensee was in the process of loading canister 68. ANO was currently loading canisters to the Holtec CoC No. 1014, Amendment 13, and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),
Revision 18.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees ISFSI cask loading from July 22 through July 26, 2019. Specifically, the inspectors observed the following activities:
- Heavy load lift by the vertical cask transporter (VCT) of the storage cask (HI-STORM) into the cask transfer facility (CTF) in preparation for stack-up operations.
The inspectors also evaluated the licensee's operational response and recovery actions associated with the small amount of helium leakage encountered when attempting to remove the removable valve operating assemblies from the MPC following initial helium backfill.
The inspectors performed a walkdown of all ISFSI radiologically controlled areas, including performing independent radiation surveys, a walkdown of the CTF, and a walkdown of the ISFSI haul path. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of the spent fuel floor for both Unit 1 and Unit 2, and a walkdown of the location of radiation monitors 2RITS-8750-1A and 2RITS-8750-1B. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the low profile transporter (LPT) in the turbine building train bay.
The inspectors evaluated the following:
- Spent fuel selection for the four Unit 1 casks and the four Unit 2 casks in this loading campaign (HI-STORMs 61-68)
- Compliance with the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 72.104 for calendar years 2017 and 2018
- Fire hazards analyses and control of combustibles for ISFSI operations
- Conditions for use of the cask supplemental cooling system
- Selected radiological surveys of the ISFSI and dry fuel storage casks
- Selected ISFSI condition reports
- Quality assurance (QA) program implementation, including recent QA audits, surveillances, receipt inspection, and quality control activities
- Compliance to technical specification for operational surveillance activities and FSAR required annual maintenance activities
- Documentation of annual maintenance activities for heavy lifting components, which included special lifting devices, the sites cask handling crane (Auxiliary Building L-3 crane), and the sites VCT
60857 - Review of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations Review of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations
- (1) The inspectors reviewed a list of 10 CFR 72.48 screenings performed by the licensee since October 2017. During this time period the licensee did not perform any 10 CFR 72.48 evaluations. The inspectors evaluated the following:
- Selected licensee 10 CFR 72.48 screenings and associated changes, tests, or experiments
- The process by which the licensee evaluates 10 CFR 72.48 screenings and evaluations performed by the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) holder
- The licensee's change in CoC loading amendment from Amendment 5 to Amendment 13
- Changes made to the licensees 10 CFR 72.212 Report (Revisions 11 and 12)since October
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Install Correct Component and Perform Post Maintenance Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000368/2019003-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.19 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Technical Specification 6.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to properly pre-plan and perform maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to install the correct diodes for control element assembly hold bus 2C70 and to perform post-maintenance testing to demonstrate component functionality.
Description:
In November 2018, during Refueling Outage 2R26, Work Order 52770071 was issued for replacement/refurbishment of the Unit 2 control element assembly (CEA) hold bus 2C70. The hold bus is designed to provide DC voltage to hold a CEA subgroup in a fixed reactor core location when the normal CEA power supply is unavailable. During the performance of the hold bus work, two diodes of the wrong type were installed. The postmaintenance testing (PMT) in Work Order 52770071, step 4.2, Section 6 (Attachment 1)required verification that the hold bus would hold a CEA subgroup. The PMT was not performed, but a note was added to the work order to indicate that it would be done during a potential forced outage and that the maintenance work order was updated to have a scheduled task prior to reactor startup. However, the testing was not done before the Unit 2 reactor startup following Refueling Outage 2R26. The presence of the two incorrect diodes ensured that transfer of CEA subgroups 1 through 10 to hold bus 2C70 would have resulted in a dropped CEA during power operations. This would have required immediate operator action to reduce power by 28 percent or greater in accordance with technical specifications and Procedure OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction, Revision 25, and the potential recovery of the dropped CEA or the performance of a reactor shutdown to meet technical specification requirements.
On January 7, 2019, the licensee documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-00041 that preventive maintenance on hold bus 2C70 was not fully completed. The condition report referenced two work orders that had not been completed, including Work Order 52770071.
This condition report was closed on January 14, 2019, with no additional corrective actions taken for hold bus 2C70.
On July 27, 2019, during Unit 2s Forced Outage 2FP19-01, the licensee performed a voltage adjustment to lower hold bus 2C70 voltage due to concerns with CEA drop times. The PMT for this maintenance was to place a CEA subgroup onto hold bus 2C70 as a functional test.
When the CEA subgroup was transferred to hold bus 2C70, two CEAs inserted into the reactor core. The licensees troubleshooting of the event determined two incorrect diodes were installed during Refueling Outage 2R26. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-02163 and performed a human performance analysis.
The licensees human performance analysis identified two causal factors:
- Inadequate work instruction: Work Standard T23467 had vague open-ended repair instructions without materials identified for the repairs
- Inadequate verification and validation practices: Craft performing the work did not verify that the parts being installed were the correct ones for that component/application
The human performance evaluation focused on why the incorrect diodes were installed, but did not determine why the licensee failed to perform the required post-maintenance test prior to reactor startup from Refueling Outage 2R26 and why no additional actions were taken when it was identified in Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-00041. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-02607 and performed an adverse condition analysis.
Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced the incorrect diodes and performed the required post maintenance testing prior to reactor startup from Forced Outage 2FP19-01. Additionally, the licensee revised the work standard for the hold bus refurbishment to include instructions and materials for the refurbishment.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-ANO-2-2019-00041, CR-ANO-2-2019-02163, CR-ANO-2-2019-02150, and CR-ANO-2-2019-02607
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to properly pre-plan maintenance activities to ensure the correct components were installed and to perform the required post-maintenance testing was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have adversely impacted the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and would have affected the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, if a control element assembly subgroup was transferred to hold bus 2C70 during power operations, it would have resulted in one control element assembly dropping into the reactor core.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision-making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, the licensee failed to consider the risk-significance of the proposed action to defer postmaintenance testing following hold bus 2C70 diode replacement to ensure equipment functionality. Additionally, the licensee failed to consider the risk-significance of the proposed action to close Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-00041 with no additional actions to verify hold bus 2C70 functionality.
Enforcement:
Violation: Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33. Appendix A, Section 9.a, states, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Work Order 52770071, step 4.1, provides instructions to refurbish the hold bus 270 power supply, and step 4.2, Section 6 (Attachment 1), provides instructions to perform the post maintenance testing of the hold bus 2C70 power supply.
Contrary to the above, on November 2018, the licensee failed to properly preplan and implement maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment.
Specifically, the licensee failed to have adequate work instructions in Work Order 52770071, step 4.1, to install the correct diodes for hold bus 2C70 and implement step 4.2 to perform Section 6 (Attachment 1), post maintenance testing. This condition resulted in the installation of the incorrect diodes and the failure to perform post maintenance testing for hold bus 2C70.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000368/2019003-02 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71152 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances.
Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct damage to Unit 2s reactor coolant pump C controlled bleed off piping in 2011, 2015, and 2017, when insulation was removed making the piping available for inspection.
Description:
In May 2019, during full power operations, Unit 2 operators observed an unexplained rise in the containment sump level which was not commensurate with the existing plant conditions. This prompted the operators to commence a reactor coolant system leak investigation. Prior to completion of the online leak investigation, Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip and entered Forced Outage 2FP19-01, as a result of a fault in reactor coolant pump motor B. During Forced Outage 2FP19-01, the licensee discovered that reactor coolant pump C controlled bleed off (CBO) piping was leaking due to a through wall crack in a socket weld. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-01365 and performed an adverse condition analysis.
The licensees adverse condition analysis determined the direct cause associated with the through wall leak on the CBO piping was a crack initiated from external damage from a thin cutting tool. The CBO piping was also subjected to vibration loads, which resulted in the propagation of a through wall crack due to cyclic fatigue. The causal factor was poor maintenance work practices that led to significant CBO piping damage which likely took place during 2008 when the removal/replacement of fibrous insulation on various lines was authorized due to damaged insulation. During the insulation removal/replacement, which occurred multiple times since 2008, the licensee did not document any observed damage to the CBO piping.
The licensee documented damage to reactor coolant pump C CBO piping insulation three times since 2011 (Condition Reports CR-ANO-2-2011-00567, CR-ANO-2-2015-03185, and CR-ANO-2-2017-01735), which provided them the opportunity to identify and correct the damage. In each instance, the licensee only addressed the replacement of the insulation, and no instructions were incorporated into the work orders which replaced the insulation to also inspect the underlying CBO piping. The licensee stated that damage to the CBO piping most likely occurred during 2008 when the removal/replacement of fibrous insulation on various lines was authorized due to damaged insulation; however, damage to the CBO piping could also have occurred when the insulation was replaced in 2011 and 2015, and during the permanent removal of the insulation in 2017. The licensees focus was the vibration-induced insulation damage, and the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the issue to determine if the CBO piping was also damaged. Specifically, the licensee did not use its internal and external operating experience to thoroughly review the vibration-induced insulation damage to identify the CBO piping damage in 2011, 2015, or 2017.
The inspectors noted that NRC Information Notice (IN) 2007-21, Pipe Wear Due to Interaction of Flow Induced Vibration and Reflective Metal Insulation, provided operating experience to licensees that significant wear marks were observed on the outside wall of chemical and volume control system stainless steel piping due to interaction between the piping base metal and the installed reflective metal insulation. The NRC IN stated that the most probable cause of the abrasive wear was flow induced vibration combined with end cap to piping interaction. The NRC IN recommended that licensees review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to identify and address similar problems, up to and including the periodic removal of insulation to allow visual inspection for piping degradation. Additionally, the licensee had its own internal operating experience associated with damage identified on piping that interfaces with the reactor coolant system. In 1989, 1994, and 2009, the licensee identified cuts on piping (Condition Reports CR-ANO-1-1989-00110, CR-ANO-2-1994-00183, and CR-ANO-2-2009-02680) and, in 2014, gouges were noted during ASME inspections of charging piping to the reactor coolant pump B discharge cold leg (Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2014-01157).
Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced reactor coolant pump A, B, C, and D CBO lines and performed an extent of condition that identified one additional location that required replacement.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-01365
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality when removing reactor coolant pump CBO insulation was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to promptly identify and correct the damage on the reactor coolant pump CBO piping resulted in a failed socket weld and a reactor coolant leak, which degraded the safety-related ASME Class II boundary.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because the finding after a reasonable assessment of degradation
- (1) did not result in exceeding the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small loss-of-coolant accident; and
- (2) likely did not affect other systems used to mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident resulting in a total loss of their function.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate CBO piping for damage, using internal and external operating experience, when insulation was removed due to vibration induced damage in 2011, 2015, and 2017.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, between February 2011 and September 2017, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct damage to reactor coolant pump C control bleed off line piping which eventually led to a failure of the line and subsequent reactor coolant leak requiring a forced shutdown to make repairs in May 2019.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 11, 2019, the inspectors presented the Unit 1 biennial requalification inspection results to Mr. D. Pehrson, Senior Manager, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 25, 2019, the inspectors presented the independent spent fuel storage installation inspection results to Mr. R. Anderson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 15, 2019, the inspectors presented the Unit 1 biennial requalification inspection results to Mr. R. Martin, Superintendent, Operations Training, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 15, 2019, the inspectors presented the Unit 2 annual requalification inspection results to Mr. R. Martin, Superintendent, Operations Training, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 29, 2019, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness program inspection technical debrief was conducted with Mr. J. Toben, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 26, 2019, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness program inspection telephonic exit with Mr. B. Patrick, Director, Regulatory Assurance and Performance Improvement, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 3, 2019, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
60855
Calculations
HI-2125213
Evaluation of MPC Lid Temperature under HI-TRAC Operation
at ANO
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2017-0355, 2-2019-02041, 2-2019-02065, C-2017-04091,
C-2017-04221, C-2017-04585, C-2017-04833, C-2018-00313,
C-2018-02422, C-2018-03438, C-2019-00149, C-2019-01006
07/24/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
1-2019-02142, 1-2019-02404, C-2019-03052
Miscellaneous
CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report ANO Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Installation
Unit 2 Station Log, Tuesday July 23, 2019
07/23/2019
Procedures
1601.305
Radiation Monitoring Requirements for Loading and Storage
of the HI-STORM
013
203.012H
Annunciator 2K08 Corrective Action
039
3305.003B
Unit 2 Operations Rounds Required Readings
Fuel Selection for Holtec Dry Cask Storage
Radiological Work Permits
OP-1015.003B
Unit Two Operations Logs
OP-2104.007
Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning and Ventilation
076
OP-3403.005
HI-STORM 100 System Loading Operations
044
OP-3406.005
HI-STORM and HI-TRAC Transport Operations Using LPT,
VCT, and Holtec Railcar
018
OP-3406.006
Forced Helium Dehydration System Operations
011
Radiation Surveys ANO-1906-00461
Map Number DFS-H8 Location Hi-Storm Work Order #454379
06/24/2019
Map Number DFS-H8 Location Hi-Storm Work Order #515364
07/17/2019
Map Number DFS-H9 Location Hi-Storm Work Order #515364
07/17/2019
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
RWP 2017-1061
Load Dry Fuel Storage MPC and Store in Hi-Storm with Unit 1
Fuel (Includes DFS support activities)
10/18/2017
RWP 2017-1063
Dry Fuel Storage Unit 1
03/07/2018
Work Orders
60855
WO 2367600, 52702275, 52800723
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
60857
Engineering
Changes
2.48 Screening
and Applicability
Determinations
EN-DC-2015-008, EN-DC-215-009, EN-DC-215-010, EN-DC-
215-011, EC 46581, EC-ANO-000074974-0000,
07/24/2019
Procedures
Process Applicability Determination
71111.04Q Calculations
CALC-91-E-0090-
ANO-2 Switchgear, Battery, DC, Corridor 2104 Emergency
(Post-Accident) Temperature Evaluation
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2019-02012, 2-2019-01429, 2-2019-01430, 2-2019-01432,
2-2019-01881, 2-2019-01887
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
C-2019-02993
Drawings
M-217, Sheet 1
Piping and Instrument Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator
Fuel Oil Storage
Engineering
Changes
ANO-2 Switchgear, Battery, DC, Corridor 2104 Emergency
(Post-Accident) Temperature Evaluation
2VUC-2C Cooling Coil Casing Configuration Changes
Sheet 1
2VUC-2D Cooling Coil Replacement - Vendor Flange Material
Change 2HCC-259-3
Procedures
Protective and Caution Tagging
OP-1104.023
Diesel Oil Transfer Procedure
OP-1104.036
Emergency Diesel Generator Operation
OP-1203.012A
Annunciator K01 Corrective Action
OP-2104.035
Ventilation System Operations
OP-2203.012U
Annunciator 2E12 Corrective Action
OP-2305.018
Underground EDG F.O. Tank 2T-57A/B Recirculation and
Cleanup
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
C-2019-03123
Fire Plans
Unit 2 Prefire Plans
Miscellaneous
FBDRL-2019-14
Fire Drill
Procedures
OP-1903.010
Emergency Action Level Classification
OP-2203.034
Fire or Explosion
71111.05Q Calculations
CALC-95-R-
Basis Requirements for the Component Database on Station
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
00024-01
Doors and Hatches
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
C-2019-02986
Fire Plans
FZ-3040
Fire Zone Detail Alternate Generator Building - Area AGB
354
FZ-2002
Fire Zone Detail Control Room, Area G, Fire Zone 2199-G
Unit 1 Prefire Plan
Miscellaneous
ER-ANO-2004-
230-011
Add Reverse Osmosis Unit to Fire Zone 2026-Y
ER-ANO-2004-
0619-001
RO Unit Watch Requirements
8395, 8396, 8397
Procedures
COPD-024
Risk Assessment Guidelines
OP-1000.120
ANO Fire Impairment Program
Work Orders
Calculations
CALC-ANOC-CS-
15-0003
ANO Flood Protection Design Basis
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2009-02250, 1-2019-00521, 1-2019-00911, 1-2019-01310,
1-2019-01581, C-2019-00907, C-2019-01773, C-2019-01976
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
C-2019-03310
Engineering
Changes
Conduit Internal Water Seal
External Flooding Protection Design Basis
Miscellaneous
CFSD-100
BDBEE/ELAP Emergency Response
CFSG-005
Initial Assessment and Flex Equipment Staging
Procedures
OP-1203.025
Natural Emergencies
OP-2203.008
Natural Emergencies
ULD-0-TOP-17
ANO Flooding
Work Orders
WO 374472, 521304, 525350, 525777
Corrective Action
CR-ANO-
2-2016-02844, 2-2017-01145, 2-2017-03648, 2-2019-00486,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
2-2019-01881, 2-2019-01887,
Engineering
Changes
2VUC-2C Cooling Coil Casing Configuration Changes
Sheet 1
2VUC-2D Cooling Coil Replacement - Vendor Flange Material
Change 2HCC-259-3
Miscellaneous
Cooling Coil Casing Configuration
Procedures
Maintenance Standard for Torque Applications
Work Orders
Miscellaneous
Unit 2 Annual Exam Results
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2018-01260, 1-2018-03238, 1-2018-03611, 1-2018-04206,
1-2018-04957, 1-2019-00756, 1-2019-01164, 1-2019-01480,
1-2019-01635
Miscellaneous
ANO1 Cycle 28 Core Reload Test
ANO1 Cycle 28 Simulator Operability Test
Unit 1 Licensed Operator 2018-2019 Requalification Cycle
Curriculum (Sample Plan
Week 3 ANO Unit 1 2019 RO Biennial Requalification Exam
Week 3 ANO Unit 1 2019 SRO Biennial Requalification Exam
ANO Unit 1 Annual and Biennial Exam Results
AOP01
Perform RO #1 Follow-up Actions for Remote Shutdown, Aux
Feedwater Pump Available
AOP39
Respond to Loss of Instrument Air Pressure
AOP41
Perform Actions for an Inadvertent Actuation of ESAS
AOP42
Fire Affecting Safe Shutdown: Outside AO Actions (Fire
Area C)
ED017
Perform Transfer of D11 from Normal Supply to Emergency
Supply Using Local Controls at D01
EDG11
Reset Emergency Diesel Generator #2 Overspeed Trip
Mechanism
EFIC2
Perform EFW Pump (P-7A or P7B) Suction Transfer to
EOP10
Perform Actions Required to Correct Inadequate Core Cooling
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
EOP13
Emergency and Abnormal Operations
EOP22
Respond to Degraded Power (Verify both EDGs supplying
associated ES buses with proper voltage, frequency and
loading)
EAL09
Classify an Emergency Event
EAL14
Classify an Emergency Event
ANSI/ANS-3.4-
1983Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI/ANS-3.4-</br></br>1983" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process.
Medical Certification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring
Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants
SES-1-007
Dynamic Simulator Scenario Week 5
SES-1-030
Dynamic Simulator Scenario Week 4
SES-1-036
Dynamic Simulator Scenario Week 4
SES-1-047
Dynamic Simulator Scenario Week 5
TQF-214-71111
Assessment Plan for Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR)
Program Pre-71111.11 Assessment
Procedures
1063.008
Operations Training Sequence
DG-TRNA-015-
EXAMSEC
Simulator Exam Security Guidelines
Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program
Description
EN-TQ-201-04
SAT - Implementation Phase
Simulator Configuration Control
TQF-201-IM05
Remedial Training Plan
71111.11Q Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2019-02295
Procedures
Conduct of Operations
OP-1202.008
Blackout
OP-1202.012
Repetitive Tasks
OP-1203.045
Rapid Plant Shutdown
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2017-02104, 1-2019-01847, 1-2019-02219, 2-2019-02477,
C-2017-04125, C-2019-01042, C-2019-02108, C-2019-02428,
C-2019-02429, C-2019-02430, C-2019-02431, C-2019-02452,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
C-2019-02485, C-2019-02486
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
C-2019-02877
Drawings
E-4, Sheet 2
Single Line and Relay Metering Diagram Common Feed
Water 4.16 kV Switchgear Bus A-15
E-4, Sheet 3
Single Line and Relay Metering Diagram Common Feed
Water 4.16 kV Switchgear Bus A-19
M-217, Sheet 2
M-217, Sheet 3
Engineering
Changes
K-4A and K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device
Isolation Valve
K-4A EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve
K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve
Procedures
COPD-024
Risk Assessment Guidelines
58, 68
Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities
Fire Protection Impact Reviews
Protected Equipment Postings
On Line Risk Assessment
OP-1104.036
Emergency Diesel Generator Operations
OP-1106.007
Common Feedwater System
OP-1107.001
Electrical System Operations
23
OP-1203.046
Loss of Load Center
OP-2104.037
Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations
OP-2202.010
Standard Attachments
OP-2203.012D
Annunciator 2K04 Corrective Action
OP-2203.012L
Annunciator 2K12 Corrective Action
OP-2203.012Z
Annunciator 2C435 Corrective Action
OP-2203.054
Abnormal Grid
Work Orders
WO 530402, 531004, 5283255, 52798239,
Calculations
CALC-93-D-5015-
Unit 1 Intake Structure Natural Convection-GOTHIC Model
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CALC-93-R-1006-
Unit 1 Intake Structure Environmental Temperature Study
CALC-M-3600-
139
Intake Structure Critical Ambient Temperature
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2018-02614, 1-2019-01897, 1-2019-02029, 1-2019-02304,
2-2018-00949, 2-2019-01372, 2-2019-01373, 2-2019-01374,
2-2019-01687, 2-2019-01861, 2-2019-01875, 2-2019-01887,
C-2019-00310
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
1-2019-01903
Drawings
E-2014, Sheet 3
Single Line Diagram 480 Volt Motor Control Centers 2B53
E-2361 Sheet 1A
Schematic Diagram Containment Cooling Fan 2VSF1B
M-217, Sheet 2
Engineering
Changes
P-4A SW Winding Temp
Procedures
OP-1015.008
Unit 2 SDC Control
OP-1015.048
Shutdown Operations Protection Plan
OP-2104.029
Service Water System Operations
115
OP-2106.006
Emergency Feedwater Operations
OP-2305.003
ESF Response Time Test
OP-2305.062
SW System Flow Testing
Work Orders
WO 484566, 527146, 528032-01, 531004, 527962, 501701,
2813296
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2019-02219, 2-2019-01374, 2-2019-01743, 2-2019-02104,
2-2019-02136, 2-2019-02260, 2-2019-02477
Miscellaneous
Flowserve Memo
06/27/2017
Procedures
OP-1104.036
Emergency Diesel Generator Operations
OP-1106.007
Common Feedwater System
OP-2104.037
OP-2304.037
Unit 2 Plant Protection System Channel A Test
OP-2304.112
Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel A
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
WO 487977-02, 525408, 527621, 527622, 52836554-01, 530402,
28622. 531004
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2019-01365
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2019-01956 Rev. 5, 2-2019-00328, 2-2019-01374, 2-2019-
01743,
Engineering
Changes
Miscellaneous
741007
Combustion Engineering Test Report
STM 1-65
Engineered Safeguards Actuation System
Procedures
OP-1304.049
Unit 1 ESAS Analog Channel 1 Test
OP-1304.052
Unit 1 ESAS Analog Channel 1 Calibration
Work Orders
WO 27621, 527622, 2790774, 52673734
Miscellaneous
Design Report Update, Upgraded Public Alert and Notification
System (ANS), Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO)
May 2016
Design Report Update, Upgraded Public Alert and Notification
System (ANS), Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Supplement (1)
February
2017
Early Warning System
Miscellaneous
Form 1903.062C,
Change 31
Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test;
Date: 06/27/2017
06/29/2017
Form 1903.062C,
Change 32
Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test;
Date: 09/29/2017
10/04/2017
Form 1903.062C,
Change 32
Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test;
Date: 10/31/2017
11/13/2017
Form 1903.062C,
Change 34
Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test;
Date: 03/03/2018
03/17/2018
Form 1903.062C,
Change 34
Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test;
Date: 06/17/2018
07/09/2018
Form 1903.062C,
Change 35
Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test;
Date: 08/09/2018
08/16/2018
Form 1903.062C,
Change 35
Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test;
Date: 12/21/2018
01/02/2019
Form 1903.062C,
Change 35
Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test;
Date: 01/26/2019
2/04/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Form 1903.062C,
Change 35
Emergency Response Staffing Drill, Scenario: ERO Test;
Date: 05/05/2019
05/10/2019
Procedures
1903.011
Emergency Response/Notifications
Emergency Response Organization Notification System
Miscellaneous
9.1,
CFR
50.54(q)(2)
Review
Procedure/Document Number: 1903.010, Revision: 055
04/09/2018
9.1,
CFR
50.54(q)(2)
Review
Procedure/Document Number: 1903.011, Revision: 056
10/25/2018
9.1,
CFR
50.54(q)(2)
Review
Procedure/Document Number: 1903.062, Revision: 033
2/08/2017
9.1,
CFR
50.54(q)(2)
Review
Procedure/Document Number: 1904.002, Revision: 042
09/21/2017
9.1,
CFR
50.54(q)(2)
Review
Procedure/Document Number: 1903.011, Revision: 54
04/24/2017
9.2,
CFR
50.54(q)(3)
Screening
Procedure/Document Number: 1903.069, Revision: 007
09/13/2017
9.2,
CFR
50.54(q)(3)
Screening
Procedure/Document Number: OP-1903.011, OP-1903.011-Y,
OP-1903.011-Z; Revisions: 056, 048, 047
10/25/2018
9.2,
CFR
Procedure/Document Number: 1903.010, Revision: 056
06/13/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
50.54(q)(3)
Screening
9.2,
CFR
50.54(q)(3)
Screening
Procedure/Document Number: OP-1903.010, Revision: 054
03/20/2018
9.3,
CFR
50.54(q)(3)
Evaluation
Procedure/Document Number: 1903.010, Revision: 054
03/20/2018
9.3,
CFR
50.54(q)(3)
Evaluation
Procedure/Document Number: OP-1903.010, Revision: 056
06/13/2018
9.3,
CFR
50.54(q)(3)
Evaluation
Procedure/Document Number: 1903.069, Revision: 007
09/13/2017
Procedures
1604.051
Eberline Radiation Monitoring System
1903.010
Emergency Action Level Classifications
2, 54, 55,
56, 57
1903.062
Communications System Operating Procedure
1904.047
Offsite Dose Projections
203.012K
Annunciator 2K11 Corrective Action
Emergency Planning 10CFR50.54(q) Review Program
4, 5, 6
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-
CR-ANO-
C-2017-00961, C-2017-01742, C-2017-01851, C-2017-01972,
C-2017-02758, C-2017-02938, C-2017-02950, C-2017-04431,
C-2018-00456, C-2018-00525, C-2018-01424, C-2018-01658,
C-2018-01783, C-2018-01851, C-2018-01882, C-2018-01890,
C-2018-01947, C-2018-02809, C-2018-02810, C-2018-02879,
C-2018-03597, C-2018-03686, C-2018-04572, C-2019-01825,
C-2019-01851, C-2019-01890, C-2019-03166, C-2019-03203,
C-2019-03621
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
Arkansas Nuclear One ERO Team "Green" Site Drill Report,
September 5, 2018
06/02/2019
Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance
Report, Site: Arkansas Nuclear One
06/06/2018
Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance
Report, Site: ANO
2/08/2018
Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance
Report, Site: Arkansas Nuclear One
2/25/2019
Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance
Report, Site: Arkansas Nuclear One
10/17/2018
Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance
Report, Site: Arkansas Nuclear One
06/07/2017
Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance
Report, Site: ANO
10/19/2017
Arkansas Nuclear One Blue Team Site Drill Report,
May 15, 2019
06/12/2019
Arkansas Nuclear One Radiological Monitoring Drill Report,
April 17, 2019
05/16/2019
Arkansas Nuclear One HP/Post Accident Drill Report,
April 17, 2019
05/17/2019
Arkansas Nuclear One Red Team Site Drill Report,
February 6, 2019
2/28/2019
Arkansas Nuclear One ERO Red Team Drill Report,
August 2, 2017
08/31/2017
Arkansas Nuclear One 2018 NRC Exercise Report,
July 17, 2018
08/10/2018
Arkansas Nuclear One Radiological Monitoring Drill Report,
December 4, 2018
2/20/2019
Arkansas Nuclear One HP/Post Accident Drill Report,
December 4, 2018
2/19/2019
Arkansas Nuclear One Health Physics Drill 2018-01 Drill
Package
05/20/2019
Arkansas Nuclear One Blue Team Drill Report, May 30, 2018
05/30/2018
2017 Medical Drill with Pope County EMS and UAMS
2/06/2017
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
December 20, 2017 Pass Drill
01/18/2018
December 14 and 19, 2017 Environmental Sampling Drill
01/18/2018
Form 1903.004-G
EAL State and Local Agreement
2/11/2018
Form 1903.004-N
Annual LOA/Contracts Review
2/18/2018
Form 1903.004N
Annual LOA/Contracts Review
05/08/2018
Form 1903.004M
ETE Update
08/22/2017
Form 1903-004-C
Quarterly Emergency Telephone Directory Review
06/28/2019
KLD TR-1022
Arkansas Nuclear One, 2018 Population Update Analysis
09/22/2018
KLD TR-938
Arkansas Nuclear One, 2017 Population Update Analysis
09/23/2017
MS-1 Drill Report
2018 Medical Drill with Pope County EMS and Saint Mary's
Regional Medical Center (September 27, 2018)
2/06/2018
NQ-2017-009
Emergency Preparedness Audit Package for QA-7-2017-ANO-
07/11/2017
NQ-2018-008
QA Audit Report QA-7-2018-ANO-1, 2018 QA Audit of
Emergency Preparedness at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO)
05/10/2018
QA-07-2019-
ANO-1
Quality Assurance Audit Report
05/20/2019
NDE Reports
Form 1903.004-G
EAL State and Local Agreement
2/05/2017
Procedures
1903.004
Admin. & Maintenance of the Emergency Plan & Implementing
Procedures
1903.011
Emergency Response/Notification
1903.060
Emergency Supplies and Equipment
1903.069
Equipment Important to Emergency Response
Drills and Exercises
Emergency Planning Critiques
Corrective Action Program
Emergency Response Organization Training
2, 13
Work Orders
WO 00439733, 00481018, 00481536, 00494038, 004388830,
2610089, 52610090, 5263126
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
C-2019-03055, C-2019-03063, C-2019-03064, C-2019-03065,
C-2019-03066, C-2019-03092, C-2019-03094, C-2019-03095
Procedures
OP-1903.010
Emergency Action Level Classification
71151
Calculations
CALC-ANO1-SA-
ANO-1 Mitigating System Performance Index Basis
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
16-00001
CALC-ANO2-SA-
06-00001
ANO-2 Mitigating System Performance Index Basis
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2019-01658
Miscellaneous
Communicator Scenario HU6
11/13/2018
Emergency Action Level Classification
A1SXMLOR1902
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, Performance Evaluation
Scenario
SES-2-007
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Dynamic Exam Scenario
SES-2-013
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Dynamic Exam Scenario
SES-2-031
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Dynamic Exam Scenario
Procedures
1903.057
Emergency Action Level Classification
Regulatory Performance Indicator Process
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2019-01365, 2-2019-01445, 2-2019-01687, 2-2019-01746,
2-2019-01820, 2-2019-02033, 2-2019-02118,
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2019-02506
Drawings
M-2235, Sheet 1
P&ID Fuel Pool System
Procedures
OP-2104.006
Fuel Pool Systems
OP-2203.002
Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies
OP-2203.012K
Annunciator 2K11 Corrective Action
50