IR 05000313/2019004
| ML20030C514 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/2020 |
| From: | John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
| To: | Dinelli J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| EPID L-2019-004-0005 IR 2019004 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20030C514 (40) | |
Text
January 29, 2020
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2019004 AND 05000368/2019004
Dear Mr. Dinelli:
On December 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2. On January 9, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is also documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000313 and 05000368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000313 and 05000368
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000313/2019004 and 05000368/2019004
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-004-0005
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Russellville, AR
Inspection Dates:
October 1, 2019, to December 31, 2019
Inspectors:
L. Carson, Senior Health Physicist
W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector
T. DeBey, Resident Inspector
N. Greene, Senior Health Physicist
C. Henderson, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Kopriva, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Reinert, Reactor Inspector
W. Sifre, Senior Reactor Inspector
T. Sullivan, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief
Reactor Projects Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report Section: 71111.04Q.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Restore a Fire Barrier to Functional Prior to De-Posting a Fire Watch Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000313/2019004-01 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.05Q The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, License Condition 2.C.(8), Fire Protection, for the licensees failure to implement all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement program procedures to restore a fire barrier to a functional status prior to de-posting an hourly fire watch and failed to identify a degraded fire barrier in accordance with documented inspection criteria.
Failure to Torque Temporary Power Supply Terminal Screws in accordance with Station Procedures and the Vendor Manual Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green FIN 05000313/2019004-02 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding associated with the licensees failure to torque temporary power supply terminal screws in accordance with torque specifications contained in Procedure EN-MA-145, Maintenance Standard for Torque Applications,
Revision 9, and the vendor manual.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at full power. On October 5, 2019, the unit was shut down to begin Refueling Outage 1R28. On November 17, 2019, Unit 1 commenced a reactor startup and the reactor was made critical on November 18, 2019. The unit was returned to full power on November 22, 2019, where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor power reductions in power to support scheduled surveillances.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at full power where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor reductions in power to support scheduled surveillances.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 2 crankcase pressure trip device on October 28, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 train A low pressure injection/decay heat removal system on November 9, 2019
- (3) Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling system on December 12, 2019
71111.05Q - Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Unit 1 auxiliary building, 335 feet elevation, Fire Zone 162-A, Fire Area B-10, on October 15, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room envelope air conditioning unit VUC-9 loop seal degradation, Fire Zone 129-F and 1052, Fire Area B-1 and G, on October 21, 2019
- (3) Unit 1 reactor building, Fire Zones 32-K, 33-K, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066, and 1067, Fire Area J, on October 30, 2019
- (4) Unit 1 computer and control rod drive equipment room, Fire Zone 160-B, Fire Area B-1, on November 17, 2019
71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined, and accepted by reviewing the following activities from October 15, 2019, to October 23, 2019:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities:
- 14-017, Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg to Full Penetration Weld - Visual
- 07-012, Reactor Coolant System Cold Leg to Full Penetration Weld - Visual
- 01-029, Reactor Vessel Interior - Visual
- 1-BOP-RT-19-018, Service Water System Pipe to Pipe Weld FW-3 - Radiography
- 1-BOP-RT-19-017, Service Water System Pipe to Pipe Weld FW-5 - Radiography
- 1-BOP-RT-19-015, Service Water System Pipe to Pipe Weld FW-17C1 - Radiography
- 1-BOP-RT-19-016, Service Water System Pipe to Pipe Weld FW-19 - Radiography
- 1-BOP-RT-19-030, Service Water System Pipe to Pipe Weld FW-1C1 - Radiography
- A-10303A, Decay Heat Removal System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination
- 21-121, Makeup and Purification System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination
- 21-062, Makeup and Purification System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination
- A-10347, Decay Heat Removal System Elbow to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination
- A-10342, Decay Heat Removal System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination
- A-10343, Decay Heat Removal System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination
- A-10340, Decay Heat Removal System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination
03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities:
- The inspector reviewed a portion of the remote visual examination of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations. The examination was incomplete because the areas of interest were obscured by deposits caused by a leak of the nonsafety intermediate cooling water system. As a result, the licensee was unable to complete the required examination and will have to re-perform the examination during the next refueling outage. The inspectors reviewed the relief request submitted by the licensee (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19304A290) which was approved by the NRC on November 13, 2019, (ADAMS Accession No. ML19318D042).
03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities:
- CR-ANO-1-2018-01843 - Boric acid piling up on cable trays in the basement of the reactor building
- CR-ANO-1-2019-02077 - Three injection block valves, two flow elements, one flow transmitter valve block and one flow orifice were observed having dry inactive white boron residue located at the packing or seal ring area
- CR-ANO-1-2019-02609 - Boric acid leak found on letdown cooler outlet isolation valve CV-1216
- CR-ANO-1-2019-02620 - Boric acid deposit was discovered in the packing area of decay heat removal valve DH-1003
- CR-ANO-1-2019-02727 - Boric acid deposit was discovered in the packing area of pressurizer spray isolation valve RC-3
- CR-ANO-1-2019-02757 - Boric acid deposit was discovered on the valve packing area of seal flow transmitter isolation valve PDT-1280
03.01.e - Problem Identification and Resolution:
- The inspector reviewed 21 condition reports associated with inservice and operating experience issues and concluded that nondestructive examination/inservice inspection-related issues and operating experience are put into the corrective action program at low levels to ensure conditions and problems are identified.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 1 reactor shutdown for Refueling Outage 1R28 on October 5, 2019
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated the Unit 1 licensed operator re-qualification scenario on December 19, 2019
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) Unit 2 chemical and volume control system failures when in 50.65(a)(1) on October 22, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 reactor building equipment hatch exceeding administrative local leak-rate test requirements on multiple tests on December 31, 2019
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room envelope air conditioning unit VUC-9 loop seal degradation on October 21, 2019
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 2 high crankcase trip during surveillance testing common cause operability on October 15, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room envelope air conditioning unit VUC-9 loop seal operability on October 21, 2019
- (3) Unit 1 mode restraint operabilities on November 21, 2019
- (4) Unit 1 reactor building spray system check valves BS-4A and BS-4B leakage operability on November 27, 2019
- (5) Unit 1 reactor building Column 17 operability on December 9, 2019
- (6) Unit 1 and Unit 2 startup transformer 2 and Unit 2 startup transformer 3 degraded voltage operability on December 9, 2019
71111.17T - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Sample Selection (IP Section 02.01)
The inspectors reviewed the following evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determinations for 10 CFR 50.59 from November 18-21, 2019:
- (1) Engineering Change EC-51967, Cooling Capability of Switchgear Room Coolers 2VUC-2A, 2B, 2C, 2D with New Service Water Temperature Profile, Revision 0 (Evaluation)
- (2) Engineering Change EC-61243, Tornado Missile Protection Features and Licensing Basis, Revision 1 (Evaluation)
- (3) Engineering Change EC-78439, ANO-1 Cycle 29 Core Reload Evaluation, Revision 0. The inspectors reviewed the composition of the limited number of lead test assemblies (LTAs), placement of LTA in nonlimiting core locations, and Core Operating Limits Reports including the analytical methods that were previously reviewed and approved by the NRC (Evaluation)
- (5) Engineering Change EC-52059, Anchor Darling Wedge Pin Shear Stress Calculations, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (6) Engineering Change EC-50092, Room 72 Floor Drain and Equipment Drain Flood Mitigation Modifications, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (7) Engineering Change EC-44152, NE-0501 Source Range Fission Chamber Bypass due to Noise Susceptibility, Revision 1 (Screening)
- (8) Engineering Change EC-66364, Emergency Diesel Generator Crank Case Over-pressure Switch Gasket and Plate Addition, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (9) Engineering Change EC-67516, Removal of Unit 2 Door 260, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (10) Engineering Change EC-49799, Temporary Modification to Remove 2P-32C RCP Axial Position 2ZIY-6066 from Service, Revision 0 (Evaluation)
- (11) Engineering Change EC-58249, Cable Re-Routes and Interposing Relays NPFA 805 ANO Unit 1 Items S1-4, S1-7, S1-8, S1-24, S1-25 and S1-26 Base EC, Revision 0 (Evaluation)
- (12) Engineering Change EC-66983, ANO-1 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump Woodward Governor Controls Upgrade, Revision 0 (Evaluation)
- (13) Engineering Change EC-80461, Fuel Thermal Conductivity Degradation in Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Methodology, Revision 0 (Evaluation)
- (14) Engineering Change EC-57619, Change Equipment Database (EDB) for valves 2PSV-2803A, 2PSV-2806A, 2PSV-2823A, and 2PSV-2826A to reclassify valves from safety-related to nonsafety-related, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (15) Engineering Change EC-66585, TSR 1702-110 'B' Safety Injection Discharge - A shielding evaluation was requested to facilitate removal and replacement of shutdown cooling heat exchanger 2E-35B, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (16) Engineering Change EC-70658, K-4A and K-4B Crankcase Pressure Change Trip Device Isolation Valve, with Child ECs 70659 and 70864, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (17) Engineering Change EC-72501, Integrated Control System Reverse Engineered Module Change Evaluation for Input Buffer and Signal Lag Action Unit, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (18) Engineering Change EC-72578, Replace Valve 2SV-5061-2 with a bolted bonnet Target Rock Model 97AA-001-1, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (19) Engineering Change EC-76046, Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Governor Upgrade (Train A) Child EC For MPU Bracket Installation Parent EC 73078, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (20) Engineering Change EC-76269, P-36A, P-36B, AND P-36C Retainer Sleeve Spacer Equivalency - adds a spacer ring in between the retaining sleeve and mechanical seal sleeve, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (21) Engineering Change EC-76707, 1R27 TSR 18-1-128 / 18-1-129 DH-17, DH-18 Replace EN-DC-218, PS-S-005, Revision 0 (Screening)
- (22) Engineering Change EC-77219, Evaluation of HBD-14-18" Wall Thickness, Revisions 0 and 1 (Screening)
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Unit 1 core lead test assemblies loaded for Operating Cycle 29 on October 8, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 turbine driven emergency feedwater pump train B steam admission valve temporary modification on November 7, 2019
- (3) Unit 1 turbine driven emergency feedwater pump governor valve replacement to digital control on November 8, 2019
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room envelope air conditioning unit VUC-9 degraded loop seal repair on October 30, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator exhaust stack replacement and lube oil cooler preventive maintenance on November 6, 2019
- (3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room envelope penetration post-maintenance testing for cable installation on November 12, 2019
- (4) Unit 1 containment liner repair post-maintenance test on November 13, 2019
- (5) Unit 1 high pressure injection pump C rebuild post-maintenance testing on November 18, 2019
- (6) Unit 1 turbine driven emergency feedwater pump governor valve replacement post-maintenance testing on November 22, 2019
- (7) Unit 1 reactor building spray pump A and B lube oil cooler service water air operated inlet valve rebuild post-maintenance testing on December 12, 2019
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 Refueling Outage 1R28 on November 20, 2019
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Unit 1 integrated leak rate surveillance testing on December 10, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 train B main steam and feedwater isolation Channel 1 response time surveillance testing on December 10, 2019
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 high pressure injection pump C inservice test reference value determination following major pump maintenance on November 18, 2019
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 train A core flood tank fill check valve MU-36A on October 21, 2019
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 flex portable emergency diesel generators K11 and K12 surveillance testing on December 9,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following:
Radiological Surveys
- ANO-1910-01302, Unit 1 Reactor Building 354 feet elevation General Area
- ANO-1910-01301, Unit 1 Reactor Building 335 feet elevation General Area
- ANO-1908-00356, Low Level Rad Waste
- ANO-1909-00218, Unit 1 AUX 335 feet elevation General Area
- ANO-1909-00222, Unit 1 AUX 335 feet elevation General Area North End Room Number 45
- ANO-1910-00068, Unit 1 AUX 335 feet elevation Drumming Station Room No. 2026
- ANO-1910-00471, Unit 2 AUX 354 feet elevation General Area
- ANO-1910-00692, Unit 2 AUX 317 feet elevation General Area
Risk Significant Radiological Work Activities
- RWP 2019-1420, Remove/Replace Scaffold
- RWP 2019-1421, Remove/Replace Insulation
- RWP 2019-1430, Reactor Disassembly/Reassembly
- RWP 2019-1432, Fuel Movement and Support
- RWP 2019-1501, VCC-2C/2D Piping
- RWP 2019-1902, P-32D Seal and Upper Thrust Bearing
- RWP 2019-2056, Unit 2 Containment Power Entries for Inspection and Minor Maintenance Air Sample Survey Records
- ANO-AS-092619-0298, Unit 1 AUX 335 feet elevation
- ANO-AS-100619-0339, Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Building 401 feet elevation
- ANO-AS-100719-0344, Reactor Auxiliary Building 404 feet elevation
- ANO-AS-100919-0360, Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Building North Cavity
- ANO-AS-101219-0397, Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Building 404 feet elevation
- ANO-AS-101319-0406, Unit 1 AUX 386 feet elevation
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following:
Radiation Work Packages (RWP)
- RWP 2019-1430, Reactor Disassembly/Reassembly
- RWP 2019-1432, Fuel Movement and Support
- RWP 2019-1902, P-32D Seal and Upper Thrust Bearing
- RWP 2019-2056, Unit 2 Containment Power Entries for Inspection and Minor Maintenance
Electronic Alarming Dosimeter Alarms
- CR-ANO-C-2018-02066
- CR-ANO-C-2018-03843
- CR-ANO-1-2019-02993
- CR-ANO-2-2018-03070
- CR-ANO-2-2019-00530
Labeling of Containers
- Various sealed containers in the Low Level Radwaste Building
- Various waste drums stored in the Drumming Station and Radwaste Building
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material.
- (1) The inspectors verified the following sealed sources are accounted for and are intact:
- Source ID 49
- Source ID 223
- Source ID 724
- Source ID 1210
- Source ID 1211
- Source ID 1468
- Source ID 1798
- Source ID 2552
- Source ID 2553
- Source ID 2612
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.
- (1) The inspectors also reviewed the following RWP for areas with airborne radioactivity:
- RWP 2019-1432, Fuel Movement and Support
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated risk-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls.
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency.
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Engineering Controls (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated airborne controls and radioactive monitoring.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following:
Installed Ventilation Systems
- Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust
- Control Room Ventilation
- Radwaste Area Ventilation
Temporary Ventilation System Setups
- There was one temporary high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) ventilation system available for observation in the Unit 1 containment area during this inspection.
Portable or Installed Monitoring Systems
- Control Room Ventilation and Radiation Monitoring System
- AMS-4 Spent Fuel Pool Area
- AMS-4 Reactor Building/Containment Area Unit 1 Elevation 335 feet
- AMS-4 Reactor Building/Containment Area Unit 1 Elevation 404 feet
- Reactor Building/Containment Area Unit 1 Equipment Hatch
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices by:
- (1) Observing in-field applications; verifying the licensee validated the level of protection provided by the devices; inspecting the material condition of devices, reviewing records and certification of devices issued for use; reviewing the qualifications of workers that use the devices; and observing workers donning, doffing and testing devices.
The inspectors observed three operations personnel and three radiation protection technicians adequately don and doff self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
The inspectors observed and inspected the material condition of SCBAs stored and staged near the control room, the fire brigade area, and operation support center for emergencies. The material conditions were determined to be adequate.
The inspectors verified that the plant breathing air systems, SCBA filling stations, and air compressors met or exceeded Grade-D air specifications.
The inspectors reviewed records and certification of devices issued for use and reviewed the qualifications of workers that use the devices.
The inspectors reviewed medical qualifications, respirator fit test records of several workers.
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated self-contained breathing apparatus program implementation.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following:
Status and Surveillance Records for Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
- SCBA - Air Supply No. UEL-003, July 28, 2019
- SCBA - Air Supply No. UEL-006, July 28, 2019
- SCBA - Air Supply No. UEL-036, July 28, 2019
- SCBA - Air Supply No. UEL-041, July 28, 2019
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Fit for On-Shift Operators and Health Physics Technicians
- 1 Senior Reactor Operator, October 24, 2019
- 2 Reactor Operators, October 24, 2019
- 3 Senior Health Physics Technicians, October 24, 2019
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Maintenance Check
- SCBA - Air Supply No. R-3176, July 3, 2019
- SCBA - Air Supply No. R-3185, July 3, 2019
- SCBA - Air Supply No. R-3206, July 3, 2019
- SCBA - Air Supply No. R-3235, July 3, 2019 Compressed Air Quality Test
- Eagle Air System Report No. 369034; August 2, 2019
- Bauer Air System Report No. 369035; August 2,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08)===
- (1) Unit 1 residual heat removal systems (October 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 residual heat removal systems (October 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 cooling water support systems (October 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 cooling water support systems (October 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
(1)
(April 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
(1)
(April 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 potential adverse trend in implementation of fatigue management program and corrective actions closed to work order backlog on December 9, 2019
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Unit 1 emergency feedwater steam admission valve CV-2663 push button failure on October 23, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Siemens breaker anti-pump relay contact with high resistances extent of condition on November 21, 2019
- (3) Unit 2 spent fuel pool lowering level due to failed cask loading pit seal on December 12, 2019
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03)
- (1) Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling pump B trip and licensee entry into spent fuel pool cooling abnormal procedure with reactor core in the spent fuel pool on October 22,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.04Q This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33. Appendix A, Section 3.s.(2)(a), requires procedures for emergency power sources (e.g., diesel generators, batteries). The licensee established Procedure OP-1104.036, Emergency Diesel Generator Operation, Revision 82, for operation of the emergency diesel generators.
Contrary to the above, from September 2017 to September 2019, the licensee failed to maintain Procedure OP-1104.036 for operation of the emergency diesel generators.
Specifically, the licensee failed to establish a procedure verification step to ensure the crankcase pressure trip device was not in the trip condition prior to placing it into service, and that there was no indication of an emergency diesel generator positive crankcase pressure condition.
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it
- (1) did not represent a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component;
- (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function;
- (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for more than its technical specification allowed outage time; and
- (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2019-02219
Failure to Restore a Fire Barrier to Functional Prior to De-Posting a Fire Watch Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000313/2019004-01 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.05Q The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, License Condition 2.C.(8), Fire Protection, for the licensees failure to implement all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement program procedures to restore a fire barrier to a functional status prior to de-posting an hourly fire watch and failed to identify a degraded fire barrier in accordance with documented inspection criteria.
Description:
On October 2, 2019, during a plant status walk-down of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, auxiliary building elevation 335 feet fire barrier penetrations contained in Fire Area B-10 of Fire Zone 162-A, the inspectors identified separation of the sealant around Fire Barrier 60-008 (FB-60-008). The licensee performed a walk-down to assess its condition to prevent the spreading of a fire from the Unit 1 auxiliary building stair well to the 335 feet elevation that contained the three safety-related high-pressure injection pumps. The licensee also determined there was separation of the sealant around Fire Barrier FB-60-008, and it was difficult to determine how far the separation penetrated the fire seal. Based on the identified condition the licensee declared Fire Barrier FB-60-008 nonfunctional and entered Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.7.12, Fire Barriers, Action Statements A.3.1 and A.3.2, implemented an hourly fire watch under Fire Impairment 8556, and documented this deficiency in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2019-02493.
The inspectors reviewed the surveillance history of Fire Barrier FB-60-008 and identified that it was declared nonfunctional in May 2016. The licensee documented this deficiency in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2016-01522 and implemented an hourly fire watch under Fire Impairment 4265. Additionally, Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2016-01522 was closed to Work Order 446193 to repair Fire Barrier FB-60-008. Work Order 446193 was still in planned status as of October 2019, and the penetration remained unchanged from when the condition was identified in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2016-01552. However, the hourly fire watch was de-posted in July 2016, and Fire Impairment 4265 was closed prior to Fire Barrier FB-60-008 being restored to functional status, which was not in accordance with Procedure OP-1000.120, ANO Fire Impairment Program, Revision 25, Section 6.3 prerequisites (i.e., the work order assigned to restore fire barrier functionality was completed).
Additionally, the repair of Fire Barrier FB-60-008 was assigned a Priority 3 in accordance with the licensee work management process, which required the licensee to restore Fire Barrier FB-60-008 to functional status around August 2016.
On September 5, 2018, a fire barrier surveillance was performed in accordance with Procedure OP-1405.016, Unit 1 Penetration Fire Barrier Visual Inspection, Revision 26, under Work Order 52746507 and was marked as satisfactory, without identifying the nonfunctional condition documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2016-01522. However, Fire Barrier FB-60-008 did not meet three of the inspection criteria documented in Procedure OP-1405.016 at the time of the inspection, and it should have been declared as nonfunctional. The licensee documented the potential human performance gap associated with the performance of the fire barrier surveillance that did not identify the nonfunctional fire barrier in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2019-02833.
Corrective Actions: The licensee implemented the required hourly fire watch under fire impairment and performed Work Order 532521 to restore Fire Barrier FB-60-008 to functional.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-ANO-1-2019-02493 and CR-ANO-1-2019-02833
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to restore a nonfunctional fire barrier prior to de-posting an hourly fire watch was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the nonfunctional fire barrier coupled with the lack of a required fire watch could have resulted in a fire spreading from the Unit 1 auxiliary building stairwell to the 335 feet elevation that contained the three safety-related high-pressure injection pumps.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors assigned the finding to fire finding Category 1.4.1 and 1.4.4 using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, 1, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Worksheet, dated May 2, 2018, because the finding involved fire prevention and administrative controls and fire confinement. The inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because the finding:
- (1) did not increase the likelihood of a fire, delay detection of a fire, or result in a more significant fire than previously analyzed such that credited safe shutdown strategy could be adversely impacted; and
- (2) the degraded fire confinement element continued to provide adequate fire endurance to prevent fire propagation through the fire confinement element given the combustible loading and location of equipment important to safe shutdown in the fire area of concern.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, the licensee failed to effectively plan and execute work activities by incorporating risk insights, job site conditions, and coordinate with different groups to restore the nonfunctional Fire Barrier FB-60-008, within the required 90 days, prior to de-posting an hourly fire watch.
Enforcement:
Violation: License Condition 2.C.(8), Fire Protection, requires in part, Entergy Operations, Inc. (ANO-1) shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Procedure OP-1000.120, ANO Fire Impairment Program, Revision 25, was established as part of the provisions of the approved fire protection program. Procedure OP-1000.120, Section 6.3, provides instructions for de-posting a fire watch if it was posted due to equipment failure, and the shift manager or designee was responsible for releasing the fire watch when the system or equipment was returned to service.
Contrary to the above, from July 12, 2016, to October 2, 2019, the licensee failed to implement all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, after a fire watch was posted due to equipment failure, the shift manager or designee failed ensure that the system or equipment was returned to service before releasing the fire watch in accordance with Procedure OP-1000.120. In particular, the individual released the fire watch prior to repair of the failed fire barrier and without the barrier being properly returned to service.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Backlog of Condition Reports/Corrective Actions Closed to Work Management Process Semiannual Trend Review 71152
The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program documentation associated with the backlog of condition reports/corrective actions closed to the work management process. The inspectors reviewed the backlog associated with condition reports/corrective actions closed to the work management process, condition reports associated with this backlog, and the adverse condition analysis for Nuclear Independent Oversight (NIOS) quality assurance finding documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2019-04254. The inspectors noted the following:
- CR-ANO-C-2019-01330: The licensees problem identification and resolution-focused self-assessment identified a standard performance deficiency for the high number of condition reports closed to work orders without scheduled dates.
- CR-ANO-C-2019-01541: In April 2019, the licensee identified that the backlog of adverse conditions closed to the work management system process had risen. The performance review group approved an aggregate performance issue on this issue, which was closed to work tracking actions associated with work order burn down curves. These actions remained open with a combined 25 extensions.
- CR-ANO-C-2019-02072: In June 2019, the licensees NIOS identified that the required reviews of open condition reports associated with safety-related equipment and performance review group oversight work orders with condition reports closed to them where not performed consistently in accordance with the licensees corrective action program. The corrective action was to perform the review by January 2020.
- CR-ANO-C-2019-04252: The licensee identified that multiple Priority 3 work orders have not been implemented in the next available system/component outage opportunity or have been scheduled beyond it. The licensees work management requires Priority 3 work orders be scheduled at the next available system/component outage within the cycle plan or based on a modified schedule.
- CR-ANO-C-2019-04253: The licensee identified multiple condition reports closed to work orders that did not have scheduled completion dates. Others had scheduled completion dates that were in the past or were unrealistic dates. An example was Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2015-02479 that was closed to Priority 3 Work Order 38483 and was scheduled for October 10, 2606.
The adverse condition analysis documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2019-04254 identified three causal factors and their associated corrective actions:
- Causal Factor 1: Priority 3 work orders have not been scheduled in accordance with the work management program. Approximately 50 percent of the Priority 3 work orders either did not have a scheduled completion date or the dates were in the past.
This was contrary to scheduling requirements of the work management process. The corrective action is to schedule all Priority 3 work orders/work requests in accordance with the work management process and the 13-week cycle plan. This action is scheduled to be completed after the backlog review.
- Causal Factor 2: The performance review group and the production department have not effectively managed the backlog of condition reports/corrective actions closed to the work management process, nor appropriately managed the risk associated with the backlog. The corrective action is to develop a burndown curve to track the backlog reduction and develop backlog metrics. The intent of this action is to allow the licensee to determine the status of the backlog and reduction efforts to provide support, challenge as necessary, and to be able to review a manageable sized backlog.
- Causal Factor 3: The production department has scheduled backlog reviews, as required by the licensees work management process; however, the meeting has not been supported by the licensees organization as indicated by the multiple condition reports documenting the inability of the licensee to meet quorum for the backlog review. The corrective action is to perform a review of all the Priority 3, 4, 8, and 9 work orders with condition reports closed to them, in accordance with the work management process.
The inspectors noted the following areas of concern:
1. Work orders have not been scheduled in accordance with the work management
process, and a number of work orders have been in the backlog for greater than 3 years.
2. The performance review group and work management personnel have not effectively
managed the work order backlog, and appropriately managed the risk associated with the back log.
3. The work order backlog reviews have not been effective, because the licensees
organization has not fully supported the reviews.
4. The licensee has previously identified this issue during problem identification and
resolution self-assessment, Aggregate Performance Issue Review, and by NIOS. In each case the corrective action closes the condition reports to the work tracking action process (a non-corrective action program process) to review the work order backlog and perform the required backlog reviews. These issues where identified by the licensee in April 2019 and June 2019.
Failure to Torque Temporary Power Supply Terminal Screws in accordance with Station Procedures and the Vendor Manual Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity
Green FIN 05000313/2019004-02 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding associated with the licensees failure to torque temporary power supply terminal screws in accordance with torque specifications contained in Procedure EN-MA-145, Maintenance Standard for Torque Applications, Revision 9, and the vendor manual.
Description:
On October 6, 2019, the licensee installed a temporary power supply to provide power to spent fuel pool pump B (P-40B) under Work Order 493512 to support maintenance activities for its primary power supply. Work Order 493512 directed maintenance personnel to implement Procedure OP-6030.110, Termination Splicing and Soldering of Cable and Wire, Revision 24, for the installation of pump P-40Bs temporary power supply. Specifically, Procedure OP-6030.110 provides directions to make the temporary power supply terminal set screw connections snug tight and to subsequently perform a wiggle test on the connections to ensure they are tight. This was contrary to the torque requirements of 90 to 100 inch-lbs specified in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-145 and the vendor manual.
On October 22, 2019, Unit 1 was in a defueled status with the reactor core being stored in the spent fuel pool in support of Refueling Outage 1R28 maintenance activities when pump P-40B tripped. Spent fuel pool pump A (P-40A) remained in service during the timeframe pump P-40B was tripped, providing uninterrupted cooling to the spent fuel pool, although at a reduced capacity. Licensee electricians discovered loose connections on the temporary power supply terminal set screws for all three phases of the lower portion of the overload heaters. This condition resulted in a loss of circuit continuity between the lugs and the terminals. The loose connections allowed heat to build up to the thermal overload limit for pump P-40B, causing it to trip. The licensee torqued the terminal connections in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-145 and the vendor manual, and pump P-40B was returned to service. During the timeframe pump P-40B was unavailable, spent fuel pool temperature rose from 110 to 120 degrees Fahrenheit (F); however, it remained below the safety analysis report design criterion of 150 degrees F. The licensee documented this deficiency in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2019-03440 and performed an adverse condition analysis. The licensee identified one direct cause and causal factor:
- Direct
Cause:
Pump P-40B temporary power supply terminal set screws had insufficient torque applied resulting in a high resistance and loss of circuit continuity between the lugs and the terminals.
- Causal Factor: WO 493512 contained inadequate instructions to ensure pump P-40Bs temporary power supply terminal set screws where torqued to the required value of 90 to 100 inch-lbs.
The inspectors noted that Procedure EN-MA-145 provides torque values for electrical bus assemblies. Procedure EN-MA-145 states, This document applies to all bolted connections regardless of size and nonsafety-related electrical connections made via threaded fasteners. Procedure EN-MA-145 continues on to state the following, When a torque value cannot be determined from controlled drawings, vendor manuals, manufacturers specifications, engineering documents, or Attachment 9.11, the planner initiates a request to design engineering to provide the proper torque value for the application. The planner provides work order step text ensuring that the torque values, fastener material and size, torque pattern and specific assembly instructions are documented in the work order package. Paragraph 5.7, items [6] and [7] of Procedure EN-MA-145 state the following, Torque application values for various electrical bus bar combinations are provided in 9.12 or as per applicable site specific procedures or standards, and, Connections to terminal blocks and bolted splice connections using 1/4 inch diameter and smaller hardware shall be tightened to snug-tight and not torqued unless a torque value is specified in site procedures/drawings/specifications or vendor supplied documents. Check for tightness by applying light finger pressure to the terminal barrel in a clockwise (tightening)direction and verify no rotation of the terminal. The connections in question are size 5/16 inch.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to provide the required 90 to 100 inch-lbs torque value into work order instructions for pump P-40Bs temporary power supply terminal set screw connections in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-145 and the vendor manual.
Corrective Actions: The licensee updated pump P-40Bs temporary power supply installation model work order to include:
- (1) the required torque specification of 90 to 100 inch-lbs for the terminal set screws;
- (2) a post-maintenance testing requirement to perform in-service thermography testing after installation of the temporary power supply. Additionally, the licensee took steps to ensure Procedure OP-6030.110 aligns with the requirements of Procedure EN-MA-145.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2019-03440
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to torque temporary power supply terminal screws in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-145 and the vendor manual was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the structure, system, and component performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the licensees failure to torque the temporary power supply terminal screws in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-145 resulted in the trip of spent fuel pool pump B and a 10 degree F rise in spent fuel pool temperature.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not:
- (1) adversely affect decay heat removal capabilities from the spent fuel pool causing the pool temperature to exceed the maximum analyzed temperature limit specified in the site-specific licensing basis;
- (2) result from fuel handling errors, dropped fuel assembly, dropped storage cask, or crane operations over the spent fuel pool that caused mechanical damage to fuel clad and a detectible release of radionuclides;
- (3) did not result in a loss of spent fuel pool water inventory decreasing below the minimum analyzed level specified in the site-specific licensing basis;
- (4) affect the spent fuel pool neutron absorber, fuel bundle misplacement, or soluble boron concentration.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide the correct temporary power supply set screw torque value into instructions during the planning of WO 493512, because the licensee used the torque requirements contained in Procedure OP-6030.110, instead of the torque requirements contained in Procedure EN-MA-145 and the vendor manual.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 23, 2019, the inspectors presented the Inservice Inspection Activities inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 25, 2019, the inspectors presented the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone inspection results to Mr. R. Pitts, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On November 21, 2019, the inspectors presented the Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments (10 CFR 50.59) inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On January 9, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.04Q Calculations
CALC-88-E-0098-
ANO-1 DBA Reanalysis
CALC-91-R-2013-
Service Water Performance Testing Methodology
CALC-95-R-0014-
DH Cooler Test Protocol
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2018-01722, 1-2019-02219, 1-2019-03439, 1-2019-03440,
1-2019-03447, 1-2019-03452
Drawings
M-217, Sheet 2
M-217, Sheet 3
M-232, Sheet 1
P&ID Decay Heat Removal System
108
Engineering
Changes
K-4A and K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device
Isolation Valve
K-4A EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve
K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve
Miscellaneous
ER 994916E101
Procedures
OP-1104.004
Decay Heat Removal Operating Procedure
131
OP-1104.036
Emergency Diesel Generator Operation
2, 83
OP-1309.016
Decay Heat Cooler Thermal Testing
Work Orders
WO 493512, 500672, 531004, 52712881, 52804684
71111.05Q Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2016-01522, C-2019-04090
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
1-2019-02493, 1-2019-02833, 1-2019-04099, C-2019-04429
Drawings
M-210
Piping and Instrumentation Service Water
Miscellaneous
265, 8556
Procedures
OP-1000.120
ANO Fire Impairment Program
24, 25
OP-1405.016
Unit 1 Penetration Fire Barrier Visual Inspection
Work Orders
WO 446193, 52746507
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2019-02577, 1-2018-01843, 1-2018-04927, 1-2019-01734,
1-2019-02077, 1-2019-02609, 1-2019-02620, 1-2019-02643,
1-2019-02675, 1-2019-02710, 1-2019-02726, 1-2019-02727,
1-2019-02729, 1-2019-02757, 1-2019-02766, 1-2019-02772,
1-2019-02838, 1-2019-02923, 1-2019-02924, 1-2019-02940,
1-2019-03094, 1-2019-03150, 1-2019-03174, 1-2018-04698,
1-2019-01574, 1-2019-01722, 1-2019-01823, 1-2019-02218,
Engineering
Changes
0000077083
Support MS-147 Functional with Locking Nuts Loose
Miscellaneous
Request for Alternative from Volumetric/Surface Examination
Frequency Requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1,
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, Docket No. 50-313, License
No. DPR-51
04/28/2014
Request for Alternative from Volumetric/Surface Examination
Frequency Requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1,
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, Docket No. 50-313, License
No. DPR-51
06/17/2016
Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Seventh,
Refueling Outage (1R27), Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1,
Docket No. 50-313, License No. DPR-51
07/25/2018
Procedures
CEP-BAC-001
Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Program Plan
CEP-CII-003
Visual Examinations of Class MC Components
308
CEP-NDE-0255
Radiographic Examination of ASME, ANSI, AWS, API, AWWA
Welds and Components
CEP-NDE-0400
Ultrasonic Examination
CEP-NDE-0404
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds
(ASME XI)
CEP-NDE-0423
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds
(ASME XI)
CEP-NDE-0641
Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) for ASME Section XI
CEP-NDE-0731
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT) for ASME Section XI
CEP-NDE-0901
VT-1 Examination
CEP-NDE-0902
VT-2 Examination
CEP-NDE-0903
VT-3 Examination
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CEP-NDE-0955
Visual Examination (VE) of Bare-Metal Surfaces
306
CEP-NDE-0965
Visual Welding Inspection ASME, ANSI B31.1
CEP-WP-002
Qualification, Development, and Control of Welding Procedure
Specifications
CEP-WP-003
Qualification and Control of Welders
CEP-WP-004
Control and Documentation of Welding Activities
CEP-WP-005
Control and Issuance of Welding Material
CEP-WP-GWS-1
General Welding Standard ASME/ANSI
CEP-WP-WIIR-1
Weld Inprocess Inspection Requirements
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program (BACCP)
Entergy Nuclear Welding Program
SEP-BAC-ANO-
001
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Inspection and
Identification of Boric Acid Leaks for ANO-1 and ANO-2
71111.11Q Procedures
OP-1102.016
Power Reduction and Plant Shutdown
OP-1105.004
Integrated Control System
OP-1107.001
Electrical System Operations
24
Calculations
CALC-ANO2-FP-
15-00001
NFPA 805 Monitoring Program Scoping
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2016-02355, 1-2018-03086, 1-2019-02481, 1-2019-02548,
1-2019-02586, 1-2019-03560, 1-2019-04092, 2-2016-03156,
2-2016-03178, 2-2019-01430, 2-2019-01432, 2-2019-01770,
2-2019-01771, C-2019-04424
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
2-2019-02300, 1-2019-04407
Procedures
NFPA Monitoring Program
OP-1003.015
ANO NFPA 805 Monitoring Program
OP-1015.002
Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control
OP-1015.036
Containment Building Closeout
OP-1305.037
Unit 1 Reactor Building Access & Ventilation Leak Rate
Testing
OP-1402.038
Unit 1 Equipment Hatch Opening, Closing, and Maintenance
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
OP-2203.014
Alternate Shutdown
OP-2203.030
OP-2203.049
Fires In Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown
OP-3305.001
Ops System Alignment Tests
Work Orders
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
C-2019-04090, C-2019-04130
Calculations
CALC-11-E-0007-
ANO-2 Startup #3 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Millstone Studies
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2018-02589, 1-2018-03079, 1-2019-02219, 1-2019-02383,
1-2019-02446, 1-2019-02447, 1-2019-02448, 1-2019-02508,
1-2019-02916, 1-2019-03459, 1-2019-03627, 1-2019-03628,
1-2019-03667, 2-2019-02767, C-2019-04090, C-2019-04130,
C-2019-04137, C-2019-04191
Drawings
M-217, Sheet 2
M-217, Sheet 3
Engineering
Changes
K-4A and K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device
Isolation Valve
K-4A EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve
K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve
Disposition of Test Results and Check Valve Health for BS-4A
1R27
Clarification of IST Requirements for Spray Header Check
Valves, BS-4A and BS-4B
Engineering
Evaluations
ANO-290342-S04
Operability Evaluation of Unit 1 Reactor Building Column 17
for Dead+Live_Seismic
Miscellaneous
CES-02
ANO-1 General Structural Design Guide
SEP-ANO-1-IST-
ANO Unit 1 Inservice Testing Bases
SPEC-APL-C-501
Technical Specification for Earthquake Resistance Design of
Structures and/or Components Located in the Reactor
Building for the Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 Power Plant
Procedures
Operability Determination Process
OP-1104.036
Emergency Diesel Generator Operation
2, 83
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
WO 531004, 52271396, 52399617, 52508169, 52612456,
2733039, 52812299
Calculations
2-E-0021-01
Emergency Duty Cycle and Battery Sizing Calc
94-E-0043-01
ANO-1 Reactor Building Surface Areas for the Heat Sink and
Hydrogen Generation Calcs.
CALC-72
Auxiliary Bldg Floor Framing.
CALC-82-D-1111-
EC-66983. Room 112 Heat Load Assessment due to Addition
of New Q Equipment.
CALC-85-E-0053-
Fire Area 1-3 Combustible Loading Evaluation.
CALC-87-E-0026-
EFW Pump Room Temperature Profiles.
CALC-91-E-0120-
244
Seismic Qualification Review Summary for EFW Replacement
Tachometer SI-6601A (Panel C531).
CALC-92-E-0103-
ANO-1 Switchgear, Battery, DC, and Corridor 98 HVAC
Evaluation
CALC-92-E-0103-
ANO-1 4160V Switchgear, Battery, DC and Corridor 98
Alternate Ventilation System Analysis
CALC-93-SQ-
0002-247
Seismic Qualification Summary for MCC D15 & D25 and
Internals
CALC-ANO1-IC-
18-00001
To determine the heat rise within the Turbine Control Panel
provided as part of the Terry Turbine Governor Upgrade.
CALC-ANOC-CS-
15-00003
ANO Flood Protection Design Basis
CALC-ANOC-CS-
15-00012
ANO Flood Protection Room Evaluations - UNITS 1 and 2
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2016-01078, C-2018-01363, HQN-2018-01637, HQN-2018-
00717,
Drawings
8002891-1
Turbine Control Schematic
F
C-272
Equipment Support Details, EFW Turbine Control Panel
E-295
Schematic Diagram Emergency Feedwater Turbine MOV's
E-531
Connection Diagram Terminal Boxes
E-559
Connection Diagram Main Control Panel CO9
M-158, Sheet 1
Heating, Ventilating & Air Conditioning Aux. Building
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Switchgear Cable Supply and Relay Rooms Plans and
Sections EL. 372' 0"
M-158, Sheet 4
Heating, Ventilating & Air Conditioning Seismic Supports for
Emergency Cooling of Switchgear & Battery Rooms Area 4
EL. 372' 0"
M-263, Sheet 2
Piping & Instrument Diagram Aux. Building HVAC Elevation
2' 0"
M-263, Sheet 3
Piping & Instrument Diagram Aux. Building HVAC Elevation
386' 0"
Engineering
Changes
Cable Reroutes and Interposing Relays
NE-0501 Source Range Fission Chamber Bypass
ANO Cask Transfer Facility
EC Markup for CALC-92-E-0103-01 to Update Room 104 Free
Convection Model and Determine New Operator Actions
This temporary modification disconnects the RCP axial
position indication, ribbon
cable on the back of the module in 2C404. Evaluation #: 14-
2.
Process Applicability Determination - Screening. This
temporary modification disconnects the axial position
indication, ribbon cable on the back of the module in 2C404.
Temporary Modification to Remove 2P-32C RCP Axial
Position 2ZIY-6066 from Service.
Room 72 Floor Drain and Equipment Drain Flood
Update Calc 91-E-0090-03 to Show Cooling Capability of
Switchgear Room
Coolers 2VUC-2A, 2B, 2C, 2D With New ECP SW
Temperature Profile
Anchor Darling DD 10 CFR Part 21 Wedge Pin Shear Stress
Calcs
Process Applicability Determination - Screening. Change
Equipment Database (EDB) for valves 2PSV-2803A, 2PSV-
2806A, 2PSV-2823A, and 2PSV-2826A to reclassify valves
from Safety Related to Non-Safety Related.
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Reclassification of Inter-Stage Relief Valves for the U2
Starting Air Compressors from Safety Related to Non-Safety
Related. (VALVES: 2PSV-2803A, 2PSV-2806A, 2PSV-2823A,
Cable Reroutes and Interposing Relays. Evaluation#: FFN-
2016-003
Process Applicability Determination - Screening. Cable
Reroutes and Interposing Relays
Tornado Missile Protection Features and Licensing Basis
Assessment of Reactor Building Corrosion as an Unqualified
Coating and Sump Debris Source
Change Design Basis Flooding Requirements for ANO-1 and
ANO-2 Decay Heat and ESF Vaults
EDG Crank Case Over-Pressure Switch Gasket and Plate
Addition CR-ANO-1-2016-2498
ANO-2 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Replacement
Project under the SGT, LLC Appendix B (QA) Program.
ANO-1 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump Woodward
Governor Controls Upgrade. Evaluation # FFN-2018-003
Process Applicability Determination - Screening. ANO-1 EFW
Pump Woodward Governor Controls Upgrade
Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Emergency Feedwater Turbine
Governor Control System, Dresser-Rand, Curtis-Wright,
Engine Systems, Inc., Woodward, Vendor Manual for ANO
Unit 1 EFW Turbine Governor Control System, Vendor
Document ID: 85005G, 85017V1, 85017V2, 801283,
890038A, 82510, CB92387, CDS36294, 16540.
Remove Unit 2 Door 260
Revision of ANO-1&2 LOCA Dose Analysis to Reflect
December 2011 RADTRAD Error and DH Vault Leakage
Process Applicability Determination - Screening. Install a
valve on the upstream oil supply to the Emergency Diesel
Generator (EDG) crankcase pressure trip device on each
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
EDG.
The Bailey 820 Analog Control, System is obsolete. The ANO
Electronic Resource Group (ERG) has reverse engineered
these modules and Engineering Change (EC) Evaluation
2501 approves them for use as an acceptable alternate
configuration.
Authorized valve 2SV-5061-2 to be replaced with a bolted
bonnet Target Rock Model 97AA-001-1.
HPSI Pump Seal Cooler Service Water Flow Requirements
Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Governor Upgrade (Train
A)
This engineering change for Byron Jackson Horizontal
Double-Bearing Pump adds a spacer ring in between the
retaining sleeve and mechanical seal sleeve. It also
allows for 316SS to be used as an alternative material for all
impeller keys.
Temporary shielding calculation to support the activity of
Removing Valve DH-17
Removal of DR-200 in the Shift Manager's Office
Performance of an Engineering Change, Evaluation (EC
EVAL) to ensure reduction in wall thickness of Service Water
pipe HBD-14-18 does not exceed design limits.
Justification for Continued Operation Until Next Maintenance
Window Without Hardened Washers on P-36C
ANO-1 Cycle 29 Core Reload Evaluation
ANO-1 large break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA) using
the latest NRC-approved LOCA methodology of BAW-
10192P-A that explicitly accounts for fuel thermal conductivity
degradation (TCD). Evaluation #: FFN-2019-001
Process Applicability Determination - Screening. ANO-1 large
break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA) using the latest
NRC-approved LOCA methodology of BAW-10192P-A that
explicitly accounts for fuel thermal conductivity degradation
(TCD).
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Revise CALC-88-E-0100-27 for Unit 1 Core Flood System
TMOD to Support Online Work for 2PSV-5082. 2PSV-5082
Maintenance Could Create Voids That Are Problematic
Engineering
Evaluations
EC-66983 (FCR
81113)
EC66983 replaces the governor control system for the ANO 1
EFW Pump Turbine K-3. This document captures lengthy
mechanical evaluations (Section B.5) for Form 4 (P2E
7.001).
EC-66983 (FCR
81113)
EC66983 replaces the governor control system for the ANO 1
EFW Pump Turbine K-3. This document captures lengthy civil
evaluations (Section B.5) for Form 4 (P2E Attachment 7.001).
Procedures
1104.027
Battery and Switchgear Emergency Cooling System
Engineering Change Process
Process Applicability Determination
CFR 50.59 Evaluations
OP-1203.012N
Annunciator K16 Corrective Action
Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2019-
00026
Pre-NRC Focused Self-Assessment for the NRC Inspection of
CFR 50.59 (IP 71111.17T).
08/15/2019
Calculations
ECH-NE-19-
000032
ANO-1 Cr-Coated Mark-B-HTP Lead Test Assembly (LTA)
Engineering Basis Summary
ECH-NE-19-
000033
ANO-1 Lead Coated Rods - Mechanical Review for
Operations
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2011-00147, 1-2011-00188, 1-2011-00194, 1-2011-00195,
1-2016-01517, 1-2017-02104, 1-2019-01847, 1-2019-02446,
1-2019-03079, 1-2019-03257, 1-2019-03738, C-2000-00076,
C-2011-00303
Drawings
E-295, Sheet 3A
Schematic Diagram Emergency Feedwater Turbine MOV's
Engineering
Changes
Operability Engineering Input for CR-ANO-1-2011-00147 PB-
2613 CV-2613
ANO-1 Cycle 29 Reload Core Lead Test Assemblies
Force CV-2663 into Auto by Removing Fuses F10 and F11 in
C09
Miscellaneous
ER-10090E101
Equivalency Evaluation for GE "CR2940" Model Selector
Switch
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
FS1-0045558-1.0
ANO1-29 Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1-Cycle 29 Reload
Report
08/08/2019
Procedures
CFR 50.59 Evaluations
17, 19
OP-1106.006
Emergency Feedwater Pump Operation
109
Work Orders
WO 263583, 381789, 445681, 499686, 529000, 529076,
2826120
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2019-02446, 1-2019-02454, 1-2019-02466, 1-2019-02467,
1-2019-02476, 1-2019-02511, 1-2019-02592, 1-2019-02987,
1-2019-03446, 1-2019-03450, 1-2019-03552, 1-2019-03619,
1-2019-03756, 1-2019-03758, 1-2019-03769, 1-2019-03774,
1-2019-03779, 1-2019-03941, 1-2019-03945, 1-2019-03966,
1-2019-03973, C-2019-04090, C-2019-04130
Engineering
Changes
Fill ANO-1 Liner Plate Trough with Grout. Calculate Minimum
Thickness Requirement for ANO-1 Liner Plate
Miscellaneous
CEP-IST-4
Standard On Inservice Testing
309
ECT-66983-002
Post Modification Offline Test of EFW Digital Governor
Procedures
Control Habitability Program
Post Maintenance Testing
5, 6
OP-1000.120
ANO Fire Impairment Program
OP-1104.002
Makeup and Purification System Operation
OP-1104.005
Reactor Building Spray System Operation
OP-1104.036
Emergency Diesel Generator Operation
OP-1106.006
Emergency Feedwater Pump Operations
110
OP-1402.066
Month Inspection on Unit One Emergency Diesel
Generator Engine
OP-5120.523
Control Room Envelope Habitability Program
OP-6030.101
Installation of Penetration Seals
OP-6030.103
Installation of Concrete and NonShrink Grout
Work Orders
WO 444113, 448859, 465327, 499686, 504742, 510330, 532923,
2826120, 52841640, 52850596, 52857465
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2017-01344, 1-2019-02417, 1-2019-02420, 1-2019-02468,
1-2019-02511, 1-2019-02625, 1-2019-03442, 1-2019-04082
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2019-02838, 1-2019-04226, 1-2019-04233, 1-2019-04234,
1-2019-04236
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Resulting from
Inspection
Drawings
M-230, Sheet 1
2
M-231, Sheet 1
P&ID Makeup and Purification System
116
M-231, Sheet 2
P&ID Makeup and Purification System
M-231, Sheet 3
P&ID Makeup and Purification System
M-232, Sheet 1
P&ID Decay Heat Removal System
108
Engineering
Changes
EC-ANO-69592-
2
Haul Path and Load Path Evaluation Associated with the
Placement of the Exhaust Stacks on the Unit 1 and Unit 2
Engineering
Evaluations
ER-ANO-2006-
0332-000
ANO-1 and ANO-2 Aux Bldg Susceptibility to Boric Acid
Corrosion
Miscellaneous
SEP-BAC-ANO-
001
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Inspection and
Identification of Boric Acid Leaks ANO-1 and ANO-2
STM 1-51-3
Fuel Transfer System
Procedures
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program (BACCP)
OP-1005.002
OP-1015.036
Containment Building Closeout
OP-1102.002
Plant Startup
2
OP-1102.008
Approach to Criticality
OP-1102.010
Plant Shutdown and Cooldown
OP-1102.016
Power Reduction and Plant Shutdown
OP-1104.004
Decay Heat Removal Procedure
131
OP-1203.028
Loss of Decay Heat Removal
OP-1502.004
Control of Unit 1 Refueling
OP-1504.005
Reactor Vessel Closure Head Stud Detensioning and
Removal
OP-1504.006
Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Closure Head Stud Detensioning and
Removal
OP-1504.007
Reactor Vessel Closure Head Removal and Storage
OP-1504.038
Removal and Replacement of the Core Support Assembly
Work Orders
WO 2960, 528927
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculations
CALC-00-E-0023-
Unit 1 Appendix J Containment Maximum Allowed Leakage
Rate (La)
CALC-88-E-0098-
ANO-1 DBA Reanalysis
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2003-00760, 1-2019-02281, 1-2019-02446, 1-2019-02447,
1-2019-03752, 1-2019-03813, 1-2019-03927, 1-2019-03941,
1-2019-03945, 1-2019-04100, 1-2019-04102, 2-2019-00328,
2-2019-02477
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
1-2019-04088
Drawings
M-230, Sheet 1
2
M-236, Sheet 1
P&ID Reactor Building Spray and Core Flood System
Engineering
Changes
Baseline the Reference Values for the ANO1 IST Components
Engineering
Evaluations
ER-ANO-2003-
0564-000
Evaluation of the Unit 1 Appendix J Test Pressure (Pa) with
Allowances for Reactor Building Pressure Up to 3 psi
Miscellaneous
ANO1ILRT.19-
R191110B
Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 2019 ILRT Final Test Report
EN-OP-201-01
Flex Program Document
HES-02
Containment Leak Rate Testing Program
SEP-APJ-002
Arkansas Nuclear One Primary Containment Leakage Rate
Testing (Appendix J) Program Section
Procedures
OP-1104.002
Makeup and Purification System Operation
OP-1305.018
Local Leak Rate Testing - Type C
OP-1305.031
Integrated Leak Rate Testing
OP-2304.112
Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel A
OP-2305.003
ESF Response Time Test
OP-3305.001
OPS System Alignment Tests
OP-4120.404
Unit 1 Integrated Leak Rate Test
OP-5120.400
Unit 1 Integrated Leak Rate Test
OP-5120.402
Unit 1 Primary Containment Leak Rate Running Total
Work Orders
WO 398744, 398746, 507360, 530402, 50573613, 52510650,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2541798, 52770826, 52852885, 52886070
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2018-01336; 1-2018-01377; 1-2018-02231; 1-2018-02388;
1-2018-04973; 1-2019-01279; 1-2019-02993; 2-2018-00740;
2-2018-03070; 2-2018-03171; 2-2018-03258; 2-2018-03601;
2-2018-03880; 2-2019-00530; 2-2019-01431, C-2018-02066;
C-2018-02084; C-2018-03843; C-2019-01454
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
C-2019-04152
Miscellaneous
ANO Alpha Hazard Evaluation
10/15/2018
LHRA/VHRA Key Inventory
10/23/2019
ANO 1R28 Outage Status Report
10/25/2019
2018 Radiation Energy Distribution Evaluation
2/28/2019
ANO 2018 Annual Radiation Protection Report
2/28/2019
Att. 9.3 to EN-RP-
208
Quarterly Whole Body Counting Report
06/30/2019
Att. 9.4 to EN-RP-
143
Radioactive Seal Source Leak Test
2/29/2019
NSTS Annual Inventory Reconciliation Report
01/10/2019
Procedures
1601.502
Radioactive Material Control at Radwaste
Radiation Worker Expectations
Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Area
Radiological Control
Radiation Protection Posting
Hot Spot Program
Radioactive Material Control
Air Sampling
Source Control
13, 14
Whole Body Counting and In-Vitro Bioassay
Radiation Surveys ANO-1908-00356
Low Level Rad Waste
08/28/2019
Unit 1 AUX 335' General Area South End
09/14/2019
Unit 1 AUX 335' General Area North End
09/14/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Unit 1 AUX 335' EL Drumming Station Room Number 2026
10/03/2019
Unit 2 AUX 354 EL General Area
10/09/2019
Unit 2 AUX 317' General Area
10/12/2019
Unit 1 RX Building 335' General Area
10/23/2019
Unit 1 RX Building 354' General Area
10/22/2019
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
2019-1027
Maintenance Activities Make-Up Pumps
2019-1420
Scaffold Activities in Non-High Radiation Areas
2019-1421
Insulation Activities (Non-LHRAs) - 1R28
2019-1430
Reactor Disassembly, Reassembly and Support Activities
During 1R28
2019-1432
De-fuel and Re-fuel the Reactor
2019-1432
De-fuel and Re-fuel the Reactor
2019-1480
Remove and Install the Core Barrel
2019-1501
Replace VCC-2C/2D Service Water Piping
2019-1902
Replace P-32D Seal Cartridge and P-32D Upper Thrust
Bearing
2019-2056
Unit 2 Containment Power Entries for Inspection and Minor
Maintenance
Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2018-
00063
Radiation Safety - Hazard Assessment, Airborne Controls, and
Performance Indicators
08/05/2019
QA-14/15-2017-
ANO-01
Quality Assurance Audit Report: Combined Radiation
Protection and Radwaste
11/16/2017
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2018-00771, 1-2018-02145, 1-2018-04993, 2-2018-01418,
2-2018-01420, 2-2018-03288, C-2018-01793, C-2019-02193,
C-2019-02377, C-2019-03205, C-2019-03401
Procedures
1601.488
Eberline Model AMS-4 Beta Particulate Air Monitor Calibration 1
2104.007
Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning and Ventilation
3E4-1104.035
Fuel Handling and Radwaste Ventilation
3E4-1104.33
3E4-2104.035
Ventilation System Operations
Operation and Initial Setup of the Eberline Model AMS-4
Continuous Air Monitor
DOP Challenge Testing of HEPA Vacuums and Portable
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Ventilation Units
Operation and Maintenance of HEPA Vacuum Cleaners and
HEPA Ventilation Units
Respiratory Protection Program
Inspection and Maintenance of Respiratory Protection
Equipment
Selection, Issue and Use of Respiratory Protection Equipment
Breathing Air
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
RWP 2018-1508
Remove and Replace CRDM
04/10/2018
Self-Assessments ANO-2019-0011
Arkansas Nuclear One 2018 Annual Radiation Protection
Report
2/28/2019
LO-ALO-2018-
00063
Radiation Safety - Hazard Assessment, Airborne Controls, and
Performance Indicator
08/05/2019
QA-14/15-2017-
AN0-01
Combined Radiation Protection and Radwaste
11/06/2017
Work Orders
Perform Test on 2VEF-14 Fuel Handling Area Exhaust
08/29/2018
Perform 18 Month Test of 2VSF-9 Control Room Filtration
System
01/31/2019
Perform 18 Month Test of VEF-38A
05/22/2019
Perform 18 Month Test 2VEF-15 Reactor Building
06/12/2019
71151
Miscellaneous
1Q2019
2Q2019
3Q2019
4Q2018
Procedures
Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas
Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2018-
00063
Radiation Safety - Hazard Assessment, Airborne Controls, and
Performance Indicators
08/05/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2011-00147, 1-2011-00188, 1-2011-00194, 1-2011-00195,
1-2016-01003, 1-2016-01004, 1-2016-01517, 1-2016-01769,
1-2017-02104, 1-2019-01847, 1-2019-02763, 1-2019-02987,
1-2019-03079, 1-2019-03581, 2-2012-02766, 2-2016-00097,
2-2017-01673, 2-2017-05811, 2-2019-00554, 2-2019-00557,
2-2019-00770, 2-2019-02306, 2-2019-02506, 2-2019-02509,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2-2019-02571, C-2000-00076, C-2011-00303, C-2019-03563,
C-2019-04471
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
2-2019-03115
Engineering
Changes
Operability Engineering Input for CR-ANO-1-2011-00147 PB-
2613 CV-2613
Force CV-2663 into Auto by Removing Fuses F10 and F11 in
C09
Miscellaneous
20
CEP-IST-4
Standard On Inservice Testing
309
E-295, Sheet 3A
Schematic Diagram Emergency Feedwater Turbine MOV's
ER-10090E101
Equivalency Evaluation for GE "CR2940" Model Selector
Switch
Procedures
OP-1104.005
Reactor Building Spray System Operation
OP-1106.006
Emergency Feedwater Pump Operation
109
OP-2107.001
Electrical System Operations
130
Work Orders
WO 2768, 258162, 263583, 435034, 438206, 438561, 445681,
448429, 485002, 486111, 486213, 488334, 489290, 511214,
20860, 529000, 532923, 52843383, 52857465
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2019-03439, 1-2019-03440
Procedures
OP-1203.050
Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies
Work Orders