Text

License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-306, Revision 2, Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration.
	ML113550138
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	12/20/2011
From:	Plona J; DTE Energy
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
	NRC-11-0049
	Download: ML113550138 (37)
	v • d • e

Joseph I Plona Site Vice President 6400 N,Dixie Highway, Newport, MI 48166 Tel: 734,586.5910 Fax: 734.586.4172 10 CFR 50.90 December 20, 2011 NRC-11-0049 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington D C 20555-0001

Reference:

Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

Subject:

License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-306, Revision 2, "Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration" In accordance with the provisions of Section 50.90 of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Detroit Edison is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Fermi 2.

The proposed amendments would modify TS requirements related to primary containment isolation instrumentation. The changes are in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF),

Improved Standard Technical Specifications change TSTF-306, Revision 2.

" Enclosure 1 provides an evaluation of the proposed changes.

" Enclosure 2 provides the markup pages of existing TS pages to show the proposed changes.

" Enclosure 3 provides the revised (clean) TS pages.

" Enclosure 4 provides a markup of the existing TS Bases to show the proposed changes.

Detroit Edison requests approval of the proposed license amendment by December 20, 2012, with the amendment being implemented within 60 days.

USNRC NRC-11-0049 Page 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1), "Notice for Public Comment," the analysis about the issue of no significant hazards consideration using the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 is being provided to the Commission in accordance with the distribution requirements in 10 CFR 50.4.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), "State Consultation," a copy of this application and its reasoned analysis about no significant hazards considerations is being provided to the designated Michigan State Official.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr.

Rodney W. Johnson of my staff at (734) 586-5076.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:

1. Evaluation of Proposed License Amendment

2. Markup of existing TS Pages

3. Revised (Clean) TS pages

4. Markup of existing TS Bases cc: NRC Project Manager NRC Resident Office Reactor Projects Chief, Branch 4, Region III Regional Administrator, Region III Supervisor, Electric Operators, Michigan Public Service Commission

USNRC NRC-11-0049 Page 3 I, Joseph H. Plona, do hereby affirm that the foregoing statements are based on facts and circumstances which are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Joseph . P ona Site Vice President - Nuclear Generation I

On this (-00 day of O/ - , 2011 before me personally appeared Joseph H. Plona, being first duly sworn and says that he executed the foregoing as his free act and deed.

MiGRA R CR0NE 10WNfU00-STATEOF MI0HMA COUNTY OF MONROE Ommisaio 2Notary0 3c

(, Notary Public

Enclosure 1 to NRC-11-0049 Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-306, Revision 2, "Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration" Evaluation of the Proposed License Amendment NRC-11-0049 Page 1 1.0 Description The proposed license amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) requirements in TS 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," by adding an ACTIONS note allowing intermittent opening, under administrative control, of penetration flow paths that are isolated. Additionally, the Traversing In-core Probe (TIP) system isolation would be added as a separate isolation Function utilizing an existing Required Action (Condition G) to isolate the penetration within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months rather than immediately initiating a unit shutdown (Condition H).

The changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Improved Standard Technical Specifications change TSTF-306, Revision 2.

2.0 Proposed Change The proposed change will add a NOTE to TS 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS, in which penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. An "S" is added to "NOTE" and the existing note becomes Note 2. The TIP system isolation will be added as a separate isolation Function (7) in Table 3.3.6.1-1, with Function 7.a, "Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low - Level 3", and 7.b, "Drywell Pressure -High." Table 3.3.6.1-1 pages will be renumbered from 4 to 5 pages in order to accommodate adding Function 7. This change will also revise the Actions of TS 3.3.6.1 by listing the new function numbers in the two Completion Times for Required Action A.1. Function 7 will be added to Surveillance Requirement (SR)

Note 2.c to allow delaying entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months when placing a channel in an inoperable status solely for performance of required surveillances.

Enclosure 4 provides a markup of existing TS Bases pages. These pages are being submitted for information only.

3.0 Background

On July 13, 2000, the NRC approved TSTF-306, Revision 2. Detroit Edison has reviewed TSTF 306, Revision 2, and has determined that the proposed changes and their justification are applicable to Fermi 2. This traveler revised TS 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," by changing the requirements for the two TIP containment isolation instrumentation functions. Previously, these functions had been included under Primary Containment Isolation Functions 2.a, "Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Level 3," and 2.c, "Drywell Pressure -High," respectively. The traveler also revised the Actions of TS 3.3.6.1 by listing the new function numbers in the two Completion Times for Required Action A.1. To be consistent with a similar note in TS 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVS)," the traveler also added a note to TS 3.3.6.1 Actions Table that states:

"Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls."

NRC-11-0049 Page 2 The current Fermi 2 TSs require a unit shutdown in the event of an inoperability of the TIP instrumentation. The proposed change would allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to isolate the affected TIP penetration flow paths.

4.0 Technical Analysis The addition of the note stating the penetration flow path may be unisolated under administrative control is appropriate since the instrumentation is a support system for Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) that already contain this allowance in TS 3.6.1.3. The addition of the note to TS 3.3.6.1 provides a consistency with TS 3.6.1.3. The administrative controls will ensure timely closure of the penetration if an event occurs that requires isolating primary containment. This addition is viewed as a correction of an inconsistency within TSs.

Additionally, the Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation that require a unit shutdown is overly restrictive in the event the inoperability would only affect the TIP system isolation instrumentation. Creating a separate isolation instrumentation Function is appropriate for this isolation. The Action selected for inoperability of this Function is the same as for inoperable manual initiation of the isolation Functions for the Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation (i.e., isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ). The TIP system penetration is small bore piping and is isolated using isolation ball valves. The redundant TIP system isolation valves are manually initiated shear valves (i.e., squib detonation valves).

The ability to manually isolate the TIP system by either the normal isolation ball valves or the shear valves would be unaffected by the inoperable instrumentation. Therefore, the same action as for manual isolation Functions for the Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation provides an appropriate level of safety.

There are no significant deviations in the proposed License Amendment from the NRC approved TSTF. The following administrative changes have no effect on the technical information in the TSTF:

" Function 7 is added to Surveillance Requirement (SR) Note 2.c to allow delaying entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months when placing a channel in an inoperable status solely for performance of required surveillances. This is necessary because the Fermi 2 TSs use individual function numbers in the SR note.

" Table 3.3.6.1-1 pages are renumbered to a total of 5 pages. This is to accommodate adding Function 7 to the table.

The proposed change provides a significant benefit to the operation of Fermi 2, in that it serves to provide consistency between the requirements for equipment and the instrumentation that supports the equipment, and additional flexibility in the performance of maintenance and repair activities.

NRC-11-0049 Page 3 5.0 Regulatory Safety Analysis 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Detroit Edison has evaluated the proposed changes to the TS using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Description of Amendment Request: The proposed TS amendment would revise the TS requirements in TS 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," by adding an ACTIONS note allowing intermittent opening, under administrative control, of penetration flow paths that are isolated. Additionally, the Traversing In-core Probe (TIP) system isolation would be added as a separate isolation Function utilizing an existing Required Action to isolate the penetration within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months rather than immediately initiating a unit shutdown.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the Detroit Edison analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration using the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 is presented below:

1. Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated?

Response: No The addition of the note that the penetration flow path may be unisolated under administrative control provides consistency with what is already allowed elsewhere in TSs.

The isolation function of the TIP valves is mitigative, and does not create any increased possibility of an accident. Also, the operation of the manual shear valves is unaffected by this activity. The ability to manually isolate the TIP system by either the normal isolation ball valves or the shear valves would be unaffected by the inoperable instrumentation. The Required Actions and their associated Completion Times are not initiating conditions for any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed Change Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Accident Previously Evaluated?

Response: No No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as result of the proposed changes. All systems, structures, and components previously required for the mitigation of a transient remain capable of fulfilling their intended design functions.

The proposed changes have no adverse effects on any safety-related system or component and do not challenge the performance or integrity of any safety-related system. As a result no new failure modes are being introduced. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

NRC-l1-0049 Page 4

3. Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin of Safety?

Response: No The proposed change will not affect the operation of plant equipment or the function of any equipment assumed in the accident analysis. The allowance to unisolate a penetration flow path will not have a significant effect on the margin of safety because the penetration flow path can be isolated manually, if needed. This change provides consistency with what is already allowed elsewhere in TSs. The option to isolate a TIP penetration will ensure the penetration will perform as designed in the accident analysis. The ability to manually isolate the TIP system is unaffected by the inoperable instrumentation. The proposed change does not impact any safety analysis assumptions or results. Therefore, the proposed change does not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety Based upon the above analysis, Detroit Edison concludes that the requested change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, as set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), "Issuance of Amendment.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements The proposed changes have been evaluated to determine whether applicable regulations and requirements continue to be met. The proposed changes do not affect Fermi 2 compliance with the General Design Criteria.

Detroit Edison has determined that the proposed changes do not require any exemptions or relief from regulatory requirements, other than the TSs. The proposed changes associated with the adoption of TSTF-306 are consistent with NUREG-1433, which provides guidance on TS Actions and Completion Times when a Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO) is not met.

Based on these considerations, there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or the health and safety of the public.

6.0 Environmental Considerations The requested changes have no impact on the environment. The proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

NRC-11-0049 Page 5 7.0 Precedent The NRC issued license amendments for adopting TSTF-306, Revision 2, for:

1. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, dated July 23, 2010 (ML100470005)

2. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, dated May 10, 2006 (ML061070292)

3. Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, dated June 5, 2003 (ML031560495)

Enclosure 2 to NRC-11-0049 Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-306, Revision 2, "Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration" Marked-Up of the Existing TS Pages:

3.3-50 through 3.3-58a

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

ACTIONS S

--- ----------- -------------------- NOTE- -----------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for channels inoperable. trip. Functions 1.f, 2.a, 2.c, 7.a and 7.b 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for Functions other than Functions a, 2.c,

.. ........ -NOTE-----------

With a Table 3.3.6.1-1 B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Function 5.c channel capability.

inoperable, isolation capability is considered maintained provided Function 5.b is OPERABLE in the affected room.

B. One or more automatic Functions with isolation capability not maintained.

(continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-50 Amendment No. 134, 173

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion referenced in Time of Condition A Table 3.3.6.1-1 for or B not met. the channel.

D. As required by D.1 Isolate associated 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required Action C.1 main steam line and referenced in (MSL).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months E. As required by E.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

F. As required by F.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Required Action C.1 penetration flow and referenced in path(s).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

G. As required by G.1 Isolate the affected 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Required Action C.1 penetration flow and referenced in path(s).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

(continued)

No changes on this page FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-51 Amendment No. 134

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. As required by H.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required Action C.1 and referenced in AND Table 3.3.6.1-1.

H.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months OR Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition F or G not met.

I. As required by 1.1 Declare associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Required Action C.1 standby liquid and referenced in control subsystem Table 3.3.6.1-1. (SLC) inoperable.

OR 1.2 Isolate the Reactor 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Water Cleanup System.

J. As required by J.1 Initiate action to Immediately Required Action C.1 restore channel to and referenced in OPERABLE status.

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

OR J.2 Initiate action to Immediately isolate the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System.

No changes on this page FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-52 Amendment No. 134

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.... .... ...---- ------------------- NOTES------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to:

a. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for Function 5.a when testing non-redundant circuitry that results in loss of isolation capability associated with this Function, provided Functions 5.b, 5.c, and 5.e are OPERABLE;

b. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Function 5 (other than non-redundant circuitry of 5.a) provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Function 5.c provided Function 5.b is OPERABLE in the affected room; and

c. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 1, 2,Fad6, provided the associated Function maintains isolation capabili y; and

d. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for Functions 3 and 4, provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.3 Verify the trip unit setpoint. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months (continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-53 Amendment No. 134. 173

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.7 Verify the Main Steam Line Isolation 18 months on a Instrumentation DC Output Relays response STAGGERED TEST time allows the overall ISOLATION SYSTEM BASIS RESPONSE TIME to remain within limits.

No changes on this page FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-54 Amendment No. 134, 151

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 a...-'(page 1 of 5)

Table 3.3.6.1-1 Primary Containment Isoatlon Fnstrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Main Steam Line Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 z 24.8 inches Level -Low Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Main Steam Line 1 2 E SR 3.3.6.1.1 2 736 psig Pressure- Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Main Steam Line Flow- 1,2,3 2 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1 118.4 psid High MSL SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7

d. Condenser Pressure- 1, 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 7.05 psia High SR 3.3.6.1.2 2 (a), 3 (a) SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

e. Main Steam Tunnel 1,2,3 2 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 206*F Temperature-High trip SR 3.3.6.1.2 string SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

f. Main Steam Line 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 3.6 x full Radiation -High SR 3.3.6.1.2 power background SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

g. Turbine Building Area 1,2,3 4 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 206*F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

h. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve (continued)

(a) Except when bypassed during reactor shutdown or for reactor startup under administrative control.

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-55 Amendment No. 134

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 (page 2 of 5)

Table 3.3.6.1-1 Af Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Primary Containment Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 Z 171.9 inches Level-Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 Z 103.8 inches Level - Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Drywell Pressure--High 1,2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

d. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve

3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Isolation

a. HPCI Steam Line Flow- 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 410 inches High SR 3.3.6.1.2 of water with SR 3.3.6.1.3 time delay SR 3.3.6.1.4 z 1 second, and SR 3.3.6.1.5 s 5 seconds

b. HPCI Steam Supply Line 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 90 psig Pressure-Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. HPCI Turbine 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 20 psig Exhaust Diaphragm SR 3.3.6.1.2 Pressure-High SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

d. HPCI Equipment Room 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 162 0F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

e. Drywell Pressure- High 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 < 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

f. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve (continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-56 Amendment No. 134,

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 (page 3 of 5)

Table 3.3.6.1-1 Primary Containment Isolation itrentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

4. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation

a. RCIC Steam Line Flow- 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 95.0 inches High SR 3.3.6.1.2 of water with SR 3.3.6.1.3 time delay SR 3.3.6.1.4 Z 1 second and SR 3.3.6.1.5 s 5 seconds

b. RCIC Steam Supply 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 z 53 psig Line Pressure-Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. RCIC Turbine 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 20 psig Exhaust Diaphragm SR 3.3.6.1.2 Pressure- High SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

d. RCIC Equipment Room 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 162 0F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

e. Drywell Pressure- 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.88 psig High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

f. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve (continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-57 Amendment No. 134

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 a (page 4 of 5)

Table 3.3.6.1-116ea4-eV4 '

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Differential 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 63.4 gpm Flow - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Area Temperature - 1,2,3 1 per F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 183 0F High area SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Area Ventilation 1,2,3 (d) F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 530F Differential SR 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

d. SLC System Initiation 1,2 2(D) I SR 3.3.6.1.5 NA

e. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 Z 103.8 inches Level - Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

f. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve

6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

a. Reactor Steam Dome 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 95.5 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Reactor Vessel Water 3,4,5 2(c) J SR 3.3.6.1.1 z 171.9 inches Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve (continued)

Change double line to single (b) SLC System Initiation only inputs into one of the two trip systems. line, add "(continued)"

(c) Only one trip system required in MODES 4 and 5 when RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained.

(d) For Function 5.c, Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation, Area Ventilation Differential Temperature - High, the required channels is 1 per room FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-58 Amendment No. A34, 173

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 5 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

7. Traversing In-core Probe Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.1 > 171.9 inches Level -Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Drywell Pressure-High 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-58a Amendment No.

Enclosure 3 to NRC-11-0049 Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-306, Revision 2, "Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration" Revised (Clean) TS pages:

3.3-50 3.3-53 3.3-55 through 3.3-3.3-58a

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.

ACTIONS

NOTES------------------------------------

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for channels inoperable. trip. Functions 1.f, 2.a, 2.c, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for Functions other than Functions 1.f, 2.a, 2.c, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b

NOTE-----------

With a Table 3.3.6.1-1 B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Function 5.c channel capability.

inoperable, isolation capability is considered maintained provided Function 5.b is OPERABLE in the affected room.

B. One or more automatic Functions with isolation capability not maintained.

(continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-50 Amendment No. '4, 1-73

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to:

a. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for Function 5.a when testing non-redundant circuitry that results in loss of isolation capability associated with this Function, provided Functions 5.b, 5.c, and 5.e are OPERABLE;

b. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Function 5 (other than non-redundant circuitry of 5.a) provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Function 5.c provided Function 5.b is OPERABLE in the affected room;

c. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 1, 2, 6,and 7, provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability; and

d. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for Functions 3 and 4, provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.3 Verify the trip unit setpoint. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months (continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-53 Amendment No. 1AA, 173

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 1 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Main Steam Line Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 z 24.8 inches Level-Low Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Main Steam Line 1 2 E SR 3.3.6.1.1 2 736 psig Pressure- Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Main Steam Line Flow- 1,2,3 2 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 118.4 psid High MSL SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7

d. Condenser Pressure- 1, 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 7.05 psia High SR 3.3.6.1.2 2 (a), 3 (a) SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

e. Main Steam Tunnel 1,2,3 2 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 206*F Temperature-High trip SR 3.3.6.1.2 string SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

f. Main Steam Line 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 3.6x full Radiation-High SR 3.3.6.1.2 power background SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

g. Turbine Building Area 1,2,3 4 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 S 206*F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

h. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve (continued)

(a) Except when bypassed during reactor shutdown or for reactor startup under administrative control.

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-55 Amendment No. 434

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 2 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Primary Containment Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 z 171.9 inches Level- Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 2 103.8 inches Level- Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Drywell Pressure-High 1,2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

d. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve

3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Isolation

a. HPCI Steam Line Flow- 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 S 410 inches High SR 3.3.6.1.2 of water with SR 3.3.6.1.3 time delay SR 3.3.6.1.4 z 1 second, and SR 3.3.6.1.5 5 5 seconds

b. HPCI Steam Supply Line 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 90 psig Pressure- Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. HPCI Turbine 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 20 psig Exhaust Diaphragm SR 3.3.6.1.2 Pressure-High SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

d. HPCI Equipment Room 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 162 0F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

e. Drywell Pressure-High 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

f. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve (continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-56 Amendment No. 134,

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 3 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

4. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation

a. RCIC Steam Line Flow- 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 95.0 inches High SR 3.3.6.1.2 of water with SR 3.3.6.1.3 time delay SR 3.3.6.1.4 z 1 second and SR 3.3.6.1.5 s 5 seconds

b. RCIC Steam Supply 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 > 53 psig Line Pressure-Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. RCIC Turbine 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 20 psig Exhaust Diaphragm SR 3.3.6.1.2 Pressure-High SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

d. RCIC Equipment Room 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1620 F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

e. Drywell Pressure- 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 1.88 psig High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

f. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve (continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-57 Amendment No. 434

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 4 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Differential 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 63.4 gpm Flow - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Area Temperature - 1,2,3 1 per F SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 183 0F High area SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Area Ventilation 1,2,3 (d) F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 530F Differential SR 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

d. SLC System Initiation 1,2 2CD) I SR 3.3.6.1.5 NA

e. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 > 103.8 inches Level - Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

f. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve

6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

a. Reactor Steam Dome 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 < 95.5 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Reactor Vessel Water 3,4,5 2(c) J SR 3.3.6.1.1 > 171.9 inches Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve (continued)

(b) SLC System Initiation only inputs into one of the two trip systems.

(c) Only one trip system required in MODES 4 and 5 when RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained.

(d) For Function 5.c, Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation, Area Ventilation Differential Temperature - High, the required channels is 1 per room.

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-58 Amendment No. A.4 17-3

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 5 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

7. Traversing In-core Probe Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.1 z 171.9 inches Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Drywell Pressure-High 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-58a Amendment No.

Enclosure 4 to NRC-11-0049 Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-306, Revision 2, "Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration" Mark-Up Pages of the Existing TS Bases Pages:

B 3.3.6.1-3 B 3.3.6.1-5 B 3.3.6.1-12 B 3.3.6.1-14 B 3.3.6.1-23 B 3.3.6.1-23a B 3.3.6.1-23b B 3.3.6.1-27

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

MSL Isolation Functions isolate the MSL and MSL drain isolation valves. The MSL Radiation-High Function also isolates the Reactor Water Sample System.

2. Primary Containment Isolation Primary Containment Isolation Functions receive inputs from four channels. The outputs from these channels are arranged into two two-out-of-two logic trip systems. One trip system initiates isolation of all inboard primary containment isolation valves, while the other trip system initiates isolation of all outboard primary containment isolation valves. Each logic closes one of the two valves on each penetration, so that operation of either logic isolates the penetration.

Primary Containment Isolation Drywell Pressure-High and Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Functions isolate lines in the drywell sumps and traversing in core probe (TIP) systems. (TIP isolation is Function 7)

Primary Containment Isolation Drywell Pressure-High and Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Functions isolate lines in the Reactor Water Sample, Torus Water Management, Standby Gas Treatment, Combustible Gas Control, Nitrogen Inerting, and Primary Containment Monitoring Systems.

Primary Containment Isolation Drywell Pressure-High also affects isolation of lines in the RHR, CS, HPCI and RCIC systems. Primary Containment Isolation Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function also affects isolation of the Recirculation Pump Seal System and the Primary Containment Pneumatic Supply System.

3. and 4. High Pressure Coolant Injection System Isolation and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Isolation Most Functions that isolate HPCI and RCIC receive input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. Each of the two trip systems in each isolation group is connected to one of the two valves on each associated penetration.

The exceptions are the HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High, Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low, FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-3 Revision 38

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected to two two-out-of-two trip systems.

The Reactor Vessel Pressure-High Function receives input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. Each of the two trip systems is connected to one of the two valves on each shutdown cooling penetration.

Shutdown Cooling System Isolation Functions isolate the shutdown cooling isolation valves.

7. Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Isolation Function receives input from two reactor vessel water level channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected into one two-out-of-two logic trip system. The Drywell Pressure - High Isolation Function receives input from two drywell pressure channels. The outputs from the drywell pressure channels are connected into one two-out-of-two logic trip system.

When either Isolation Function actuates, the TIP drive mechanisms will withdraw the TIPs, if inserted, and close the inboard TIP System isolation ball valves when the TIPs are fully withdrawn. The outboard TIP System isolation valves are manual shear valves.

TIP System Isolation Functions isolate the TIP inboard isolation ball valves.

APPLICABLE The isolation signals generated by the primary containment SAFETY ANALYSES, isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the LCO, and safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure APPLICABILITY of valves to limit offsite doses. Refer to LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail of the safety analyses.

FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-5 Revision 0

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

This Function shares common instrumentation with the RPS.

This Function isolates the drywell sumps and TIP isolation valves. (TIP isolation is Function 7) 2.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 2 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed to be isolated post-LOCA.

FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-12 Revision 29

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

This Function isolates certain RHR, CS, HPCI and RCIC isolation valves, as well as groups of drywell sumps, TIP (TIP isolation is Function 7), Reactor Water Sample System, TWMS, Drywell and Suppression Pool Ventilation System, Nitrogen Inerting System, Recirculation Pump Seal System, Primary Containment Pneumatic Supply System, and PCMS isolation valves.

2.d. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the valve control.

One channel of the Manual Initiation Function per valve is available and required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the MODES in which the Primary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Systems Isolation 3.a., 4.a. HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Flow-High Steam Line Flow-High Functions are provided to detect a break of the RCIC or HPCI steam lines and initiate closure of the steam line isolation valves of the appropriate system. If the steam is allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor will depressurize and the core can uncover. Therefore, the isolations are initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for these Functions is not assumed in any UFSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks. However, these instruments prevent the RCIC or HPCI steam line breaks from becoming bounding.

FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-14 Revision 0

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation (i.e., Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path.

This Function isolates the RHR shutdown cooling isolation valves, as appropriate.

6.c. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

One channel of the Manual Initiation Function per valve is available and required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since these are the MODES in which the containment isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation 7.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-23 Revision 38

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can initiate an inadvertent isolation actuation. The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in each penetration.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

This Function isolates the TIP inboard isolation ball valves.

7.b. Drywell Pressure - High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment. The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded. The Drywell Pressure -

High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell. Two channels of Drywell Pressure - High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can initiate an inadvertent actuation.

The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in each penetration.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure - High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

This Function isolates the TIP inboard isolation ball valves.

FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-23a Revision 38

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

A-Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to primary containment isolation instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

A.1 Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for Functions 1.f, 2.a, 2.c, and 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for Functions other than Functions 1.f, 2.a, 2.c and 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 5 and 6) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases).

If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-23b Revision 38

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for plant operations personnel to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s).

G.1 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is acceptable due to the fact that these Functions (Manual Initiation) are either not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the UFSAR (Manual Initiation) or, in the case of the TIP System isolation, the TIP System penetration is a small bore (approximately / inch), its isolation in a design basis event (with loss of offsite power) would be via the manually operated shear valves, and the ability to manually isolate by either the normal isolation valve or the shear valve is unaffected by the inoperable instrumentation. Alternately, if it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could result in a reactor scram),

Condition H must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

H.1 and H.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, or any Required Action of Condition F is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-27 Revision 38

v t e Letter Sequence Request
TAC:ME7720, Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request Acceptance Administration Questions Answers Results Approval Other:
MONTHYEAR2012-01-18 [Table View]

NRC-11-0049, License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-306, Revision 2, Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration.

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NRC-11-0049, License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-306, Revision 2, Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration.

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