NRC-06-0044, Response to Request for Additional Information for Revision to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

Response to Request for Additional Information for Revision to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

ML062000313
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	07/12/2006
From:	Cobb D DTE Energy
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NRC-06-0044
Download: ML062000313 (24)

Text

Donald K. Cobb Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Generation Fermi 2 6400 North l)ixie lHwy., Newport, MI 48166 Tel: 73.1.586.5201 Fax: 7:34.586.4172 DTE Energy-July 12, 2006 10 CFR 50.90 NRC-06-0044 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington D C 20555-0001

References:

1) Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

2) Detroit Edison Letter to NRC "Proposed License Amendment to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," NRC-04-0006, dated March 19, 2004.

3) Detroit Edison Letter to NRC "Revision to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," NRC-05-0016, dated March 17, 2005.

4) Detroit Edison Letter to NRC "Revision to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," NRC-06-0001, dated January 31, 2006.

Subject:

Response to Request for Additional Information for Revision to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation" In Reference 4, Detroit Edison requested NRC approval of a proposed license amendment. The proposed change addresses an inconsistency that was inadvertently introduced during conversion to Improved Technical Specifications.

This letter provides revised pages to our request for amendment submittal (Reference

4) in response to a Staff request for additional information and clarification, dated May 2, 2006 and telephone calls of June 2, 2006 and June 21, 2006. Enclosure 1 of Reference 4 is revised by Enclosure I of this letter. The attached Enclosures 2, 3, and 4 replace Enclosures 2, 3, and 4 of Reference 4.

-A60o

USNRC NRC-06-0044 Page 2 provides marked up replacement pages for Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.6.1. Enclosure 3 provides revised TS pages. Enclosure 4 provides revised pages for the Technical Specification Bases (for information only). These changes are minor and do not result in any change to the No Significant Hazards Consideration determination.

TS 3.3.6.1 and TS 3.3.6.1 Bases that apply to this amendment request have been reviewed to ensure the use of the terms "area" and "room" are applied consistently and in accordance with Fermi 2 plant nomenclature.

There are no new regulatory commitments associated with this proposed change.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Ronald W. Gaston at (734) 586-5197.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:

1. Evaluation For License Amendment Request

2. Proposed Technical Specification Change (Mark-Up)

3. Proposed Technical Specification Change

3. Marked up pages of the existing TS Bases showing the proposed changes (for information only) cc: D. H. Jaffe C. A. Lipa NRC Resident Office Regional Administrator, Region III Supervisor, Electric Operators, Michigan Public Service Commission

USNRC NRC-06-0044 Page 3 I, Donald K. Cobb, do hereby affirm that the foregoing statements are based on facts and circumstances which are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

D. K. dobb '

Assistant Vice President Nuclear Generation On this /2 day of J -J,2006 before me personally appeared Donald K. Cobb, being first duly sworn and says that he executed the foregoing as his free act and deed.

1'otary Public KAMlNL ItE NOTARY PMUMO. STATEOFM COUMYOF&ROE cOn*CO* TO X S SV2011 ACTNGINOOJNYOF F4au-ýc

ENCLOSURE I to NRC-06-0044 EVALUATION FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST

USNRC NRC-06-0044 Page 2 The last paragraph on page 6 of Enclosure I of Reference 4 is revised to read:

Fermi 2 has diversity in its RWCU temperature isolation instrumentation in that Area Ventilation Differential Temperature - High and the RWCU Area Temperature - High monitor for a small leak in the same rooms. The reliability of the RWCU system isolation function remains high even in the presence of single or multiple failures of differential temperature channels because of diversity of the LDS for the RWCU A Pump Room, RWCU B Pump Room, RWCU Phase Separator Room, and RWCU Heat Exchanger Room. A steam leak will cause a coincident trip of both the differential and ambient temperature channels in RWCU A Pump Room, RWCU B Pump Room, RWCU Phase Separator Room, and RWCU Heat Exchanger Room. There is no diversity for the RWCU Open Trench Above Pump Room and RWCU Torus Room areas

ENCLOSURE 2 to NRC-06-0044 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE (MARK-UP)

TS PAGE:

3.3-50 3.3-53 3.3-58

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.

ACTIONS

................ NOTE ---------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for channels inoperable, trip. Functions 1.f.

2.a. 2.c.

and 6.b AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for Functions other than Functions l.f. 2.a. 2.c.

and 6.b B. One or e automatic B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Functions ca th ility capability.

isolation not maintained.

Note- -.-------...

-- (continued)

With a Table 3.3.6.1-1 Function 5.c channel inoperable, isolation capability is considered maintained provided Function 5.b is OPERABLE in the affected room FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-50 Amendment No. 134

'b.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Function 5 (other than non-redundant circuitry of Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 5.a) provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability. 3.3.6.1 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Function 5.c provided Function 5,b is OPERABLE in the affected room; SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

..................................... NOTES ....................................

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to:

a. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for Function 5.a when testing non-redundant circuitry that results in loss of isolation capability associated with this Function. provided Functions 5.b. 5.c. and 5.e are OPERABLE:

c 1.ý 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Functions 1. 2. 5 othes thn nn,redund*an* circitr. "f a and 6. provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability: and d -.- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for Functions 3 and 4. provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.3 Verify the trip unit setpoint. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months i

SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months (continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-53 Amendment No. 134

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 4 of 4)

Primary Contairmv-nt Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REWIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE VALUE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS

5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Differential 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 :s63.4 gpm Flow- High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SIR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Area 1.2.3 1 per F SR 3.3.6.1.1 " 1B3"F Temerature - High area (d) SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Area Ventilation 1.2.3 e F SR 3.3.6.1.1 " 53"F Differential SR 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

d. SLC System Initiation 1.2 2 (b) I SR 3.3.6.1.5 HA

e. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 x 103.8 inches Level - Low Low. SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

f. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA varver

6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

a. Reactor Steam Dome 1.2.3 I F SR 3.3.6.1.1

• 95.5 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Reactor Vessel Water 3.4.5 2(c) J SR 3.3.6.1.1

• 171.9 inches Level - Low. Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA (b) SLC System Initiation only inputs into one of the two trip systems.

(c) Only one trip system required in MODES 4 and 5 when RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained.

(d) For Function 5.c, Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation, Area Ventilation Differential Temperature - High, the required channels is 1 per room.

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-58 Amendment No. 134

ENCLOSURE 3 to NRC-06-0044 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE TS PAGE:

3.3-50 3.3-53 3.3-58

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.

ACTIONS

..................................... NOTE .....................................

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for channels inoperable, trip. Functions 1.f, 2.a, 2.c, and 6.b AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for Functions other than Functions 1.f, 2.a, 2.c, and 6.b

........... NOTE ...........

With a Table 3.3.6.1-1 B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Function 5.c channel capability.

inoperable, isolation capability is considered maintained provided Function 5.b is OPERABLE in the affected room.

B. One or more automatic Functions with isolation capability not maintained.

(continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-50 Amendment No. AýA,

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

NOTES ------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to:

a. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for Function 5.a when testing non-redundant circuitry that results in loss of isolation capability associated with this Function, provided Functions 5.b, 5.c, and 5.e are OPERABLE;

b. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Function 5 (other than non-redundant circuitry of 5.a) provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Function 5.c provided Function 5.b is OPERABLE in the affected room;

c. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Functions 1, 2, and 6, provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability; and

d. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for Functions 3 and 4, provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.3 Verify the trip unit setpoint. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months (continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-53 Amendment No. XAý,

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 4 of 4)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Differential 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 63.4 gpm Flow - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Area Temperature - 1.2.3 1 per F SR 3.3.6.1.1 1830 F High area SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Area Ventilation 1.2,3 (d) F SR 3.3.6.1.1  : 53°F Differential SR 3.3.6.1.2 I Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

d. SLC System Initiation 1.2 2 (b) I SR 3.3.6.1.5 NA

e. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 2 103.8 inches Level - Low Low. SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

f. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 1 ýer G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA va ve

6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

a. Reactor Steam Dome 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1  : 95.5 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

b. Reactor Vessel Water 3.4.5 2(c) J SR 3.3.6.1.1  ; 171.9 inches Level - Low. Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5

c. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 1 ver G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA va ve (b) SLC System Initiation only inputs into one of the two trip systems.

(c) Only one trip system required in MODES 4 and 5 when RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained.

(d) For Function 5.c. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation. Area Ventilation Differential Temperature - High. the required channels is 1 per room. I FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-58 Amendment No. 2X

ENCLOSURE 4 to NRC-06-0044 PROPOSED REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGES (FOR INFORMATION ONLY)

INCLUDED PAGES:

B 3.3.6.1- 1 B 3.3.6.1- 4 B 3.3.6.1-19 B 3.3.6.1-24 B 3.3.6.1-25 B 3.3.6.1-29 B 3.3.6.1-32

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The primary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate primary containment Isolation valves (PCIVs). The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). Primary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a DBA.

The isolation instrumentation Includes the sensors, relays, and switches that are necessary to cause Initiation of primary containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) Isolation. Most channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a primary containment isolation signal to the isolation logic. Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters. The Input parameters to the isolation logics are (a) reactor vessel water level, (b) area ambient and differential temperatures, (c) main steam line (NSL) flow and radiation, (d) Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System initiation, (e) condenser pressure, (f) main steam line pressure, (g) high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core Isolation cooling (RCIC) steam line flow, (h) drywell pressure, (i) HPCI and RCIC steam line pressure, (j) HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure, (k) reactor water cleanup (RWCU) differential flow, and (1) reactor steam dome pressure. Redundant sensor input signals from each parameter are typically provided for initiation of isolation. The only exceptions are SLC System initiationn and RWCU differential flow. In addition, manual isolation of the valves is provided.

Primary containment isolation Instrumentation has inpu to the trip logic of the isolation functions listed bel

, RWCU differential temperature FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 -1 Revision 0

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) and Drywell Pressure -High Functions. These Functions receive inputs from four turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure and four steam supply pressure channels for each system.

The outputs from the turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure and steam supply pressure channels are each connected to two two-out-of-two trip systems. Each trip system isolates one valve per associated penetration.

HPCI and RCIC Functions isolate the HPCI and RCIC isolation valves.

5. Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low, Level 2 Isolation Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected into two two-out-of-two trip systems.

The Differential Flow-High function is derived from three non-redundant flow transmitters and a non-redundant flow summer. The output of the summer is fed to two trip units, the outputs of which are channeled through relays into two trip systems. One trip system isolates the inboard isolation valve, while the other trip system isolates the two outboard isolation valves.

SLC System Initiation Functions receive input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. Both channels are only input to the trip systems that isolates the outboard isolation valves.

The Area Temperature-High Function receives input from twelve temperature monitors, six to each trip system. The Area Ventilation Differential Temperature -High Function receives input from four differential temperature monitors, two in each trip system. These are configured so that any one input will trip the associated trip system. One of the two trip systems is connected to the inboard valve and the other trip system is connected to the two outboard valves on each RWCU penetration.

Insert 1 - 1 RWCU Functions isolate t RWCU isolation valves.

Either trip system isolates the RWCU system.

FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1- 4 Revision 0

Insert I The Area Temperature-High, and Area Ventilation Differential Temperature-High, Functions act together to provide protection from small leaks in the monitored areas and rooms of the RWCU system.

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 Area Ventilation Differential Temperature-High BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The Differential Flow-High Allowable Value ensures hat break of the RWCU piping is detected.

This Function isolates the RWCU isolation valves.

5.b.. S.c. Area and Area Ventilation Differential Temperature - Hi gh RU and aroa we'ntilation diffepronti -teempeecitturzm are Area Temperature-High rovided to detect a leak from the RWCU System. The isolation occurs even when very small leaks have occurred and is diverse to the., ........ ,wn,_,,, instrumentation for the hot portio of the RWCU System. If the small leak continues w isolation, offsite dose limits is not may inbe any taken Credit for these instruments Differential Flow High transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR, since boundin analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or 14SL breaks.

and ae etlte ifenalea signals are initiated from temperature elements that are located in the area or room that Is being monitored. Twelve thermocouples provide input to the Area Temperature-High

,six areas Function (two per arp*). Two channels per area are required tn hp nPFRAeRlZ_4ao sure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

Eight thermocouples provide input to the Area Ventilation Differential Temperature-High Function. The output of these thermocouples is used to determine the differential temperature in four rooms containing RWCU piping and equipment. Each channel consists of a differential

, four rooms te.-mper.,eP instrument that receives inputs from thermocouples that "e located in the inlet and outlet of the room cooling systsu and for a total of four available channels (one per room).

The Area and Area Ventilation Differential Temperature-High Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm.

These Functions isolate the RWCU isolation valves, as appropriate.

A note has been added to Table 3.3.6.1-1 for Function 5.c, RWCU Area Differential Temperature - High, clarifiying the required channels per room is one. Function 5.c has only one trip system per room.

FERPI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1- 19 Revision 0

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

(

B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

A.1 Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for Functions 1.f, 2.a. 2.c. and 6.b and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for Functions other than Functions l.f. 2.a, 2.c, and 6.b has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 5 and 6) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g.. as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation). Condition C must be entered and its Required Action i otaken.

! ua m As an ie i ea~i!ll Vent

......*Iie.iat il B-i * -F.r.F-L.

(-- fl i ;--

. l 1.

AMi-z-'t*

)

-Tfmprziture High in"trur*. .*t ii .o..rb- Ts 3,3.641.

CV11I i.shoul d-be antorod.

-B.

B.1 Required Action B. 1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic isolation capability being lost for the associated penetration flow path(s). The MSL Isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. The other isolation functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one FERMI -UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-24 Revi si on 21

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1

(

BASES ACTIONS (continued) trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the two PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path can receive an isolation signal from the given Function. For Functions l.a. l.b, l.d, and 1.f, this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. For Function I.c, this would require both trip systems to have one channel, associated with each MSL, OPERABLE or in trip.

For Functions 1.e and l.g, each Function consists of rwym)S of-areas channels- that monitor several locations Within a given area (e. ifferent locations within the main steam tunnel area). -refore, this would require both trip systems to r_m ohave one chnel per location OPERABLE or in trip. For r*ov-area *Functions 2.a, .b, 2.c, 3.b, 3.c, 4.b, 4.c. 5.e, and 6.b.

this would requ e one trip system to have two channels, ch OPERABLE or i trip. For Functions 3.a, 3.d, 4.a. 4.d,

5. , .d. and 6.a. is would require one trip system to have on hannel OPE LE or in trip. For Functions 5.b Iner2 _and 5.c, ea Functio consists of channels that monitor several differ t 4aea-arti . Therefore, this would require one channel per to be OPERABLE-&r- -- 4pp- (the (channels are not required to be in the same trip system).

The Condition does not include the Manual Initiation Functions (Functions l.h. 2.d, 3.f, 4.f, 5.f, and 6.c),

since they are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual, initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as allowed by Required Action A.1) is allowed. -45 am ,, .

'GE d*÷tn P 4 ic f-o hp ,inr fnr an inoper-ble RW.U Ar: -

• r-Egni tsdL dp*l"1jLlt n of Cond4tion BT heR a g;h

..han... .. af .. A,,t

'M*V', inDfferentie! Temperz-*tu Hi1gh 4s 4sp:conseý ývei" in~ this ct~t

.......... in.i r..iva reading 4 CoRd#itin S.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channel s.

Revision 21 UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-25 FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-25 Revision 21

Insert 2 As noted, with a Table 3.3.6.1-1 Function 5.c channel inoperable, isolation capability is considered maintained provided Function 5.b is OPERABLE in the affected room. There is diversity in the RWCU temperature isolation instrumentation in that Area Ventilation Differential Temperature-High and the Area Temperature-High monitor for a small leak in the same rooms. The reliability of the RWCU system isolation function remains high even in the presence of single or multiple failures of differential temperature channels because a steam leak will cause a coincident trip of both the Area Ventilation Differential Temperature-High and the Area Temperature-High channels in RWCU A Pump Room, RWCU B Pump Room, RWCU Phase Separator Room, and RWCU Heat Exchanger Room. There is no diversity for the RWCU Open Trench Above Pump Room and RWCU Torus Room areas.

Primary Contamient Isolation Inon B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (continued)

(Refs. 5 and 6) ass--Mtlon of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the galloance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) When n s .

Insert 3 SR 3.3.6.1._1 Pet f ance of the CHAMEL CHECK on every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of lnst -- ntton has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a awrison of the paraeter indicated on-one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assmmtion that instriznt channels montoring the same parameter should read ar Mately the same value. Significant deviations the nstruhent channels could be an indication of excessive instruent drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect ross channel failure: thus, it is key to verityIng the stnwuetation continues to operate properly between each CHWUEL CALIBRATIONI.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instruent uncertainties.

including Indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria. It may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside Its limit.

The Frequency Is based on operating experience that demonstratesichannel failure Is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal. but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCD.

SR 3.3.6.1.2 and SR 3.3.6.1.6 A ONI!EL FLHCIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the requ"ired contact(s) of a canel r6lay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL B 3.3.6.1-29 Revision 21 FERNI - hhilT FEIW - 2 UNrr 2 8 3.3.6.1-29 -Revision 27

Insert 3 Note 2.b clarifies that the isolation function is maintained for Function 5.c, RWCU Area Differential Temperature - High, provided Function 5.b, RWCU Area Temperature -

High, is OPERABLE in the affected area.

Primary Containment Isolation Instrunentation B 3.3.6.1 BASE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPOE TIME tests are conducted an an 18 month STANERE TEST BASIS. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience that shows that random failuirs of Instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are Infrequent occurrences.

REFERE1 CES 1. UFSR. Section 6.3.

2. UFSAR. Chapter 15.

3. NEDO-31466. "Tedmical Specification Screening Criteria Application and Risk Assessment,"

November 1987.

4. UFSAR, Section 4.5.2.4.

5. NEDC-31677P-A, 'Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BW Isolation-Actuation Instrumentation,"

July 1990.

6. NEDC-30851P-A Supplement 2i "Technical Specificationis Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation.' March 1989.

7. UFSAR, Section 7.3.

8. UFSAR. Section 6.2.

9. NEDO-31400. *Safety Evaluation for Eliminating the BW MSIV Closure Function and Scram Fuction of the KSL Radiation Monitor., Licensing Topical Plant Report for BWR.

10. NEDO.32291. "System Analysis for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements." January 1994; and Fermi-2 SER for Amendmen i.111, dated April 18, 1997.

11. NFD)O-32291-A. Supplement 1, 'System Analyses for The Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirement,' October 1999.'

I

'D~uiafs~ u~

W. Tochnicatl

,,MRl~S

• W CnacifkoatIens

.. ist n,'1- *7 te-P9 Th.

Sao B 3.3.6.1*32 Rei~Ision 21 FEJ~4I

• 1R~IT 2 FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-32 P,* st on 21