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! a UNITED STATES 5., NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g..... wAswmotow,o.c. 2oses l
November 4,1987 I .
Note To: Ray John -
REDRA,FT OF ERDS LEGISLATION Enclosed for your infonnation is a copy l l
of the ERDS legislation that was forwarded to j Congressman Huckaby yesterday.
i Felicia i
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8712230251-871210 PDR FDIA 4 -
SHOLLY87-737 PDR
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
I This Act may be cited as the " Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987."
SECTION 2. REQUIREMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM.
(a) IN GENERAL. --
(1) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall provide for the implementation of a nuclear power emergency response data system for the purpose of responding, in accordance with section 3, to a qualified nuclear power reactor emergency occurring at any commercial nuclear power re ictor.
(2) The data system shall enable the Commission to receive from a co1ner-cial nuclear power reactor such electronic transmissions of data as may be necessary for the Commission to carry out the incident response role described in section 3. Such data shall, with respect to the commercial nuclear reactor involved, include information on the condi-l tion of reactor system, the condition of the containment building,
- the monitored release of radioactive material, and relevant meteorolog-l ical conditions.
i (3) The Commission shall complete implementation of the data system not later than three (five) years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) ACTIVATION OF SYSTEM. -- Upon the implementation of the data system, the Eemmissien-shali-activate-the system-and-ensure-that-the system-functions centineensiy-with-eniy-such-deactivations-as-may-be necessary-to provide fer-maintenance-of-the-system or-improvements-to-the system (the data system shall continuously maintain a 24-hour electronic record of the data and the operator of each commercial nuclear power reactor shall, during a qualified nuclear power reactor emergency, activate the transmission of the stored and real time data by automatic electronic means to the NRC Operations Center.)
SECTION 3. INCIDENT RESPONSE.
(a) IN GENERAL. -- In the event of qualified nuclear power reactor emergency, the Commission shall --
l (1) monitor the data received as a result of the data system; (2) Assess the severity of the condition of any nuclear' power reactor :
involved in such an emergency; (3) assess the actions necessary to minimize any onsite and offsite conse-quences of such emergency; (4) assess the adequacy of actions by the operator with respect to responding to such emergency;
( (5) assess whether appropriate recommendations are being made with respect to offsite radiological protective actions; and (6) support the operator by making recommendations with respect to responses by the operator that are appropriate as a result of the assessments made under paragraphs (2) through (5).
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(b) LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORITY OF COMISSION. -- The Comission may not under this Act --
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(1) require any operator of a comercial nuclear power reactor to take any action recommended under subsection (a)(6); or (2) relieve such an operator of the responsibility to maintain the nuclear power reactor in accordance with applicable standards of safety.
((c) EXISTING AUTHORITY OF COMISSION. -- Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Comission under other provisions of law.)
SECTION 4. EXCLUSIVITY OF FEDERAL NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM.
(a) IN GENERAL. -- Except as provided in subsection (b), the data system imple-mented under section 2 shall be the exclusive such system in the United Stated. A State, or a public or private entity, may not implement any electronic data system that is --
(1) capable of transmitting the data described in section 2(a)(2); and (2) connected to any commercial nuclear power reactor facility.
(b) EXCEPTION FOR EXISTING SYSTEMS. -- With respect to any non-Federal electronic data system that is capable of transmitting the data described in section 2(a)(2) and that is connected to any commercial nuclear power reactor, any such system implemented before the date of the enactment of the Act may
' i continue to operate after such data and may operate independently of the data system implemented under section 2.
SECTION 5. AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION TRANSMITTED BY DATA SYSTEM.
(a) IN GENERAL. --
(1) Subject to subsection (b), the Commission shall, upon the request of any state which possesses electronic equipment capable of receiving transmissions of data described in section 2(a)(2) and within which any part of a commercial nuclear power reactor's emergency planning zone falls, continuously electronically transmit to such state, imme-diately upon receipt of the data inte-the-data-system, (at the NRC Operations Center) all such data received by the data system regarding such plant. The Commission shall determine the most practical manner by which to immediately transmit such data to such states. I l
(b) LIMITATIONS. -- l (1) The Federal Government may not pay any cost of providing data to a State under subsection (a)(1).
(2) A State, or a public or private entity, may not interfere with the incident response role described in section 3.
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SECTION 6. DEFINITIONS.
, For purooses of this Act:
(1) The term " commercial nuclear power reactor" means any comercial nuclear power reactor licensed by the Commission under section 103 or 104 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.),
(2) The term " Commission" means-the-Naclear-Regulatory-Eomission (in the event of an emergency, means the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission in whom all the functions of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission with respect to that emergency are vested in accordance with Reorganiza-tion Plan Number 1 of 1980. Otherwise the term means the Comission of five members or a quorum thereof sitting as a body, as provided by section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1242),
or any officer to whom has been delegated authority pursuant to section 161n of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 919).)
(3) The term " data system" means the nuclear power emergency response
- data system.
(4) The term " emergency class of alert" has the meaning given such term pursuant to regulations issued by the Commission.
(5) The term " general emergency" has the meaning given such term pursuant to regulations issued by the Commission.
(6) The term " site area emergency" has the meaning given such term pursu-ant to regulations issued by the Commission.
(7) The term " qualified nuclear power reactor emergency" means a determi-nation by the Commission's designated staff in accordance with the NRC's Incident Response Plan and procedures, or by the operator of a commercial power reactor, that an emergency class of alert, a site emergency, or a general emergency, is in progress with respect to the reactor.
SECTION 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriate such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act. l 1
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- SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER
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- .la"0!= masfjington. BC 20515 PUBLIC HEARING DATE AND TIME: OCTOBER 1,1987,10:00 a.m.
PLACE: Room 2218 Rayburn Building
SUBJECT:
H.R. 2683, Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Amendments H.R.1570, Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987 H.R. 3025 Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Consent Act Witnesses:
The Honorable Jerry Buckaby U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable Lando W. Zech Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555 PANEL Dr. Terry R. Lash Mr. Ronald E. Harris Director System Emergenc.y Planner Illinois Department Duke Power Company of Nuclear Safety Nuclear Production Department '
1035 Outer Park Drive P.O. Box 3318 Springfield, Illinois 62704 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 1
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AMERICAN NUCLEAR ENERGY COUNCIL 410 FIRST STREET, SE WASHINGTON, DC 20003 9903 (202)484 2670 towano M. Daws seESCENT September 29, 1987 The Honorable R1111p R. Sharp Chairman sith =ittee on Energy and Power Ccrmittee on Energy and Ctumerce U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I appreciate your invitation to subnit otzments for the record of the j h
s1-ittee hearing of C+4=r 1 en various nuclear legislation, includity {
H.R.1570, the Nuclear Power Dnergency ."ea r -ase Data System Act of 1987, H.R. l 2683, a bill to amend the Atmic Energy Act of 1954, and H.R. 3025, the Appalachian States low-Imvel Radioactive Waste Capact Consent Act of 1987. I s i
submit these written cxmnants on behalf of the American Nuclear Energy Cbuncil (ANEC) . We are joined in our catenants on H.R. 3025 by the Edison Electric 3 Institute (EEI), and the Utility Nuclear Waste Managenent Group (12MC) . l i
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As you know, Mr. Ronald E. Harris of Duke Power Ccrpany will testify on behalf of Duke Power ard ANEC at the 9!hw=1ttee hearing with r=9=ct to H.R.
1570. With this in mind, I plan to offer only brief ccrnents en the bill. In ;
short, the nuclear energy irdustry c5 poses H.R.1570 in its current form. Our major objection is the provision that reqtures continuous operation of the l energency res r ,ss data system (ERDS) when no =iAgurcy is in progress. The bill has moved far fran its original purpose, namely improving the quality of data transmission during an emergency at a nuclear power plant. Instead, trie bill takes a step towards NRC intervention in normal plant operations, which for the reasons given below, we believe is detrimental to safety.
The nuclear energy industry is =cisismi that the cx:ntinuous transmittal of plant data to NRC and the states during normal plant operations could lead to a weakening of the licensees' authority ard responsibility. Continuous data transmission to both NRC and the states could also result in confusion over proper regulation of nuclear power plants. Congress grandid the federal government exclusive authority over the safe regulation of nuclear power in the Atcmic Energy Act of 1954. Clearly, any dimunition of Federal preenption in the regulation of nuclear power would violate the provisions of the Act.
Although H.R.1570 does not interd to diminish the licensee rimispoisibility for safe plant operation, the practical effect of this bill could be just that.
Although we do support the sharing of all relevant information to the NRC ard the states in the event of an emergency, we do not believe the continuous data ,
transmission requirement will inprove a evcy response r=Philities. '
I With regard to H.R. 2683, we do have sme objections to section 4 of the '
I bill. ANEC believes that secticn 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 l
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( prwides an adequate framework for requiring reports of nonocupliance with NRC safety requirements or defects whicts oculd create substantial safety hazartis.
A well-established and well-understood reporting regime exists urder section 206 and the implementing NRC regulations (10 CFR Part 21); ard this regulatory regime fully satisfies the objectives of the Energy Reorganization Act. ANEC does not believe that NRC has advanced persuasive reasons for its prrpnaal to expand the scope of section 206. Moreover, there is no sound basis for the additicn of a further layer of reporting obligations whicti could prove to be even nere emplex and burdensene than section 206 initially proved to be after its enactment as part of the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act.
ANEC also questions the equity of legislation that would inpose a civil sanction on a firm for r is r.,rting without a finding of willful misconduct.
In short, ANEC does not believe that section 4 of H.R. 2683 will improve the process for the safe regulation of nuclear power. However, ANEC does support the three other sections of this legislation.
I would also like to offer ocuments on H.R. 3025, the #=1=hian States low-Imvel Radioactive Wasta Wriy Consent Act of 1987. As stated above, we ;
are joined in our e-nartts on H.R. 3025 by Fdimew) Electric Institute and the Utility Nuclear Weste Management Group. Under the Iow Imvel Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, states are accorded responsibility for the d4==21 of low ;
level nuclear wasta. The 1980 Act established a national system of ragional ocupacts approved by the Cbngress for the regional di===1 facilities. In view of the difficult constraints affecting wasta di===1, Congress extended the daadline for ocmpact development in 1985, through a program fourded on interim access to existing facilities, siting milestones, financial ircentives i such as surcharges and penalties, and state assistance. Seven conpacts were svirJ.tted in the 99th Congress ard later adopted as Title 2 of the Iow Imvel Radioactive Wasta Policy Amendments Act of 1985.
The nuclear energy industry is enceuraged by the significant progress made l'y the states to establish ocupacts and develop low level wasta sitas.
H.R. 3025 is an example of the progress made towards develognant of regional low level wasta sitas, and we support this igertAT. lagisistion.
The nuclear energy industry supports the states whict have assumed the responsibilities accorded to them through the Act. In addition, we encourage the states to sutanit Congressional ocupacts whidt may assure that siting milestones are met in a timely fashion and consistant with LINPA guidelines, an:1 which may assure the development of an efficient national system of low level wasta regional d4- = =1 facilities. The industry is prepared to assist states to meet the next siting milestone in January 1988.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to omnant on this legislation.
Sincerely,
, W l Edward M. Davis DO:jk t
l AIEIRACT OF 'IESTI!GY OF R. E. HARRIS CN H.R.1570 - NUCU%R POWER i DECENCY REKNSE DATA SYSITM ACT OF 1987 SUBCMETIEE CN DEGY AND 10WER I
OCIDBER 1,1987 The purpose of H.R.1570 is to improve the quality and timeliness of data transmission duri@ nuclear accidents in order to enhan energency response.
Urder the current system, data would be transmitted over telephone lines via voice ccreunication. H.R.1570 would establish a mardatory electronic data transmission system to replace the current system.
The NRC has taken steps to improve the current system and has established a voluntary electronic data transmission system. Sin e 1983, Duke Power and commonwealth Edison have voluntarily moperated with IRC in providing axess to utility data transmittal systems. In the event of an energency, these data systems would provide data to emergency operations facilities, the NRC operations center, and the states within a 10-mile energency planning zone of the affected plant could obtain this information frcn NRC. Utilities support the concept of improving data transmission durig emergencies.
The nuclear energy irdustry opposes H.R.1570 in its current form. Our major objection is the provision that requires continuous operation of the energency response data system (ERDS) when no emergency is in progress. The bill has roved far fran its original pugose, namely i@rovirg the quality of data transmission during an emergency at a nuclear power plant. Instead, the bill takes a giant step towards centralized NRC operation of nuclear power plants, which could jeopardize safe plant operation. We are very concerned that continuous data transmission during normal planc operations could weaken operator authority ard responsibility. The reason the continuous monitoring provision was added to the bill was to ensure that the NRC had pre-event data.
However, there are better ways to a w plish this objective.
H.R. 1570 contains several good provisions that should be incorporated in any system implemented by the NRC. In particular, the provisions in Section 4 regarding exclusivity of the federal ERN is very important. This provision is needed in order to pre /ent other entities fran establishirq separate and different requirements for an ERDS. Without federal pree @ tion provisions, the cost, ccraplexity, and confusion would become capletely unmanageable.
However, we do support allowirg states to have access to federal ERDS data.
H.R.1570 contains worthwhile provisions which properly describe the NRC's role during emergencies ard how the ERDS data should be used. The ERDG cannot possibly contain enough information for managirq the on-site aspects of an energercy, such as plant operation ard accident mitigation. These vital functions can only be perfomed effectively by persons on-site who have all relevant inferration such as which safety systems are available to operate.
The safe operation of nuclear power plants is best guaranteed by keepirg responsibility in the hands of plant operators. For this reason, an energercy response data system should be limited to nuclear power plant emergencies, not normal operations. The nuclear energy irdustry is concerned that an energency
, response data system withcut this limitation could umiermine safe operations.
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SN OF R. E. HARRIS ON H.R.1570 - NUCIZAR IOWER DERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTD! ACT OF 1987 BEIVRE THE U.S. HOUSE OF mtNIATIVES COMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMERCE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PCEER OCIDBER 1,1987 I. I!TTROIUCTION AND BACKGRCUND Mr. Chairnan, members of the sih3ttee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Ronald E. Harris and I am the System Energency Planner for the Nuclear Production Department of Duke Power Carpany.
I would like to provide the perspective of Duke Power Company and the American Nuclear Energy Council on H.R. 1570, the Nuclear Power Energency Response Data Systens Act of 1987. Mr. T. C. lt2hekin of Duke Power Cer1pany has previously i
testified on H.R.1570 before the Mcuse SnW_it and Err /ironment of the Carnittee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
As introduced, the purpose of H.R.1570 was to improve the quality and timeliness of data transmission durirg nuclear accidents in order to enhance energency response. Curmntly, the data is transmitted to the NRC from the 1 licensee by standard voice telephone communication. However, the NRC has
A established a voluntary electronic data transmission system in order to i@ rove both the quality and timeliness of data transmission. The NRC has testified that it expects the majority of licerm will participate in this voluntary program. I would like to -wd the lac for taking this important initiative to improve energency resr nse. -
It should be noted that since 1983 Duke Power and Commonwealth Edison have voluntarily cooperated with the NRC in providing access to utility data tranmittal systems. These systems would provide plant data in an emergency to emergency operations facilities, to the NRC operations center, and 'to the states within the 10-mile emergency planning zone of the affected plant. In the case of Duke Power we operate three nuclear stations in North and South Carolina. My testimony should be considered in the context of the history of voluntary utility cooperation with NRC.
II. NUCEAR DIERGY DUJSTRY FOSITION ON H.R.1570 The U.S. nuclear energy industry opposes this bill in its current form.
Our major objection is the provision that would require continuous operation of the energency remirr amie - data system (ER N) when no emergency is in progress.
The bill has moved far frca its original purpose, namely i@ roving the quality of data transmission during an wegcy at a nuclear power plant.
Instead, the bill takes a giant step towards centralized IRC operation of nuclear power plants, which we believe could jeopardize safe plant operation. Moreover, we do not believe the continuous data transmission requirement will improve the energency response capabilities of either licersees or the NRC.
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g We also feel that the benefits of havirq a single, mandatory ERM for all plants are not great and do not justify the substantial cost to be incurred both by the NRC and the licensees. However, we do support the sharing of all relevant infomation to the NRC and the states ard feel that the bill contains -
some good provisions that should be incorporated in any system implemented by the NRC. I would like to elaborate on each of these points.
III. ION-D'IFGENCY OPERATION OF 'IHE ERDS
'Ihe nuclear energy industry is concemed that the continuous transmittal of plant data to NRC arri the states durirq normal day-to-day plant operation could lead to a weakening of the licensees' authority and responsibility.
Also, some states might use this data inappropriately to usurp IGC's authority to regulate nuclear safety. Continuous data transmission to both the NRC and the states could result in confusion over proper regulation of nuclear' power plants. Corgress granted the federal governnent exclusive authority over the safe regulation of nuclear powur in the Atcnic Energy Act of 1954. Clearly, any dirunition of federal preenption in the regulation of nuclear power would violate the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Although H.R. 1570 does not intend to diminish the licensee responsibility for safe plant operation, the practical effect of this bill could be just that. If NRC and the states have on-line access to plant data 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day, 7 days per week, the potential is great for this data to be used inappropriately. There should be no concern about NRC already having adequate information to perform their day-to-day regulation of licensee activities. For example, each plant has one or more resident NRC inspectors who can walk into the control room at any time. 'Ihese resident inspectors are typically more knowledgeable of their I
, assigned plant and of the licensee's programs for ensurirs efe, normal operations than NRC officials at h a d?mMus.
The report from the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs stated that the purpose of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> operation of the EROS is to provide NRC '
a- to all data - includirg pre-energency data - which tac may determine is appropriate to fulfill its energency response functions. This data includer, plant parameters which prrvide information to indicate whether plant safety functions that are being acomplishai and to indicate the potential breach or actual breach of the barriers to fission product releases and to determi(e the i
ragnitude of releases of radioactive materials. The cccmittee was concerned that the }mc have access to data describirq conditions at the facility leadirg up to the accident. This goal can be achieved in a better way by requiring pre-energency data to be stored and rade available during an emergency. In fact, NRC guidance already provides for storage of pre-event data. In NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities, the N'iC recc= mends that the data acquisition system for the licensee emergency ,
operations facility provide data storage for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of pre-event "
I data and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of post-event data. The Duke Power data transmittal system already provides for at least 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of pre-e/ent data. Therefore, the bill need not require continuous, non-emergercy operation of the ERDS in order to ensure that pre-event data would be available.
Since pre-event data can be assurai through these and other means, the continuous monitoring requirement really has little to do wi2 emergency i response. An emergency response data system should be limited to qualified l nuclear power plant emergencies.
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i IV. COST VERSUS BENEFTFS O ' r EC DtDS ,
t Althcugh the ruclear energy industry supports providing all relevant s v' .
t 5 i information rw by the TRC and tbo states in the event of an emergency at a
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nuclear pcwer plant, we question whd, '.her the ben 9 fits of ERDS outweigh the
, costs. It r;hould be noted that not having an EFIS would not prevent the NRC ,
frtan havirq ama g plant data in an emergency. NRC's incident response.
plan for a major energency would involve serding a " site team" of about fif tyf
'>' (50) persons to the. vicinity of the plant. About 2'5 of these would go to the ;
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i licensee's near-dite e.nergency operaticos f'Jcility and about ten (10) persons sculd (A. to t%r technical support centar 'sc the plant site. Once the site
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team is in place, the NRC regional adminbtrator would be named the Director of Sitd4pt:. rations. In this mle, this pddson would be in charge of the NRC's incident response activities. Meanwhile, t'sa NRC operations center in
' x
, Bethec<,i, Maryla.*xi woulct have a support role. The>NRC site team would have s: 4 faergto-face contact with the licensee's emergency response personnel and i
wou1M have access to all information which would be availabib to b e licensee.
1 L%cause of this% w%i. of operation by NRC, the EPIS would not be a crucial r-city for ensur133 NRC accerm to plant data.
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Regardirn the cost, the Iw:Juirements for a single, nationwide ERDS will involve significant costs to the lj.cceseos in addition to the costs to the NRC. Accordirg to the Cory;essioria.11 Bucket f Office estimate, the ERDS would cost $7 million to develop and 'SO.5 million per year to maintain. This does e
s ,
not incltde the coat to NRC licensees to oevelop hardware and software to t
\\ intd dSce with the ERT . Depending upon' avsilable data pmcessirg capability fx <
and c.etatibility, g this cost cxmld be significant.
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2 Because of cur concerns for the ecsts and our recognhion of the L relativeJy small benefits, the nuclear energy industry does not support a sirgle, rardatory ERDS des!.gn. Instead, w Jugercist NRC pursue an ERDS that
! would utilize as tuch as psible the existing data transmittal capabilities el irds.vidual licensees. In our opinion, if a raw requirement for an ERDS is t-ary and justified it should tri acxxrplished through rulemaking by the NRC rac.*.r than thm:$s l legislation. '1he rulemakirg process would provide for analysis of the cost versus benefits unleen it is deternined that the new ruquirenent was r-ory to reet mininum standards of nuclear safety. The rule:rakirq process would also provide for a public notice ard ox1nent period.
V. EXCIDSIU.Tl OF 'IHE FEDERAL ERDS H.R. 1570 contains severf. good provisions. In pacticular, provisions in i Section 4 regardirq ex:c]usivity of the fe$eral ERT is v+.ty important. This i
provision is noxied 'o prtvent the pessihinty that othsr entities such as states and local governments would esuablish separate and different requirements for an ERDS. Withwt these federal preer.ption provisions, the ccce, cceplexity ard confusion could necome ccrpletely unmanageable. Hcuever, we do support the concept of allcuirg states to have access to the data in a federal ERDS. I VI. ROIZ CP THE NRC DURItG DERGE!CDE i
H.R.1570 contains worthwhile provisions which properly describe the NRC's role durirg energercies ard hcw the ERDS data should be used. The ERDS cannot possibly contain enough information for managirg the on-site aspects of
- an emergency, such ecs plant operation ard accident mitigation. These vital Amu..s
i l , furetions can only be performed effectively by persons on-site who have all ,
relevant information such as which safety systems are available to operate.
Such information cannot be transmitted by an ERDS. Also, on-site personnel are more familiar with plant design and its expected response to transients.
H.R.1570 properly states that the ERDS data should be used by NRC to monitor the li nsee's activities durig an emergency. The lac has an ir.portant role in eme. w response. However, operational authority should always remain in the hands of licensees. The safe operation of nuclear power plants is best guaranteed by maintaini g res- r usibility in the hands of lac licensees.
VII. SLM RRY In sunnary, the nuclear energy industry supports the concept of providing the NRC and the states electronic access to plant data during a qualified energency. However, we do not support H.R. 1570 in its current form for several reasons. Most important is the provision requiring continuous, non-energency ogeration of the proposed ERDS. This could have the unintended effect of weakening lice.nsee authority for normal plant operations. We are concerned that any dimunition of operator responsibility could jeopardize the safe operation of nuclear power plants. In addition, we are concerned that the sigle, nationwide ERDS design would involve significant costs which we not justified by the benefits.
l The House Ce mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs adopted a continuous 1
monitoring requirement out of concern that pre-event data was important to the smooth operation of ERDS. However, there are other ways to provide pre-event I
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a data that are more appropriate than continuous monitoring. I have outlined one such alternative in my testimony here today.
Continuous data transmission frtan 11oensees to the NRC will not improve l the emergency response capabilities of either the licensees or the NRC. An emergency response data system should be limited to qualified emergencies.
l Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
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,p STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY 1035 OUTER PARK DRIVE SPRINGFIELD 62704 (217) 785-9900 PARY t R. LASH O2nscion l
TESTIMONY ON H.R. 1570: NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY DATA SYSTEM ACT OF 1987 STATEMENT l OF
\
TERRY R. LASH, PH.D. -
DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY i
i before the '
SUBC0f1MITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE I
U.S. HOUSE OF REPPr.SENTATIVES i
October 1, 1987 f Washington, D.C.
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Good morning Mr. Chairman. My name is Terry K. Lash, and I am the Director of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS). I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and present coments on the H.R. 1570. I am accompanied today by Mr. Roy Wight, Manager of the Department's Office of Nuclear Facility Safety and Mr. Stephen England, the Department's Chief Legal Counsel. I will be presenting a brief oral statement after which we will be happy to answer any questions you may have. I request that my full written statement be incorporated into the record.
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The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety is one of only two cabinet level' ))
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state agencies dedicated solely to nuclear safety. Governor James R. Thompson created the Department by Executive Order following the accident at Three Mile l Island. One of our responsibilities is implementing the Illinois Nuclear Safety Preparedness Act. In that Act it was declared to be the policy of the State of Illinois "to protect the people of the State of Illinois against l
adverse health effects resulting from radiological accidents by establishing a 1 mechanism for emergency preparedness to mitigate the effects of such accidents." The Act authorized the Illinois Nuclear Safety Preparedness Program which consists of "an assessment of the potential nuclear accidents, their radiological consequences, and the necessary protective actions required to mitigate the effects of such accidents."
An amendment to the Illinois Nuclear Safety Preparedness Act in 1984 required owners of nuclear power reactors in Illinois to provide the Department with all system status signals which indicate operating power i
levels, initiate Energency Action Level Declarations, actuate accident a
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mitigation, and provide mitigation verification. The amendment further directed that signals were to be provided in a manner and at a frequency specified by the Department.
Before focusing on IDNS's :;ystem for monitoring nuclear power plants, I would like to make a few comments about the bill before you. Specifically, I would like to suggest three areas that should be improved to incretse emergency response capabilities of states and the ability of NRC to fulfill its responsibilities.
- 1. Preemption of State Data Links: Off-site emergency response is a state and local responsibility. I believe that the Department of Nuclear Safety Data Link (DDL) contributes greatly to the emergency response capabilities of the State and local governments in Illinois. We reconmend our program to other states. In my view, one of the weaknesses of H.R. 1570 is that it would preempt other states from implementing their own data links. It is unclear whether a system in which a state must obtain critical information directly from the NRC would be as effective as a system such as ours in which information is obtained directly from the reactor's computers. In a real accident, NRC personnel would be fully occupied in providing technical assistance to utility personnel as they attempt to bring the accident under control. It is unlikely that providing information to state and local officials would be an important secondary priority. By having an independent data link, state and local emergency response personnel can best fulfill their i
energency response role without depending on others to provide information.
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In the Interior Committee's mark up of H.R. 1570, language was added in Section 4(b) to create an exemption from the pre-emptive effect of the bill for existing non-federal electronic data systems. It is .:y understanding that this exemption was added to allow the Illinois system to continue. I believe this exemption is important to the health and safety of Illinois residents who reside near nuclear power plants. I appreciate the efforts that have been made to allow the Illinois system to continue. We are, however, concerned that Illinois' system is not fully protected, we have data links to all twelve licensed reactors in the State. H.R. 1570 would allow these data links to continue in operation. A second reactor at the Braidwood station is scheduled to load fuel in the near future. As nandated by the Illinois Nuclear Safety Preparedness Act, the State plans to install a data link to that reactor before fuel is loaded. I am concerned that if H.R. 1570 becomes law as presently written before the State data link to Braidwood 2 is operational, ,
1 that data link will be prohibited under the terms of Section 4(a). I do not believe this situation was intended and request clarification to protect the data link at Braidwood 2 and other reactors which may be constructed in Illinois in the future.
- 2. Need For 24-Hour Monitoring By State and NRC: As I will discuss in more detail, the DDL monitors key nuclear power plant parameters 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. This is essential for early identification of accident sequences which I
have the potential for off-site radioactive exposure consequences.
Coordination of emergency response actions by state and local governments is
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, complicated and can be time-consuming. Early identification of potential serious problems would save valuable time in the event of an accident, allowing emergency response personnel to provide optimum protection of the.
potentially affected population. An additional advantage of,24-hour nonitoring is that it assures that the system would be operable in a real accident.
Although the role of the NRC in responding to a real accident would be different from that of state and local governments, 24-hour nonitoring would also greatly enhance the value of an NRC data link. Without 24-hour nonitoring, valuable time could be lost in a real accident as data for the time period preceding the accident is analyzed. Furthermore, without the continuous testing of 24-hour nonitoring, the system might not function as designed once an emergency is declared and the system is activated.
- 3. Data Links Are Vital To Both The NRC And The States: I commend the NRC and Congress for considering an NRC data link. It should significantly improve the NRC's capabilities in the event of a real accident. ' Data links j
are also vital to states as they fulfill their emergency response f
J responsibilities in conjunction with local governments. By preempting other states from developing data links, H.R. 1570 would prevent them from taking a l
step which would optimize their energency response capabilities. If a state I must rely on the NRC for information.in a real emergency, critical time could be lost. Additionally, there is a greater potential for error as the number
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of parties in the chain of information increases.
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THE ILLINOIS PROGRAM The DDL is one part of a comprehensive program that is designed to achieve the goal of excellence in accident management and off-site consequence analysis. The Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA) and plant radiological effluent monitoring are other key parts of the program. IPRA prescribes the duties and responsibilities that would be taken by all respondents to a nuclear incident, thus enabling action to be taken quickly and efficiently. The plant radiological effluent monitoring equipment currently comprises on-line gaseous effluent isotopic monitors (3 stations) and pressurized ion gamma detectors positioned radially around each plant (7 stations). A liquid effluent monitoring system is currently being developed.
The DDL is a direct data link to each of the 7 nuclear stations and receives hundreds of key plant status signals every few minutes.
DDL DESIGN BASIS Excellence in accident management and off-site consequence analysis have been the motivation for the DDL design basis. These bases include 24-hour monitoring of each Illinois reactor, frequent updates of information, sufficient current information to support in-depth accident analysis and confirmation of actual and precursory challenges to radioactivity release barriers, historical data to support trending and, lastly, data communications equipment that assures high reliability and does not intrude upon into utility i
Computers.
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, 6-The DDL has as its primary objective the automated early determination of those accident sequences which have the potential for off-site radioactive exposure consequence. This objective had, as its origin, the~ accident'at Three Mile Island that demonstrated that the utility was both reluctant and slow to declare an emergency. A secondary objective is to minimize the need for telephone exchange of technical information with utility personnel who might otherwise be diverted from the inmediate responsibility of plant control.
To achieve these objectives, DDL has the capability to identify current symptoms of safety significant abnormal events, to determine whether utility.
actions to recover from abnornal events are successful and, in :he future, IDNS will be able to identify the outcome of significant possible abnormal events and associated off-site risks.
IDNS's DDL equipment includes sending and receiving statistical multiplexer, a dedicated data line connecting those multiplexer, a mini computer and high density Storage disk drives to store seven days of data.
IDNS selects, for DDL transmission, parameters normally available to control room personnel. The selected data which are received 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day include parameters from key safety systems, baseline reference data from power generation systems and secondary parameters used in confirmation and analysis. IDNS has also developed software that receives, trends, displays.
and provides for analysis of as many as 1750 parameters from each reactor.
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IDNS has developed utilizing the methodology tested during FFE-2 an integrated plan for continuous monitoring and notification of degrading reactor safety conditions for each of Illinois' nuclear reactors (13 total).
When fully implemented, challenges to the barriers of radiation will be annunciated thus alerting IDNS staff personnel who are on duty 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per ;
I day. The on-duty staff person will then notify the on-call IDNS Technical Analyst. The Technical Analyst, who is equipped with renote access to the IDNS computer system during off-hours, will analyze the event to determine significance. Once having determined that the event has potential for off-site radiological consequence, the on-call IDNS Executive will be notified.
The IDNS Executive will then further evaluate the situation and may elect to alert remaining on-call technical staff. Once alerted, the technical staff will advise the IDNS Executive as to further mobilization of the IDNS IPRA team. Included in the plan are provisions for assuring the reliability of the DDL. Because the DDL Data is monitored continuously, minor equipment and system deficiencies are discovered and corrected in a timely fashion before they become a larger problem. This monitoring provides much greater assurance l
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that the system will be available when it is needed.
It is important to recognize that program goals have controlled the IDNS DDL design requirements. For example, an elementary data link could involve simple modems, commercial telephone lines and minimal computer capability such as an IBM PC. This system could provide for continuous monitoring and ,
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detection of abnormal conditions. However, data reliability, number of plant variables, frequency of updates, in-depth analytical and predictive capability :
and I
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i trending would be sacrificed. IDNS's DDL design basis goas beyond this elementary monitoring capability.
t DDL CAPABILITIES As noted earlier, one of the objectives of IDNS's DDL is early determination of abnormal events with the potential for off-site radiation exposure. In June of this year, the Federal Government conducted its second full scale nuclear power plant emergency response exercise (FFE-II). IDNS used this opportunity to test the Zion DDL continuous plant monitoring model.
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The design basis for the FFE-2 model was the notification of degrading reactor conditions with the potential for challenge to the barriers to radioactive release. Those barriers are the fuel clad (first defense), reactor coolant system pressure boundary (second defense) and the primary reactor containment (final defense).
Parameters for fuel clad monitoring were selected from those made available for the particular exercise scenario (approximately 120 total). The 1
selection basis was those parameters that assured notification of actual or degrading fuel clad challenge conditions. Twenty-nine points were monitored including core exit temperature, hot leg temperature, cold leg temperature, reactor coolant sub-cooling, pressurizer level, reactor power, and others, 4
In those cases where direct indication parameters were not available, as ;
is often the case, it was necessary to relate current and historical information and deduce the challenge potential. For example, positive rate of
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change of a variable such as steam air ejector radiation level is a reasonable indication of steam generator tube rupture. Steam generator tube rupture accidents are a fuel clad challenge concern. Another example of the critical nature of historical data was pressurizer level. At one point during the exercise, safety injection systems had recovered level in a previously voided pressurizer. Historical data on pressurizer level alerted the technical staff to look for symptoms of a reactor vessel bubble which can result in a loss of pressure control and therefore challenge fuel clad integrity. Set points were conservatively selected and were combined in a way which assured early notification of degrading conditions. Once alerted to degrading conditions, the technical analyst used both current and historical data to further analyze the condition. Historical information assured that the analyst's conclusions from current data accurately correlated with pre-existing conditions.
Reactor coolant system pressure boundary and reactor primary containment parameters were selected en the same theme, i.e., analysis of those parameters which assured early notification of actual or degrading barrier challenge conditions.
The FFE experience clearly demonstrated that IDNS's DDL and software were able to provide notification of safety significant degrading conditions well in advance of the standard telephone notification procedure. In a real emergency, this additional time might have saved lives, i
Thank you again for the opportunity to present these comments. We would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY STATE OF lLLINOIS 1035 OUTER PARK DRIVE SPRINGFIELD 62704 (217) 785 9900 TERRY R. LASH DMECTOR l
TESTIMONY ON H.R. 1570: NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY DATA SYSTEM ACT OF 1987 STATEMENT OF .
i TERRY R. LASH, PH.D.
DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY before the i
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER COMMITTEE DN ENERGY AND COMMERCE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OCTOBER 1, 1987 H.R. 1570 would preempt all state data links except for Illinois' existing system. A state data link would contribute greatly to the emergency response capabilities of state and local governments. The Illinois data link provides important information directly to emergency response personnel and eliminates the time consuming step of obtaining it orally from utility representatives.
H.R. 1570 should be clarified so that it does not prohibit data links at reactors in Illinois which are licensed in the future (Example: Braidwood 2).
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.l NRC is to be comended for proposing a data link. That data link should have 24-hour monitoring. Other states should not be preempted from having data j links as long as those data links do not interfere with the NRC's data link.
The Illinois data ifnk is part of a comprehensive program mandated by the Illinois General Assembly after the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. The l primary objective of the data link is automated, early determination of accident sequences which have the potential.for off-site radioactive exposure consequences. Asecondary objective is to minimize the need for telephone exchanges of technical information. To meet these objectives, 24-hour monitoring is essential. We believe that 24-hour monitoring would be an essential part of an NRC data link program.
l In June,1987, a full scale Federal Field Exercise (FFE-II) demonstrated that the Illinois data link and software are able to provide notification of significant safety-degrading conditions well in advance of standard telephone notification. In a real emergency, this capability could save lives.
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Telecon w/ Fred Combs on HR 1570 8:00am, Y cc. J. l Neb 8/19/87 i
Bill has been reported from Udall's Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
Based on conversations between Fred and Congressional staffers it vts.
their intent to have 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> monitoring but not necessarily 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> transmission. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> transmission to States will be expected if the State co desires. I'd nap Ad- A/R0 f St4Tes Mould have OR Eumt; noT W% > NT, t% %er neeas ctm4 m m % m ss % .
I made Fred aware of our three continuing concerns: Is continuous conitoring of data at the site OK or is 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> transmission required?
Transmission to all affected States will be difficult but not impossible.
The budget of $7 million stated in the legislative language is inadequate.
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The bill next goes to Phil Sharpe's subcommittee on Energy and Power, part of Dingle's Committee on Energy and Commerce. If it comes out of Dingle's committee different form the Udall version then the staffs will have to reconcile the two versions.
The bill would then go to the House rules committee to determine how it will be considered by the full House.
Then it would go to the Senate.
Fred will persue getting Phil Sharpe and staff including Sue Sheridan who has seen op Ctr, and Gejdenson and staff out to Op Ctr to talk with us about what we do, what we need, and our problems with the bill. -
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Lt Current ERDS Concept I i
Limited parameters set appropriate to role (typically 65).
Minimize impact on licensee. 1 1
Will accept data in licensee format.
Will accept data at licensee' frequency of updates.
May need some software to assemble data points. .q If equipment is needed to deliver data stream from licensee port.then '
the NRC will provide (e.g., MODEM).
Licensee will activate the data stream most likely at ALERT level.
Not intended to provide earlier data. i No flight recorder concept (earlier data provided by voice).
Access to the data would be provided, during an event, to states within l the Plume Exposure EPZ. ;
Implementation Status: '
Survey of licensee systems completed. A high availability of-data and computer capability was found at most facilities.
Proceeding with implementation based on voluntary licensee participation.
In final phase of selecting contractor to assist in implementation of the NRC portion of the system. Expect award in September 1987.
Implementation expected to take 5 years.
Effects of H.R. 1570 (Dated July 27,1987)
In general, the bill requires the implementation of an emergency data system that will provide to the NRC data on plant, radiological, and ,
1 meteorological conditions necessary for the NRC to perform it's incident response role.
I In several areas, however, the bill changes the current ERDS concept: 1 The bill requires implementation within 3 years after the date of enactment of the legislation.
The bill requires the ERDS.to be activated upon implementation and to function continuously except during maintenance.
The bill requires the NRC to continuously provide the data to any state within an EPZ (Plume or ingestion not specified) that .is capable of receiving the data. It is.left up to the NRC to 3 determine the most practical manner to do so.
The bill budgets $7 million for system implementation over three i years and 50.5 million for maintenance each year. This dollar amount is based on NRC's concept of ERDS, not the Bill's (continuous operation; extended to EPZ states).
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( The bill requires the ERDS to be activated upon implementation and to function continuously except during maintenance.
This modification can be interpreted to require either of two possible modifications. The first would require continuous monitoring of.. data '
at the site with transmission to the NRC Operations Center only in an emergency and the historical data transmitted at that time. The second would require the continuous transmission of data from all' sites to the NRC Operations Center at all times'with the capability of being monitored at the Operations Center. It is unclear if Congress would insist on either alternative but the Committee report states that the Commission-can best determine the most effective manner for collecting, storing, q receiving and monitoring the information transmitted through the data system. If the site monitoring and emergency transmission option is chosen, the current implementation contractor selection may be accept-able. with a modification to the scope of work. . If the continuous .
transmission option is chosen, the scope of work is changed so significantly that a new request for proposals would be necessary.
The bill requires the NRC to continuously provide the data to'any. {
state within an EPZ (Plume or ingestion not specified) that is capable j of receiving the data. It is left up to the NRC to determine the most practical manner to do so.
This presents a major new burden to the. system design. The previous g concept would have required for us to provide data access to up to {
three states during an emergency. This modification would require providing approximately 142 continuous data feeds if.every affected state wanted data on every unit within 10 miles or 224 continuous 'i data feeds if every affected state wanted data on every unit within 50 miles. Depending on our system design this could be done from our equipment at the site or from the Operations Center central system.
Given the option some states may not want a continuous feed of raw data from the site in favor of access to our processed data at the Operations Center in an emergency.
The bill budgets $7 million for system implementation over three years and $0.5 million for maintenance each year.
This is insufficient funding for any system that would meet the -
requirements of this bill. The previous estimate for a system with site monitoring and emergency transmission was $11.1 million.
and for a system with continuous transmission was $25.million.
Operation and maintenance for each of the systems was estimated at~
$1.1 million and $5.5 million respectively. Costs of providing data to the states was not included in these estimates but the bill specifically prohibits NRC from paying ^or that in any case.
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100ru CoNoarss ' ' Rurr.100-243 1st Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Part 1 ESTABLISHING AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM WITHIN THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION JULY 27,1987.-Ordered to be printed Mr. UDAE, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, submitted the following REPORT
[To accompany H.R.1570)
(Including the cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, to whom was re-ferred the bill (H.R.1570) to establish an Emergency Regulatory Commission, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the " Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987."
SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT OF NCCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM.
(a) IN GENT.RAL.-
(1) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall provide for the implementation of a nuclear power emergency response data system for the purpose of respond-ing, in accordance with section 3, to a qualified nuclear power reactor emergen-cy occurring at any commercial nuclear power reactor.
(2) The data system shall enable the Commission to receive from a commer. 1 cial nuclear power reactor such electronic transmissions of data as may be nec- j essary for the Commission to carry out the incident response role described in section 3. Such data shall, with respect to the commercial nuclear reactor in-volved, include information on the condition of reactor systems, the condition of the containment building, the monitored release of radioactive material, and relevant meteorological conditions.
(3) The Commission shall complete implementation of the data system not later than three years aner the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) AcrIVATION OF SYSTEM.-Upon the implementation of the data system, the Commission shall activate the system and ensure that the system functions continu-ously with only such deactivations as may be necessary to provide for maintenance of the system or improvement to the system.91-006
2 SEC. 3. INCIDENT RESPONSE.
(a) IN GENERAL. In the event of qualified nuclear power reactor emergency, the Commission shall-(1) monitor the data received as a result of the data system; (2) assess the severity of the condition of any nuclear power reactor involved in such emergency; (3) assess the actions necessary to minimize any onsite and offsite conse-quences of the (4) assess such emergency;f adequacy o actions by the operator with respect to responding to such emergency; (5) assess whether appropriate recommendations are being made with respect to offsite radiological protective actions; and (6) support the operator by making recommendations with respect to re-sponses by the operator that are appropriate as a result of the assessments made under paragraphs (2) through (5).
(b) LIMrrATIONs ON AttruoarrY OF COMMISSION.-The Commission may not under this Act-(1) require any operator of a commercial nuclear power reactor to take any action recommended under subsection (aX6); or (2) relieve such an operator of the responsibility to maintain the nuclear power reactor in accordance with applicable standards of safety.
SEC. 4. EXCLUSIVITY OF FEDERAL NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in subsection (b), the data system implement-ed under section 2 shall be the exclusive such system in the United States. A State, or a public or private entity, may not implement any electronic data system that 1s -
(1) capable of transmitting the data described in section 2(ay2); and (2) connected to any commercial nuclear power reactor facility.
(b) ExcErrioN ron ExisTrNo SYSTEMS.-With respect to any non. Federal electronic data system that is capable of transmitting the data described in section 2(aX2) and that is connected to any commercial nuclear power reactor, any such system imple-mented before the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to operate after such date and may operate independently of the data system implemented under section 2.
SEC. 5. AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION TRANSMITTED BY DATA SYSTEM.
(a) IN GENERAL,-
(1) Subject to subsection (b), the Commission shall, upon the request of any state which possesses electronic equipment capable of receiving transmissions of data described in section 2(aX2) and within which any part of a commercial nu-clear power reactor's emergency planning zone falls, continuously electronically transmit to such state, immediately upon receipt of the data into the data system, Mi such data received by the data system regarding such plant. The Commission shall determine the most practical manner by which to immediate-ly transmit such data to such states.
(b) LIMrrATIONs.-
(1) The Federal Government may not pay any cost of providing data to a State under subsection (aX1).
(2) A State, or a public or private entity, may not interfere with the incident response role described in section 3.
GEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this Act:
(1) The term " commercial nuclear power reactor" means any commercial nu.
clear power reactor licensed by the Commission under section 103 or 104 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.),
(2) The term " Commission" means the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(3) The term " data system" means the nuclear power emergency response data system.
(4) The term " emergency class of alert" has the meaning given such term pursuant to regulations issued by the Commission.
(5) The term " general emergency" has the meaning given such term pursuant to regulations issued by the Commission.
(6) The term " site area emergency" has the meaning given such term pursu-ant to regulations issued by the Commission.
(7) The term " qualified nuclear power reactor emergency" means a determi-nation by the Commission, or by the operator of a commercial power reactor,
I 3
that an emergency class of alert, a site area emergency, or a general emergen.
r cy, is in progress with respect to the reactor.
SEC.7. At, *THEORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act.
I. PURPOSE The purpose of H.R.1570 is to require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to establish, within three years, an electronic data system capable of instantaneously transmitting ' data from each large commercial nuclear power reactor to NRC headquarters.
This information is intended to aid the NRC in responding to emer.
. gencies at commercial nuclear power plants.
H. BACKGROUND AND
SUMMARY
OF H.R.1570 When an emergency occurs at a nuclear power plant, the Nucle-ar Regulatory Commission must be prepared to provide advice and support to the onsite operator, offsite state and local authorities and other Federal officials. The NRC is also responsible for keeping .
Federal, State and local officials and the general public' informed as to the nature and extent of the emergency The NRC's ability to fulfill its responsibilities during such an emergency is dependent upon both the quality and the timeliness.
of information received from the plant experiencing the.emergen-cy. At present, the information related to management of the emer .
gency is communicated by voice using a telephone to the NRC op-erations center at which NRC managers assembled during an emergency, During an emergency, experience has shown voice com-munication by telephone to a too slow and error prone. Faulty in-formation can result in loss of precious time during a nuclear emergency or cause NRC officiah to give inaccurate advice to onsite personnel and incomplete assessments and recommendations to other Federal agencies, and state and local officials.
Because of these data transmission difficulties, the NRC devel-oped and tested a data transmission concept called the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) as a supplement to voice-only phone communications. The ERDS system supplies accurate and timely direct electronic transmission of selected _ types of data necessary for the NRC to respond to an emergency. The ERDS system would focus on data in four areas: (1) the core and coolant system in order to assess the extent or likelihood of core damage; (2) the conditions .
inside the containment building to assess the likelihood of its fail--
. ure; (3) the release rates of radioactive material to assess the imme-diacy and degree of public danger; and (4) meteorological informa-tion to assess the distribution of radioactive release and their impact on the public.
H.R.1570 ca,ls for the NRC to establish an electronic data trans-mission system linking all commercial reactors to the NRC within three years of enactment. The system would transmit information the Commission determines is necessary to enable the Commission to effectively respond to 'an emergency at a commercial nuclear power reactor. This information would include data similar to that transmitted by the existing ERDS system including, but not limited to, information on the condition of reactor systems and the contain-l
4 ment building, the monitored rate of release of radio-active materi-i als, and relevant meteorological conditions.
Although the data system established under the Committee i amendment to H.R.1570 is intended to aid the NRC in responding !
to certain defm' ed emergencies at commercial nuclear power reac- l tors, and not in routine monitoring of plant operations, the data ;
system would operate continuously,24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. The purpose of J 24-hour operation is to give the NRC access to all data-including-pre-emergency data-which the NRC may determine is appropriate in fulfilling its incident response functions under H.R.1570. It is the Committee's intent that the NRC shall letermine the most effi-cient and effective manner by which the NRC would collect, re-ceive, store and monitor the data transmitted through the data system.
In the event of an emergency class of alert, general emergency or site area emergency (as those terms are defined by NRC regula-tions), the Committee amendment requires the NRC to perform certain functions. These functions include: monitoring data re-ceived through the data system; assessing the severity of the emer-gency and the actions necessary to minimize both the onsite and offsite consequences; assessing the adequacy of the onsite operator's actions and the recommendations for offsite radiological protective actions; and supporting the operator with recommendations based upon the assessment outlined above.
The Committee amendment does not grant any new authority to7 the Commission to relieve the onsite operator of responsibility or authority for the safe operation of the facility. The Committee amendment does not affect any other authority the Commission possesses to issue orders to the reactor operators, or to take what-ever actions the Commission deems necessary on the basis of infor-mation received through the data system.
The Committee amendment also provides for state access to the "
data system. It provides that any state which has electronic equip-ment capable of receiving the types of data to be transmitted shall have continuous access to that data, as it is received by the data system, for any commercial nuclear power plant any part of whose emergency planning zone falls within the state requesting access to the information. The Committee amendment gives the Commission discretion to determine the most practical manner for the NRC to continuously transmit the data, as it is received by ~ the data system, to the states requesting access to the system. The Commit-tee amendment also preempts any future state data systems con-nected to a nuclear power reactor facility unless the system is al-ready in operation on the date of enactment.
The Committee amendment does not contain any provision spe-cifically granting the Commission authority to issue rules and reg-ulations to implement the data system because the Committee be-lieves that the Commission already possesses such authority pursu-ant to section 161 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2201(b)). -
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5 III. EXPLANATION OF AMENDMENTS i
The subcommittee amendment The Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment adopted an amendment to H.R.1570 in the nature of a substitute. The Sub-committee amendment, in addition' to making numerous technical i changes, made two major substantive changes to'H.R.1570 as in - 1 troduced. First, the Subcommittee amendment clarified that state !
data systems existing on the date of enactment are exempt from the prohibition against future state systems that was contained in j
q H.R.1570, as introduced. The Subcommittee amendment also al- 1 lowed any interested state. access to data received through the NRC's data system. Second, the Subcommittee amendment restrict- .
ed operation of the system.to declared emergencies and routine testing of the system. H.R.1570, as introduced, would have allowed the NRC to require activation prior to a declared emergency. The full Committee considered the Subcommittee amendment in the nature of a substitute and, after adopting several amendments, ap- 1 proved it. An explanation of the changes made during Full Com- 1 mittee consideration follows:
{
24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> operation of the data system The Subcommittee amendment to H.R.1570 would have limited the operation of the data system to declared emergencies and nec-essary testing of the system. The Committee amended section 2(b) of the Subcommittee amendment to require that once the system is operational it remain on 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, not just during emergen-cies. The purpose of the Committee amendment is to give the NRC access to all data it may determine is necessary to perform its func-tions in the event of an emergency at a nuclear power plant. The Committee was concerned that activating the system only after an emergency had been declared would detract significantly from the usefulness of the system. Valuable information about conditions leading up to an accident could be lost. At Three Mile Island, for example, the reactor had been- severely damaged by the time an emergency was declared. Under the Committee amendment, in the -
event of an emergency the. Commission would have access to the data about conditions leading up to the emergency.
The Committee remains concerned, however, that the mere oper-ation of the data systems 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day not be construed to in any way lessen the licensee's responsibility for the safe operation of the facility. The existence of the data system does not in any way di-minish the licensee's duty to report incidents, occurrences or events which the licensee is required by law, rule or regulation to report to the NRC or any other entity.-
The information available through the data system may be used by the Commission in exercising any authority the Commission possesses pursuant to this bill, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the .
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 or any other law. The Commit-tee believes that the Commission can best determine the most ef-fective and efficient manner for collecting, storing, receiving and monitoring the information transmitted through the data system.
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Cost ofproviding data \
The Committee amended section 5(bX1) of the Subcommittee amendment which prohibited the Federal Government from paying the cost of providing to any entity information received through the data system. The Committee amendment prohibits the NRC from paying the cost of providing this data to the states, but allows the NRC to pay the costs of providing such data to public or pri-vate entities. This is intended to allow the Cominission, in its dis-cretion, to share such data with public or private research laborato-ries or consultants.
State access to data system information The Subcommittee amendment to H.R.1570 required the NRC to provide information received through the data system during a j qualified emergency to any state upon request. It was unclear, how- i ever, how a state would gain access to this information and which j' states would be eligible to receive information about which plants.
The Committee adopted two amendments dealing with state access to the system. In order to clarify technical ambiguities be-tween these two amendments and the amendment requiring. 24-hour operation of the system, the Committee's two state access amendment were combined into one amendment to section 5 of the Subcommittee amendment. The Committee amendment requires the NRC, upon the request of a state that (1) possesses electronic equipment capable of receiving data transmitted through the data system, and (2) is requesting information about a plant any part of whose emergency planning zone falls within the state, to continu-ously electronically transmit to the state, as the data is received by the system, all information about the plant collected by the data system.
The Committee amendment accomplishes three things. First, state access to information transmitted through the data system is limited to information about plants whose emergency planning zone, or any part of the zone, falls within the state requesting the information. Second, if a state possesses electronic equipment capa-ble of receiving the data transmitted through the data system and if the state so requests, the NRC must continuously, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, transmit data to the state as soon as the data is received by the data system. Finally, the NRC would determine the most prac-tical manner in which to immediately electronically transmit this data to the states.
Technical amendments The Committee considered and adopted five technical amend-ments to the substitute.
IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS Section 1 entitles the act the " Nuclear Power Emergency Re-sponse Data System Act of 1987."
Section 2 requires the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to develop and implement an emergency response data system within three years of enactment of this bill.
7 Subsection (aX1) requires the NRC to implement an emergency '
response data system to respond, in accordance with section 3, to
" qualified" nuclear power reactor emergencies as defined in section 6 (7).
Paragraph (2) describes the types of data which must be electron- i ically transmitted from commercial power reactors to the NRC.
This data would enable the Commission to perform the functicus described in section 3 and would include data on the conditions of reactor systems, condition of the containment building, monitored I
rates of release of radioactive materials and relevant meteorology- '
cal conditions.
j Subsection (b), as amended, requires the NRC, once the data system is implemented, to activate the data system and operate it continuously except for necessary maintenance or improvements.
Section 3 describes the Commission's functions in relation to the data system during a qualified nuclear power reactor emergency.
The Commission would be required to:
- 1. Monitor data received;
- 2. Assess the severity of the condition of the reactor in-volved; I 3. Assess the actions necessary to minimi2.e both onsite and offsite consequences of the emergency;
- 4. Assess the adequacy of the actions taken by the reactor operator in responding to the emergency;
- 5. Assess the recommendations being made as to offsite radi-ological protective actions; and
- 6. Support the reactor operator by making appropriate rec-commendations based on the assessments made under this sec- j tion.
Subsection (b) makes clear that under the authority of this bill, the Commission may only make recommendations to the licensee ,
but may not require the licensee to take any action recommended, I l
and may not relieve the operator of his or her responsibility to J maintain the reactor in safe operating condition. This provision re-garding the Commission's authority is only applicable to authority granted by H.R.1570. The Commission may take whatever action it deems necessary, based on information received through the data i system, pursuant to authority the Commission may possess under l
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5811 et seq.) or any other law.
Section 4 specifies the relationship between the data system es-tablished by H.R.1570 and the state data r stems.
Subsection (a) provides that the data system established pursuant 3 to H.R.1570 would preempt any future state data systems which
) would transmit data trom a reactor facility separately from the NRC data system.
Subsection (b) makes clear that any State or local data system which is implemented prior to enactment of H.R.1570 would not be preempted. This provision would allow data systems like the one now operated by the State of Illinois to continue to operate.
Section 5 provides the manner in which States and other entities may gain access to the data transmitted to the NRC by the data system.
8 Subsection (aX1), as amended, provides that any State which is I capable of receiving transmissions of the data system and which re-quests access to the NRC system shall be granted access to the data immediately upon receipt of the data into the data system, from any plant, any part of whose emergency planning zone falls within such state.
Subsection (aX2) allows the Commission to provide data received during a qualified emergency to other public or private entities as the Commission deems appropriate. Thus the Commission could provide such data to public or private research laboratories.
Subsection (bXI) clarifies that any costs incurred in providing in-formation to a State under subsection (aX1) could not be paid for by the NRC or any other agency of the Federal government.
Subsection (bX2) makes clear that no person or entity receiving information that the Commission has. received through the data system has any authority under this bill to interfere with the NRC's or the licensee's functions, during a qualified emergency or at any other time.
Section 6 defines certain terms used in H.R.1570.
Paragraph (1) defines " commercial nuclear power reactor" as any commercial reactor licensed by the NRC under section 103 or 104 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Paragraph (2) defines " Commission" as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Paragraph (3) defines " data system" as the nuclear power emer-gency response data system established pursuant to this bill.
Paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) defines " emergency class of alert",
" general emergency" and " site area emergency" as the NRC de-fines those terms in its regulations.
Paragraph (7) defines " qualified nuclear power reactor emergen-cy" as a determination by the NRC or the operator of a reactor that an emergency class of alert, a site area emergency or a gener-al emergency is in progress at a reactor.
Section 7 authorizes appropriations of such funds as may be nec- !
essary to implement H.R.1570. I V. COMMTPTEE ACTION AND RECOMMENDATION On May 7,1987, the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environ-ment held a hearing on H.R.1570. The Subcommittee considered the bill on June 18,1987 and, by voice vote, adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The full Committee considered the bill, and ordered it reported, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by voice vote on July 1,1987.
VI. INFLATIONARY IMPACT, COST AND BUDGET ACT COMPLIANCE The Committee finds that H.R.1570 will have no significant in-flationary impact on the national economy. The NRC is presently.
implementing an emergency response data system on a voluntary basis. H.R.1570 will require implementation of a similar system 1 within three years of enactment on a mandatory basis. The analy-sis of the Congressional Budget Office, which the Committee adopts ;
as its own follows:
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, ; 4 9 4 2 ;
I CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
- 1. Bill Number: H.R.1570.
- 2. Bill title: Nuclear. Power Emergency Response Data System 4 4
Act of 1987.
- 3. Bill status: As amended and ordered reported by the House Committee on Interior and Insular Anairs, July 1,1987. S
- 4. Bill purpose: H.R.1570 requires the ' Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission (NRC) to develop a continnoraly adivated automatic elec-tronic data transmission system to be used by the NRC in the event of an emergency at a commercial nuclear power reactor. The data transmission system would permit NRC personnel in Wash--
ington, D.C. to monitor conditions and support -the-activities of commercial reactor operators durin;; an emergency situation.' Cur-rently, NRC personnel rely mainly on telephone voice communin-tions during these situations. The ne,w system is to be implemented within three years after enactment 6f the bill. - . 1
- 5. Estimated cost to the Federal Government: f hk,
[By fasi ren. 3 mens of aanns] _
1988 1989 IkA ml 1992 Estnated atherizaten level .. 2.8 2.1 ~ 2.1 0.5 0.5 Estmated outlays 2.4 2.2 2.1 0.8 0.5 '
. l -]
The costs of this bill fall within budget function [270.
Basic of Estimates: CBO's estimate assumes th'at funds necessary for reimbursement of NRC fbr annual costs associated with the emergency response data system wE be appropriated prior to the beginning of each fiscal year.
Based on information supplied by the NCR, CBO expects that the initial costs of establishing the system will be approximately $7 million over three years. In addition, the system is expected to cost-approximately $0.5 million per year to maintein after implementa-tion. .
s
- 6. Estimated cost to State and local governments: None.
- 7. Estimate comparison: None.
- 8. Previous CBO estimata: None.
- 9. Estimate prepared by: Kim Cawley (226-2860). 5
- 10. Estimate approved by: James L. Blum, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. ,
1 5*'3 -
VII. OVERSIGHT STATEMENT The Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs h'as conducted 4' hearings on nuclear power plant safety for some time and will con- W ,t tinue to maintain oversight activities over the implementation of f this legislation. No recommendations sere . received by the Commit- 4 tee pursuant to Rule X. '-
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BACKGROUND J
son:Uednesday, July ), 1997,A$.e Comnittee on Interior and Insular Affairs 1 reported H.R. 1570, taefimergency Response Data Systems bill. The bill was cmended to require the ERLS to be activated upon ittplementation and to function continuously exck>t during maintenance.
The current Emergency Rov;&,0se Data System (ERDS) concept is a direct electronic data line from the electronic data systems of nuclear power facilities to the NRC Operations Center for use only during emergencies at the facilitied. The data to be transmitted would be a limited set of 'l parameters mogt likely available, on' the existing data computers at the l nites. NRC wouid accept thes.datM .in a transmission format and at an update frequency convenient to the'lienraea '
and the licensee would control activation of the system. ( ,
f The amendment to the bill can be interpreted to require two possible modification to the ERDS concept; The first,'which will be referred to as ERDS+, would require continuoud monitoring of data at the site with automatic initiation of transmission to the NRC Operations Center based on a licensee generated signal such as a Reactor Trip signal. The second, which will be referred to as the Nuclear Data Link (NDL), would require the continuous transmission of data from all sites to the NRC Operatiend Center at all times Etth the capability of being monitored at the Operations Center. .. ]
F .
The following analysis provides cost estimates for the various data transmission options described above. The ERDS implementation cost 3, ostimate reflects the current budgetary proposals. The implementation cost Lentimates for ERDS+ and NDL are based on comparison estimates dona in 1983-Yor the Commission andtCongress. As with any estimate of this type.the I larger and more costly the system the greater the margin for error. l 1
t COST
SUMMARY
gs g' % ;
L ERDS ERDS+ NDL V f. <
y, ,
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Implemhalation'
$5.7 million $11.1 million $25.0 million !
1 FTE 1 FTE 2-3 FTE i Operation N/A N/A $3 million/yr N/A N/A ' 7, FTE .
Maintenance $570K/yr $1,110K/yr $2,500K/yr tl '
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COS ESTIMATE Implementation 3 1
ERDS: The estimate for implementation of the'ERDS concept is $5.7 al311on over a five year implementation period. This includes NRC hardware, software, and contractor assistance. This does not include the effort by the licendees to modify their systems to output a data stream of the selected parameters to a modem for transmission to the NRC. This also does not include NRC FTE which is budgeted at one for the duration of implementation.
ERDS+: An estimate for implementation of the ERDS+ concept is $11.1 million. This includes NRC hardware, coitware, and' contractor assistance. This includes providing a " black box / flight recorder" data storage devien at the facility for storing and transmitting the recent historical data prior to the initiation of transmission. It is assumed that the licenses will provide a signal indicative of a Reactor Trip to trigger initiation of the transmission. Again, this does not include the effort by the licensees to modify their systems'to provide a data stream. This also does not include the NRC FTE required to monitor implementation.which could probably remain at one, NDL: An estimate for imp]cre,ntation of the NDL concept is $25.0 million. This includes NRC hardware, software, and contractor assistance. This ausumes continuous transmiresion from all the facilities with a procesaing, screening, storage, and display system for this dates at the NRC Operations Center.,This does not inclu6a the effort ts the Licensees to modify theirisystems to provide a continuous l data. stream. This does not include the NRC FTE required to monitor implementation which would probably be increased by one or'two.
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4 Operation:
ERDS: Normal operating costs of the ERDS are expected to be minimal.
Data transmission costs are anticipated to be able to be incorporated in the current NRC communications requirements. No additional continuous staffing of the NRC Operations Center l' would be anticipated to be required. ERDS activations would be expected to average ten or less per year (the number of declared Alerts at the facilities). 1 ERDS+: Normal operating costs of the ERDS+ would only increase slightly i over ERDS. Data transmission costs should also be able to be i accommodated by the current NRC communications capabilities. No !
additional continuous staffing of the NRC Operations Center would be anticipated to be required. ERDS+ activations would be !
expected to average 500 per year (the number of Reactor Trips ;
per year at all the facilities).
NDL: Normal operating costs of the NDL would require significantly more communications capability. Data transmission costs for approximately 100 dedicated lines operating continuously would ;
be about $3 million per year. Due to the continuous transmission i of data in this system the on shift staffing of the Operations l Center should be increased by one which requires an increase in I FTE of seven.
i Maintenance:
ERDS: System annual maintenance costs are estimated to be approximately 10% of implementation costs. For the ERDS concept this is $570K/ year.
ERDS+: 71,110K/ year.
NDL: $2,500K/ year.
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19 C b p u y h e.aC fo~ m a cC a ed u - * .
y 20 vec . it e e.- ,,, .' " e e- n .> a'y.
21 22 23 24 25 C h' m -* ** S 7""% m 4 wcow#4 .Ai ca /g
?3 27 o A v d e a-n a # Ec* ~'v.--, e, .v / /~9 /* C a <~ 4 et 4 **m 28 R} ~ ;;? A ,_ A . e., # . l c = ' cc = # ca 6 ##e- -
29 30 31 32 l
34 30 36 SFP 20768 Rev,46/761 g p yy e .
s s.
.)
j EUCKAB032 t9 18ted b o " "
AMENDMENT IN THE UR A SUBSTITUTE TO 0FFERED BY MR. HUCKABY Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:
1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
2 This Act may be cited as the Nuclear Power Emergency 3 Response Data System Act of 1987.
4 SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA 5 SYSTEM.
6 (a) IN GENERAL.--
7 (1) The Nuclear Reyulatory Commission shall provide 8 for the implementation of a nuclear power emergency 9 response data system for the purpose of responding, in ,
10 accordance with section.3, to a qualified nuclear power 11 reactor emergency occurring at any commercial nuclear i 12 power reactor. I 13 (2) The data system shall enable the Commission to 14 receive from a commercial nuclear power reactor such !
15 electronic transmissions of data as may be necessary for
~
16 the Commission to carry out the incident response role 17 described in section 3. Such data shall, with respect to 18 the commercial nuclear reactor involved, include
9
,' HUCKA8032
) -
2
- 1 information on the condition of reactor systems, the condition of the containment building, themofuhved re;.; cf d4A. swr 2
oS ra} wca kh!L tWOT.cb 3 ::ler e :f ;edietier., and relevant meteorological.
4 conditions.
5 (3) The Commission shall complete implementation of 6 .
the data system not later than three years after the date' 7 of the enactment of this Act.
8 G) ACT!VisiiGW G- $7;iG.-- 5 4 @ hT da q % 8 a b kG 9 (1) In the event of a quali ied nuclear er reactor 10 emergency resulting from a ommercial nue ar power l 11 reactor, the operator the reactor all activ e the 12 data system and tr smit to the C ission t data 13 described in su ection (a)(2 14 (2) The ommission may equire any operator of a 15 commere 1 nuclear pow reactor activate the data 16 syst for the pur se of carrying out scheduled testing 17 the data syst m.
18 SEC. 3. INCIDENT RESPONSE. ., , e 19 (a) I N G EN E R A L .--i.:p:T
. tr..n.ui
%' ;;t e, aicr.
V Ewi' c ? d.ca s y. u.;,
vi che 20 5:17.; a qualified nuclear power reactor emergency, the 21 Commission shall-- .
1 22 (1) monitor the data received _as a result of the data -
23 system; ,
24 (2) assess the severity of the condition of any i
25 nuclear power reactor involved in such emergency; i
i
P. 2 A
/
G/ J079 (6-29-87]
[H.R. 1570)
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. [1EJDENSON TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A $UBSTITUTE KEPORTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE Page 2, strike lines 0 through 17 and insert the following:
1 (b) ACTIVATION OF $YSTEM.--Upon the implementation of the 2 data system, the Commission shall activate the system and 1'
3 ensure that the system functions continuously with only such 4 deactivations as may be necessary to provide for maintenance 5 of the system or improvements to the system.
l a
l l
l s
EUCKAB032
- I 3
3 -
~!
1 (3) assess the actions necessary to minimize any .
~
2 onsite and offsite consequences of such emergency; ,
3 (4) assess the adequacy of actions by the operator-4 with respect to responding to such emergency; I
5 (5) assess whether appropriate recommendations are
.6 . being made with respect to offsite radiological )
7 protective actions; and 1 8 (6) support the operator by making recommendations 9 with respect to responses by the operator that are ;
10 appropriate as a result of the assessments made under 11 paragraphs (2) through (5).
12 (b) LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORITY OF COMMISSION.--The 13 Commission may not under-this Act---
14 (1) require any oper~a tor of a commercial nuclear 15 power reactor to take any action recommended under 16 subsection (a)(6); or 17 (2) relieve such an operator of the responsibility to 18 maintain the nuclear power. reactor in accordance with 19 applicable standards of safety. '
20 SEC. 4. EXCLUSIVITY OF FEDERAL NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY 21 RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM.
22 (a) IN GENERAL.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
23 the data system implemented under section 2 shall.be the _
24 exclusive such system in the United States. A State, or a 25 public or private entity, may not implement any electronic
(
l s
l EUCKAB032 l 4
1 data system that is-- 4 2 (1) capable of transmitting the data described in .
3 section 2(a)(2); and i
4 (2) connected to any commercial nuclear power =
-Pee ._0 5 reactor.
6' '. (b) EXCEPTION FOR EXISTING SYSTEMS.--With respect to any' i 7 non-Federal electronic data system that is capable of 8 transmitting the data described in.section 2(a)(2) and that 9 is connected to any commercial nuclear power reactor, any 1
10 such system implemented before the date of the enactment of 11 this Act may continue to operate after such date and may 12 operate independently of the data system implemented under-13 section 2.
14 SEC. 5. AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION TRANSMITTED BY DATA 15 SYSTEM.
16 (a) lN GENERAL.-- eu.ls.5 ft fu be Iqucqe. cdtcdid 17 (1) Sub t to subse on (b), the ommission sh 11, 18 upon the equest of State, pro Ide to the S te the .
19 data eceived by e Commissi through the ata system 20 ring a qua ied nuclea power react emergency.
21 (2) The Commission may provide data received by the 22 Commission through the data system during a qualified 23 nuclear power reactor emergency to such public and _
24 private entities as the Commission determines to be 25 appropriate.
I
l 1
9.4 CL 1
i 5
~
. yyn . .
r x- .., a AMENDMENT OFFERED BY Mr. Huckaby TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE KEPORTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE Page 4, strike lines 17 through 20 and insert the following new paragraph:
I, 1 (1)(A) Subject to subsection (b), the Commission 4 1
2 shall, upon the request of any State within the emergency 3 planning zone of a commercial nuclear power reactor, y j l
provide to the State all data received from such reactor i
4 5 through the data system during a qualified nuclear power (
)
1 j
6 reactor emergency occurring at any such reactor.
7 8 (B) If a State constructs electronic equipment 9 capable of receiving transmissions of data described in 10 section 2(a)(2), the Commission shall, upon the request 11 of the State, connect the equipment to the data system.
12 Throughout any period during which the data system is l l
13 activated for purposes of receiving such data from any commercial nuclear power reactor, any part of whose emergency i
14
~
15 planning zone falls within such State, the Ccamission shall i 16 continuously transmit such data to such State through the 17 electronic equipment..
l
_ m____._ _ _ _ _ _ _
1 l
. \
HUCKAB032 5
5 .~
l (b) l.!MITATIONS.--
l 2 (1 PONti) The Federal Government may not pay any cost ofw h E bse<. b @ ) O) 3 prerid gi ,,icdA e.d:: +o o_ 24cdt
- bacctica ':), data t 2 State :: te r 4 publie :: p.. ivete entii.y .
5 (2) A State, or a public or private entity, may not 6 . interfere with the incident response role described in 7 section 3.
8 SEC. 6. DEFINTIONS.
9 For purposes of this Act: -
10 (1) The term commercial nuclear power reactor 11 means any commercial nuclear power reactor licensed by 12 the Commission under section 103 or 104 b. of the Atomic 13 Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)
14 (2) The term Commission means the Nuclear j 15 Regulatory Commission.
16 (3) The term data system means the nuclear power 17 emergency response data system.
1 18 (4) The term eme'rgency class of alert has the 19 meaning given such term pursuant to re;s ta.tien setier s prempi r?.0. vu-g.fral h 20
+b niucte.4.~-50%efbLiLi.
appendi: ; v: y..e w M10,. 0:d Of T:d ::1 21 e;"1 = H er .
22 (5) The term general emergency has the meaning 23 given such term pursuant to r::5 e: Atas PA.. *of eyyendixWdh b tie: Pl. -
24 Godear- Q & k m w. ram.
cf p :t ;0 vu titre 10, coue v2 d= el Regelatier.:.
25 (6) The term site area emergency has the meaning j
l l
_ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ .I
HUCKAB032 I
6 1
given such term pursuant to re -sq(pk NI'J.C.P NM ___..
c.,f e go.:l $'i:: k: Y -
2 us r.M. .b. %. J !M. .. .,M. , ww t S5 9%_ ' .
wu c-uws.i nwyui m er.3. -
3 .
(7) The term qualified nuclear power reactor '
4 emergency means a determination by the Commission, or 5
by the operator of a commercial nuclear power reactor ,
6
. that an emergency class of alert, 7
a site area emergency, or a general emergency, is in progress with respect to 8
the reactor.
9 SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
10 11 There are authorizied to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act.
m O
y'..xud ' . = . ~ -.a. w..d%1 ~i.iEl .u1.a-.2.:.. L w.a ...aEl!A &..kk j -
1l ENCLOSURE 1 m _. A. EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS)
.1 PLANT FILES j .f.a
~
i A. BEAVER VALLEY
] 1. Miscellaneous Note, not do g
,, 2. Letter to F. Pavlechko fros J. B. Hickman, dated September 23, 1986.
q j B. BROWNS FERRY ij 1. Note to K. E. Perkins from D. collins, dated April 15, 1986.
.; 2. Letter to J. N. Grace from R. Gridley, dated March 25, 1986; subject:
Site Visit for Emergency Response Data System.
q;
, 3. Miscellaneous Note, not dated. '
l .
j C.. BRUNSWICK
'i" 1. Miscellaneous Note, note dated. *
- 2. Participant List for dates May 13-14, 1986.
- 3. Letter to B. Poulk from J. B. Hickman, dated May 5,1986.
) D. CATAWBA
- 1. Plant Data and Status Sheet, not dated.
, E. CLINTON l , E( S ,
' 1./ 1. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
~
- 2. Letter to T. Riley from J. B. Hickman, dated October 2, 1986. I
- 3. Letter to J. G. Keppler from F. A. Spangenberg, dated July 21, 1986,
. 'i subject: Clinton Power Station (CPS) Emergency Response Data System !
Data Parameters and Protocol. i
- 4. Miscellaneous Note, dated April 5, 1987. '
1 i F. COOK '
j 1. Participant List, not dated. i
,j 2. Letter to D. Loope from J. B. Hickman, dated August 27, 1986. I 1 .
.j G. COOPER
- 1. Cooper ERDS Survey, not dated.
H. CRYSTAL RIVER j C; 1. FPC/NRC Emergency Response Data System, dated June 24, 1986.
1 2. ERDS Requirements Analysis - Survey Plan, not dated.
- 3. Letter to J. Hickman from R. C. Widell, dated May 21, 1986; subject: ,
Crystal River Unit No. 3. Docket No. 50-302, Dperating Licensee No.
3 DPR-72, Site Visit for the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). j!
4 4. Miscellaneous Note, not dated. l
. . ,. n .
.-g i
8 y_t_.cy _- e_v 7 s== pv w== c e= - . .=- w r--~
- a'
{ _l
- i _*_l _ _'
yx. MLa. :x a.LJa..:.ah.u.uiu.m..;mi.&;Z.O%GsMULxw2.:ssadaudh@ -
W 1 .
I
- i. .x !
l ,id I. DAVIS-BESSE
, 1. Letter to J. Lietrau from J. 8. Hickman, dated September 22, 1986.
Letter to J. Lietrau from J. B. Hickman, dated August 5,1986.
2.
- 3. Letter to K. Perkins from R. P. Crouse, dated May 13, 1985.
J. DIABLO CANYON l l l 1 1. Participant. List and notes for dates April 24-25, 1986. 1
] 2. Letter to T. Mack from E.' M. Garcia, dated March 19, 1986. 1 i; K. DUANE ARNOLD 1
- .j 1. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
- 2. Table 2 - BWR Parameter List, not dated.
?q 3. Letter to S. Marshall from J. 8. Hickman, dated July 7,1986.
l . 4. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
1 -!
.1 3 L. DUKE 4 4
, 1. Participant List, not dated. j Y 2. Contact List for Duke ERDS, not dated.
J 3. Letter to W. H. Owen from E. L. Jordan, dated September 5, 1984. .
r 4. Memorandum for R. C. DeYoung from K. E. Perkins, dated August-14,1984; subject: Energency Response Data System Development Exercise d g(1 -)
j f July 19, 1984.
'i
- 5. Comments on ERDS Exercise with Duke, not dated.
H 6. McGuire Nuclear Station Plant Data and Status Inforention, dated )
1 July 19, 1984.
N 7. ERDS Exercise - McGuire, dated July 19, 1984.
j 8. Memorandue for S. Long from G. Rogers, dated June 21, 1984; subject:
4
- j July 19 Drill.
a 9. Memorandum for G. Rogers from S. Long, dated May 30, 1984; subject:
j Data List for July Exercise.
l a 10. Parameter / Data Point List for McGuire Exercise, not dated. i
- 11. Memorandue for S. Long from G. Rogers, dated May 24, 1984; subject: l
%j P0RY and Safety Status. i Ei 12. McGuire Nuclear Station Plant Data and Status Infomation, not dated.
d 13. Duke Presentation of DTS, dated May 18, 1984.
1,! 14. Duke /NRC Meeting on Data Transmission System, dated May la,1984. -3 2 15. Notes for Meeting with Duke Power Company, not dated. '
Ij 16. Memorandue for NRC/ Duke Power Meeting Attendees from E. L. Jordan, s dated May 17, 1984; subject: Highlights of May 8,1984 Meeting on l Ki Emergency Response Data System Development. j 1 17. Memorandum for multiple addressees from K. E. Perkins, dated May 15, j ,
Z 1984; subject: Exercise with Duke Power. ;
i l
] .~
M. FERMI l
L Ie Letter to J. Mulvehill from J. B. Hickman, dated August 5,1986.
f:
n y
a a) ;
J L
M-._____..___.,, .. . -- ,_ .
.m. m.. ,_ . _
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25s ; - a:gE -; lgt._ d.x.,,,;m Agati.;;sm.,w,;)J. a;gg,J6, g;,g.a. Ga2.,:d p
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4
)
'q ,
Ej .JY N. FARLEY g
i l 1. Letter to K. McCracken from J. B. Hickman, dated June 17, 1986..
- 2. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
]
O. FITZPATRICK
- 1. List of Attendees for NRC/ERDS Meeting, dated July 24, 1986. l Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
- 2. ,
Letter to A. Zarumba from J. B. Hickman, dated July 17, 1986.
3.
1 P. FT. CALHOUN
' t i
- 1. Ft. Calhoun ERDS Trip, not dated. i
- 2. Letter to R. L. Andrews from J. B. Hickman, dated July 23, 1986. ,
=:,
j Q. GINNA
, 'l, j 1. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
I 5 R. GRAND GULF l q . .
- 1. Letter to R. F. Rogers from J. B. Hickman, dated August 5,1986.
a f']. ..
S. HARRIS
- 1. Letter to A. Schnich from J. B. Hickman, dated No'vember 18, 1986.
j 2. Miscellaneous Notes dated July 18. l l T. KEWAUNEE 4
- 1. Letter to D. Nalepka from J. B. Hickman, dated October 28, 1986.
.]
y U. LACROSSE i.
- 1. Letter to R. Christians from J. B. Hickman, dated September 15, 1986. 'l O
a V. LaSALLE .I ii tl 1. Parameter Lists, dated December 2. i
, 2. LaSalle Exercise, dated December 2. l. I 3 3. Miscellaneous Note, not dated. !. I j 4. Miscellaneous Note, dated November 22, 1985.
M 5. Miscellaneous Note, dated November 18. l!
d 6. Letter to L. W. Ducheck from J. B. Hickman, dated November 29, 1985. ;
j 7. Letter to N. W. Wandke from E. L. Jordan, dated October 15, 1985. ;
N 8. Manorandum for J. A. Shields from K. E. Perkins, dated October 4,1985. j' h 9. Namorandum for K. E. Perkin from J. A. Shields, dated September 10, 1985. h,
- 10. Comments on ERDS Exercise with LaSalle, not dated.
- 4 _ 11. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
- [M,) 12. Letter to J. B. Hickman from J. C. Golden, dated June 27, 1985; subject
- i a (;y ERDS Test at the LaSalle Unit 1 Nuclear Power Station.
a 1
J, 4
a
~ .j
-_ _v ._ __ . _ = .
- bOid$kGiu : A 2 .. w w . w ..d w G n L G L:hbl.zs 3LJ K $n1AE G A.ii u; a
1 b
] ' , _., 2
} !b j j V. LaSALLE(Continued)
- 13. Note to John from Ray dated July 11, 1985. '
- 14. Miscellaneous Note, dated July 2. ;
.. i 15. Letter to J. B. Hickman from J. C. Golden, dated May 22, 1985; subject:
! ERDS Test at LaSalle Nuclear Power Station.
il 16. Miscellaneous Note, dated May 20.
- 17. Table 2, BWR Parameter List, not dated. I a 18. Miscellaneous Note, dated April 24, 1985. !
"{ 19. Miscellaneous Note, dated April 10. l
{ 20. Miscellaneous Chart, not dated. -
1 21. Note to K. Perkins from J. Hickman, dated March 5.
- 22. Memorandum for K. Perkins from C. J. Paperiello, dated March 12, 1985; subject: Request for Guidance Regarding Ceco Identified Concerns i Described in February 19, 1985, Meeting Report with Commonwealth i Edison Personnel.
- l l W. LIMERICK
- 1. Miscellaneous Not.a. not dated.
. 2. Note regarding Philadelphia Electric, not dated.
l 3. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
1
' l
, X. MAINE YANKEE
. : r'.T 'h
.! * (. ).
- 1. Miscellaneous Note, October 16-17.
j 2. Letter to J. Temple from J. Hickman, dated September 26, 1986.
- Y. MILLSTONE
- 1. Participant List dated November 12, 1985.
j 2. Hardware Configuration for 0FIS Data Transfer, not dated.
l 3. Letter to P. M. Blanch from J. B. Hickman, dated October 30, 1985.
j 4. Millstone Unit 2 Parameter Log, dated October 5,1983. )
l Z. MONTICELLO 3
1 1. Letter to B. Hill from J. Hickman, dated August 1,1986.
l] 2. ERDS Requirements Analysis, not dated.
1 A1. NINE MILE P0 INT q ,
': 1. Meeting Attendance Roster, dated July 22, 1986.
- 2. Plant Status Board Unit #1, not dated.
- 3. Plant Status Board Unit #2, not dated.
- l 4. Letter to J. Benson from J. Hickman, dated July 17, 1986.
j 5. Eles Requirements Analysis, not dated.
.!! -, Bl. OYSTER CEFEK l
)
[Qjl 1.
2.
Letter to R. Sullivan from J. Hickman, dated November 18, 1986.
P. B. Fiedler's address 3 !i
!i 3 i
._v==-=n_-_,,___n:_===_:==______:_ . ~ - ,, _
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-ca.a .;_.: . .. . m 1
J l .q , -r *p j ; 'd V _f C1. PALISADES d 1. Letter to D. Fugere from J. Hickman, dated August 28, 1986. j 2. Letter to John from D. Fugere, not dated. j D1. PALO VERDE
] 1. List of Participants, dated April 17-18, 1986.
- 2. Letter to Arizona Nuclear Power Project from E. M. Garcia, dated
, March 24, 1986. ~l d El. PERRY i o
i 1. Miscellaneous Note, dated September 9.
- 2. Letter to D. Hulbert from J. Hickman, dated August 14, 1986.
- 3. Letter to D. Hulbert from J. Hickman, dated Aurust 8,1986.
i . j t F1. PILGRIM
- 1. List of Participants, dated November 6,1986.
.; 2. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
., 3. Letter to C. Fuller from J. Hickman, dated October 2,1986.
t
. G1. POINT BEACH 73 ;
1
'V s'
- 1. Letter to S. Schellin from J. Hickman, dated October 27, 1986. l l
Hl. PRARIE ISLAND
- 1. Letter to K. Slingsby from J. Hickman, dated July 29, 1986.
- 2. EADS Requirements Analysis, not dated.
4 3. Miscellt.neous Note, not dated. 1 II. RANCHO SECO i
- 1. Letter to 8. Meyers from E. M. Garcia, dated March 20, 1986.
2 J1. RIVER BEND
- 1. Letter to W.- J. Cahill from J. B. Hickman, dated July 29, 1986.
- 2. ERDS Requirements Analysis, not dated.
j 3. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
- s Kl. ROBINSON q 1. List of Participants, dated May 15, 1986.
1
- 2. Letter to G. Honna from J. Hickman, dated May 5,1986.
- 3. ERDS Requirements Analysis, not dated.
g a
- r. _. L1. SALEM
/ g.17 d Qh 1. List of Participants, dated June 10, 1986. i 1 4
..e+., awe...%e. e w.get a- *es% s-- eae = t*wa-++ - - i I- O '-- I-
, , -, - - - ;u ,. ,..,-m . ,
, ,- c.
4 .. , - a$1AEA5s.$ Nss*JU $E r ,as,,Am.ba A>A Ll.,,.i. M a,41 s .. s h a.5he..imd Se' ,.LLOh E. 5li Y .bSLbs.d ]$ bes *S *U $
~
1
?
r.1 p 6-
+(, ;;n.
i G' L1. SALEM (Continued) J .i 2. ERDS Briefing for Licensees, not dated. l 3. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
- 4. Letter to C. A. McNeill from J. 8. Hickean, dated May 29, 1985.
M1. FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT -- ST. LUCIE - TURKEY POINT j 1. Miscellaneous Note, dated August 11, 1987. 3 2. Miscellaneous Note, not dated. . L! 3. Letter to R. Gouldy from J. B. Hickean, dated September 12, 1986. ] 4. Letter to D. Mothena from J. B. Hickean, dated May 29, 1986. i N1. SAN ONOFRE 1 i l j 1. List of Participants, dated April 21-22, 1986. , .; , 2. Miscellaneous Note, not dated. -
- 3. EADS Briefing for Licensees, not dated.
- 4. Letter to Southern California Edison Company from E. M. Garcia, dated '
March 24,1986. 1 1
- 01. SEABROOK
- 1. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
(r.A
. T j .
4 j Pl. SOUTH TEXAS l 1. List of Participants, dated August 26-27, 1986. ) 4
- Q1. SUP64ER j 1. Miscellaneous Note, dated May 6 and July 21.
f.
- 2. Letter to H. Donnetly from J. B. Hickman, dated August 5,1986.
R1. SURRY & NORTH ANNA l *
- 1. PWR Parameter Lists, not dated. l
. 2. Miscellaneous Note, dated April 15. i
- 3. ERDS Briefing for Licensees, not dated. !l
- 4. List of Participants, not dated. ' I
'~ i 5. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
- 6. Letter to J. Lee from J. Hickean, dated March 27, 1986.
i 7. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
- 8. Ad, " State / Local Computing," not dated. 1 g 9. Ad, "Va. Melds Tech for N-Alert Systes," not dated. l
.J l N ' S1. SUSQUEHANNA l Lj
- 1. Letter to USNRC from C. R. White, dated March 4,1987. '
- 2. Quality Tag - Data Transferred from Plant Computer, not dated.
(g) i .. 3. Range Checks, dated July 25, 1986. v A t)
' + - *' ID # Ol
,,,,.me-wew .un.e a.= e P hay %4 f W *ehqW gere geng.ogWyW ag_ae-- M. "
yms;ks%$dh& < wh--....a.la,:.w:w aaa;muL:a G.L.lalNIdik.uzcan d . j q n 'i "1 ... q .3
- 1 j
t.
%:}
- 51. SUSQUEHANNA (Continued) 4
-l 4. Time Lapse Checking, dated July 25, 1986. j 5. Stability Code Checks, dated July 25, 1986.
- 6. Miscellaneous Questions, dated June 19, 1986.
U 7. Specification Log, dated December 8,1986.
- 8. Miscellaneous Questions, dated June 19, 1986.
']; 9. Letter to C. Wike from J. Hickman, dated November 18, 1986. 1 10. Miscellaneous Note, note dated, d 11. Letter to C. Wike from J. Hickman, dated October 7,1986. j 12. Miscellaneous Note, dated June 4. J 13. Letter to 8. Kenyon from E. Jordan, dated December 17, 1984.
- 14. Letter to C. R. Wike from S. M. Long, dated December 13, 1984.
- 15. Miscellaneous Note, dated November 2. '
- 16. List of Participants, note dated.
- 17. Miscellaneous Note, datec October 31. ,
j T1. TROJAN j 1. Letter to J. Martin from 8. Withers, dated June 3,1986; sub. ject: Site Visit Concerning the Proposed NRC ERDS. i 2. Letter to Portland General Electric Company from E. Garcia, dated
- March 24,1986.
- c~ <
d
} U1. VERMONT YANKEE ; 1. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
V1. V0GTLE i .j 1. Miscellaneous Note, not dated. I W1. WNP i 2 1. Washington Public Power Supply System from E. Garcia, dated March 24, 1986. 9 XI. WATERFORD o ,
! 1. Letter to G. E. Wuller from J. B. Hickman, dated July 25, 1986. 'I a
I n Y1. WOLF CREEK i !
- 1. Participant List, dated October 6, 1986. t
] Z1. YANKEE R0WE y ; -] 1. Letter to L. French from J. Hickman, dated November 18, 1986.
- 2. Miscellaneous Note, not dated. ;l
- j ,q p:O Q
%9 '
e sa u.m_._.-.__._._~_,._..._.,,.....s...- _
_. :.:-.a. :...m. ;aau2h.sk$1.:azU2BGM s2:WWR.s f%::dhi2thdhhu &^..uE 1 . 9 1 < y li [ ,.... Nh t*/ Bl. IION 1 I (
- 1. Miscellaneous Note, not dated. '
l 2. Miscellaneous Note, dated April 29, 1987. 4" 3. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
- 4. Parameters by Critical Safety Function Group, not dated. !
- 5. Letter to J. Hickman from F. McManus, dated April 27, 1987.
j b
- 6. Letter to P. Tebbe from T. Blackmon, dated April 10, 1987. i
- 7. Parameters by Critical Safety Function Group, not dated. ,
)
- 8. Letter to P. Edgeworth from D. Schultz, dated March 25, 1987; subject:
1 Task Order No. 009, " Continuing Exercise Support to NRC Operations j f Center, Electronic Transmission of Plant Parameters Dutrng Exercise," under Contract No. NRC-05-86-170, entitled " Technical Assistance for i Emergency Response." .
;it 9. Memorandum for P. Edgeworth from R. F. Priebe, dated March . 11, 1987; subject: Contract for Technical Assistance for Emergency Response - , NRC-05-86-170.
1 10. Letter to R. Priebe from D. Schultz, dated March 4,1987;' subject:
.. Draft Statement of Work, Revised, for Task Order #9, Contract NRC-05-86-170. , 11. Note to John from Gary, dated February 12.
1 12. Miscellaneous Notes, not dated. I
- 13. Miscellaneous Notes, not dated.
- 14. Miscellaneous Notes, not dated.
, h, i ;
^
- 15. IDNS Points, not dated.
'a) ; 16. Table 1, PWR Parameter List, not deted.
1
- 17. Computer Point Identification, dated August 5,1985.
1 18. Miscellaneous Printout, not dated.
! 19. Miscellaneous Printout, not dated. ; 20. Miscellaneous Printout, not dated. 3 9 21. Note to K. L. Grasser/E. Fuerst, A. Miosi, R. Sorrentino from L. Duchek, i
- dated February 28, 1985; subject: Illinois Department of Nuclear i j Safety - Zion DATA LINK.
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1 ENCLOSURE 1 i E. ERDS -- HUCKABY BILL -- 1 i
- 1. Redraft of ERDS Legislation, dated November 4, 1987.
- 2. Miscellaneous Notes, dated October 1.
- 3. Public Hearing Announcement, dated October 1,1987; subject: H.R. 2683, !
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Amendments; H.R. 1570, Nuclear Power Emergency l Response Data System Act of 1987; H.R. 3025, Appalachian Sttes Low-Level ] Radioactive Waste Compact Consent Act.
- 4. Letter to the Chairman P. R. Sharp from E. M. Davis, dated September 29, l 1987. ,
S
- 5. Abstract of Testimony of R. E. Harris on H.R.1570 - Nuclear Emergency I Response Data System Act of 1987 Subcommittee on Energy and Power, dated October 1, 1987.*
- 6. Testimony on H.R. 1570: Nuclear Power Emergency Data System Act of 1987, Statement of Terry R. Lash, PhD. , dated October 1,1987.
- 7. Testimony on H.R.1570: Nculear Power Emergency Data System Act of 1987, Statement of Terry R. Lash, PhD. , dated October 1,1987.
- 8. Telecon with F. Combs on H.R. 1570, dated August 19, 1987.
- 9. Current ERDS Concept, not dated.
- 10. Establishing an Emergency Response Program Within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated July 27, 1987.
- 11. ERDS State Data Links, not dated.
- 12. Note to P. J. Rabideau from C. J. Heltemes, dated July 14, 1987; subject:
AE00 Cost Estimates for H.R. 1570.
- 13. Background, note dated.
- 14. Note to John, not dated.
- 15. Miscellaneous Note, not dated.
- 16. Miscellaneous Note, dated July 2,1987.
- 17. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 1570, dated June 17, 1987.
- 18. Memorandum for T. A. Rehm from E. L. Jordan, dated April 23, 1987; subject:
H.R.1570 -- The Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987.
- 19. H.R. 1570 Bill, dated March 11, 1987 (Mark up copy).
- 20. H.R. 1570 Bill, dated March 11, 1987.
- 21. H.R. 5192 Bill, dated July 17, 1986.
- 22. Statement of T. C. McHeekin on H.R. 5192 - Emergency Response Data System Act of 1986 before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Energy and the Enviornment, dated August 11, 1986.
- 23. Testimony of J. M. Taylor concerning H.R. 5193, The Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1986, dated August 11, 1986.
- 24. H.R. 5192 Bill, dated July 17, 1986.
- 25. Huckby Questions, dated August 8, 1986.
- 26. H.Rl 5192 Bill, dated July 17, 1986.
- 27. Memorandum for V. Stello from J. M. Taylor, dated July 10, 1986; subject:
Congressman Huckaby's Nuclear Data Link Bill.
- 28. Note to Ed from Ken, dated July 1.
- 29. H.R. (Bill), not dated.
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