ML20235K863
| ML20235K863 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1987 |
| From: | Wooldridge R TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC), WORSHAM, FORSYTHE, SAMPELS & WOOLRIDGE (FORMERLY |
| To: | Bloch P, Jordan W, Mccollom K Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#487-4528 OL, NUDOCS 8710050258 | |
| Download: ML20235K863 (162) | |
Text
] z9 L . m oconamoman WORSHAM, FORSYTHE, SAMPELS " kdotorunor TMtRTY.TWO HUNDRED,2OOI BRYA84 TowCR M O.SAMPELS SERTA WOOLD Rf DGe DAL!JLs, TEXAS 1 JOE A WO MAM SPENCER C, RELyg A
. RONALD M. MANSON TELEPHONE (214)S79 3OOO J. DAN SOM ANN AN OF COUNSEL TRAVIS E. VANDERPOOL JOS. lRION WORSHAM JUDITM M. JOMNSON bf NIN CARL A. FORSYTH E WChElrNG C3OrtM1 O v D C LON RGAN TELECOPIER;(214) 880= 000
'THOMA F L LLARD eMOTMV A. MACM ROBERT M. FILLMORE WM, STEPHEN BOYD 8
MARM R, WASEM CHRISTOPHER R. MILTENB ERGER ROBERT P. OLivCR RICHARD G MOORE NANCYE L. SETHUREM CECEL>A J. BRuNER JOE A, DavtS September 29,1987 ERec M PETERSON W ALT E R W. WHITE Peter B. Bloch, Esquire Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom Chairman Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 1107 West Knapp U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Stillwater, Oklahoma 74075 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Walter H. Jordan Elizabeth B. Johnson Administrative Judge Oak Ridge National Laboratory 881 West Outer Drive P. O. Box X, Building 3500 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Re: Texas Utilities Electric Company, et al (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2); Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50 446 'd
Dear Administrative Judges:
TU Electric has this date delivered to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the following SRT approved Results Reports:
II.e Rebar in the Fuel Handling Building V.a (Errata) Inspection f or Certain Types of Skewed Weldsin NF Supports DSAPIX Piping and Supports Discipline Specific Action Plan These reports should be piaced in sequence behind the tab " Civil / Structural" for !!.e; " Mechanical" for V.a (Errata); and "DSAP" for DSAP IX in the results reports binders previously transmitted. Also enclosed is a revised Table of Contents reflecting the issuance of these reports. As with all previous Results Reports issued to date, this material is not being offered into evidence at this time but provided for information only.
8710050258 0709291 PDR Respect [Ily submitte ,
C ADOCK 05000445 /
PDR '
Robert A. Wooldridge RAW /klw Enclosures hh cc: Service List
M MM Log # TXX-6809 L
_ d CPRT-1001
= = File # 10068 filELECTRIC wmi m c. courait September 29, 1987 Execut,ve Vuce Prwdent U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
! Attn: Document Control Desk l
Washington, DC 20555 l
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET N05. 50-445 AND 50-446 CPRT RESULTS REPORTS Gentlemen:
We transmit herewith the following SRT approved Results Reports:
II.e -Rebar in the Fuel Handling Building V.a (Errata) Inspection for Certain Types of Skewed Welds in NF Supports DSAP IX Piping and Supports Discipline Specific Action Plan These reports should be placed in sequence behind the tabs " Civil / Structural" for II.e; " Mechanical" for V.a (Errata); and "DSAP" for DSAP IX in the results reports binders previously transmitted.
The files that contain supporting documentation for these Results Reports have been reproduced in their entirety and are available for public inspection in our Dallas office. Anyone wishing to inspect these files should contact Ms.
Debra Anderson (214-812-4379).
We shall issue further Results Reports on a periodic basis as they are approved by the CPRT Senior Review Team.
Very t uly yours,
[ -
W. G. Counsil By: A [
G'. S. Keeley c~ /
Manager, Nuclear Licposing c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3) 4tv North Ohw Street LB BI Dallas, Texas 75201
s, TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 i
! ' ') . COLLECTIVE SIGNIFICANCE REPORT l
Later -
COLLECTIVE EVALVATION REPORTS
- Later -
RESULTS REPORTS Electrical 1.a.1 Heat-Shrinkable Cable Insulation Sleeves -
Revision 1 1.a.2 Inspection Reports on Butt-Splices, Revision i 1.a.3 Butt-Splice Qualification - Revision 1 I.a.4 Agreement Between Drawings and Field Terminations
- Revision 2 I.a.5 NCR's on Vendor Installed Amp Terminal Lugs
- Revision 1 l \
(_,) 1.b.1 Flexible Conduit to Flexible Conduit Separation
- Revision 1 1.b.2 Flexible Conduit to Cable Separation - Revision 1 I.b.3 Conduit to Cable Tray Separation - Revision 1 1.b.4 Barrier Removal - Revision 1 Civil / Structural II.b Concrete Compression Strength - Revision 1 II.c Maintenance of Air Gap Between Concrete Structures
- Revision 1 II.e Rebar in the Fuel Handling Building - Revision 1 n]
L
~
Testing III.a.1 Hot Functional Testing - Revision 1 Ill.a.2 JTG Approval of Test Data - Revision 0 Ill.a.3 Technical Specification for Deferred Tests
- Revision 0 ll!.a.4 Traceability of Test Equipment - Revision 0 III.a.5 Preoperational Test Review and Approval of Results, Revision 1 lll.b Conduct of the CILRT - Revision 0 ill.c Prerequisite Testing - Revision 1 Ill.d Preoperational Testing - Revision 1 Mechanical V.a Inspection for Certain Types of Skewed Welds in NF Supports - Revision I with Errata V.c Design Consideration for Piping Systems Between Seismic C.ategory I and Non-Seismic Category 1 Buildings.- Revision 1 V.d Plug Welds - Revision 1 V.e Installation of Main Steam Pipes - Revision i VI.a Gap between Reactor Pressure Vessel Reflective Insulation and the Biological Shield Wall, Revision 1 0
r.
V' g ')
\
QA/QC
)
I I.d.2 Guidelines for Administration of OC In3pector Test
- Revision 1 1.d.3 Craft Personnel Training - Revision i VII.a.1 Material Traceability - Revision i Vll.a.2 Nonconformance and Corrective Action System -
Revision 1 Vll.a.3 Document Control - Revision i Vll.a.4 Audit Program and Auditor Qualification -
Revision 1 vil.a.5 Periodic Review of 0A Program - Revision i Vll.a.6 Exit Interviews - Revision i VII.a.7 Housekeeping and System Cleanliness - Revision 1 Vll.a.8 Fuel Pool liner Documentation - Revision 1 VII,b.1
/ ,_h Onsite Fabrication - Revision 1
\~s/ VII,b.2 Valve Disassembly - Revision i VII.b.4 Hilti Anc. hor Bolt Installation - Revision 1 DSAPs IX Piping and Supports Discipline Specific Action Plan
- Revision 1 O
.b
,s.
t!
i.
'O COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM 4
RESULTS REPORT i
ISAP: II.e
Title:
Rebar in the Fuel Handling Building !
REVISION 1 i
l O
JM Isade Coordinator SM Dafe '
Reflew" Team Leade'r i
U h 8)
Date '
Y. _14 - Tf3l17 J p W. Beck, Chairman CPRT-SRT Date l
4 O !
i m - . - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - . - - _ - - _
~' l Ravision: 1 i
Pass. 1 of'25 RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.e Rebar in the Fuel Handling Building I
1.0 DESCRIPTION
OF ISSUE IDENTIFIED BY NRC 4
lasue II.e was identified in Supplement 8 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER-8) for the CPSES (Reference 9.1, page K-89) as follows: .)
{
Allegation AC-15 identifies a specific instance of the possible unauthorized cutting of rebar. In this case, a former Brown & Root employee stated he possibly drilled holes through rebar in a concrete floor without a component modification card (CMC) or a design change authorization (DCA). He explained that in January 1983 he drilled approximately 10 holes about 9 inches deep while installing 22 metal plates with a core drill. He said the metal plates were used to secure'the trolley process aisle rails located on the 810-foot, 6-inch floor level in Room 252 of the Fuel Handling Building.
The TRT inspected the trolley process aisle rails and its ,
anchoring system and observed no violations of project -'
drawings or specifications. The TRT reviewed the O reinforcement drawings (2323-S-0800 and 2323-S-0820) for the Fuel Handling Building to determine the location of rebar.
The drawing showed three layers of reinforcement in the upper part of the mat, which consisted of a No. 18 bar running in the east-west direction, in the first and third layers, and a No. 11 bar running in the north-south direction, in the second layer [See Figure 1].
The review of the reinforcement drawings (2323-S-0800 and 2323-S-0820) revealed that the it.yout of the east-west reinforcement and the trolley process aisle rails was such j j
that only one bar of the east-west reinforcement could be cut i by dril!ing holes for rail anchors. However, if 9-inch holes were drilled, both layers of the No. 18 reinforcing bar would be cut. Design Change Authorization (DCA) No. 7041 was written for authorization to cut the uppermost No. 18 bar at only one rail, but it did not reference the authorization to cut the lowermost No. 18 bar. The DCA (No. 7041) also stated that the expansion bolte and baseplates could be moved in the east-west direction to avoid interference with the No. 11 reinforcement running in the north-south direction. The information described in DCA No. 7041 was substantiated by Gibbs & Hill calculations. The DCA approval was based on the t understanding that only the uppermost No. 18 reinforcement would be cut. If the 10 holes were actually drilled 9 inches deep, then the allegation that reinforcement was cut without proper authorization may be valid.
- u. _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _.__ _ _____.__..__ _ . _ _
_ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - ~ - - - - - - . _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
... l Revision: 1 Page 2 of 25 RESULTS REPORT G ISAP II.e (Cont'd) 2.0 ACTION IDENTIFIED BY NRC The NRC (Reference 9.1, page K-91) indicated that the following action should be taken on this issue:
TUEC shall Provide:
- 1. Information to demonstrate that only the No. 18 reinforcing steel in the first layer was cut, or
- 2. Design calculations to demonstrate that structural integrity is maintained if the No. 18 reinforcing steel on both the first and third layers was cut.
3.0 BACKGROUND
The base mat (slab) at elevation 810'-6" of the Fuel Handling Building is approximately 5 feet thick with reinforcing steel (rebar) layers near both the top and bottom surfaces of the slab.
Reinforcing steel at the top of the slab consisted of three layers, No. 18 bar in the first and third layers, spanning east-west, and No.
1). 11 bar in the second layer, spanning north-south (see Figure To install a pair of rails, holes were drilled into the slab in order to insert Hilti bolts that would hold rail clips. This rail installation (which according to the operational traveler for this activity (Reference 9.2) actually occurred in September 1982, not in January 1983 as stated by the alleger) will be referred to in the following as "the subject case". It was alleged that in the subject case ten holes were drilled approximately 9 inches deep 3 inches deeper than required for the Hilti installation. Drilling to 9 inch depth may have resulted in cutting through both the 1st and 3rd layers of the east-west No. 18 reinforcing steel along a line next to the northern-most rail at the top of the mat.
Design Change Authorization (DCA) No. 7041. Rev. 7 (Reference 9.3) concerning of only the first drilling layerfor oftherebar.
subject installation authorized cutting The DCA required that the rail clips be so located in the east-west direction that cutting of the 2nd layer of (No. 11) rebar running north-south would be avoided.
A field inspection verified that the location and length of the Hilti bolts installed is such that rebar in both the let and 3rd layers could have been cut in several locations along the east-west line next to the northern-most rail (Reference 9.4).
Revision: 1 Page 3 of 25 RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.e g (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN 4.1 Scope and Methodology The objectives of this action plan were to:
i Assess the structural adequacy of the slab in the subject case.
Evaluate whether in other cases where cutting of reinforcement bar was authorized for the installation of Hilti bolts structural adequacy was compromised due to potential unauthorized cutting of additional bars. l l
The CPRT tasks. implemented to achieve these objectives are described in the following paragraphs. l Design calculations (Reference 9.5) were generated to evaluate structural adequacy of the concrete mat at elevation 810'-6",
assuming one No. 18 bar in the 1st layer and one in the 3rd layer are each cut along the east-west line Both bars were modeled as being completely ineffective (i.e., omitted) in the analysis.
Procedural controla governing rebar cutting for Hilti installation drilling as well as for core drilling were reviewed. The review focused on requirements for engineering authorizations and inspections of drilling as well as on craft procedures and control of rebar cutting equipment, j All cases from units 1 and 2 where rebar cutting was requested for installation of Hilti bolts were identified (Reference 9.6). The possibility of additional (i.e., unauthorized) rebar cutting was determined for these cases, based on the design reinforcement pattern in the slab or wall. An
- evaluation of structural adequacy (Reference 9.7) was performed by postulating that the additional rebar was cut in all cases for which the possibility for unauthorized rebar cutting existed. Ultrasonic inspection was conducted in some of these cases to verify actual installed embedded length of Hilti bolts (Reference 9.8).
In addition, following a review to identify other work processes in which rebar could have been cut, installations of pipe supports in units 1 and 2 that utilize shear lugs were investigated for the possibility of rebar cutting while drilling holes for the lugs (Reference 9.9).
O
Revisionr 1 Pags 4'of'25 RESULTS REPORT g ISAP II.e
(
%. (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)
A review of the NRC conclusions regarding the number of diamond drill bits that could have been used for unauthorized rebar cutting was performed. This also involved comparison of' the alleged unauthorized rebar cuts and the Project documentation on cut authorizations.
4.2 Participants Roles and Responsibilities The organizations and personnel that participated in this effort are described below with their respective scopes of work.
4.2.1 TUGC0' Nuclear Engineering (TNE) - Civil / Structural Discipline-4.2.1.1 Scope Prepared design calculations documenting the adequacy of the slab at elevation 810'-6".
[3 L/ -
Identified rebar cuts by review of all DCAs and CMCs, and evaluated cases where potential for unauthorized cuts existed.
4.2.1.2 Personnel Mr. C. R. Hooton TNE Civil / Structural
~
Discipline Supervisor Mr. D. G. Patankar Civil / Structural Lead Engineer }
Mr. S. A. Raz Structural Engineer 4.2.2 Gibbs & Hill (G6H) - Site Design Review Team 4.2.2.1 Scope Performed design review of calculations performed by TNE.
O
Revision: 1 Pags 5 of 25 RESULTS REPORT
,A '
( .- -
ISAP II.e
-(Cont'd) 4.0 TUEC ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) 4'2.2.2 Personnel Mr. B. Wilcoxson Design Review Group Supervisor Mr. B. K. Bhujang Structural Group Lead Mr. R. P. Shah Principal Engineer 4.2.3 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC)
Lead Contractor responsibility for this task was transferred by TU Electric from G&H to SWEC on October 13, 1986. After that date, SWEC participated in the execution of this action plan as described below.
4.2.3.1 Scope Assessed the extent of potential unauthorized rebar cutting by reviewing:-
- a. the diary of the foreman of the crew that performed drilling for most of the Hilti installations; this individual made allegations that unauthorized rebar cuts were made and documented in his diary;
- b. Project design change documents to determine whether the rebar cuts listed in the alleger's diary were or were not authorized; and
- c. Project documents to determine the number of diamond drill bits that are capable of cutting rebar and to n determine the total number of rebar )
at the plant.
4.2.3.2 Personnel i
f Mr. T. W. Houston Principal Structural f Engineer !
j j
.O: "'"""""' "" "" ' ' '-
Structural Division l j
e -_ - -- o
y Revision: 1 Pags 6 of 25 RESULTS REPORT l
}/"
.\
ISAP II.e l (Cont'd) 4.0 'TUEC ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) 4.2.4 Third-Party Activities 4.2.4.1 Scope Reviewed design calculations performed by TNE to verify adequacy l
of the slab at elevation 810'-6". '
Reviewed procedural controls for rebar cutting.
Reviewed Project identification and evaluation of Hilti installations-where potential for unauthorized rebar cutting existed.
Determined actual lengths of Hilti bolts by Ultrasonic testing for cases where rebar cutting was
, required for Hilti bolt installation and the possibility of additional rebar cutting exists.
Reviewed' Project evaluations of the total extent of potential rebar cutting.
Prepared Results Report.
4.2.4.2 Personnel Mr. H. A. Levin TERA - Civil /
Structural Review Team Leader Dr. J. Honekamp TERA - TRT Technical Manager Mr. J. Miller TERA - TRT Issues Manager Dr. J. Arros TERA - Issue Coordinator O
. r. ;_
Revision: _1 Page 7 of 25' RESULTS REPORT I
~~#- ISAP II.e (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)
Mr. G. Lagleder Southwest Research Institute - UT measurement of Hilti bolt' lengths 4.3 Personnel Qualification Requirements Where inspections required the use of certified inspectors, qualifications at the appropriate level were to the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6, " Qualification of' Inspection, Examination,;and Testing Personnel at Nuclear Power Plants".
Third-party inspectors were certified to the requirements of the chird-party employer's quality assurance program and trained to the applicable inspection procedures.-
Third-party participants in the implementation of this Action Plan meet the personnel qualification and objectivity.
requirements of the CPRT Program Plah and its implementing procedures.
Of .
Other participants were-qualified to the requirements of the CPSES Quality Assurance Program or to the specific requirements of the CPRT Program Plan. Activities performed by other than third-party personnel were governed by the applicable-principles of Section III.K, " Assurance of CPRT Program Quality", of the CPRT Program Plan.
4.4 Proceduras Calculations and evaluations performed by THE, Gibbs & Hill, and SWEC were performed in accordance with the procedures normally applicable to those activities for CPSES.
Third-party activities were conducted in accordance with applicable CPRT guidelines.
Procedure SWRI-NDT-800-103, Revision 1, " Ultrasonic Length Measurements of Bolting" (Reference 9.8) was specifically developed-by Southwest Research Institute to provide guidance for ultrasonic length mea 6urements of bolting in place. This procedure describes the responsibilities of SWRI personnel and the techniques and equipment to be utilized during the performance of ultrasonic length measurements of bolting and establishes the method of recording the results of field inspections. This procedure was approved by TNE and TERA.
-R2 Vision: 'l
.Page 8 of 25 RESULTS REPORT
'/ %
o' k-s - ISAP II.e (Cont'd)
.4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) 4.5 Standards / Acceptance Criteria
- 1. ACI-318-71, " Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete", and stipulations of FSAR Section 3.8 formed the basic standards and. design criteria for the original. design of the' concrete. mat at El. 810'-6" in the Fuel Handling Building. The acceptance criteria for calculation generated within this action plan were consistent with the original design criteria.
- 2. Adequate controls of activities related to rebar cutting, such as engineering authorization, equipment use, and QC inspections must be defined in the Project procedures.
3.
DCAs and CMCs associated with identified rebar cuts must be supported with appropriate analyses-to evaluate and qualify the changed condition.
.5. 0 IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS The implementation of this action plan involved: preparation of design calculations for the Fuel Handling Building concrete mat postulating that the unauthorized robar cutting had occurred; review of procedures for drilling for Hilti installations and core drilling to' determine the controls'for rebar cutting; identification and evaluation of Hilti installations where a rebar cut was authorized and the possibility of cutting underlying rebar existed; and ultrasonic measurement of the length of some Hilti bolts. These taska are discussed in the following sections.
Additional sections discuss a review of the NRC conclusions, an evaluation of the potential safety significance, and root cause and generic implications of this issue. Figure 1 provides a sketch of the subject Hilti bolt installation and rebar placement in the concrete mat. The activities that were performed by the Project were reviewed by the Third Party.
5.1 Fuel Building Concrete Mat at Elevation 810'-6" l
I In order to respond to the NRC request regarding the possible rebar cutting in the subject case, as stated in Section 2.2 above, a field walkdown of the area was performed by Projects.
The walkdown consisted of a determination of the location of O
r- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
. J \
Revision: 1 i
Page 9 of_25 RESULTS REPORT fN
( ,) - ISAP II.e (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) I the bolts and a UT measurement of the length of the installed Hilti bolte (Reference 9.4). It was determined that some of !
the bolts were long enough (greater than 7 inches) to have required holes to be drilled deep enour,h to potentially cut a rebar in the third layer. In addition,'TNE performed ,
I calculations, assuming that a section of rebar in the first and third layers was cut (Reference 9.5). The calculations established that even if rebar in both the first and third layers had been cut along the east-west line next to one of ,
)
the rails, the mat satisfies the requirements of the design criteria (i.e., ACI-318-71). DCA-7041 was revised to incucporate authorization for cutting both the first and third layers of rebar.
The new calculations and DCA-7041. Rev.10 were reviewed by the G6H Site Design Review Team and also by the third party.
In the subject case, and in the 62 other Hilti installations where potential for additional unauthorized rebar cutting was determined to exist (see Section 5.3), it has not been f\ confirmed that additional rebar was actually cut because
\~- removal of the Hilti to allow inspection would lead to the i destruction of the bolt or the concrete around the hole.
Instead, it was conservatively assumed for evaluation purposes that the rebar was cut in all instances where it may have been cut as a consequence of drilling deeper than the design documents authorized.
Even if any rebar was actually cut by drilling in any of these cases, it is unlikely that the rebar was completely cut. It is probable that the drill bit and the rebar were not aligned perfectly and, further, in several cases the diameter of the drill bit was less than the diameter of the rebar. For example, the diameter of a No. 18 bar, potentially cut in the subject case, is 2.25 inches, while the diameter of the Hilti bolt was 1/2 inch, for which a 1/2 inch drill bit is used. As a result, the potential drilling into the 3rd layer No. 18 bar could not totally sever the bar, but could only reduce the cross-sectional area by 28 percent. However, in all evaluations, it was conservatively assumed that every rebar that could have been partially cut, was totally ineffective.
These two assumptions provide a significant margin of conservatism in the results of the evaluations.
5.2 Review of Procedural Controls for Rebar Cutting (s_,N) Procedural controls for cutting rebar either while drilling for Hilti installations or by core drilling were reviewed by the third party.
l Revision: 'l Paga 10 of 25 .
RESULTS REPORT j'~
- ISAP II.e (Cont'd) i l
5.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd)
Hilti bolts range in size from 1/4 inch in diameter to 1 1/4 inch in diameter. Hilti bolts are installed by drilling into concrete using drill bits of the same nominal diameter as the bolt and by inserting the bolt into the hole. When the nut is tightened, the wedges around the bolt expand and the bolt is anchored.
Core drilling (also sometimes called core boring)-is performed using special drives and core bits to drill an annular void and to remove the core of material from within the void.
The procedures relevant to rebar cutting activities in the context following:of Hilti installations were identified as the Construction procedure CEI-20, " Installation of 'Hilti' Drilled-in Bolts",
Craft pr..edure CCP-47, " Requests for Rebar Cutting",
p)
Quality Control Procedure CP-QP-11.2 " Inspection of Concrete Anchor Bolt Installation",
Quality Instruction QI-QP-ll.2-1, " Installation of
'Hilti' Drilled-in Bolts".
The procedures relevant to core drilling were identified as the following:
Craft procedure MCP-13, " Requests for Core Drilling",
Quality Instruction QI-QA-11.0-6, " Inspection of Grouting".
The procedures were reviewed for the following aspects relevant to rebar cutting:
The requirements for engineering approvals for rebar cutting; l 1
the method of drilling, including any details that relate to the possibility of cutting rebar; e.g.,
specification of equipment to be used; m
f
,Ravision: 1 Paga 11 of 25 RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.e
/~")C
(_,
(Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) the requirements for QC inspection of the drilled holes to verify that either no rebar was cut or that rebar was cut in accordance with a DCA authorizing rebar cutting; and the control of drilling equipment capable of cutting rebar.
5.2.1 Procedures for Hilti Installations Construction Procedure CEI-20 " Installation of 'Hilti' Drilled-In Bolts" This procedure established the guidelines and requirements for the field installation of 'Hilti' .l drilled-in expansion anchors. The provisions of the '
procedure apply to Hilti bolts used for installation of safety-related equipment, and for the installation of non-safety-related equipment located in safety-related structures. Revision 0 of thia procedure was issued on
[\
.Q May 31, 1978.
Section 3.2.1 of the procedure states, in part,
" Expansion bolt holes shall not be drilled into concrete reinforcing steel unless approved by the Gibbs & Hill resident engineer or his representative. Holes for the expansion bolts shall be drilled into concrete by the use of suitable power drills using 'Hilti' carbide masonry bits of the same nominal size as the bolt and which are designed and recommended by the Hilti Corporation specifically for this purpose."
These requirements have been repeated in all subsequent I revisions of the procedesre. It is noted that the carbide masonry bits are not capable of cutting through rebar (Reference 9.10).
Revision 7 of the procedure, issued on February 11, 1981, added in its Section 3.1.2.3.
"Where cutting of structural reinforcing steel is permitted by the engineer, Drillco O)
\
v L _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
\ ..:
Ravision: 1 Paga 12 of 25 RESULTS REPORT
> [b) ISAP II.e (Cont'd)
'5.0 IMPLEMENTATION'AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS'(Cont'd) water cooled carbide / diamond bits or equal shall be used. Once the structural reinforcing steel is cut, the remainder of
'the hole shall be drilled with a 'Hilti' carbide masonry. bit per 3.1.2.1." (Paragraph 3.1.2.1 of Revision 7 corresponds to Paragraph 3.2.1 of Revision 0.)
Section 3.1.2.4 of Revision 7 further added, "In limited access areas it may be difficult to drill holes for expansion bolts using equipment as required by 3.1.2.1. For this situation, a flexible drive drill with drill E preas/ vacuum base and Drillco water cooled carbide / diamond bit or approved equal may be used. Caution shall be used when drilling to avoid the cutting of.' structural reinforcing steel. In no case shall structural s reinforcing steel be cut without prior approval of the Engineer."
The requirements of Sections 3.1.2.3 and 3.1.2.4, have been repeated in the subsequent revisions of the procedure.
When drilling is performed, whether using carbide masonry bits or diamond drill bits, it .is obvious to an operator when a rebar is encountered. Thus, the caution in Section 3.1.2.4 affords a practical means of controlling rebar cutting.
Revisions 1 and 2 of CEI-20 specified QC inspection requirements for Hilti bolts. In-process surveillance inspections performed at a frequency (once per shif t) specified'in the procedure were intended to verify that Hilti. installations were performed in accordance with the guidelines of the procedure. All unsatisfactory conditions were to be reported on an Inspection Report.
However, the Inspection Report for these inspections did not include specific requirements for a check of p
V a
_ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . - - . i
g-Rsvision: 1 Pags 13 of 25 RESULTS REPORT f]
lg ISAP II.e (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) the hole drilled for the Hilti to determine whether any rebar was cut, or to verify that rebar cutting was in accordance with design change documents. This observation was transmitted to the QA/QC Review Team for their consideration in collective evaluation.
Since Revision 3 of the procedure (dated January 11, 1979), QC inspections have been addressed by reference to applicable QC procedures and instructions.
Craft Procedure CCP-47 " Requests for Rebar Cutting" Revision 0 of this. procedure was issued'on June 17, 1981, and is still the current revision.
This procedure provides a method for controlling the requests for cutting of structural reinforcing steel embedded within structural concrete by requiring that a' document, Rebar Cut Request (RCR), be used to communicate a rebar cut request to the Project Civil Engineering. It is noted that prior to June 1981,
, -[~h rebar cut requests were communicated to engineering by phone calls or memoranda (Reference 9.11); however, the requests were still to be dispositioned with engineering approvals documented in DCAs or C.MCs Section 2.3 states, "The project civil engineer or his designee shall review the RCR to ascertain its correctness, determine the specific reinforcing steel being encountered, review the cutting criteria and rebsr maps to determine the acceptability for cutting. If acceptable for cutting, a Design Change Authorization (DCA) will be issued indicating rebars to be cut."
Also, engineering approval was required before issuance of the DCA.
I Quality Control Procedure CP-QP-11.2, '"' Inspection of Concrete Anchor Bolt Installation" and Qaalicy Instruction QI-QP-il.2-1, " Installation of Hilti Drilled-In Bolts"
Revicion: 1 Peg 2 14 of 25 RESULTS REPORT
(
-y ISAP II.e (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd)
Revision 0 of CP-QP-11.2 and QI-QP-11.2-1 were issued on December 14, 1979 and December 13, 1979, respectively. Before this time, the requirements for Hilti installation inspections were specified in CEI-20. The generic inspection requirements are l identified in CP-QP-11.2 while more detailed requirements are addressed in QI-QP-11.2-1. {
CP-QP-11.2 and QI-QP-11.2-1, Revision 0 and later revisions required inspections to be performed at a specified frequency to verify that Hilti installations were performed in accordance with the requirements of the CEI-20. Section 3.1 of QI-QP-11.2-1 specifically stated that concrete anchors were not to be drilled into reinforcing steel without written engineering approval. However, the Inspection Report for these inspections did not include specific requirements for a check of the hole drilled for the Hilti to determine whether any rebar was cut or to verify that rebar cutting was in accordance with design change documents.
[, . This observation is the same as was observed with
\ respect to CEI-20 and was also transmitted to the QA/QC Review Team for their consideration in collective evaluation.
5.2.2 Procedures for Core Drillina Construction Procedure MCP-13, " Requests for Core Drilling" Revision 0 of this procedure was issued on September 27, 1977, and provides a method for controlling the request for core drills and obtaining required approvals. It applies to all core drilling in the plant. Core drilling is typically performed for installing wall / slab penetrations and installations of through or grouted-in anchor bolts.
Section 2.4.2.1 contains instructions for correct placement of core drill holes to prevent damage to embedded plant items. Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 require the engineer responsible for the craft requesting the cutting of rebar to initiate a Core Drill Request (CDR)
- _ - -.-, ' ' -~
N ,;
, g Revision:
^~ ,
k ^
1 1
, Pcge 15 of 25 b.
RESULTS REPORT ,
I j
e -
f ISAP II.e ,
( ,f;,'
(Cont'd) y r i / . i, MA #
, j , C.
5.0 IMPLEMINTI, TION AND ' DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Coat"d)'
.f ;. .
detain,ng Oh size and location of the hole to be drillen . "the Tequest form'is then routed for review 3
y' j <_ and jpproval tg wugh i.he B&R Engineering Department and e
ttA tpwr." The approval cignature block on the CDR
'y fona includes a sign-off by.' civil engineering personnel as wel.? as representatives:c,( other disciplines, if t
gy ' appro pidate. Accofding ta-Se'etion 4.2.1, "QA/QC 4
notifinocion of core drilling is required. The witness
,s of work is a QA option, wo;;it may proceed if the QC
/; 4 inspectors are not availabla unless otherwise notified by QA/QC Department."
'4 2e Later revisions of the procedure have maintained all of
' the requirements of Revision 0 and have added guide?1res on 'thipping of concrete where needed for 4
locating Teiar. Ite requirement for QA notification es del ted t in the' second (May 28, 1980) and later revisiMn of the procedure. However, core drilled holps were inspected prior to grouting as discussed in
(
-b g) Section 5.2.3 t.elos 4
' ' s 5.2.3 Quality Ms'truitknv s/ < -<
, 7 ", s _ Quality InstruerLon QI-QP-11.0-6, " Inspection of Grouting" j r g
- f. Rerision 0 ef this procedura'was issued on July 28 1976, and outlines the methods and criteria used to Anspect gront pre-placement, placement and post placendnt. The instruction is relevant to +he subject isade through the fact that core bores except for special cases, e.g., in block-outs, are grouted.
s
- Revision 1 June 13, 1977, of procedure CCP-16,
" Grouting of Base Plates, Bearing Plates, and Equipment Bases", which also applied to grouting of core bores, established the grout card as the place where the QC inspector dre .ments his pre-pour checkout and acceptance by a signoff in accordance with the requirements of the QI-QP-11.0-6. The grout card required verification of " structural steel" but not of "rebar cutting" as a line item. Observed notations
/, addressing rebar on the grout cards pertaining to pours
- involving rebar cuts indicated awareness of rebar cutting considerations. However, the formal inspection require.ents A$d not address inspection of core bores for possible~rebar cutting.
6 y'
Revision: 1 Page 16 of 25 4
RESULTS REPORT
/"'N ISAP II.e
. ( ,)
(Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) 5.2.4 Results of Review It was concluded that the procedure for Hilti installation, CEI-20, and the procedure for core ;
drilling requests, MCP-13, established strict requirements for obtaining engineering approval prior to any rebar cutting.
For Hilti installations, since its original issue in May 1978, CEI-20 cautioned against drilling into reinforcing steel and specifically required the use of a carbide masonry bit which is not capable of cutting through rebar (Reference 9.10). If rebar needed to be cut, an engineering evaluation and a DCA were required.
Hilti installations were inspected by QC under a Hilti surveillance program for conformance with CEI-20 requirements; however, inspections for rebar cutting were not documented.
In the subject case, the requirements of CEI-20 were
('s followed to the extent that when the first layer of no.
18 East-West rebar was encountered, an engineering evaluation was performed and a DCA was issued that authorized cutting of the first layer. However, if the rebar in the third layer was cut as alleged, authorization to cut a rabar in both the first and third layers would have been required. i For core drilling, since its original issue in September 1977, MCP-13 cautioned about not damaging items embedded in concrete and required engineering evaluation and approval for every core bore.
Pre-grouting inspections in accordance with QI-QP-11.0-6 required the involvement of Civil Engineering QC inspectors for every core bore that was grouted, i.e.,
essentially every core bore. However, inspection to verify that either no rebar was cut ,or that rebar was cut in accordance with engineering authorization was not specifically required.
No procedures were identified that would establish controls on equipment used for rebar cutting, i.e.,
O ;
Revision: 1 Page 17 of 25 RESULTS REPORT O- ISAP II.e (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) core bore drill machines, diamond drill bits or core bore drill bits. Such procedures were not essential to preclude unauthorized rebar cutting, since the procedure on Hilti drilling (CEI-20) and core drilling (MCP-13) provided adequate controls. However, procedures controlling equipment would have added to the control of rebar cutting activities and reduced the possibility of unauthorized rebar cutting.
It is concluded that while the procedural controls governing drilling operations were adequate, additional requirements for QC inspections for all rebar cutting and controls of rebar cutting tools would have strengthened them. Current procedures have been strengthened in these respects as discussed in Section 8.0.
5.3 Review of Documentation of Rebar Cuts for Hilti Installations and Evaluation of Postulated Rebar Cuts
) All Civil / Structural concrete outline and reinforcement drawings were reviewed by THE to identify all DCAs and CMCs regarding rebar cuts for Hilti installations in units 1 and 2 (Ref. 9.6). A total of 189 such rebar cut cases were identified (113 DCAs and 76 CMCs). For each of these cases, design drawings were reviewed to determine whether there was rebar beneath the bar authorized for cutting that could potentially have been cut if a hole had been drilled deeper than implied by the authorization using a diamond drill bit.
It was determined that in 62 cases such underlying rebar was specified in the design. TNE evaluated these 62 cases to determine structural adequacy, postulating that the additional rebar, not authorized to be cut, was cut,
- regardless of the length of the Hilti bolt installed. In all 62 cases the structures were found adequate. Therefore, it was not necessary from a structural point of view to determine if the additional rebar that could have been cut while drilling in the authorized locations, were in fact cut.
Identification of DCAs and CMCs regarding rebar cuts and the structural evaluations performed by TNE were reviewed and found acceptable by the third party (References 9.12 and 9.13).
O
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - . - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - -
Revision: 1 Paga 18 of 25 l
RESULTS REPORT 1.
( ISAP II.e
( (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) 5.4 Results of Ultrasonic Measurements Within this Action Plan two methods were originally identified to evaluate and disposition Hilti installation cases where it was determined that the potential existed for cutting more rebar than authorized: 1) to determine whether the drilled hole was deep enough to possibly cut rebar and evaluate I accordingly, or 2) to evaluate the structure, postulating that if a rebar was authorized for cutting, any underlying rebar was also cut. As discussed in Section 5.3, all cases with potential for unauthorized cutting were evaluated using the latter alternative. However, during the early execution of the Action Plan, the length of the Hilti bolts was determined by ultrasonic measurement (as discussed in Section 5.1) in nine additional c3ses (Reference 9.8). In six out of the nine cases the Hilti bolt was found to be long enough that rebar underlying the rebar that was authorized to be cut could also have been cut. In the other three cases the length of the Hilti was such that only the authorized cut should have been
'[ )
made (assuming the hole is, in accordance with the procedures, only one half inch deeper than the length of the Hilti bolt.)
Based on these findings, the Hilti bolt length was not relied upon in dispositioning cases with potential unauthorized cutting. Instead, all of the 62 cases where there was rebar underlying the rebar authorized for cutting were evaluated postulating that the unauthorized cutting had occurred as discussed in Section 5.3.
5.5 Shear Luas An investigation to determine whether there were other work processes that might have caused rebar cuts revealed that rebar cutting also could have occurred when holes were drilled for shear lugs used in some pipe supports. A shear lug is a piece of round steel bar, up to nine inches long, with a diameter from one to two inches, welded at the back of a support base plate to increase the shear capacity of the pipe support anchorage. All pipe support drawings were reviewed to identify the supports utilizing a shear lug (Reference 9.9).
Twenty-four (24) such supports were identified, one of which had QA documentation. Therefore an evaluation was performed j for the concrete slab or wall where each of the remaining twenty-three (23) supports was installed assuming rebar was cut (Reference 9.14). In all cases, the structure was found to meet the design criteria.
O G
Rsvision: 1
' Pass 19 of 25 RESULTS REPORT
' /G '} ISAP II.e (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) 5.6 Review of NRC Conclusion An issue that was addressed in the SSER (Reference 9.1),
concerned the fact that the number of diamond drill bits of the diameter sizes used for Hilti installations purchased for the plant appeared to be significantly larger than should have been needed based on the extent of rebar cutting documented in the DCAs authorizing rebar cutting. This raised questions concerning potential unauthorized use of diamond drill bits.
The possibility that such use could have resulted in unauthorized rebar cuts was concluded by the NRC to be of
"... inconsequential effect..." (Reference 9.1).
This issue was reopened in a meeting between NRC staff and the third party in October 1985, and the NRC staff indicated that an investigation of unauthorized use of diamond drill bits should be conducted.
The NRC staff based their original conclusion of g
("N q_,) inconsequential effect on an analysis that assumed a maximum of 5000 diamond drill bits had been used on the project by the time of the TRT investigations. The upper limit estimate of 5000 bits was arrived at by researching the purchase documents for drill bits. NRC further assumed, in accordance with the statements made by an individual who made allegations about unauthorized rebar cutting, that as many as 20 percent of the diamond drill bits may have been used in an unauthorized manner, and that up to five rebars could be cut with one drill bit. These assumptions combined with the estimate of approximately 800,000 to 1,200,000 rebars installed in the concrete structures of the plant, led to the NRC's conclusion that approximately 0.6 percent of the total rebar in the plant could have been cut in an unauthorized manner. It was further noted (Reference 9.1) that if every one of the 5,000 drill bits were used to cut rebar (5 bars per bit), only 3 percent of the total rebar at the plant could have been cut.
In response to the NRC staff's request to reconsider the diamond drill bit issue, the Project investigated all diamond drill bit purchase documents. After screening for those sizes of bits used for Hilti installations, and deducting the number of bits used for cuts through non-structural embedded steel, e.g.,
steel templates, and the bits in stock as of late 1986, it was estimated that the number of diamond drill bits that
()
were available for rebar cutting was less than 2000 (Reference
'-- 9.15) rather than the 5,000 conservatively estimated by the NRC, as discussed above.
Revision: 1 Page 20 of 25 RESULTS REPORT O ISAP II.e (Cont'd) 5.0 l IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd)
A further added margin of conservatism to the numbers presented by the NRC in the SSER is provided by the fact that the Project estimated the total amount of rebar in all concrete structures to be in t'ae order of 2,000,000 (Reference 9.15) rather than the 800,000 to 1,200,000 assumed by the NRC.
Two crews, the steel fabrication department drilling crew and a millwright crew were assigned to perform drilling using diamond drill bits. The steel fabrication drilling crew typically drilled the small holes (2 inches or less in diameter) and the millwright crew did the larger core borsa (Reference 9.16). (Drilling of concrete for Hilti installations using carbide masonry bits which could not cut rebar was not limited to the two special drilling crews.)
After the termination of his employment, allegations about unauthorized rebar cuts at unspecified locations were made by the foreman of the steel fabrication department drilling crew that performed most of the drilling involving rebar cutting for Hilti installations.- (Reference 9.1).
O The foreman had maintained a diary about the drilling activities of his crew.
He had stated that the diary included documentation of rebar cuts that had not been authorized and documented in appropriate design change documents. To assess the accuracy and implications of the allegations, the Project obtained c copy of the diary and thoroughly reviewed it. By comparing every rebar cut identified in the diary for seismic Category I l
buildings with the authorizations in the project documents, the Project determined that there were no more than ten rebar cuts that had not been authorized by the Project (Reference 9.17). All ten cases were for installations for which other rebar cuts had been authorized.
l An estimate of the number of potentially unauthorized cuts l
performed by the drilling crew during the total construction period was extrapolated by multiplying the number of unauthorized cuts during the foreman's employment by the ratio of the number of design change documents authorizing cuts issued during the total construction period to the number of authorizations issued during the period of the foreman's employment (September 1978 - October 1979). This resulted in an estimate of a total of 22 potentially unauthorized rebar cuts in the concrete structures. This led to an estimate that at most 0.0013 percent of the approximately 1,650,000 0
1
Revision:- 1 Pags 21 of 25 !
RESULTS REPORT
')
- O ISAP II.e (Cont'd) 1 k
5.0 \
IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) !
rebar in the seismic Category I buildings of the plant (as compared to 2,000,000 in the total plant) have been subjected to some amount of cutting (Reference 9.18). This is significantly less than the NRC estimate of 0.6 percent that was stated in the SSER-8 for all concrete structures _!
(Reference 9.1). This estimate of .0013 percent is judged to be reasonable, in part, because the controls on rebar cutting became more rigorous during the time frame following the foreman's employment.
Considering the fact that the steel fabrication department drilling crew performed practically all drilling for Hilti installations that required rebar cutting (Reference 9.10) (a millwright crew performed core drilling for holes with larger diameters) using special heavy drilling equipment providing water cooling to the drill bit, and the fact that the diary appears to be an accurately maintained log of.the crew's activities,that evidence it can be judged that the diary provides strong the total number of unauthorized rebar cuts is O
well-below the upper bound estimate presented by NRC in SSER-8.
Further, nine individuals, who allegedly had knowledge of potential use of diamond drill bits by personnel othec than the crew assigned to perform drilling requiring rebar cutting, gave sworn statements denying any knowledge of unauthorized rebar cutting (Reference 9.1). -
Collectively,-the evidence supports the NRC's conclusion about the " inconsequential effect on the safety of the structures" of the issue of unauthorized cutting of rebar.
5.7 Summary of DIRs Two DIRs concerning potential unauthorized rebar cutting in the Fuel Handling Building were written during implementation of the ISAP II.e.
Both of these DIRs (E-0986 and E-1050) were written to document the concern expressed on the subject case in two separate NRC Reports. Based on the evaluation of the subject i.e.,
case, the two DIRs were classified as deviations, the possible (not confirmed) unauthorized rebar cutting represents a violation of a design criterion. The subject case was resolved by implementation of this Action Plan, ISAP II.e and the two DIRs were closed.
O
Revision: 1 l' Pags 22 of 25 i .
RESULTS REPORT
/~'T kl m ISAP II.e (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) 5.8 Safety Significance Evaluation The evaluation of the Fuel Building mat concluded that the structural design criteria are met even if a rebar in the third layer was cut as alleged. The evaluation of the 62 cases where rebar cutting was authorized but underlying rebar could also have been cut, concluded that even if the underlying rebar had been cut, the structural design criteria were net.
The same conclusion was reached in the evaluations of the ten potentially unauthorized cuts identified in the alleger's diary. Based on these evaluations, and the fact that the potentially unauthorized cuts identified in the diary are at scattered locations, there is a reasonable assurance that other unauthorized rebar cuts would not present a safety significant deviation.
This conclusion is in agreement with the conclusion af " inconsequential effect on the safety of structures" presented in the SSER (Reference 9.1). In conclusion, no deficiencies were identified in the investigations for this ISAP.
O) is ,
5.9 Root Cause and Generic Implications Assessment The investigations performed under this action plan did not identify any deficiencies or adverse trends, thus an evaluation of root cause and generic implications is not required by the CPRT Program Plan.
6.0 CONCLUSION
S The concrete mat at the 810'-6" elevation of the Fuel handling Building was found to be structurally adequate even if the second layer of No. 18 rebar was cut as alleged. The other identified locations where the possibility of unauthorized rebar cutting i existed was cut.
were also found to be structurally adequate assuming rebar l
The procedures specify requirements to perform drilling '
for Hilti installations and drilling core bores in such a way that, if they are followed, unauthorized rebar cutting cannot occur.
This investigation did not identify any deficiencies.
7.0 ONGOING ACTIVITIES There are no ongoing activities.
O O
'Rovision: 1 Pags 23 of 25 RESULTS REPORT
/~T (s,l - ISAP II.e (Cont'd) 8.0 ACTION TO PRECLUDE OCCURRENCE IN THE FUTURE Procedures CEI-20 and QI-QP-11.2-1 were revised to strengthen the controls of rebar cutting in order to minimize the possibility of I future occurrences of unauthorized rebar cutting when drilling for Hilti installations. The revised procedures require that if rebar cutting is performed, a construction traveler be used and that a QC inspector inspect the bolt holes to ascertain that the rebar is cut in accordance with the issued design change authorization. The QC inspection for rebar cutting will be documented.
Procedures MCP-13 and QI-QP-11.0-6 were revised to require that if rebar cutting is performed, a construction traveler be used with a
" hold point" for QC inspection to verify that any rebar cutting is ;
completed in accordance with the issued design change '
authorization. This strengthens procedural controls of rebar cutting due to core boring.
MCP-13 was further revised to establish controls on the diamond drill bits and core bore bits; new requirement will restrict i issuance of those bits only to the cognizant craft foreman
('- responsible for core drilling'against the rebar cutting traveler.
The General Mechanical Superintendent or his Assistant signs on the traveler for hi.s approval of issuance of the drill bit.
9.0 REFERENCES
9.1 NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 8, " Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2",
pages K-89-91, February 1985.
9.2 Operation Traveler ME-82-1454-6000. !
1 9.3 Design Change Authorization, DCA-7041 Revision 7.
9.4 Memorandum, J. Arros to ISAP II.e File, August 25, 1987.
9.5 Comanche Peak Project Civil Engineering Calculation SFB-102C, Set 1, Revision 10 with supplementary information.
9.6 THE-CPSES Calculation Sheet, "TRT-Issue II.e. Investigation into Possibility of Additional Rebar Cuts - Other Than Those Previously Authorized - for Hilti Bolt Installation" M. M.
Kamble, June 12, 1986, with supplementary information.
Revisit '
1 Page 24 of 25
, RESULTS REPORT f3 ISAP II.e
( ) (Cont'd)-
9.0 REFERENCES
(Cont'd) 9.7 TUCCO Memorandum, C. R. Hooton to B. K. Bhujang, " Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, TRT Issue II.e, Evaluation of Rebar Cuts", March 6, 1986, with supplementary information.
9.8 Final Report " Ultrasonic Length Measurement of Selected Bolting at the CPSES Units 1 and 2":, Rev.1 Southwest Research Institute, September, 1985.
9.9 Memorandum to ISAP II.e File " Project Identification of Pipe Supports Utilizing Shear Lugs", G. Braun, August 20, 1987.
9.10 TERA Contact Log, Ben Hauser, Bob Prather, J. Arros, August 12, 1987.
9.11 TERA Contact Log, J. Arros with S. McBee, August 3, 1987.
9.12 TENERA Notes, "TRT Issue II.e Review of Project's Identification of CMCs and DCAs Related to Hilti Rebar Cutting", F. Ramezanbeigi, July 14, 1986.
(~
,( 9.13 TENERA Notes, "TRT Issue II.e, Review of Project's Evaluation of Postulated Additional Rebar Cuts due to Hilti Installations", F. Ramezanbeigi, July 14, 1986.
I 9.14 TENERA Notes, " Review of Shear Lug Calculations TRT-Issue j II.e", F. Rameranbeigi, June 12, 1986. i 9.15 STIR CPRT-S-004, Rev. O, "Rebara Improperly Drilled / Cut During Hilti Expansion Anchor Installation" June 12, 1987.
f 9.16 Letter, USNRC to TUCCO, G. L. Madsen to R. J. Gary, September 29, 1983.
l 9.17 Memorandum, F. Ramezanbeigi to J. Arros, " Third Party Check of l SWEC's Review of Messerly's Diary", September 1, 1987. !
9.18 Memorandum, F. Rameranbeigi to J. Arros, " Third Party Check of SWEC's Estimate of Total Number of Rebara Received at CPSES",
September 1, 1987. 1 0
f*
i Pags 25 of 25 8
RESULTS REPORT f~y ISAP II.e
( ).
(Cont'd)
Figure 1 Fuel Building Slab at Elevation 810'-6" Partial Plan Shcwing Process Aisle Rail, Hilti Bolt Location and Positions of Upper Three Layers of Rebar N 11.2-
_ b 1- -
(oA ..}k e l l l d _ d.l_..p!_ Rail Base 2 l l e e y -p .,_
l Centerline (TYP.)
- 9 _ l. _ 4 _ q - -.}l_ ._. .lI l
8 I I l l l -Process Aisle g l l l j u _7 gl _ + _ . 7 __ J l l Rail (TYP.) '
y e
e I J l _.
..,_l g .
b, 4
_ _j __1_ _.jl i l-' ' T--Hitti Bolt N _9 i tj---~
l T - 7 ~ ' LL(TYP.) '
l l
.1 i l l l l 1 #18 CCla@ 1'-0*
g 1 _ (TYP.)yers 1 & 3 C 7 _ _7 - .
,-f q _ . -_
a Li _t l i l l l l I 3 ~
C ~~- "'f - ~~f --'i -"-Y '!!! ! [ ,33 g 3 0*
@ l l l CCla g
m
- .4 .
_ .1 _ l _ p,l _
_f , . pl . 'TYP.)yer 2 i i I O I l l !
g l l
__j .... .t_
g
_ i_l _ p _l .4__.9._.4,
._i a .,_
l 1 l .
.I ;
h_h_
p i i
~
b l ll l l I
__ 4 __ y __ .4_ _ .
e a 4 .,_
T- _ .4. __1_.
.}_ .... __
g i e, e i i i._; .
bE n
L i (TYP.) 3' 3' i l p
3 t 2'-7 3/4" i
2'73/4" I~lr r. .
CENTeiRLINE CENTERLINE g
e RAll PROCESS AISLE CENTERLINE RAll l 1
n , f op T of Floor W$
h eis l A SECTION A.A )
i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ l
4 l CCMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM RESULTS REPORT ERRATA JULY 21, 1987 ISAP:V.a TITLE:
Inspection For Certain Types Of Skewed Welds In NF Supports.
i C2.M.,
Iss e Co rdinator w c. e.c.er '~
l Date
~
M Rtview ' Team Leader' 'V
] "
l 8-/3- n Date 1
04- o. La-Jo!6 W. Beck, Chairman CPRT-SRT 9/z/e 7 !
Date i
1 O
e*
RESULTS REPORT ISAP Ya REY. 1
'.- SKEWED WELDS I
-m Pg 5, Subsection 4.1.2 i
~I Change j Add at the end of the subsection:
'The revision'has no physical significance.
It did not change the measurement techniques or the inspection requirements.
1 Reason:
Statement of physical significance of changes'.
Pg 8, Subsection 4.6
. Changer Add at the end of the subsection:
It was established that no supports exceeded the ASME Code allowables. I Reason:
Statement on need for modifications i
.Pg 13, Three places Change:
Change QI-QAP-12.1 to CP-QAP-12.1 Reason: Typographical error i
. Pg 18, Second paragraph Change: Change the paragraph to read
\
Fourteen (14) welded supports had a record documenting a QC j inspection at fit-up of the type-2 skewed welds'. Eight (8) of these j welds were fit-up inspected prior to October 18, 1984. I date on (Pros this e partial penetration welds were required by construction procedure inspection).CP. CPM-6 90, Rev. 6 DCN #003 to have the fit-up Since the fitwp inspection would not have been required prior to that date unless the scribe line technique was intended to be used, it is considered probable that at least those the reasining six (6)eight (8) welds were inspected using the Of scribe line tec line technique was use,d, because the inspector had to inscrib(
lines to inspect the fit-esp, and he or another inspector would most likely with the have weldtaken advantage of the existing scribe lines to proceed inspection. !'
Reason:
Clarify a statement in the original paragraph about fit-up
. inspections of these welds prior to January 25, 1985 not being using the scribe line technique. required, and the associated logic abo
Pg 18, Third paragraph, third sentence 1 Change:
D
" Eleven of these inspectors..." to read " Twelve of these inspectors..."
Pg 18, Third paragraph, fourth sentence Change:
"The remaining inspector..." two inspectors each..." to read "The remaining Reason: !
Original statements were based on the inspection signoff, these statements reflect the identification of the actual inspector.
Pg 38, Third column Change:
"Rev. 8 (05/02/82)" to "Rev. 8 (05/20/82)"
Reason: Typographical error Pg 38, Second column !
Change:
"Rev. 16 (12/15/83)" to "Rev. 16 (12/15/82)" 'l Reason: Typographical error Pg 39, Third column
( Change:
V "thru 06/28/86)" to "thru 06/28/83)"
"thru 08/02/82)" to "thru 08/02/83)"
Reason: Typographical errors Pg 40, Second column Change:
"thru 04/14/85)" to "thru 04/24/85)" f "thru 04/15/85)" to "thru o4/25/85)" j Reason: Typographical errors ]4 Table 4 t
Change Replace the table with the attached Table 4 Errata. Table 4 of Revision 1 identified the individual who signed off the inspection (
records.
He may not always be the same as the individual who I performed and initialed for the actual inspection. The new table identifiestypographical corrects the actual inspector errors. and the inspection checklist and also i
\
i l
)ii \i1 ll11((1i m
e n
7, =
e 1 1
7 e e 5 r= i t
s t o
l N
f c t 3 = C 4
4 1 e C me C A 4r p E L C T r y M c C E O _
A 2 =T Q I W Cr R g l C M Q R e E P
=
r m = m o u ht u r
t W
c y m a t e m i e s E ro l
p n 1
1 s A n E
. a T
I l .
C R R e .
W d v . 8 l e o 2 RN 5 0 Wa 9 2 1 9 ds u 8 a 8 8 k 2-S e 1 1 2- 2-I r
o t h r 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1
M f
r Me B n o r
e
- 1 1 1 2
1 I
E e. ) 4 a rnN Q P-4 P @
R V 'd i -
Q A
q-3 L 3
1 P
A t l ah Ta I (c S
R v
e e
P I Q N I Q
I Q
Q G-
- S g
a t t 0 k S 3 1
c - t e 8- "A 2 3 a -,
a 5 6 8 8-P r= D 1 5 8 T
1 1 3 t 2- - - 0 1 n
a 1 1 1 9 7- 4 n 0 0 0 u
c o e s D n d d e e o 3 n l a
d l d C d U a 3 Q g r W W n s
tr d U E = e u
t e t 7
r
= o m = C T n h = = E S % n a. N Ve c P
. 5 3 Ad 1 S e
'F t 1 1 I
= red r 1 t/i "2 t d
i r
a3h z / . a "8 M t
/ nt a eh 0/ "4 l 1 l t edp 1 l a c ul i s ar l
i F x "4"6 xt oMl i 3at i 83 1
=
a d bWc S se / == F F hol e1f t
l "4 "63 '
x "21 "61/ "6 Sctdfd = we D /5o "d &1"6 e ea :
1 1 t "6 //
35 "6 t 5o/
"0 ip s "2 /
1PT1 t .
io m
r nW r U
nN 2 1
= Mo f 2 r= it n
o m N m A i -,
i 3 m A r t"- "
- i. 5
, 8- JE 3 4
F k-
/
W 1
7 1
0 0-2 0
. 3 0
4-5 1
0 0
2 t
a ;
UfF h 0- 0 I
_ 2- 0- Gr : :
2- 1
- 2 1 2
"= I S c o T-I ea C to t T- NE E l l I'i
){\ ! j! l s
t s
a 2 m
- t e
Cn N o
7 5
f t o s i C de p , C C
- S S 4
4 l
e y Q C S A wT I W rA Q re rA
- T O Q Q A e R g
_ R a
_ E P r a t
o se r s r
c y b= a e
p a r i
y a =
s n
H S S I ve I .
D S .
S M v .
eo 4 RN 2 0 9 1 7
8 2-e r
1 1 1 1 1 R b 1 2 1 2 2 r 6 a o. P
- 1
- 1 B cN o A P -
= a. ) r q- A P A
=
s V 'dt 4) e d l 't P I Q P C
q G- C Q-P P
A n bacn u
t SC I (
c TC( t 4
s c ee 6 3 8 % 3 m pt 9
sa nD
) 7-1 W
/
2 4
f I M O 1 1
- 2 1
0 8-0 s s d d s s
= l a l d d W e l a l W W W a
6 d d e d Rcr B
I k w
e w e
e e w
e d
e w
e S k k S S k e+ a 1
3 e m Ma e i
1 Sl M
0= +e t i
d t ov "4 at Td 0 a l a v a d t edp 8 o/ "2 i aa wli e e r " gr1 / M li 4 =oi ol "2
/s1 kWc 2 xt i oa . ri 1
S se i
/ a kt mf hc"2/ gf 1 k "2 f 1 D Sd 1 "6 1 "8 li
%' // "4 "4 S 1 "4 "2 "3 t 5 1o//i f '6 31 "8 t 1o// %' o/ /1 "4 1 '6 t 1 t .
io nN 2 U 2 1 1 o A N 3 K A i
3 3 3 K 1
A.
6
% M p
r 1 3
H l
fH /<e 4 0 1 0 S
t
- !. ) 1 1 0-
/
0 1 5"r H 0 1 s
s 2
- 1
- 0- 0 0-L F- 2- 1 l I
A C C % h ll !llll\{)1,1l l
,(
7 5
r e N t
o N
t o
e N
t o
_ f o t C C C i
s S C- S S 5 L 4 l e k p G Q
X
( X C C L
A
(
c y Q Q I I T eT W W A 2 O
_ R g R c EP l dr
_ l e o r hp f s a o a n t s d t
c e t u r o l
e e C S B r i p F F s . .
n W J F I V L v . 0 eo 1 6 6 3 3 RN 2 2 8 8 2 2 e 1 1 1 -
r u 2 2 1 1 1 2 r Rd E e o 1 1 1
1 1 1
B cN P P- P A P M o q- A A P r Q- Q A A H a. ) 4) d P P Q- Q-R V 'dt e
l 't C G P-C I I S Q Q I P A m c ba m L'
m.,(y, U S
SO I ( TG ( t c 4 8-3 3 E e e pt 8- 8- 3 8 3 R sa 5 4 1 0 2
- 8-I nD -
1
- 2- 1 9 3 6 /e 0 0 0 2- 2-1 1 s s a n d d d o l e l e l d l
d l
i t W W E e a R c
& e d d W W B p e d d d m e e e s a w u u n e e w e6 a5 I n k S k S k#k#
S S i
S Q I S e 0 l
l "21e 0 m "2 4 e m 0at /Mt 8i1 i I
=dl i p i
t 6 me 1 sl 1
xhl l e
0hc ht S Qt e l a+t t
l ee l i 4 c n e 0 pvl hc/ "2 f i h S al l 8
= e r f t l "6 i ol "4 "2 nWc s x / "6 c
S "4 si f o f hc/"2 ri gf D
e S 1 "4 1 1
1 e p6 t "4 "2 to/1 "6 t7 o/ "2 oi/0/ S 1o// "8 "8 1 t P541 "6 t 33 t .
i o nN 1 U 1 2 2 o K N A A 1
2 3 A i
3 9 4 3 3
C- F-M X 5 6 6
X 1 0 2-A %
/
M 4
4 0
f 0-6 1
1 4-6 1
O- 1 0 1 0-r- - 1 2- 2
'I
- C R
r- D F-C C A
r- t e
o 7 N 5
f t o s i C l e k p C S C 6 cy 0 C- C C S 4 O C-A heT M G 0 G T C Q M M Q A e R g R a EP r k c d o e i n l t
c c w a y a e d l z n p o a p n o D
i a D m .
G K L i
M c
I .
S W N A D v .
eo 5 RN 2 7 9 4 1 2 6 8 8 2 8
- 2 e 1 1 2-1 1
1 w 1 2 1 T Aa f m o P
1 1 1 1
1 2
l R B en N A P- P- P O Q- 4 A A P r 4 Q-E a. )
V 'd
- 4) P Q-e d I
R Q I S P t l 't @ Q I
Q P C
m T L
U A
SC I (
ebam TC ( t S c 4 3 e e 8 3 5 E 6- 4 8 3 R pt -
6-sa 1 6 4 7-nD 3- 1 1 2 3 I 6 6 2- 3 2-0 0 6 0 0 0 s s n d d s a o l a l d d i a l t W W W e i Rc E e d d m
B p e e d d s w u a e n e e =
= w I k h e S S n k S
3 S t e
1 T l m t + il d
i t /
"4 ee l l /
"2 ee t
ef at 1 l l v m edp wl i e a r xoaF Mli 1 dl di o
o "4 i 0 i
Mll e
kWc s t a xoaf t s r/ m 4
= i S gl eu h "3 "6 nl r = f D
e x "21 "8 x "21"6 "41 6d t d S c
"3 //
1 3 "8 // // a o "4 "4 1 5 1 3 st "6 to// 31 t .
io nN 2 U 1 2 1 o x
- N z K A i
a 5 C
1 2
4 m
n s 4 C f -
0 3 t 4- D 0 1 2
4 O. 4 4-5 -
_ #- 6 3 7 9 3 0 1 1
.- 0
- 5-2- 1 B 2- 1 I
R 0 1
G F-C 1 ,!
l !' l.!,!l)1 liIlIi1 il1 1
s t
1
~.,> -
7.
r e N t
e o
2 t
e o
5 N f t o s C i
l e E C 7 k p C 5 4 cy A C D rA L
C A nT Q M I Q I T O W A m R g R a E P s r e *
^ w l
l a
g *a i m t s
D P. n o r
u- r F T . R.
R J T V
v .
eo RN 9 2 1
3 8 2 8
8 2-
-e 1 1 1 2-1
= 2 1 2 I
R 6 o 1
- 1 1
1 1
@ P P -
H W
- a. ) 4) BWN P Q
P A
q A
Q-P A
q R V 'd e d C I
Q P I-
)) S T
P A
t m
l 't bam C
Q
,(%
L L
S I (C TC( t c 3 3 E ee 8 3
4 E 6 R_ pt sa H 1 8
- 6 6
I nD 2- 1 1
- 1 8 7- 8 0 0 0 2-0 s s d d s
= l e l e
d l
i W W e 6 d W
B e Rv T h h S
u e w S
t l
e x n
o sl S "
6 f
i 0 t aio0 f t2 t T 1 t o / t
==dp 6 T
t "8 " 0 1 = "8 3 a
= l i
= ar 1
1 /68h=
31 1
1 "8
/3 "T 3
/+l i
nWcse S c t h o "2 1 ,f hc 3 c c1 1 f 2 i
D "6 P1 1 P1 a/
eI /-Mn "8 St o/hSM
.S8 "4 "61x/iveef m M o "8 o
5 "480 pl "4 "6 r/ S1 "4 toa a g3r/
t .
do k N I
1 e m 2 o K N 2 A A
. 3 3 i 4 0 3 A- -
/J M
Or t W 0 S
/
H r
e g
r e
N 1
6 6
0 1
X-t-
- 4-6 0
0 2-F-
1 5 A
!i{I' i ill1I IJ {b t
a
.7h' 7
C- -
5 -
f t -
o i s .
l e C C 8 k p L :S A
4 e y wT H Cd G - L W G C T Q Q Q I A e W R g R a E P r
o s h t t c e c e y i w
e a y p
s H a W u n R I .
L D E C. .
M J veo .
RN 3 2 9 3 7 2 -
8 -
2- 8 .
1 .
1 2-T R
R :-
8
- n. o 1
1 P-1 2 2 1
1 1
1 1
O B -
c-N 4 P- P -
P r 9- A A P E a. ) 4) l' Q Q A Q-R V 'dt e d
l 't I
Q 0- I
\ S T P n b n @- Q A o ao
^ L U
E SC I ( TC( t c
ee 4
8- 3 3 R pt 8 4 sa 1 - 8 I
nD 1 1
2-M 1 2-2 0 0 7- 2- -
1 0 3 -
0 -
s a n d i e s i
n l e L d i d R
W W W 1
W B
6
- y d e
w e
d a
d e
w d
e r h e w I S %= k e t
S S 5
n e 1 a
a t i l
d e4 p i
t 0 t
a l e 0M 0 =
t a
"4
/Mt u1 i 0 l 1 aa e i 1 sl l
r 4 i nl eWcs 8 "8 .
s i hc/1 "8 f l x l l
S d/1 f a h S/ "2 f c
i "2 "2 f i e
D S3M "4 S 3 M "1 6 "3 tom R /
1 "5 ton aS / "4 1o/"4 x/1 "4 2 t1 "4 t 1o/
t .
io U
nN 2 1 1 2 o A N A 2
4 3 1 A L 3 2 A
C- A 6 4
, g- 0 8- M 1
4- 0
)
9
/
r s
xc y
9 3
0 2-r-
H 3
0-1 H
1 3
)
4 1
M 0
2-C 0 0 D F-I C -
El Ir
I s
t n
2 2 e e r
t
,~,t N o t o
7 N 5
f t o .
s C _
i S l e : C 9 k p C . S 4 cy A C 0 Q C A eT Q M I G
T O W Q A e R g R a E P y r r - y e o 1 a_
a p t
a y d r c r a e
p B
t e H s .
U s n R. O L I .
A A M F
hNo 7 2 5 8 2 9 _.
8 8 2
- 2 e
r 1 1 1 e 2 1 1
T R 6 o
. 1 1 1 1 2 P 1 W BdN r 4
) u'-
q P
A P-H a. ) 4) P M q- A q _
V 'd e d R Q I I -
t l 't Q Q 5
3 P s A a b n aa
~
. 1 U SC I ( TC( t e, S c 3 .
E ee 6 % % 3 pt -
4 4 8 I
sa 0 }
nD 1 0 7-I 7- 4 7
2 0-0 0 2- 9 1
0 s s d d a s
= l l a
d 1 d i
t E W W l
e Rc 6 e d W e d 1 B p m e - d s e w m e I
n k e w S k S *a k S
e t
o "4
/
m 1 e
t +et/. "2 + 3 S i T 0 a e6 o t d
=lidp t
8Ml al v a l ul r v19t o 1 hai c f ul gfi4x,
" o 5/ "4 r m *.
"2
/
1 t
4= Wsec r i gxti
= 1 "4x/1, f
D S "1 "8 o/
"8 "4 "4 "4at 661 =
=M 1
1 t 3 //S a 1 1 1
//i na "4z 3 M 1"6 1 1 I' m 53fTs "4 toa/ m5 t .
io nN 1 U 2 2 1 o _
N A K i.
i a 2 2 2 2
t 3
6-3 A- 6 _
g 0 9 1 0 }
Y-4 D O A
/
=
N O -
S 3
0
- 4-6 1
0
(
2-0 1
2- 2-0-
- 1 P= 5 I S % F-A
,! ll
!{l s
ta r
s I a
(
-., )#
7 r
m e
N t
e o
5 f t o s C i
E C C l e k p S S C 0 cy K C C E 5 C e A heT Q C Q C e K C
T C Q Q A 2 R g R e E P r l o sa n l e
t a b r c
a c n p a a t a l
n a S D t
a 1 b
n .
C I I .
J S .
W M. .
v .
eo RN 7 9 0 1
7 r
e 1 1 1 1 r 2 2 1 1 2 2 r
E RM 6
B c o.
N P-1 P
- 1 m
R a. )d 4) e d P n
r W P
A q
P-A Q
P-A Q
m S
V P n
't l 't b s C C G- @-
Tl T A o aa '
7(j
' L U
S E
SC I ( TC ( t c
e e pt 3
6- 3 8- 4 6- 3 R 9 sa 2 6 I H
nD - 2-I 6 O 0 9 0 M O 7-0 e a a _
= d l
< s .
< l l 1< d a 1 4
e W E
- l e
Rc 6 = d i
=
W B n e d e d a w = e n e w e w i k S h k k e
S S o1 tM Sa e
p
=
r T me i p
i a t T l
w ad p r "820l
/
l 0
4 i a 0 t e
0 t
6 "4 h= Wc er i l l i 3hf l l 8 0 1 xc 6 S
h c "4 ef i h/
c1 ef i
s 1
i s
e 'r S "6 f
S/i S -1 1 d hcl . f D 1 M "2 S "823m "4 / "8 3oa/ M "8 "6 oa/ S im1"4a/
1 t n3 i
1 t a1 "3 to "4 t .
io hN U 2 r.
1 1 o t _
N 3 A i
0 1
3 4 a i
x- A-h 6 5 0 0 r 9
/
7 5
3 0-2
- 0-9 7
0 X-h 2
0 0-1 N
5 0- .
"- W S E - 1
( 6 1
P-C
!l! I
1!1i! 1' 2
s t
2
,\ /
7 r - N t
e o _
5 f t s C o i C C l e E S S C _
1 k p cy C- :
E _
5 M G M A heT Q Q Q N
T C Q A a R g R e E P n
y r n e m d r
o y o t
m l f s l
y s k n y n i o kt C E a l A T .
F J D P v .
e RW 9 9 9 6 e 1 1 1 1 rt 2 2 2 T
R 6
1 1 1 1 2 _
P R
U BMW r A
Q-P-
4 Q
P-A Q
P A
H a. ) 4) d P P Q R V 'd e C G- G-S t l 't G-I P n A ba m E
U SO TQ t
(\ S E
I( ( c e e 3
6- 3 4
3 8- 3 R pt sa 3 4 6
) 5 7-nD 0- 0 )
I N
I 0 1
2- M 1
O s s s n d d d s o l l e 3 d i
t E W W l
e Rc 6 e d f W
B p e = d n
1
=
s w =
u n e a m
k I S h k S h t
a i
l i
= 6 0f i t et d r 0T a 0 i e 0 1 "4 ee nd p l l a u1 s r
8 l 8 Ml l 6h/
1 c1 0 Ml l hWc S
m s
hc/l"4 S3t ef i
h c o nf ai hc S
e 4
hc o ai mf e
D i "2 r
r S t "8 "4 S "4 M 1
S t "8 "4 "6 toa/ m1 "4 //
31 "3 tomm "8 //
51 t . a io s nN s U 1 1 1 o C
o A
- N 2 3 A A
- t 3 i 3 2 K r Y % 3
- o p H F H 7
A-
]/ p u
0' 0
3 0 0 0
6 S 7-1
/ 3 2-1 7- 7-0- 0 9 5
- 5- 0 4
1 1
1
- 1
- I-7 S D I G A V
l l t
i i!) i
=
t s
2 I 1
e
)#
,(
7 Pe N t
o t h
e N
t e
o 5
f t a
o i C
l e p C S 2 k cy 0 Ce L C 5 C A wT M C Q I O T Q W M A e R g R a E P e l
k c y r i i d
o m h r i s c a o s
o i s g f k
I w
r C
r N
i D
a I
m G D . .
G D v .
eo 0 RN 3 7 4 2 9 -
8 8 _
2- 2 e 1 1 - -
1 r
r 1 1 -
2 RL 6 - o 1
1 1
1 2 1
B N P P m F
- A Q A P-A P
- 4) q Q- A _
m a. )d P I Q .
e d a V 't Q P-C I
s P n l 't Q @- -
A o ba m
~s) u SC I( T (Q t
/ a ce e 5 8- 3 4 3 8- 8- _
m pt sa 8 1
nD 0- 5 2 4 H I
6 0 7-1 6
- O -
0 0 0 1
s s d d s s
= l e l e
d 1 l d
W W W e R
6
- d d W
B - e e d d w w e e r- e e w w T k k e e S S h k
S I l
a w n l i
a e S + e o t e "8 i T Si dedp t i
Shx v
o/7 0 Mt - et IMt x "8 a vol a "8 a e 6 al w1 i o 1 al /l ol ri ml r x kWc S
e s
r d s "2
/ g"6 el t hct oTf i
5x M gf a
/
5x/ "4 f l
i D
e S1"81 l S "2 "8 "B x
mF ' 'F "6s 3 "4 "6 o//i t77f "3 //
1 3 "8 t 3 3o// "6 t 1o/
i t
t .
hb 2 C m 1 1 o A N A A i
3 3 3 5 3 K 1
6 3 m A- 4
- 1
- 4 C-g 0 0
2 4 0 6 0
% ' 7- 0 0-
/ S l 7-C 8 5
- O O 0- 3 1
2- X- -
= 1 1
" F-A R-I
% L 1 I
a.,
7 O
m N t
o 5
f t o s C i
l e k p B .
C S C 3
5 c y rA C C E A wT Q I W ce rX T O Q Q A e R g R c EP r s s o n 1
= r t i = y e g
c g a e d e g l s o p i n
s R s H r a n .
M .
I H T M.
J J v .
eo RN 6 5 2 9 9 8
2 e 1 1 r 1 1
u 2 1 T
Rd . 1
- 1 2 1 2 6 eo P -
1 B cN o A P P -
W r Q- A Q- A P D a. ) 4) P P Q- M
(
R V 'd e 'd C I Q
S P t l t @ T I A m ba n '
C SG TO(
U I ( t S c 4 E e pt e 8 3 8- 3 R_ s a -
I nD N
O 1
1 7-0 8
2-9 0 W O
a e m d d s s i
l d d h h a i n l Rc t W U W e
6 e d d B p n d d s u = e n m w a I h e S h k S h "6
1 "4
/
/
5 3 x n o 6 e d
it 0 "4
/
t "6 1 3 1
/ t nt t ad p I e lae 8 1 0/ 0 pl l i e r 65+ 8 l 0hl c h "8 , t 1 8 c SMl hW s c/1 e hi av et e d/"2 t
i i h nf i
D e S3Ml l ScMol ol S 1 "4 Sc "5 a "2 toai mf "4 am gf ri " o/ o2/0 "4 3t1 "3 t1 1 t .
i o nN 1 U 2 1 1 o
N t
1 5 3 A A 2 A r C 3 4 2 4
o 6 C 0-p p 0 M 1 3 1
_ e 0- 4- 2 3 S 5 4 4-
/ 9 r 3 9 e
g 2
1 0
0 3 0-4 5
0-a - 2- 1
- H G F-1 O A T- T-C C
m o t C
o N N o
7 5 R I
f t I o i s C S l e S C C k p 4 :S 9 5 cy A C F C A heT Q S C
A F Fr T C Q Q A e R g R a E_ P r y o dy n l e
t i c k g l e o y e a p l o B n s L B t
r I
n .
B J R R. .
. A P v
eo RN 9 0 3 7 9 8
2 e 1 1 1
r 1 t u 2 1 1 2
d . 1 2 r
K Me o P
- - 1 1
O B cN o A P P -
Q A A P P r Q- A E a. )
V 'd
- 4) P Q- )
R e d T- I Q N S P n t 1 't @ (
T A o 4m -
\D L
I S
E R_
SC I ( TQ ( t c
e pt e 3 4
5 8 3 3 8-sa 4 7- Hl I
nD -
) (
1 4 2
2 1 M O 7- 0 0 1 s s n d d s s i
o l e l e
d l d t W W W e l e
Rc E e d 1 W B p e = d d s w = e e n e = w w I k S
e e
% k S k S
t o t S a e n l a S a o T t i l
i i
Il a e Ma +e v f Mt i
t l l e
=
= d p
= l i t "2
/Ml i 04 m o o "4 0 al nl "2
/ =Mt
=l e
e r l nf 8 i 1 l hWcse hc/"2 rg/l h "2 f x "2 F i "6 x D %"xa
'61 "21
//
7 S1 o//
"4 "8 S1c / "5 1 M"1 / "4 "6 t 1 1 "6 t 5 o/ &o/
1 T1 t .
io nN 1 U 2 1 1 b A A I
2 2 A S 7 2 2 i
Q- C- 7 C 7 A- 1 3 - C-t 0 4 0 4- 0 3 2 1
S 2
- 4 0-
_ / 4 7 7-2 2 0- 2 e 1 1
2 1
0 0-L r- r-1 T-1 C
_ C C 6 1
l 7
re N t
o N
t e
o 5
t
~f s e i C C C l e S S C C k p C- C 5 3 5 cy G e 3
A 5 eT Q r rA rA A h Q Q f T C Q (
A o R g R c EP r n a
o m m n t
c e o d n e l u n y i o n o f p
s C h I
C a l f o
n .
L C I .
F S M J B s o.
RN 9 9 9 7 9 1
e r
1 1 1 1 u 2 2 2 T
Rd 6 eo 1
1 1
2 1
2 1
R B cN P P - -
o A P P -
O Q-h q A A P r q A P
E a. ) 4) P - Q- q R V 'd e d G G T-
) S P t l 't b n G G-
~, T L
A e ao SC TC( t r U S
E I (
c e e 3
6 3
8- 3 8-3 8
3 R pt sa nD 6
( B 9 2 2- M
(
I 2- M 0 3 1
O 2- 7- -
1 0 8 0
s s s d
l d d e s l d d h d i
e i
e l e i i n i E d d l W W B a e d d e
RP m u a u e u a
e I % k S h S k S h 0 r e o
- t 1 f 0 S1 o
) st 2 "6 8 TMt k
d el wh W h 80 mie c n/
h pll h "4 f c
i e S3 p1, t h1 c/
t0 e4 h l 1 c l
i h f cf '
S /
"2 l
x "2 e
mli l f
e t
0i s 4M1 h =1 et S S p 1
e S0 c =f eEA "6 (st3o /
a 3 "8 t i '5 Mll "3 toe "4 " 2 "41"6 u
/
S "4/
mf i "6 1
/ 0 o o/
31 t "4 t5 1 33 t .
i o nN 1 U 1 1 1 1 o R N A t A
i 3
3 3 3 /
a 2 R 3
6 A- 9 3 m3 x -
C A-
} 4 g
0 2 4 3 0- 7 1 0
S
/ 5 2-4- 0-6 1 9
- 0- 0- 0 3 1
- 1 0- 0- 0-
- 1 1
"- ce - -
1 1 O D I
E r
T- 0 C 0
, i
gV 7 r N N
t o
N t
o 5
t R f I o i s W l e , c s C S 6
- 5 k p c y Q I
c :S &
A wT W r, rA F S
T O Q Q C A 2 R g R c EP l
r l e
o i n n t
c m a a n e i c l i
p w p ky s S m a o n .
D K B I
C S M R v ,
e6 R2 6 2
9 7 0 3
8 2- 8 2
e 1 1 -
r i 1 1 1 Rk n . 1 2 2 1 T - 1 1 6 e o P - 1 E B cN o A q
P-4 P P R
E a. ) 4) P r - Q A q A q
I -
R V 'd e d Q -
5 P t l 't @ &- I Q
N) 1 L A e ba m SC TQ
(
't*
U S
E R
I ( ( t c
e e pt s a 2 4
8 4
3 8-1 3
8- 5 6 -
nD 9 6 I - 0 2 2-0 2-1 1
7- 6 0 0 s
d s s s 1 d d h W l
e l e
d l
i n 4 i e
1 n 6 d B e d RW w w e
e u
e d
w e
e T
n k S k k S S "4 x
/ "6 t e
+ le 3 v 1
/ o l e o o
m o 5t t l i t "6 e ei a vf l
at o S T
rt ge 1 dl0 o t et ese t
d p 45 ai o 0 u 0dl l e '# 1 1
l i 0 / n lfh4c d gr4"/ "8 hic e r 4 8dl /1
/ 3i d
s cl v h ed e Sd o "6 S 1
s hc/"2 ri hc af ni 3x "4 e e
D "8
a o1 "
s rg/314377 "41"61 ft
/ / / S 1 "8 S "2 "2 "6m 3d3d /
/ l "8 "8 o/ t3 "41 //
1 "6 toa+ s t .
io r
hN t 2 1 1 2
o N A A t 3
3 3- 3 i
4 5
- A- 4 6
4 5 2- 4 t 1 4 )o 1 0
5 4
/ 8 H r
p 2
0- 0 M 7 6 1
1 1 g 2 - 4 r l a l 2
H @ -
& G 6 1
/)D 7 C N N o
5 t
f s o C i e S C C ,
S 7
5 i fyp Q C A X'r W
I re g hT
(
T Q Ao -.
f ,.
R g ~
R c EP t r
o m 's w r g t e e e c ht e l o d p
C a f r
s M I
n F
C %
C K K
v .
j RN eo 9 9 2 9 9 2
8 e 1 6-1 2
r 1 1 x 2 1 1 1 2 I r R & o.
6 e P P
- 1 I
B cN o A -
M r q A q- w 2 H a. )
V 'd
- 4) P - q 9-R e d T I Q I t l 't T-
-g)
GI T
P A m SQ(
b a m TC( t c
e e pt 3
6- 5 8- 3 8 3 Q
R s a 5 8 -
8 1 1 -
nD -
2 1 7
s i
2 3
- 0-1 1 0 1 2
0 s :
d d e o
= l i d 1 d H E W W i
E d d W
B e 3 Rv k u
e a
W
=
=
T S h S h e
m e
t t l
e o.
t- '8x el ae M 1 -
i t l
d nd p u1 i t t pl a i 0 m d "6 en1 0 al Mte i. l e
4 a/ 8 ml m :. "B l hWcsr e
lp"4 f hc/"2 vext 5 hc/ "2 f i _kif.
"4 /3 "6 S _ m '2 D
e 1 S1 o "2 el n / "6
/ o/
3 t5 " or/i o3l S 1o/"4 4 1
1 BtG5f "6 t3 /S/
3T5 t .
io nN 1 U 2 1 2
o t N 3 R A 3 3 3 t.
S 3 m- -
s- 2- s
] g 0 0- %
L M
1 l
(D l
e 5
)
K
/
6 t 0
M i
0-
_ 1 C 2
0-1 2
0-2
" % F-
@ A E
(
)
l l
7%
V l
COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM RESULTS REPORT DSAP IX TITLE:
PIPING AND SUPPORTS DISCIPLINE SPECIFIC ACTION PLAN REVISION 1 O
tb6 Discipline Coordinator rhan Date ww ] 27fD RlVTew' Team Leider V '
Date Q+c-v. L' JohnMi. Beck, Chairman CPRT-SRT s/1/> v Date O
7
.. .x. , 1 a
.,4c w i
i r -k ,
COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM * " ~ '^ f '
,... . .+ * ' "
~
- 4. p, ,-
DESIGN ADEQUACY PROGRAM
~
.. . , '-w m..
DISCIPLINE SPECIFIC.RESUI.TS REPO .. . . .
PIPING AND SUPP6RTS ""
- E
, <n ....
c wa,. .g . .
, D'9 = I
.P
- ;, W'
. . k y ,y.<
. .u . >
+ ,.
1's
- s.
.y o.;.
DAP-RR-P-001 '
Revision 1 .
August 27,1987 t
i % "".* '-
W -
+v .
E
. J. A .
., g.A . ,; 5'm h
.. . .. . .; . .g 4$,5
-a . ..
. J. '
i,, ' . [
. %,i vr + 2 y, ;
, g aU&l
'W
-bp. a % i L.
.1,.
MSw N 'a
.; ~
.$ 1: 4 en .
.a
- m. a5 . E' N's
- s. rsme,u .. %
. 2c+M ~ww.
',t - ,-
.. 4. .
Avgnug
~
www - = 4cs r w z w..s
- ym r ;- ggcF4 '
' w .s.:.
- 3,, , , , , . f,
..- v'4
$ J '
e *'u *, ,8 e .. .,
4t. %Qa. . . .n, .
..,u % f w < e' ' '
, .< w . .e: ,.+..
"k. J 1 . , . . .
r own. w a 9 k'Lw .w-y} *
. ' f.5,e., .
Y ' Y' ., 3;$
Y s
S
. . y~an .,.. . . . ~ . . ~ ~ ~ = -
secnow TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE O covaa TA S tE or conte NTS ... ... .......... .. . .... ...... . .... ... .. . .. . ...........
LIST Or FIGURES A ND TAB LES ................................
i PAG E COU NT SU M M ARY ................................. .... iv 1.0 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS .....
2.0 SC OPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . .....................2-1 . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .
3.03.1EXTERNA L SOURCE ISSUEG ..............................
Review Methodology . . ... .. ......................... ............ ......................
3.1.1 Identification of Extemal Source issues ....................
3.1.2 Criteria and Commitment Compliance Review of SWEC Procedures ... . ... .. .. . . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . . . . .
3.1.3 Evaluation of Resolution Methodology ................................ 3-4 3.2 Results............................................................................
3.2.1 External Source issue identification .............................
3.2.2 SWEC Compilance with CPSES Criteria .............................
3.2.33.2.3.1 Extemal Source issue Resolution ....................... 3-6 3.2.3.2 Rich mond insa rts .. .. . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .
\
Local Pipe Stresses .................................... ..... 3-12
....... 3-7 3.2.3.3 1.arge Frame Wall-To-Wall And Floor-To-Ceiling Supports ................................ 3-14 3.2.3.4 Support System Stability ..........................
3.2.3.5 3.2.3.6 Generic Stiffness ...................................... ....... 3-17 ......
U-Bolts Acting As Two-Wa Restraints ............ 3-21 3.2.3.7 Friction Forces ..................y 3.2.3.8 3.2.3.9 AWS Versus ASME ...................................... . 3 22 3.2.3.10 A500 Grade B Tube Steet ................................ 3 24 Section Properties ............................................ 3-25 3.2.3.11 3.2.3.12 Cinched U-Bolts ............................................... 3 28 3.2.3.13 Axial / Rotational Restraints ............................... 3-29!
G ap s . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.3.14 Seismic Design Load Specification .................. 3 31 3.2.3.15 Suppoit Mass Effects On Piping ...................... 3-33 3.2.3.16 Mass Point Spacing .......................................... 3-34 3.2.3.17 High Frequency Mass Participation .................. 3-35 TN 67-7256 i
DAP-RR-P-001. REV.1 1
I l
TABLE OF CONTENTS (
q (Continued)
V SECTION PAGE 3.2.3.18 {
3.2.3.19 Fluid Translents ................................................ 3-35 Self-Weight Excitation ...................................... 3-39 3.2.3.20 Local Stresses In Pipe Support Members ........ 3-40 3.2.3.21 S afety Fact o rs .. .. . . . . . . . .... ... ...... .... .. .. .. . . . . . .
3.2.3.22 .. .... 3-41 3.2.3.23 SA-36 And SA-307 Steels .... ........................... 3-42 Valve And Flange Qualific Valve Modeling ................ations And i
.................................3-43 3.2.3.24 Pipi ng Mode I . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3.2.3.25 We lding .. ..... . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . ... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . i
. ..... ... 3-4 5 I 3.2.3.26 3.2.3.27 A ncho r Bo it s . .. ... . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
Strut Ang ularity ................................................. 3-49 3.2.3.28 Structural Modeling For Frame Analysis .......... 3-50 3.2.3.29 t Computer Program Verification And Use ......... 3-52 3.2.3.30 Hyd rotest .. . . .. ... . .. . . . . . . . . .. . .. ..... ... . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .
3.2.3.31 Seismic /Non-Seismic Interface ........................ 3-53 3.2.3.32 Programmatic Aspects And QA ...................
3.2.3.33 I Oth e r D i Rs .. .. .... ...... .... . .... .. 3-56 4.0 S EL F-INITIATED R EVIEW .......................................................
5.0 CO R R ECTI VE ACTIO N .........................................................
l 6.0 C O NC L U Sl O NS ... .. ..... .... .. . ....... . ... . .... .. ... ............ . .
7.0 R EFER E NCES .. ......................... ............................ .. ... ......
ATTACHMENTS 1 ATTACHMENTS:
EXTERNAL SOURCE DOCUMENTS ..................... A-1 i ATTACHMENTS: OTH E R DI Rs . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ... .. .. .. . .. .
ATTACHMENT C: PROJECT MEMORANDA .....................................
ATTACHMENT D:
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS LIST ............ D-1 I
l l
i l
i TN 87 7256 11 DAP-RR.P.001, REV.1 l l
e .
I l
NUMBER LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES PAGE FIGURE 3.1-1 EXTERNAL SOURCE ISSUE LOGIC DIAGRA TABLE 3.2-1 ISS UE DOCU ME NTATlON .............................
FIGURE 3.2-1 TYPICAL RICHMOND INSERT /TUSE GTEEL FIGU R E 3.2-2 SU PPORT STAB ILITY ...................................
FIGU R E 3.2-3 FLARE B EVEL WE LD .....................................
FIGUR E 3.2-4 ANCHOR BOLT G APS ....................................
TN.87 7256 E
DAP.RR-P-001, REV.1
PAGE COUNT
SUMMARY
f SECTION
\ SHEETS COVER...............................................................................................................1 TA B LE O F C ONTE NTS . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LIST OF FIG U R ES A N D TA B LES . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . ..
PAG E OF COU N T S U M MA RY . . . . . . .. . . . .. . ... . . . . .... ... . . .. . .. .... . . .. . . . ... .
SECTiON1.........................................................................................................2 SECTION2.........................................................................................................2 ECTl@3........................................................................................................M SECTlON4.........................................................................................................1 SECTION5.........................................................................................................1 SECTlON6.........................................................................................................1 SECTION7.........................................................................................................2 l AWAC H M E NT A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ARA C H M E N T B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
i - C AWACHENTC................................................................................................6 g
ATTAC H M E NT D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .
TOTAL......................................................................................................112 3 1
1 1
4 1
1 1
,1 C
TN47-7256 IV DAP-RR-P-001, REV.1 l
_m_____ - - - - _ _ - - _ -
(
1.0 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS
\
1his Results Report summarizes the results of a lhird Party review of the ad 4 l
!arge bore piping and suppons at the Comanche Peak Sacam Elsesric Sta described in Section 2.0. This review was performed as part of the Desig (DAP) under the charter of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRTl 7.1) by a 1hird Party Organization (TENERA, L.P.) 1he approach, meth developed to accomplish this review are described in Discipline Specifi
' (Appendix C of the CPRT Program Plan) as modified in Appendix A of Refere cenain piping and piping supports at CPSES. " Ade '
-codes CPSES FinalSqfery Analysis Report (PSAR) and licensing commitme and standards. i The scope of this review, which involves extemal source concems, has been ca thiny two "externalsource issues," each of which has been the subject of an evaluation. These issues were identified in publicly available NRC docketed info purpose of this report is to summarize the results of these evaluations and to provi ,
regarding the adaqwy of the design aspects reviewed by the 1hird Party, -j i
The 1hird Party overview of the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporat reanalysis and pipe support requalification program has been completed.1his effor evaluadon of SWEC's methodologies that address resolution of the conc two extemal source issues.1his scope involved large bort pipe stress manalysi pipe suppon requalification, including the basis for the methods discussed in used in these activities. Other activities,includsg the review of technical procedures O reanalysis and requalification of small bore piping and supports and the overview of th implementadon of procedures for both types of piping including veri 5 catio Assurance Technical Audit Program (See Reference 7.2).as co 1his report summanzes the results and presents the conclusions from this T .
1he activities addressed in this report are as follows: .
- Issue Review (DSAP Df, Secdon 4.2.1.1)
- t'nmmitment Verification (DSAP IX, Section 4.2.1.2)
- Large bolt piping reanalysis and support requalification procedures review (D wrian 4.2.1.3)
!- BrieSy stated, the review identi5ed extemal sourm issues, established applicab
! on the CPSES PSAR and licensing commitments, reviewed SWEC's procedures!
criteria, and evaluated the resolution methodologies for the issues.1he res were prenanted in SWEC's Generic issues Report (GIR)(R<ference 73) and k-:siys SWEC's procedures. Consideradons regarding root causes and generic implica programmade aspects of the extemal source issues will be addressed as part of the TU programs Reference 7.2).
for processing and evaluation of nonconfonnance and discrepancy reports (S ;
O TN47 7256 11 DAP RR-P-001, REV.1
As required in DSAP IX, the Third Pany identified extemal source issues by condu document review. The Third Pany review of over 40,000 pages of documents resulte issuance of approximately 800 piping-related Discrepancy //ssue Resolution Rep which documersed concems raised by extemal sources. These DIRs were consolidated EnernalSource Issue Summaries (ESISs, which are also referred to as " issues"), to f efficient resolution of the concems.1hese DIRs and ESISs were for the basis for the scope of this report.
SWEC procedures were reviewed for compliance with applicable CPSES FSA criteria. Licensing commitments applicable to CPSES were used to establish a listin which were then used to check SWEC procedures. The procedures were detennined to compliance either with the existing criteria or criteria changes that were accepted by th submittal as FSAR amendments. (see NRC letter to TUGCO dated November 4,1 7.4).
As documented in the GIR and its procedures, SWEC addressed each of the thirty-two i using one or more of the following options:
Elimination of selected designs Use of analysis and design practices that are typical ofindustry practice Development of new methods specifically applicable to the concems raised e
Use and design of more methodsadvanced analysis techniques or testing to confirm the adequacy o
- Use of SWEC Corporate Quality Assurance Program
. Implementation
~ " ' ' ' ~ ofproject specific procedures for control of all phases of design and O
For each of the thiny two issues, the resolution methodology has been reviewed by th Pany and found to be responsive to the concem and in compliance with applicable FSA licensing criteria. The Third Pany has concluded that the overall objectives of the revie been met, and considers all piping related external source issues applicable to the l piping scope to be closed with respect to the methodology being applied to the requa effon assuming the NRC approves the FSAR amendments.
1he Third Pany has concluded that SWEC's large bore pipe stress reanalysis and requalification program is comprehensive and capable,if property implemented, of re known will meet the PSAR and licensing commitments.
issues. Proper implementation will ensure that the CPSES large bore pi O
TN47 7256 12 DAP RR P 001, REV.1
2.0 SCOPE 1his report addremes three areas of review identified in DSAP IX as follows:
- Issues - The 1hird Pany identified, reviewed, and tracked extemal source id issuer which were raised reganiing pipe analysis and pipe suppon design also included consideration of TRT Issue V.c (Rgerence 7.5) which ad considerations for piping between seismic Category I and non-seimnic C tmidings. The criteria and methodology used by the Project (SWEC) for a these systems were reviewed by the 1hird Pany. 'Ihis review provides reasonab assurance that the extemal source issues have been identified and th methodology used by the Project address all identified issues.
- Commitment Verification - 1he 'Ihird Party verified that commitments which piping and support-related design criteria and standards are adequately addres procedures and other Project documents. '!he commitment sources included design specifications, and the ASME Codes of Recon 1 for piping (Rgerence piping supports (Agerence 7.7). For each criterion source and standard iden appropriate of development criteria Mu and commitments were summarized.1hese criteria were us m for the review of specific program areas. '!his review ensures that Project procedures are consistent with applicable criteria and commitments
{
Where criteria changes have been submitted by the project to resolve difL .ec the approved FSAR and Pmject procedures (documented on C DIRs) closure the assumption that the NRC will appmve the amendments.
Procedure Review *Ihe 1hird Party reviewed procedures (mcluding appropria Project Management memoranda) developed by the Project (SWEC) for the p of the SWEC scope involving large bore piping analysis and support des evaluation of the supporting analyses, that they are adequate to achieve theirinten purpose.1his issues.
review verifies that the project procedures resolve the extemal source i
{
1he focus of these review efforts is to ensure that the SWEC pecedures adequa compliance with Project li==ing commitments, codes, and standards, {
e resolution of extemally identifled issues, and e
ability to accommodate and resolve additional issues as needed.
The portions of the SWEC scope involving piping reanalysis and pipe suppon requ addressedin this report are:
e all piping and pipe supports within ASME III Code Casses 2 and 3 large bore than 2 inch pipe size) stress pmblem boundaries (mcluding ASME Code Oasses 2 small bore and Cass 5 piping and supports within these boundaries), and e
all pipe suppons within ASME M Code Cass I stress problem boundaries (mc ASME M Code Casses 1,2, and 3 and Oass 5 supports within these boundaries Reference 7.1).
SWEC analytical methods are govemed by procedure CPPP-7 (Rgerence 7.8 both Unit I and Unit 2. Procedure CPPP 6 (Reference 7.9)is largely administrative anj applicable to Unit 1. CPPP 9 (Reference 7J0)is the contsponding Unit 2 procedure. T !
l TN 87 7256 21 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1 l
__ _ w
Pany seviews of both CPPP-6 and CPPP-9 determined that the differences in t reDect differences in the stage of completion between the two units and provide O adequacy of analytical methods.1he results expressed in this report are applic because the procedural differences do not have a significant effect on the adeq methods. Where it has been necessary to review implementation activities as par the Third Party generally exartined Unit I results because Uniter1 implementatio ,
stage of compledon. Unit I and 2 implementation is based on the same methodolo Where the scope of the review covered by this report required an interface with discipline, that interface was established as discussed in Section 3.2.3 unde .
This report does not address the following DSAP IX reviews: 1 Review of technical procedures for small bort piping and suppons e
Overview of the implementation of procedures
- Overvkw of Project verificadorvreconcdiation of as-built information.
The status of these areas of DSAP IX reviews will be addressed in separate repor transmitted Audit Program. to TU Sectric for funher consideration under their Quality Assurance Tech O
O TN 87-7256 2-2 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
_ - _ - _ - - - - - - - - _ - - - = - - - -
3.0 EXTERNAL SOURCE ISSUES O s4 a vi = thodoioav All external source issues identified as being related to the piping and supp addressed in this report. DSAP IX addresses both the identification of these iss program for resolving them. The conduct of the Third Party review was controlle Adequacy Procedure 10 (DAP-10) (Reference 7.11).with 1 The diagram in FIGURE 3.1 1 depicts the relationship among review activiti evaluadon of the SWEC methodology. One path fo the extemal concems. The other path focused on the criteria to which the OS The process incorporated consideration of the extemal source issue DIR commitments to verify that the methodology used will produce an acuptabic reso external sowce issues. All issue resolutions were reviewed and the Engineering Evaluations which are the basis for the conclusions presented .
A discussion of each of the thirty-two issues is provided in Section 3.2.3. The r section describes the Third Party approach to identification of extemal source i comajitment methodology. compliance review of SWEC procedures, and evaluation of SWEC reso 3.1.1 Identification of Extemal Source issues O Extemal 7.12).1he process source required issues were the following threeidentified steps: and documented in acc
- 1) identification of extemal source documents,
- 2) source document review and preparation ofissue records /DIRa, and
- 3) consolidation ofindividual issues into issue summaries.
1he identification of source documents focused on documents judged to include su relevant issues, particulady infonnation either presented to the Asomic Sqfet Board (ASLB) or originated by the Board. ASLB hearing w. gig were used as a ba ofinformation. In addition to the ASLB hearing transcripts, pertinent filings the NRC staff, Texar Usflities Elecsric Company (TU Electric) (previously Texas Utiliti Generating Corapany or TUGCO), Citizens Associationfor Sound Energy (CA Energy Services were included and, as appropriate, the Sqfery Evaluorion Repo supplements thereto (SSERs). The documents also encompassed transcripts of any of the above-mentioned parties, and between those parties and the 1hird Party piping or support issues. Cygna reports and letten addressing these issues were a The listing provided of all source as Attachment A. doc 67-a used by the 1hird Party for extemal issue idendficat Each source document was reviewed in accordance with DAP 2. Th external issues capture a minimum of one discussed in the citadon of each distinct source dccumenta. Issues are docum issue.
O TN47 7256 3-1 DAP RR P 001, REV.1
i IDENTIFY EXTERNAL l SOURCE DOCUMENTS REVIEW UCENSING COMMITMENT DOCUMENTS 1
REVIEW DOCUMENTS &
PREPAREISSUE RECORDS /DIRs DEVELOP CRTTERIA LIST CONSOLIDATE DIRs TO l IDENTIFY PRMY ISSUES N PROCEDURES FOR CRllERIA COMPUANCE REVIEW SWEC GIR TO VERIFY COVERAGE r
EVALUATE SWEC RESOLUTION -
METHODOLOGY FOR ISSUE k REVIEW OTHER SWEC DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING METHODOLOGY J
DOCUMENT THIRD PARTY POSmON N ENGNEERNG EVALUATIONS d
SUMMARIZE N RESLLTS REPORT FIGURE 3.1-1 O EXTERNAL SOURCE ISSUE toaic oixaRAu TN 87 7256 32 DAP RR P 001, REV.1
For every Issue Record, a DR was issued to assist the Third Pany in tracking c issue.1he document title and specific page(s) on which the issue is discusse each DR. The reviewer was not permitted to exclude any issue based on an asse validity or consideration by the source that the issue was closed.
The public records used as source documents contain considerable d and suppon issues. In most cases, extemal issues ait discussed in many d repetitive documentation of the same issue in more than one DR. To comprehe and to suppon effective resolution of each issue, it was necessary to consolidate relating to a given issue. The aim of this consolidation was to ensure that key identified in the various DRs were included within the definitio issues are denned in thirty-two ESISs. The issue descriptions in each E technical assessment of the key aspects discussed in the source 40%.
1he DIRs serve as references to the extemal source documents pertaining to the issue. Lists of the g are provided in each ESIS, and a primary DR is used for each issue to track the resoluti Because TU Electric elected to proceed directly to corrective actions for the extem issues in piping and suppons, the Primary DIRs are categorized as " unclassified described in Appendix E of the Program Plan.
3.1.2 Criteria and Commitment Compliance Review of SWEC Procedures l 1he second review activity conducted by the 1hird Pany to evaluate the adequacy requahfication program was to identify the criteria and commitments which the SWEC procedures must address.1he criteria and commitments used fbr the overview ofpi reanalysis and support and pipe requalification were taken from the FSAR (Agere applicable Regulatory Guides; industry standanis: the ASME Code; and design spe 1hese documents were used by the 1hird Pany to develop the Design Criteria Ust, 001 DAP-1.(R<ference 7J.7) in which applicable irquirements are consolidated in accordanz The criteria were then evaluated collectively. Design Criteria Review Checklist D was used to review the criteria for completeness, accuracy, and consistacy, The acceptance criteria idesitified in the Design Criteria List were funber taBored to by development of Design Review Evaluadon thklista Applicable criteria were broadened ineo checklist attributes, as appropriate, by stating the specific requirements of the or regulatory guide. This appmach permitted a damited, documented ammaamment of the r items.
\
j Application of a Design Review Evaluation Ch~+1i= to specific design procedures involv assessment of compliance of the document with the checklist anributes. For each attribute, reviewer detennined if the procedure was in compliance with design commitments. If compliance was satisfactory, the reviewer indicated " SAT." If the procedure was not in compliance, or was indeterminate, the disposition was "UNSAT." Each UNSAT determin was followed by issuance of a Discrepancy / Issue Resolution (DR) Report which docum l finding for futme evaluation. An attribute which was not applicable to the specific doc design was marked "N/A." If an attribute was outside the defined scope of review docu on a panicular checklist, it was marked "N/C" (Not Checked) since it was not evaluated.
The final status of the Design Review Evaluation Checklist will be delineated and forw O the TU Electric QA Technical Audit Program.
TN 67 7256 3-3 DAP RR-P-001, REV.1
SWEC has issued two procedures that define input and methods, and techni including informadon interfaces, for the reanalysis and requalification effort:
- 1) CPPP4: Pipe Stiess/ Support Requalification Procedure - Unit 1 (Rgreren
- 2) CPPP-7: Design Criteria for Pipe Stress and Pipe Supports (Reference 7.8 includes the approaches used to resolve the extemal issued CPPP-9 which applies to Unit 2 and corresponds to CPPP4.
1he procedures were reviewed using a set of checklists. The checklist. DAP-CLC used to document the review for Revision 2 of CPPP4 and CPPP-7. Some aspects methodology were not included within Revision 2 and were either so indicated within procedures or documented in a series of project memoranda. A list of project memora reviewed as part of CPPP-7 is included as Attachment C of this report. Ca=** wer with the checklist and DIRs were used to track open items. Differences between re reviewed and later revisions will be addressed as part of the TU Electric Quality As Technical Audit Program (See Reference 7.2).
3.1.3 Evaluation of Resolution Methodology The third review activity conducted by the 1hird Party was to evaluate the SWEC methodology. This evaluation incorporated the results of the Third Party review of SW procedures that were described in the preceding section. Assessments by the1h SWEC approach to each of the extemal source issues are provided in a se evaluadons.
'Ihe SWEC Generic Issues Report (GIR) outlined the approach to resolving externa issues. This report and the proadures that implement the approach are the major evaluation required additionalinformation Fr-=- M CPP SWEC documents supporting the methadatagy (prhaarDy generic analyseshalcu.
generic analyseshalculations were reviewed to facuitaat selective numerical checks of tah values and checks of the mathemadcal development of equations specified in CPP the procedure does not include this nevel of detail.1he calculations also provide certain assumsions on which specific methods were based.1he approedt used for these justifications was also reviewed.
Using the issues as defined in the ESISs, acceptance criteria for resolution we Demedon of those criteria and the evaluation of SWEC's methodology against themI provided in a separate ==i=Aug evaluation for each issue. This report summarizes th of those evabiarlann 3.2 Results 3.2.1 Extemal Source issue identification As discussed in Section 3.1.1, repeated references to a common set oflisucs wer 800 Issue Records that have conesponding DIRs that TABLE 3.2 1 lists the consolidated issues, the primary DIRs used to track them, and TN 87 7256 3-4 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1 j
}
1 l
TABLE 3.21 1 I
ISSUE DOCUMENTATION i ISSUE uTLE ENG. EVAL. ESIS PRIMARY DIR Richmond Inserts Local Stresses DAP-E-P-001 ESIS P-001 E-1234 Large Framed Wall to-Wall and DAP E P 002 ESIS-P-002 E-1235 Ploor to-Ceiling Supports Support System Stability DAP E P 003 ESIS-P-003 E-1236 DAPGP-004 )
Generic Stiffness ESIS-P404 E 1237 DAP&P-005 ESIS-P405 E-1238 U-Bolts Acting as Two-Way Restraints Fdction Forces DAP-E P-006 ESIS-P 006 E 1239 DAP E-P-007 ESIS-P-007 {
AWS vs. ASME E-1240 '
A500, Grade B Tube Steel DAP-E-P 008 ESIS-P-008 E-1241 Section Properties DAP-E-P 009 ESIS-P 009 E-1242 U Bolt Cinching DAP-E-P-010 ESIS-P-010 E 1243 '
DAP-E-P 011 ESIS-P-011 E-1244 Axial / Rotational Restraints Gaps DAP-E-P-012 ESIS-P 012 E-1245 Seimnic Design Load Specification DAP-E-P 013. ESIS-P413 E-1246 g DAP&P414 ESIS-P 014 E-1247 Support Mass Effects on Piping Analysis Mass Point Spacing DAP-E P 015 ESIS-P415 E 1248 DAP-E P417 ESIS-P417 E-1249 High FrequencyMass Panicipation Fluid Transients DAP E-P 018 ESIS-P-018 E-1250 Self-Weight Excitation DAP-E-P-019 ESIS-P 019 E-1251 DAP-E-P-020 ESIS-P 020 E-1252 LocalStress in Pipe SupportMembers Safiery Factors DAP-E-P 021 ESIS-P 021 E 1253 DAP-E-P 022 ESIS-P 022 E-1254 SA-36 and SA-307 Steel -
DAP-E-P 023 ESIS-P 023' ~ E-1255 Valve and Plange Qualification and Valve Modeling Piping Model DAP-E-P 025 ESIS-P 025 E-1256 Welding DAP-E P426 ESIS-P426 E-1257 Anchor Bolts DAP&P 027 ESIS-P 027 E-1258 Strut Angularity DAP-E-P-028 ESIS-P-028 E-1259 Structural Modeling for Frame Analysis DAP-E-P 029 ESIS-P-029 E-1260 Computer Program Verification and Use DAP&P 031 ESIS P431 E-1263 Hydstest DAP-E-P 032 ESIS-P-032 E 1264 DAP-E P 034 ESIS-P-034 E-1266 Seimnic/Non-SeismicInterface DAP E-P-038 ESIS-P-038 E-1275 Programmatic Aspects and QA DAP-E-P 016 ESIS-P.016 E-1276 O
TN 67 7256 35 DAP RR-P 001, REV.1
identified. DIRs for Issue Records that were addressed in Section 3.2.3.33. These DRs generally covered less complex ques DIRs were addressed usmg the DIR form for documentation in accordance procedures.
In the opinion of the Third Party, there is sufficient information in the public re listed in Attachment A) for each concem, to enable the Third Party to define and high degree of assurance that all concems are addressed. issu The extemal source issues can be classified into the following four groups of concem concems that well-defined and explicit working level requirements werl 1)implemented, k
i
- 2) concems that a technically specific FSAR commitment, industry code or stan regulatory position was not implemented in design methods, 3)n-concems that the use of standard design and analysis practices were not my when applied to atypical designs, and
- 4) concems that specific aspects of methodology, although in compliance Appendix A of10CFR50. codes, standards, or standard practice, failed to sati ,
3.2.2 SWEC Compliance with CPSES Criteria consistent, and adequate set of criteria.The collective evaluation of the D ,
SWEC procedures CPPP-6 and CPPP-7 were reviewed, and comments provid every item in the procedures that was determined to be a discrepancy when comp M% attribute, a DR was written. These DIRs are C-type DRs,u which ent are used to di technical resolution and to track the closure ofopen items. Each DR lasued against procedures provides both a description of the quesdon posed by the third party and ,
resolution.1he DIRs have all been closed by the Third Party through either techn{
or transfer to the TU Electric Quality Assurance Technical Audit Pisgr.- (Aq(erenc the NRC. Unresolved DIRs will be delineated in the!
Additionally, CPPP 9 was compared to CPPP-6 to detern.ine if there were signil 1he conclusion with CPSES criteria. was that no differences existed that affected the adequacy of{
Based on the above reviews, the conclusion was reached that the SWEC pr!
that set of criteria.
3.2.3 Extemal Source issue Resolution Evaluations of the resolution methodologies have been completed for the thirty-tw source issues. Each of the thirty two issues is described in an individual subs with discussions of resolution methodology and the 1hird Party evaluation and co O
TN 87 7256 36 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
_ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - . _
3.2.3.1 Richmond inserts ISSUEDESCRIPTION The use of Richmond Insens in structural tube connections (see F concems generally relating to design allowables, methods used to compute bok loads in connections, and frame modeling and analysis of the insertAube connection. A mor discussion of this issue can be found in Engineering Evaluation DAP E P-001.
within these areas are the following:
- Factor of Safety - he design allowables for tension and shear were detennine Richmond Screw Company test data from tests using 3000 psi concrete an factor of 2.0. De Richmond Screw Company recommends a safety factorof 3 products. A second, related concem is adequacy, without confirmatory testmg, o interacdon equation for combined tension and shear, which was taken from the Prestressed Concrete inrtitute (FCI) Handbook.
- Concrete Strength - De concern is that the Richmond Insens have been installed concrete weaker than the 4000 psi design strength used for design.
- Shear Stress ABowables fbr 1 1/2" Richmond Inserts - Shear a Richmond not Inserts be conservative. have been extrapolated thxn test data for 1" and 1-1/4"
- Cornputation of Bolt and Insert Imads - Richmond InsertAube steel connections we analyzed using a simplified method which does not account for bolt angularity or bending due to shear in the tubing, and may not accurately predict the prymg te the insert and the tube.
O
- Frarne Modeling of Tube-to-Insert Connections - Inconsistencies in modeling tube-to-insen connections (such as the selection of pinned versus fixed joints in imes calculation of suppon stiffness and tube / frame stresses. Deae inconsistencies may also result in unconservative c=N=% ofloads on bolts and inserts.
- Testing of Richmond Inserts - TUOCO perfonned tests on Richmond Inserts to hJhs the loadwi ng icapacity of the insert and to examine the behavior of connection for combined loading. Questions were raised by extemal sources re (a) the represetativeness of the testa to actual plant conditions, and (b) the of the test results.
- TUGCO Finite Bement Study - Verification of the screening method used toj simplined method for design of Richmond Insens was based on improperty int results of Anite element analyses.
- Local Stress at Bolt Holes in Tubing - he local stress at bok holes in stmetu was not evaluated. Such sotas could cause punching-type failure in the tubing.
- Fatigue design. Padgue caused by cyclicloading of the connection was not considered in th
- Improper Um of Richmond Allowables Dreaded rodsholts at Richmond Insens occasionaHy were unconservatively evaluated because the tension and shear allowa forthe insen were used.
O TN 87 7258 37 DAP.RR.P-001, REV.1
P l rO ~~ l l NUT l
WASHER PLATE I I
[f !!
'i D)
- TUBE STEEL THREADED ROD
/
/ /
/ \
/
j k(il ,
!! j '
WASHER PLATE l l I I v g.4 w
g ,, , c.
, - - e
, 1 -
s .
C a
kd
,' RCHMOND INSERT 3 @ $ ',.,
.Sh N /
jM.J $h w (.-
s a
j
- l E' jvf- j 7 y, -
, vg 3
, , ..,$r -
P.M pc. pL .- v.*~
... 9 FIGURE 3.2-1 i TYPICAL RICHMOND INSERT /
TUBE STEEL CONNECTION O
TN 87-7256 38 DAP-RR.P 001, REV.1
e Spacing at Richmond Inserts - Lack of TUGCO structural attachment interface program could result in failure to consider spacing effects of nearby anchors / sleeves the structuralevaluadon ofinsens.
- Shear Distribution at Richmond Inserts - De threaded rod and hole fit-up tole could cause unequal sharing of shear loading fmm tubing which is anchore more Richmond Inserts.
LOCA hermal Expansion of Tube Steel Under LOCA conditions, thermal expansion oflong tubing anchored by two or more Richmond Insens could produ unacceptably high loads and large defo:mations in the insen/ rod connection.
SWEC RESOLUTICWMETHODOLOGY De methods used by SWEC to resolve or address the concems identified above a e
Factor of Safety - SWEC has adopted a safety factor of 3 for Richmond Inserts un normal, upset, and emergency loading conditions, as recommended by The Richmo Screw Company, but SWEC used a safety factor of 2 for faulted condition lo allowables are based on averaging TUGCO insert capacity test failure loads.
Additionally, specific requirements have been imposed for concrete strength spacing, and concrete edge distance.
For combined tension and shear, SWEC has adopted the Prestressed Concrete lass (PCI) Handbook interacdon equadon which is used to evaluate all loading condition Concrete Strength - SWEC methods assume a concrete strength of 4000 psi.
Shear Stress Allowables fbr 1 1/2" Richmond Inserts - TUGCO perfonned addidon
- O_ tests to estahliah allowables for all sizes of Richmond Insens. Shear a Richmond repons. Inserts are based on the average test failure loads presented in the TU Computation of Bolt and Insert IAads - De SWEC approach for computation of b and insert loads depends on censin modeling requirements Ibr structural snalysi linearinteraction equation to evatuses the adequacy of the md in the inoest fbr co bending, tension, and shear, and a lbree-couple transformadon of bok bending compute insert sension.
Frarne Modeling of Tube to-Insert Connections - De SWEC approach for ev tube-to insert connecdons structuralinterfaces,M dk antahtiehes specific modeling requirements at specific the insert, md emid attaching to the tube steel, and rod and tube stee
. Testing of Richenood Inserts - De SWEC approach uses the load capacity insert t results of two TUGCO test reports. For Richmond Inserts, these test results ait used to aarahHah the design allowables fbr plant serYiot Condidons, to validate the ka.cdon equadon for combined shear and tension, to establish the design sdfthens for insert onandans, and to establish the design limits used to evaluate the effects of LOCA thermal expansion. ne'IUGCO tests used previously to examine the behavior of the connection are not used.
. TUGCO Mnite Element Study - De SWEC approach to insert connection qualifi does not rely on the previously perfonned TUGCO finite element study.
O TN 87 7256 39 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
. Local Stress at Bolt Holes in Tubing - SWEC procedures provide a methodolo Q implementing tables for evaluating the local load capacity at bolt holes in stmetu steel. This methodology limits the local stress in the bolt hole vicinity.
. Fatigue - SWEC does not consider fatigue to be a relevant factor in these conn and therefore does not include it in the design.
- Improper Use of Richmond Allowables - The SWEC methodology requires that th threaded rod and insert be evaluated separately, using specified allowables and interaction equations.
- Shear Distribution at Richmond Inserts - SWEC procedures assume equal distrib of shearloads resulting from rod and hole fit up tolerances, where tubing is two or more Richmond Inserts However, during final reconciliation, these designs w be reviewed by SWEC to verify that unequal shearload sharing assumption
. LOCA Thermal Expansion of Tube Steel SWEC procedures provide methods for evaluating the effects of LOCA thermal expension of tubing on Richmond Insert connections.1he method is based on RLCA Report RLCNP142/01-86dOD9 (R<feren 7.18) which uses shear test results in combination with an elasdc analysis of failure estimate defonnations. By applying a safety factor of 2 to these deformations, d limits on insert / rod deformations are established for LOCA thermal expansion and system mechanicalloads.
- Specing at Richnend Inserts - SWEC Cbnective Action Program (SWEC-CAP)is responsible for collecting all structural attachment load information and performing evaluation for all pipe support structural attachments, including Richmond Inserts.
O ~"~" ~ ~ ~
1he following paragraphs describe the 1hird Party evaluations of the SWEC methods f identified concems:
- Fwtor of Safety - The safety factor of 3 for nonnal, upset, and emergency load conditions complies with ine acommendadan of the Richmond Screw omepany. T safety thceor of 2 for faulted conditions is based en American Concrese Inadtm Standard 349-85 (Aqference 7.15) using the results of tests perfonned by TUGCO.
349-85 provides e industry experienor#=aanana basis for design of maclear s related concrete structures. TUOCO does not have a licensing cammitment to '
with this standard for this application; however, this is an @ standard for establishing adequase margin. The 11XiCO test data indicanes that the scatter in th faDure loads is quhe small, particularly when compared to data for other types o concrete =d-s indicating that the reliability of Richmond Inserts is much greater than that ofexpansion bolts. A lower safety factor is acceptable, based on the test d and ACI 349 85.
Use of the interacdon equation for counbined tension and shearis supported by Technical Report, " Connections for Precast Conense Building", which senses that an interaction equation (identical to that used by SWEC) represents a lower bound c insert test results. The statement is not limited to prestressed concrete. The ap of this equation was evaluated and determined by the Third Party to be ==phic f Richmond Insens without reliance on confirmatory tests.
O TN-67 7256 3 10 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
Concrete Strength - Plant concrete strength was addressed in Issue Specyte (ISAP)ll.b Results Report, tided Concrete Compressive Strength,(Rgference!
CPRTprogram. This report concluded that reasonable assurance exists thatl required design strength of 4000 psi was met. . l I
e Shear Stres Allowables for I I/2" Richmond Inserts The SWEC a based on average results obtained from TUGCO tests performed specifically Richmond Inserts. The test results are adjusted in accordance with ACI 349 85. '
safety factors discussed above are maintained. This is En acceptable basis to a variations in shear stress allowables.
. Computation of Bolt and Insert Loads The SWEC methodology forcomputatio
- bolt and insert loads provides a conservative evaluation of the rod and insert, wh adequately considers bolt angularity, bolt bending due to shear in the tub action in the insen and the tube. The SWEC structural modeling procedure resu set of rod loads that yields conservative rod interaction values when compared to of detailed finite element studies performed by RLCA. The SWEC procedure for transforming rod loads into insen loads results la conservative insert interaction v (using the PCIinteraction equation) when compared to the detailed RLCA stud with the additional check for direct stress in A-193 evaluation of the threaded rod in tension, shear, and bending.
. Frame Modeling of Tube-to-Insert Connections - The influena of structu on Richmond Insen qualification is discussed above.1he influence on support stiff and member stresses is covered in Section 3.2.3.28, where it'is concluded that the modeling is adequate and in compliance with ASME Section III, Paragraph XVII Briefly stated, the classical approach to modeling a connection based on an either a pinned or fixed connection is replaced with a more detailed model.
- Testing of Richmond Inserts - The representativeness of test to in-plant conditio being evaluated under DSAP VIII in 1hird Party Issue Resolution Report (IRR)
DAP-E-C/S-515. (R<ference 7.17)
"The concem regarding interpretation of TUGCO mst results is acceptably reso because: a) the SWEC procedure for evaluating the tube steel to Richmond Ins connection relics upon the RLCA analysis previously discussed, not on the TUGCO connection tests previously used to justify the TUGCO methods, b) the SWEC p appropriately adjusts insen capacities to account for the difference between plan concrete design strength and the concrete strength for the insen capacity tests, and industry codes and standards (e.g. ACI 349) permit the averaging of test failure establish the design strength ofinsens.
- F1 nite Element Study Because the SWEC approach does not use the simplifie screening method and does not rely on the previously performed analysis, this conc irrelevant to the cunent technical resolution.
Local Stress at Bolt Holes in Tubing - Richmond insert / tube steel cxmnoctions large rectangular 1 inch thick washer plates which distribute the stress at the bolt Under the maximum allowable tension loads which can develop at 1-inch and 1-1 connections for the sizes of tube steel used, the simplified SWEC local load ca methodology provides an adequate means for evaluating local effects at the loaded connection hole. The model on which the SWEC methodology is based employs TN47-7256 3 11 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
l o i 4
simplifying construct to calculate the stresses in the bolt hole region. To verify adequacy of this analysis, additional analyses were performed by the 1hird Pa O alternase methodology. These separate analyps confirmed the acceptability of the SWECmethodology.
- Fatigue - Since specific loads identified in the SWEC procedures are dynamic SWEC evaluadon was performed to consider high cycle fatigue as required by A Section III. This evaluation conntmed that the lower threshold limit of 20,000 cyc established in subaection NF, below which fatigue is not a concem, will not be reached
- Spacing at Richmond Inserts - 1he SWEC ap[soa:h provides a cersralued comprehensive program for evaluating Richmd Insens, considering effects of all nearby anchorages / sleeves.
- Improper Use of Richmond Allowables - The SWEC procedures ensure that Richmond Insert connections will be properly evaluated.
- Shear Distribution at Richmond InsertafTube Steel Connections - The SW procedures provide specinc written criteria for the evaluadon of Richmnnd Insens used in conjunction with tube steel 1he1hird Pany considers these methods adequate for evaluating sheardistribution.
- LOCA 1herrnal Expansion of Tube Steel - The SWEC procedure for evaluating LOC 1 thermal expansion of Richmond Insen connected tube steel is based on the results of a '
detailed analysis, RLCA/P142/01-86409 (Agerence 7J8), performed by RLCA. To verify the adequacy of this analysis, additional analyses were performed by the Third Pany using an attemate methodology, lhese separate analyses ~connnned the acceptabdity of the SWEC methodology.
CONCLUSION SWEC methodology adequately addresses the concems identified in this issue.1his issue is closed.
3.2.3.2 Local Pipe Stresses ISSUE DESCRIPn0N A concern was raised that local pipe stresses at welded attachments, such as lugs and tru were not being evaluated for comparison to piping stress limits. Although the Code of Record ,
(Reference 7.6) does not contain specinc requiremeras for the analysis of attadunents, it is i standard pmetice to calculase spesses in the pipe that result from suppon loads on the attachments. Analysis of MJv dng pads and dimensional limitations on analytical methods are two concems that att selated to evaluation oflocal pipe stresses.
There are some frame suppons at CPSES with zero radial clearance. Normally, box frames a designed with a gap to allow for pipe radial thermal growth. A concem was raised that the differential radial growth between the pipe and the support could result in unacceptably suesses in the pipe and the support. For Oass 2/3 piping, radial thermal expansion effects are not normally considered and the Code does not specify criteria for this type ofloading. Similar concems were raised about cinched U-bolts and anchors. In these cases, the effect can be classified as a circumferential line load. Another concem was raised regarding the conj oflongitudinal line loads on piping. At a frame support, the pipe rests with line contact on a )
TN.67 7256 3-12 DAP-RR P.001, REV.1
1 I
cross-member. Local stresses are induced in the pipe as a result of a support l contains a detailed discussion of the issue. contact. The local pipe su SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHOD0t.OGY SWEC is evaluating local pipe suesses at welded attachments. Proc stresses for comparison to Code allowables. W
' (WRC) 107 methodology is followed for some of the configurations. Certain L
studies whichjustify the use of procedures in thes dimensions outside the WRC recommended limits and for unique desig .
. Design changes have eliminated zero gap frames and cinched U bolts, thermal expansion. Radial thermal expansion local suesses are being evalu i
(uncinched-cinched U bolts have been deleted), stiff pipe clamps, and opp addition, SWEC has developed procedures to investigate radial thermal ex anchors.
line loads at supports. Procedures were also defined for evaluating loc t
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION SWEC has issued procedures for evaluating local pipe stresses at welded suppons with circumferential or longitudinal line loads. *!he computed stress O consistent with Code Cases N-318 2 and N-329 wh .
j Cases N-318-2 and N 329 use allowables from a later Code which are high Record. 'Ihese higher allowables are also used for circumferential and longit to local spesses in the cases analyzed by SWEC. evaluations. T ;
I f
for certain parameters, and to qualify unique design the issue. A sample of thirteen finite element analyse .
beta limits, expanded Pitrife limits, non integral pa '
anchor local stress, and a finite element model sensitivity study. Five of the calcul reviewed are qualifications of specific support attachment designs.
As a resuk of the finite element analysis studies, several procedures forlocal have been changed. Pipe local suesses caused by radial thermal expansio for support designs where they could be significant. The stresses are b suesses for comparison to Code allowables-this is a conservative approa CONCLUSIONS SWEC's approach (calculating local stresses and adding local suesses to th O comparison to piping allowables) adequately addresses the concerns. This issue is 1N 67 7256 3 13 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
3.2.3.3 1.arge Frarne Wall-To-Wall And Floor-To-Ceiling Supports ISSUE DESCRIPTION This issue is evaluated in Engineering Evaluation DAP-E-P 003 which provides a detailed discussion of the issue. In summary, the concem is that in the design evaluation oflar wall-to-wall and floor-to-ceihng supports the following considerations for frame or anchor were not explicitlyincluded:
e frame thermal expansion due to LOCA and containment ambient conditions.
relative differential displaments between the frame and the building attachment po for seismic building movements and time-dependent displacement effects, e.g., concr creep, and e
cumulative effects resulting from thermal expansion, seismic, and time dependent relative movements.
i SWEC RESOLU110 METHODOLOGY I
SWEC addresses the issue through analysis or support modifications as follows:
- With the excepdon of aervice water tunnel supports, large frame waH-to-waH or floor-to-ceiling supports are modified to include slipjoints to accommodate differential displacements and thennal expansion.
- Service water tunnel supports extending fmm wall-to-wall or floor to ccahng are quahfied forloading combinations that include frame thermal expansion, relat've
( differential building dispiremesen due to seismic movement, long tenn concrete and live loads. Effects are evaluated cumulatively.
- Comer supports other than those attached to secondary walls are qualified using p loads only. Relative building displacements have been demonstrated to be insignifica by SWEC. For supports spanning between building primary and W 7 walls, project procedure O'PP 35 (Agerence 7.25) has been issued to addreas such designs. !
THIRO PAR 7 DEVALUATION The approach adopted by SWEC addtesses issue resolution by three methods. 'the modificatil of all large frame supports (except those in the service water tunne!) to include slipjoints eliminates the concem of differential displacements for these supports. 'Ihe combination ofloa\
used to evaluate large frame wad to-wall and floor-to ceiling supports in the service water tunnl addresses the issue and the requirements of subsection NF-3231.l(a) of the ASME Code !'
(Reference 7.7) and the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.124 Position 5.
CONCLUSIONS
'Ihe SWEC approach adequately addresses this issue for wall-to-wall and Goor-to-ceilin supports either by physical modification or by design qualification. SWEC method to address corner supports for significant OBE building displacements spanmng primary and secondary walls as defined in CPPP-35 is adequate to close this issue.
O TN-87-7256 3 14 DAP PD P-001, REV.1
3.2.3.4 Support System Stability
,. m ISSUEDESCRIPTION Certain pipe supports were identified which appeared to be capable oflarge displa possible result of such displacements is a loss ofintended function, that is, th restrain the pipe as modeled in the piping analysis. Such supports are considered un supports in question have been grouped, for convenience, into the following categori Box frames connected to struts or snubbers U-bolts connected to a single strut or snubber e Trapeze supports e
Column / strut assemblies e
Trunnion / strut assemblies For each of these categories, a displacement mechanism can be postulated that le to cany the intended load. 'the technical issue is whether one can analytically demonstra the postulated mechanisms do not occur under the set ofloading conditions imposed qualification of piping. FIGURE 3.2 2 depicts a postulated displacement wherein a box moves along the axis of a pipe. A support which may undergo such displacement is con unstable because it may not perform as required or as modeled in the analysis.
'Ihe stability issue is evaluated in Engineering Evaluation DAP-E-P-004 which provi detailed discussion of the issue. A related issue is U bolt cinching, which is evaluated in Engineering Evaluation DAP-E P 011.
SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY SWEC addressed support system stability with the following solutions:
e 3
delete the potentially unstable supports from the analysis and physically remove the from the piping system, i e
redesign clamps), these supports, using a rigid configuration or standard hardware (e.g. p e
modify trapeze designs to eliminate potential for large displacements, and e i develop analytical methods to confirm stability.
SWEC established a procedure for evaluating support function and stability which inclu specific types of design that were previously questioned and extends the evaluation to othi '
designs. Both support designers and piping analysts participate in these evaluations. The evaluatim is performed for all piping analyses. 'this evaluation is intended to provide as that varlems of the questionable configurations are also considered.
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION i *Ihe approach adopted by SWEC addresses the concem specifically for the types j 1
were previously challenged, and also for every piping analysis, by performing evaluations f l
' third Par,y that the stability issue is comprehensively ad !
I TN 87 7256 3-15 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
O INITIAL POSITION VERTICAL LOADING 1
1 i
6
- BOX FRAME /
gl SLIDES ALONG PIPE i'
l I
+
, PIPE IS DISPLACED REFERENCE VERTICALLY I g POINTS I
I SUPPORT '
l ROTATES g l
l I
I I
I O l
_ l I
I i i i i l I
l FINAL POSITION
, l r-- 7 i
I I l l 3+ :
L _;
- +
l 6
FIGURE 3.2-2 SUPPORTSTABILITY O
TN-87 7256 3 16 DAP.RR P 001, REV.1
has placed the major emphasis on suppxt removal (q) 5 categories were treated in the following ways:ap1 roach has res
- Box frames Box frames connected to struts or snubbers were eli U bolts - U-bolts connected to a single strut or snubber were eliminated.
Trapeze supports -Trapeze suppons were not entirely climinated. The altema preferred by SWEC was to remove the suppon. or redesign to eliminate this was not mandatory. The cinched U bolt, however, was in all cases climina Three types of trapeze modification were permitted. The displacement m these designs have been examined, and the designs have been detennined .
Column / strut assemblies - Analytical confimiation of stability was emp columrVstrut assemblies, whern classical buckling analysis techniques coul in Third Pany calculation DAP-C.P 002. establish a criterion for a
- Trunnlon/ strut assemblies 'Ihe only potentially unstable suppon category specifically addressed by SWEC under the issue of suppon stability is the assembly. SWEC procedures, however, require a SWEC review of all supports '
SWEC has adequately defined the general mquirement for achieving stab Pany review of the specific configuration questioned by CASE indicate by the methods used forlocal stress evaluation of trunnions.'
CONCLUSION
\
SWEC Third Pany. has established The stability an issue is closed. approach addressing stability of support design 3.2.3.5 Generic Stiffness ISSUEDESCRIPTION f
\
Generic stiffness values were used to represent the pipe suppons in the pipe f imposed as a check to ensure that the stiffness was .
suppon stiffness criterion was not established. Extemal sources determined that f lightly loaded supports, the calculated stiffness was orders of magnitude lo values. Since the isgae of the piping /suppon system is influenced by the stiffness ;
i supports, the results of tise pipe stess analysis may not be valid if generic values are use Additional concerns were raised regarding the method used to calculate d stiffness values. It was contended that the calculation should include the a:;soc of all support components, i.e. U. bolts, base plates, and the potential effects of o holes.
Specific questions resulting from the generic stiffness issue are as follows:
- Is the piping response accurately predicted if generic stiffness values are used?
O TN 87-7256 3-17 DAP-RR P 001, REV.1
)
e Is the stifthess used in the piping analysis verified as being representadve o stiffhess of the installed rappon?
- Does the calculation of the suppon stiffness account for the flexibility effec support components?
This issue descripehnof is evaluated theIsrue. in Engineering Evaluation DAP-E-P 005 which prov SWEC RESOt.UTION METHOD 0t.OGY SWEC addressed the piping response aspect of the generic stifthess issue determination of generic stifthess values to be used in suffoess valvo miow which calculated stiffhesses are used. The report concluded th will not result in significant variations in qualincation paramete .
)
during the pipe /suppon system qualificadon pecess:SWEC add It Generic stiffness values were established based on support type (e.g., rigi
'schor, snubber, etc.).1he generic values were derived from a sample su inmatted supports and are representanvc of the majority of sample supports co
- 2) Minimum stifthess values were also established fbr each generic value' defined minimum values were determined to denne a stifthem range below each generic that would penduce comparable pipe spess results.
O 3) Prior to performing the piping analysis, each support stifthess was calcut***d b f
as-built drawings and screened against the minimum values. If the calculated valu '
' above the minimum value, generic stiffhess values were used in the piping an calculated value was below the minimum value, calmtare41 adffnesses were used.
excepdon is made regardirig suppons that are to be modi 5ed or toplaced. For these suppons, the generic value is assumed Whh "counnandon requimd." ConSrmation required suppons are to be designed to meet or exceed the minimum miffhnas value deAned by Tables 3-10 3-1 through 310-3-3 of CPPP 7. Addidonally, specific crit were defined so that the analytic 11 value would be used when consin local condidons existed generic (i.e., supports which restrain large masses or large axial rum) that may a values.
SWEC concluded that using the generic stiffhess value produces no signific results.1he stiffness values used in the analysis are venfied on this basis.
Addidonal SWEC confirmation of the generic stifthess method .was provided in OEN comparative analysis study of five piping problems seleced by the 1hird Party. A c results was made between analyses using the generic stiffhess and the analyses us (calculated) stiffames ihr all supports. (A#rrence 7.20). The problems were selected fm completed produedort analyses having higher than average numbers of si:ppons w values were representative. use& The problems were not considered worst case but were considered O
TN 67-7256 3 18 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
SWEC addressed the issue ofincluding the local flexibilities of suppon components stiffhess calanlation by the procedures defined in CPPP-7.
O Class 2 and 3 pipe support stiffness was evaluated by methods prescribed in At CPPP-7.1hese methods include engineering judgment (inspection or comparison to designs with Imown stiffnesses), simple hand calculation, and detailed analysi also defines methods used to determine the stiffness of "special support types."
I' In addition to the guidance given in Attachment 4-18, the following additional g provided for specific details elsewhere in CPPP-7:
- Attachment Ant. hors.
4-4: Anchor stiffness values for Drilled in Expansion type Concrete
- Attachment 4 5: Stiffness values for a single tube with insen connections alo as the only means of structural attachment.
Attachment 4-8: Allowable stiffness ratios between support structures (for dual snubber / strut suppons using riser clamps). ,
- Attachment 412: U-bolt Stiffness, Trapeze Crosspiece stiffness, clamping stiffn U bolt and crosspiece.
- Attachment 415: Stiffnesses of trunnion type anchors.
1he procedures for calculating support stiffness do not explicitly address oversized See Section 3.2.3.26 for a discussion of bolt hole clearances.
THIRD PARTYEVALUATICW The Third Party evaluation of the SWEC generic stiffness approach centered on the two sources of SWEC M-wation; the SWEC report " Generic Pipe Support Stif Values for Piping Analysis" and the SWEC calculation GENX-117 summariz verification results of the five problem comparison analyses. ,
1his approach, developed by SWEC, as we8 as those used ; .4-i the nuclear as their objective to provide a methodology to ensure that the stifthess values u representative of the actual structures used in the plant. It is not is .s y practice to use ac calculated acceptable stifthess for au suppons and all analyses but rather so use generic results.
Industry approaches generally involve estmNishing minimum stiffness (or sets of mi stiffhess values) prior to the design of the suppons. Usually a deflection crit criterion is also used. In this case, however, it is different in that these minimum va established prior to design and installation. The effect of this is that the suppons te flexible than if a minimum stiffness or frequency criterion had been used.1he obj methodology is to use generic values where appropriate and to use actual values fo supports.1his objective is considered by the lhird Pany to be reasonable and practical. {
Based on the number and degree of piping analysis parameters and the factors wh the piping system qualification, the basis for =~saw of the generic approach focuse sample verification effort provided in GENX Il7 (Aqference 7.20). The review of the S principles." Third Party concems were raised that the simp TN 67 7256 3 19 DAP RR.P-001. REV.1
representative of actual configurations. The Third Pany acceptance of the SWEC approach to generic stiffhess was therefore based on evaluation of the sample analysis verincation documented in GENX 117, O 1he results of the comparative analyses of the problems selected by the Third Party were reviewed in detail The conclusions are discussed below:
Pipe Stresses - The analysis using calculated stiffness indicated increases in stress over those calculated using generic stiffness at certain locations. These increases were generallyless than 15%.
Support IAads - Support loads from the analysis using calculated stiffness indicated inestases in loads over those calculated using generic stiffness by more than 15% in a significant number ofir=* wee e
Valve Accelerations - Valve accelerations from the analysis using calculated sdffness indicated increases in accelerations over those calculated using generic stiffness significantly more than 15%.
While the differences in the two analytical results were in some instances greater than 15%, th Third Party agnes with SWEC that in general, with some additional considerations, there are sufficient inherent safety factors associated with standard industry design practices so that variations of this order of magnitude can be neglected.1he various parameters invesdgated the comparative analysis are discussed below:
- Piping Analysis - The1hird Pany agrees that there is signincant conservadsm in the simplified SIF approach used in production piping design such that variations of this natme can be neglected rw~airian the overall m' hetent factors of safety.
Os + Support Imads - No documentation has been provided to demonstrate overall conservadsm such that the variations in loads can be neglected. SWEC issued a Project Memorandum requiring that during Anal reconciliation, all highly loaded supports (i.e.,
those with loads greater than 85% of design capacity) will be reviewed by the Options Review Conumuse so ensure that the use of the generic stiffhess spproach on a system I basis does not violate the overall factor of safety consideration.1hc SWBC procedural requiranavn to review an highly loaded supports are sufficient to enset that potendal variations in support loads will not unacceptably compromise safety margins.
- Valve Accelerations - Accurate modelirig ofsupports nearlarge masses is impostant to ensure accurate calculation of valve accelerations. To ensure adequate representation, SWEC has issued a Project Memorandum to review, during Anal reconciliation, suffness reptemeration near valves. In addition. SWEC has provided data which indicane islwd design marsms for the acceleration values used as design limits. Based upon this, the Third Party believes that SWEC's position regarding overall design margms is maliumined.
Based upon the above discussion, the 1hird Party considers the reasonableness of the ap be conAnned.
The detailed guidance for calculation of support stiffness including support component local flexibility was also considered of sufficient accuracy to be consistent with the generic stiffness methodology.
O TN 67-7256 3-20 DAP-RR-P-001, REV.1
)
CONCLUSION The method established by SWEC of accounting for support flexibility in the pipi considered adequate. The generic stiffness issue is closed.
I 3.2.3.6 U-Bohs Acting As Two Way Restraints ISSUE DESCRIPTION U bolts have been used at CPSES to attach piping to rigid suppon members. In in question, the U-bolts are not cinched. Suppons of this type were used wh called for restraint in a single transnational degree of freedom. Such suppons a refened to as one directionalstops. The intent was that the U bolt would provide re direction parallel to the axis of the threaded portion. No restraint was modeled in the la direction, and no lateral loads were considered in the design of the support. The ,
insufficient space exists between the pipe and the U-bolt in the lateral dir{ '
to move thermally and seismically without contacting and loading the support. In effect ,
alleged that accordingly, the support acted in two di;ections and should have been modeled a f
i This issue description is issue.
of the evaluated in Engineering Evaluation DAP-E P- 006 which provides a m SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY Resolution of the issue under the SWEC requalification program consists of:
e replacing with all function, the analyzed uncinched and U-bolts on pipes greater than 6-inch with a support e
modeling all uncinched U-bolt supports on pipes 6-inch and less as two-way restra) the piping analysis, and qualifying the support for the resulting loads. I I
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION U-bolts that continue to be used at CPSES, i.e.,6 inch and smaller, will be mod as both axial and lateral restraints. 'Ihe allowable loads for the U bolts are based with ASME Section III, Subsection NF, paragraph NF-3330 (Rgference 7.7). 'I} '
basis for addressing the concem and qualifying the support in accordance w commitments.
\
CONCLUSIONS l SWEC has established an approach to address the issue that is acceptable. The issu 3.2.3.7 Friction Forces ISSUE DESCRIPTION The influence of friction was considered to be inadequately and inconsistently addrea support design calculations. For designs produced by certain design organizations, CASE f contended that: (
O e l the coefficient of friction was inconect, TN 87-7256 !
3 21 \
DAP-RR-P 001, REV.1 I
_ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - . _ _ 1
e friction had been neglected for pipe movement less than 1/16" withoutjustificadon, e
the reduction in friction load based on support stiffness was inconect, and e
friction should have been included fordynamic load cases but was not.
The friction forces issue is evaluated in Engirwring Evaluation DAP-E P@7 which provide more detailed discussion of the issue.
SWEC RESOLUTIONMETH000t.OGY SWEC addressed the technical concems as follows:
The effect of friction at all sliding surfaces is considered in pipe support design regantless of the size of the pipe displacement.
e A coemcient of friction value of 0.3 is used for all steel to steel fricdon loa The calculated fricdon force is not reduced based on support stiffness.
- Friction loads are included in all static and/or steady state load cases. Dynamic load conditions are not included in the friction load evaluadon.
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION The SWEC approach to Mcdon forces eliminates the inconsistency concem. It also eliminates the concems related to pipe movement and support stiffness affecting friction.
The use of a coefficient of friction of 0.3 is consistent with industry practice and is considered to be sufficiently representative of the condition that would exist at a contact point betwec O and support.1he coefficient of Mction wiB vary between a dynamic value for sliding contact, which is significandy less than 0.3, and a static value corA to zero movement of the pipe relative to the support. It is not engmeering practice to anempt to quantify the time varymg friction force or to use upper bound values.1hc nuclear industry has adopted a practice o a value of approximately 0.3.
The industry pracdcas fbr addressing Mction loads fbr dynamic conditions such as seismic response varies to some extent; however, the pe=tanninant practice is to neglea fHetion that mi develop due to dynamic conditions. Under vibratory condinons, friction forces are lower than those encoumered in simple sliding without vibradon.1he Motion force that would occur would also typically be intenninent, because the surface contact is interrupted. These conditions are not analyzed. Instead an industry practice is to establish a design practice that recognizes that the forces are not likely to be significant in support design.1his practice is considered adequate CONCLUSCN
~
The SWEC sppicach to fricdon forces in support design calculadons is w*prahle. The frictio forcesissue is closed.
3.2.3.8 AWS Versus ASME ISSUE DESCRIPTWN r
The C issue arises from a CASE concem that the ASME Boller and Pressure V O ode) does not adequately address aspects of weld design and welding procedures that are TN 87 7256 3-22 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
- essential to ensuring the adequacy of welds. Further 10CFR50 Append Criteria I, requires the establishment of appropriate standards, and, since t Inadequae, The American Welding Society Structural Welding Code, should be imposed. There are ten areas where the ASME Code was con 1
inadequate. These are listed as numbered by CASE (Reference 7.21):
' 1)
Pre heat requirements for welds on plates over 3/4 inch thick 2)
Drag angle and work angles (which limit the space allowed for the
- 3) Beta Factor for tube-to-tube welds 4).
Multiplication factor and reduction factors for skewed "T" weld joints
- 5) Limitations on angularity for skewed "T" joints 6)
Calculations joints for punching (actually a reduction factor for the weld) s
- 7) Lapjoint requirements 8)
Design procedure forjoint of tube to tube with Beta equal to 1.0 )
9)
Calculation for effective throat of flare bevel welds
- 10) - Limitations on weld sizes relative to plate thicknesses i
Additionally, the appropriateness of the CPSES welding procedures for we welding, preheat requirements, and cap welding were questioned. ,
'Ihe AWS versus ASME issue is evaluated in Engmeering Evaluation DAP E-P provides a more detailed discussion of the issue.
O V SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHOOOLOGY Items (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), (9), and (10) as listed above, are welding desig .
(5), and (10) are discussed in Section 3.2.3.25 as part of the Skewed "T" Join of the Tube Steel and Wide Flange Web Stresses . ,
the AWS versus ASME (areas 1,2,7, and 9) are discussed furtherin this section .
THIRD PAR 1 DEVALUATION Of the ten numbered items discussed in this section, three relate to welding p (1), (2), and (7). Weave welding, downhill welding, preheat requirements, by the ASLB, was 'whether welding procedures qua Code are she.aic in light of AWS requirements for prequalified welds". Using comparison of ASME and AWS and their review of TUGCO welding procedures, able to reach a conclusion. On June 29,1984, ASLB ruled that," Applicant's co
, ASME Code has been adequate to assure the safety ofits welding procedu of this issue is based on that decision. welding parameters in this issue O
TN 87 7256 3-23 DAP-RR-P-001, REV.1
NRC staff examination of this subject, and in panicular the ASLB decision, leads to nothing to indicate that the weld procedure concems .
Item number (9) was a design issue closed by the ASLB on December 28,1 a closed issue. An aspect related to this issue is weld design assocised with stru outside comer radius. This is di=~md in Section 3.2.3.10 Section Propenies.
CONCLUSION There is no need to evaluate the adequacy of TUGCO welding procedures, and ASLB have concluded they are W=ble with respect to this issue. The desig aspects are addressed in Sections 3.2.3.20 and 3.2.3.25.1his issue is closed.
3.2.3.9 A500 Grade B Tube Steel ISSUEDESCRIPTION Pipe supports at CPSES, using A 500 Orade B tube steel, were designed ba stress. This was in accordance with ASME Supplement 9 of Code Case N71. Supple lowered the design yield stress to 36 ksi. It was contended that these supports sho$
redesigned using the allowable based on the lower yield stres in Supplement 10 }
a concem that the ductility of A 500 Grade B steel was too low.
\
This issue theissue. is evaluated under Eneinaadng DAP-E-P409 which provides a de O SWECRES0WTIONMETHOO0t.OGY The methodology used in requalification of pipe supports is as follows:
- Suppons yield stress ofdesigned 36 kai. unng A-500, Orade B tube steel will be qualified using an aD
- Those supports not gealif)ing with a 36 kal ytand stres will be qualified using a allowable yield stress of 42 kai and marked " Confirmation Required".1he
- Confinnation Required" will be removed upon issuance of a later supplemem to Case N71, which is expected to retum the allowable yield stress to 42 ksL THIRD PARTYEVALUADON by virtue ofits inclusion in Code Case N71. Since use o 1 TUGCO licensing commitments and is therefore acceptable.an Regarding the concem over an acceptable yield suess for A500 Grade B tube stee
- 9 and 10 of Code Case N71 have been adopted by the NRC under Regulatory G i Revisions 18 and 20, respectively. A response from the ASME regarding this issue that (1) the yield stress for A 500 Grade B tube steel was reduced to 36 ksi in Co -
j to address the slight reduction in yield arength which occurs in the heat affected zone o weldments, and (2) 36 ksi was a conservative lower bound value, O
TN-67 7256 3-24 DAP RR-P 001, REV.1 l
- The initial SWEC approach, using a design allowable based on 36 ksi yield stress is co
. with the more conservative position taken by the ASME and is acceptable on that bas acceptance of 42 ksi by the ASME would be an acceptable basis for aDowing the in stress. The ASME has full knowledge of the issue and their decision constitutes a reasone industry consensus, if the ASME revises the yield stress to 42 ksi there will be a suff for removing the " Confirmation Required" status of the supports.
CONCLUSION The SWEC approach of identifying and tracking those supports that were qualifi higher allowable yield stress permitted by Code Case N71-9 ensures that appropria be used in the final designs. This issue is closed.
3.2.3.10 Section Properties ISSUE DESCRIPTION Section properties of structural rubing are properties entirely dependent upon the g configuration and dimensions of the tubing cross section. An example is moment ofinert Such properties are used in structural calculations of member stresses and stiffnes for commercially available structural tubing are tabulated in the American Insstrus Construction (AISC) Manual of Steel Construction and in various other industry pub however, the properties differ imm publication to publicadon.1he differences can be s dependthis regarding primarily on the comer radius used to calculate the values. Four concem comer radius:
- CASE contended that steel milled prior to 1980 had a different comer radius than th milled after 1980, the date coin gawling to the issuance of the 8th Edition of the AIS Manual.
- CASE contended that the AISC manual was the appropriate source for sectio but that both the 7th and 8th Editions had to be used, depending on the date that t was fabricated.
- 1here was a concem that flare bevel welds for tube 404ube connecti adversely affected by the dimensional fit up at the comer.
- 1here was also a concem that the effect of boh holes on section properties had no considered.
The section properties issue is evaluated in Engineering Evaluation DAP E-P-01 a n$re detailed discussion of the issue.
SWEC RES0t.UTIONMETHOD0t.OGY 1he technical concems relating to section properties are addressed as follows:
- SWEC performed an industry survey and determined that standard milling toleran not change during the CPSES procurement of structural tubing and the properties assumed are consistent with the 8th Edition of the marmal. For the requalificati supports, the section properties of structuralm tub' g are taken fmm the 8th Edition of the AISC Manual.
O TN 87 7256 3 25 DAP RR-P-001, REV.1
l- . ,
L l
- To address the concem related to flare bevel welds, SWEC performed tests to establish a basis for the eNecdve weld throat calculation. A sample ofinstalled supports was f]
L measured to determine comer radius. 'Ihis was compared to the assumed AWS DI.1 conAguration, i.e., a comer radius of twice the tube steel thickness. See PIOURE 3.2 3 for samples with the AWS configuradon which would provide weld penetradon. SWEC uses a throat equal to t minus 1/16 inch where t is the tube steel thickness in inches. For configuradons that were more limiting with respect to weld penetration, specimens were welded and the effective throat measured. 'Ihis resulted in a SWEC requirement to design welds on 2 x 2 x I/4 and 2 x 2 x 3/16 inch tube steel using an effective throat equal to t minus 1/8 inch. 'These were the only tube steel sizes requinng a reduction of the effective throat, i.e.,less than t minus 1/16 inch.
1
- SWEC addresses the effect of bok holes on section properties in accordance with ASME Section III, Appendix XVll, which allows the designer to neglect the effect of a hole, provided the reduedon in cross secdonal area does not exceed 15 percent of the cross sectional area.
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION I The 'Ihird Party evaluadon results are summarized as follows:
- The AISC Manual is an arvahle source for section properties. It is a recognized industry standant and is enmmonly used throughout the nuclear industry for this purpose.
The 7th and 8th Editions have alightly different values for secdon properties. 'lhe 8th Edidon states that the properties are exact or alightly conservative, and there is no evidence that standard milling practice changed in 1980, or at any other time during -
CPSES procumnent. 'the AISC Manual chapter titled " Standard Mill Practice" did not O change for structural abing between the 7th and 8th edition, indicating that no milhng practice change was sted by the AISC. 'Ibe SWEC survey also support this point.
- 'The 8th Edition properties are based on an assumed outside comer radius equal to twice the tube steel wall thicknem. Based on the dimensions taken ha the SWEC sample, that ,
assumed radius is a smaannahte basis lbr determining secuan properties. k had been
! annaandar by CASE that a radius of three times the tube steel wall thidness might be more appropriate. This contendon was not anharantiaand by the physical measurements.
'the AISC Manual, the SWEC survey of milling practice, and the physical measumnents taken fbr a sample of tube steel all support the conclusion that the 8th Edition is an adequate source of section properties for tube steet In the absence of any data that suppons a contrary position, the use of the 8th Edition is evaluated to be nevahle.
- The SWEC procedure generally applied for calculating weld throat, i.e., t minus 1/16 inch,is ennmarvative with respect to the weld throat permined by AWS Dl.1, provided the AWS amanmed geometry or a geometry allowing greater weld penetration is achieved.
SWEC's method is conservative in such cases, heratne the throat is reduced 1/16 below the AWS value.
- In the process of sampling tube steel dunensions, a geometric configuration was identified by SWEC that has an effect on the capacity of a Dare bevel weld for a matched tube steel connection. F10URE 3.2 3 depicts the difference twi.ca., the configuration typically assumed and the actual configuration. As a result of the difference, the opportunity to achieve weld g..a iion is l=~nad which has an adverse effect on weld threat. For such cases the tests performed by SWEC to arrive at a calculation method, i.e., t - 1/8 inch, are an =ceahle means for qualifying the welds.
TN 87 7256 3 26 DAP RR P 001, REV.1
WELDMETAL
/ /,/,/ / / / ,/ f O NpNNNNTNNN' G/ ::
/
/ [
/ l ACTUAL CONFIGURATION TUBE /::
/
/
\ ['l d
/ \ ASSUMED CONFIGURATION
_2 '
xxNNNN
/
/
/h
/ N p / N N N
/ N g {
/\ 3 POTENTIAL REDUCTION' N g
TUBE IN WELD THROAT
/ N x
/ \
g
^ N O i 1
R.ARE BEVEL WELD Y
._ __. __ [
rj
. m MATCHED TUBE I STEEL CONNECTION
(
FIGURE 3.2-3 O
FLARE BEVEL WELD TN 87 7256 3 27 DAP RR P 001, REV.1 I
g_____________--- --
I e
of bolt holes on section properties,is an accepta c
/}
\ critical bending secdons, the section properties are reduced if the area ASME rule. is reduced by 15%. 'this is an appropriately conservative interpr member CONCLUSION The approaches foraddressing the three aspects of the section propertyl issue is closed. .
3.2.3.11 Cinched U-Botts ISSUEDESCRIPTION U bolts were used instead of pipe clamps on some single strut or snubber p original design. Stability of these supports was questioned because of the p j bolts rotating about the axis of the run pipe. As a response to the stabilit U-bolts (installation to a specific torque) was proposed as a design fix U-bolts resulted in additional technical concems. 'Ihese included:
assurance of adequate preload through plant life, e
preload-torque relationship,
- adequacy of SA 36 material for the preload application. }
- U-bolt stresses including effects of preload p o ' radial thermal expansion effects, and )
V e localized pipe stresses at stiff pipe clamps are also a concem, based on co to those raised for emched bolts. ,
'Ihe emched U bolt issue is evaluated in Engineering Evaluation DAP-E-P 011 Evaluadon DAP-E-P402. , ,detaDed discussion of the issue. 'the loc !
j SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY SWEC is eliminating all cinched U-boks at pipe supports.
THIRO PARTYEVALUATION
, Eliminating cinched U-bolts elimlan'as the concems. Thes function een of the stiff cla l
reviewed with respect to all concems raised for cmched U bolts, and it has been clamps. Local stresses fbr stiff clamps are discussed clamps is Wa-!y addressed by SWEC.
CONCLUSIONS pipe claraps are adequately addressed forlocal pipe stre .
O TN47 7256 3-28 DAP RR P-001, REV.1 I
3.2.3.12 Axial /RotationalRestraints
. ISSUE DESCRIPTION 1
Cenain axial and/or trapeze type suppons at CPSES use welded lug or trunni transferloads suppons are summarized to frames as follows:or comporeent hardware. The corcerns regarding th
- Eccentric loading, which can result from effects such as differential snu support steel stiffness variations, raust be considered in the design process.
- Snubber analysis results. end clearance effects may cause significant increase in loads, or inv
- Multiple frame design. lug configurations must consider a conservative loading distributi
'
- Insufficient clearances or eccentricities may exert rotational restramt on the pi
- Rotational restraint effect must be treated as a primary stress for the suppo The axialhotational restraint issue is evaluated in Engineering Evaluation DAP-E contains Evaluations:
Engineering a detailed discussion of the issue. Related issues are discussed in the
- local Streu (Pipe)- DAP-E-P-002
- Generic Stifthess - DAP-E-P-005 )
- Gaps - DAP-E-P413 SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY SWEC addressed the above concems by separately considering integral d non-integral dual component suppons, and lug / frame. ,
Integrally attached suppons (includmg those which are welded to pads which are pipe) were addressed by integradng the geometry of the trunnions into the piping Additionally the design loads, obtamed directly from the analysis, were increase account for differential snubber lock-up. ;'
Non integral dual struthnubber axial supports (including frame / lug type) transnational suppons and each component is designed for 75% of the total load fr analysis. Pourlugs are typically used for non integral axial clamp supports. Ea to 50% of the total load for dual component supports modeled as a single compone .
Where signincant variations in stiffness exist in the two sides of the suppon, component on the aoAer side will be physically removed and the eccentricity modeled in i piping analysis. Por such eccentncally modeled suppons, the load for each lug i i with the assumption that all of the moment is reacted at the lugs, i.e., the clamp connection does not resist the moment. i Cinched U-Bolt trapeze suppons are being eliminated.
TN 87 7256 3-29 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
Lugs for rigid frame type axial restraints are cach qualified for the total load if only two used, or 50% of the total load if four lugs are present. 'the total load will be distributed to half O lugs which will produce the most cridcal stress in the frame.
Analysis ofload distribution at lug / frame interfaces will be based on art assumption that will maximize cridcal stress in the frame.
Suppon stresses resulting from rotational restraints effects will be treated as primary st both integral and non integral suppons.
THIRD PARTYEVALUATICW The use of a 20% increase in load to account for differential snubber lockup on integr attached supports is appropriate for matched snubben.
SWEC is reviewing the vendor data 10 ensure that paired snubben are matched. Where
-a y, modifications will be made to achieve this. SWEC calculations to suppon the load distribution for dual strut / snubbers modeled as single axial restrairu were reviewed, and it is concluded that the 75% load, which assumes an increase of 50% of the load for each half of dual support, is adequately conservative.
For non-integral dual strut / snubber supports that are modtfica by removal of one snubb suppon eccentricities and configurations are modeled imo the piping analysis, thereby ade addressing the rotadonal restraint.14ad distributions are sufficiently accurate and adeq Supports modeled as single / axial (e.g., frame / lug type and clamps with dual snubbe not consider rotational restraint of the piping. SWEC has issued a procedure which evaluates O produce unusually large pipe rotations. Evaluations of s include the effects of pipe rotations.
'Ihe SWEC method for determining load distribution on multiple lugs is considered both remannahle and conservative based on the close lug / frame gap solerances.
1he SWEC spproach to evaluating support /Erame stresses based on a selected, crit load distribution is reasonable and acceptable based on simple statics.
1he Code, approach to evaluating constraint of free end displacement is consistent with the ASME I
}
End clearance effects are evaluated in the Enniwring Evaluation of the Gaps issue (DAP-E-P413).
CCWCLUSCN
'Ihe SWEC approach to resolving this issue is considered adequate based on the gnMe provided in the SWEC procedures. The axial / rotational restraint issue is closed, i
O TN 87 7256 3-30 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
3.2.3.13 Gaps ISSUE DESCRIPTION in the piping / support system. The specific gaps of concem e
excessive clearance between pipe and supports in the loaded directions, e
inadequate lateral clearance for U bohs, e
excessive clearance between Hilti expansion anchors and the bolt holes and
- excessive clearance between Richmond Insert threaded rods
'Ihe first of these is discussed in this section based on Engineering Evaluation piping system response given that the actual system con The adequacy of U-bolt lateral clearance is discussed in Section 3.2.3.6 EvaluationEvaluation Engineering DAP E-P406. Bolt hole DAP-E P428. clearance Richmond forhole insert bolt Hiltis is discu clearances ar 3.2.3.1 based on Engineering Evaluation DAP E P 001.
SWEC RESOLUTIONME7HODOLOGY The pipe / support gap clearances to be used by SWEC in designs are listed in
. Attachment 411 of CPPP-7.
O THIRO PARTYEVALUATION ,
Table 1 A. Attachment 4 of CPPP 7. .Rev 2, specifies clearances that allow a m linear analysis, which does not model gaps, is an app j applies to piping systems that have 1/8 inch gaps.1his is predicated on the aarum linear analysis is a sufficiently accurate means for calculating the response of p suppons.acceptable. On the basis that SWEC is applying accepted industry practices, the pramice considered CONCLUSIONS 1he SWEC appmach to pipe / support clearances is acceptable. This issue is closed.
3.2.3.14 Seismic Design Load Specification ISSUEDESCRIPTION 1he seismic design load specification issue is comprised of several miscellaneous co reganling the adequate specification of conservative design criteria. The extemal so are summarized as follows:
- - Analysis procedures allowed a dynamic amplification factor of 1.0 for equivalent!
analysis. No justification was provided, but justification is required by the CPSES FSAR.
i TN-87 7256 3 31 DAP RR P-001, REV.1 i
A. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . l
- NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 is not conservative.
/~
- NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 requires the use of the lower OBE dampening SSE spectra for design of active components, e.g. active valves. Extemal So is part of the system. interpret this to apply to analysis of piping system the less conservative, higher dampened spectra fo .
- Spectra used did not envelope all the applicable spectra
- Observation that emergency design loads sometimes exceed faulted loads led presumption that errors in the determination of the loads may have been made.
'Ihe seismic design load specification issue was evaluated in Engineering Evaluati DAP E-P-014 which provides a detailed discussion of the issue.
SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY i
SWEC procedures require a dynamic amplification factor of 1.5 for equiv unless otherwisejustified. ,
SWEC's approach to resolving damping concems is to apply industry EW s specify damping values for qualification of piping systems. 'Ihis includes N Guide 1.61 and the NRC-approved (R<ference 7.22) usage of the more rec N 411, which recognizes the variable damping relative to systems frequency. 'I regarding reduced damping for active components is not considered to be
, analysis. Such reductions are tot consistent with industry practice for piping.
require that piping systems containing mixed pipe sizes above and below 12 in evaluated with the lowerdamping values.
with N-41I spectre.SWEC envelopes spectra or uses multiple response spec Implementation of SWEC corporate quahty assurance procedures is intend regarding random errors.-
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION
'Ihe concems raised are of three types:
- 1) equivalent static analysis criteria,
- 2) damping criteria, and
- 3) implementation of various criteria.
- !he use of a 1.5 factor for equivalent static analysis is the approach accepted used thmughout the industry as a conservative calculation. It is an acceptable p The SWEC approach to addressing the spectra damping is considered acceptab plants. The results of more recent industry studies a l I
O '
TN-87 7256 k 3 32 I DAP RR.P-001 REV.1
been approved for use by the NRC on other nuclear plants and specif 7.22).
Certain requirements were established as NRC conditions for the use o .
]
Case N 411 are to be identified in the FSAR. Com! '
directly relate to the assessment of technical methodology. Other requir with walkdown programs that follow the compledon of analysis. It has b requirements can be sadsfied by SWEC walkdown programs and the stability included in CPPP-6 and CPPP 9; however, the adequacy of the tec ;
l not dependent on completion of such programs. Therefore, the walkdown history analysis.as evaluated SWECpart of this complies withissue.
this. One requirement is that N 411 damping is SWEC's with position industry practice. regarding reduced damping for active components is a The other resolutions addressing random errors of incorrectly damped spe specific project procedure errors are considered to be adequately addressed by SW procedures.
CONCLUSION SWEC has provided an ec
- Die approach to address seismic design load sp consistent with that utilized by the industry. The seismic design load specific .
3.2.3.15 Support Mass Effects On Piping ISSUE DESCRIPTION It was aneged that Gibbs and Hill procedures did not specify how or when have bein included in the CPSES piping analysis. The result was inco inadequate eccounting oisuppon mass effects in the prediction of pipin stress. Spee:6c mnoems were the related effects of eccentric support mass for evaluating dynamic loads, including fluid transient induced loads. The s evaluate:d the issue. in Engineering Evaluation DAP E-P-015 which provides a more d SWEC RESOLUTION METHOD 0t.OGY SWEC wiB consider suppon mass in the analysis of all CPSES piping syst procedures have been issued which address common support configurations for sta component type supports, detaihng the component mass or portions of mass which a modeled concentrically or eccentrically in the piping model. In addition to the gu modeling support mass effects in the piping model, methods for evaluatin mass effect on piping response, due to design or installation deviations, have be THIRD PARTYEVALUATION The methods described in the SWEC procedures address the majority of sup data in the procedures.. The SWEC procedures do .
TN 87 7256 3 33 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
e.g., structural frames or cantilever supports. The significance of the effect of the m types of supports is Wt on both the mass and stiffness of the support e
This aspe modeling stifthess and evaluating self weight excitation considering the mass effect for the type of designs encountered.
As part of the assessment of this issue a review was conducted of an aspect design modifications in limited use, it is possible for th three directions. The NUPIPE SW Program has the capability to model directio caution provided by SWEC procedures are adequate for evaluating "special situa Third Pany considers these adequate for closure of this issue.
. CONCLUSION SWEC has provided guidelines for considering support mass, including ecce effects, in the piping model which are adequate. The issue of support mas analysisis closed. i 3.2.3.16 Mass Point Spacing ISSUE DESCRIPTION Gibbs & Hill procedures for CPSES established requirements for minimum spaci poiras in the piping model, to predict an accurate response to dynamic loadin analysis reviewed by Cygna did not comply with the established requirements. In a computer program used (ADLPIPE Version C) impsopedy lumped concentrated masses.1 primary issue is adherence to established requirements for mass poim spacm spacing issue was evaluated in Engineering Evaluation DAP E-P-017 which contai discussion of the issue.
SWEC RESOLUTIONMETN000 LOGY SWEC modeling guidelins specify where lumped mass poims are to be locat a reviewitem in the analysis MHa-analysis . To assure adherence to these THIRD PARTYEVALUATION 1he review of the SWEC requirements indicates that the lumped mass pom accurate to capsme dynamic characteristics. The evaluation of SWEC fonnulations is con in DAP calculation number DAP C-PA)3. The inclusion of mass point spacing a checklist itasa provides adequate assurance that the estabhshed guidelines are ve manually derived and automadcally generated mass point spacing.
CONCLUSIONS
'the SWEC procedures provide adequate guidelines for locating lumped mas model. The mass point spacing issue is closed.
O TN 87 7256 3-34 DAP-RR.P 001, REV.1
3.2.3.17 High Frequency Mass Participation L
ISSUE DESCRIPTION The pipe stress analyses conducted by Gibbs & Hill did not comply with CPSES F requirements in that there was no assurance provided that the potential inclu frequency modes in response spectrum analyses would not increase syst issue was evaluated in Engineering Evaluation DAP discussion of the issue.
SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY SWEC has addressed this issue by requiring one of the following:
- Perform amplified response spectmm (ARS) modal analysis up to a 50 Hz cutoff frequency option chosen. using NUPIPE SW V04/102 with the high frequency missing mas
- Perform a NUPIPE ARS analysis with a 50 Hz cutoff frequency without th mass correction option chosen. Combine these results with the results from a static analysis for the zero period acceleration (ZPA). The combination is by S each of three orthogonal directions.
The above criteria are specified in the current project procedures. In additio mass item. conection is specifically included in SWEC's pipe stress analysis checklist as a review THIRD PARTYEVALUATICN C
1he two methods permitted in SWEC procedures addressing the concem frequency modes were reviewed. The NUPIPE missing mass conection is anj technical methods described in published papers that have been subjected to pee .
j i
1his is the basis for acceptmg this method for CPSES. methods ar The second method was in common use prior to the availability of missing mass c\
methods. It is a conservative means of bounding the resyrcw. !
CONCLUSION SWEC has established an approach to resolution of the high frequency mass that is acceptable. The high frequency mass participation issue is closed. !
3.2.3.18 Fluid Transients ISSUEDESCRIPDON Several transients. indirectly related concems were raised relative to design of piping systems discharge loads. These are:Two of the concems are related to assumptio TN-87 7256 3 35 DAP-RR-P-001, REV.1 I
- flow distribution in Crosby dual port S/RVs for the purpose of developing m and stresses on the Main Steam line, and
[]
's /
- conservatism of assumptions regarding multiple S/RV actuation sequence used to evaluate the maximum instantaneous stress in the Main Steam piping system.
The remaining concerns are related to analysis / design requirements and acce specifically addressing the unique characteristics of Duid transient loads. These are:
rigid frame gaps in unrestrained directions for fluid transients, e
e criteria or requirements to validate time step selection for time history analysis, consideration supponed of steady state versus dynamic fluid transient loads in piping sys by snubbers.
a detailed discussion of the issue.The fluid transients issue was evaluated SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY SWEC's approach to addressing the fluid transient issue is to develop con and loading criteria.
Concems reganiing Main Steam S/RV loading have been verified with the vendo underway to develop conservative piping response to single and multiple S/RV actuat ,
The specific concems regarding analysis / design requirements and acceptance cri addressed in project procedures as follows:
l]
\-'
- Clearance requirements are addressed by requiring the transmittal of piping displacements for all pipe loadings, combined in accordance with the loading combinations, to the pipe support design group for acceptance.
- Guidelines are provided for determining time steps and cutoff frequencies in a tim history analysis and reviewing resuhs for reasonableness.
- General guidelines are provided for consideration of the type ofloading (static or dynamic) for modeling snubbers in the piping analysis.
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION 1he SWEC apptoach to resolving the concems is sufficiently detailed to provide as specific concems will be adequately addressed. The more general concem, rega is partially addressed by the procedures. Review of the that the attention to fluid transient related design requirements is adequately consiste general practice. However, because it is not general practice to proceduralize mos Duid transients design and analysis activities, implementation review was require adequate consideration of all related design criteria.
The Third Pany's review of fluid transients implementation was conducted through t which paralleled the SWEC activities: first, the identification of significant events, and the quantification of fluid transient loads from these events. The Chemical and Volum System (CVCS) and the Main Steam System were selected as subjects for this review.
TN 87 7256 3-36 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
Tank 1: 1hc Arst task was a review of the identification of(screening for)signin transient events.1he System Infonnation Documents, the supporting calculations
/( assumptions, and the implementing (fluid transient) analyses were reviewed ag base of CPRT systems, alignments, and events, independently j.A express Third Party review. Bases used for the determination of significance as well acope boundaries were also specifically reviewed.
The review indicated an adequate implementation of the SWEC procedures and commitments consistent with industry practice.The SWEC screening pro resulted in the specific design attention to more events than originally addresse also indicated adequate attendon to the major aspects of plant design and op can result in fluid transients and knowledge of general nuclear plant experience with -
Adequacy of the SWEC screening process is dependent on verifying that bou transient loads are properly evaluated to determine significance on piping and compliance. SWEC has issued a calculation and an implementation procedure for evaluating pipe stress. The proceh additionally requires supports to be evaluate cases to assure that fluid transient loads, which are screened out based on pipe stre accommodated.
Assurance is also dcp4snt upon verincadon that some additional events consiste the FSAR design basis have been reviewed for significance. Specific conc Third Party me being addressed by SWEC procedures. The procedures require following: ,
e
. lhe non-safety piping and suprorts for the Main Steam line fmm the moment re the turbine and condenser are to be reviewed to detennine if the new turbin calculated by SWEC are within ANSI B31.1 allowables.
- Recent modifications perfonned on the Pecdwater and Auxiliary Feedwater sy the effects of these revisions on the piping and supports are to be reviewed adequacy.
- 1he Safety h$ession system will be uviewed for potential two phase water bam due to valve leakage. Syssem operating procedure or design analysis remedies implemented valveleakage if wa y. Other Class 2/3 systems will also be reviewed forpotent Guid transients.
1he piping integrity will be reviewed for the isolation of pipe rupture events o Main Steam and CVCS piping adjacent to SWEC piping scope. The licensing ba CPSES support will design. be reviewed to determine if these events need to be addressed The 1hird Party concludes that these p ocedures provide sufficient assurance that transients events identification process is adequate.
Tsak 2: 1he second task of the Third Party review of fluid transients implementation verified the adequacy of the development ofloadings to be used in pipe stress a Review of the CVCS symem analyses, MS turbine trip analysis, and FW break isola analysis verified a generally adequate and conservative approach to the estimation transient loadings.
The review verified that the various methods used by SWEC, including com O with Method of Characteristics programs (WATHAM and STEHAM), RELAP, and TN 67 7256 3-37 DAP-RR P-001 REV.1
i-
\
results for these analyses were veri 5ed in magnit O reasonable by independent calculations. Inputs for the analyses, including ,
including time steps, nodalization, equipment mod ,
verified as reasonable and generally conservative through a detail calculations.
Modeling assumptions, includmg the selection of boundary condidonsq were verified as consistent with system operation by independent review a review it was verified that essendal equipment of the analytical results were adequately considered.
The analytical models were also reviewed to assure the insensitivity to nod isolation analysis model as appropriate for the RE Sensitivity analyses performed on the Main Steam turbine trip analysis mo be selected sman enough so that results are adeq analyzed. Also, a sensitivity analysis representative of SWEC analyses was venfied the reasonable insensitivity of the remaining analyses.
Assurance as to the adequacy of the SWEC Auid transients analyses is verification that flashing during the majority of depressurization transients a increase the calculated loads or impair valve perfonnance. Specific verificati potential for vapor pocket collapse overpressure and loads are not signincant or are O bounded by existing load cases wiB be provided b procedures issued to address this concem. SWEC will calculate loads for r by the imi E-tion ofspecific project and events (using a method that explicitly addresses vapor pocket form
. and will include these loads in piping analysis.
Addidonally, specific substantiadon that the RV's can pass two phase B requirements wiH te provided by a review of thes pmcedures.
Related discussions are contained in the foHowing Engineering Evaluations:
- Mass Point Spacing DAP-E-P-017
- Support Mass Effects on Papsng Analysis DAP-E-P 015
- High Frequency Mass Participation DAP E-P 018
- Valve and Plange Qualification DAP-E-P-025
- Generic Stifthess DAP-E-P-005 CONCl.USION as discussed above are sufficiers to provide assurank{
considerations will be addressed. 'the Duid transiems issue is closed.
O TN 67-7256 3-38 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
3.2.3.19 Self-Weight Excitat;on '
ISSUE DESCRIPn0N The qualification oflarge bore pipe supports did not generally include the pipe justification was not provided for neglecting these loads. weight Support self weight excitation was evaluated in Engmeering Evaluation DAP-E-P-contains a more detailed discussion of the issue.
SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY SWEC addressed this issue by the following methodology:
Dead Weight leads - SWEC has committed to evaluate all large bore pipe su dead weight loads. Under this approach, the component dead weight is considered either the structural (suppon) analysis or the piping stress analysis.
e Self Weight Emdtation Imads SWEC procedures sequire that all self weight e$
loads be included in the support evaluation for all frame suppons. The psocedu i require a calculation of these loads for elements of supports attached directly to th building be structure, i.e., suppons without structural frames.1hese loads are consid insignificant.
THIRD PAR 7 DEVALUATION 1he Third Party evaluation is summarized as follows:
e O. Dead Weight Loads -1he dead weight load of any cossponent support hardware is included in the piping analysis model or directly in the support design calculationl issue. weight load is not double counted. This adequately addresses this aspect o dead
- Self-Weight Endtation Imads -1he SWBCpsocedmes provide four nunhads for analyzing suppons for seismic loads. Supppre mass est is not modnied wie t anodeled whh the support.1hree of the methods stancaDy analyse the suppon acceleration values derived by SWEC fnun the CPSES response spectra, A sep 1hird Party evaluation perfonned to review this derivation determined that the method and acceleration values are acceptable. The iburth method is a dynande analysis nonnally would not be necessary to calculate self-weight excitation Etiads'because the simpler and more conservative static analysis typicaHy produces loads which are conservative. Dynamic analysis would be used to reduce the loads Such if a=~=='y.
dynamic analysis is an appropnate analytical tool; however, it has not been used to j J The SWEC appoach of not requiring a calculadon of scissnic self weight excitation for component support hardware attached directly to the building structure is acceptable, becau component part (e.g., snubber rear bracket) which is attached is so rigid that it foDows the building motion without amplificadon and does not produce significant additional load) support itself. This is considered a valid approach and one which is typical ofindus O
TN47 7256 3-39 DAP-RR P 001, REV.1
- - - - - - - - - - - }
CONCLUSION loads and loads due to the self weight excitation of the 3.2.3.20 Local Stresses in Pipe Support Members ISSUE DESCRIPTION Cenain types of pipe supports or details of pipe suppons have been identifie may include:be the limiting design factor, but they were not evaluated during the design
- local stresses in cinched U-bolts.
- local stresses in piping anchors.
- local stresses in zero gap box frames, e
tube steel and wide flange web stresses at connections, and e
shon beam stresses.
Local stress in pipe suppon members was evaluated in Engmeering Evaluation which provides a more detailed discussion of the issue.
SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY the remaining concems is as follows: Local stresses in piping anchors a
- Local Stresses in Cinched U-boks - TUGCO has eliminated t .
Local gap Stresses in Zero Gap Box Frames - SWEC has commined to eliminate box frames.
Tube Steel and Wide Range Stresses at Connecdons SWEC procedures local stresses in tube steel connections and welded bracket connections be accordance with the requirements of AWS DI.1 U-bolt nuts bearing on tube meel w wide flanges) are designed using AISC Specificadon guide e
Short Beam Stresses - local stresses in shon members are evaluated using approach which depends on an engineer to conectlyjudge load transfer behavior of t beam.
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION "Ihe Third Pany evaluation is summarized as follows:
Local Stresses in Cinched U bolts - Elimination of all cinched U-concern.
- Local Stresses in Zero Gap Box Frames - Elimmation of all zero gap box frames the CPSES designs resolves this concem.
Tube Steel and Wide Mange Stresses at Connections - Review of the design procedures, and calculations used in the engineering development of the procedu TN-87-7256 3-40 DAP RR-P-001, REV.1
verify that SWEC methodology for the design of tubular connections, inclu consideration of beta factors and punching shear, and for the design of welded
' attachments to tabe steel is consistent with the mquirements of AWS DI.I.
1he SWEC analysis perfonned to develop the methodology for qualification of n headng on tube steel walls was reviewed and determmed to be acceptable wh appropriate washerplates are used between the nut and the tube steel.
The SWEC procedures provide adequate directions for evaluating the local stre open shapes due to welded attachments. The procedures are in accordance with th
' guidelines presented in the AISC specificatiort e
Short Beam Stresses - The SWEC procedures provide an acceptable qualitative approach to evaluatmg the local snesses in short beams.
CONCLUSbON 1heissue
'Ihis approach is closed. used by SWEC for the evaluation oflocal stressa in pipe suppo .
3.2.3.21 Safety Factors ISSUE DESCRIPTION 1he concem relates to possible reduction of built-in safety factors resulting from failure comply with various applicable regulatory, licensing and code requirennents.1his dimin results from improper camalia= or lack of compliance with vanous design criteria r and pracdces. The safety factor issue is a concem for failwe guerally to comply with t acquirements, not to any specinc, individual issue compliance.
Safety factors are evaluated under Engineering Evaluanon DAP E-P 022 which p detailed discussion of the issue.
SWEC RESOLUTIOMMETH000t.0GY 1he resolution methodology '=?
M by SWEC is that aD genede issues must be resolved before CPSES can invoke the inherent design margins (safety factors) accumulated fm built in conservasians in codes, input, and agulatory posidens that typically provide s margin so that minor variations or small loads that might potentially occur during nor operation can be neglected. All generic issues have been evaluated and included into CP design crieria. Wkh all generic issues appmprianely addressed, there is suf5cient{
allow for anali potential loads that occur during nonnat operation.
THIRO PARTYEVALUATION 1he safety thetor adequacy of codes and regulatory positions per se is not at issue, a not spectSed within mch daannava Generally, such posidons reflect ennamisus %
smuy of experts in the field. Compliance with appucable FSAR, AISC Manual, ASME C and Regulatory Guides and Bulletins requirenavn is sufficient to denonstrase existence o appropriate safety margins. Only in cases where deviation fmm such requirements occu4 where such r=h.~.e fall to provide adequase guidance, should questions regaij a concem. The SWEC CPSES piping and pipe support requalification effort, as defined in 6 and CPPP-7, is consistent with standard design methods for nuclear generating
)
TN47 7256 3-41 DAP RR-P-001, REV.1 1
u________________________________.____._
methods include compliance with applicable codes, standards, and regulatory re are supplemented, where necessary, by good engineering practims. SWEC identified technical issues involved, established the method of resolution, and implemente by way of CPPP-7 design procedures.
The general safety factor concem is resolved by satisfactory resolution of all ind CONCLUSION Based on the fact that individual issues have been satisfactorily resolved, the g safety factors is also resolved. The issue is closed.
3.2.3.22 SA-36 And SA-307 Steels ISSUE DESCRIPTION Specific supports aspects are as follows: of this issue relating to the use of SA 36 and SA-307 steels
- SA 36 Steel Used in Dynamic Applications - The use of SA-307 bolting mate recommended, by code, for use in dynamic applications. CASE contended that since SA 36 material is similar to SA-307, the same cautionary consideranon s .
SA 307 Material Used in Dynamically Loaded Friction Connections - SA-307 material has been used in dynamically loaded friction connections. This i the code.
Regulatory Guide 1.124 Limitations - Botting material has been designed u allowable spesses which exceed the snaterial yield strength under Level D Service Limits. This does not meet the requimnents of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.124, wh limits load increases to 1.5 dmes Level A Service limits because of the potential ductile behavior.
Use of Law Strength Nuts with High Strength Bolting - 14w strength nuts, A-563 Orade B7) botting.A (companion nuts to SA 307 botting) were used with high soength (A 1 A detatled discussion of this issue is pron.e4 in Engineering Evaluation DAP-E P 023 SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY The SWEC appmach to resolve each of the concerns identified above is as follows:
SA 36 Used In Dynamic Applications - SWEC procedures permit the use of SA-3 material in bolted type connections subject to dynamic loads, e
SA 307 Material Used In DynamicaBy-Loaded Friction Connections SWEC procedures preclude the use of SA 307 matedal for U-bolt and rod type app connections subject to dynamic loading.
- Regulatory Guide 1.124 Limitations - SWEC procedures make no direct referenc the Regulatory Guide 1.124 :equirement that allowables be limited to 1.5 times Se level A limits. SWEC has adopted ASME Code paragraph NF-3225.2, Winter 1982 addenda which limits the stresses to yield.
O TN 67 7256 3-42 DAP.RR P-001, REV.1
e Use of Low Strength Nuts With High Strength Bolting - SWECprocedu that, for high strength botting connections using low suength nuts, the tens of the connection be reduced by 40 percent.
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION 1he 1hird Party evaluation results are summarized as follows:
- SA 36 Used In Dynamic Appilcations Although SA-36 and SA 307 material similar, it must be recognized that neither the ASME nor the AISC co pmhibit the use of SA 36 material under dynamic Mg= However, sirn spec identified in the SWEC procedures are dynamic, a separate 1hird Pany eva performed to considerhigh cycle fatigue as aquired by ASME Secdon HI. This is not a concem, will not be reached. evaluation con 5rmed that the SA-307 Material Used In Dynamically 14aded Friction Connections - To the resolution, SWEC has undertaken a program to review all applicable Certifie Materials Test Reports, Load Capacity Data Sheets, and Certified Design enswe that SA-307 material is not used. The procedures also require that any S threaded md identified on the pipe support drawing be replaced.
Regulatory Guide I.124 Limitations - The acquirements of Rardamy Guide 1.1 apply specincally to ASME Class 1 bolting. However, the intent of the Reg Guide has been met through the adophon of a later code paragraph which lim stresses to the material yield seength at temperature under all service loads, e
Use of14w Strength Nuts With High Strength Bolting - A separate 1hird Pa O evaluadon was performed verifymg that the reduced allowables for conne low strength nuts with high 6trength bolts is acceptable.
CONCLUSION The approach adopted by SWEC adequasely addresses the issues. The issue is clos 3.2.3.23 Valve And Flange Qualifications And Valve Modeling ISSUEDESCRIPTION The analysisissue of qualification raised three areas of concem: of valves and flanges and the conect modeling o
- 1) The main steam relief valve operator supports (snubbers) are not qualified fo loads, the and the opentorsuppons. adequacy of the valve has not been demonstrated for as
- 2) Valves with Amdamental frequencies less than 33 Hz which have operator sei testmints should have accurate modeling of the yoke stiffness to ensure that the va responseis conectlypredicted.
- 3) flange The loadsvalidity of a aampling process to assure the acceptability of valve accelera has not been desnonstrated.
1he valve and Osnge qualifications and valve modeling issue is evaluated in E O Evaluation DAP E-P-025 which provides a more detailed discussion of the issu TN 67-7256 3-43 DAP-RR-P 001. REV.1 l
discussed in Ergi.wd Evaluation DAP-E-P-014, Seismic}
SWECRESOLUTIONMETHOOGOGY SWEC procedwes require as-built data (e.g., suppon locations) to be incorpor by TUGCO. Then all valve accelerations, valve end requirements are transmined to TUGCO for ultimate accepunce and con 5rmation.
Valves with Amdamental frequencies less than 33 Hz are modeled using a can equation to determine an equivalent moment ofinertia based on the valve's fundam include support directions, Ametion, stiffneas, and mass. freque
'!he SWEC pmcedures require aR valves be quali5ed for applicable acceleratio ASME qualification of the bolts. limits. All bolted flangejoints are required 1HIRO PARTYEVALUATION
'Ihe SWEC pmcedures provide methods and requirements for
- Hag arul quali5 c valves, Banges, and associated supports. No specinc reference is made to motor operators; however, this case is addmased by the general criteria in the procedur Because SWEC's scope of review requires qualification of all valves and Ban of a sampling process is no longer a concem.
O he !
SWEC approach to the qualification of v and this suppon issueis closed. mod-Mag techniques provide adequate methods of addrer. sing t 3.2.3.24 Piping Model ISSUE DESCRIP71ON
'!his issue comprises sental concens telating to the accuracy and input of pipin models. 'Ihese concems are:
' supportlocation tolerances, e
correct identincation and input of Sress huensMcation Factors (SIFs),
e inclusion of valve and Dange insulation / fluid mass, and
- taradan of anubbers a4 aces to rigid attachment points.
'Ihe piping model issue was evaluated in Enginmedrig Evaluation DAP-E-P.026 w detailed discussion of thisissue.
SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY SWEC addressed each of these concems in the project procedures:
TN 87 7258 3-44 DAP-RR.P 001, REV.1
e As-built infcfmadon is to be the basis for all CPSES piping analysis, wit O
- Piping SIFs for the most common componenes and transitions are speci in the project procedures. 'the specification of SIFs is noted to be of s is included as an analysis checklist item.
Procedures contain a general requirement to include mass effects of pipi insulation in the analysis model.
Procedures recommend removal of snubbers near equipment connectio areequipment and requirements to evaluate snubber activation for those in close proximity t connections.
THIRO PARTYEVALUATION locations is acceptable and veriRable.SWEC's method for identifyin Identincadon of concem regarding SIFs in general, inclusion wumitem of SIFs as an a and specific address this concem.identification of SIFs for the more common piping components ar SWEC's this corxzm. general requirement to include mas of consents and insulation is s o SWEC procedures adequately address the concem regarding snubber CONCLUSION l
SWEC presis are sufHeiently detailed to ensure that these piping desigrdnpu evaluated. The piping model issue is closed.
3.2.3.25 Weldine ISSUEDESCRIPTION
- Concems have been raised regarding the adequacy of a) engineering method for stzing of welds and/or Miag of weld stresses, b) violation of applicable c and c) fabrication pracdces. Specific aspects of these concems are as follows: ,
l
- Unsymmetrical Welds - For three. sided wends, the occumtricity between the gravity of the member and dw weld was not considered in the weld demgn, could increase weld stresses with a consequent efEsct on the weld size.
- Cover Plate Walds 'the weld design snethods were inadequate forevalundng stresses of welds snehirig cover plates to primary members to Ibra composite sec A related concem involves the failure to considerlocal loading efface of com bracket anachmenss.
- Understand specifiedin the Code M5et Walds - Some welds did not meet the minimum size requ ofRecord.
TN 87 7256 3-45 DAP-RR-P-001, REV.1
y N
- 0
- Combination Bolted and Welded Connections - Connections w O bolting and welds did not meet the Code criteria requiring welds to be d the entire shearforce.
e a Skewed "T" Joint Welds - The design of skewed "T' joints in accordance with the ASME Code did not adequately consider reduction factors for determining the e throat and angularity limits as prescribed by American Welding Society (AWS) C DI.l.
- Fabrication Practices - Concems were raised relating to inadequate welding p including weave welding, downhtli welding, preheat requirements, lap joint requirements, cap welding, and weld cracking. -
This issue is discussed in detail in Engineering Evaluation DAP E P-027.
SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHOOQt.OGY
.1he SWEC resolution methodology for each of the design issues is as follows:
Unsymmetrical Welds - SWEC procedures require that any eccentricity betwee center of gravity of a member and the associated weld be evaluated when det total weld loading. Altematively. fbr symmetric weld pattems with diflierent weld siz eccentricity lluust. need not be considered if the weld evaluation uses the smallest effective Cover Plate Welds - SWEC procedures require that coverplate r welds be quali5 shear flow. '
/
e ,
Undersized Fillet Weids - SWEC has adopted ASME code Case N-413"'which ex the minimum Allet or partial penetration weld size requirements.
- o Combination Bolt and Weld Connections - SWEC procedures require that, on basel plates using bolt and weld combinations, the weld be designed to carry the entire sh load on the face of the plate.
Skewed "T" Jolet Welds - SWEC procedures idamtify specific seguirements for the design of skewed "T" joints.
- I Fabrication Practless + Concems regardmg the fabricathn practices have not been addressed by SWBC in design promdures. These concems are Mammaad under the "AWS vs. ASMElasue Summay," '
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION I
The Third Party evaluadon results are mammarized as follows; e
Unsyuanserical Walds - SWEC procedures for evaluating unsymmetrical welds are acceptable because proper weld stresses will be calculated when the eccentricity is considered, and conservadve resuhs will be obtained when usmg the smaDest effectiv weld throat for patteres made up of different weld sizes. " '
- Cover Plate Weids - SWEC procedures identify specinc instmetions for +%g maximum weld stress. Although the procedures require that coverplate arrachment {
welds be quali5ed for shear flow, no specinc guidelines or instructions are prtvide performing this evaluation. Normally, pipe support design practims do not involve th
)
{
TN47 7256 ,
3 46 DAP RR-P-001, REV.1
use of composite significant. members; therefore, the absence of specific guidehn e
Undernised Fillet Welds - Code Case N 413 (which has been incorpor Code revisions) recognizes the differences in ASME and AISC weldjo minimum weld sizes in the Code. 'this Code Ca Regulatory Guide 1.84, Revision 24. (Reference 7.28).
- Combination Bolt and Weld Connections 'the SWEC requirements combinadon bolted and welded connecuons are consistent Appendix XVII Paragraph XVII-2442 (Reference 7.7) and are acceptable.
- Skewed "T" Joint Welds - SWEC procedures adequately address the d "T" joints, including specific requirements for determining effective thrj applying reduction factors to welds based on the angularity between memb requirements are consistent with AWS DI.I.
i CONCLUSION Where necessary SWEC has established specific requirements which ade welding design issues 'this issue is closed.
3.2.3.26 Anchor Bolts
. ISSUEDESCRIPTION O C=*me*
identified reganiing the design of anchor bolts at CPSES are the ib Friction vs. Bearing Connections - Whether base plates fastened with anchors should be designed as friction or bearing connections. If the conrwn bearing connecdons, there is a quesdon regarding unequal shearload di anchors
' 3.2-4). and the effect on support stiffness caused by oversized bolt holes Anchor Bolt tacation Tolerances - Construcdon tolerances fbr a tolerances may result in unconservadvely predicted stres e i
/cdw Ernbedmont 'the embedment lengths on sorne support sketches do no masch those used in the respective calculations.
- !his issae is demanamad in4detail in Er#M Evaluation DAP E P 028.
SWECRESQLUTIONMETHODOLOGY The SWEC methodology for addsessing the items above is as follows:
- Friction vs. Bearing Connections - SWEC procedures require that only be connecdons be used in pipe support design. SWEC has adopted Suhamian N Summer 1985 addenda (Reference 7.23) which defines the al such bearing connecdons.
- Anchor Bolt Location Tolerances - In addition to specifying minimum edge dis for holes in base plates, SWEC provides a procedure for verifying the accep TN 67 7256 3 47 DAP-RR-P-001, REV.1
~~'
1
-O BOLT HOLE 1
ANCHOR BOLT e
e-.
L_.
p ,-a- [
e 3 N ng v ln g y;;;ff l
i
! w_____ J N '
rasA 8.-
9.rg t
E C) sTsuCn a.
ATTACHMENT
/ Oo Oo BASE R. ATE - ,
FIGURE 3.2-4 O Ancsos sotr eres TN-87 7256 3 48 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
i built plates that were designed without consideration of possible bolt and attachm location tolerances.
- Anchorage Embedment - SWEC procedures pmvide specific requirements for the design of anchor bolts including establishing minimum embedments.
THIRD PARTYEVALUA110N 1he Third Party evaluation results are summarized as follows:
- Friction vs. Bearing Connections - The concem related to the connection to the concrete surface has been evaluated using the requirements of subsection ASME Code based on NRC staff acceptance of the adoption of subsection NF- ,
Summer 1985 addenda. SWEC procedures and design requuements comply w subsecdon NF, and ar: therefore acceptable. Such connections are used without i
exce# in all commercial nuclear facilities in the United States.
'Ihe CPSES Hilti installation procedure requires preloads which contspond to a leve f which was shown by test to have no effect on local-displacement behavior and th) effect on anchorstiffness.
- Anchor Bolt Location Tolerances - SWEC procedures define specific calculation requirements which conservatively consider all possible design combinations of attachment and bok location changes. 'the design combinations provide for c the specific member shape into an equivalent square member.
- Anchorage Embedment - SWEC procedures provide W"" requirements for determirdng the embedment depths on anchors. These requirements include rel O embedment length for concrete topping, as well as speciSc methds for calculai cmbedments when the depth is not indicated on the drawing. In such cases th !
bolt length is used as input to the calculation which will then conservatively det minimum embedment.
CONCLUSION The SWEC inethodologyis nanniment with ASME and AISC Cbdes and provides mnsideradon of the issue. This issue is closed with respect to extemal source concerns.
Anchor boks are also the subject of the self initiated review doc =nenwd in DAP-E-C/S-51 (R<ference 7.N) and 515 (R<ference 7J7).
3.2.3.27 Strut Angularity ISSUE DESCRIPTION Standard component supports, such as snubbers and struts, may transmit an add load component resulting fmm relative pipe displacement (s). A " kick" load occurs wh component orientation is other than normal (at 90' to) or parallel whh the pipe axia. Angu swing results froen relative pipe movements (caused by thermal, seismic andhr Di or relocation permitted by installation tolerances.
The issue is whether or not the " kick" load component associated with the angu tolerance must be considered in the support design. The strut angularity issue is evalu Engineering Evaluation DAP E P-029 which provides a detailed discussion of the issue. '
SWEC RES0t.UTIONMETHODO(.0GY SWEC addressed this issue by establishing the following requirements:
- Struts and snubbers installed with swing angle exceeding 2* tolerance will be documentedin the as-built program.
- Angular swing of struts and snubbers from relative movements caused by seismic, and/or fluid transients combined with the as-built installation angle wi assessed.
- The load component associated with swing angle will be considered for al designs.
5
- Angular swmgs exceedmg1 and load rating of support components.
' will be additionally evaluated to ensure prope
- Support components.Design Checklists include an evaluation for the swing angle effects of THIRD PARTYEVALUATION The approach taken by SWEC addresses both the concern regarding considera and load rating is evaluated. The approach is therefore accep CONCLUSION SWEC has established ar-p=Me guidelines to address the design considerat strut and snubber angularity variadons.1his issue is closed.
3.2.3.28 Structural Modeling For Frame Analysis ISSUEDESCRIPTION The computer modeling of pipe support fhunes by TUGCO engineers and en contractors at CPSES did not leflect actual cordtions under the foDowing cimunmaam:
- Torsion Evaluation - To evaluate the wide flange member torsional spesses using an extremely high value for the torsional resista actual member torsional properties, resulted in conservative estimates of flange in the wide flange members at locations of torsional loadi
- Member End Restrainta/ Boundary Condition Modeling for Richinond Inserts -
Three different approaches were used to model member end restraints at Richm Inserts connections.
1)
Release all rotational degrees of fteedom (DOF) at member end.
2)
Release rotational DOF along axis of member and along axis of the Richmond Insert, and restrain rotational DOF normal to the member and tne Richmond I .
- 3) Restrain aD sotational DOF at member end.
O TN-87 7256 3-50 DAP-RR-P 001, REV.1
j e
. Pipe Support Boundary Conditions - CASE identified several suppons evaluand assuming questionable boundary conditions. Analyses used en experience / practice in defining support boundary conditions.
' Itis issue is evaluated in Engineering Evaluation DAP-E-P-031 which provides a discussion of the issue.
SWEC RESOLUTIONMETHODO(.OGY SWEC addressed this issue with the following methodology:
- Torsion Evaluation '!he SWEC approach to modeling and evaluatmg structural members in pipe supports is based on using values for torsional resistance dete imm dimensions provided in the AISC Manual of Steel Construction. Equati provided in the design procedure for evaluating wide flange members and local due to tonional loading. A stiffness criterion is used in lieu of deflections; th actual torsional resistance values are required to be used in the suppon suffness determination.
Member End Restraints / Boundary Condition Modeling for Richmond Inserts -
SWEC pmcedures identify specific modeling requirements for Richmond Inse steel connections. 'Ihese requirements are die 3=-4 in Section 3.2.3.1 where it is concluded that the SWEC approach is adequate.
Pipe Support Boundary Conditions - SWEC requires the individual supp to establish the boundary conditions appropriate for the model used.
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION The Tturd Pany evaluation results are summarized as follows:
Torsion Evaluation '!he SWEC pmcedure provides a conservative approach t evaluating member stresses induced by torsion. Torsional shear, warping shel warping normal stresses are all conservatively evaluated by assuming each stres{
peduced by the full torsional mosmet. 'Ibese sesesses me also conservatively with other stresses by manuming that all maximums occur at the same point i flange cross section. By using AISC torsional resistance values for wide flan) in structural models, pipe support stifthesses win be calculated appropriatel Member End Rastraints/ Boundary Condition Modeling 'the SWEC approach modeling the Richmond Insen/ rube steel connection includes the threaded rod in th strucsural model and uses realistic secnon propenies for the rod. Any offset betwee censerlines of the rod and tube steel is modeled as a fictitious member. *!his approads acceptably addresses the flexibility of connections so urimaded structure accordance with the requirements of ASME Section III, nr.gr.$ XVII 2420,
" Connection Design".
. Support Boundary Conditions - Modeling assumpoons for boundary conditions at hwami of structural elements in a suppon are typically made by the suppon designer. It is not appropriate to anempt to describe typical tv=adary conditions f taultitude of conditions encountered. The adequacy of the modeling is depe the use of sufficiently experienced designers and checkers. '!his is common pr such design
=~p=Me effons and SWEC's 4=-h on their designers' judgments is an practice.
TN 67-7256
, 3 51 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
,_,,.___.m.-~.L----- " - - - - - ~ ~ "
t i
t CONCI.USION
' SWEC has established an adequate approach to stmetural modeling through:
e use of supports, representative section properties of wide flanges for structural analy
{
{
conservative calculation of member torsional stress and conservative them in evaluating member stresses in accordance with code requirements, and e
accurate specification connections. of boundary conditions for modeling of Richmond Insert / tube i
The issue is closed. l 3.2.3.29 Computer Program Verification And Use ISSUE DESCRIPTION Concerns were raised regardmg the existence of adequate program verification assurance) and use of the appropriate pmgram versions for the folloring computer pro ADLPIPE Version 2c (Date: 4/77)(a piping analysis program) e FUB II (an TIT Grinnell base plate quahfication program)
- Ccmer and Lada Base Plate Qualification Pmgram The computer program verification and use issue was evaluated in Engineering Evalua D DAP E P-032 which provides a more detailed discussion of the issue.
0 SWEC RESOLUTIONME1 HOD 0t.OGY SWEC addressed the computer program verification issue in the following ways:
- All computer program verification is documented for the idennfied programs and the verification 6===Ma addresses all project applications. Also, these pmgrams are qualified for the purpose for which they are e be used. * - ' " "
- All computer programs and applicable program versions used for Piping / Supp are appmpriately identified in the project promdures and/or the PSAR.
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION
'Ihe computer programs about which specific concems were raised are not being utilized SWEC requalification effort. However, the original acceptance criteria still apply to the programs. SWEC's use of computer programs is verified in accordance with SWEC st program requirements with regard to verification, technical adequacy, and use of appropri version. The methods used to control computer program use are acceptable.
CONCLUSION SWEC's approach to addressing th: Issues related to computer program verification and acceptable. This issue is closed.
O V
TN-87 7256 3-52 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
)
- _- D
p 3.2.3.30 Hydrotest ISSUE DESCRIPTION Concems were raised that hydrostatic test loading conditions for specific pip designs were not adequately considered. Specifically, the following concerns wer e
Damage observed during or subsequent to a hydrotest of the componen was attributed to hydrotesting.
- De Cygna review indicated a lack of consideration for hydrotest condition analysis and support design calculations.
The hydrotest issue was evaluated in Engineering Evaluation DAP-E-P-034 more detailed discussion of the issue.
SWEC RESOLUTIONMETH0004.OGY Procedurally, SWEC addressed the hydrotes issue by evaluation of piping and hydrotest conditions in accordance with the Code of Record (Rgerence 7.6), e Classes inmead 2 and 3 hydrostatic tem pressure, which was taken as 1.25 times the of 1.5.
j THIRO PARTYEVALUATION SWEC's method of evaluating Casses 2 and 3 piping symems forhydrostatic tes accordance with the ASME Code. ASME Casses 2 and 3 piping were tested and .
l.25 times the synem design pessu't. Casses 5 and 6 piping are tested and a l is in acmidance with a later Code version, which is le code update is acceptable based on the Project meeting requirements of ASME C his criterion was confirmed by the Riid Party in the Engmeeting Evaluanon DAP-E CONCLUSCN SWEC has adequately established and defined requirements for inclusion o conditions forpiping and support evaluations. De hydrotest issue is closed.
3.2.3.31 Seismic /Non-SeismicInterface ISSUEDESCR9 DON This issue, identified by the NRC and addressed in the CPRT ISAP V.c, (Agerenc the adequacy and implementation of seismic /non-seisnic piping interface design cr issue was transfened to DSAP IX. Specific mncems were the following:
e Safbty related piping is routed tun seismic Category I buildings and non seismic Category I buildings without seismic isoladon.
e Postulated Turbine Buuding failure, due to an earthquake, was not addres related piping routed between seismic Category I buildings and the Turbine which is a non-seismic Category I building. ' !
O TN47 7256 i 3 53 DAP RR-P 001, REV.1
.l
- *the seismic effects of non safety related piping attached to safety rel have been adequately considered in the associated piping and ancho .
The seismic /non-seismic interface issue was evaluated in Engmeeting Eva which contains a detailed discussion of the issue.
SWE0 RESOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY SWEC procedures address ASME piping as described in Section 2.0 of and methods for assuring seismic isolation and designing against pos failure as well as the interface between seismic and non-seismic piping are three basic methods described for the design of seismic piping at non methods assume a collapse of this non seismic pipe: one method assume the seismic interface anchor whereas the other assumesromathe collapse at a point seismic interface anchor by seismically designed non-seismic Category The third method requires that all attached non-seismic Category 1 pj and supported to the next anchor.
THIRD PARTYEVALUATION 1he three methods described by SWEC provide a reasonable basis for desig -
seismic interfaces where interface anchors are present. The first two method .
address Turt>ine Building failure. Although SWEC procedures do not specific for seismic piping interfaces. 'Ihis method is accepta interfaces where non-seismic piping is selsruically analyzed.
CONCLUSION The seismic /non seismic interfaz issue is closed.The e. methods de 3.2.3.32 Programmatic Aspects AtW QA ISSUEDESCRIPTION documents. The extemal source programmatic conarn
- Interfaces - A significant number of the technical concems that were raised result from inadequate interface control between the numerous organizationa
- Itarative Design - Identification and correction of design errors should no undl the end of the iterative design process l
- Quality 6-a - Calculations did not follow industry or project guidelines fbr Quality Assurance.
- Timeliness - Generic concems which affect numerous designs were not eva timely manner, leadmg to widespread design deficiencies of similar types i I
- Field Changes - Field changes were made without obtaming proper Ia unconventional designs being evaluated for adequacy "after the fact." {
TN47 7256 3 54 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
- Personnel - Qualifications of personnel appmving designhnodifications we due to insufficient pmcedures denmns qualifications required to perfonn at various levels of responsibility.
- Procedures - Procedures and instructions at CPSES were changed frequently inadequately contmtled and often not in place resulting in a chaode situation in wh procedures changes. were oRen violated, relying on the Anal review to identify design criteria
- Construction - Pmcedures and documents controlling installation / construction wer inadequate and/or not kept up-to-date.
- Calculation implyprogrammaticErrors - Numemus random calculation errors were identified wh deficiencies.
- MlaceDaneous - Various other concerns were raised regarding the updating of c and the adq'ag of various practices used in desigrvgualincation activities. '
SWECRESOLUDONMETHODOLOGY SWEC's appmach to resolving the various programmatic issues is through pmcedu document responsibilities, interface control requirements and quality assurance pr
- plan is outlined in project procedure CPPP-1, the Management Plan for Project Q (Rqference 7.26), which addresses each of the eighteen criteria of 10CPR50, Appe plan is imA.kd and Quality through issuance of Project Pmcedures, Fmgineering Assurance Pm Standards. '
THIRO PARTYEVALUATION 1he Third Pany evaluation is summarized as follows:
- Interfaces - The Project Pmoedures controlling interfaces and defining swsibilitie provide detailed descriptions of responsibilities and specific deAnition ofinterface information to be transmitted between various design orgarurarians within the CPS project.1he cautmis delineated in SWEC procedures are acceptable since the requiresness at an applicable interfans.1he signi8 cam reduction of the number of ensnal Iraerfaces also enhances the imphanentation of these procedures.
- Iterative Design - 1he SWEC Procedure Controls provide an acceptable basis for t iterative design process since au stages from design to as-built are tracked design denciencies and open items. This will assure that design changes and erm closed, and that any preliminary information that was used is confirmed.
- Queuty Assurance -The SWEC Management Plan for Pmject Quality establishes a program to assure project quality consistent with industry gudelines. Implementation of the plan is an acceptable basis fbr closure of this lasue.
- Thaeliness SWECpecedure CPPP-13 (A<ference 7.27) provides adequate assura that changes due to design iterations or disposition of nossonfonnances win be addressed anWor incorporated within a reasonable time frame by providing mechanism on forms used to document such changes, implementation of the Management Plan for Project Quality wiH assure that concems regarding tre generic implications are appropriately addressed.
O t TN 67 7256 3-55 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
Field Changes - Requirements contained in SWEC Pmject Procedures ensure tha new designs, modifications, or reconciliadons with as built condition ,
documented and approved by a qualified responsible engineer / designer.
Personnel - SWEC procedures for project penonnel trauung and indoc the means to ensure that the design is perfonned to acceptable standards people.
Procedures - SWEC has published guidelines forissue and control of pro
-design adherence of safety related to these items. guidelines will ensure that proper procedures are in pla e \
of analysis input data to identify additiorul technica and supportsis properlyevaluated. reconciliation walkdown/ analysis re e !
Calculation Errors 'the detailed Project Pmeedures for documentation, revie mntrol of calculadons provide a means to identify random types of enors. The the implementation of these procedures during the TU Electric QA Technic pmvide additional assurance that random enors will be minim 12ed. .
- MisceDaneous design practices used Standard Ibr SWECprocedures are adequate to ensure that criter miscellaneous concems. qualification of CPSES piping and supports address these CONCLUSION g 'the SWEC pmcedures establish adequate methods and contmls to eliminate programmatic concerns raised over the initial design e Engmeeting Functional Evaluttion will povide added assurance that similar co reoccur. '!his issue is closed.
3.2.3.33 Other DIRs "
In addition to the DIRs addressed by the thirty-two Primary isne evaluations, f unrelated to the Primary issues were seviewed. A lia of these DRs and a hW of each respective DR. Each of the fifty one DRs is resolved a O
TN 87 7256 3-56 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
_ _ _ _ _ . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i
4.0 SELF-INITIATED REVIEW
' /'
i All of the Third Party review acdvides required by DSAP IX are external sou corrective action overviews. 'Ihere are no self initiated reviews, r
O 4
i O
TN-87 7256 d'I DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
5.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION
(
The SWEC resolution methodology and Third Party evaluation for external so discussed in Section 3.0 of this report. The implementation of that meth work defined in Attachment 2 of DSAP IX is the corrective action for the pi discipline. The 1hird Pany evaluated this methodology in conjunction with t Extemal Source Issues and determined that the methodology resolves exte meets applicable criteria and commitments. Among the purposes of the conective a overview described in Appendix H of the CPRT Program Plan was the evaluation of Pany activities under Appendix H have been modif ,
Assurance, including recommendations for further co Program.
O TN-87 7256 51 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
6.0 CONCLUSION
S
'lhis repon presents the results of a Third Party review of the adequacy of mrtam large bore piping and pipe suppons as related to issues raised in external source documents. The Third Pany categorized these issues into thiny-two issue categories which formed the basis for the scope of the teview. Resolution methodology for all these issues is provided in the SWEC Generic Issue Repon and the SWEC procedures. The evaluation of adequacy comprised an evaluation based on the CPSES FSAR and licensing commitments of the SWEC resolution methodology. The Third Pany has concluded that the SWEC large bore pipe stress reanalysis and pipe suppon requalification program is comprehensive and capable of resolving known technical issues. Proper implementation will ensure that the CPSES large bore piping and suppons will meet the FSAR and licensing commitments. Where criteria changes are proposed by the Project final verificadon of compliance is subject to review of NRC approved amendments. The overview of the implementation of the program by the TU Electric QA Technical Audit Program provides assurance that the technical issues will be resolved.
O l
l l
TN 87 7256 61 DAP-RR-P-001, REV.1 1
I
7.0 REFERENCES
7.1 Comanche Peak Response Team Pmgram Plan, Rev. 4, June 18,1987.
7.2 Memorandum from John W. Beck (Chairman, SRT) to Howard A. l2 vin, DAP-R DAP Piping and Piping Supports Results Report, August 12,1987.
7.3 Report on SWEC's Evaluation and Resolution of Generic issues, Rev.1. April 7.4 Letter from Vincent Noonan (NRC) to William Counsil (TUGCO) re: Pmposed F Change -Piping / Pipe Suppons November 4,1986.
7.5 IS AP V.c, " Design Consideration for Piping Systems Between Seismic Categ Non-Seismic Category I Buildings," Rev. 2 January 24,1986.
7.6 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1,1974 Editio Summer 1974 Addenda, Subsection NC and ND (as documented in Section 2.0 of Reference 7.8).
7.7 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division I,1974 Edition Winter 1974 Addenda, Subsection NF.
7.8 CPPP-7, " Design Criteria for Pipe Stress and Pipe Suppons," Rev. 2 April 25,1986 7.9 CPPP-6, 28,1986. " Pipe Stress / Support Requalification Pmcedure - Unit No.1," Rev. 3 No p (
( 7.10 1986.
CPPP 9, " Pipe Stress / Support As-Built Procedure - Unit No. 2," Rev. 3 No
}
l 7.11 DAP 31,1987.
March 10. " Development and Use of DAP Pmeedures and Discipline Instructions 7.12 DAP 2," Documentation and Tracking ofissues arg! D:screpmcics," Rev. 6 May 19,1987.
7.13 Design Criteria List DAP-CR P-001, Rev. 2, May 8,1987.
7.14 R.L. Cloud and Associates Report RLCA/P142/0186/008," Richmond Insert / St Tube Steel Connectwn Design Interaction Equation for Bolt /Ducaded Rods," Rev. O September 10,1986, including Errata dated September 11,1986 (1 page).
7.15 American Concrete Institute (ACI) Standard 349 85.
7.16 ISAP U.b Results Repon " Concrete Compressive Strengtt," Rev.1. February 28 7.17 'Ihird Party Issue Resolution Repon (IRR) DAP E-C/S-515. Rev. O October 2,1986 7.18 R.L. Cloud and Associates Report RCLA/P142/0186009," Richmond Insert / Struc Tube Steel Connection Effect of 7hermal Expansion of Tube Steel on Richmond Inse and Bolts," Rev. O. April 6,1987. l O
TN-87 7256 71 OAP RR P-001, REV.1 l l
, 7.19 K.R. Wichman et al. " Local Stresses in Spherical and Cylindrical Shells Loadings." Welding Research Council Bulletin 107, August 1965.
7.20 SWEC in the Ana2ysisCalculation 15454 of Piping System " Rev. J. MayNP(C)-
26,1987. GENX-117. " Verifica 7.21 before the ASLB dated August 22,1983. CASE's Proposed Findin 7.22 Letter from Vincent Noonan (NRC) to W.G. Council (TUGCO), March 13 198 l
7.23Summer ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IU, Division I,198 1985 Addenda, Subsection NF, Paragraph 4721.
7.24 'Ihird Pany issue Resolution Repon (IRR) DAP E-C/S-514 Rev.1. March 2 7.25 CPPP 35, " Piping and Pipe Suppon Qualification Procedure for Second Displacement " Rev. O. June 8,1987.
7.26 CPPP-1, " Management Plan for Project Quality," Rev. 7, March 25,1987.
7.27 CPPP-13," Site Construction Suppon Activities Procedures," Rev.1 Dec , .
7.28 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.84, " Design and Fabrication Code Case Acc Section III Division 1" Revision 24. June 1986.
7.29through Comanche
- 55. Peak Steam Electric Station, Fatal Safety Analysis Repon w O
t TN47 7256 72 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
O ATTACHMENT A EXTERNAL SOURCE DOCUMENTS O '
O M47 7256 A1 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
-b
ATTACHMENT A EXTERNAL SOURCE DOCUMENTS Sowce Doewnent Dese Dwument Tide ASLB1 09/01/83 BOARD MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - MOTION ASLB 2 TO REOPEN THE RECORD AND TO STRIKE 12/28/83 BOARD ORDER AND MEMORANDUM LBP-83 81:
ASLB-3 (QUALITY ASSURANCE FOR DESIGN) 02/08/84 MEMORANDUM AND BOARD ORDER LBP-84-10:
(RECONSIDERATION CONCERNING QUALITY ASSURANCE POR DESIGN)
ASLB-4 06/29/84 ASLB MEMORANDUM AND ORDER LBP-84-25 !
(WRTITEN FILING DECISIONS,#1: SOME AWS/ASMEISSUES)
ASLB5 12/18/84 BOARD MEMORANDUM CONCERNING WELDING ISSUES ASLB-6 12/18/84 BOARD MEMORANDUM -REOPENING DISCOVERY: MISLEADING STATEMENT ASLB 7 07/29/82 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-8 07/30/82 ASLB PROGEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-9 09/13/82 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-10 09/13/82 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-11 09/14/82 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFT ASLB-12 '09/15/82 ASLB PROGEDINGS TRANSCRPr ASLB-13 09/l&B2 ASLB PROGEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-14 04/25/83 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-15 05/16/83 ASLB PROGEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-16 05/17/83 ASLB PROGEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-17 05/17/83 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB 18 05/18/83 ASLB PROGEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-19 05/19/83 ASLB PROGEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB 20 05/20/83 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB 21 06/13/83 ASLB PROGEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB 22 06/14/83 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB 23 06/15/83 ASLB-24 ASLAPRO EDINGS TRANSCRFr 06/16/83 ASLB PRO EDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-25 10/17/83 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-26 10/18/83 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr TN 67 7256 A2 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
t ATTACHMENT A - Continued
, .=
Document Date D%. a; Title ASLB 02/20/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-28 02/21/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-29 02/23/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB 30 03/19/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-31 03/20/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB 32 03/21/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-33 03/22/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB 34 03/23/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB-35 03/30/84 ASLB PROGEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB 36 04/18/84 ASLB PROGEDINGS TRANSCRFT ASLB-37 04/24/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB 38 04/25/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFr ASLB 39 04/26/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS 1RANSCRFT ASLB 40 04/27/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSGFr ASLB-41 05SI/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFT ASLB 42 O' ASLB-43 05/02/84 05/03/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRFT ASLB PROCEEDINGS TRAN3CRIPT
,, ASLB-44 02/22/84 ASLB PROCEEDINGS 1RANSCRFT '
ASLB-45 10/31/85 ASLB MEMORANDUM AND ORDER LBP 85-14 (PROCEDURAL RULING BOARD CONCERN ABOUT QA POR DESIGN).
ASLB-46 02/28/84 1EIEPHONE CONPERENCE-10 DISCUSS I SCHEDULING MATIERS RELATED TO MARCH 12 THROUGH MARCH 16 HEARINGS CASE-1 07/29/82 CASE EXHIBTT 659 WALSH TTSTIMONY (EXH 659A-H)
CASE-2 08/19/82 3 CASE EXHIBIT 669 - DOYLE ORAL DEPOSITION (VOLUME I). EXHIBrr 669A - (VOLUME II), AND !
CASE-3 EXHIBrr 669B - (DEPOSTr!ON EXHIBirS) 09/13/82 CASE EXHIBIT 683 - DOYIE SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY CASE-4 07/2P/83 OBJECI10N TO BOARD'S PINDINGS AND CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' 07/15/83
SUMMARY
OF THE RECORD REGARDING WEAVE AND DOWNHIII WELDING CASE 5 08/22/83 CASE PROPOSEDFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OFLAW TN-87 7256 A3 DAP RR-P-001, REV.1
)
)
\
i ATTACHMENT A - Continued Source
{
Documem De Documam Tith CASE-6 09 S3/83 I CASE'S MOTION REGARDING 09S7/83 l CONFERENCE CALL CASE 7 $
11/10/83 CASE'S RESPONSE TO (1) APPLICANTS' BRIEF REGARDING BOARDINQUIRY INTO APPLICABIIJrY OF AWS AND CODES TO WELDING ON PIPE SUPPORTS AT CPSES: (2) NRC RESPONSE M BOARD QUESTION ON CPSES WELDING CODE CASE-8 11/23/83 CASE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (AFFIDAVITS ON OPEN ITEMS RELATING TO WALSH/DOYLE ALLEGATIONS)
CASE-9 08/06/84 {
CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING CONSIDERATION OF FRICTION FORCES IN THE DESIGN OFPIPE SUPPORTS WTTH SMALL THERMAL MOVEMENTS CASE 10 08/06/84 CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICAVIS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSMON OF CERTAIN CASE ALLEGATIONS REGARDING AWS AND ASME CODE PROVISIONS RELATED 10 DESIGN ISSUES CASE-11 08/06/84 CASE'S ANSWEk TO APatICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING ALLEGED ERRORS MADEIN DETERMINING DAMPING FACTORS FOR OBE AND SSE LOADING CONDmONS CASE 12 08/13/84 CASE'S ANSWER'!O APPLICANTS'MOTIONFOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING CASE Af .I PnATIONS REGARDING SECTION PROPERTY VALUES CASE-13 08/20/84 CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON OFCASE'S ALLEGATIONS REGARDING U BOLTS ACTING AS TWO WAY RESTRAINTS CASE-14 08/27/84 CASE'S PARTIAL ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH 1 MERE IS NO OENUINE ISSUE REGARDING THE UPPER LA1ERAL RESTRAINT BEAM CASE 15 08/27/84 CASE'S PARTIAL ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THEREIS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING A11EGA110NS CONCERNING CONSIDERATION O OF FORCE DISTRIBUTION IN AXIAL RESTRAINTS TN 87 7256 A-4 DAP RR P-001. REV.1
Lw A'ITACHMEffr A - Continued Document Date D=. a Title CASE-16 08/27/84 CASE'S PARTIAL ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHICH THEREIS NO GENUINEISSUE REGARDING APPLICANTS' USE OF GENERIC STIFFNESSES CASE-17 08/27/84 INSTEAD OF ACTUALIN PIPING ANALYSIS CASE'S PARTIAL ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINEISSUE REGARDING DIFFERENTIAL DISPLACEMENT OF LARGE-FRAMED, WALL TO-WALL AND FLOOR TO-CEILING SUPPORTS CASE-18 08/27/84 CASE'S PARTIAL ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MA'IERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THEREIS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING SAFETY FACTOkS CASE-19 08/29/84 CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING CONSIDERATION O CASE-20 LOCAL DISPLACEMENTS AND STRESSES yO 09/10/84 CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANIS' STA'IEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS RELATING TO RICHMOND INSERTS AS TO WHICH THERE APINO MATERIALISSUES CASE 21 1041/84 CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASE'S ANSWER M APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSMONREGARDING -
CASE 22 CONSIDERATION OFFRICTIONFORCES 10M8/84 CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSMON REGARDING CONSIDERA'IlON U BOLTS OFCINCHING DOWN OF CASE-23 10 S 9/84 CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING LOCAL CASE-24 DISPLACEMENTS AND STRESSES 10/13/84 ATTACHMENTS M CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANT 3' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING CONSIDERATION OF CINCHING DOWN OF U BOLTS O
TN-87 7256 A-5 DAP RR P 001, REV.1
A'ITACHMENT A - Continued Document Deze Documem Tide CASE 25 10/15/84 DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION REQUESTED BY CASE REGARDING APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING STABILITY OF PIPE SUPPORTS CASE 26 10/18/84 CASE'S PARTIAL ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING APPLICANTS' QUALTTY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR DESIGN OFPIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS FOR OSES CASE-27 10/18/84 CASE'S DISCOVERY REQUESTS TO APPLICANTS .
CASE-28 REGARDING CROSS-OVER LEO RESTRAINTS 10/30/84 CASE'S 2ND PARTIAL ANSWER 'ID APPLICANTS' STA1EMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THEREIS NO GENUINEISSUE REGARDING APPLICANTS' QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM CASE 29 POR DESIGN OF PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS
' 11/20/84 CASE'S ANSWER'ID APPLICANTS'REPLYTO CASE'S ANSWER 10 APPLICANTS'MOTIONFOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING THE UPPER LATERAL RESTRAINTBEAM CASE-30 12/19/84 CASE'S 4TH ROUND ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON CASE-31 REGARDING THE EFFECTS OFGAPS 01/17/85 CASE'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO CASE-32 APPUCANTS AND REQUESTS TO PRODUG 0244/85 CASE'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES M APPLICANTS AND REQUESTS M PRODUG RE:
GEDIBIUTY CASE-33 02/25/85 CASE'S FOURTH SET OF Df!ERROGATORIES 'IU CASE 34 APPUCANTS AND REQUEST 3 M PRODUCE 02/25/85 CASE'S THIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO j
CASE-35 APPUCANTS AND REQUESTS M PRODUCE '
0344/85 CASE'S FIPTH SETOF DfTERROGATORIES TO CASE 36 APPUCANTS AND REQUESIS M PRODUCE 04/26/83 SURREBLTITAL 1ESTIMONY OF JACK DOYLE {
CASE-37 04/28/83 (CASE EXHIBrr761 AND ATTACHMENTS)
SUPPLEMENTARY SURREBUTTAL'IESTIMONY OF JACK DOYIE(CASE EXHIBrr 762)
O TN47 7256 A6 DAP RR-P-001 REV.1
A'ITACHMENT A -Continued km O' ' Document ' Dew N-- .; Tide CASE 38 05A)4/83 SUPPLEMENTARY SURREB UITAL TESTIMONY OF JACK DOYLE (CASE EXHIBTT 763 AND ATTACHMENTS)
CASE-39 11/04/83 CASE RESPONSE TO NRC AFFIDAVITS ON OPEN l ITEMS RELATING TO WALSH/DOYLE ALLEGATIONS CASE-40 11/28/83 CASE'S ANSWER TO BOARD's IW25/83 MEMORANDUM (PROCEDURE CONCERNING '
QUALITY ASSURANCE)
CASE-41 02/01/84 CASE'S ANSWER'ID MCrrIONS FOR $
RECONSIDERATION OF BOARD'S MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (QUALITY ASSURANG FOR DESIGN)
BY APPLICANTS AND NRC STAFF I
CASE-42 08/13/84 CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING THE EFFECTS OF GAPS ON STRUCTURAL BEHAVIOR UNDER SEISMIC LOADING CONDITIONS CASE-43 05/04/83 SURREBUTTAL TPS11 MONY OFMARK ANTHONY WALSH CASE-44 10/02/84 CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASES'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' MOTION REGARDING AILEGED ERRORS MADEIN DETERMINING DAMPING FACIDRS FOR OBE AND ,
SSE LOADING CONDITIONS.
CASE-45 12/19/85 CASE'S RESPONSE'ID APPLICANTS' 11/12/85 '-
CHANGES 1D AFFIDAVTIS IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANI5' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION.
IAP-1 IW12/84 COMANCHE PEAK INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM FINAL REPORT 1R 8309041. REV. O IAP-2 11/2W84 COMANCHE PEAK INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT IAP-3 PROGRAM FINAL REPORT (PHASE 3) 1R 84042-01 03/14/85 TUOCO/CPRT MEETING TD DISCUSS FINDINGS PROM INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM IAP4 04/04/85 REVIEW ISSUES IJST TRANSMTITAL - PIPE STRESS & PIPE SUPPORTS IAP 5 04/04/85 REVIEW ISSUES IJST 1RANSMTITAL - CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS & CONDUIT SUPPORTS IAP-6 O 04/04/85 REVIEWISSUES LISTTRANSMTITAL -
ELECIRICAl/l&C TN47 7256 A-7 DAP RR P-001. REV.1
_ _ ,____ w--- - - - ^ - - ' ' ' ' '~ .
ATTACHMENT A -Continued somce
- p. Document Date Documaar Title IAP 7 04,t)4/85 REVIEWISSUES LISTTRANSMITTAL -
MECHANICAL SYSTEMS 1AP 8 04/04/85 REVIEW ISSUES LIST TRANSMTITAL - DESIGN CONTROL 1AP-9 04/23/85 REVIEW ISSUES LIST TRANSMTITAL - PIPE 1AP 10 STRESS 9tEV.1) & PIPE SUPPORTS (REV.1) 04/23/85 REVIEW ISSUES LIST 7RANSMTITAL - CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS (REV. 9) & CONDUIT SUPPORTS (REV.1)
IAP 11 04/23/85 REVIEWISSUES USTTRANSMTITAL -
ELECTRICA1/I&C, REVISION 1 IAP 12 04/23/85 REVIEW ISSUES LISTTRANSMITTAL -
MECHANICAL SYSTEMS, REVISION 1 IAP 13 04/23/85 REVIEW ISSUES LIST TRANSMTITAL - DESIGN CONTROL, REVISION O IAP-14 06/21/85 REVIEW ISSUES LIST 1RANSMITTAL - CABLE !
TRAY SUPPORTS, REVISION 10 IAP 15 06/21/85 REVIEW ISSUES LIST TRANSMTITAL - DESIGN CONTROL, REVISION 1 IAP-16 08/13/85 REVIEWISSUES LISTTRANSMTITAL CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS (REV.11) & CONDUIT SUPPORTS (REV. 2)
LAP-17 08/13/85 REVIEW ISSUES LISTTRANSMTITAL -
MECHANICAL SYSTEMS, REVISION 2 IAP-18 08/13/85 REVIEWISSUES LISTTRANSMTITAL -
ELECTRICA1/I&C, REVISION 2 1AP 19 05/15/84 IAP PHASE 4 - SUPPLEMENT TO APPLICANTS' PLAN TO RESPOND TO MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (QUALITY ASSURANCE FOR DESIGN),
MARCH 13,1984 IAP 20 10A)9/84 CYGNA LTR. 84056.032 - REACTOR COOLANT l THERMAL BARRIER RUPTURE IAP 21 10/22/84 CYGNA L7R. 84056.035 - REACTOR COOLANT PUMPTHERMAL BARRIER RUPTURE -
CLARIFICATION IAP 22 01/18/85 CYGNA L7R. 84042.022 - OPEN TIEMS ASSOCIATED WrrH WALSH/DOYLE ALLEGATIONS IAP-23 01/25/85 CYGNA L1R. 84056.050 - STATUS OFIAP O CONCLUSIONS, ALL PHASES TN 87 7256 A-8 DAP RR P-001, REV.1 i
{
sowoe ATTACHMEIR A - Continued Document Deze Doer;;u-; Title IAP 24 01/31/85 CYGNA LTR. 84042.025 - PHASE 3 - WALSH/DO ALLEGATIONS (RICHMOND INSERT IAP 25 01/31/85 ALLOWABLES AND BENDING STRESSES)
CYGNA LTR. 84056.053 - PHASE 4 OPEN ITEMS (PUNCHING SHEAR)
IAP 26 02/08/85 CYGNA L'IR. 84042.021 - PHASE 3 OPEN ITEMS (MASS PARTICIPATION AND MASS POINT SPACING)
IAP 27 02/12/85 CYGNA L'IR. 84056.041 - CABLE TRAY SUPPORT REVIEW QUESTIONS IAP-28 02/19/85 CYGNA LTR. 84042.035 - STABILITY OF PIPE SUPPORTS IAP 29 03/08/85 CYGNA LTR. 83090.023 - RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTIONS,IAPPHASES 1 AND 2 IAP-30 03/12/85 CYGNA LTR. 84056.058 - PHASE 4 OPEN ITEMS (PUNCHING SHEAR)
IAP-31 03/25/85 CYGNA LTR. 84042.036 - PHASE 3 OPEN TIEMS IAP 32 (CINCHING OF U BOLTS)
( 03/29/85 CYGNA L'IR. 84056.060 - GENERIC ISSUES IAP-33
SUMMARY
.IAP- AIL PHASES
- 11/2Q/85 REVIEWISSUESLIST* TRANSMITTAL CABLE IAP 34 TRAY SUPPORTS (REV.12)
I1/20/85 REVIEW ISSUES IJST TRANSMr!TAL - CONDUIT SUPPOR'IS (REV. 3)
MAC-1 05/17/78 NRC-1 02/15/83 MANAGEMENTQUALT!Y ASSURANCE AUDIT NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION TEAM (SIT) REPORT (50445/82-26X50446/82 14) AS A RESULT OF WALSH/DOYLE CONCERNS NRC-2 04/11/83 CONSTRUCrlON APPRAISAL INSPECTION (CA 50445/83 18.50-446/83 12 NRC-3 08/29/83 NRC STAFF DECISION OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED INITIAL NRC-4 08/30/83 NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT IN NRC 5 1043/83 THE PORM OF A PARTIAL INTTIAL DECISION NRC-6 REGION IV CATPOLLOW UP REPORT 10/28/83 NRC STAFFRESPONSE TO BOARD QUESTION REGARDING CPSES APPIJCABLE WELDING CODES AT O
TN47 7256 A-9 DAP RR-P-001, REV.1
ATTACHMENT A -Continued sowoe Document Deze
. C+2 .a.; Title U
NRC7- 07/13/84 COMANCHE PEAK SPECIAL REVIEW TEAM REPORT NRC-8 11/02/84 NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION ON AWS AND ASME CODE PROVISIONS ON WELD DESIGN NRC-9 09/30/85 STAFF EVALUATION OF CPRT PROGRAM PL.04, REVISION 2, DETAILED COMMENTS / CONCERNS NRC-10 07/01/81 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT - CPSES UNITS 1 &
2 (NUREG-0797)
NRC-11 10/01/81 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT - CPSES UNITS 1 &
2 (NUREG-0797) SUPPLEMENTNO.1 NRC-12 01/01/82 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT - CPSES UNITS 1 &
2 (NUREG-0797) SUPPIEMENTNO. 2 NRC 13 03/01/83 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT - CPSES UNITS 1 &
2 (NUREG 0797) SUPPIEMENTNO. 3 NRC-14 11/01/83 SAFETY EVALUA110N REPORT - CPSES UNITS 1 &
2(NUREG 0797)SUPPLEMENTNO.4 NRC 15 11/01/84 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT'- CPSES UNITS 1 &
2 (NUREG-0797) SUPPLE.MENTNO. 6 NRC 16 01/01/85 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT - CPSES UNITS 1 &
2 (NtfREG-0797) SUPPLEMENTNO. 7 NRC-17 02/01/85 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT - CPSFJE UNITS 1 &
2 (NUREG-0797) SUPPLEMENTNO. 8 NRC-18 03 S 1/85 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT - CPSES UNI 151 &
2 (NUREG 0797)SUPPLEMENTNO. 9 NRC-19 04/01/85
. SAFETY EVALUA110N REPORT- CPSES UNITS 1 &
2 (NUREG-0797)SUPPIEMENTNO.10 NRC 20 05/01/85 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT- CPSES UNITS 1 &
2 (NUREG-0797) SUPPIEMENTNO.11 NRC-21 09/02/82 NRC STAFF TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH I. TAPIA AND W. PAUL CHEN IN REBUTTAL'ID THE
'IESTIMONY OF MARK ANTHONY WALSH NRC-22 CONCERNING THE DESIGN OF PIPE SUPPOR13 05/13/83 INSPECrlON REPORT $0445/83-12: 50446/8347 -
INSPECTION CONDUCIED BY J. I. TAPIA AND W.
PAUL CHEN NRC-23 12/13/83 AFFIDAVITS OF JOSEPH I. TAPIA AND W. PAUL CHEN ON OPENITEMS RELATING TO WALSH/DOYLE CONCERNS NRC-24 //
O NRC INSPECTIONREPORT 82-30 TN-87 7256 A 10 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
i r
ATTACHMENT A- Continued sowoe O - - ~~
NRC-25 0148/85 NRC LETTER TO TUOCO RE: TRT QA/QC NRC-26 FINDINGS (A1TACHED TO NRCT4).
05/30/85 NRC REGION IV INSPECTION REPORTS 2/17/84 THROUGH 5/30/85.
NRC-27 10/11/84 NRC INSPECTION REPORT (50 445/84-22X50-446/84-07)-INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED UNDER ,
RESIDENT INSPECTION PROGRAM 05/19/84 I THROUGH 07/21/84 NRC-28 02/27/79
SUMMARY
OF FEBRUARY 13,1979 MEETING ON i
NRC 29 AUXILIARY SYS'IEMS BRANCH QUESTIONS 11/17/80 LETTER, R.L. TEDESCO TO RJ. GARY RE: SERVICE NRC-30 INSPECTION OF PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES 01/14/81 1EITER, R.L.1EDESC010 RJ. GARY RE:
PRESERVICE INSPECITON AND TESTING OF SNUBBERS NRC-31 10/14/B2 1 RIP REPORT-AUDrr OF TUSI DOCUMENTATION POR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALE 1 CATION OF SAFETY-RELA 1ED EQUIPMENT FOR CPSES 1 AND 2.
NRC-32 10/29/82 SSER INPUT ON SEISMIC AND DYNAMIC QUALIFICATION OFSAFETY RELATED ELECTRIC AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT NRC 33 01/31/83
, REGION IV RESPONSE 10 RJ. GARY LETIER ON SYS1EMATICARRRt*MDTTOFUGNSEE ,
PERFORMANG(SAIJ')
NRC-34 07/06/83 SUBMr!TAL OF INTERIM STAFF EVALUATION OF THE ALTERNA1E SHU1DOWN DESIGN FOR THE CPSES NRC 35 01/24/84 SER UNRESOLVEDISStJES REQUIRING NRC-36 RESOLUTION PRIOR TO LICENSING CPSES UNrr i 01/24/84 SER OUTSTANDING ISSUE (1), "PROIECTION AGAINST EPPECTS ASSOCIA* LED WITH THE POSTULATED RUFrURE OF PIPING OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT" NRC-37 .02/13/84 ADDITIONALINFORMA110N ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION NRC 38 05/17/84 1RANSMTITAL OF PROPOSED SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX C OF THE SER FOR COMANCHE PEAK NRC 39 09/12/84 STEAM EXECIRIC STATION (UNrrS 1 AND 2)
NRC STAFF CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW REPORTFOR THE CPSES TN 87 7256 A 11 DAP RR-P 001, REV.1
r 1
A1TACHMENT A -Continued sowoe Docenent Dois D_== Title NRC-40 09/18/84 COMANCHE PEAK REVIEW NRC-41 11/13/84 ACCEPTABILITY OF ASME CODE RELIEF REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE PRESERVICE INSPECrlON (PSI) PROGRAM FOR COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 1 NRC-42 11/19/84 ISSUANG OFSUPPEMENTNO. 6 TOTHE COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNrrS 1 AND 2 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT NRC-43 06/05/85 USE OF ASME CODE CASES N 397 AND N-411 FOR THE CPSES (UNITS I AND 2)
NRC-44 OMT//85
SUMMARY
OF MEETING BETWEENNRC STAFF l AND TUGCO TO DISCUSS THE COMANCHE PEAK FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM NRC-45 06/10/85 ISSUANG OF SUPPIEMENT NO.11 TO NUREG-l 0797 COMANCHE PEAK STEAMELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND2
' NRC 46 07/24/85 RESPONSE TO LD. BLTPTERFIELD'S MAY 16,1985 REQUESTPOR COMMENTS ONTHE WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP (WOG)
O GUIDELINES ICR PREPARING SUBMr!TALS REQUESTING NRC APPROVAL OF REACTOR TRIP
" TECH. SPEC. CHANGES NRC-47 09/25/85 USE OF ASME CODE CASES N 397 AND N-411 FOR
NRCT-1 09/18/84 NRC-1521ECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM BRIEFING:
COMANOiE PEAK REVIEW NRCT-2 11S 1/84
SUMMARY
OFMEETING1D DISCUSS THE APPLICANIS'PLANPOR RESOLtrTION OF REQUES13 POR ADDrrlONAL INFORMA110N PROM THE COMANCHE PEAK 1ECHNICAL REVIEW 1EAM EPPORT DESCRIBED IN LETTER DATED 09/18/84 NRCT-3 12/2054 1RANSC3tIPT CYGNA/NRC MEETING -
INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTPROGRAM NRCT4 01/10f85 MEETING Wrni CYGNA ON CPSES INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTPROGRAM(PHASE 3)
NRCT5 01/15/85 MElfrtNO WrrH11JOCO CON RNING THE MOTION POR
SUMMARY
DISPOStrION ON QAA2C PROGRAM FOR DESIGN OF PIP!NG AND P!PE SUPPORTS FOR COMANCHE PEAK O
TN 87 7256 A 12 DAP RR-P-001, REV.1
. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - - )
W ATTACHMENT A - Continued O' sowce Docenent Does
' h-r- Title
' NRCT-6 01/17/85 MEETING TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAMSTAFFFINDINGS COMANCHEPEAK NRCT7 02M/85
SUMMARY
OF MEETING WITH CASE, TUGCO AND NRC CONTENTION 5 PANEL CONCERNING COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION AND TECHNICAL ISSUES RAISED IN THE ASLB HEARINGS THURSDAY,PEBRUARY 7,1985 NRCT8 02/26/85 MEETING BETWEEN TEXAS UTILmES AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGARDING COMANCHE PEAK STEAM EIECTRIC STATION-PIPING AND SUPPORT DESIGN NRCT-9 02/27/85 MEETING BETWEENTEXAS UTILMES AND THE NUCIEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGARDING COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC !
STATION-PIPING AND SUPPORT DESIGN NRCT-10 03/06/85 MEETING BETWEEN TEXAS UTILmES AND THE '
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGARDING CPSES - TRT TESTING PROGRAM ISSUES NRCT 11 03M/85 MEETING BETWEEN TEXAS ImLMES AND THE NUCLEAR REGULA7ORY COMMISSION REGARDING CPSE3-MECHANICAL' AND ~
MISCELLANEOUS NRCT 12 04/26/85 CYGNA BRIEPING TV NRC MANAGEMENT ON COMANOIE PEAK STEAM EIECIREC STATION !
INDEPENDENTASSESSMENTPROGRAM NRCT-13 OM)6/84 TEIEPHONE CCNPERENCE CALL (06/0W84)10 DISCUSS VARIOUS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON ON PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN AND QA ISSUES WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMr!TED BY THE APPLICANT NRCT-14 06 M /84 MEETING IN BETHESDA ON TECHNICAL DATA l
AND SUPPORTING MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmONS NRCT 15 06/11/84 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE (NRC, CASE, TUGCO) 10 DISCUSS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON ON PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN AND DESIGN QA O
TN47 7256 A 13 DAP RR P 001, REV.1
I ATTACHMENT A -Continued O
sowce Document Due Docu=== Title NRCT 16 10/23/84 MEETING TO DISCUSS THE APPLICANT'S PLAN FOR RESOLUTION OFREQUESTS FOR ADDmONAL INFORMATION FROM THE COM/.NCHE PEAK TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM (TRT) EFFORT NRCT 17 03/23/85 MEETING TO CONDUCT FEEDBACK DISCUSSION i WITH MESSRS. WALSH AND DOYLE REGARDING CONCERNS ABOUTTHE COMANCHE PEAK PLANT )
NRCT-18 04/19/84 MEETING WTTH CYGNA ENERGY SERVICES ON INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (IAP) FOR COMANCHE PEAK NRCT-19 0743/84 MEETING BETWEEN NRC STAFF AND CYGNA - '
0743/84 NRCT-20 03/05/85 MEETING BETWEENTEXAS tmLITIES AND THE NUCLEAR REGULA1 DRY COMMISSION REGARDING COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - QA/QC, APPLICANTS' PROGRAM PLAN NRCT-21 06/20/84 NRC MEETING 10 DISCUSS SUBMITTED
SUMMARY
DISPOSmONS O- NRCT 22 10/19/84 TUGCO MEE!1NG WITH NRC STAFF NRCT 23 11/13/84 PREHEARING BRIEFING
" i NRCT-24 08/06/84 DISCUSSION ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON FILED BY APPLICANT, COMANCHE PEAK NRCT 25 OWOS/84 QUESTIONS ON
SUMMARY
DISPOSMONS PILED BY1EXAS ImLmES ON COMANCHE PEAK '
NRCT-26 08/09/84 (HEARING TRANSCRIPT) IN THE MATIER OF COMANCHE PEAK,1EXAS UTILTTY NRCT-27 08/23/84 COMANCHE PEAK MEETING BETWEEN NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF AND TEXAS UTILITIES - MOTIONS POR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON NRCT-28 06/13/85 NRC/rUGCO MEE11NG OF06/13/85 AND 06/14/85 NRCT-29 1042/85 PUBLIC HEARING RE: HOMOGENEOUS HARDWARE POPULATION POR CONSTRUCTION ADEQUACY REVIEW AND SWEC REANALYSIS PROGRAM.
NRCT-30 06/13/85 NRC/TUGCO MElmNG - VOLUMEI- MORNING SESSION O
TN47-7256 A 14 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
I i A'ITACHMENT A -Continued sowc4 l
1 (O) Document Date r- ; = . Tide NRCT 31 06/13/85 NRC/rUGCO MEETING - VOLUME II - AFTERNOON SESSION NRCT-32 06/14/85 NRCfrUGCO MEETING - VOLUME I - MORNING SESSION NRCT-33 06/14/85 NRCfrUGCO MEETING - VOLUME II - AFTERNOON SESSION NRCT-34 06/18/85 MEETING ON RECALCULATION OF SEISMIC RESPONSE SPECTRA: COMANCHE PEAK NRCT-35 08/14/85
SUMMARY
OFMEETING BETWEEN THE NRC COMANCHE PEAK INTIMIDATION PANEL, THE APPLICANT, AND THE INTERVENER TO BRIEF THE COMANCHE PEAK PANEL ON THE ALLEGED NRCT-36 INTIMIDATION ISSUES AT COMANCHE PEAK 09/17/85 MEETING BETWEEN NRC STAFF AND TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY 10 DISCUSS THE WELDS OFFICIAL INSPECTION OF PAINTED SUPPORT NRCT-37 10/18/85
SUMMARY
OF 1W2 3/85 MEETING - B ASIS FOR O, ESTABLISHING THE HOMOGENEOUS HARDWARE POPUI ATIONS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION ADEQUACY REVIEW, AND THE STONE AND WEBSTER PIPE AND PIPE SUPPORT REANALYSIS PROGRAM NRCT-38 11M/85 TUGCO MEETING WTrH NRC-CPRT MONTHLY STATUS -NOVEMBER 5-6,1985 - VOLUME I NRCT-39 11/06/85 TUGCO MEETINd WTTHNRC- CPRTMONTHLY STATUS - NOVEMBER 5-6,1985 - VOLUME II NRCT-40 11M/85 HANDOUTS FROM PUBLIC MEETING IN GRANBURY NOVEMBER 5-6,1985 NRCT 41 11/12/85 TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC HEARING HELDIN DALLAS, TEXAS NRCT-42 12/18/85 TUGCO MEETING WITH NRC-CPRT MONTHLY STATUS NRCT-43 02M/86 TUGCO-NRCPUBLICMEETING, ARLINGTON, TEXAS TUGC-1 08 2 /83 APPLICANIS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INTITAL DECISION TUGC-2 08/29/83 1RANSMTITAL OF " DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10CFR2.206" DENYING PE1TTION FILED BY MRS. ELLIS ON BEHALFOF CASE TN 87 7256 A 15 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
ATTACHMENT A -Continued
- p soun=
Q Document Dess P+: - 1 Tide TUGC-3 08/30/83 APPLICANTS' MCrrION TO ESTABLISH SCHEDULE FOR SPECIAL PROCEEDING,FURTHER 3 PROCEEDINGS (IFNECESSARY), AND FOR j CLOSING RECORD AND FOR EXPEDITED REPLY l TUGC-4 08/31/83 l APPLICANTS'(1) ANSWER TO CASE'S MCYrlON TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD (REGARDING WALSH/DOYLE ALLEGATIONS) (2) REQUEST FOR EXPEDTTED RULING AND(3) MOTIONFOR TUGC 5 NOTICE OFINTENTTO IMPOSE SANCTIONS 09/06/83 APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASE'S PROPOSED
\
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW i TUGC 6 (WALSH/DOYLE ALLEGATIONS) 10/28/83 APPLICANTS' BRIEFREGARDING BOARD INQUIRY INTO APPLICABILITY OF AWS AND ASME CODES TO WELDING ON PIPE SUPPORTS AT COMANCHE PEAK TUGC-7 05/16/84 APPLICANTS' MCrrlON FOR
SUMMARY
DEPOSIT REGARDING ALLEGED ERRORS MADEIN i O TUGC 8 05/17/84 DETERMINING DAMP!NG FACTORS FOR OBE AND SSE LOADING CONDmONS APPLICANTS' MOT 10NFOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON OF CERTAIN CASE AT r FnATIONS REGARDING AWS AND ASME CODE PROVISIONS RELATED TO DESIGNISSUES TUGC 9 05/18/84 APPLICANIS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING THE EFFECTS OF G APS ON STRUCTURAL BEHAVIOR UNDER SEISMIC 14ADINO CONDmONS TUGC-10 05/18/84 APPLICANTS'M(yrION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON OF CASE ALLEGATION REGARDING SECTION PROPERTY VALUES TUGC 11 05/20/84 APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING UPPER LATERAL RESTRAINT BEAM ,
i TUGC-12 05/2W84 APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON OFCASE'S AT T FAATIONS REGARDING SAPETY FACIORS TUGC-13 05/21/84 APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
l j
DISPOSmON REGARDING USE OFGENERIC '
STIFFNESSES INSTEAD OF ACTUAL STIFFNESSES INPIPING ANALYSIS TN-87-7256 t A 16 DAP-RR P 001, REV.1
sowee A1TACHMENT A -Cont /W o.. Document Dese Document Title TUGC-14 05/23/84 APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON OF CASE'S ALLEGATIONS REGARDING U-BOLTS ACTING AS TWO-WAY RESTRAINTS TUGC 15 06N2/84 APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING DESIGN OF RICHMOND INSERTS ANDTHEIR APPLICATION 1D SUPPORT DESIGN TUGC-16 06/17/84 APPLICANIS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING STABILITY OF PIPE SUPPORTS TUGC-17 06/18/84 APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING CONSIDERATION OF TUGC-18 LOCAL DISPLACEMENTS AND STRESSES 06/22/84 APPLICANTS'MCYrIONFOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON OF CASE ALLEGATIONS l
REGARDING DIFFERENTIAL DISPLACEMENT OF LARGE FRAMED, WALL-TO-WALL, AND FLOOR-1D-CEILING PIPE SUPPORTS TUGC-19 06/29/84 APPLICANTS'MCmON FOR
SUMMARY
~O DISPOSmON OF CASE'S ALLEGATIONS TUGC 20 07/03/84 REGARDING CINCHING DOWN OF U-BOLTS APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING ALLEGATIONS CONGRNING QUALrrY ASSURANCE PROGRAM IOR DESIGN OFPIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS FOR TUGC 21 07/09/84 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION APPUCANTS' MOT 10N FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING Af m1ATIONS CONCERNING CONSIDERATION OF FORCE TUGC-22 DIS 1 RIB 1mONIN AXIAL RESTRAINTS 08/31/84 CORRECTIONS TOTHE RICHMOND INSERT TUGC 23 MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION 09/19/84 APPLICANTS' REPLY 10 CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING CONSIDERATION OF FRICI1ON FORCES TUGC 24 09/21/84 APPLICANTS' REPLY TD CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS'MOTIONREGARDING ALLEGED ERRORS MADE IN DETERMINING DAMPING FACTORS POR OBE AND SSE LOADING CONDmONS TN47 7256 A 17 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
ATTACHMENT A -Continued somce Daewn.n Dem Docunas Tak TUGC 25 09/28/84 APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASE'S ANSWER 10 APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING LOCAL TUGC 26 DISPLACEMENTS AND STRESSES 1Q01/84 APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmONREGARDING DIPPERENTIAL DISPLACEMENTS OF LARGE PRAMED, WALL-TO-TUGC-27 WAIL, AND PLOOR TO CEILING PIPE SUPPORTS 10/26/84 '
APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASE'S ANSWER TO !
APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING THE UPPER LATERAL RESTRADfr BEAM TUGC-28 1Qf26/84 APPLICANTS' REPLY TO (1) CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS'MOTIONFOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSmON REGARDING THE EPPECTS OF GAPS AND (2) BOARD CHAIRMAN'S PRELIMINARY TUGC-29 11A12/84 VIEWS" REGARDING ADDmONAL PLEADINGS i
APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASE'S PARTIAL ANSWER TO APPLICANIS'!:10!10NICR
SUMMARY
FACTORS DISPOSmONREGARDING SAFETY !
TUGC 30 11/12/84 f APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASE'S ANSWER TO l APPLICANTS'Mor10N FOR
SUMMARY
l TUGC 31 06/06/83 DISPOSmON REGARDING SECTION PROPERTIES APPUCANT'S RESPONSE TO BOARD INQUIRY REGARDING PIPING TrERATIVE DESIGN PROGSS POR TUGC-32 09/14/82 TES11 MONY OF KENNETH L. SCHEPPEL2, ROGER F. REEDY, PIm!R S. Y. CHANG, JOHN C.
FINNERAN, AND OARY KRISHNAN REGARDING WALSH All2GATIONS TUGC-33 09/14/82 SUPPLEMENTAL 1ESTIMONY OFKENNETH L SCHEPPEL2, ROGER F. REEDY, PE1ER S. Y.
CHANO,JOHNC.FINNERAN, ANDGARY TUGC 34 09/13/84 KRISHNAN REGARDING DOY12 A1120AT10NS DISCUSSIONBIrrWEEN CYONA ENEROY SERVICES AND1EXASImLmESGENERATING COMPANY ANDEBASCO SERVICES,INC.
TUGC-35 05/21/85 1EXAS 1TTILITIES CPRT MEETING - CYONA ENEROY SERVIGS 05/21/85 AND 05/22/85 O
TN47 7256 A 18 DAP RR-P 001, REV.1 l
i j
r-ATTACHMENT A-Continued O somos Document Dese Document Tide TUGC-36 10ml/82 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELEC11UC STATION, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION, SELF-INITIATED EVALUATION 1 TUGC 37 08/0108 LETTER, H.R. ROCK'!O H.C SCHMIDT RE:
PRESSURIZER DISCHARGE PIPING CLASSIFICATION TU0C-38 08/17#8 GTTER. H.R. ROCK TO H.C SCHMIDT RE:
IJCENSING QUESTION TUOC-39 08/24n8 IEITER,H.R. ROCK TO H.C SCHMIDT RE:
CONFIRMATION OFINSTRUCTIONS-CLASSIFICATION OF PRESSURIZ2R SAPETY TUCC-40 03/19n9 RELIEP VALVE DISCHARGE PIPING IETIER, RJ. GARY TO W.C SEIDM RE: UNTT NO.
1 REACIVR DEFECIS VESSEL NO2ZLE WELD METAL TU0C-41 08/10/79 LETTER, RJ. CARY TO W.C SEIDLE RE: PIPE SUL Oiti5 TU0C-42 09/11/79 IETIER,RJ. CARY TO W.C SEIDW RE: PIPE v TUOC-43 WALL 11DCKNESS 01/23/80 GTTER, RJ. GARY 10 W.C SEIDE RE: PIPING MINIMUM WALL TU0C-44 03/28/80 MTTER, RJ. CARY TO W.C SEIDE RE: PIPING MINIMUM WALL TU0C-45 04/21/80 LETIER, R1 OARY 'IU W.C SEIDLE RE: CLASS V TUOC 46 04/15/80 PIPING SUPPORTS l 1EITER, RJ. GARY TO W.C SEIDE RE: PIPING TU0C-47 MDGMUM WAIL..
06/19/80 IEITER, RJ. GARY 'IV W.C SEIDG RE: PIPING MINIMUM Wall TU0C-48 07/14/80 IEPIER, RJ. GARY TO W.C SEIDG RE: CLASS V PIPING SUPPORTS !
TU0C-49 09/18/80 MTTER, RJ. GARY TO W.C SEIDG RE: CLASS V PIPING SUPPORTS TU0C-50 10/21/80 LETTER, RJ. GARY TO W.C SEIDE RE: DIESEL TUOC-51 GENERATORPIPE SUPPORTS 12/16/80 IETIER, RJ. CARY '!V W.C SEIDLE RE: PIPING MINIMUM WALL TU0C-52 01/12/81 IE!TER, RJ. CARY TO W.C SEIDE RE: DIESEL O _
GENERA *IOR PIPE SUPPORTS TN47-7256 A 19 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
i A1TACHMENT A -Continued som u I Document Deze N r a.; Tide TUGC 53 04/13/81 LETTER, J.S. MARSHALL TO R.L. TEDESCO RE:
PRESERVICE INSPECTION AND TESTING OF SNUBBERS TUGC-54 07/29/31 LETTER, RJ. GARY TO G.L. MADSEN RE: DIESEL GENERATOR PIPE SUPPORTS TUGC 55 06M3/81 LEITER, RJ. GARY TO G.L. MADSEN RE: PIPING MINIMUM WALL TUGC-56 10 S2/81 LETIER, RJ. GARY TO G.L. MADSEN RE: DIESEL GENERATOR PIPE SUPPORTS TUGC 57 03/31/82 LETTER, H.C. SCHMIDT TO S.B. BURWELL RE:
FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF CLASS 2 AND 3 BENDS ANDELBOWS TUGC-58 08/16/82 LETTER, RJ. GARY TO H.R. DENTON RE: DESIGN CERTIFICATION TUGC 59 05/13/82 LETTER, H.C. SCHMII7T TO S. BURWELL RE:
TUGC 60 S'IEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL 03M8/83 LETTER, H.C. SCHMIDT TO BJ. YOUNGBLOOD RE:
g ACCIDENT MONITORING - STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY VALVE POSITION INDICATION TUGC 61 03/29/83 IEITER, RJ. GARY TO G.L. MADSEN RE: VENDOR TUGC-62 06/21/83 INSTALLED HVAC SYSTEM (SDAR 106 CP-83 06) 1.ETTER, RJ. GARY TO G.L. MADSEN RE:
COMPONENT COOIJNG WATER CLASS V PIPING (QA PIIE: CP-83-11, SDAR-111)
TUGC-63 07/22/83 ALTERNATE SHtTTDOWN-DTIERIM STAFF EVALUATION TUGC-64 08/31/83 RESPONSE TO NRCNOTICE OF VIOLATION -
INSPECTION REPORT NO. 83-23, FINDING NO.1 TUGC-65 1046/83 TUGC-66 SER TABLES ON EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION 01/05/84 LETTER, H.C. SCHMII7T TO BJ. YOUNGBLOOD RE:
HIGH/ MODERATE ENERGY PIPE BREAK ANALYSIS TUGC-67 02/17/84 IEITER, RJ. GARY TO BJ. YOUNGBLOOD RE:
TUOC-68 REQUEST POR PARTIAL EXEMPTION 03 S 8/84 HUMAN FACIORS CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW- FINAL REPORT TUGC-69 04/06/84 TUGCO COMMENTS ON CYGNA'S INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTPROGRAM O -
TN47 7256 A 20 DAP RR P-001, REV.1
sowoe ATTACHMENT A-Contlamed l O Document Date N -_: Title TUGC-70 06/29/84 IETTER, H.C. SCHMIDT TO BJ. YOUNGBLOOD RE:
EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION TUGC 71 09/28/84 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERIM OPERATION LETTER, J.W. BECK TO BJ. YOUNGBLOOD RE:
IMPACT OF TEMPERATURE DUE TO MAIN STE LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT ON EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION THAT REQUIRES ENVIRONMENTAL TUGC 72 01/17/85 LETTER, J.W. BECK TO BJ. YOUNGBLOOD RE:
ENGINEERING REPORT AND CONSTRUCrlON STATUS
)
TUGC-73 02/14/85 :
LETIER, J.W. BECK TO BJ. YOUNGBLOOD RE: !
MAIN STEAMLINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT TUGC-74 04/09/85 LETTER, J.W. BECK TO BJ. YOUNGBLOOD RE:
TUGC-75 04/23/85 FINAL DRAFT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LETTER, J.W. BECK TO BJ. YOUNGBLOOD RE:
TUGC-76 05/02/85 1EMPORARY CHANGES TO PROGDURES O TUGC-77 0@ 07/85 LETIER, J.W. BECK TO V.S. NOONAN RE:
ARBFIRARYINTERMEDIATE PIPE BREAKS LETTER, J.W. BECK TO V.S. NOONAN RE: NRC GENERICLETTER 83-28 TUGC-78 07/10/85 IETTER W.G. COUNSEL TO V.S. NOONAN RE:
RESOLUTION OF TMI ACI1ON TIEMS D.K.3.30 AN H.K.3.31 RELA 1EDTO SMAIL BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS .
TUGC-79 07/15/85 IETTER, W.G. COUNSEL *ID V.S. NOONAN RE:
CLARIFICATION TXX-4426 '!D TEXAS (frILrrIES LETTER .
l TUGC-80 10/14/85 1277ER. W.G. COUNSEL TO V.S. NOONAN RE:
RESPONSE TOGENERICLETIER 85-06 TUGC-81 12/20/85 (ANTICIPA'IED TRANSIENTS WrrHOUT SCRAM)
IETTER, J.W. BECK TO E.H. JOHNSON RE:
DAMAGE TrUDY EVALUATION OF TUGC 82 WESTINGHOUSE SDAR: CP-85 46 02/28/86 LETIER. W.G. COUNSEL TO V.S. NOONAN RE: US TUGC-83 12/15/86 OF ASME CODEEDITION AND ADDENDA
'IRANSCRIPT ROSE, TEXAS OF CYNGA/SWEC MEETING IN GLEN O -
TN47 7256 A-21 DAP RR P-001. REV.1
\
i
)
ATTACHMENT A- Continued {
Q 6 o.,
Docum mTide TUGC-M 04/05/84 l
APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOStrlON OF CERTAIN CASE ALLEGATIONS REGARDING AWS AND ASME CODE PROVISIONS RELATEDTO WELDING ISSUES XASL-001 REQUEST FOR EXPEDTIED RESPONSE '
08/19/83 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER -MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION SUPPORTS ON THERMAL STRESS IN PIPE XASL 002 07/06/83 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - THERMAL STRESS INPIPE SUPPORTS XASL-003 10/18/84 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER-MORE DETAIL ON INDIVIDUAL PIPE SUPPORTS l XASL 004 11/10/83 APFIDAVrrOFJACK DOYIE XASL 005 IWO6/83 j PARTIAL INTTIAL DECISION (CHANGEIN i XCAS 001 08/16/83 MA'IERIAL PROPERTIES POR A500 STEEL)
CASE'S ANSWER TO APPLICANTS' MOTION POR CLARIFICATION OFMEMORANDUM AND ORDER {
1 XCAS 002 07/15/83 ON THERMAL STRESS AND PIPE SUPPORTS MOTION POR RECONSIDERATION OF BOARD'S 07/06/87 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - THERMAL STRESSINPIPE SUPPORTS XCAS 003 05/09/83
' CASE'S RESPONSE 1D BOARD's REQUEST FOR DISCUSSION OF INTERRELATIONSHIP OF ASME APPENDIX XVII,2271.3 TO REST OF ASME CODE XCAS004 1@06/84 CASE'S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL PACT AS TO WHIGI TTIERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING i CASE'S PIRSTM0110NFOR
SUMMARY
I DISPOSITION REGARDING GRTAIN ASPECTS OF XCAS 005 09/26/84 11IE DdP12 MENTATION OF APPLICANTS' DESIGN CASE'S ANSWER 10 APPLICANTS'RESPONSETO BOARD'S PARTIAL INT!1AL DECISION REGARDING A500 STEEL XCAS-006 05/14/84 CASE'S ANSWER TV APPLICANTS' MOTION ICR
SUMMARY
DISPOStr!ON OFCERTAINCASE ALIJOATIONS REGARDING AWS AND ASMB CODE PROVISIONS RELATED TO WELDING ISSUES XCAS-007 01/17/85 CASE'S 01/17/R5 SUPP12 MENT TO CASE'S ANSWER TO APPUCANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSTilON REGARDING LOCAL O DISPLACEMENTS AND STRESSES TN 67 7256 A 22 DAP RR P-001, REV.1 l
senes ATTACHMENT A-Constaued Doannant Date F= 2_ Tale XCAS-008 11/05/84 CASES ANSWER TO APit.ICANTS' RESPONS BOARD REQUESTPORINFORMATION XNRC 001 05/11/83 REGARDING CINCHING DOWN U BOLTS NRCSTAFFRESPONSE 70 BOARDINQUIRY REGARDING APPENDIX XVII OFTHE ASME XNRC-002 05/03/83 BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSELCODE NRC STAFF REPLY M CASE'S BRIEF REGAR CONSIDERATION POR PIPE SUPPORTS OF LOCA IN DESIGN GTTE XNRC-003 04/29/83 XNRC-004 04/20/83 NRC STAFF MOTION POR PROTECTIVE ORDE NRC STAFF ANSWER TO CASE MOTIONS SE ADMISSION OFDOCUMENTS XNRC-005 06/02/82 NRC STAFF'S ANSWER SUPPORTING APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
XNRC-006 03/15/82 DISPOSITION OFCONIENrlON 5 NRC STAFF'S ANSWER M CPUR'S MOTION PO VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL XNRC-007 09/28/84 NRCSTAFFRESPONSETO APPLICANTS' AND CASE'S FINDINGS OFFACTON WELD FABRICATION l
XNRC-006 02/02/84 NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO CASE'S (1)
DECEMBER 23,1983 RESPONSE TO APPLICANTS' IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES, AND (2) JANUARY 16,1984 Q ARIPICATION OFISSUES IN 12/23/83 -
,,7 PLEADENO .,_
XNRC-009 02/06/84 -,
,, NRC STAFF RESPONSE M CASE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF BOARD'S 12/28/83 MEMORANDUMANDORDER(QUALTTY XNRC-010 ASSURANCE POR DESIGN) 01/27/84 NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO APPLICANTS' MOTI POR RECONSIDERATION OF MEMORANDUM AND XNRC-011 12/13/83 ORDER (QUALITY ASSURANCE FOR DESIGN)
NRCSTAFFMOTIONTO REOPEN RECORDM XNRC-012 12/13/83 ADMTT THE APP! DAVIT OF DR. JAI RAJ N. RAJA NRC STAFF RESPONSE M CASE'S MOrlON FOR RECONSIDERATION (APPIDAVrrS ON OPEN ITEMS RELA 11NOTO WALSH/DOYIE AL12GATIONS)
XNRC-013 10/28/83 NRCSTAFFRESPONSETO BOARD QUESTION REGARDING APPLICABLE WELDING CODES AT O CPSES TN47 7256 A 23 DAP RR P 001, REV.1
i ATTACHMENT A -Continued O sowce b P-:- _. .; Tide XNRC-014 09/12/83 NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50445/83 24,50-446/83- i 15 !
XNRC-015 02/17/83 LETTER FROM G. L. MADSEN, CHIEF, REACTOR PROJECT BRANCH 1. TO R. J. GARY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, TUGCO XNRC-016 04/13/83 {
LETTER FROM COUNSEL FOR NRCSTAFFTO t ASLB IN THE MATTER OFTEXAS UFILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. (COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2)
DOCKETNOS.50 445 AND 50446 XNRC-017 03/17/83 LETTER FROM COUNSEL FOR NRC STAFFTO ASLB INTHE MATTER OFTEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. (COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2)
DOCKETNOS.50445 AND 50 446 XNRC-018 02/22/83 COUNSEL POR NRC STAFF - IN THE MATTER OF TEXAS UTILrrIES GENERATING COMPANY, ET O AL. (COMANCHE PEAK STEAM EIECTRIC STATION, UNrrS 1 AND 2) DOCKET NOS. 50445 AND 50446 XNRC-019 02/08/83 LETTER FROM NRC STAFF COUNSEL TO ASLB IN THE MATIER OFTEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY,ET AL.(COMANCHE PEAK STEAM E12CIRIC STATION, UNrrS 1 AND 2) DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50446 I XNRC-020 02/18/82 LETTER FROM NRC STAFF COUNSEL TO ASLB IN THE MATIER OFTEXAS UTILrrIES GENERATING COMPANY,ET AL. (COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2) DOCKET
- NOS.50445 AND 50446 XNRC-021 03/27/83 k LETTER AND REPORT ENTTTLED " REVIEW OF CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY Q na:NS 4
ASSOCIATION POR SOUND ENERGY ABOUT '
CONDUCT OFREGIONIV XNRC-022 INVESTIGA110NS/ INSPECTION 1D ASLB" !
11/04/83 COUNSELPOR NRCSTAFFINTHE MATIER OF 1EXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY. ET AL. (COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNrrS I AND 2) DOCKETNOS. 50-445
^* "'
O 7 72M A 24 DAp.RR-P 001, REV.1
-J g- so m ATTACHMENT A- Contimd
' i Document Deze i Daewnen: Tide i
XNRC-023 11A)1/83 COUNSEL POR NRC STAFF IN THE MA' ITER OF TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL.(COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2) DOCKET NOS. 50445 AND 50-446 XNRC-024 10/14/83 COUNSEL POR NRC STAFFIN THE MA1TER OF TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. (COMANCHE PEAK STEAM EIECIRIC i STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2) DOCKET NOS. 50445 AND 50446 XNRC-025 12/31/84 LETTER FROM D. R. HUNTER, CHIEF, REACTOR PROJECT BRANCH 2,TO M. D. SPENCE, }
PRESIDENT,TUGCO !
XNRC-026 05/17/84 LETIER FROM COUNSEL FOR NRC STAFFTO ASLB INTHE MATTER OFTEXAS UI1LITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY, ET AL. COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECIRIC COMPANY, ET AL (COMANCHE XNRC-027 PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2)
("g 05/11/84 ADDENDUM 10PAGE 27 OFNRC STAFF V 1ESTIMONY ON WELDING FABRICAT10N XNRC-028 04/24/84 CONCERNS RAISED BY MR. AND MRS STINES.
LETTER FROM NRCTO APPLICATNTIN THE MA* ITER OFTHE NRC STAFF RECEIVING ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPER CONSTRUCTION PRACI1CES, ET. AL (COMANCHE PEAK S1EAM ELECIRECCOMPANY,UNTT1 AND2). DOCKET NS.50445 AND 50446.
XTUG 001 02/18/87 APPLICANTS'IN!ERROGATORIES TO INIERVENER,(SET NO.19874)
XTUG-002 08A)2/83 APPLICANTS MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON THERMAL S1RESS AND PIPE SUPPORTS XTUG-003 05/11/83 APPLICANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF XTUG-004 REGARDING PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN 05A)3/83 APPLICANTS' REPLY BRIEFREGARDING CONSIDERATION OF LOCA IN DESIGN CRITERIA PORPIPESUPPORTS XTUG-005 04/21/83 APPLICANTS'BRIEFREGARDING )
CONSIDERATION OF THERMAL STRESSES IN DESIGN OFPIPE SUPPORTS O
TN 87 7256 !
sowce A1TACHMENT A -Continued 0 - -
~ =~
XTUG-006 07/03/84 APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE RE APPLICANTS' QUALrrY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR DESIGN OF PIPING AND PIPE SUPPORTS FOR XTUG-007 06/29/84 COMANCHE PEAK S1EAM ELECIRIC STATION APPLICANTS ' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS '
AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING U BOLTS CONSIDERATION OF CINCHING X'I1JG-008 06/18/84 APPLICANT 3' STA1EMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINEISSUE REGARDING CONSIDERATION OF LOCAL DISPLACEMENTS AND STRESSES XTUG-009 06/17/84 APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS M WHICH THEREIS NO GENUINEISSUE XTUG-010 06/02/84 REGARDING STABILrrY OF PIPE SUPPORTS APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS RELATING TO RICHMOND INSERTS AS TO WHJCH
/ XTUG-Oli THERE ARE NO MATERIALISSUES 05/2W84 APPLICANTS' STA1EMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS XTUG-012 05/16/84 AS TO WHICH THEREIS NO GENUINEISSUE APPLICANTS' STA1EMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS XTUG-013 AS TO WHICH THEREIS NO GENUINE ISSUE 05/16/84 APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MA1ERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THEREISNoGENUINEISSUE REGARDING CONSIDERATION OF PRICIlON PORCES IN THE DESIGN OF P!PE SUPPORTS WTTH SMAILTHERMALMOVEMENTS XTUG 014 05/16/84 APPLICANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS M WHICH THEREIS NO GENUINEISSUE REGARDING APPLICANTS' CONSIDERATION OF DAMPING FACTORS FOR OBE AND SSE LOADING CONDrrIONS XTUG-015 06/01/83 COUNSEL POR TUGCO - RE: 1EXAS LTr!LTTIES GENERATING CO., ET AL. (COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECIRIC STATION, UNr!31 AND 2)
XTUG-016 DOCKET NOS. 50445 AND 50-446 11/19/84 APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASE'S MOTION CONCERNING INFORMATION REGARDING CDOHNGDOWN0 80LTS TN 87 7256 A 26 DAP-RR P 001, REV.1
ATTACHMENT A -Continued Dw. r.t Dese D- :aTide XTUG 017 11/16/84 APPLICANTS' REPLY TO CASE'S ANSWER TO !
APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO BOARD'S PARTIAL XTUG 018 1145/84 INITIAL DECISION REGARDING A500 STEEL APPLICANTS' MCrrlON FOR RECONSIDERATIO OPMEMORANDUM AND ORDER (MORE DETAIL XTUG 019 07/11/84 ONINDIVIDUALPIPE SUPPORTS)
COUNSEL POR APPLICANTS RE: 1EXAS LTTILITIES COMPANY, ET AL. (COMANCHE PEAK 51EAM ELECIRIC STATION, UNrrS 1 AND 2), ,
1 XTUG-020 DOCKETNOS.50445 AND 50446 06/29/84 COUNSELPOR APPLICANTS-SUBJ. TEXAS trrILITIES ELECIRIC. ET AL. (COMANCHE PEAK STEAM EECIRIC STATION, UNrrS 1 AND 2 i
XTUG-021 06/17/84 DOCKETNOS.50445 AND 50446)
LETTER PROM APPLICANTS' COUNSEL TO ASL\
SUBJ.1EXAS UTILITIES COMPANY, ET AL.
(COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECIRIC STATION, XTUG-022 04/11/84 UNrr$ 1 AND2)DOCKETNOS.50445 AND50446 O XTUG-023 06 S 2/84 APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO PARTIAL INITIAL DECISIONREGARDING A500 STEEL 21TER FROM COUNSEL FOR APPLICANTTO ASLB IN THE MATTER OF AI.I.Ft1ATIONS REGARDING SAPETY FACTORS, ET. AL.
(COMANCHE PEAK STEAM EECTRIC COMPANY, UNrr 446. '. 1 AND UNrr 2) DOCKET NOS. 50445 AND 50 9
9 O
TN47 7256 A-27 DAP-RR P-001. REV.1
O 1
ATTACHMENT B OTHER DIRs i
l O
O TN 87 7256 B1 DAP RR-P-001, REV.1
A*ITACHhENT B r
The following three categories were established for DIRs which were not covered Source Issues / Primary DIRs. Each DR was resolved individually. A summary of thl follows: i 1
CATEGORY-MISCELLANEOUS (#36) 1.
DRs with no specific concem identified. These DIRs are classified as unsubstantiated D R E-0323
Subject:
Cygna desire to complete review of procedures.
Resolution: No concem identified.
1 DIR E-0812
Subject:
Overthickness in pipe.
Resolution:
No specifics identified; only mentioned as a subject to be covered later.
DIR E-0940
Subject:
Responsiveness of SIT Report to Walsh/Doyle items. l Resoludon:
All Walsh/Doyle items are addsessed by SWEC's GTIR.
DIR E-1198
Subject:
Assymetric dynamic loads on Reactor Coolant System Resolution:
Issue was indicated as " undergoing staff review" in SSER 6.
Limited infont.o don is provided for DAP review.
D R E-1199
Subject:
Resolution:
NRC review of WECAN computer program not complete.
Program not used in SWEC's requalificadon program.
DIR E-1200
Subject:
Resolution ofTMI Action Items.
Resolution:
O' Document (TUGCO 78) describes resoludon - FSAR levision. Any funher resoludon required will be identified by the NRCin subsequent SSERs.
DIR E-1201
Subject:
Use of Code Cases N 397 and N-411.
Resolution:
Per NRC letter from V.S. Noonan to W.G. Council dated 3/13/86, the NRC approves use of these Code Cases, psovided listed seguimnents are met.
2.
Concems closed outside of DSAP IX review and/or closed as invalid. T classified as Observations or Unsubstandated:
DIR E-0242
Subject:
Functional capability of austenitic bends / elbows.
Resolution:
NRC raised the issue in the SER; a method was developed and applied on a sampling basis; NRC closed it in SSER #3.
DIR E-0347
Subject:
Improper use of temporary suppons, and the erection process in general, could have damaged Main Steam pipes Resolution: Per ISAP V.e. Results Report the issue is closed.
DIR E-0354
Subject:
Snubber failure after steam / water hammer.
Resolution:
Snubbers are load rated by vendors. Given that piping loads are propedy determined and correct snubber size is chosen, the supports should not fail.
DIR E-0586
Subject:
Resolution: Combined load evaluation for AWS weld evaluation.
TUGCO satisfies CASE's question later in the extemal sourte document (NRCT 13).
TN-87 7256 B-2 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
DIR E-0858
Subject:
ANI is responsible for interpretation of ASME Code.
Resolution:
- DAP disagrees with Doyle. ANI does not interpret engineering related matters; the only design related responsibility is to ensure that the required analysis has been -
done and is property certified DIR E-0936
Subject:
Resolution:
No error occuned. Da.nping values were based on Reg.
Guide 1.61.1he Reg. Guide damping values are noted as '
being conservative per recent WRC studies (WRC-300).
DIR E-1176
Subject:
Incorrectly calculated pipe suess allowable.
Resolution: 1 Per ASLB-43, the allowables are shown to be correctly calculated. \
DIR E-1191
Subject:
j Resolution: Whether or not all seismic restraints must be +/ .
Third Party agrees with TUGCO's response - that uni directional supports can be used if dead weight is larger than the +Yloads.
3.
Concerns with TUGCO arguments that are not pertinent to SWEC resolu are classified as Unclassified Deviations:
DIR E-0560 .
Subject:
Snubbercapacity test results.
Resolution:
Per CPPP-7, the allowable loads are stated in vendor LCD sheets or certified design report summaries. These test results s are not used.
DIR E-0778
Subject:
O Resolution:
Inelastic deformation in bolts used to justify shear distribution among base plate bolts.
SWEC does not use bolt deformation to justify shear distribution among base plate bolts, but bases their procedurthenolution on NF 4721.
DIR E-0843
Subject:
Resolution: BSeas of bolt bone gaps on material and impact damping.
SWEC does not use impact or maserial damping to justify their approach to the bolt hole gap issue, but bases their procedurchesolution on NF-4721.
DIR E-1195
Subject:
Resolution: U bolt Mg, can torqueing or paint be used forlocking.
PerPM-82 Rev 1, cinched U-boks are elimiam~!. Jam nuts orlock nuts are used on stiffclamps.
4.
Calculadon/ Procedural concerns. Addressed by SWECin CPPP 6 and 7:
DIR E 0062
Subject:
STRUDL analysisguidelinea.
Resolution:
Supports analyzed using STRUDL are checked against NF )
Code requirements. l DIR E-0134
Subject:
i Member bearing may be inappropriately considered for compressionloads on welds. i Resolution:
CPPP 7, Att. 4-2 requires compression to be considered.
O ,
TN 87 7256 B3 DAP RR-P 001, REV.1
DIR E-0295
Subject:
Combining SRV and seismic loads in Emergency for Main g)
(
V Resolution:
Steam pipe.
CPPP 7, Table 3.5-1 and 3.5-2 requires SRV and SSE to be combined in the Faulted condition. 'Ihis change in load combination required an FSAR change, which was (
incorporated in Amendment 61 (per DIR C-0024).
DIR E 0313, DIR E-0734, DIR E-0823, DIR E-1188
Subject:
Spring travel, frame gap, and swing angle evaluation for seismic and fluid transients.
Resolution:
CPPP 7, At:. 4-1 requires that displacements be calculated for spring travel evaluation using Table 4.7.2 1 combinations (which include seismic and fluid transient). Frame gaps are addressed in DAP-E P-019, and swing angles in DAP-E-P-004.
DIR E-0322
Subject:
Embedded plates - connections assumed as pinned, and stiffeners required for moment connections.
Resolution:
CPPP 7 does not require that attachments to embedded plates be assumed as pinned, and per CPPP-6, calculated loads are '
transmitted to SWEC-CAP for evaluation.
DIR E-0735
Subject:
Spacing of attachments to embedded plates.
Resolution:
Per CPPP-6, support reactions on embedded plates are transmitted to SWEC-CAP for evaluation.
DIR E-0969
Subject:
Gang supports pinned to building structures were not censidered interactively between attached piping.
Resolution:
CPPP 7, Att. 4 9 requires elimination of pinned attachments of ganged supports to building structures.
DIR E 1174
Subject:
Spesses due to reduced pipe wall thickness.
Resolution:
Reduced wall thicimess is evaluated per CPPP-7, Att. 3-14 and PM-137.
CATEGORY - GENERIC / CUMULATIVE (#37) 1.
Concem with inconsistent and nonstandard criteria. Addressed by SWEC requali program use of CPPPProcedures:
DIR E 0008
Subject:
Inconsistent criteria forS7RUDL Resolution:
CPPP-7 defines criteria and methods for requalification of supports. SWEC uses its own version of STRUDL, and has issued controlled user's manuals.
DIR E-0331
Subject:
Non-standard pipe support designs invalidate standard engineering assumptions and practices.
Resolution:
CPPP-7 defines criteria and methods for requahfication of supports, ensunng all supports in SWEC's scope are reevaluated based on industry codes /standanis.
1 i
TN47 7256 B-4 DAP-RR-P-001 REV.1
DIR E-0523
Subject:
Unresolved issues related to provisions of GDC-1.
y' Resolution:
Specinc items were addressed under SWEC's requali5 cation V program, including: Skewed "T" joint welds, Flare bevel welds, Punching shear, and Tube-to-tube welds. (See DAP-I E P.008 and DAP E-P427).
DIR E-0884
Subject:
1 Piping analysis techniques have changed.
l Resolution:
CPPP-7 dennes criteria and methods for requalification of piping. Loads generated in these analyses will be inmrporated into suppon designs.
2.
Concem with cumulative effects of specific concems. Each specific conce individually addressed by SWEC, kreby dimisting the cumulative effects DIR E-0658, DIR E-0720, DIR E-0730, DIR E-0731
Subject:
SIPS Resolution:
Pluid/msulation weights See DAP-E-P-026 of valves and Bar;ges Mass point spacing See DAP-E-P426 Suppon mass See DAP-E-P-017 Suppon stiffnen See DAP-E-P-015 See DAP E-P-005 -
Valve acc. generic study Plangeload generic study See DAP E-P 025 Welded attachments -See DAP-E-P425
( See DAP-E-P-002
\ SS elbow functionalcapabdity CPPP 7, Att. 3-16 Suppon self weight excitation See DAP-E-P-020 l
i l
l O
TN 87 7256 B-5 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
CATEGORY- WESTINGHOUSE Concem with seismic damping in Westinghouse piping analysis:
DIR E-0035,
(]
b DIR E-0121, D R E-0135, D R E-0230, DIR E-0526, DIR E 0527, DIR E-0528, DIR E 0583, DIR E-0641, DIR E-0785, DIR E-0787, DIR E-0972, DIR E-0983
Subject:
Loads on one support were gnater for Norm / Upset than Emerg/ Fault. The damping values used in the OBE/SSE analysis of a 3" pipe were questioned (2,4%)
Resolution:
FSAR specifies 2% and 4% damping for OBE and SSE for 12" and larger piping; it also pennits CC N-411 damping.
Westinghouse memo TCX-SDI 150 notes damping used for RCL analysis isjustified/ documented in FSAR Sect. I A(N)-
34, and that the specific analysis in question (1-41) is based en N-411 damping. (All DIRs in this category were transfened to DIR E-0121.)
l I
TN 87 7256 B-6 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1 f
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . )
I
+
ATTACHMENT C PROJECT MEMORANDA l
l 0
O TN47 7256 C-1 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1
L A'ITACHMENT C Procedwo W. Rev. Dess of Title W. Issue REVIEWED AS PART OFCPPP 7, REVISION 2 PM-001 Pipe Suppon ComputerPmgram Usage PM-003 1
0' 48/86 Design Information Request Procedure 0 11/18/85 PM-016 Qualification of Two (2) Bolt Base Plates 0 PM-025 01/24/86 Gang Hanger and Terminal Anchor Pmcedure - Unit 2 0 PM426 02/28/86 Impact Testing ofIntegral Attachments l
' 0 02/28/86 PM-039 Administrative Procedure for Qualifying Wall to-Wall, 2 Ploor-to Ploor, and Comer Pipe Suppons 07/21/86 PM 050 ;
Procedure to Adjust the Seismic Response 1
06/16/86 Acceleration for Valve Quahfication PM-051 Integral Welded Attachment (IWA) Task Group 0 PM 052 05/09/86 Through Bolt ABowable Load Criteria 0 05 S 9/86 PM 053 CPPP-7, Rev. 2, Sec. 3.6.4 (Essential Systems) 0 PM-054 05/15/86 Project Engineering Assurance Engineer
( -
Responsibilities 0 05/15/86 PM 055 Weld Design Criteria for Pipe Supports 0 05/19/86 PM456 Simplified Method for Qualification of As Built Small 1 Bore Piping 12 S 3/86 3
)
PM 057 Ploor Slabs with 2" ConcreteTopping 0 06/16/86 PM458 Pipe Suppon MemberStress due to LOCA for CT and 0 SISystems 06/18/86 PM 059 Two-Bolt Baseplate Quali!! cation Procedure 0 06/18/86 PM 060 Revised Pad Width Requirements for Attachmem 4-6A 0 of CPPP-7 06/18/86 PM-061 Mismatch SIFs 0 06/23/86 PM462 Calculation of Suppon Loads for Non Nuclear Safety0 06/24/86 Related Piping Anached to an ASME DI Support PM 063 Pipe Suppon Clearanz Requirements 0 06!24/86 PM 064 As Built Verification of Base Plate Using Drilled In 1 Expansion Type Concrete Anchors 07/14/86 PM 065 Use of Hardened Beveled Washers 0 06/24/86 O PM 066 Pipe Wall'Ihinning Criteria 2 10/09/86 TN 67 7256 C2 DAP-RR-P-001, REV.1
ATTACHMENT C- Continued i
n= h No.
Tm an. one or
- m. hem PM-067 _
Suggested Distance Between Mass Points PM468 0 06/24/86 Weld Terminabon at MemberEdges PM-071 0 06/24/86 PM-072 I4 cal Stress Evaluation for Dual Trunnion0Anchom 06/25/86 Anchor Stiffness for APE (ST-378) Computer Program 0 i PM474 06/25/86 Code Case N318 ComputerProgram 1
PM 075 11/21/86 Design Considerations for E-Systems and Western 0 07/07/86 Piping Stiff Clamps used on Main Steam and i
PeedwaterPiping PM 076 Local Stres Checkin Tube Section PM 077 0 07/07/86 Code Case 392 ComputerPmgram PM479 0 07/07/86 Revised NF17 Code Check Equadon Tables PM 080 0 07/14/86 Clarincation of Attachment 4-2 of CPPP-7 0 PM 081 07/14/86 I NewRelease ofSTRUDAT/SANDUL 0 PM-082 07/14/86 Modificadons to Cinched U-Bolts '\
1 PM483 12/26/86 Procedure for Evaluating riehad U-Boh Supports1 PM-084 09/23/86 ClariScadon of S** for CT and St Piping Systems 0 PM485 07/21/86 14 cal Stress Evaluation for Pipe-to-Pipe Bearing0 PM 086 07/21/86 PM487 CPPP-11 Administradvc Control of r@ Mons 1 02/13/87
. AnalyticalP=? ?
and Boots =- forL.- & Sleeve Seals
' 0 07/21/86 PM 088 Correcdon of TyT4,gr.p.l cal Errom - CPPP-7 PM 089 0 07/21/86 Riiminarian of Hanger Engineering Data Report (HEDR) 1 02/13f87 PM-090 Review of NCRs for Potendal Deportability 1 PM 091 12/16/86 Pmblem Wa y Modifications PM 092 0 07/31/86 Computer Program for Pipe Support Analyses 0 PM 093 07/31/86 !
Allowables For 3/8 in. Diameter Hilti Kwik 0Bolts07/31/86 15/8 in. Emhadment Depth with PM494 Revised Procedure for the Qualification of Camp 0 l
Anchors 07/31/86 i PM-095 Cmched U-Bolt Analysis Computer Program PM496 0 08/13/86 Piping Decoupling Criteria O 1 09/10/86 TN47 7256 C3 DAP-RR P-001, REV.1 j
ATTACHMENT C-Continued O W.
Rev. Dam of Te W. Issus PM-097 Pipe Support Welded hbe Steel Joints 0 08/20/86 PM-098 Local Suess Evaluation for Uncinched U Bolt Supports 0 08/20/86 PM-099 Allowables for Hilti Anchors Having Edge Distance 0 less Than SD 08/20/86 PM 100 Additional Direction for Self Weight Compu:erInput 0 PM 102 - 08/20/86 Local Pipe Stresses Due to longitudinal Beanng Leads 1 PM-103 10/0946 Allowable Valve Accelerations 0 08/2146 PM-104 SuessIntensification Factors.
0 08/26/86 PM 105 1hermal Expansion Range Stress for Run Pipe Local 0 Streu Evaluation 08/2846 PM-106 Proposed Modification Reports 0 09/09/86 PM 107 Reactor Coolant Loop (RCL) Movements 0 09/10/86 PM 108 local Stress Evaluation Procedure 1 PM-109 1041/86
-( Local Member Suess Induced by Nuts Bearing Against0 Tube Steel Wall 09/08/86 PM 110 Allowable loads for A193 Grade B7 Threaded Rods 0 09/10/86 PM 111 Procedure forModelirig Tse Back Supports 0 PM-112 '09/08/86 1herma1 Expansion of tong hbe Steel 0 09/18/86 PM 113 Additional Plastic Moments ibrInterface Anchors 0 09/30/86 PM 114 Cinched U Bolt Computer Program Clarification 0 09/30/86 PM 115 Code Case N318 2 and N413 Usage 0 09/30/86 PM 116 Self Weight Excitation Loads forTse-Back Supports 0 09/3W86 PM 117 New Release of SANDUL 0 09/30/86 PM-118 Calculation Transmittals and Distribution 0 9 =, _%;;,. '
10m9/86 PM 119 Allowable Suess Range for Expansion Stresses S A 0 10/09/86 !
PM 120 Small Bore Pipe StrapStifthess 0 IQl09/86 PM 121 l Loads and Movements Reqmred to be Shown on Pipe 0 Support Drawings 10/09/86 PM-122 Effect of Construction Tolerance on Pipe Support 0 Stifthess 10/20/86 l
TN 67 7256 C-4 DAP-RR-P-001, REV.1 1
ATTACHMENT C-Continued Procabre 5O W.
Tide Rev. Den of No. tem PM-123 ._
Effective Fillet Weld length for Trurmion to-Elbow Connection 0 10/20/86' PM 124 Procedures for Qualifying Decoupled Vent / Drain and Pree-End Connections 0 IW20/86 PM-126 SA, PSM, and PSC-Memos 0 10/20/86 >
PM-039 REVIEWED AS PART OFISSUE RESOLUTION Administrative Procedure for Qualifying Wall to-Wall. 3 Moor to-Floor, and Comer Pipe Supports 6-02 87 PM 103 Allowable Valve Aculerations PM 110 0 82186 PM 133 Allowable I. cads for A193 Grade B7 Threaded 0 Rods 4 14-87 Pinal Reconciliation Check List 1 5 27-87 PM 135 Sections of CPPP-7, Rev. 3. Which Require Confirmation 0 2-23-87 PM 137 Wallihinning Criteria PM 138 0 3-18-87 Dynamic Analysis of Fluid Trarment Loading 0 PM 139 3-31-87 x Promdure for Evaluating Pipe Stresses at Stiff0 Camp Supports 3-31 87 PM-140 Plare Bevel Groove Welds 1
PM 141 05 01 87 Unequal Shear Loading Effect on Richmond Insens 3-25-87 and 1hreaded Rods Used g J ,. . in Nh-4an with a-Tube ,
PM 146 The Use ofGalvanized Nuts on CPSES 0 PM 151 4-20 87 PSAP RELAP 5, and REPIPE Computer Programs0 PM 154 5-01-87 Axial Restraints with Lugs PM 155 0 5 07-87 SIF Evaluation of Branch Connections 0 PM 157 6-08 87 BrealdCrack Postulation. Pipe Stress Analysis, and 0
Pipe Qualification Requirements for Class 5 High and 5 13-87 Moderate EnergyLines- Units 1 and 2 PM 162 CircularTrunnion Attachments to Elbows 0 PM-163 5-22-87 CPPP-7 Changes Piping and Pipe Supports Cbde Applicability 0 5-27-87 PM-164 Overall Final Anneamment Review of Piping Systems 1 PM-165 6-19 87 Screening Procedure - Fluid Transient Cutoff r_Wa O 1 6-25-87 TN 87 7256 C-5 DAP RR-P-001, REV.1
ATTACHMENT C-Continued CN n=- A e No. 3,,, p,, og Titls No, w PM 166 Pipe Stn:ss and Suppon System Review Checklist 0 5-28-87 PM 167 Use of Computer Program PITRIFE (ME 21!) 0 i
PM 170 60387 Revised Procedure for Qualification of Elbows with 0 6-08 87 Branch Connections
, PM-178 Resolution of TERA Fluid Transients Issues 0 62587 ,
i O
O TN-87 7256 C-6 DAP-RR P-001, REV,1
O ATTACHMENT D ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS LIST i
O 1
i O l l
TN 87-7256 D-1 DAP RR P 001 REV.1
7._
./
,y V wr l_
, ATTACHMENT D '
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS LIST Abbreviation or Acronym Explanation ACI American Concrete Institute AI6C American Institute of Steel Construction ARS Amplified Nesponse Spectra ASLB Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AWS American Welding Society CAP Corrective Action Program CASE Citizens Association forSound.bergy CPR Code of Federal Reguladons CPPP Comanche Peak Project Procedums CPRT Comanche Peak Response Team CPSES Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System DAP Design Adequacy Program DIR Discrepancy / Issue Resoladon Repon DOF Degrees ofFreedom DSAP Discipline Specific Acdon Plan ESIS Exernal SourceIssue Summary PSAP. Final Safiery Analysis Report FW f%edwater GENX Stone & Webster Generic Calculadon Number GIR GenericIssues Report Hz Hertz (Cycles per Second)
IRR Issue Resolution Report ISAP lasue Specific Acdon Plan KSI KIPS (Thousand Pounds) Per Square Inch LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MS Main Steam N/A Not Applicable N/C Not Checked NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
.O _
TN 87 7256-D-2 DAP RR P 001, REV.1
ATTACHMENT D-Continued O- Abbreviation M
Acronym Explanation OBE Operating Base Eanhquake PCI Presuessed Concrete Institute QA Quality Assurance RLCA R.L. Coud Associates RTL Review Team Imders RV ReliefValves S/RV Safety /ReliefValve SAT Satisfactory SER Safety Evaluation Report SSER Supplemental Safety Evaluation Repon SIF Stress Intensification Factors SRSS Square Root Sum of the Squares SRT SeniorReview Team SSE Safe Shutdown Eanhquake SWEC Stone and WebsterEngineering Corporation TRT Technical Review Team TU- Texas Utilities i TUGCO Texas Utilities Generating Company UNSAT Unsatisfactory WRC Welding Research Counsil ZPA ZeroPeriod Acceleration [.
2 O
./ TN-87 7256
, D-3 DAP-RR P 001, REV.1
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - - - -