ML20235D036

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Rept on Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1
ML20235D036
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Shoreham
Issue date: 10/30/1968
From:
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235B311 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-87-111 NUDOCS 8709250089
Download: ML20235D036 (8)
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' .y October 30, 1968-

- n LONG ISL.GD LIGHTIEG CCIGINY SHOPZJJ.M NUCLEAR PCWER STATICCs, CZ21

.DOO:GT EC. 50-322 i.

Hote by the Director, Livision cf Reactor Licensir.g The attached re;crt has been prepared by the Divisien of Eeacter Licensing for the infor:ation of the Advisory Co=ittee on Res: er Safeguards.  ;

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Introduction On July 5, 19o3 ve sent the ce= ittee our introductory report en ;cng

! Ialand Lighting's Shoreha: Station. In this re;crt *;e mentiened potential problems with the plant having no stack, and therefc e net having an elevated release of fission products in the event of s.n accident. 21s proble=, we noted, is aggravated by the proposed site's relatively small exclusion distance of about 1,0C0 feet. .

Another proble: that has arisen in our review c' the Shoreha: plant, not mentioned in our earlier report, is the location cf a large airpor facility less'than 5 miles from the site. Our lates: thinking en both of these problems is outlined in this repert. We veuld like to discuss these problems with the Cc=ittee at the IcVerter see:ing.

?rcximity of Airport to preposed Site Se proposed site of the Shereha ?lsr.: is located L-3/h tiles northwest of the Gru=an Aircra' Ccspany Airpcrt. Tr.is sane air;crt is also referred to as the peconic F.iver Airport and the Calverten . Airport.

Se site is only about 1/2 mile off a straight line project.on of cne of d the airport's two runwa's./ Se airpo. :. is owned by the U. S. Kavy and is currently under lease to the Grur an Aircraft Corporation, which uses it

'- -y for test flying aircra't which it fabricates for the U. S. amed fccces. Se airport is currently aso being used by certain ec=ercial airlines for pilot training on large ec=ercial jet aircraft. 2e air;crt's

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- 2-two runways are anc s the longest (10,000 and 7,000 ?.. ) in the ncrth-eastern United States, and it is one of several sites, apparently cne cf the leadin6 contenders, being considered for the location of a nev metropolitan Kev York City international airport.

Another fact which may relate to this pretle 11 -hat 3reckhaven National *aboratory

. is also located in this area. 2.2 3reckhaven reactors are located slight'.y less than four miles frc the eci of the other runway and slightly = ore than one mile off a straight line ; rejection cf this runway.

We are considering whether the Shorehan plant sh:uld be designed to take into account the potential effects of an airplant crashing into the fc c111ty, such as was done for the Met Ed 2ree Mile :aland ple.nt. A draft prc-posed amendment to 10 CFR 100, providing criteria fcr siting reae:crs near airports has been sent to the Co dttee for its inferatien. 2ese criteria,

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as currently proposed, would require that the potenti!.1 effects cf airplane d craches be taken into account in the design of the 1~00 S;n crehan facility _

i because it falls within one mile laterally along the five mile projected flight path frc the end of a runway. Se "projectei flight path" is not sin;1y a straight or even curved line projecticn, but rather a fan-shaped )

i area which includes all the flight paths ncr: ally used for landing and l taking off from that run.is'f prcjected vertically to .le ground surface. ]

2e prcrosed criteria vould, therefore, also reqaire .c.at airplane crashes ce considered in the design of the Met Ed ~hree Mile .21and plant and the 2rechhLven reactors, even though they are located scre .han one mile frc straight line projections of runway axes. Se proposed regulaticn (part 100) 1 .

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3-1s intended to apply only to stationary pcuer and :ss;ing reactors, and at least one of the Brookhaven reactors,'the LO Mw high Flux 3eam Eeactor, vould have to be classified as a test reactor.

We initially indicated to the applicant our cen:ern abcut the proximity of an airport to the propcsed LILCO Shoreham site a a technical neeting on August ik,1963, and we plan to request additional infor aticn concerning

- this matter. Se applican; has indicated that his ;caition is that the air-port is at a great enough distance from the proposed Shorehan site that i; should net be a factor in the design of the plant. Ze further indicated-that his response to a request for additional infer:stien en this matter vill cons:.st largely of a defense of this positicn, using the same air-craft crash data sub=1sted by Met Ed en the Gree File Island plant. "

We have not told LILCO of the provisions in the prc;; sed amendment to 10 CFR 100 nor that such an amendnent was being prepared.

We propose to tell LI.00, if the Ccntittee dces not disagree, that since Shorehan encroaches within five miles of a ma?:r airpcrt facility, protection against the effects of aircraft cre4'is a: the site must be provided to reduce the prc3 ability of a carz.ging strike on the plant. We expect that the protection required would be of the.-jpe required for the Sree 2.*ile Island facility in uhich the containment design vu not affected, but additional impact and fire protection was provided for the auxiliary and centrol structures. Se probability of a strike on the Three Mile Island facility by a large aircraft at a critical an-le was shcun to be very stall and approach the probability cf a strike :n an unprotected l .

plant in a "mediu " overflight area. We expect that similar calculations I ,

vill be required on the Shcrehat plant.

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-n summary, we plan to require sc e crash prc e::1cn, but not encugh to handle " worst case" situations.

Effects of No Stack on Accident Dese Calculations The Shorehan plant differs free c her GE-3W 's in the.: i; has no ,

l stack. In addition, the exclusicu distance, 1,000 feet, is rather snali.

2.e applicant apparently feels strongly about not prcviding a stach for this plant, primarily for "public relations reascns". In lieu cf a stack, he proposes to provide a holdup tank system which vill delay (8 hrs to 3 days) the release of the radioactive off-gases whi:h are associated with the normal operation of all 3G's so that these gases can be released frc a rooftop vent and still satisfy 10 CFR 20 req:1rtments.

In the event cf a D3A, fission products would ty-pass the heidup

- syste: and be released through the standby filter syste: and to a separate rooftop vent, where the effluent eculd be swept into a devnvash on the downwind side cf the facility buildings. O.is possibility has been demonstrated by previcus tests, e.nd was ecnfir:ed by a tes progra:

spenscred by II .00 specifically fcr this project. . effect, the release frc: a 23A vould be at 6round level, as oppcsed to sr. elevated release frc the usual 3W, so that concentrations at the exclusion boundary would be much greater than if the release vere from a stack.

On 3E's with a stack, the deses ve calculate fcr a 23A using our stands-d techniques, are several orders of ra;nitude higher than these d

calculated fer the spplicants by GI; nevertheless, cur calculated deses are ucually within 10 CIE 100 guidelines- In the Ehcrehan case, cur standard cal: laticns yield doses which exceed 10 C.3 1CC guideliner s.:

the exclusion bcuncary by about a fac;cr of five, primarily because of the absence of a stack

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5 We have discussed the results of our dose calciatiens .;ith the applicant during teetings, but he has remained non-c: ittal in view cf 1*

the fact that his cale laticns (i.e., GE's) shcu tha offsite deses are .

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vell within 10 CFR 100 guidelines even wicheut a ste.:?.. Recent attentien i

I en the differences te:veen our calculations and thcze of GI, particularly by t.,e ACES and A3&L3's, has stimulated efforts to resolve the differences.  !

We have net with GE cn this subject several times vi-heut much prcgress i 1

e.ni it is not expected that the differences will be satisfactorily resolved in the near future. It is doubtful that the Shoreht: schedule can vait j l

resolution of this general problem.

Tne potential solutions to the Shorehat problen shich we have identified are any one er combination of the follevin;:

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1. We could relax scre of the =cre conservative assumptions t which we use in our " standard methed" fcr cCeulating E2A 1

deses. An appropriate specific ext.:ple scu~i te cur standard assumpticn that any leakage frem the prica:/ (vapor su;pression) containment passes directly into the reac;ct building ventilating syszen, rather than first being mixed, and :.erefore de:ained, within the reacter building. Sc e special iesign provisiens proposed in this plant would enhance such nizing, chich take this a likely choice, and the a;;'.icant has indicated un interest in trying to denenstrate that such nixing vculd ,

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2. A stack could be added to the plant, but as noted abcve, :he applicant has indicated a great reluctance to do this. It should also be noted that if a stach is added, the applicant may cheese to eliminate the cff gas heidup system, which is a desirable innovation in that it significantly reduces the a cunt of routine radioactivity released to the envirens.

3 The currently proposed design leak rate cf the pritary containment (0 5% per day) could be reduced. The applicant vculi undoubtedly resist this because of the additicnal difficulty and expense involved in achieving anc maintaining a lever leak rate. We are also not in favor of this alternative, because of the difficulties and inaccuracies inv:1ved in positively verifying very anall leakage rates and :he relatively great i:portance that snall changes in leak rate have when one relies en very small containment lea.: age rates.

k. The exclusion distance for the facility could be increased.

The presently designated exclusien cistance of 1,000 ft could be increased Only if the applicant accuired centrol cf ad-diti:nal land beyond the presently limiting eastern tcundary of the site. The present vestern beundary would then limit the exclusion distance to about 1,k00 ft, so that this alternative could cnly be used as a partial solu:1cn.

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7-Frc= the potential alternatives indicated, we canne: resclve this problem withe:: further information frc: the applicant. We plan to.: ell him that, based on our standard calculations, the resul cnt doses in the event of a less of coolant accident are considerably above part 1:0 guideline values and ask him what he prcposes to do to reduce the potential deses to acceptable levels.

We vould appreciate any cc =ents of the Cc ittee en this prob"en.

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