05000322/LER-1988-003

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LER 88-003-01:on 880322,unplanned Automatic Initiation of Reactor Bldg Standby Ventilation Sys Side a Occurred During Deenergization of Relay.Caused by Close Placement of Relay Terminals.Wiring Inside Electrical Panels Reworked
ML20055C502
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 05/16/1990
From: Schnaars G
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20055C491 List:
References
LER-88-003, LER-88-3, NUDOCS 9005240085
Download: ML20055C502 (3)
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LER-2088-003,
Event date:
Report date:
3222088003R00 - NRC Website
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On March 22, 1988 at 1436, an unplanned automatic initiation of the Reactor Building Standby Ventilation System (RBSYS) "A" side occurred when an Instrument and Controls (I&C) technician l Anadvertently deenergiced a relay during a surveillance test. The plant was in Operational Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) with the mode switch in shutdown and all rods inserted in the core. The technician was performing a channel functional test on the i instrument loop which initiates RBSYS on a low reactor building differential pressure signal. He had begun to reterminate the leads which he had lifted on Relay 3B-1T46A19 prior to the start of the test. However, while he was performing this step one of the leads slipped out of his hand causing the deenergization of the relay, resulting in a RBSVS "A" train initiation. After the leads were l

reterminated, the procedure was halted. Operators verified the I

signal and took the necessary steps to return the RBSYS to its normal configuration. Plant Management was notified of the event l and the NRC was notified at 1459 per 10CFR50.72. This Supplemental Report is being submitted to inform the commission of the status of corrective actions taken, h$

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PLANT AND SYSTEM _ IDENTIFICATION ,

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor ,

t Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [xx).

IDENTIFICAIION OF_THE_EVEHI ,

An unplanned automatic initiation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), Reactor Building Standby Ventilation System (RBSYS) (BH] l occurred when a lead being lifted by an Instrument and Controls .

(I&C) technician while performing a surveillance test, slipped out of his hands, deenergizing a relay.

Event Date: 3/22/88 Report Date: 5/16/90 l CONDITIONS PRIQB IQ THE EVEBI Operational Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode Switch - Shutdown RPV Pressure : O psig RPV Temperature : 111 degrees F POWER LEVEL - 0 I

All rods inserted in the core.

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On. March 22, 1988 at 1436, an unplanned automatic initiation of the RBSYS "A" train occurred during an I&C surveillance test. A technician had removed the leads from the terminals of Relay l 3B-1T46A19 to prevent the initiation of the RBSVS "A" train to perform a channel functional test on 1T46*PDT043A (Reactor Building Differential Pressure Transmitter) in accordance with SP 44.650.16 I (Reactor Building Differential Pressure - Low Channel Functional Test).

After the test was performed, the tech. relanded one set of '

leads on the relay and was preparing to reland the second set.

While attempting to insert the screw through the lugs into the terminal, one of the leads came loose and made contact with an  ;

adjacent terminal causing the 3B relay to deenergize. Deenergizing the relay resulted in the initiation of the RBSYS "A" train only.

After the leads were reterminated, the procedure was halted.

Operators verified the signal and proceeded to return the system to its normal configuration. Plant Management was notified of the  !

event and the NRC was notified at 1459 per 10CFR50.72.  !

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0 l1 Text rn = w. wwwc a smuunn CAUSE_DE_IHE_EYESI This event occurred because the accessibility to the terminals is extremely difficult. The relay is located in the lower portion of the panel (1H21*PNL-VX1) forcing the technician to crouch in order to perform the procedure. Lifting the leads at the relay terminals is difficult since the terminals are located very close together.

Caution steps already exist in the procedure for lifting the leads from the terminals and for reterminating them. The technician was fully aware of the consequences and was using extreme care while performing the procedure.

l ANALYSIS _DE_IHE EVENT This event resulted in an unplanned automatic initiation of an Engineered Safety Feature (RBSVS) and is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). There is no safety significance to the event.

The RBSVS operated as designed and operators carried out all reguired actions. No other systems were challenged or required as a result of the event. Had this event occurred under a more severe set of circumstances (5% power) there would still be no safety significance.

l COBBECI1YE_ACIl0SS

1. A wiring change has been made which reworked the wiring inside the electrical panels. This ch'.nge allows leads to be lifted

, from a terminal strip rather than the relay in order to prevent an RBSVS actuation.

2. A modification has been prepared which will install keylock l switches in the front portions of the associated electrical panels. These switches will disable the RBSYS initiation logic l

! and will allow performance of the surveillance test without l having to lift any leads. Implementation of this modification l has been deferred indefinitely due to the New York State -

l LILCO Shoreham Settlement Agreement.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

a. tianniacturer_and_mndel_ number _ni_f ailed _comnonent_Lal l None l
b. LEB_ numbers _of_ previous _similar_eyents85-050, 86-026,86-038 86-044,89-010 I CIC Fe,m 3e6A (6401

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