ML20213H155

Forwards Articles Transmitted by Conger Re O-welds & Safety Measures of Plant.Update of NRC Actions Requested

ML20213H155
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	10/07/1986
From:	Chiles L SENATE
To:	Kammerer C NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA)
Shared Package
ML20213F158	List: ML20213F156 ML20213H155 ML20213H173
References
NUDOCS 8611190128
Download: ML20213H155 (7)

Text

e Co"umu s

,LAWTON CHILES FLOa!DA APPROPRIATTONS BUDGET GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

. tiinited States Etnatt October 7, 1986 Carlton Kammerer, Director Office of Congressional Affairs Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1712 A Street, NW Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Kammerer:

I have recently received correspondence from Mr. Steve Conger pertaining to the attached articles on the "0-Welds" and safety measures of the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

I wou1C appreciate it if you would provide me with an update of any recent actions that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has taken in regard to Turkey Point's operation and safety standards.

With kindest regards, I am Mostsincere)y( ,

/

AWTON CH E LC/nrg Enclosures 8611190128 861007 PDR ADOCK 05000250 H pop REPLY To: FEDERAL BUILDING, LAKELAND, FL 33801 i

1. " p nerg#'e UNITED STATES / [5 E\- , - 7 't NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'{ .gy)c ,E

. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

~

• ** l  !.

EDO PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL FROM: DUE: 10/28/86 EDO CONTROL: 002208 DOC DT: 10/07/86 SEN. LAWTON CHILES FINAL REPLY:

TO:

KAMMERER FOR SIGNATURE OF: ** GREEN ** GECY NO: 86-1084 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DESC: ROUTING:

ENCLOSES CORRESPONDENCE FROM STEVE CONGER GRACE CONCERNING "O-WELDS" 84 SAFETY MEASURES AT GCUNNINGHAM TURKEY POINT DATE: 10/14/86 ASSIGNED TO: NRR CONTACT: DENTON

- - ~ . _ . - _ _

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

NRR RECElVED: OCT. 15, 1986 ACTION: / DPLA:NOVAR .

NRR ROUTING: DENTON/VOLLMER PPAS M0SSDURG L_ . _

j ..

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET PAPER NUMBER: CRC-86-1084 LOGGING DATE: Oct 10 86 ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR: L. Chiles--Const Ref AFFILIATION: U.S. SENATE LETTER DATE: FILE CODE: ID&R-5 Turkey Point

SUBJECT:

Req Comm update on Turkey Point's operation and safety standards ACTION: Direct Reply DISTRIBUTION: OCA to Ack SPECIAL HANDLING:

NOTES: Steve Conger DATE DUE: Oct T7-86~

SIGNATURE: .

' DATE SIGNED:

AFFILIATION: g '

Rec'd Cit. us Date MY 'b Time Mf6 I l

EDO - 002208

(. __ __.

c%  % ItN- d

- C E.N ~E 7 20 7 N C _ A7 7 ES 30 \ S 3 _ ~Y 7210 Red Road . Suite 217. Miami, Rorida 33143 . 661-2165 THE "0-WELDS" 0F TURKEY POINT g 7 5 g cc, n e,,,,,

12.i N ewcw THE TROUBLE AT TURKEY POINT IS THIS: the large steel pressure vessels that 4d surround the nuclear fuel cores and contain the cooling water for reactor Units 3 Upd and 4, were designed so that they should never crack during the reactors 40 year Ft.

lifetime. But, age and radiation damage have caused the copper welds belting the 133 ty reactor vessels of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 to become brittle. So brittle, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has admitted that Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 have the 2nd and 3rd most brittle reactor vessels in the entire United States.

This means that these vessels are susceptible to cracking in an emergency that requires FPL to pump cold. water into the vessel to cool the reactor core. The shock of the cold water could cause the brittle vessel to crack, much like a hot glass would if you p_ laced it in cold water. A crack in the reactor pressure vessel would cause all the cooling water to escape, resulting in a core meltdown - the most feared reactor accident.

~ THE METAL AND WELDS IN A NUCLEAR REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL are important. They can respond to abrupt changes in temperature and pressure (such as would ie ex-perienced in an accident) with either ductile or brittle behavior. Ductility is the ability of the reactor metal and the welds to withstand stress without cracking.

in a new nuclear power reactor, the metal is extremely ductile. The metal in a new pressure vessel can be easily cooled from the reactor's normal operating temperature of 550 F to 0-40* F. without cracking. But, as time goes on, the weld metal becomes increasingly brittle even at high temperatures in the 200-300 F. range.

THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION has named the temoerature at .

which the weld metal stops being ductile and becomes brittle the g

(

transition temperature (RTNDT). The NRC has also set a point at "55" which the transition temperature in a given reactor would be a cause for concern. THE NRC BRI'ITLE TEMPERATURE LIMIT, OR DANGER ._=____.j POINT, HAS BEEN SET AT 300*F. These high brittle temperature limits are dangerous because the reactor vessel has to be main- ~fN ..

/

7#

tained at these temperatures if the effects of brittle metal are M ... /"o-weld' to be avoided. Thus, any incident which results in abrupt pressura  ?" , N..

and temperature changes and requires quick cooling below 300*F. G4, j ; '

h

]h could result in a pressure vessel rupture in a severely embrittled [#

nuclea n eactor. g 'a-p i  :: =

THE DEGREE OF EMBRI'ITLEMENT CAN BE MEASURED by taking metal nmples out of the reactor and testing them. In these tests, called 1

! [ .

Charpy tests, metal bars are hit at different temperatures to [q j see at what temperature they will crack. Such tests were performed on reacter weld metal samples from Unit #4 in 1976. The tests by Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) showed that '.he Unit 4 weld metal was 30% more brittle than that of Unit 33, and that Unit 4 would ecceed the NRC's screening criterion of 300*F. about 1980. SWRI suggested that FPL conduct another test of the weld metal in 1978 and again in 10 years. FPL HAS CONDUCTED NO FURTHER TESTS OF THE WELD METAL OF UNIT 4. Instead, about 1981, FPL began to use test data from the less severely affected reactor Unit #3 to predict safe operation of Unit 4, stating that Unit 3's data was mare representative of Unit 4 than Unit 4's actual test data. The NRC approved FPL's legal alchemy, despite statements from an independent expert that this process was scientifically invalid. And, the NRC has also allowed FPL to defer weld metal tests on Unit 4 scheduled for this.y' ear, for %n additional 14 years until the year 2,000.

The risk Unit #4 poses to'the South Floeida community is intolerable. TURKEY POINT UNIT #4 MUST BE SHUTDOWN, TESTED, AND PROVEN SAFE.

i i

I \

i

_. x

-~% *m e

/

i CONTAINMENT /p [.

N s

! STRUCTURE [~f0 TURBINE / 70 MILE RADIUS

• D dabg i

M } / 4.= DEuvui .,

s N I

l STEAM

' / C ANCER DE ATHS a mo 'maits  :",J ?yi l GENERATOR (( f '

,,i07t,1%7Ac, f

, i ygy

.g CONTROL

' /

l / TURKEY l RODS I EAD m"

- * "f . POINT l

@I I 4 == j 1 J REACTOR J A

m"""dh l

M g (- \

4

• 20 MILE RADIUS 29.000 IMMEDIATE DEATHS /

/

/

l ,

\ g3 1 /

'. h .,,/

3 s

,'1 -

%-~

i Certain weather conditions could spread radiation from meltdown at FPL's Turkey Point nuclear power plant over much

y. ,ty , . . EEk

4. .

heavily populated South Florida, according to a congressi<ml 1 ..  ;. , <;< . . " ; r.

smi,.ii...,. ..n,rou si.sTos report. Most immediale deaths would occur within 20 miles of plant, but radiation's effects could spread as far as 70 miles.

Center for Nuclear Responsibility 7210 Red Road #217 Miami, Florica 33143

, .. c enon t ..nger 121 Brrerwood Circle Holigwood FL 33024 9uJ uiu0 orpt 26,1966 Stoffperson Of fice of Senator Chiles, Federal Building Miami FL To: The Staf fperson who reads mail for the Senator,*

RE: Turkey Point I spoke with Hank Osborne in Senator Chiles' Washington of fice regarding the enclosed press release from the Center for Nuclear Responsibility. I oiso enclose o 15-page paper from Public Citizen that orgues for shutting down nuclear power plants (like Turkey Point) on economic grounds.

l) Please have someone contact Ms. Lorion. Determine for yourself whether or not her ellegations are groundless. If you conclude (es I have) that a reasonable person might have doubts about the safety of the 0-welds at Turkey Point, I would oppreciate hearing on answer to this question: what should Senator Chiles do to make Turkey Point safe?

2) Discuss with Ms. Lorion possible action that Senator Chiles might take. Since this is a federal matter (Nuclear Reguletory Commission), it's a matter for the Senate to consider. I've heard it's possible to restrict the NRC by changing its charter (which granted the NRC power to act es Congress' agent). I've also heard that the NRC might withdraw a utility's license to operate until a series of tests are made to determine the ability of certain parts to withstand pressures during an emergency.

I'm o resident of Florida. I went to be o resident when Senator Chiles runs for re-election so I con vote for him. However, if Turkey Point isn't declared safe for operations by an independent group of qualified experts (other than the NRC or FP&L), I won't be living in Florido.

All the best, ,

Steve Conger j

• l realize that the Senator receives a lot of mail. I just want to grab geur attention I've l already sent a copy of the press release to Hank Osborne in the Senator's Washington office and I '

expect Sen. Chiles vill see that. Hank said he vould send the press release to "someone who can l handle it locally," 30 I just vant to present more information to you. I asked myself, "Who is more likely to act on this matter, somebody in Washington or a person living and working _3J miles from South Florida's (potential) Chernoby1?"

j

L tlNItl< F.Ul< INULLtMK KCOFUIN01otLii Y 7210 Red Road . Suite 217. Miami. Rorida 33143 . 661-2165 THE "0 WELDS" 0F TURKEY POINT THE TROUBLE AT TURKEY POINT IS THIS: the lar8e steel pressure vessels that j surround the nuclear fuel cores and contain the cooling water for reactor Units 3 and 4, were designed so that they should never crack during the reactor's 40 year lifetime. But, age and radiation damage have caused the copper welds belting the a reactor vessels of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 to become brittle. S 4 b rittle, the .

C U.S. Nuclear Re ulator y ppggigsjon NRC has Turke g oin% UnTt hs a g Mmeans i M @ g %that tfie,$3,,fggm.o,gdr.j%'p),tible 1

se vessels are ,suMe Qh3, to crack'in .-  %

requires FPL to pump cold water into the vessel to cool the reactor core. The shock of the cold water could cause the brittle vessel to crack, much like a hot glass would if you placed it in cold water. A crack in the reactor pressure vessel would cause all the cooling water to escape, resulting in a core meltdown - the most feared reactor accident.

THE METAL AND WELDS IN A NUCLEAR REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL are important. They can respond to abrupt changes in temperature and pressure (such as would be ex-

. perienced in an accident) with either ductile or brittle behavior. Ductility is the ability of the reactor metal and the welds to withstand stress without crackin8 In a new nuclear power reactor, the metal is extremely ductile. The metal in a new.

pressure vessel can be casily cooled from the reactor's normal operating temperature of 550* F. to 0-40" F. without cracking. But, as time goes on, the weld metal becomes increasingly brittle even at high temperatures in the 200-300 F. range.

THE NUCLEAR REGULA1 DRY COMMISSION has named the temperature at which the weld metal stops being ductile and becomes brittle the ,.

"55' transition temperature (RTNDT). The NRC has also set a point at which the transition temperature in a given reactor would be a cause for concern. THE NRC BRITTLE TEMPERATURE LIMIT, OR DANGER POINT, HAS BEEN SET AT 300*F. These high brittle temperature fN < ; ,_,

7""'

limits are dan 8erous because the reactor vessel has to be main- .

tained at these temperatures if the effects of brittle metal are [ ... y /"o-weld' to be avoided. Thus, any incident which results in abrupt pressure T h and temperature changes and requires quick cooling below 300*F. 4[] -~

could result in a pressure vessel rupture in a severely embrittled l@

h

nuclear reactor.

..o d, THE DEGREE OF EMBRITTLD4ENT CAN BE MEASURED by taking metal v __

p samples out of the reactor and testing them. In these tests, called I kp=:

Charpy tests, metal bars are hit at differen't temperatures to s ,,,,,

see at what temperature they will crack. Such tests were performed '

on reactor weld metal samples from Unit #4 in 1976. The tests by Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) showed that the Unit 4 vald metal was 30% more brittle than that of Unit #3, and that Unit 4 would exceed the NRC's screening criterion of 300*F. about 1980. SWRI suggested that FPL conduct another test of the weld metal in 1978 and again in 10 years. FPL HAS ,.,.

CONDUCTED NO FURTHER TESTS OF THE WELD METAL OF UNIT 4. Instead, about 1981, FPL i began to use test data from the less severely affected reactor Unit #3 to predict safe operation of Unit 4, stating that Unit 3's data was more representative of Unit 4 than Unit 4's actual test data. The NRC approved FPL's legal alchemy, despite statements from an independent expert that this process was scientifically l invalid. And, the NRC has also allowed FPL to defer weld metal tests on Unit 4

- scheduled ~ for this year,"'fo~r an additional 14 ' years until the year 2,000.

The risk Unit #4 poses to the South Florida community is intolerable. TURKEY POINT ~

UNIT #4 MUST BE SHUTDOWN, TEMw AND PROVEN SAFE.

• % .n 2.-.,, .,-w,- wi ww.+