ML20117M288

Requests That Commission Require NRC to Take Possession of Q-1 Files & Provide Analysis of Why Significant Deficiencies at Facility Do Not Pose Danger to Health.Requests Results from Failure to Address Serious Safety Allegations

ML20117M288
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	05/15/1985
From:	Garde B, Guild R, Stephens S GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
To:	Asselstine J, Bernthal F, Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#285-024, CON-#285-24 2.206, NUDOCS 8505160628
Download: ML20117M288 (20)

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GOVERNMDR ACCOUNTABluTY PROXCT 1555 Connecticut Awmue, N.W., Suite 202 g* y s Washington, D.C. 20(Xg (202)232-8550 May 15, 1985

!sWi The Honorable Nunzio Palladino, Chairman Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick Bernthal qFFICE OF SECRETAiiY Commissioner Thomas Roberts u0CMETggERVICf.

Commissioner Lando Zech

Dear Commissioners:

On behalf of the Nuclear Awareness Network (NAN).the Government Accountability Project (GAP) hereby files a request pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.206 regarding the Wolf Creek nuclear power plant now operating at low power near Burlington, Kansas.

This request results from the continuous failure of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to address serious safety allegations in a manner which can assure that the Wolf Creek facility can operate above 5% power without endangering the public health and safety.

At a recent Commission meeting regarding the Near Term Operating License (NTOL) Plants the Commissioners were advised on the status of the Wolf Creek plant and the various staff investigations and inspections. Unfortuantely that briefing was neither complete nor accurate. This request seeks to insure that the staff is required to review and also to report publicly on the full scope of safety significant problems at the Wolf Creek plant prior to the Commission granting full power operation.

Since NAN and GAP have had a continuous dialogue with the staff, particularly the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, for some time we had hoped that formal legal measures would not be necessary. Unfortuantely for all parties, the staff has affirmatively refused to acknowledge the serious ramifications of saftey problems at the plant. In other words, this 2.206 is not based on what the Commission would prefer to regard as late-filed allegations, but instead on the inadequate handling of hardware and quality assurance information known to the staff.

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Specifically, the Staff through Region IV has refused to take possession of and pursue the allegations that have been provided through the Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E)

Quality First program. (The Quality First program is the utility company's allegation finding initiative program.) Since the program was widely popularized as being a progressive and totally independent effort GAP has channelled workers with quality concerns to the program. It is now clear, through the monitoring of several of the safety related allegations, that neither the company nor the NRC are going to resolve those problems.

For example, contained in the Quality First files (referred to as "Q-1 files") are the statements and supporting information from over 240 individuals who have expressed over 700 safety significant concerns. It is our understanding that not only has the Licensee ignored or buried the serious concerns of the members of the workforce, but so has the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's task force on Wolf Creek.

The staff reported to the Commission that there were only nine allegations under review at the plant. That may be technically accurate, but in reality the staff has knowledge of several hundred allegations which it has steadfastly refused to take regulatory possession of or to monitor or to enter into the NRC's allegation tracking system. This has allowed the staff to inaccurately present a picture of a plant without serious safety deficiencies.

Since the staff has refused to take possession of the files and assure the Commission and the public that the allegations contained in these files have been adequately resolved, GAP and NAN have recontacted the workers in order to take affidavits relative to their concerns. Under seperate cover today the first affidavit of workers who have raised concerns in vain to site management has been forwarded to the Office of Investigations for their review. We have also requested that the Office of Investigations open an inquiry into the allegations of deliberate management mishandling of the Quality First program.

Additionally, attached to this letter is a copy of NAN's Analysis and Comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's March 11, 1985 Response on the Isolation and Resolution of the Structural Steel Weld Deficiencies at Wolf Creek which NXS has provided to the members of both federal and state officials who have demonstrated an interest in the safety of the Wolf Creek plant.

I In conclusion GAP requests that the Commission

! 1) require the Staff to take possession of the 0-1 l files and provide to the Commission and the public the analysis of why the significant safety related deficiencies identified for the past year by members of the workforce do not pose a danger to the public health and safety,

2) conduct an inquiry on the ramification of the collective safety significance and/or adequacy on the quality assurance program in the light of the information contained in the Quality First files, and

3) require an explanation from both NRR and Region IV as to why they allowed the allegations to be exempt from the regulatory analysis for determination of safety significance.

4) request 01 conduct an investigation into the compromising of the Quality First program by William Rudolph, site QA Manger. Mr. Rudolph was originally responsible for the resolution of allegations made against the QA program which he supervised. He currently is responsible for the resolution of Quality First Observations (OFOs), discrepancies identified in the course of 01 investigations.

We look forward to an early response.

Respectfully submitted, kI N es _ _.,,

Billie Pirner Garde ci '

sClinicgrpetor Fvj{

4 4 Robert Guild, Esquire Staff Attorney n k,.w Stevi Stephens Director of Nuclear Awareness Network

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• GOCKETING & SEP'llIl BRANCH ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS ON THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S (NRC) MARCH 11, 1985 RESPONSE ON THE ISOLATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE STRUCTURAL STEEL WELD DEFICIENCIES AT WOLF CREEK.

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On March 3, 1983 the NRC imposed a $40,000.O0 Civil Penalty on Kansas Gas and Electric (KG&E) for failure to adequately control activities affecting the quality of safety-related work. Specifically, the Borated Refuling Water Storage (BN)

System and the Auxiliary Feedwater (AL) System were turned over from the construction contractor, Daniels International Corporation (DIC) and accepted by KG&E start-up organization on October 28, 1982, and November 23, 1982 respectively. This followed final Quality Assurance (QA) checks with quality documentation in which hardware (actual "in the field") dis-crepancies were not listed. The NRC's evaluation of this incident was that "the aspect of (KG&E's] QA program which should have assured that systems and documentation deficiencies were identified, tracked and resolved has broken down."

The NRC places great emphasis on the need for licensees (KG&E]

to " implement a QA program that identifies and corrects con-struction deficiencies in a timely manner." However, " based on a review of the circumstances surrounding this violation (the NRC] determine [d] that (KG&E's] untimely notification of

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the conditions under the reporting criteria of 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.55(e) (50.55e) was also a violation."

The NRC insisted that KG&E's actions should include a "...re-view of related Quality documentation", that KG&E's " response should also address measures taken or planned to ensure that

[their) QA procedures are adequate..." and that " appropriate documentation (be) available."

To prevent recurrence of such a violation, KG&E established a Quality Documentation Review Task Force on January 20, 1983.

A corrective action program was subsequently submitted to Region Four NRC (RIV) on March 2, 1983. Among KG&E's commit-ments to the NRC were " implementation of organizational and personnel changes that should improve quality" and a "documen-tation review which will be expanded to include additional detailed review of those areas where documentation deficiencies have been experienced."

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More specifically, in KG&E's January 13, 1983 inter-office memo (KWCLC-2403) Gary Fouts, KG&E Construction Manager, informed Luther Warrick, DIC project Manager, of the estab-lishment of a Task Force to investigate and review documen-tation due to " concern about completion and accuracy of the turnover Quality documentation and backup Quality docu- ,

mentation" and that "the concern of the review of.both groups I of documents has been somewhat substantiated by the recent KG&E QA surveillance of the BN system." .

The'NRQ discipsed that these late 1982 KG&E audits " revealed numerous documentation deficiencies that were carried on a i list separate from the systems exception list. This separate i

list was referenced on the exception list as a single line entry to ' resolve discrepancies with the BN travelers.' The exception list stated that the traveler [ documentation] dis-

crepancies were cosmetic and did not affect hardware. Your

[KG&E] audit, however, discovered that some hardware dis-crepancies (lack of heat numbers) were included in this dis-crepancy list. The scope of the problems discovered in this

audit were discussed during the enforcement conference on February 18, 1983." [ Minutes from this meeting should be l requested.)

i j During the approximate time frame of January 1983, a Special Projects Group under the direction of Craig Moring as " piping l

document co-ordinator" was given authority through a KG&E inter-office memo to "fix travelers". .

Jim Tweedy, " traveler

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review lead" in. piping and hangers, was assigned two engineers

] and two clerks to check the documentation. Inquiries should

< be made as to the exact identity and function of these persons

! and organizations, what occurred within these organizations j after the discrepancies in the BN system were discovered, and

why the discrepancies within the BN system were considered i unique.

"Due to potential deficiencies in the Wolf Creek Quality pro-1 grams", KG&E submitted a letter (KMLNRC 83-019) outlining a i

Systems Turnover Quality Action plan and delineating the commitments made by KG&E to RIV. Among these:

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1) "To assure that KG&E construction'and startup personnel

' will conduct a complete walkdown of all future safety-

• related systems."

2) "As a tool to monitor the effectiveness of the DIC and KG&E turnover verification reviews, KG&E QA will perform a sur-veillance of each safety-related system after the formal i systems turnover."

} 3) "A management audit by an outside firm will be performed

of both DIC Quality and KG&E QA organizations" which was

expected to be completed by the end of August 1983. [This independent audit should be requested and reviewed.]

i 4) "As a related matter, the KG&E procedure for reporting l 50.55e deficiencies will ist revised to clarify responses."

i [ Implementation of this procedure was reported closed out

! in Inspection Report 50-482/83-11 on May 20, 1983.]

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- The Combin d Ravisw Group compriCOd cf KG&E and DIC empicyOcc was established as an additional quality check point to provide final Quality construction documentation review. This group has issued status reports for all of the weeks within the months of November 1983, December 1983, January 1984 and the

[ As DIC contends that this group first week of February 1984.

was responsible for discovering future documentation dis-crepancies, these status reports should be requested and re-viewed for information pertaining to the Structural Steel Weld deficiencies which arose.] .

In the early spring of 1984, KG&E developed its Quality First (01) prcgram to receive, evaluate and resolve Quality concerns

- from workers at the Wolf Creek site. All workers are required to be processed through Q1 before leaving the site and to sign a statement revealing any Quality concerns. In essence, worker allegations related to safety are contained within Ol's case files. Of the thousands of exit interviews conducted, KG&E has established approximately 250 case files which in- ~

clude their investigations and resolutions of employee safety -

4 allegations.

Until September of 1984, Q1 was under the direction of William Rudolph, also KG&E QA site Manager since April 20, 1983.- Thus, employees relayed allegations to 01, which were a direct re-flection against QA, to the QA Manager. When the NRC inspected Q1 in September of 1984, it found that processing of wrong-doing concerns (i.e. drugs, alchohol, intimidation, harassment, discrimination, falsification of documentation) was particu-larly deficient, informational flow had no feedback mechanism for wrong-doing concerns directed to Security or KG&E manage-ment, which may include technical deficiencies. Nor was there any feedback mechanism from Security or KG&E management re-garding corrective action or disposition of wrong-doing con-cerns for file closeout. Although the potential conflict of interest under the direction of Bill Rudolph was reduced when his replacement coincided with the NRC's inspection, KG&E management is still in direct control of Q1 with no systematic check or review by any independent body.

! In spite of these Quality organizations and commitments by KG&E, they received a disconcerting twenty-one Violations and two Deviations from the NRC during 1983. These were issued l primarily for failures within the QA program. This was more j

than double the number they had received in 1982. In 1984 KG&E once again received an inordinate number of Violations and Deviations. Among the most serious during these two years l were violations for intimidation of Quality Control (Q/C) in-spectors occurring in March of 1983. Another incident in-volving the termination of a QA inspector on August 4, 1983 transpired when the inspector identified "O relared problems with documentatalon of various safety-related items as well 4 as concerns in the hardware of items." This information,/

) reported to Bill Rudolph, KG&E QA site Manager, resulted in

his decision to terminate this employee. Yet Rudolph was later put in charge of Q1 processing of worker allegations regarding safety concerns.

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on-September-4, 1984 a $64,000.00 civil Penalty was levied i against KG&E for intimidation of this QA inspector. The NRC d '

rated this a Severity Level II violation, the most severe received by KG&E to date. KG&E now holds the dubious dis-tinction of being the only licensee of a nuclear facility to be fined-for intimidation of a worker. This worker was rein-stated in the fall of 1984 and subsequently fired again in January'of 1985. He is now suing KG&E for failure to adhere to the: courts orders: reinstating employee to a comparable position, compensating back wages, posting status of decision on Wolf Creek site, and expunging worker's record. KG&E is appealing the court's decision and requesting the Fifth Circuit. Court's interpretation of the Employee Protection

s. Act be upheld. In brief, it states that in order for an

employee to be protected he must report his concerns directly to the NRC,_not to the utility. Conversely, KG&E contends I that the safety allegations of workers are being properly processed and adequately resolved by Q1. Due to concerns over conflict of interest within KG&E's Q1 management, the

' NRC's assessment of improper processing of Q1 corrective actions and particularly KG&E's contention that worker alle-gations be directed to the NRC not to them, all 250 case files should be requested and thoroughly reviewed.

On November 21, 1984, the NRC imposed another Civil Penalty on KG&E in the amount of $75,000.00. The penalty was esca-lated $25,000.00 due to the NRC's appraisal of KG&E's failure to correct discrepancies when found. "Contarary to the [re-quirements], the inspection program for safety-related

' Structural Steel Welds (SSW) was not adequately executed to assure conformance to the requirements of construction Pro-csdure QCP-VII-200 Revision 4 and the American Welding Society j -

J (AWS) D 1.1-75 Code nor were adequate records kept to document i the quality of the welds. Furthermore, once deficient welds I were identified, no actions were taken to correct the deficien-P- cies."

The chronology of the SSW problems is as follows:

• DIC Corrective Action Report (CAR) 29 was. issued on March 22, l 1983 indicating a failure of 148 out of 241 SSW which were L randomly reinspected. A' potential 50.55e was reported to RIV on MarchT23, 1983 and Non-Conformance Report (NCR) ISN 10381PW was issued. This NCR dispositioned the defects as " cosmetic" and called for rework on 6 (2.5%) of the welds. This NCR was closed on August 30, 1983, the potential 50.55e was withdrawn on October 21, 1983 and DIC CAR 29 was closed on October 22,

^ 1983 with the Architect / Engineer (A/E) disposition: "use-as-is."

~f Simultaneously, CAR 31 was issued on August 10, 1983 indicating

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20% of the Miscellaneous Structural Steel Weld Records (MSSWRs) l were missing. In August of 1983 NCR ISN 11975CW was issued

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'!- documenting 42 missing weld records in the pumphouse, even though the discovery of missing records was documented on the

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. NCR on June 30, 1983.

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- ~- g Although KG&E's QA/QC program required MSSWRs to be prepared and retained [QCP-VII, QP-IV-III, ANSI Code N45.2, Bechtel Spec 10466-QA-1] no 50.55e was reported by KG&E relative to the discovery of missing documentation until a telephonic report to the~NRC on September 18, 1984.. This occurred only after the June 11-September 18, 1984 time period " review of QA/QC and Q1 personnel qualifications and subsequent inter-views when the NRC inspector became aware of potential prob-lens with DIC. CARS 29 and 31." The NRC immediately called and enforcement meeting with KG&E on October 29, 1984. Ihr November 21,'1984 the violation and $75,000.00 civil Penalty were issued.

In August of'1983 when NCR ISN 11957CW was issued documenting i the 42 missing records in the pumphouse, "KG&E along with RIV NRC performed other inspections", yet the NRC claims to have had no knowledge of the problems with missing documenta-tion until June-August of 1984. This is a decided discrepancy within the'NRC's response. Also of concern is why a delay of one year occurred before this " clearly reportable 50.55e item" was reported to the NRC.

Despite the concerns evidenced by CAR 31 regarding documen-i tation discrepancies, CAR 29 which indicated hardware dis-crepancies on the same welds that showed documentation problems, was closed approximately two months after CAR 31 was issued.

Inquiries should be made into why there was no connection made between CARS 29 and 31 by DIC and KG&E Quality management organizations; why KG&E did not issue a 50.55e relative to CAR 31 document discrepancies in August of 1983; why CAR 31 was issued in August of 1983 instead of June of 1983 when the 42 miss'ing weld records were discovered; how these buildings with the MSSWRs could have been turned over and accepted by KG&E from February 1984 onward without CAR 31 being completed and closed; and why CAR 31 was not closed until January 26,

, 1985 when the corrective action date on it is January 26, 1984.

l During the February 27, 1985 KG&E/NRC meeting in Bethesda on the MSSWRs, Richard Denise (RIV) questioned John Berra (DIC) about the reason why these missing MSSWRs did not surface

} earlier than late 1984. Berra rep 1'ied, " sample NRC inspection done in the summer of 1983 [ occurred] and no deficiencies were found", yet in February of 1983 DIC had performed a ,

random reinspection of Structural Steel fillet welds and in-dicated an unacceptable percentage of welds were defective.

Further, CAR 29 was generated on March 22, 1983 to document these failures. It indicated 148 out of 241 welds inspected were deficient.

On September 11, 1984, KG&E and DIC informed the NRC that there were no records for 319 weld joints in the reactor building alone, of which 48 did not meet code / design original require-ments. The NRC's position was that the August 30, 1983 NCR was improperly dispositioned and the underlying premise for

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its closure was' faulty. It further appeared that "the quality 4

status of the majority of 311 structural steel welds was at best indeterminate." By September 28, 1984, numerous inspection records were found missing, welds were found missing or un-acceptable and records which were located indicated unacceptable welds were documented as being acceptable..

Among many requirements' relative to the SSW problems, the NRC requested KG&E to demonstrate that problems of QA activities experienced within the SSW area.were not also present else-where at Wolf Creek. A letter dated January 9, 1985 from

' Congressman John Dingell, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Oversight and Investigation, was sent to Nunzio Palladino, Chairman of the NRC, echoing identical concerns. The letter voiced worries on behalf of the committee that "these problems were not found until construction of the Wolf Creek plant i had been virtually completed" and requested assurance that "a QA breakdown such as that which occurred in the SSW program did not extend to other aspects of design and construction of

. Wolf Creek."

On January 23, 1985 Chairman Palladino issued his response to

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Chairman Dingell "which raised more questions than it answered."

Among those appear to be his citation of the establishment of an NRC Task Force at Wolf Creek in July of 1984 to " insure the overall inspection program at the Wolf Creek Station would be completed on a schedule consistant with the utility's pro-jected fuel load date." A subsequent lengthy investigation and extensive report has been published by a Louisiana reporter i releasing evidence that these Task Forces assigned to all Near Term Operating License Plants (NTOLs) are under the direction of the Department of Energy (DOE). The division p

between the NRC and DOE has been made very distinct by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1975. Congressman Ed Markey, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Energy, Conservation and Power is now investigating this involvement. Palladino personally l issued a March 20, 1984 memo indicating that the NRC must make licensing of these NTOLs their highest priority regardless of safety implications.

Palladino's response went on to inform Chairman Dingell that 4

the "NRC's Office of Investigations (OI) has several investi-gations underway whose conclusions would provide insight into this [SSW) problem." Those investigations relate to a number of. issues including missing, falsified, or erroneous QA records. With these investigations incomplete, the NRC issued Wolf Creek's low-power testing license on March 11, 1985 and resolved the SSW problems with the issuance of a voluminous response to Kansas. officials which was mailed the same day the license was issued. These investigations, which could involve potential criminal activity by KG&E management have still not been completed.

Palladino additionally responded to Dinge11's concerns over the NRC granting KG&E exemptions from welding regulations that "the NRC has not ' granted' exemptions from conformance to AWS D 1.1 as the deficient welds required, but rather ' accepted

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changes' that KG&E requested to ammend the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 3.8.3.6.3.3."

Needless to say, we do not have the expertise to question the technical issues of the A/E resolutions. However, it is of major concern that there seems to be no regulatory guide for the review of compliance with regulations relative to QA breakdowns. Instead, the NRC,'rather than utilize' regulatory guidance, relys.on engineering judgement ~for reinspections.

Consequently, it puts into question the regualtions governing other areas reviewed for reinspection.

The assurances within the NRC response that deficiencies do not extend to other areas at Wolf Creek are questionable. DIC contends that the MSSWRs were controlled by an "open-ended" traveler system as opposed to the " closed-ended" system present in other disciplines. Secondly, usage of the " triplicate traveler" was not put into effect within the MSSWRs until approximately 1980, by.which time the SSWs were almost com-plete. Thirdly, the fact that the utility did not discover documentation problems earlier was blamed on the absence of the Combined Review Group. An outline of the precise differences between the two traveler systems should be required including:

the reason why the MSSWRs were on an open-ended system when all other areas involving AWS D 1.1 welding were on closed-ended systems; whether all closed-ended systems are recorded with travelers documented in triplicate; when the triplicate traveler system was introduced; if other systems did not have triplicate travelers until 1980 as well, why there are not simi-lar documentation deficiencies within those systems; how many of the MSSWRs were recorded in triplicate (it has been determined that a portion were); and of those, in how many cases were all three travelers missing; and lastly if the Combined Review Group was not established until late in 1983, how can there be any assurance that all other areas prior to this time are not deficient as well (recalling that the Combined Review Group i

did not discover the documentation problems even once it was functioning.)

i The other areas which could be potentially affected by AWS D 1.1 l welding deficiencies are: 1) Pipe Whip Restraints, 2) Embed-i ment Fabrications, 3) Fire Dampers, 4) Safety-Related Ductwork and Supports, 5) Electrical Raceway Supports, 6) Electrical Equiptment Installation, and 7) Stud Welding.

On November 26, 1984, report KQWLKQW 84-456 was submitted to Bill Rudolph constituting the review done of all (twenty) KG&E CARS by KG&E Quality Engineer, T. M. Halecki. This brief, two page report consists of a list of the CARS and a two line

, summary, ". . .other than CAR 19 (MSSWR) no other si gnificant problems pertaining to DIC inspection and documentation were I

noted by review." However, approximately five weeks later on January 2, 1985, Surveillance Repbrt S-1223 was issued, signed bjr T . W . Halecki, showing an electrical weld problem. DIC CAR l-EW-OO46 was subsequently initiated on electrical equiptment foundation welds for deficiencies in welding and shimming of electrical installation, a AWS D 1.1 area. This CAR remains open.

In summary, the parallel between the chronology of the f deficiencnes experienced within the BN system and the SSWs i is remarkable. The Violation, Civil Penalty and KG&E's corrective action commitments on the BN system occurred in 1 March of 1983. Simultaneously, in March of 1983, DIC CAR 29 I indicating SSW defects was issued. Just three months later,

> in June of 1983, SSW documentation was discovered missing.

! One of KG&E's commitments to the NRC to correct potential

conflicts in their Quality program was to revise the procedure

for timely reporting of 50.55es. This was resolved and closed on May 20, 1983. Yet, no 50.55e was reported relative to missing MSSWRs until the fall of 1984.

The reporting criteria of a 50.55e requires:

1) a licensee to notify the NRC of each deficiency found in in design, which, were it to have remained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safety of. operations of a plant representing i) significant breakdown in any portion of Q/A program,

11) significant deficiency in final design not conforming to SAR, iii) significant deficiency in construction, iv) significant deviation from performance of specifications which will require extensive evaluation, redesignor repair,

2) a licensee to report deficiencies within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the NRC, and

3) a licensee to submit a written report within 30 days to the NRC.

However, as recently as February 2, 1985, KG&E received another Violation for failure to follow procedure for reporting non-conformances. An NCR dated in September of 1984 with numerous non-conformances relating to disassembly of pipe supports by insulation contractors against regulations, was not reported as a 50.55e until December 12, 1984. Pipe supports also falls into the area of AWS D 1.1 welding..

Two further commitments by KG&E involved conducting complete walkdowns of all future safety-related systems and additional KG&E surveillance of each safety-related system after the formal system turnover occurred. Yet, KG&E's walkdowns failed to be influenced by these major hardware and documentation dis-crepancies obvious within the MSSWRs. Even though these dis-crepancies in hardware and documentation were available within their CARS, NCRs, 50.55es, etc. , by February of 1984 KG&E accepted as complete, the turnover of a number of buildings with glaring safety-related deficiencies. Further, if KG&E did surveillance of systems after turnover as they were com-mited to, they failed in this redundant effort to recognize these major discrepancies.

Despite KG&E's appearances of insituting numerous additional quality organizations to assure discovery of deficiencies, KG&E has either been unable to uncover and report these prob-lems in a timely manner, or if they have discovered deficiencies, they have not implemented adequate corrective measures to pre-vent recurrance or resolution. It would appear that KG&E's QA program is either seriously defective or blatantly deceptive.

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The QA/QC program is the only means by which the public can be assured a nuclear facility has been constructed in a safe manner. The implementation of the QA/QC program is under the direct control of the licensee (KG&E). Although the NRC performs periodic checks on the QA/QC system, these are primarily reviews of issues brought to their attention by KG&E. The NRC must rely on KG&E to follow the 50.55e reporta-

. bility criteria. In concluding the documentation problems within the MSSWRs was not reportable under 50.55e requirements, -

KG&E exercised their discretion. Similarly, they were de-linquent in their reporting of the deficiencies in the BN system. In both instances, these serious deficiencies were

only discovered inadvertantly by NRC's review of other areas.

The NRC, and ultimately the public, must rely on the integrity of utility management to discover, report and resolve all issues involving potential safety concerns. This represents

, the most disconcerting defect in the system. In concept, a l system which allows a utility with no previous nuclear ex-perience, to monitor, analyze and correct problems within their own QA/QC program (with no independent review body) is*at best questionable. It is unconscionable that a utility with the magnitude of vested interest KG&E has in getting Wolf Creek

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on line and in the rate base as soon as'possible in order to recover financial debts be allowed to survey, and expected to report and resolve deficiencies. More importantly than theory, however, has been the practical application of thif internal monitoring program. It has been repeatedly evidenced that KG&E has succeeded only in their lack of conformance to NRC regulations, lack of adherance to their own quality com-mitments, lack of effectiveness of their redundant quality organizations, and lack of integrity and competence within their management.

The NRC apparently has not maintained a chronology of safety defects, documentation problems and reportability of deficiencies which have occurred at Wolf Creek. The NRC continues to refer to each recurring incident as " isolated" and does not acknowl-edge problems within other areas which blatantly confirm the j existance of a dangerous pattern of identical QA breakdowns.

Seemingly, the NRC intends their response to satisfy any. con-t cerns on the " isolation" of the SSW problems. They requested investigations be conducted to discern potential problems with AWS D 1.1 welding n other areas, and they accepted as conclusive a two page report of a review of twenty KG&E CARS by a KG&E Quality Engineer [ Enclosure]. Not only is it of major concern  %

that they allow KG&E to perform their own evaluation, but they apparently do so without requiring KG&E to submit any supporting documentation. Moreover, even though the NRC accepted KG&E's review and assessment that no other problems in areas of AWS D 1.1 welding existed, within the NRC's own response, they reference DIC CAR l-EW-0046 and KG&E Surveillance Report S-1223 issued in January of 1985 (although they do not submit these reports in their response for officals to review) showing electrical equiptment foundation weld problems in an area with AWS D 1.1 welding. Evidence of extending into other

areas of AWS D 1.1 welding did not deter the NRC from closing j out the SSW issue. Nor was the NRC's decision to issue an t operating license to a utility under investigation for potential criminal activity (i.e. missing welds, falsification of weld records and falsification of inspection reports) altered until investigations could be completed. These investigation are still not resolved.

Of utmost concern is KG&E's continued intimidation and harassment ~of QA/QC inspectors. This is far from an " isolated" incident. In March of 1983, four QC inspectors were inter-viewed and corroborated another inspectors a'11egations of

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being harassed into signing off inspection reports erroneously.

An August'1983 incident involved the termination of a OA inspector who reported safety violations and resulted in an unprecedented Civil Penalty against KG&E in September of 1984 for this intimidation. Again in October of 1984 allegations from two inspectors performing ~ reinspection of the SSWs were reported. These employees claimed they were intimidated into producing results which would show the welds were acceptable.

Disallowing Quality inspectors to perform their function negates the most important safety check within the QA/QC system. Extending their appalingly lax attitude toward quality even further, KG&E is requesting, through the appeal process, that any responsibility toward their Quality personnel be alleviated and foisted upon the NRC. Simultaneously, KG&E is issuing assurances to the state of Kansas, through their Q1 program, that worker allegations concerning safety are being handled properly. There is absolutely no assurance that this is occurring. There has been no independent review of Q1 case files. In fact, requests to retain and review these files by attorneys intervening in the rate case, have been steadfastly refused. Nor has there been an independent investigation into intimidation and harassment of QA/QC personnel. In view of the serious, repeated breach of com-mitment by KG&E to allow safety-related problems to be identi-fied and corrected, a review of all Q1 case files (with emphasis on intimidation and harassment), and interviews of select QA/QC personnel should be conducted immediately.

In conclusion, once again the NRC's response has raised more questions than it has answered. Firstly, neither KG&E or the NRC's resolution of the MSSWR deficiencies is satisfactory.

They have concentrated on technical reanalysis and have paid woefully inadequate attention to the cause behind the SSW problems: KG&E's significant Q/A breakdown revolving around substanital documentation falsification and-major deficiencies in the function of KG&E and DIC Quality organizations.

Secondly, the NRC has accepted KG&E's contention that the SSW problem is an isolated incident when there are repeated episodes of recurrance. They further rely on KG&E's redundant quality organizations which have failed consistantly to discover deficiencies t

t ..

Thirdly, the NRC continues to allow KG&E to perform self-analysis without any independent review, when KG&E has con-spicuously failed to correct monumental quality problems or utilize additional quality program enhancements.

Lastly, the rampant intimidation and harassment of Quality personnel not only jeopardizes the safe operation of Wolf Creek, but is indicative of the arrogance and irresponsibility of KG&E quality organizations. It is also-a direct reflection upon management integrity.

The NRC and KG&E must be held accountable. If the state of Kansas is to have any assurance that Wolf Creek has been constructed properly and will be operated safely, it must engage in the following:

1) request and review additional documentation,

2) conduct a limited investigation into intimidation and harassment of Quality personnel (including review of 01 case files), and

3) invite the NRC and KG&E to a Kansas forum to respond to

. inquiries into these numerous concerns raised about the quality of construction practices and the function of quality organizations at Wolf Creek.

CHRONOLOGY

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9/80 DIC CAR 7. issued (100% reinspection of socket velds (fillet) on.small bore piping made prior to 6/80.

9/80 50.55e on socket welds reported.

8/81 DIC CAR 9 (deficiencies in mechanical / welding sur-veillance programs adverse trend in electrical area.

DIC begins to question AWS D 1.1 welding when,these ASME deficiencies arise.)

8/82 DIC CAR 19 issued (100% reinspection of fillet welds made prior to 4/1/81 on ASME pipe ' hangers. They began looking into other areas.)

10/22/82 BN system turned over.

11/23/83 AL system turned over; ' :.

11/82 DIC CAR 9 closed.

11-12/82 KG&E audits uncover deficiencies in the BN system. ,

1/20/83 Establishment of Quality Documenation Review Task Force.

2/3/83 Intimidation of a QC inspector.

2/18/83 Enforcement Conference on BN discrepancies.

2/83 Began looking at AWS D 1.1 areas.

3/2/83 KG&E's Corrective Action Report to improve Quality Documentation review.

3/3/83 $40,000.00 civil Penalty levied for BN system problems.

3/22/83 CAR 29 issued (148 out of 241 welds defective.)

3/23/83 Potential 50.55e reported to RIV on SSW defects.

3/83 NCR ISN lO381PW issued (weld discrepancies considered cosmetic. 6 welds reworked.)

4/20/83 Bill Rudolph assigned as QA site Manager.

5/20/83 Implementation of procedure for timely reporting of 50.55es revised to clarify response.

6/30/83 42 missing welds on NCR ISN 11957CW documented.

7/25/83 Interim 50.553 report on SSWs.

8/4/83 Termination of QA inspector.

8/10/83 DIC CAR 31 issued [Through Revision 7, 10/20/84]

(20% of MSSWRs missing, accepted as missing because of weld quality established during sample reinspection. ,

Not closed until 1/16/85. Cause concluded to be result of lack of procedural compliance with respect to responsibility for organization, completion and maintainance of records.)

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8/83 NCR ISN 11957CW issued (documenting 42 missing welds records in the pumphouse, dated 6/30/83.)

8/30/83 NCR ISN 10381PW complete.

10/21/83 Potential 50.55e withdrawn.

10/22/83 DIC CAR 29 closed (A/E dispositioned: "use-as-is".)

11/83-2/84 Combined Review Group status reports.

2/84 ,

First building with missing MSSWRs turned-over.

3/84 KG&E's Q1 established under direction of Bill Rudolph.

6-8/84 NRC says they first learn of potential records problems.

9/4/84 $64,000.00 Civil Penalty for intimidation of QA inspector.

9/18/84 50.55e report on SSW (22% of MSSWRs missing) reported telephonically, TE3564-K152.

9/84 Rudolph replaced as director of Q1 due to conflict of interest.

9/25/84 KG&E/NRC meeting to present reinspection information.

10/12/84 Inspection Report 50-482/84-12 issued: inspection period 5/14-8/31/84 (p 16q: TES3564-K91 closed, "The suspect welds were found to be acceptable even though they did not look exactly like text book type weld.")

10/17/84 Interim Potential 50.55e telephonic report.

10/17/84 KG&E CAR 19 issued.

10/84 Reinstatement of QA inspector.

10/26/84 Inspection Report 50-482/84-22. (Significant Violation:

inspection period 6/11-9/28/84. "During a review of QA/QC and Q1 personnel qualifications and subsequent interviews, NRC inspector became aware of potential problems with DIC CARS 29 and 31.")

10/29/84 Enforcement Meeting KG&E/RIV.

11/15/84 RIV Confirmation Action Letter (Guidance on KG&E corrective action program.)

11/21/84 Violation and Civil Penalty issued: $75,000.00.

($25,000.00 was assessed for failure to correct dis-crepancies when found.) -

11/26/84 KG&E Quality Engineer's report on KG&E's CARS.

(Summarized no other problems in AWS D 1.1 welding except in MSSWs.)

11/84 Non-Destructive Examinations by NRC begin (to verify KG&E's corrective action program. They continue to 2/85.)

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} 12/4/84 Enforcement Conference at Wolf Creek with KG&E/NRC.

f 12/12/84 ConstructionLDeficiency Report (CDR) reporte 9.IV.

r (concerning , insulation contractors: DIC ge.

31 NCRs--the first on 6/1/84--on-pipe suppo

.i: being partially disassembled. The first 6 ?

were through 7/27/84, which caused KG&E to CAR 14. As a result of DIC reinspection o>

?

supports, 25 NCRs were generated, 16 betwet 94

• identifying Potential-50.55e.)

12/31/84 KG&E issues final CAR 19 report (1,0509 of f MSSWRs for safety-related SSWs are missing:

12/31/84 KG&E pays $75,000.00 fine.

1/9/85 Congressman Dinge11's letter of concern: WoI MSSWRs.

1/2/85 Surveillance Report S-1223 issued signed by ?cki.

DIC CAR l-EW-0046 issued. (Electrical Equipt i 1/85 attaching equiptment to foundation embeds has 1 discrepancies. "An analysis of hardware app of AWS D 1.1 welding identified one other art investigated for AWS welding problems. This i e

-area of electrical equiptment installation wh a-nent installation is by welding the equiptment Ang frame to foundation embeds.")

1/11/85' QA-inspector terminated again.

1/21/85 KG&E issued supplement to final report.

1/23/85 Palladino's response to Dingell. (As part of th, Task Forse effort, the NRC staff conducted a.SCVi at Wolf Creek. . .there were no pervasive breakdowns in QA identified.)

2/25/85 Inspection Report 50-482/84-23 (Intimidation of two weld inspectors during reinspection of SSWs. Reported to NRC 10/84 concerning performance of SSW reinspection program. Task Force Director and NRC inspector inter-viewed individuals / allegations not substantiated.)

2/25/85 Inspection Report 50-482/84-23 (KG&E receives violation for not reporting nonconformances to NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. " Failure To' Follow Procedure With Respect To Handling Of Potential Reportable Non-conformances",

checked on NCR as " reportable" in 9/84.)

2/27/85 KG&E/NRC meeting in Bethesda to discuss SSW problems.

2/28/85 Inspection Report 50-482/85-58 (p5 & 8: closed; allegation 4-84-A-98...given to RIC from DOL 8/25/85 stating MSSWRs generally inadequate.)

2-3/85 KG&E supplemental information submitted to NRC.

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UUfl T.L50501 K019 ^n?mr*@

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INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE 10: W.J. Rudolph II KQWLKQW 84-456 FEM: T.W. Malecki 7 %M

[mTE: November 26, 1984 ScancT: Review of KG&E Generated Corrective Action Request In support of KGEE CAR No. 19, I have reviewed an of the KG&E initiated CAR's. The general review was conducted to determine if any of the CAR's were similar in nature to the Quality Assurance problems as noted by KG&E CAR No. 19. CAR No. 19 noted inadequacies in inspection and doctanentation by Daniels. This review will determine if other CAR's pose any significant problems as far as inspection by Daniels. Listed below are the CAR's reviewed and the results of the review.

CAR No. SUEHCT SITE IMPM*F 1 Drawings out of revision No Impact ~

2 Storage vault does not contain the proper No Impact envirorrnental controls 3 No security procedures No Impact 4 Culf Alloy not providing the correct doc . entation No Impact for various fittings 5 Internal pipe cleanliness No Impact 6 Internal pipe cleanliness No Impact 7 Internal Pipe cleanliness No Impact 8 Inadequate document control on obsolete doctraents No Impact and change information not controlled and translated into travelers .

- 9 Deficiencies in the mechanical / welding surveillance No Lyct program, surveillances not being performed as prescribed ,

10 QE not reviewing travelers for accuracy No Impact 11 Not issued .

N/A 12 Work Request not properly processed, tere;crary

~ No Impact modification log used in correctly and nonconfor-mance reports not properly initiated, tracked and closed.

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J T550501 KO19 a77Ac uAse7 es '/1 c UUE ^1 l KQWLKQW 84-456 Page 2 s

13 Permanancy of corrective action No Impact

,/l/gg_,=14 y3 Insulation contractors tampering with pipe supports t W e9lnl81 No Impact

- 15 Minim.zn separation violated No Impact -

16 Inadequate documentation and documentation review No Impact 17 Inadequate review, processing and documentation No Impact pertaining to KG&E Work Request i

18 Start-up Field Reports not being properly processed No Impact 19 Miscellaneous Structural Steel Welding (,ws-Dl.1) N/A

("his is the subject of the CAR Review) 20 Lack of procedural compliance for start-up and No Impact operations activities In st.rmary, other than CAR No.19, no other significant problems pertaining .

to Daniels inspection and documentation were noted by the review. ,

"a/sjs

\ RESPONSE REQUIRED: YES BY:

NO X de m 6

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