|
---|
Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20153B0531998-09-16016 September 1998 Special Rept:On 980817,errors in Implementation of Selected Licensee Commitment Testing Requirements on Fire Protection Sys Instruments,Was Discovered.Caused by Error in Interpretation of SLC Requirement.Will Revise Procedures ML20236M9151998-07-0707 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980611,determined That Required Firewatch Patrol Had Been Missed.Caused by Firewatch Being Performed on Wrong Unit Due to Human Error.Employee Was Verbally Counseled on Firewatches & Documentation Was Corrected ML20236G4451998-07-0101 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980618,declared Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Meet TS Definition of Channel Calibr.Will Revise Selected Licensee Commitment ML20248K1431998-06-0202 June 1998 Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Shrinkage of Foam & Improper Installation During Construction of Plant.Posted Fire Watches & Repaired Firestop F-AX-348-W-134 ML20247H5351998-04-12012 April 1998 Special Rept:On 980415,missed Insp of Fire Hose Caskets Was Discovered.Caused by Error in Transferring Info from One Procedure to Another.Planned Rev of Applicable Procedure to Include Gasket Insp at Appropriate Frequency ML20216B0211998-04-0606 April 1998 Special Rept:On 980325,determined That Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Being Inoperable for Greater than Thirty Days.Caused by Incorrect Testing.All Channels of Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Tested Utilizing Revised Test Method ML20217K9271998-03-26026 March 1998 Special Rept:On 971229,procedure Step for Closing Safety Injection Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Valve Was Inadvertently Skipped.Caused by Injection of Water Into RCS from Rwst.Simplified Procedures & Discussed Event ML20216D5641998-03-0505 March 1998 Special Rept:On 980204,discovered That Fire Detection Panel Was Apparently Not Communicating W/Several Local Fire Detectors.Caused by Faulty Computer Sys Cards.Replaced Four Computer Cards in Sys ML20202C4701998-02-0505 February 1998 Ro:On 971228:Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 6 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Excessive Static on Channel. Caused by Loose Connection.Work Order Has Been Written to Pursue Repairs ML20138E6851997-04-24024 April 1997 Special Rept:On 970318,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 13 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Sporadic Electical Static.Channel Was Removed from Svc & Entered Into TS Action Item Logbook as Inoperable ML20149M7251997-01-20020 January 1997 Special Rept:On 961209,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring (Lpm) Sys Channel 20 Declared Inoperable Due to No Signal Being Received from Field.Lpm Channel 20 & 22 Operable & Providing Monitoring Coverage for Primary Side of 1D S/G ML20134K4901996-11-0606 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961009,selective Licensee Commitment for Operability of Fire Protection Sprinkler Sys Not Maintained. Continuous Fire Watch Established within One H Following Identification of Incorrect Remedial Action ML20134H1331996-11-0404 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961004,Unit 1B DG Failed Due to Failure of Motor Operated Pot,Electronic & Mechanical Governor,Governor Droop Relay & Mechanical Binding of Fuel Rack Control Linkage.Dg Procedures Will Be Revised ML20113A1801996-06-17017 June 1996 Special Rept:On 960521,declared Detectors A01 for Zone 69 & A04 for Zone 60 Inoperable Because Detectors Effectively Isolated from Area in Intended Protection.Detectors Relocated,Tested & Declared Operable on 960524 ML20100H9801996-02-20020 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960111,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Channel 21 Declared Inoperable,Due to Spurious,Unexplainable Electronic Bursts.Work Request Initiated to Pursue Corrective Action ML20100H9751996-02-20020 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960111,Unit 2 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 7 Declared Inoperable,Due to pre-amp Bias Voltage Indicating Zero Volts Twice During Previous Seven Days.Work Request Written to Pursue Corrective Action ML20097F5011996-02-11011 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960102,Unit 2 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 17 Was Declared Inoperable.Two Other Channels Operable & Providing Coverage Against Loose Parts ML20096E7731996-01-12012 January 1996 Special Rept:On 951214,unit 2 DG Valid Failure Occurred. Caused by Fuel Line Fitting Backing Off from Cylinder Head Connection,Which Resulted in Fuel Oil Leakage.Dg Successfully Started,Run & Declared Operable on 951215 ML20096A8761995-12-18018 December 1995 Special Rept:On 951120,during Periodic Surveillance Testing, Lpms Channel 5 Declared Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Preamp Bias Voltage Indications.Work Request 95048483 Initiated to Perform Corrective Maint During Unit 1 Cycle 9 ML20094Q5811995-11-13013 November 1995 Special Rept:On 951014,auxiliary Bldg Filtered Exhaust Sys Pump Room Heater Declared Inoperable Due to Blown Fuse & Not Restored to Operable Status within 7 Days Per Ts. Technical Investigation Will Be Performed ML20094B8291995-10-25025 October 1995 Special Rept:On 950919,loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 1 Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Preamp Bias Indication. Work Request Written to Investigate & Repair Channel ML20098A4641995-09-19019 September 1995 Special Rept:On 950817,Unit 2 Lpms Channel 12 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Channel Sensor Failing Acceptance Criteria During Performance of PT/O/A4600/03 ML20092G6041995-09-14014 September 1995 Special Rept:On 950815,CNS Unit 1 DG 1A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Main Bearing High Temp Trip Signal.Caused by Failed Splice Installed in Circuit for RTD 1LDRD5630.New RTD Installed in Main Bearing 5 ML20086H1401995-07-12012 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950615,Channel 4 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Noise Uncharacteristic of Healthy Channel Detected Via Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring Sys.Corrective Maint Will Be Performed During 1EOC9 Outage ML20086H1431995-07-11011 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950608,Channel 13 Was Declared Inoperable. Trending of Bias Voltage & Background RMS Evaluated to Conclude Channel Was Experiencing Periodic Failures. Corrective Maint Will Be Performed During 1EOC9 Outage ML20086C6441995-06-29029 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950523,Unit 1 Train a Fuel Handling Ventilation Filter Heaters Declared Inoperable.Evaluation Done to Determine Fault ML20085M4061995-06-20020 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950501,lower Rv Tube 4 Was Declared Inoperable ML20084N7271995-05-25025 May 1995 Special Rept:On 950425,valid Failure of DG 1A Occurred. Caused by Jacket Water Thermostatic Control Valve Sticking in Position Which Reduced Engine Cw Flow Through Heat Exchanger.Thermostatic Cv Internals Removed & Replaced ML20082L2711995-04-17017 April 1995 Special Rept:On 950308,Unit 2 Cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable & Remained Inoperable Greater than 10 Days ML20081D4851995-03-13013 March 1995 Special Rept:On 950211,actuation of PORV 1NC32B Occurred. Procedure OP/1(2)/A/6100/02 Revised to Require More Emphasis on Monitoring Pressure Indication During Sensitive Evolutions ML20080Q8701995-03-0202 March 1995 Special Rept:On 950202,Unit 1 DG 1B Invalid Failure Due to Overcurrent Breaker Trip During Governor Troubleshooting ML20149H7821994-12-20020 December 1994 Special Rept:On 941129,discovered That Selective Licensee Commitment (SLC) for Visual Insp of Fire Rated Assemblies Exceeded Due to Misinterpretation of Requirements of SLC 16.9-5.Fire Barriers Visually Inspected ML20078R0021994-12-12012 December 1994 Special Rept:On 941103,Channel 3 (Upper Rv a) Declared Inoperable.Caused by Channel Sensor Failure of Acceptance Criteria During Performance of PT/0/A/4600/03.Repair Planned for End of 2EOC7 Outage Due to Containment Entry Required ML20078K7361994-11-17017 November 1994 Special Rept on 941021,DG 1A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Main Bearing High Temp Trip.Operability Performance Test Successfully Completed & Engine Declared Operable on 941022 ML20149G8041994-11-0101 November 1994 Special Rept:On 940922,CNS,Unit 2 Cathodic Protection Sys Declared Inoperable & Remained Inoperable for Greater than 10 Days.Wo 94080948-01 Initiated to Replace Prepackaged Anode Well 1.WO Scheduled for 941114 ML20076F3191994-10-0404 October 1994 Special Rept:On 940908,valid Failure of D/G 1A Occurred Due to Air Start Valve Sticking Open.Maint Procedure MP/0/A/7650/99 Revised,New Air Roll Criteria Developed & Sixteen Starting Air Valves Replaced ML20072P4251994-08-23023 August 1994 Ro:On 940719,channel 9 (S/G a Channel 2) Declared Inoperable.Work Request Was Generated to Repair Channel During Future Outage of Sufficient Length Since Containment Entry Required for Work ML20072E5961994-08-15015 August 1994 Special Rept:On 940715,inoperability of Unit 2 Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring System Channel 4 & 6 Occurred.Caused by Leds Not Lighting During Performance of PT/0/B/4600/03. Work Orders 94051250-01 & 94051251-01 Initiated ML20071N8511994-07-28028 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940711,main Steam Relief Valve Exhaust Monitors Declared Inoperable Due to Engineering Calculation Concerns.Engineering Calculation CNC-1229.00-00-0047 re-performed Using EPA-400 Methodology ML20071N7441994-07-28028 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940711,delta-t Channel on Chart Recorder Found to Be out-of-tolerance Due to Drifting of Analog to Digital (A/D) Converter Card.A/D Card Replaced & delta-t Channel Chart Recorder Declared Operable ML20070K0191994-07-18018 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940630,re Inoperability of Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 2EMF12.Work Request 94026262 Generated to Reattach 2EMF12 to Main Steamline.Work Request Completed on 940701 ML20069H0861994-05-31031 May 1994 Special Rept:On 940501,Unit 2 DG 2A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Right Bank Turbocharger Vibration Trip.Based on Cooper-Enterprise Recommendations,Procedure Changes Made to Calibr Procedures for All Four DGs ML20065K5011994-04-13013 April 1994 Special Rept:On 940314,invalid Failure of Diesel Generator 1B Occurred Due to Output Tripping During Calibration of Electronic Governor.Dg 1B Started Successfully on 940315 & Declared Operable ML20064G2911994-03-15015 March 1994 Special Rept:On 940203,SG Channels 9 & 11 Declared Inoperable.Channels Failed to Meet Band Limited RMS Acceptance Criteria During Performance of 18 Month Channel Calibr Test.Work Request Written to Repair Channels ML20064G2771994-03-0707 March 1994 Special Rept:On 940125,Channels 6,7 & 10 Were Declared Inoperable.Channels Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria During Performance of 18 Month Channel Calibr Test.Work Request Written to Repair Channels 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20212J1891999-10-0101 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Exemption from 10CFR54.17(c)re Schedule to Apply for Renewed Operating Licenses ML20212A6271999-09-30030 September 1999 Rev 0 to WCAP-15243, Anaylsis of Capsule V & Capsule Y Dosimeters from Duke Energy Catawba Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program ML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 05000414/LER-1999-004-01, :on 980906,error During Tagout Caused de-energization of Vital Bus & Actuation of Ltop.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Individuals Involved Were Counseled1999-09-27027 September 1999
- on 980906,error During Tagout Caused de-energization of Vital Bus & Actuation of Ltop.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Individuals Involved Were Counseled
05000413/LER-1999-015, :on 990616,discovered That Auxiliary Bldg Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Improperly Positioned Vortex Damper.Damper Was Repositioned Correctly & Sys Was Retested Successfully1999-09-27027 September 1999
- on 990616,discovered That Auxiliary Bldg Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Improperly Positioned Vortex Damper.Damper Was Repositioned Correctly & Sys Was Retested Successfully
ML20212G2511999-09-22022 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 180 & 172 to Licenses NPF-35 & NPF-52,respectively 05000413/LER-1999-008, :on 990610,operations Prohibited by TS 3.5.2, Was Violated.Caused by Inoperable Centrifugal Charging Pump. Operators Swapped to CCP 1A & Sys Parameters Were Returned to Normal.With1999-09-21021 September 1999
- on 990610,operations Prohibited by TS 3.5.2, Was Violated.Caused by Inoperable Centrifugal Charging Pump. Operators Swapped to CCP 1A & Sys Parameters Were Returned to Normal.With
05000414/LER-1999-005-02, :on 990727,missed Emergency DG TS Surveillance Concerning Verification of Availability of Offsite Power Sources,Was Declared.Caused by Defective Procedure.Revised Affected Procedure1999-09-20020 September 1999
- on 990727,missed Emergency DG TS Surveillance Concerning Verification of Availability of Offsite Power Sources,Was Declared.Caused by Defective Procedure.Revised Affected Procedure
05000413/LER-1999-009, :on 990518,inoperability of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Valve in Excess of TS Limits Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Retest Following Surveillance Test Failure.Valve Was Retested & Returned to Service1999-09-15015 September 1999
- on 990518,inoperability of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Valve in Excess of TS Limits Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Retest Following Surveillance Test Failure.Valve Was Retested & Returned to Service
ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 05000413/LER-1999-014, :on 990816,missed Surveillances & Operation Prohibited by TS Was Noted.Caused by Defective Procedures or Programs Inappropriate TS Requirements.Affected Procedures/ Programs Were Revised & Testing Was Performed1999-09-0101 September 1999
- on 990816,missed Surveillances & Operation Prohibited by TS Was Noted.Caused by Defective Procedures or Programs Inappropriate TS Requirements.Affected Procedures/ Programs Were Revised & Testing Was Performed
05000414/LER-1999-004, :on 990616,CIV 2NM-221A Was Returned to Svc Without Testing,As Required by TS 3.6.3.Caused by Programmatic Deficiency.Test Procedure Has Been Revised & Subject Valve Was Successfully Tested & Returned to Svc1999-09-0101 September 1999
- on 990616,CIV 2NM-221A Was Returned to Svc Without Testing,As Required by TS 3.6.3.Caused by Programmatic Deficiency.Test Procedure Has Been Revised & Subject Valve Was Successfully Tested & Returned to Svc
ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 05000414/LER-1999-003, :on 990612,unplanned Actuation of ESFAS Occurred Due to a SG High Level.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Msiv 2SM-7 Was Closed & SG 2A Level Was Returned to Normal1999-08-31031 August 1999
- on 990612,unplanned Actuation of ESFAS Occurred Due to a SG High Level.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Msiv 2SM-7 Was Closed & SG 2A Level Was Returned to Normal
ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 05000413/LER-1999-012, :on 990727,adverse Sys Interaction Between Annulus Ventilation Sys & Auxiliary Building Ventilation Sys Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Design.Compensatory Actions Developed & Implemented.With1999-08-26026 August 1999
- on 990727,adverse Sys Interaction Between Annulus Ventilation Sys & Auxiliary Building Ventilation Sys Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Design.Compensatory Actions Developed & Implemented.With
ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999 ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20210U8341999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 179 & 171 to Licenses NPF-35 & NPF-52,respectively ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 05000413/LER-1999-009, :on 990518,inoperability of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Valve Was Noted in Excess of TS Limits. Caused by Inadequate Testing Following Surveillance Test Failure.Valve Was Retested & Restored to Service1999-07-19019 July 1999
- on 990518,inoperability of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Valve Was Noted in Excess of TS Limits. Caused by Inadequate Testing Following Surveillance Test Failure.Valve Was Retested & Restored to Service
05000414/LER-1999-004-02, :on 990610,violation of TS 3.6.3 Was Noted Due to CIV 2NM-221A Being Returned to Service Without Testing. Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Civ 2NM-221A Was Tested & Returned to Operable Status1999-07-15015 July 1999
- on 990610,violation of TS 3.6.3 Was Noted Due to CIV 2NM-221A Being Returned to Service Without Testing. Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Civ 2NM-221A Was Tested & Returned to Operable Status
ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation 05000414/LER-1999-003-02, :on 990612,unplanned Actuation of Esfa Sys Due to a SG High Level Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Long Term Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence of Event Are Being Developed1999-07-0808 July 1999
- on 990612,unplanned Actuation of Esfa Sys Due to a SG High Level Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Long Term Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence of Event Are Being Developed
ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 05000414/LER-1999-002-03, :on 990504,plant Was Forced to Shutdown as Result of Flow Restriction Caused by Corrosion of Afs Assured Suction Source Piping Due to Inadequate Testing. Affected Piping Was Cleaned & Flow Tested1999-06-0303 June 1999
- on 990504,plant Was Forced to Shutdown as Result of Flow Restriction Caused by Corrosion of Afs Assured Suction Source Piping Due to Inadequate Testing. Affected Piping Was Cleaned & Flow Tested
ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions 05000413/LER-1999-004, :on 990310,operation Prohibited by TSs Was Noted.Caused by Incorrect TS Requirements for Cravs & Auxiliary Bldg Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Sys Actuation Instrumentation.Submitted Lar.With1999-04-12012 April 1999
- on 990310,operation Prohibited by TSs Was Noted.Caused by Incorrect TS Requirements for Cravs & Auxiliary Bldg Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Sys Actuation Instrumentation.Submitted Lar.With
ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML20205N2381999-04-0909 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 178 & 170 to Licenses NPF-35 & NPF-52,respectively ML20205N2121999-04-0808 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 177 & 169 to Licenses NPF-35 & NPF-52,respectively ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205B3101999-03-26026 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 176 & 168 to Licenses NPF-35 & NPF-52,respectively 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
Text
_.
',o h
l Duke hunt Coinpany -
- v:
Catau'ba NuclearStation
'~
PO Box 256 L M
. Chur, SC29710 ;
DUKEPOWER a;y
- .x -
June 12,;1991 c
- Document Control Desk U.J S. Nuclear
- Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555-
Subject:
Catawba-Nuclear Station Docket-50-414 Special Report, Revision 1 IIR C90-067-2; PIR 2-C90-0294 Gentlemen:=
Attached is a revision to the report submitted October 15,
-1990 concerning-UNIT COOLDOWN TO COLD SHUTDOWN DUE TO r
= REACTOR-COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE.
This report is being
' submitted as~a."Special Report" to ensure industry awareness of.this-event =-
The health'and-safety.of.the public.were not affected by this-incident.
Nary trull' yours,
. W., Har pto Station Manager.
ken: REPORT.SP xc Mr.'S. D. Ebneter M & M Nuclear Consultants Regional Administrator, Region II 1221 Avenues of the Americas
' U. S. _ Nuclear Regulatory Commission
_New York, NY 10020
.101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 R.:E.. Martin INPO Records Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 1500
' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1100 Circle 75 Parkway
. Washington, D c.
20555 Atlanta, GA 30339 f4 OA Q.
' ~ ' ' EOU #
.Mr. W.-T. Orders NRC Resident' Inspector Catawba Nuclear. Station-9106210028'9106f.2 --
[]Uhi /
PDR. ADOCK 05000414 I.
- S-PDR s~-
s
+-
n
DlWF p0WEP, COMPANY E
CATAWBA NUCIEAR STATION g-PROBLEM INVESTICATION REPORT NO, 2-C90-0294, Revision 1 I
UNIT COOLDOWN TO COID SHitfDOWN DUP 10 RF AC10R Cn0LATI SYSTEM l EAKAGF ABSTRACT On September. 14,-1990 at approximately 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />, with Unit ? in Mode 3, llo t j
Stanlby, vendor personnel were in tie process of performing a leak repair on a Cote Exit.Thermncouple Nozzle Assembly (CETNA) on the Peactor Vessel head.
in order to perform the leak repair, it was necessary t o drill t hrough a modi fied blind hub (part of the Grayloc finnge at the CETNA) into the kenetor Coolant
.(NC) System pressure boundary.
A sealant injection valve was installed duiing
-this process to provide isolstion at-the pressure boundary.
Af ter the final drilling was completed, the scalant injection valve would not close A second valve was t hr eaded into the back of - the first valve, but before it could be closed the entire assembly ejected f rom the hole.
A conservative decision was made to consider the leakage as NC system pressure boundary leakage.
Unit 2 commenced cooldown-to Mode 5 Cold Shutdown, and an Unusua l Event was declared.
I An analysis was performed to determine the cause(s) of this failure The original CETNA leaks are att ributed to a Mannfneturing Deficiency in that the modified blind hubs did not meet dimensional requit ement s during fabricat inn.
' The unacceptable hubs we re identifled and replaced.
This report -is being submitted as a Special Report, t
4 W
4
-u.
a.__.____..__._.._.__.-_._,...._-.________._.._....
1
..1 l
DUKE POWCR COMPANY / CATAWBA NtiCI.r5R STATION PIR-2-C90-0294/Special Report, Revision 1 l
4
- page 2 I
.l BACEGROUND
. l The Reactor Coolant [ETIS: AB} (NC) % stem is designed to transport heat f1om the
- J Reactor t o t he Steam Generators [ Ells:llX] (S/Gs), wher e heat is t ransf erred to the Feedwat er [EIIS:SJ] (CF) Systrm and ' fain Steam [ Ells:SB} (SM) Syst em of t he secondary side.
The NC System consists of four identical heat t ransf er loops connected in parallel to the Reactor Vessel [E11S:VS1}.
The Incore Instrumentation [r11S:1G] (ENA) system provides information on the neutron fTux dist ribut ion and fuel assembly outlet temperatures at selected cote locations.
Chromel-alumel thermocouples are threaded into guide tubes that penetrate the Reactor Vessel head thsough seal assemblies, and t erminat a at the exit flow end of the fuel assemblies.
Catawba Unit 2 ut ilizes a Core Exit Thermocouple Nozzle Assembly (CETNA) t o provide the NC System pressure bound 9ry seal where t he t hermocouple leads penetrate the Reactor Vessel head, Thete are five CETp' on Unit 2 ident ified as connections 074 through 78 The CETNA, supplied by < mbustion ingtneering, Inc. (CE), consists of a nonle assembly which is thread-l and seal welded to the Reactor Vessel head nozzle, a Grayloc clamp set, a modi fied blind hub t o form the second half of t he flange and house Graf oil packing rings, di ive sleese and nut, thrust-bearing and washers, and a hinged split collar to ret ain t he assembly.
Gray Tool Company manufetured t he original Grayloc clamp set s,
-including the modified blind huhs.
Gray Tool lat er gave up thei r N-st amp and turned.over t he manuf ac turing' responsibil it y' for t hese part s to CE.
During the Catawba Unit 2 End-of-Cycle 2 (200C2) refueling outage, discoloration was found on three of the original modified blind hubs (manuf act ured by Gray Tool),
As a conservative measure, these hubs were replaced with spare hubs manuf actured by CE.
'eakapa inspections were conducted during start up, ami no leakage was noted.
Tnhhical Specification (T/S) 3.4.6.2 requires NC system leakage to be limited to no. pressure boundary leakage during Mode 1, Power Operation, Mode 2, Startup, Mode 3, Ilot Standby, and Mode 4, Hot Shutdown, Pressure boundary leakage is defined as-leakage (other than S/G tube leakage) t hrough a non-isolable fault in a NC system component body, pipe [ETIS: PSP] wall, or vessel wall With'any
. pressure -houndary leakage present, the required act ion is t o be in at least Hot Standby wit hin 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, wi t hin t he following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, The T/S Bases states that pressure boundary leakage of any magnitude is unacceptable since it may be indicative of an impending gross failure of the pressure boundary.
' EVENT DESCRIPTION-On; June 10, 1990, Uni t 2 was shutdown f or t he End-of-Cycle 3 (2EOC3) refueling
. outage.
Following couldown, it was noted that Core Ex i t-Thermocouple Nozzle Assemblies (CETNAs) had been leaking at; the Grayloc flaner connection.
w
q:
h :
DUKE p0WER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCI EAR STATION Fili 2-C90-0244 /Special Rel ort kevision 1 l
i page 3 Maint.enance Engineering Services (MES) contacted Design Engineering and the
.CETNA suppliet, Combust ion Engineeritte (CE) to evaluat e the tenson for the leaks so that corrective actinn could be t aken prior to restart.
During disassenhly of t he - CETNAs, a breakaway t orque check W5ts pet formed oij the Gruylor clump nuts.
The breakaway torque r esult s indicated that t im bol t ing mat er ial had relaxed during plant operation, therefore, CE recommended a new torque procedure for the Gr tyloc f1 mge connect ion, which Design apptnted fot use at Cataktm.
I On August 19, 1990 the CETNAs were reassembled using t he new torque procedure per Work Request.(W/R) 5312 SWE On Sept ember 4, 1990 with Un;t 2 in Mode 4, Maintenance inspect ed t he React or Vessel head and CETNAs for leakage CETNA #74 had baron residne present, indicating leakage had occurred. but did not appear to be leaking at this time CE was contacted and recommended that
-t h e CETNAs he rechecked in Mode 3 due t o -
a design feat ure t hat provides better seating at higher ptewures.
On Sept ember 5 at. 2155 hours0.0249 days <br />0.599 hours <br />0.00356 weeks <br />8.199775e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 ent ered Mode 1.
r on September 6, the CETNAs were reinspected and no leakage was ident11ied.
On September 8, anot.her inspection was performed and boron residue was found on CETNAs #74 and #76 in the area of the lower Grayloc clamp seal.
On September 9,
[
Maintenance cleaned the boron residue f rom bot h leaking CETNAs and observed a l
small st eam lenh at a76 (d74 did not appea r t o be leating at this time).
CE was-contact ed and recommended that a torque check pass he performed on the Gtayloc l
flanges.
Maintenance performed the torque check'on #76 and did not note any nut movetnen t, indica t ing the prop (,r t orque existed, On September 10,-
the CETNAs were inspected several times, and both #74 and #76 were leaking a small amount.
of steam.
At the time, leak repair by injection of a sealant at t he Gray loc L
-connection was considered, This proross is regularly used t hroughout. the-industry for repair of leaks under pressure.
MES, Design, and CE conducted extensive evaluations t o establish a sealant injection leak repair procedure for L
the CETNAs.
During this evaluation process on September 12 at 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 entered Mode 2 f or complet ion of 7ero. Power Physic s Test.ing (7 ppt),
l On September 13, Catawba Nuclear St at ion Modi f.icat inn (NSM) CN-20626 und the l
required 10CFR50.59 evaluation were approved t o allow injection of a sealant into the CETNA seal ring areas on 474 and C76.
The process consisted of
-pat tially drilling into the modified blind hub at the Grayloc flange, tnpping t he hole,- inserting a threaded sealant injection valve [FTTS:V}, and drilling through the remaining hub thickness ta the NC system pressure boundary.
The sealant. injection valve would then be closed to isolate the pressure boundary, and reopened when the sea 1ing process was to begin.
Mocirup training sessions were conducted to.fami1iarize workers with the repu11 procedure and the configuration ot"the involved components.
W/E 3109 MES was originated to implement this mod firation.
a -.
... w
... _ _.. _..., _ _.. -. _ -,., --_, _,., ~, -,,
1 6
e DUlT POWER COMPANY /CA1AWi;A NFCI 1.AR ET A'l ION Pilt 2-C90-0294/Special Repont, Revisien 1 l
rare 4 i
Oil h8'p t t'ilikit' r } 3 :it 1200 litairs, Uli i ! 2 e-tit e! eul Mculet t ii ; t l liiw Cl1NA t <>[i:1 i t k t il I to begin.
At algit ox imu t ely 2110 houts, a ju e job mer t itm w m held Imtwern Radiation P t o t ec t. i nn (1:P). MES, Maint-n nwe, a:nl Et ilit ies Suppmt <pec t il t s t.
Inc (USs1), who had been cont iact ed by Inike Powet ta pri f a t in the ieptir wo k.
u (Mt the RP re41ue s t ed t ha t the area he ' loaned pitot to uoth beginning init ial pat t of the j ol could be performed w i t hout t espira t or = and addi t ional pr ot ect is e weat The cleaning wa' comple t ed at a ppi m. i u t e l y 2100 hom s Also du t itte Pt e-j ob pt epai n t ions. emch sealant i nj ei-t t ish Valte w1 W c)* led wve ra l times to ensore ptopei opetation.
On Septen. bet 14 at approximately on2O htmrs, U%) 3"twinnel entoted the aten to Imgin wot k on CI TN A 976 ihe initial diillieg w e performed, the hole wn tapped, atul the sealant injection valve was inserted.
At app r ox inn t e l t 0200 houts the final diilling inta !he NC %) stem ptessute bounlary was t 'omp l e t ed.
As the drill hit was ret rac t ed f rom the hole, C%1 per sonne l at t empt ed t o eler the They then setewed a sealant inject ion valvo, bllt the valve ktsuld nat i
.w second sealant injection salve into the back of the first talte while holding the first valve in place When the first t ais e was telee>cd in oider to close the seconi valve, the entire as wmbly ejected itom the hole Wtthin minutes, a centei punch was tapped inta the hole to at i empt to plug the opening 1.c ala ge was rethtced but did not stop completely.
0%I personne1 le1t the aten at tbls time to loent e anot het size cent er punch t o better plug t he hole At app!oximately 0305 houts, USS1 a t. t cap t e i t<>
insert a centet punch with a i87 inch diomelet, but ww unsuccessful.
The at iginal cent et punch um :"i nse rt ed,
again reducing the leak but not complet e l y stoppiny it Saatt af t er t he pl oblem occu t i ed, the 5h i f. t Maniger, Shiff Supervisot, M1 ;, and Maintenance met to evaluate the NC system leak %e A ionsetvattse decision w %
reached to sonsider the leakage as NC sy st em ptwsttre houndary leakane The T/S 3,4,b. 2 act ion s t at ement was entered and preputations began foi cooldowit to % ute 5.
On September 14 at 0710 hunts, Operations commenced coaldown to Mo I" 5
.Also nt this t itne, an Unusual Event was declared and proper notifications were made per datawha Fmergency Response Procedure-E.ven tbough leakag+ h'id been reduced by ins t allat ion of t he cent er punch, et t at I s continned ta minimtre the led age to prevent contaminnt. ion of ot he r component s in t he ar ea.
On Sept mhe t 16 at 142R hours. Unit 2 entered 44dr 4.
On September 14 at a pp rox i mi.t e l y 1530 honi', 0%1 p"rsonnel inst all< d a mulitied C-c i uap in place of the center punch at CPTNA v76 ir, older to minimive l e aka r.e This reduced leukat, even futthet, but not complete 13 On Septemhor 14 at 2338 hoors, Unit enieie1 Made ; and the Unusual Frenf um t+ rm i n a t ed,
~ ~... - -. _. -..
~. -
' DUKE p0WER. COMPANY /CATAWIR NUCl. EAR S'I ATION -
PIR.2-C90-0294/ Spec 1al Report,.
l Kevision 1
-page.5 Following Unit 2 couldown to Mode 5, CE and Gray Tool representetives were onsite t o assist in the final CETNA repair voik.
While inspecting the spare modified blind hubs manufactured by CF, it was determined that the hubs did not meet.the dimensional tolerances required f or these pat t s.
Af t e r evaluat ion, i t was also determ:ned that the utmensional error would have ptevented proper seal seat ing cont act when inst alled.
The original hubs manufactured by Gray Tool were checked and no dimensional problems were found, All five CETNAs were subsequently checked to verify which hub (CE or Gray Tool) was currently installed.
CETNAs #74, 76, and 78 had hubs manufactured by CE, and #75 and 77 had t he original hubs manufact ured by Gray Tool.
The original Gray Tool hubs for connectors n74, 76, and 7R were located, cleaned, and Inspected, No dimensional problems were found, and the hubs were approved for reuse on September 21, the original modi f ied hiind hubs manuf act ured by Gray Tool wer e installed at-CFTNAs #74, 76, and 78.
After this replacement was compleIc, al1 five Unit. 2 CETNAs had dimensionally acceptnble hubs in place On September 25 at 2318 hours0.0268 days <br />0.644 hours <br />0.00383 weeks <br />8.81999e-4 months <br />. Unit 2 entered Mode 4.
On Sept ember 26 at approximatel) 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />. Maintenance inspected all five CETNAs for leakage.
No leakage was noted.
On September 27 at 0449 houts, Unit 2 entered Mode 3.
At approximately 2110 hours0.0244 days <br />0.586 hours <br />0.00349 weeks <br />8.02855e-4 months <br /> Maintenance again inspected all five CETNAs.
No leakage was noted.
. CONC 1.USION The original CI:TNA leaks at e at t r ibut ed to a Manuf acturing Deficiency in t hat the modified blind hubs manufactured by CE did not meet requ.ed dimensioual l.
tolerances. -The original hubs manufactured by Gray Tool were checked and met the dimensional requirement s.
Inspection of all five CETNAs revealed that #74, 76, and 78 had hubs supplied by CE.
These CETNAs were ident i fied as the ones that had experienced leakage.
The original hubs manufactured by Gray Tool were jc
-locatedi-cleaned and inspected.
No dimensional problems were not ed and t hey i
l
'were installed on Unit 2.
All five Unit 2 CETNAs now have dimensionally I
acceptable modtfied blind hubs inst alled.
During subsequent ' st art up preparat. ions. Maintenance inspected all five CETNAs in Mode 4, and again in Mode l1 3,- for leakage.
No leakage.was noted.
Atter investigations concerning the Jmpro'perly manufactured hubs, CE feels that thelimIroper hubs-are isolated to Cat.awba-2, Millstone-3, and CE St ock All i
improper hubs at Catawba have been located.
In addit inn, CF contact ed Mi:11 stone-3 to advise them of tbe buproper hubs The Duke Power Qua1i t y Assurance-Vendor Division has been contacted and advised of this problem.
l L
Whi]e at t.empting to repair t he leaking CETNAs, the sealant injention valve Installed at the NC syst em pressure boundary would not close A second valve was threaded into the back of the nriginal valve, but before the second valve could be closed the ent' ire assembly ejected from the h, il e.
MES completed a root l
_. _ - ~,. - _... _. -. _ _ _. _ _. _ _ _, _..
DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCilAR STATinN l
plR 2-C90-0294/Special Report, Revision 1 f
Page 6
)
L
-cause urutlysis ain! conc luded t he pr oblem was t he inabil'ity to achieve proper thrend engagement,.This was due to the angle of t he hole not allowing full use of t he available t hreads on the inject ion valve and t hread lengt h on t he valve not being cottsidered in t he original review i
The decision to coimider t he leakage us React m Coolant. System pressute botmdary leakage, and the resul t ant. Unit cooldown atui declat at ion of an Unusual I vent,
was a conservative action not st rict ly i equi rel by Catawha Technica l Specifleations.
Pressure. boundary 1ankage 1imit s are est ahlished to preclude growth of defects to the point where coolant leak _tates pose a threat to nuclear safety.
Unit shutdown is t equit ed be f ore crack pr opagat ion rectil t s in potentially limiting leak tates.
The drilling of a 3/16 im b diamet er hole is not considered to have pon_d a demonstiahle porential ior propagatlon.
I.enkage t hrough t he drilled hole was well wit hin the capability of the normal chaining system and posed no danger t o unit safety, This event was conservat ively report ed to the NRC under the provisions of 10CIRSO 72.
This r e po r t is
- submit ted as a special Report and is not requi r ed un:le r 10Cf7t30,73 This event was consl.dered for report abili t y under t he requirement s of 10CFR part 21 with the conclusion that existence of a subst ant ial sat et.y hazard was not demonstrated. Ieakage through the CETNA was of a magnitude that would have l
remained well within the capabilit y of t he normal. charging syst em.
The potential for a cata.; trophic failute of the CCTNA. leading to o loss of coolant accident and safety system challenge, was not et eat ed as a result of the i
out-of-toletanee fittings.
Further, the vendor concluded t hat only t wo plant e,
Catawba Unit 2 and Millstone Unit 3..could pot ent ially have the out -of-t olerance l
parts. Thus, it was concluded that a Part 21 Yepott was not tequityd.
ihls report is submitted as a Special Report to ensure industry awareness of fhis event.
l I
-A review of the OEp database for the past 24 motiths revealed one event in which an operating Unit was shutdown due to a Manufacturing Deficiency (IIR 413/90-24).
This incident involved a Nuclear Service Watet [ElTS:Bl] (HN)
System pump [ETTS: Pl motor {EITS:M0} for which a stator had been manufactured
.appt oximat ely 0,1 inches shorter than required.
Two other events in this time l
period were att ributed to %nufacturing Deficiencies.
IIR 414/89-01 invoked a Reactor Trip' due to a fuse that failed on a feedwater cont rol valve.
LER
.l 413/89-26 documented an unexpected Hydrogen Skimmer ran (EITS:BLn] breaker
'l
{EITS:BRKl trip due to a defective Westinghouse ht aker.
'lhese two incidents I
are different-from-the incident in this re po r t - in t hat they were not attributable to dimensional requirement inaccuracies.
per Nucleat Safety Assurance guidelines, this is not a recortlug problem CORRECTIVE ACTION I
sttBSEQUENT l
- 1) After the sealant injection valve assembl3 ejected from the NC system pressure boundary, Unit 2 come nced couldown to Mode 5 and au l'nusual Event ww declared.
l L
i
\\
-e
' V
, DUKE POWCR COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STA110N P!N 2rC90-0294/Special Report,' Revision 1 l
-Page 7 l
l
- 2) During subsequent itwest igat ions, the spare modi f ied Itlitul hubs manuf actured by CE were inspect ed and it was det eunined that -t hey did not meet the dimensional requirements for these part s.
- 3) The original hubs manufactured by Gray Tool wer e inspected.
No dimensional
. probleins were noted.
- 4) All five Unit 2. CE'INAs were inspected to determine whether CF or Gray Tool.
~
hubs were installed.
CETNAs #74, 76, and 78 were identified as having CE hubs installed.
- 5) The original Giny Tool hubs for CETNAs #74, 76, and 78 were located,-
cleaned, and inspected.
All were accept able f or inst allat ion on tinit 2, and were installed per W/R 5312 SWR.
4
- 6) Maintenance inspected all five CPTNAs for leakage during Mode 4, and again in Mode 3.
No leakage was notrd.
- 7) The Duke Power Quality Assurance Vendor Division was contacted and advised of the problems concerning the hubs manufact ured by CE.
'8) Revise on-line leak repair proceshu e t o inclinie caut ion against using an angled hole for any leak t epair operat lon.
The procedute revision has been approved to ada a sign-aff for verification of act.ual thread engagement.
-9) An analysis was performed to determine the cause(s) of the failures associated with the sealant injection valve.
SAFETY ANA1.YSIS 4
Following-this incident, Performance conducted a review of Operator Aid Computer (OAC) data.to establish the leakage ret e at the repnir locat ion.
An initial
-review indicated that NC system leakage at the COTNA was 6 to 9 gpm.
Atter n
-detailed. review of plant evolut ions in progress during t he incident, the actual leakage rate was-determined to be less -t han 5 epm.
A leak of t his magnit ude is well within normal charging pump capability (approximately 150 gpm)-an<l falls well below the limits of a small break Loss of Coolant Accident (1.0CA ).
The in h s act:ual hole diameter (11875 inches) was less than the hole sir.e of '.375 c e considered in Sect ion 15.6.5 of the-Catawba Final-Saf ety Analysis Report L(FSAR) for'which NC system inventory can be. niaintained by one charging pump.
The henIth and safety of the public were not affected by t hi s.. incident.
1
'*+4*'t-
-4w fr rip
-'===++r+F%*r-
- ++N'tet r my y-w e.. wee.yrMew 1--
-ip-N3$
9***
uh6B-*W"W*1t9'-4-dWWW
-'tF"'EN"-*
-tTg-*r-W 1*"WTr
% WTr r -wa+->vg-----mmye yg13 tgy-w
+8'P
q fM