ML20080E802

Responds to 830809 Order Imposing Civil Penalty in Amount of $30,000.Payment Encl.Classification of Violation as Severity Level III Unwarranted

ML20080E802
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	09/08/1983
From:	Ziemer P WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP.
To:	Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
CON-NRC-83-171 NUDOCS 8309140085
Download: ML20080E802 (3)

Text

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NRC-83-171 WISCONSIN PUBLIC S E RVICE CO RPORATION P.O. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305 gg5 September 8, 1983 -

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Response to Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty

Reference:

Letter from R. C. DeYoung (US NRC) to P. D. Ziemer (WPSC) dated August 9, 1983 Your letter of August 9, 1983 ordered Wisconsin Public Service Corporation to pay a civil penalty in the amount of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000) for a violation of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications which WPS discovered on October 4, 1982. Enclosed is the company's check for said amount. This represents WPSC's agreement to resolve this matter at this level.

! This agreement notwithstanding, we have also detailed below several items of continuing difference of position between WPSC and NRC regarding the nature of this incident and the NRC's handling and analysis of it.

Because both parties agree'that this event is of significance, we do not wish to let these differences interfere with an appropriate and prompt resolution.

However, so that WPSC's position as to the technical and regulatory aspects of this matter remains clear on these important points, we feel comment on the staff analysis in the order imposing penalty is appropriate.

The appendix to the order expresses the opinion that the guidelines in the enforcement policy are non-exhaustive examples. This is a fundamental misreading of the definitions of the various severity levels. Level III does not include all "significant violations," but only those which have certain defined characteristics.

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.Unlike;LevelhIViandV, Level 4 III does not-include general language to encom-1 pass undefined situations. In light;of the drastically higher penalties for Llevel IIIl and higher violations,xthis distinction in' definitional approach is .

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isignificant.

The: enforcement policy: serves'to provide' licensees with known and . defined . o m ; guidelines for the~ consequences:of;their-acts. It also binds the NRC, which isinot free to. disregard its own rules.. Allowing' unwritten, vague, >ost hoc (definitions-to escalate enforcement action defeats the principles in1erent in the formal promulgation of an enforcement policy.

_ The . specter that significant' violations need go unpenalized. is illusory. The counontinterestiin encouraging actions ~ to p' reserve public safety can be served by use-of penalties under Levels IV:and V-in appropriate cases..

The' staff's analysis further notes that the NRC may categorize a violation as

severity, level III and assess a civil penalty based on the violation's potential safety significance._ WPSC does not disagree. However, the implica--

tion made'in the analysis.is;that this violation.had potential safety signifi-cance. o WPSC has' provided ~ analyses, which the staff has acknowledged as l correct,'which_have clearly shown that this event had no actual or potential adverse effects on public: health and safety. Accordingly,-this argument'does (not support a Severity Level III' classification in this case.

With-respect;to the concern that this event could-have .naterially mislead 'the.

' operator, the staff has di_sagreed with WPSC's conclusion-that this would not'

[ _ have-been the case. "The staff has stated _that the operators would have been:

without~a diagnostic parameter which~would be;used to."make.certain decisions such as whether to change equipment status which would affect the containment Fenvironment, to monitor.-the effects'of such changes, and to evaluate the sta-itus.of" containment integrity during certain accident conditions." WPSC's ana-

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, lyses _have shown that?the loss of this diagnostic parameter would not have c ~a ffected the' operators' actions in'a manner adverse to the health and safety l :of'the public. Consequently, WPSC remains adamant that our initial'conclu-L :sion,-i.e.', that the-loss of this diagnostic ~ parameter would not have

'. materially mislead;the operator, is' correct.

' The last-area of disagr'eement is in regard to mitigation because WPSC iden-tified the Levent and promptly reported >it. "The enforcement policy clearly' states that mitigation "may be.given when a licensee identifies the violation and g .promptly reports _.the violation to the NRC." The enforcement policy continues a by._ noting that the duration of the violation is a factor weighed in con-f p ,

. sideration!of mitigation.

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The staff has declined to mitigate this violation because "the licensee could L

l, have identified the event earlier (emphasis added). WPS agrees that the L 1 possibility of identifying this event earlier did exist; however, it is L 1 arguable as to whether this event should have been identified earlier. WPSC b ' believes that the substantially longer durations of similar events which have p occurred'at'other licensee's' facilities supports the conclusion that the dura-tion ~of this violation was not extreme.

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. [Mr. Richird DeYoung

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' - .More l importantly, however,;is the staff's combination of " prompt -iden -

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Etification and : reporting." - The purpose of this' mitigation category, as'

. explained in the enforcement' policy,11s two-fold: " to-encourage-licensee

self-identification ~and correction of violations and to avoid potential con-

_cealment-of problems of safety significance." ~This implies that the- staff.

, intendsito reward-(through mitigation) prompt and accurate: reporting as well 2=

Jas prompt identification.

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While it could_be~ argued that WPSC could have identified this event-earlier, ithere is no ~ doubt that WPSC promptly and accurately reported it to the NRC.

'The staff should have granted'mitightion for this,~ consistent with the intent of_the enforcement' policy..

'Notwithstanding the' foregoing disagreements with the _ staff's analysis; WPSC

. recognizes the significance of. this event' and, accordingly,iaccepts the ,

enforcement ' action imposed.- WPSC. appreciates the staff's consideration of'our May 11,1983 response,;especially in regard to the arguments on escalation and

mitigation _which were presented therein... . WPSC .further~ appreciates the staff's-recognition'of the prompt'and. extensive corrective actions we have taken.to prevent.the recurrence of events of this nature.

We trust that- the foregoing comments will be considered constructively as lpossibleassistanceinthefuture..

y tr .yours, .

. t P. D.

emer

. Pre nt and C'hiefLExecutive Officer w

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!- cc: - Mr.-- S. A. 'Varga,' US. NRC i- .Mr. Robert Nelson, US NRC Mr. David Baker, Foley &' Lardner L

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