IR 05000482/1990028

Insp Rept 50-482/90-28 on 900701-31.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Monthly Surveillance & Maint Observation,Operational Safety Verification & Onsite Followup of Events

ML20059N322
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	09/28/1990
From:	Joel Wiebe NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059N310	List: IR 05000482/1990028 ML20059N309 ML20059N313
References
50-482-90-28, NUDOCS 9010110246
Download: ML20059N322 (12)

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APPENDIX B-U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPNISSIO ,

REGION IV

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NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/90-28 Operating License:' NPF-42 Docket:' 50-482

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Licensee: . Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411' . -

Burlington, Kansas 66839 =I

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Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station'(WCGS) )

Inspection At:. WCGS, Coffey County, Burlington,-Kansas- -

Inspection Conducted: July 1-31, 1990

. Inspectors: M. E. Skow, Senior Resident Inspector-Project Section D, Division of Reactor ProjectsL L. L. Gundrum, Resident Inspector Project Section D Division of Reactor Projects

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Approved: ( b Ah O c)b 9 S. Wiebe, Chief, Project Section D .Datt- d j'

ivision of Reactor Projects >

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Inspection Summary s

Inspection Conducted July 1-31,1990(Report 50-482/90-28)

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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant' status,

operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, and onsite followup of events'at operating power j

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reactor Results: Within the areas inspected..two violations were identified i (watchstander with inactive license, paragraph 3, and inaccurate secondary '

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-chemistry records as a result of fabrication, paragraph 3). Although shift personnel identified the first_ violation, licensee. management was. unaware of the event for over a week. The second violation was identified by the licensee and prompt' corrective action was take i 9010110246 901001 PDR ADOCK 05000482 G PNV L

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'A maintenance worker added the wrong oil to a pump (paragraph 5). The error was-- , .

identified, reported to the control room and corrected prior to operating the i pump.. Although no violation was identified, the event highlighted the potential-for comon mode failure of safety equipment through , improper lubrication. The licensee took appropriate action-to prevent recurrenc .

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- Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Personnel- 4

• B. D. Withers, President and CEO 1 J. A. Bailey, Vice President,1 Nuclear Operations I

• F. T. Rhodes, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services G. D. Boyer, Plant Manager R. S. Benedict, Manager, Quality Control (QC)

H. K. Chernoff.-Supervisor, Licen:ing

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j A. B. Clason, Supervisor, Maintenance. Engineerin .

M. L. Clemens Technician, Instrumentation and Control-(180)

H. E. Dingler, Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE)--Systems.-

R. B. Flannigan, Manager, Nuclear Safety. Engineering (NSE);

C. W. Fowler, Manager, I&C-

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• R. W. Holloway, Manager, Maintenance and Modifications

• W. M. Lindsay, Manager, Quality-Assurance (QA)

• R. L. Logsdon, Manager, Chemistry T. S. Morrill, Manager, Radiation Protection' >

• B. Norton, Manager, Technical Suppor * E. Parry, Director, Quality

• J. M. Pippin, Manager, NPE

• C, Sprout, Section Manager, NPE, WCGS.

l *D. R. Smith, Engineer

• J. D. Weeks, Manager,.0perations

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• S. Wideman, Senior Licensing Specialist 1

, *M. G. Williams,. Manager, Plant Support -

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The inspectors also contacted other members of the-licensee's staff during

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the inspection period to discuss identified issues.-

• Denotes personnel in attendance at-the exit meeting: held;on 4

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July 31, 199 .; Plant Status The plant operated in Mode 1 (100 percent reactor thermal power)~during the i inspection period July 1-31, 1990, except as described below: ,

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o Power was reduced to 84 percent on July 13 to' change oil.in the l "C" circulating water pump-(CWP), and returned to 100 percent upon ,

L completion of the maintenanc O Power was reduced to 60 percent on July 21 to repair an overspeed tri on the "A" main feedwater pump, and to replace the "C" CWP upper

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l bearing cooler. Power was returned to 84 percent upon completion ~o l

! the feedwater pump maintenance and to 100 percent upon completion of ;

l the cooler replacemen '

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- o- A brief transient occurred on July 26 which caused power to runba'ck'to

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90 percent power. Power was' restored'to 100 percent power within ,

approximately 20 minutes.;  ;

L q There were no reactor or turbine trip ,

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3., Operational Safety Verification (71707) 1 1

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The purpose of this'. inspection:was to ensure that the. facility was being< ,

operated safely and;in conformance' with license and regulatory requirement ." '

i It also was'to ensure that the licensee's management control. systems were effectively promoting continued safe: operation. The methods used to perform; <

this inspection included direct observation-of activities and equipment, 3 tours of the facility,! interviews 'and discussions with licensee personnel,

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i independent verification of safety system status and~ limiting conditions for' ,

operation (LCOs), corrective actions,.and review of facility records. - u

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Areas reviewed during this inspection included; but were not limit'ed to.. . i control room activities, routine'surveillances, engineered saf 3ty feature; f operability, radiation protection controls, fire protection, security, plant 4 cleanliness, instrumentation and alarms, deficiency reports, and corrective-actions. Selected inspector observations are discussed below:

,t o On July 7,1990, an operator signed on the control room . log as the l supervising operator, a position required by Technical; 3 Specification (TS) Table 6.2-1 to be filled with an individual: holding '

a senior reactor operator (SRO) license. To maintain an active SR0 "

license, individuals are required by 10 CFR 55.53(e) to stand five; 12-hour shifts in an SR0 function per calendar quarter. . That~. .

individual stood four 12-hour-shifts as an,SR0 the preceding quarter i and thus, had not maintained an active SRO license. This is a -

violation (482/9028-01). The error was identified by shift personnel after 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 7 minutes and he n . ralieved byuanother SRO.- The significance of this event is mitigated by the fact' that another SR0 -

was present in the control room during this period. In-addition, the individual normally stands other watches including' watches requiring a reactor operator license, and he had maintained an active' reactor-operator license. The inspector noted that licensee management was not aware of this item until the inspector questioned them over a week later. It appeared that operations management had not reviewed the control room log, where this item was addressed, only the shift-supervisor's log where this item was not note The operations manager had earlier recognized that.it was difficult to adminnwatively track the n:aintenance of individual licenses and on July 5, 1990, issued a memo to the-shift supervisors directing them to maintain a tracking log in the control room showing the first five j dates on which each license holder stood a watch requiring a licens '

The memo did not require that the information be gathered for the previous quarter, and thus could not have prevented this occurren'c The inspector noted on July 17, 1990, that not all shift supervisors-

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were maintaining the new tracking 41og up to date. IS ince the operations

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manager was not aware' of, the' July 7,1990, violation for over a week,..a

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timely. assessment to determinefif' additional corrective actions were necessary. was not mad ,

o On July 16,1990; theslicenseeiinformed the-senior resident inspector- 1 that a chemistry technician's employment had been. terminated for -

, falsifying-chemistry records.: The licensee found that-the technician l

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had falsified records of chloride and sulfate analys.is' on' July _6',- -

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31990. _ These records are required' by the licensee's- secondary water - ,

chemistry program which isirequired by TS 6;8.4.c. cThis is ani o apparent violation'of 10 CFR-50.9 which requires that informations  ;

required by the Commission'be complete and accurate. Since the . . .

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licensee promptly initiated an investigation:to evaluate the extent and significance of the' falsification, took prompt action to> address the personel integrity concerns's, and informed the NRC of this matter, a Notice of Violation will not'be-issue .

The licensee reviewed all analysis performed by that technician for the previous 2 months. The technician had performed 1144 analyses in that- ,

period. The review concentrated on those lab analyses performed outside normal working hours since other personnel working in'the labs; -1 during normal working hours, would have made it difficultuto' falsify  !

records. The review excluded tests on nonplant. systems.such as_ potable wate Only .103 analyses were performed by thei technician on , .' '*

backshift or weekends, including 61 that were performed on July 6. ' A11 .

except 8 of the 103 analyses were performed on secondary systems. The'

8 remaining analyses were performed on primary systems.-'Six of.the~

analyses were on the_ reactor ; coolant system (RCS), and the other two l- were on the "D" accumulator.and;"B" boric acid storage' tank (BAT). 9 Four of the analyses were TS-related including a May 9 boron analysis on the BAT "B," which was reported to the control room ast a out-of-specification high, a May 13 boron on "D".. accumulator, a May 13

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RCS gross activity (results are reviewed later by a supervisor), and a '

June 2 RCS dissolved oxygen (D0)-analysis. Since RCS~D0 is required-

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every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and one was done-on June 1 and another on> June 3, even 4 if the technician had falsified this analysis, TS requirements would

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have been met. As f ar as 'the TS analyses are concerned, only one 1

! analysis performed on the ."D" accumulator may be in question. - -On that >

l date, the plant was in Mode 2 and additional analyses: performed by l

other technicians before and after the suspect analysis' were

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correspondingly in the same concen'. ration range. In conclusion, tSe licensee determined that the analyses performed by that technician during the preceding 2 months would'have had little or no impact upon plant safety if he had indeed falsified all his analyses 'as an unsupervised technicia This licensee review appee d to be satisfactory in determining the potential impact on the plant, e d their actions on this matter were prompt. During discussion with ths. licensee, management stated that a i plant-wide discussion of the unpurtance of truthfulness and not

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falsifying records would be included in :an. upcoming issue 'of their -

1, newsletter. The July 23, 1990 newsletter contained the: appropriate l' ..E discussion. It is apparent from routine; observations by the' inspectors

• that licensee management does not condoneithe: activities discussed abov ,

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...> .o During a routine plant-tour, several fue1Voiltretu'rn lines on the

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emergency diesels appeared to be. in contact with the' injector pump This was discussed with the licensee andathey' stated that the position of the, lines would be adjusted to prevent' wear.

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Health physics (HP) controls appeared to be effective'during' the inspection L period.. The-involvement of HP personnel was evident during the plant tours and observation of the maintenance. activitie One violation occurred when a-licensed 'SR0 relieved the supervising operator watch without maintaining,an active license. Shift personnel identified the

violation, but plant management was not informed of it until brought to:

their attention-by the inspecto In another matter, prompt corrective '

action was taken by management when they identified .that a chemistry t i technician had falsified chemistry analysis records.- ,

i L ' Monthly Surveillance ~ 0bsersation (61726)

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The purpor. of this inspection was to ascertain whether surveillance of safety-significant systems:and components' was .being. conducted in accordance with TS. Methods used to perform this inspection included direct observation of licensee activities and review of records.

l Inspection .in this area included, but was not limited to, verification that:

l l 0 Testing was accomplished.by qualified personnel in accordance with an

. approved test procedure;

, o The surveillance procedure was in conformance with LTS requireme'.ts;  !

o The operating system and. test instrumentation was within its current calibration cycle; J l o Required administrative approvals and clearances were obtained prior to a initiating the test; o LCOs were met and the system was properly returned to service;'and -

o The test data were accurate and complete and the test.results met TS requirenent ,

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Surveillances witnessed and/or-reviewed by-the inspectorsJare listed belowi o -STS KJ-0050,tRevision 12. " Manual / Auto Start, Synchronization, and - 4 Loading of Emergency Dieselt Generator NE02." performed July 19, 1990;

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o ; STS IC643B,7 R esision 3,;" Slave--Relay Test ~ Train

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Selected: inspect'or! observations are discussed below:- 3 The'surveillances were> accomplished in au.Grdance with approved. procedures oE i

by knowledgeable technicians. ,The control rcom was kept informed regarding, - i expected annunciators. Appropriate operator: log entries-were made when TS .

O LCOs were entered and exite Monthly Maintenance Ob ,ervation- -(62703) '

q The purpose of inspections in this area was to ascertain that maintenance- d activities on. safety-related systems and components were conducted in accordance with approved: procedures and TS. Methods used .in this inspection- 1 included direct observation, personnel interviews, 'and -records- revie l

Inspection in this area included, but was not limited to',. verification thati:

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o Activities did not-viciate limiting conditions for operations:1and that 1 redundant components were operable; 1 o Required administrative approvals and clearances- were obtained before initiating work; l

o Radiological controls were properly implemented; .

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o Fire prevention controls were implemented; )

o Required alignments and surveillances to' verify postmaintenance- '

operability were performed-

o Replacement parts and materials used ;were properly certified; .j o Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and  !

additional technical expertise was.made available when-needed; o QC hold points and/or checklists were used and QC personnel observed j designated work activities; and 1 q

o Procedures used were adequate, approved, and up to dat l

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Portions of selected maintenance activities regarding the woik reme (WRs) )

were observed. The WRs and related 4cunents reviewed by the inspectcrs arc !

listed below: .~  ;

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Act'ivity W,t 04287-90 ~ Troubleshoot / repair motor driven rocker lube punp/ Pressure Indicator.PXJ02A WR 02090-90 Change crankcase oil in standby diesel generator WR 00216-90 Add oil to the positive displacement charging pump WR 02959-90 Investigate and repair excessive leake9e of uti from )

outboard seal of CCP when pump is not running, WR 50733-90 Change oil in CCP motor WR 50734-90' Meggar and check running amps WR 60735-90 Obtain oil sampit from CCP to detemine the need to i

change oil MR 50736-90 Lubricate the motor to gear coupling WR 50755-90 Annuhl n:aintenance and inspection of cooler fan and motor

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WR 50920-90 Perform meggar and running amps checks on residual heat removal (RHR) pump motor Selected inspector observations are discussed below: ,

o After a maintenance worker had added oil to the pcsitive displacement charging pump on July 17, 1990, he recognized that he had ad& d the wrong oil. He promptly notified the control room of his cror and the pump was not operated. The licensee. subsequently detemined ftw the -

011 manufacturer that the added oil was only a different weight of the correct oil and that they were mixable and compatible. .The licensee subsequently changed the oil in the pump before operating the pum The inspector reviewed the methods used by the licensee to routinely ,

add oil to plant equipnent. In the above case, a standing work request was used to document the oil addition, and it was during the completion of that paperwork that the maintenance worker noticed his error. For much of tise safety-related equipment. Standing Order No. 2 Revision 11, permitted operators to add oil t6 the equipment. Attached was an approved list of lubricants for the operator's reference. The standing order also permitted the operators to write a.WR for maintenance if they believed oil usage for a piece of equipment was too high. However, the inspector noted t. hat the program did not contain a

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. provision for independent verification that the correct oil was being utilized. The potential, therefore, existed that a noncompatible oil could have been used for similar pieces of equipment in opposite trains causing a cosmon mode failure. Standing Order No. 2 was reviseo by the a licensee to have WRs used when oil addition was required for safety-related equipment. The licensee stated that standing WRs were being prepared for the purpose of documenting oil consumption and prnviding independent verification that the oil was as specified, o On July 19, 1990, an engineer was showing another engineer the turbine driven euxiliary feedwater pump and its throttle valve assembly. On of the engineers had been recently assigned to write work instructions-for maintenance to repair the trip mechanism which was binding when being reset. The other engineer had previous experience on that equipment and was pointing out the various components and providing background information when he inadvertently tripped the throttle-valve. The turbine was not running at the timo but was in its normal standby mode for an automatic start. Tripping the throttle valve made the turbine and pump inoperable and caused a control room alarm. The engineer immediately notified the control room. The turbine trip was reset and the turbine and pump returned to operable status. The other '

auxiliary feedwater pumps remained operabl In this and the p yious example concerning the oil, individuals who made errors promptly notified the control room so that the errant l condition could be corrected. This behavior was encouraged by licensee management and showed that workers were comfortable coming forward when they had erred, o On July 2, 1990, the scheduling of maintenance for the "A" centrifugal charging pump (CCP) and motor, the "A" residual heat renoval pump and motor, the *A" CCP room cooler was well planned and coordinated with the work being performed on the "A" diesel generator. The WRs for the CCP and motor were reviewed. It was noted by the inspector that appropriate TS were referenced and shift supervisor signatures were obtained prior to beginning the work. Oil samples were taken'with a ;

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small, hand-operated, vacuum pump that allowed uncontaminated samples ,

to be obtained. The area was cleaneo following the performance of the maintenance activities, o The inspector observed the meggaring and checkiry of the running amps o for the RHR pump moto Procedure MGE E00P05, Revision 7, was use The instruments were within their calibration date. In each case, the !

data was within acceptable ranges given in the procedur )

o The performance of the change of the crankcase oil was observed. The !

work required coordination with security personnel to provide compensatory measures for the door to the outside through which the 55. gallon drums of oil were delivered to the iob sit i

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o The inspector noted that management personnel visited the job site to ' .!

observe the work being performed, WR 08287-89. A "Do Not .

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Operate" (DNO) tag was appropriately hung on MCC NG030 for the standby  :

diesel generator rocker and prelube motor while maintenance was being i performed. The DNO was replaced with a human DNO when the breaker was l energized prior to testin .

.l No significant problems were identified. Two personnel errors occurred. In each case the involved personnel reported the error and action was taken to'

correct the error. Perinnnel appeared to be conscientious and to self .

identify inadvertent error % Onsite Followup of Evr.nts at Operating Power Reactors (93702) t The purpose of this inspection activity was to provide onsite inspection of t events at operating power reactors. Specific. inspection activities  !

included: i

o Observing plant status;

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o Evaluating the significance of the events, performance of safety systems, and actions taken by the licensee;

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o Confirming that the licensee had made proper notification ofLthe events and of any new developments or significant changes in plant' conditions;- l and t

o Evaluating the need for further or continued NRC re>ponse to the i events.

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The following items were considered during the followup: . -l 0 Details regarding the cause of the event;  ;

o Event chronology; [

o Functioning of safety systems as required by plant conditions; f o Radiological consequences and personnel exposure; o Proposed licensee actions to correct the cause of the event; and o Corrective actions taken or planncJ prior to resumption of facility  ;

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Selected events that occurred during this report period are listed in the I table below:

Date Event Plant Status Cause  ;

7/26/90 Turbine Mode 1, Temperature !

Runback (100 Percent Power) spike 7/29/90 Unplanne Mode 1 Equipment .

Gas Releah: (100PercentPower) malfunction +

i Selected inspector observatinns.regarding these events are discussed below:

o At 8:53 a.m. (CDT) July 26,1990,-while at 100 percent power, the main !

turbine experienced an automatic runback to about 90 percent power, from 1189 MWe to 1053 MWe. The load stabilized at that level for about 'i 2 minutes. The plant then experienced a partial automatic recovery of i the lost load, to 1140 MWe, until the load approached the load set !

point which had been runback to 1149 Mwe. Operators then increased !

load to 100 percent power. The partial load _ recovery appeared to be !

normal turbine electrohydraulic contml response to the transien All plant systems responded nomally to the runback. The initial.cause of the runback was believed to be from an overpower differential .

temperature spike. The licensee was perfoming normal surveillance on another channel and had that channel in test. When the s)ike occurred, t it completed 2 out of 4 logic and the runback occurred. 1.icensee :

evaluation was continuing concerning why the "C" atmospheric dump valve ;

opened during the event. Steam pressure appeared to have peaked at l 1060 pounds-per-square-inch gage (psig) while the lift setpoint for the !

atmospheric dump was 1125 psig. Although this event was not a ;

reportable event, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.72 or. .73, the inspector ;

considered this 'a significant transient' and will continue to monitor ;

the licensee's evaluatio l I

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o At approximately 8:30 a.m. on July 29, 1990, the licensee made an inadvertent release from a gas decay tank. Maintenance was being performed on the operating mechanism for the_ drain valve from one of 3 eight gas-decay tanks. After maintenance was complete, the operator stroked the valve. Pressure from the gas-decay tank leaked passed a ,

liquid trap' and was released through the radwaste building vent. The '

release was monitored by the unit vent radiation monitor and by particulate monitors. Since the vent was not alanred, the tank had not been sampled prior to the release as required )y TS. The activity that .

was released was subsequently calculated by the licensee to be well-below TS requirements based on a sample of 9e gas .that remained in the decay tan !

The inspectors will review the LERs:for these events and will report any :

findings in a subsequent inspection report.

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h 6. Exit Meeting (30703) >

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The inspectors met with licensee personnel (denoted in paragraph l' on ;

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July 31, 1990. Tbc inspectors sumarized the scope and findings oi the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector ;

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