IR 05000482/1990014
| ML20059J362 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1990 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059J360 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-90-14, NUDOCS 9009190277 | |
| Download: ML20059J362 (28) | |
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i INI?IAL-SALP REPORT
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E S. NUCLEAFi REGULATORY COMMISSION:
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REGION IV
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SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF-LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
50-482/90-14
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Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating. Corporation Wolf Creek Generatihg Station April 1, 1989, through June 30, 1990
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9009190277 900911
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PDR ADOCK 05000482 O
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INTRODUCTION
i The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program is an
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. integrated NRC staff effort fo collect availafse observations and data on I
a periodic basis and to evalsate licensee per ormance based upon this j
information.
The program is-supnlemental, to sormal regulatory processes
used to ensure compliance with NRC rules and regulations.
It is intended j
to be suffi::1ently diagnostic to provide a rational basis for allocating l
NRC resources'and to provide meaningful feedback to licensee's management i
regarding the NRC's assessment of'their facility's performance in each i
functional area'
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AnNRCSALP. Board,homposedof'thestaffmembers'11stedbelow,meton
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August 14, 1990, to review the observations and data on performance and to assess lir.er:5cr p 4rformance in accordance. with NRC Manual Chapter 0516, i
" Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance.". The guidance and
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evaluation criteria art summarized in Section III of this report.
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Board's findings and recommendations were forwarded to'the NRC-Regional i
Administrator foi approval and issuance.
l This report is the NRC's assessment of the licensee's safety performance at the Wolf Creek Generating Station for the period April 1,1989, through
June 30, 1990.
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J The SALP Board for the Wolf Creek Generating Station was composed of:
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Chairman L. J. Callan, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Region IV Members
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B. A. Boger, Acting Assistant. Director for Region IV and V Reactors,
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
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T. P. Gwynn, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), Region IV A. B. Beach, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and
Safeguards (DRSS), Region IV C. I. Grimes, Director, Project Directorate IV-2, NRR
J. S. Wiebe, Chief, Project Section D,-DRP, Region'IV.
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D. V. Pickett, Project Manager, Wolf Creek Generating Station, Project-
Directorate IV-2, NRR
M. E. Skow, Senior Resident Inspector, Wolf Creek Generating' Station
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The following personnel also participated in the SALP Board
meeting:
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B. Murray, Chief Facilities Radiation Protection Section, DRSS, Region IV D. A. Powers, Chief, Security and Emergency Preparedness Section (SEPS),
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i j-3-W. C. Seidle, Chief, Test Programs Section, DRS, Region IV T. F. Stetka, Chief, Plant Systems.Section, DRS, Region IV.
j J. E. Gagliardo, Chief, Operational Programs Section, DRS, Region IV W.~ B. Jones, Senior Project Engineer, Project Section D, DRP, Region IV
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L. Gundrum,< Resident Inspector, Wolf Creek Generating Station
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H. F. Bundy, Inspector, Test Programs Sectien, DRS, Region IV:
II.: SUMMARY OF RESULTE
Overview
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WCGS attained a,high operating capacity factor this assessment.
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period. The licensee performed well in day-to-day plant operations.
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Effective management involvement in' security and emergency. preparedness l
was noted.
However, better procedural controls were needed in many areas,
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including maintenance troubleshooting and radiological controls.
The licensee improved their performance in,the' area of radiological
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controls. The licensee's ALARA program was well implemented as evidenced i
by the' low person-REM exposures received during the previous year.
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However, additional critical self-assessment and improved procedures for identification and correction of deficiencies was needed to support-further improvement at WCGS.
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The licensee's performance ratings are summarized in the table below, along with the ratings from the previous SALP assessment period..
Rating Last period Rating This-Period Functional Area (04/01/88 to 03/31/89) (04/01/89 to 06/30/90) Trend
1.
Plant Operations
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Radiological Controls
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Maintenance / Surveillance
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Security
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Engineering / Technical
2 Support 7.
Safety Assessment /
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Qual'ty Verification
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III. CRITERIA
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l-Licensee performance was assessed in seven selected functional areas.
Functional areas normally represent areas significant to nuclear safety
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and the environment.
The following evaluation criteria were used, as applicable, to assess each.
functional area:
A.
Assurance of quality, including management involvement and control; B.
Approach to the resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint-i C.
Enforcement history;
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Operational events (including response to, analyses of, reporting of,
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andcorrectiveactionsfor);
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Staffing (including management); and j
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Effectiveness of the training and qualification programs, f
However, NRC is not limited to these criteria and others may have been
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used where appropriate.
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On the basis of the NRC assessment, each functional area evaluated is rated according to three performance categories.
The definitions of these
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performance categories are:
Category 1 - Licensee's management attention and involvement are readily evident and place emphasis on superior performance of nuclear safety or i
safeguards activities, with the resulting performance substantially
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exceeding regulatory requirements.
Licensee's resources are ample and
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effectively used so that a high level of plant and personnel-performance l
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Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.
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Category 2 - Licensee's management attention _to and-involvement in the.
t performance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities is good. The-
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licensee has attained a level of performance above that needed to meet regulatory requirements. The licensee': resources are adequate and s
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reasonably allocated so that good plant and personnel performance is being achieved. NRC attention may be maintained at normal levels.
Cattcory 3 - The licensee's management attention to, and involvement in, i
the performance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities are not i
sufficient.- The licensee's performance does not significantly exceed that l
needed to meet minimal regulatory requirements.
Licensee resources appear to be strained or not effectively used.
NRC attention should be increased above normal levels.
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I Improving:
Licensee performance was determined to be improving during the assessment period.
IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A.
Plant Operations
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Analyr'j The assessment of this crea consisted chiefly of the control and-i
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execution of at tivities,iirectly related to operating the plant',.
I such as plant startup, power operation, plant shutdown, and.
system lineups.
Thus,-1: included activities such as monitoring i
and logging pla.it' condicions, normal operations,' response to
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transient and off-norm,1 conditions,. manipulating the reactor
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and auxiliary controls, plant-wide housekeeping, contro room professionalism, and intorface with activities that support
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operations.
This area was inspected by the resident inspectors.and regional inspectors throughout the assessment period.
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The last SALP report (NRC Inspection Report 50-482/89-14)
recommended that the licensee: (1)' Continue efforts towards improvements in the operations area;;(2) continue to stress communications between operations and support organizations; and (3) continue to focus attention to detail in day-to-day activities.
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The licensee facilitated critical self-assessment of operational
activities through the rotation of reactor operators and i
training instructors. This helped identify areas where licensed operator training could improve operator performance.
The operations manager also provided additional guidance for
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operators concerning areas he wished to reinforce.. Despite the
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l above, there were several personnel and procedural errors committed by operations personnel, particularly during the
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fourth refueling outage.
The trend noted towards the end of the previous SALP cycle-for improving organizational communications continued through this assessment period.
In an effort to improve internal communications, the licensee initiated a team building training program. Several individuals from different parts of the
organi1ation participated in each course.
Promotions within the J
licensee's organization appeared to have been based on an
individual's ability to communicate ideas and motivate personnel as well as their technical skills. Despite the above, lack of
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communication between craft and operations personnel continued to be evident prior to the performance of some maintenance troubleshooting activities..
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i The previous 5 ALP report identified that the operation of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) appeared to be a problem at ta i
for the licensee as evident by the large number of Licensee i
Event Reports (LERs) and violations related to their operation.
l During the present SALP cycle, no LERs regarding the EDGs were issued. One noncited violation was identified concerning a valve line up on the diesel generator skid, however, the error -
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' did not affect diesel generator availability.
The plant operating staff consisted of 32 senior reactor operators (SRO) and 15 reactor operators (RO).. Six crews were'
used to operate the plant.
Each of the six crews rotated-
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through a week as a relief crew and were available to fill in i
for individuals on shift absences as well as during planned j
act vities requiring additional-operator. involvement. The
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relief crw was aise available during day shift to assist the
- onshift crew with unexpected plant' transients. -Radios and
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reading materials which were not directly related to plant i
operations were prohibited from the operating area of.the control room.
Clerical support was provided for each shift-
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which removed some of the administrative burdens from the i
control room operators. Administrative controls have been effective in keeping personnel not directly involved in plar.t -
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operations out of the main control room. Control room
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professionalism was a strength during the assessment period.
During the operating cycle prior to the refueling outage, the
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licensee had a very high capacity factor. The plant was tha leading electrical producer'in the. nation for 1989. This consistent operation showed that the licensee could operate the plant well.
The operators shut-the plant down in a systematic manner to I
begin the fourth refueling outege.
The reactor trips that t
occurred during the assessment period showed that' operators responded well to those challenges.
fhere were occasions, such f
as a repair to the main turbine electrohydraulic control. system, where the potential for a plant transient increased, but they
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were actively managed by.the licensee..Very good communications between operations and the maintenance crews existed during the above work activity.
There were both routine and nonroutine operations that the plant staff performed well, including the shutdown discussed above.
Operating crew turnover during normal plant operations was a
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strong point. The operators discussed ongoing evolutions as well as items that had occurred during the last shift.
The shift supervisors gave their crew briefings on plant status and f
discussed items that had occurred, were ongoing, or were expected.
All crew members were encouraged to contribute to the briefing.-
t There were three occasions where shift turnovers following
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involved evolutions or test briefings'did not provide an i
adequate assessment of the plant's status.-
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The reactor was operated at essentially full power up to'the
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fourth refueling-outage.
One. reactor trip was experienced prior:
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to the refueling outage because of,a relay-problem associated
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with a reactor coolant pump. Three additional reactor trips
were experienced during or closely'following the-refueling-
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outage..One reactor trip, which occurred because of a failed
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open main steam line power operated relief-valve, was exceptionally well handled by the operating. crew..However. one.
reactor trip and a reactor' trip breaker actuation occurred as:a'
i result of ' operations. personnel not~ being fully' cognizant. of the
status of the plant and the effect their. actions would have.on j
the plant. Another example of operations personnel not.being-
fully cognizant of the plant status involved a failure;to j
L restore the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump speed controller following recovery from a plant trip..The improperly-L set controller was not identified by the operators through two '
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shift turnovers.
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Operators generally performed in a professional manner and took
pride in their work. There:were a few occasions where errors by i
the operators contributed to events or TS violations.
In
severait cases, the procedures utilized did'not provide.
sufficient instructions to ensure that all the' required actions were performed. One example involved the. failure to remove
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power to two reactor coolant-system (RCS) safety injection accumulator isolation valves following surveillance tests, as
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fueling cavity cooling fan'with RCS temperature above TS limits,
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i securing the centrifugal charging pumps when they were required
as a boron injection path, and filling the refueling cavity a
without venting the containment building, which pressurized the containment and nearly caused a spill:alr4ng the-transfer canal in the adjoining fuel building.
Operators later moved the fuel
.i handling bridge crane without first releasing a rod cluster control assembly.
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Licensee management appeared to be committed 'to' quality operation and worked to instill that attitude in the operators.
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However, it was noted that the operations department was not
represented on the ALARA committee. Management relied on the
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operators to perform proper plant operations in accordance with-the TS and approved procedures.
Procedures were written,to
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provide maximum fleribility where possible and relied on the shill of the craft and training to assure that some safety-
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related activities were properly performed.
Some of the above
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noted errors involved failure to follow procedural steps that
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were clear; others occurred because procedural steps were vague or silent.
In reviewing these events, corrective actions often
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involved additional training 'to maintain procedural flexibility.
The extent to which management relied on operations and other personnel to take. appropriate actions and make proper decisions, i
which were not covered by procedures, placed an additional responsibility on the overall training program to. ensure that all personnel were. qualified to make those decisions.
The-licensee enhanced operator' performance by completing-modifications to the rod control system daring the fourth refueling outage. This modification was effectivetin that the:
rod control: system was. subsequently operated :in automatic. 'This allowed improved operator cognizance of plant transients without having to manually operate the control rods to maintain the proper reactor parameters.. Quicker response to transients was also possible with the system in automatic.
The licensee _ continued a college education program.for some of.
the licensed operators. These operatorsL were taking courses-on a full-time basis' leading to a ba'chelors degree in nuclear engineering tad.noiovy. - The operators ' returned.to' duty during -
refueling.,utage periods and they returned to duty-during semester breaks.
The operators, therefore, maintained their; licenses and remained current on' plant conditions _and: training.
This program was consistent with the NRC!s policy concerning shift technical advisors.
The licensee continued their efforts toward improvement of.
operational activities. - t!DG operations, and departmental -
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communication. There were some weaknesses: identified in these improved areas.
Several problems were noted that appeared to be-related to a lack of procedorai-adherence or procedures which relied on the skill of tk.e craft which were not adequately provided for through training. The operators demonstrated,that'
they were cognizant of the facility _ des.ign and that their training had been effective in assuring that-they properly responded to plant events.
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Performance Rating The licensee is considered to be in Performance' Category 2 in this functional area.
3.
Recommendations a.
NRC Actions Inspection effort in this functional area should be consistent with the core inspection progra __.
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Licensee Actions i
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maintenance should be emphasized, particularly with regard i
to troubleshooting activities. The licensee should?
continue to promote self-critical assessment of plant
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operations. Management,should. utilize the results of..the-assessment to ensure they had adequately disseminated.their-u expectations to the operations staff.. This needs to.
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include identifying personnel and. program weakness _ promptly'
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.to management for resolution.
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' Radiological Controls
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An3 ysis
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The assessment of this' functional area consists of activities
related to radiation. protection, radioactive?wante management, j
radiological effluent controls and monitoring, radiological
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environmental monitoring,' water chemistry controls, radiochemistry and water chemistry confirmatory measurements, and transportation of radioactive materials.
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Problems were identified in the radiation protection program during the previous SALP assessment involving' lack of management involvement in the radiation protection program, lack of-attention to detail and failure,to follow' established L
procedures, the ned to revise existing procedures, lack of'an
l aggressive audit program for the self-identification of problem areas, and the lack of oversight of ongoing work involving
radiological contmis.
In-this SALP assessment period, the two
inspections of this program area indicated'that'the licensee has taken significant steps to make improvements in this program.
The licensee is. aware of the:;e past prob ~1 ems and has worked
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aggressively to resolve most of them.
However, continued improvement is still needed in some areas.
For example, inconsistencies were noted in existing procedures regarding the issuance of respiratory protection equipment, tritium bioassay requirements, and the release of items from the' radiation controlled area. The licensee recognized the need to improve department procedures and plans to conduct a thorough review of-all procedures during mid-1990.
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Increased management involvement was evident in the performance l
of quality assurance-(QA)' audits of the radiation protection
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depa'tment supervisors.
Staffing for the-radiation protection i
department has been maintained at an adequate level to support
routine plant operation.- Several new positions were approved and filled during the assessment period. All permanent j
positions were filled with licensee personnel.
Contractor j
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health physics technicians.were used to support the permanent l
plant staff during outages, but the licensee'does,not place
heavy reliance on contractors during normal plant operations.
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The licensee had maintained a stable staff with a low personnel
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turnover rate.
The licensee had implemented a' comprehensive-i
training and qualification program for personnel at thef
' technician level. A program had-been implemented to encourage
technicians to become certified through the National: Registry of-.
Radiation Protection Technologists (NRRPT).
Several technicians
had received NRRPT certification during this: assessment period.'
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However, a we11' defined program had not-been established for
department supervisors and professionals. The training
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department was understaffed concerning the number of qualified
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~1nstructors assigned to provide; training for_the radiation l
protection organization.
In some cases, these instructors were
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not provided adequate time to prepare for their training
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sessions.- Some.of the controd or personnel filling' senior
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radiation protection positions h d limited experience.
This was in part due to the lack of a proceoere.to provide guidance for persons responsible for evaluating thi. past work histories of_
. prospective contract technicians'.
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l Improvements were made in the area of keeping radiation
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exposures "as low as is reasonably achievable"-(ALARA).
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Management had provided increased support for:the ALARA program.
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Improvements were noted concerning staffing, procedures,.and
ALARA summary reports. An ALARA handbook was developed and'
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issued to plant personnel.
The ALARA Cnmmittee provided good
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support for ALARA activities. Only 14: person-rem were expended
during 1989.
This period'did not include any' major' outages, but the licensee had also maintained low person-rem in that the average annual person-rem for 1986 through 1989 was only 147.
The licensee established a 312 person-rem goal'for 1990.
Based on scheduled work activities, it appears that-the licensee
should be able'to meet the projected person-rem goal.
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-The radioactive waste management and radioactive effluent
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control and monitoring programs were inspected once during the
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assessment period. No violations were identified.
Radioactive
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effluent sampling, analyses, and controls were adequately -
defined in plant procedures. An effective liquid and gaseous release parmit program was in place to kssure that planned
continuous and batch radioactive effluent releases to the
environment receive proper review and approval prior to being
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released.
No problems were identified concerning staffing,
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training, or qualification of personnel responsible for
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operating the radwaste systems.
The licensee had implemented a radwaste management program that demonstrated compliance with the Radiological Effluent-Technical Specifications and the
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Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
The semiar nual effluent reports'were submitted in a timely manner and contained the
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required inform. tion. Testing and surveillances of the plant air cteeing system were performed as ~ required.
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The radiological environmental monitoring program was inspected i
once during the assessment period.. No significant problems were
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identified.
Regulatory requirements were met regarding sample -
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collection, analyses, and offsite dose calculations. The group
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assigned to implement the environmental program included an
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adequate number of well qualified personnel.' A formal training (
program had not been established for personnel responsible for
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implementing the environmental program. Most of the' training.
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'provided to the group was through on-the-job training.
Program
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review was accomplished by the performance of routine QA audits.
The audits were designed to verify compliance with environmental
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procedures, but did not contain comments or recommendations J
regarding program improvement items.'lThe audit team did not i
include a member with. technical expertise-in raciological environmental matters.
The radiochemistry and water chemistry confirmatory measurements were inspected once during the assessment period. The
inspection also included radior;nemistry and water chemistry
confirmatory measurements using the Region IV mobile laboratory.
An adeq9 ate staff had been maintained to implement the
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radiochemistry and water chemistry ~ programs.. ~ A 'staf fing.
turnover rate of about 20 perc9nt was noted, but the staffing changes did not seem to affect tSe performance in this area.- No problems were identified in the arcas of personnel
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qualifications, enforcement, resolution of technical issues, or i
responsiveness to NRC initiatives, tianagement oversight-included comprehensive QA eudits of the radiochemistry and water'
chemistry-programs. Westinghouse and the Electric Power Rese rch Institute (EPRI). guidelines and recommendations had
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been incorporated into the plant cher.istry procedures to ensure
'j that water chemistry parameters were properly maintained. The results of the radiochemistry ' confirmatory measurements indicated 96 percent agreements between NRC and licensee
i results. Water chemistry confirmatory measurement results l-
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indicated 100 percent agreement. These results reflect high I
quality programs in both areas.
The transportation of radioactive materials and solid. waste
processing programs were inspected once during the assessment period. The licensee had established implementing procedures for these programs that addressed such items as waste a
classification and characterization, procurement, and celection
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of packages, preparation of packages for shipment, and delivery of the compic+ed packages to the carrier.
The level of' staffing
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assigned to handle the transportation and solid radwaste activities was adequate.
The individual responsible for supervising these programs spent most of his time involved with
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administrative matters, which' reduced the amount of time i
available to devote to the oversight of field activities.
.No-i problems were identified concerning enforcement, personnel
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training and qualifications, or resolution of technical issues.
A declining trend was observed in the radiation protection area i
during the,two previous SALP assessments.
In response to the
1989 SALP report, the licensee made several specific commitments.
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to improve the radiation protection program.
The licensee had.
expended considerable resources and management effort to address
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various identified problems. The licensee had stopped the declining trend and there was a good. indication that the-
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radiation protection program would continue to.show improvements
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in the future,
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performance Rating I
The licensee is considered to be in Performance Category 2 with an improving trend in this functional area.
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Recommendations a.
NRC Actions Inspection effort in this-functional area should be i
consistent with the core inspection' program.
Regional
initiatives should be performed in the areas of:
(1) training and qualifications, (2) the effectiveness of
the licensee's program for the self-identification of problem areas, and (3) review of radiation protection'
implementing procedures.
b.
Licensee Actions
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The licensee's management shot'd continue to provide their pr. ent level of support for the radiological controls program.
Continued development of radiological procedures will help to ensure the consistent implementation of the radiological control program.
C.
Maintenance / Surveillance 1.
Analysis i
The assessment of this functional area included all activities
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associated with predictive, preventive, and corrective maintenance:
procurement, control, and storage of cc.iponents,
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qualification controls: installation o' plant mooificati_ons; and-I maintenance of the plant physical cono lon.
It included conduct of-t all surveillance, inservice inspection, and testing activitie-
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-13-This area was inspected on a routine basis by the resident inspectors and periodically by regional inspectors. The regional inspections
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included:
two regional initiative. team inspections; verification of isolation component exemptions (VOICE) and system entry retest (SERT).
An inservice inspection utilizing the nondestructive examination (NDE)
van was also conducted.
The previous SALP Board recommended that the licensee:
(1) complete their review of surveillance requirements and related procedures,-
(2) increase their effort in assessing quality of maintenance.
activities, and (3) improve root cause analysis.
During this SALP period, the licensee we.s more effective in ensuring proper corrective action was taken to correct surveillance identified deficiencies.
There were no examples of surveillance identified deficiencies not being corrected which later resulted in equipment being inoperable per the TS, A weakness which had been carried over from the previous SALP assessment period, concerning the 46quacy of surveillance procedures, improved during this assessment period. The licensee identified one example at the beginning of the assessment period where a TS-required surveillance had not been implemented in the surveillance program. The surveillance involved a diesel. generator fuel oil cloud point analysis.
The example was promptly corrected.
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One inspection was performed to foilowup on maintenance program concerns.
It was found that the licensee had taken actions to strengthen several areas which were previously identified as weak.
There was evidence of management involvement in most phases of the maintenance process, including prior planning.with the appropriate consideration for operational priorities in both the maintenance and surveillance areas. The plant manager was involved in the decisionmaking process for significant maintenance activities,_ aid took an active part in a daily meeting held to. discuss, among otner things, both emergent and planned maintenance and surveillance activities. Personnel in the maintenance organizations were included in the licensee's team building training program.
Management involvement in the inservice test (IST) and inservice inspectior. (ISI) programs was evident. The licensee had a good inservice test administrative program for assuring compliance with ASME codes and the Safety Evaluation Report.
The IST program check valve tisassembly and inspections were performed during the previous outage is required by IST program relief request. The ISI program was rev.ewed, in part, by the NRC NDE inspection.
The IST program was proparly performed with the use of detailed procedures.
Records of the atove programs were properly retained.
In Decembtr 1989, NRC staff assessment of the licensee's trending program, as part of followup to maintenance program concerns,
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concluded that little work had been performed to improve performance in this area. The lack of an effective trending program was identified to the licensee as a weakness in 1988 during the i
maintenance' team inspection. Since that time to December 1989, the licensee had not determined what parameters should be trended or how trending information should be evaluated.
Subsequently, the licensee made some progress in trending.
In the past, data was available for j
trending such as vibration, flow rates, oil analysis, and leak rates, j
but the information was not compiled.in a useable form..Some trending
.was performed informally by various personnel. The licensee was
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planning a trending system of. component failures from corrective; work I
request data.
This showed that some progress had been,made on the-l trending issue, but that significant work remained.
The licensee's j
quality verification program was-not effective in.this case'for
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following through with the identified trending weakness.-
The onsite policies and procedures for controlling maintenance and surveillance activities were generally adequate.
The licensee was
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found to have good corrective maintenance procedures and detailed
procedures for complex surveillance activities.. The licensee has j
shown an ability to effectively manage complex surveillance and
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maintenance activities..The containment building tendon surveillance J
was controlled and performed well. An electronic component in the i
main turbine electrohydraulic control unit was replaced while the
turbine was on the line.
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The licensee's program for scheduling-surveillances was not completely effective.
There were several surveillance scheduling j
errors identif'ed by the licensee during the assessment period.
These instances involved both personnel errors in scheduling and
implementation and a we aness with the licensee's program for scheduline, surveillance activities.
The licensee procedurally required the surveiMance coordinator to weekly review the past due-
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surveillance procedure inquiry report.(PDSIR). However, it was found i
that the PDSIR er,tries did not accurately reflect actual cases of'
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missed surve1117.nces.
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The VOICE inspection evealed that the licensee had a strong program
in the area of containment integrated leak rate testing (CILRT) and
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During a 100 percent visua1' inspection, the~
inspectors did not observe any significant discrepancies. The SERT
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inspection covered modifications, temporary modifications, and maintenance activities.
It was determined that the licensee had a
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strong program for determining the need for retest after maintenance
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and modification activities and for identifying the appropriate type-of retest. The licensee also had a good program for development and
performance of adequate procedures for retests of structures, components, and systems following plant modifications and maintenance
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activities.
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Although the licensee's corrective maintenance program demonstrated.
- good control of maintenance, this same control was not evident with-e
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the maintenance troubleshooting program.
The established i
maintenance troubleshooting program did not ensure that control room i
personnel were cognizant of allstroubleshooting activities and the i
scope involved and did not ensure the activity was properly
documented. On one occasion, a worker was found inspecting a
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transformer without the knowledge that a work request existed for.the
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- job.
In another case, workers tightened body-to-bonnet bolts for a-
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number of diaphragm valves without documenting the specific. valves j
on which the bolts were tightened. Troubleshooting activities
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contributed to an LER when maintenance workers left a panel to an.
s auxiliary feedwater pump room cooler off. That.left the cooler and-
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l the pump inoperable. Troubleshooting.a digital rod position
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indication problem gave the. control room operators several unexpected i
alarms and indicatiens.
The licensee's procedures provided much-
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latitude for skill-of-the-craf t knowledge. instead of detailed
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troubleshooting and maintenance instructions. This latitude appears to be carried over to documenting work accomplished ~and informing-the
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control room of potential indications, alarmst or other systems I
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affected by those activities..
j Performance of root cause analysis has shown improvement. Management
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has generally been prompt at requesting root
'use analyses and in f
many cases the analysis has been good.
The licensee expanded efforts
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to identify the root cause(s) for the main feedwater isolation valve
four-way slide valve problems.
The identified problems were corrected
and the surveillance frequency increased to assure that the valves.
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were operating properly.
On the other hand, the sensitivity to the potential need for root cause analysis had not reached all areas of I
the organization.
For example, a circuit breaker was discarded l
before root cause analysis could be performed.
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l Improvement was noted in EDG operation.
The licensee performed
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several additional 24-hour reliability runs of the EDGs'above.those required by the TS.
These additional runs were.also performed prior
',i to and after the preventive maintenance tasks performed on the EDGs
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during the last refueling outage.
However, maintenance problems continued 4o exist regarding the EDGs. A fire occurred as the result
L of using an unacceptable sealant for repairing leaks on the exhaust manifold.
Fretting and leak problems were also noted on fluid lines.
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These items had been noted by the licensee;and were included in their work request program.
In an effort to resolve the EDG problems. a maintenance engineer and system engineer have been assigned to the
EDGs. This effort appeared to be effective in resolvin;; EDG maintenance problems before they became operational problems.
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The licensee improved their performance in the areas of root cause analysis, ensuring that appropriate corrective action was taken for surveillance identified deficiencies, and erisuring surveillance
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requirements were properly implemented through the surveillance program. The maintenance and surveillance programs were generally well controlled.
However, improvement of the trending program was
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i slow and lacked direction. The surveillance scheduling program di_d
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not provide the proper assessment tools to the surveillance program i
coordinator to reliably schedule the required surveillances.
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Troubleshooting activities were not well documented to demonstrate'
I proper notification of control room personnel or specify the work.
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performwd.
2.
Performance Rating The licensee is considered-to be in Performance Category 2'in this functional area.
i 3.
Recommendations
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t a.
NRC Actions J
Inspection effort in this functional area should be consistent l
with the core inspection program.
In addition, regional
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inspection initiatives should be-performed to follow up on
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maintenance team inspection issues. The control and documenting of maintenance troubleshooting activities and the surveillance scheduling program should be specifically. reviewed.
b.
Licensee Actions
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The licensee should continue to provide daily management.
involvement with'the maintenance and surveillance programs.
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Additional licensee attention should be directed toward i
establishing ar offective trending program, surveillance tracking program, identifying the root cause for personnel errors committed during implementation of the surveillance program, and improving controls over maintenance troubleshooting activities.
D.
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1.
Analysis The assessment of this functional area included activities
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related to the establishment and implementation of emergency
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plan and implementing procedures, licensee performance during
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exercises and actual events that test emergency plans, and'
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l interactions with onsite and offsite emergency response j'
organizations during exercises and actual events.
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During this assessment perioc', region-based and NRC contractor i
inspectors conducted two emergency preparedness inspections.
l The first inspection consisted of observation and evaluation'of
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the annual emergency response exercise. The second inspection l
involved a review of the operations status of the emergency
preparedness program, j
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good.
The scenario was challenging to major segments of the
emergency response organization. Also, the use of the simulator during the. exercise greatly contributed to licensee player
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performance by providing realism.
Emergency response personnel
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in the control room and emergency operations facility (EOF)
proved proficient in detecting, classifying, and declaring =
i-emergencies. The licensee's players made-prompt notifications t
to offsite authorities. Operators in the control room worked
well as a team and effectively utilized off-normal.and emergency procedures. The command and control: demonstrated by managers in
- i the emergency response' facilities was observed to be strong.
The licensee's overall performance during the exercise was
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demonstrative of a licensee fully capable.of implementing the i
necessary measures in'the event.of an actual emergency.
- Although the licensee's overall performance during the exercise was good, NRC evaluators identified some exercise werxnesses.
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One weakness involved inadequate informatbn flow in the EOF
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that resulted in the failure of key EOF s'.atf, ir.:.luding the
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emergency director, to be aware of critical reactor conditions such as the uncovery of the core' and the it. crease in hydrogen levels. ' Another weakness' involved several scenario problems I
that caused substantial deviations from the time line, large
differences between actual and' intended data, and the failure to meet an exercise objective.
Following the exercise, the lice" * conducted a self critique and was able to identify and
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charai s several exercise weaknesses, improvement items, and j
examples aood performance. The licensee did not, however.
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identify t s above-described weaknesses. The'11censee q
ultimately scheduled corrective measures to be completed before
the end of June 1990.
l The inspection of the operational ~ status of the emergency preparedness program identified a problem involving the training
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of emergency response personnel who are responsible for.
j performing dose assessments.
This deficiency was identified through interviews of teams of emergency responders, including
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those who would perform dose assessments of offsite releases.
l Most of the teams interviewed made simple errors in calculating offsite doses which resulted in, or could have resulted in, nonconservative emergency classifications or protective action
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recommendations being made. A factor contributing to this
finding was the widely expressed reluctance among the dose
assessors to perform computer-based dose assessments because'
they believed the software program was slow and difficult to i
use. Aside from this deficiency in dose assessments, all teams demonstrated a good understanding of the emergency plan,
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Overall, the annual QA audit was.found to'be extensive in scope
and depth as well as in resources employed during the audit.,
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The audit employed five auditors.'(one from outside the l
licensee's organization) for a duration of about 2 weeks.
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was favorably noted that training interviews were, incorporated i
as an integral part.of the audit effort.- Although NRC review of
the audit program activities resulted in a favorable: impression, some corrective actions were not. implemented a year:after identification.
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During the assessment period, NRC personnel found that several I
aspects of the:11censee's' program either improved from the j
previous period or continued =to be exemplary of a strong program. Corporate management, involvement was apparent in various aspects of the, implementation of the emergency preparedness program.
Emergency facilities'and equipment were found to have been maintained,in a secure and good state of
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readiness.
Organizationally, the emergency planning department
was moved to a higher reporting level, eliminating the manager
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of health physics in the reporting chain between emergency; planning and the manager of plant support.
In addition, the-emergency planning staff has added two professional staff members.
During the assessment period,- the licensee replaced three emergency pager systems with a single, more modern pager system.
The new pager system provides greater geographical coverage.
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The licensee has issued the new pagers to plant and corporate emergency response personnel and the two NRC resident inspectors.
l The licensee has continued to maintain a highly effective-
program throughout the appraisal period. Management commitment
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and dedicated efforts.to seek improved performance have been
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evident.
2.
performance Rating The licensee is considered to be in Performance Category 1 in this-
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area.-
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3.
Board Recommendations
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a.
Recommended NRC Action Inspection effort in this functional area.should be consistent
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with the core inspection program.
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b.
Recommended Licensee Action Licensee management should maintain the present level of support
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for the emergency preparedness program.
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Security-1.
Analysis The assessment of this functional area included' activities related to the security _of the plant including all aspects of access control, security checks, safeguards, and fitness-for-duty, activities and controls.
During this-assessment period, this area was routinely, reviewed by the resident inspectors.
Region-based physical security inspectors conducted three inspections.-
One inspection-of the_ licensee's program for handling Safeguards Information-(SGI) was conducted at both the Wichita corporate offices and at the plant site.
The inspection found that the licensee had-experienced numerous occasions over the past 2-year period when SGI had not been handled properly.
Following NRC's compilation of the individual events and a QA audit (89-0328) conducted the month before the inspection,.tha licensee became aware of the extent of the
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problem.
Consequently, the licensee developed two consecutive task forces to investigate the root cause, issued an SGI stop work order, and issued a corrective action request. These actions'were discussed with NRC personnel during a management conference at corporate
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facilities on January 11, 1990.l Ultimately, the_ licensee centralized _
the storage and control'over SGI documentation, provided awareness training for involved personnel, and made procedural revisions for evaluating the significance af and reporting of potentially compromised SGI.
The licensee's responses to the inspection. findings'
were exceptional and have apparently resolved the problem.
In regard to the licensee's fitness-for-duty program, the NRC inspection effort was limited to the resident inspector observing a i
training session given by the licensee. The training appeared to be in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 26.
The licensee's annual audit of the physical security program was performed using an experienced lead auditor and an individual from another licensee who had expertise in security'ooerations.
The audit-appeared to be comprehensive, and oe licensee appeared to have responded promptly in correcting adverse findings.
The licensee maintained a good access control program despite some routine access control problems that were self-identified. An example of the licensee's good performance in controlling visitor access was the Family Open House that was conducted on October 28 and:
i 29, 1989.
During this 2-day event, many of the licensee's employees brought their relatives to tour portions of the facility located e
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within'the protected area.
The licensee met with the NRC regional i
staff before the event and discussed the planned visitor processing.
i These tours, which were challenging to the security program, were
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accomplished within the provisions of the security plan.
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Management has demonstrated good. support for the physical security j
program..The licensee has been generally responsive to the need to
promptly correct-self-identified problems promptly. As an example,
the. licensee reported a problem with escort personnel transferring-
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escortees and subsequently implemented a stronger proce> whereby
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transfers were to take place. Management support for the physical.
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security program was also evident in the attention given to maintaining security equipment.
Specifically, equipment testing was
=i conducted within the: specified time frequencies and gene' ally resulted -
.i in, optimum equipment performance. tDuring the essessment period, the f
licensee completed the installation of a new microwave intrusion
detection system and a new stride breaker fence. These hardware
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upgrades improved the security force's ability to respond to an
assault on the protected area perimeter.
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The licensee had an ample number of supervisors, fully qualified
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security officers, and support personnel assigned to the security
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department to continue its effective nuclear security performance.
The security staff continued to perform at a high level'. The' licensee continued to maintain a highly effective nuclear security. program throughout the appraisal period. Management commitment and dedicated i
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efforts to seek improved. performance have been evident.
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Performance Rating
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The licensee is considered to be in Performance Category 1 in this functional area.
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3.
Board Recommendations
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a.
Recommended NRC Action L
Inspection effort in this functional area should be consistent with the core inspection program.
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b.
Recommended Licensee Action The licensee management should maintain the present level of support for the physical security program.
l-F.
Engineering / Technical Support l-l 1.
Analysis
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The assessment of this area evaluates the adequacy of technical and
engineering support for all plant activities.' It in.:1udes al'
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i licensee activities associated with the design of plant modifications;
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l-engineering and technical support for operations, outages,
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maintenance;, testing, surveillance, procurement, and traini.ng.
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This functional area was inspected on an ongoing basis by the-resident inspectors and, periodically, by' region-based personnel.
There were three areas identified during ihe previous SALP period.
where the licensee should improve performance.:.These areas were l
drawing configuration control,' licensed operator exam performance,
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-and engineering involvement in operational. technical issues.
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Configuration management regarding revision of control room drawings
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has shown some. improvement.
However, general drawing; revision still
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l take a long time. The licensee was implementing a computer aided.
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design system to improve the quality and' timeliness of revisions to
controlled drawings.
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The previous SALP assessment identified problems with the quality of
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training that resulted in excessive failure rates among the reactor
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operator candidates (5 out of 6 failed).
During this SALP cycle, a l
single site _ visit waslmade to administer retake examinations to the l
individuals for the purpose of licensing. The individuals passed the i
examinations and have been issued the appropriate licenses.
Because
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the examinations only involved individual candidates retaking the i
specific sections of.the exam that they had~ failed, this exam sample
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of the training program was insufficient to determine whether the s
program weaknesses had been corrected. The observed deficiencies were pred'.>minantly in the knowledge of basic principles and theory
and were not reflected in plant operations.
The licensee's training program improved with respect to communications.
Communications were established and functioning well
between the training and plant operations department.
Student.
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evaluations of instructors and the training program were promptly
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reviewed by the training staff and the appropriate actions taken.
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f The training department staffing and personnel turnover rate was identified as a concern in that vacancies in the department added stress and additional workload on the present staff. This turnover rate was noted for plant operations and health physics training
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staffs. Subsequent discussions with the licensee revealed that the licensee was implementing corrective actions to r.esolve this problem.
The licensee showed some improvement in engineering involvement in
operational technical issues. The licensee had established the-
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industry technical information program (ITIP) for reviewing and
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evaluating industry information applicable to the plant..In response
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to the last SALP, the licensee began to solicit information that they may not have readily available.
From that standpoint, the program
has become more proactivo.
The licensee strengthened procedures to
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t ensure that incoming items are transmitted to the ITIP coordinator for inclusion in. the program. ' Prior to the ITIP procedure revisions, j
significant items had.been either excluded from the program or an
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operability determination was not properly performed. Two examples-
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were the containment cooler seismic support and solenoid operated valve positioning.. Other improvements-in ITIP included moving the manager of nuclear plant engineering next to the operations manager to j
1 facilitate better communications and program changes that further
support those' managers:promptly discussing design basis and operability issues that may arise. An~1nformal goal of.3 days was j
established by nuclear plant engineering.to present operations with a
' design basis determination, of potentially significant design'
y concerns, so that operations could make an: operability determination.
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The adequacy of the ITIP program changes was not assured this SALP period.
j Engineering evaluations were generally adequate:and' records and plant performance data were generally complete,' well maintained,'and '
j available. The engineering staffing levels-and expertise were
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satisfactory.
The licensee provided adequate controls associated with changes and modifications to the facility. One concern was identified by NRC inspectors regarding the lack of attention to details ~ associated with-modification program procedures and implementation activities.
One example was identified where a 10 CFR 50.59 review was not J
performed, although required,. for a temporary modification made-to the essential service water system.
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The management philosophy on procedure flexibility discussed in the plant operations and maintenance / surveillance areas was applicable to
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this area as well.
Licensee management preferred to allow personnel
flexibility within the the bounds of procedures, especially
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administrative procedures. This was noted within the ITIP procedure for the time allowed in coming to a design basis ~ determination.
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.There was a. reliance on the knowledge level.. communications, and common sense of personnel to perform properly in specific conditions.
The liceasee's outage management organization had improved.during the
previous-SALP periods.
Continued improvement was noted during the fourth refueling outage which was initiated and completed during this
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SALP period. The licensee had added SRO licensed individuals to.the
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outage management organization.
This resulted in an improvement in the licensee's ability to plan and schedule work activities during the refueling outage.
The work scope established for the fourth refueling outage was comparable to previous refueling outages.
During the fourth refueling outage, the licensee identified a problem with heat
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exchanger tube integrity on a containhcrit unit cooler, EDG lube oil'
cooler, and several pump room coolers.
These cooler problems were
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i not' anticipated by the licensee and represented considerable growth
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in work effort. Notwithstanding the improved management of the
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outage schedule, there were several instances where workers and operators failed to follow procedure leading to minor contaminations
or eque :ent damage.
I The licensee' improved in the area of design configuration control,
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although general drawing updates still involved a lengthy completion period.
Improvements were made in communications between operations and the training. department.
The loss of experienced training i
instructors added a significant work' load to the: remaining staff.
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The time to complete engineering program evaluation of some operational technical issues was lengthy.
The licensee continued'to improve.in the area of outage management. Modifications ~to the facility were,= generally, well controlled.
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2.
Performance Rating The licensee is considered to.be in Performance Category 2 in this functional area.
3.
Recommendations I
a.
NRC Actions
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Inspection effort in this functional area should be consistent with the core inspection program.
Regional initiatives should i
include an inspection.to further evaluate the modification program and the training department staffing levels.
The
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effectiveness of the ITIP program should be reviewed.
l b.
Licensee Actions
Licensee management should concentrate on the completion of the l
program and procedure enhancements regarding the modification
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program and stressing attention to detail'in all-activities.
T M training department staffing levels should be evaluated.
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...agement should continue to increase engineering involvement
in plant operations. The licensee should assure that I
j procedural detail is adequate to ensure that tasks will be
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performed in accordance with approved guidance.
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G.
Safety Assessment / Quality Verification i
1.
Analysis The assessment of this functional area includes all licensee review activities associated with the implementation of licensee safety. policies; licensee activities related to amendment, exemption, and relief requests; response to NRC generic-letters, bulletins, and information notices; and resolution of Three Mile Island (TMI) items and other regulatory initiatives.
It also.
includes the licensee's activities related to resolution of J
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safety issues, 10 CFR Part 50.50 reviews, 10 CFR Part 21
assessments, safety committee and self-assessment activities, i
root cause analyses of plant events, use of-feedback from plant'
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quality assurance / quality control reviews, and participation 'n '
i self-improvement programs.
It includes the effectiveness of the
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licensee's quality verification function in identifying and
.i correcting substandard or. anomalous performance, identifying
. precursors of potential problems, and monitor'.ng the'overall performance of the plant.
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The licensee performed well in the. area.of-safety assessment.
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.This included licensee TS amendment submittals to.the NRC,
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resolution of.comr, lex technical issues, and. supporting-industry groups.
However, critical self-assessment in the area.of. plant -
operation, although improved,avas noted to have needed additional strengthening. This was evident through the number of personnel and procedural errors noted during the latter part.
j of the SALP period.
- During the assessment period, there were 11 license amendients issued. The Technical Specification request submittals were
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almost'always consistently thorough and indicated an assurance'
of quality including management involvement.. In addition, the-submittals indicated an understanding of the technical issues
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and how the issues relate to plant' safety.
In those instances
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when it was necessary to return to-the licensee for additional information or clarification, the licensee provided prompt and
complete responses to'the staff. The quality of the engineering for the Technical Specification amendments indicated ~that the licensee had technically competent and adequately staffed ~
t engineering capabilities, j
Three of the licensee amendments most notably demonstrate how
the licensee was capable of coordinating the engineering and
operations staff.in managing and resolving complex technical
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issues. Generic Letter 88-17. " Loss of: Decay Heat' Removal,"
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directed licensees to identify and modify those Technical
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Specifications that could limit or restrict operation of shutdown
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cooling systems. The-licensee proposed a. number of significant'
procedural and hardware modifications-that enhanced plant operations during Modes 5 and 6 when decay heat removal relies on the residual heat removal' system. This was a major' effort by the licensee.
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The second license amendment of note was the reduction of l
essential service water flow to the containment fan' coolers.
This Technical Specification submittal was the culmination of a-
long-term engineering study and the critical pats ~ plant
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modification during the refueling outage to redistribute the
- service water system flow rates.
This work also represented a
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licensee' commitment to a long-term staff concern regarding
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service water system pipe erosion and corrosioc..
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Finally,: the licensee's Technical. Specification submittal proposing operability requirements for the ste'am generatort
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atmospheric dump valves represented a complex engineering.
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- analysis' relating:to the steam generator; tube rupture. analysis.'
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Generally,lhe,11 cense'submittals were madeisufficiently ahead 1 (
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of the required date-such that the staff-could review:them'as y
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part of their' regularly scheduled work. However,. two4 exceptions
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c to this were.. license amendment:submittals that were.needed for-the recent refueling outage and were submitted only.4 weeks:
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ahead of the scheduled nutage, r
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- Duringithis _ assessme, t period the' licensee's responsiheness tos >
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NRC's ; Bulletins.ad G eneMcL Letters continued to,beitechnically I
complete and time k There were alsoLseveralestaff efforts 3to'
'7'
survey the.implementat'on_ status;of-generic.activitiesrduring
the; assessment period; Specifically, the: staff requested.
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. implementation status oi the TMIfaction: plan,-_ unresolved safetyr
;
- issues (UEI), and generi'l safety issues (GSI).
Esch of the staff's requests required a relatively short respnse time from
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the licensee.- In addition to'providing> accurate and timely
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responses to:these: requests,'the backup records retained by the
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licensee for each item were well organized and traceable.
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The licensee continued to show a willingness to part'icipate in.
j-industry groups and to be the lead plant on importantMissues, l
The licensee'is participating in the Westirghouse Owner's' Group, in the Technical-Specifications improvement program:on
Westinghouse-plants and'i_n:a risk-based inspection guide I
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program.
In addition, the licensee continued to. support voluntary NRC initiatives such cs the voluntary response-to-Generic Letter 90-01 regarding the -NRC regulatory impact survey. -
.
The licensee's self-assessment program,. including: quality-verification, was not completely effective in(identifying
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problem areas and ensuring that appropriate corrective 6ction'
_
was taken to prevent-recurrence,1 'he previous SALP ' report also
,3 identified weaknesses in this functional crea.,These weaknesser included inadequate ano-untimely corrective action'. JExamples
]1 of these weaknesses identified'during this assessment' period
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included the trending, surveillance',.and maintenance'-
troubleshooting programs, and E0P verification items.
'
NRC violations continued to, cite examples of inadequate cp untimely corrective action.
The line organizations were i
generally effective in identifying'and resolving specific i
problems, but did not alwaus enrure that'the deficiencies were-a completely resolved to prevent their recurrence.
Examples'
'
included multiple surveillance test, scheduling errors and repeated problems with the control of maintenance troubleshooting activities.
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The licensee's assessment of,two ofethe reactor. trips'did not l
, provide' documented assuranc' that the. plant..was' ready for
e restart..,However, the appropriate:short-term corrective action
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had been taken in each case ;
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'The licensee had a programito' evaluate"and track industry =
operating experience;.The: ITIP program.was effective att.
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assigning-an, item to:the cognizantipart-of the: organization for.
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evaluation and tracking the status:'of f the item.
The' program had'
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'd s been recently. revised to moredeadily'surfacesthose items forL
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prompt action that;had higher' safety: significance. ;The.
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j effectiveness > ofs this: programihad not;been demonstrated at the end of'the assessment' period.;
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'The licensee demonstrated good overall performance.by the)
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- nuclear safety review comm_itteel(NSRC), plant safety review?
YW committee-(PSRC),andLindependentYsafety. engineering'
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group - nuclear safety engineering -(NSE). : However, a specific:
~
concern'was: identified. The licensee had notfprovided formal'
y oversight and' audits,(NSRC, QA, NSE, or.special) of the-a corrective actions--completed or ingprogress to-address theJ t
weaknesses identified by the emergency operating procedure team I
inspection, completed in 'early;1988,: to ensure;that the actions -
H taken were adequate..
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.QA-audit activities had been expanded to provideLa comprehensive review of program, areas.
Increased management involvement was--
j noted for the QA assessment of?the radiological program._ The effort could have beenuimproved by including'an' individual with-a strong technical health physics background. The licensee's'
>
efforts did include the-use.of independentioffsite.
.
organizations. This organization:had' assisted in the area of health physics and:QA'.'
The licensee provided prompt -and tecNM y? adequate licensee amendments which demonstrated coordinated efforts betwran l~
l engine cing and the operations staff. The licensee. participated
- in industry groups and was the lead on,many importaatiissues.
The lhensee's self-assessmentLand ; quality verification cap'abflities continued to need improvement. -The NSRC, PSRC,cand NSE were effective overall.
2.
Performance Rating i
The licensee is considered to be in Performance Category 2 in this functional area.
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RecommendationsE j
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a'
NRC Actions-
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f Inspecti6n effortlin'this functional area should be consistent
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withfthe! core inspection program.
Regional ~. initiatives should-m be performed in-the the area;of licensee self-assessmentL _
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s
' capabilities and.the: effectiveness of their corrective action
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. program.
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b'.
Licensee Actions-k JThe < lice'nsee should evaluate 1 the ef fectiveness': of their
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,: corrective / action 1and'self-assessment programs.
The1 ' nota'D1'e L j
strong: performance in evaluating-complex =1ssues.and the
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participation'in: industry significant issues should continue.
':
-Management;shouldLensure-that QA teams. include l members with
technica1' expertise in the areas under. review.
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V.
SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES'
!
A~.
Licensee Activities
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1.
Major Outages
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-ThefourthrefuelingcatagewasconductedfromMarch9,1990;-to[
May 16, 1990.
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2.
License Amendments
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During this assessment period, 11' license amendments vere'
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issued.
One of-the more significant amendments was:
Reduction of essential service' water flow to the
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containment fan coolers. Amendment'38.
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3.
Significant Modifications
'The rod control circuitry was modified,to facilitate reactor operation with, the control rods in automatic,
Service water flow through'the system was redistributed to improve system performance and minimize erosion / corrosion problems.
B.
Direct Inspecticn and R. view Activities e
NRC inspection activity during this SALP cycle. included
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43-inspections performed with approximately 4423 direct inspection hours expended.
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.C.-
Enforcemc Activity:.
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The SALP Board. reviewed the enforcement history for the period.
l April 1,1989c through: June 30,,1990.
The enforcement history is tabulated in the' enclosed table.' No orders were issued.
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- TABLE'
H ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY'
o NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS
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FUNCTIONAL AREA
.IN SEVERITY' LEVEL
.I Weaknesses.- Dev* NCVs** -V.
'IV
.
$
A.-
Plant Operations 1-
B.
Radiological Controls 1.
C.
Maintenance / Surveillance ~
3~
{
D.
<2;
l E.
-Security 1~
=2; F.
Engineering / Technical Support 2(
G.
Safety Assessment /
5
!
Quality Verification TOTAL
6
' 15 -
!
Deviations-
Noncited violations
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-!
-I th
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