IR 05000424/1993019
| ML20056G792 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1993 |
| From: | Barr K, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056G785 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-93-19, 50-425-93-19, NUDOCS 9309070172 | |
| Download: ML20056G792 (15) | |
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UNITED STATES f#p mac"%g
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
-* 4 REGloN 11
[ ) S 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
- &y o,, -4 ':lE ATLANTA, GEORGIA 303234)199
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Report Nos.: 50-424/93-19 and 50-425/93-19 Licensee: Georgia Power Compan P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2 l
Inspection Conducted: August 2-6, 1993 l- Inspector: N[ w Dnte Signed D
F. ff. Wright, Team Le,bdeY i
i Team Members: G. Arthur i B. Holbro al ett Approved by: ,[, WP( [2/ 3 K. PJ Barr, Chief s Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection -involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility. The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's critique. This announced exercise was conducted on August 4, 1993, between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., with offsite participation limited to receiving Emergency Notification Message Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations, deviations or exercise weaknesses were identified. The licensee demonstrated the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine emergency action level parameters, and correctly '
classify the emergency throughout the exercise. The licensee demonstrated significant improvement in the preparation and issuance of Emergency Notification Messages during the exercise. One Inspector Follow-up Item was 9309070172 930826 PDR ADOCK 05000424 G PDR
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I identified to review licensee corrective actions for problems identified during the exercise. Several Improvement issues regarding command and control i in the Operational Support Facility were discussed with licensee management
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(Paragraph 8c). Overall, the licensee's perforinance during the exercise was !
. good, with the licensee meeting exercise objectives and demonstrating a capability to implement the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures in the event of a radiological emergenc l l
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REPORT DETAILS *
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1. . . Persons Contacted l
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Licensee Employees i
- J. Beasly, General Manager
- Brumeister, Manager, Engineering Support L *S. Chestnut, Manager, Technical Support
- C. Coursey, Superintendent of Maintenance
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- P. Cupp, Senior Engineer
- R. Dorman, Manager, Plant Training and Emergency Preparedness l K. Duquette, Health Physicist )
- J. Gasser, Outage Schedule Supervisor ,
- M. Griffis, Manager Plant Modif$ cations -
'*D. Hayck, Manager, Nuclear Security ,
-*W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager l
- I. Kochery, Superintendent, Health Physics !
! ;*L. Mayo, Naclear Specialist :
l *D. McCary, Supervison Maintenance Engineering l l *A.~Parton. Sup&intendent, Chemistry :
- J. Roberts, Emergency Preparedness Coorclinator !
- A. Rollins, Supervisor, Plant Administration
- M. Sheibani, Supervisor, NSAC
- T. Webb, Engineer, NSAC
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L Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included l engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians,
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and administrative personnel, i
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- P. Balmain,' Resident Inspector ,
- B. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Starky, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
- - Abbreviations used throughout this report are defined in the last
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- Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios For Power Reactors (82302)
" The scenario.for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion'of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I l
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The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives. The scenario was adequate !
- to. exercise fully the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the ;
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! - There were some scenario problems identified by the licensee and the [
inspectors during the critique process. For example:
- ' The controllers 'did not have any RCS radioactivity information for l
a RCS. sample taken early in the exercise. The scenario developers did not anticipate a RCS sample ~ would be made prior to the PASS !
l sample. The real RCS sample results were low and did not reflect ,
! scenario accident conditions -(Failed Fuel), creating some confusion among player j l.
! '* The radioactivity-reported in-the RCS PASS sample did not :'
l- correlate with the offsite measurements made by field monitoring teams. The iodine to noble gasses ratio was high for the extent f of indicated core damage. The scenario developers planned to release about 20 percent of the. gap activity, however, data
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provided indicated all of the gap activity was released. The ;
scenario developers anticipated the scenario would be over before l-the staff was able to use PASS results to make offsite dose !
l projections. Therefore,- the scenario developers did not try to :
, correlate source-term'with offsite doses measured by field team '
l The players took appropriate actions and made protective action .
decisions based.upon field monitoring measurement !
The licensee's process for scenario development, review, and verification _was identified as an area requiring corrective actio l Several issues were identified for review and corrective actions by the [
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licensee and-inspector. An IFI was identified (Paragraph 11) to review '
the licensee's corrective actions for these issues in a future inspectio :
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i Exercise objectives were appropriate for the exercise and all objectives :
l -were met. However,' some exercise objectives were very general and l
! lacked specific criteria for assessing performance. Licensee :
( . representatives reported that specific exercise objective criteria was l
[ -needed. The licensee identified the issue as an area requiring !
i corrective action and committed to develop such criteria for future EP i- ' exercise In general, the controllers provided adequate guidance and the inspector observed adequate interactions- between the controllers and the players
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throughout the exercise.
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L Players worked hard during the exercise to implement the Emergency Plan !
L and its implementing procedures. The inspector noted good use of s l- _p rocedures and checklists throughout the exercise.
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No violations or deviations were identifie . Assignment of Responsibility, Evaluation of Exercises For Power Reactors (82301) ,
The area of assignment of responsibility was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee ,
had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available -
to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specified criteria'in NUREG-0654,
Section I During pre-exercise reviews of the licensee's Emergency Plan and implementing procedures, the inspector concluded that the onsite and offsite emergency organizations were adequately described, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations had been specifically established, and key emergency response organization positions were clearly defined in approved plans and implementing
- - procedures. The inspector observed that adequate personnel were .
available to respond to the simulated emergenc ~
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No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Emergency Organization, (82301)
Implementation of the licensee's onsite emergency organization was abserved to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insu initial facility accident response in key functional arens at all tin: :d that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR do.U (i')(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in ;WREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined; the responsibility and authority for directing actions necessary to respond to the emergency were clear; that st:.ff were available to fill key functional positions within the organization:
and that onsite and offsite interactions and responsibilities were clearly define The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize Georgia Power emergency response personnel. Augmentation of
, the initial onsite emergency response organizations was accomplished through mobilization of additional day-shift personnel. Following the
, Alert declaration, the on-shift emergency _ organization was augmented l with the activations of the TSC, OSC, and EOF ERFs. During the exercise, the inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the SCR, TSC, the OSC, and the EO The required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent
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with the licensee's approved procedures and the licensee was able to l staff and activate the facilities in a timely manner.
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The Shift Superintendent assigned to the exercise assumed the duties of Emergency Director promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, l and directed the response in the SCR until formally relieved by the i Plant General Manager. The General Manager became the Emergency i Director and directed emergency operations in the TSC, OSC, and EOF as i the' exercise scenario progressed and the facilities became activate I No violations or deviations were identifie ! Emergency Classification. System, (82301) ;
-The emergency classification system was observed to determine that a .
standard emergency classification and action level- scheme was in use by i the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),
10 CFR 50,' Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG- '
0654,Section I ~
Licensee EPIP No. 91001-C titled, " Emergency Classification and Implementing 1 Instructions," Revision 12, was used to identify and classify the scenario simulated events. The licensee's staff made the following emergency classifications:
The Alert was declared at about 8:27 a.m. on the basis of damaged-fuel. cladding integrity (loss of one fission product barrier)
indicated by Gross failed Fuel Detector and CVCS Letdown Monito *- 'The Site Area Emergency was declared at about 9:44 a.m. on the basis of damaged RCS integrity-(loss of second fission product barrier) through a ruptured control rod mechanism, resulting in a leak in the reactor vessel hea A General Emergency was declared at about 11:06 a.m. on the basis of loss of containment integrity (loss of third fission product barrier) through an isolation damper and associated piping that l had been breached by an explosio The Shift Superintendent in the SCR and the Emergency. Director in the
.TSC and E0F effectively evaluated existing conditions and declared appropriate emergency classifications in accordance with approved
= procedures in a timely manne No violations or deviations were identifie . Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
-The Notification Methods and Procedures area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and-emergency personnel by the licenses, and that the content of initial and follow-up messages to respon:,e organizations was established. This area was further observed to assure that means to
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provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph I ,
of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in '
Section II.E of NUREG-065 ;
A review of notification messages to Federal, State, and local agencies ;
was made to determine that completed notification forms to Federal, State, and local offsite authorities contained the following information; emergency conditions, emergency classifications, radioactivity release status, potentially affected population, projected !
population doses, recommended protective actions, and any changes to these condition i Significant improvements in Emergency Notification bessage content and
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timeliness were observed during the exercise. In the 1992 NRC evaluated EP exercise some problems including timeliness of issuance, adequacy of information concerning radiological releases and documentation of notifications made to the NRC were identified. During the exercise, ,
licensee personnel issued timely initial and follow-up notifications !
that accurately described site emergency conditions. The licensee also documented notifications made and simulated to the NRC Operations Cente .
No violations or deviations were identified.
l l 7. Emergency Communications (82301)
l l The Emergency Communications area was observed to determine whether
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provisions existed ~for prompt communications among principal response i organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), l 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
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The licensee demonstrated the adequacy, operability and effective use of ,
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emergency communications equipment. However, the licensee experienced some communication problems that were identified by the license Communication issues included the following:
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There were transmission problems with the radio in the E0F which !
was used to communicate with State of South Carolina officials.
, Licensee personnel could receive transmissions but could not I
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a There was some cross-over between radio frequencies on the radios utilized in the OSC.
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l The above items were identified in the licensee's critique for review l and corrective actions. There were also some other minor communication I issues concerning status communicator headsets and simulator telephones I
that were also identified for corrective actions by the licensee in the critique process.
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The inspector noted that radio communications between the Field '
Monitoring Teams and TSC were adequate to dispatch and direct field team i
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activitie In general, the inspector observed that adequate communications existed
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No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
The Emergency Facilities and Equipment area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
! Licensee procedures required activation of the TSC and OSC emergency l facilities upon declaration of an Alert emergency classification. An l Alert classification was made at 8:27 a.m. and an announcement was made at 8:30 a.m. over the PA system to activated the TSC and OSC and placed l the EOF on standby. The inspector observed the activation, staffing and
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operation of key ERFs, including the TSC, OSC, and E0F.
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! Simulator Control Room The Control Room personnel performed in an exemplary manne I
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Positive control and direction were provided by the Shift i i
Superintendent and Shift Supervisor both of whom communicated j extremely well with all members of the shift. Operations l personnel adequately assessed the problems ftced during the J exercise and their responses were timely and appropriate to the circumstances. The Shift Superintendent ensured that the classifications and notifications were accomplished in a timely manne The Shift Supervisor's knowledge of emergency action levels enabled him to quickly assess the reported system and
- equipment damages and correctly classify the event. Both reactor f
operators and supervisors demonstrated good use of the normal, abnormal, emergency operating procedures, and the EPIPs throughout the exercis ' Communications were maintained between the ERFs. Operations l' personnel kept management well informed of changing plant j conditions. A qualified staff member was available to notify the l Federal, State, and local authorities of the emergency and to r maintain communications 15 minutes after the emergency was i declared. The ENN communicator was very good in providing the
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verbal transmission of the notification messa;es to local and l State officials.
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exposed to a radiation field of approximately 3.4 E+3 re# hou I j- The monitor in the SCR' read out in mre# hour and indicated i approximately 3.4 E+6 mrem / hou In the licensee's player !
L critique,-operations personnel reported that the readout of the i j ~; Containment High Range Monitor caused them to' consider entry into {
t the adverse containment parameters procedure. Conditions for i entry into the procedure were met when the Containment High Range ,
Monitor exceeded 10 E+5 reWhour (10 E+8 mreWhour). Operations l
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l-personnel suggested the procedure be changed to show initiation i criteria'for the Containment High Radiation monitor in mrem / hour
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verses Rem / hour. The issue was identified in the licensee's ;
i critique process for review and possible corrective action l l
! .The Plant General- Manager. entered the SCR shot tly after the Alert
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was declared, at' 8:27 a.m.~ He-assessed the situation and began a .
l turnover from the Shift Superintendent, but did so in a way that l did not impact the management of the accident. Once turnover was completed, the General Manager assumed the role of Emergency l
Director, at 8:52 ,
No' violations or-deviations were identified.
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i Technical Support Center l Th'e inspector observed th'e initial activation and personnel'
response in'the staffing of the TSC. The TSC was activated at
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8:51 a.m., following the declaration of the Alert classification
. at 8:27 a.m., by the Shift Superintendent. The TSC was activated, fully staffed and functional in a timely manne l The TSC Manager was well qualified, appeared knowledgeable of his i duties and responsibilities and assumed the command in a j professional and organized manner. The General Manager entered l the TSC at 9:28 a.m. He assessed the situation and began a j turnover from the TSC Manager, but did so in a way that did not l impact the management of the accident. Once turnover was '
completed, the Plant General Manager assumed he role of Emergency Director, at 9:32 !
Technical assessment and mitigation activities were aggressively and properly pursued by the TSC staff and periodic briefings regarding the incident status and ongoing mitigating actions were frequently given. The TSC Manager showed good decision making when a bomb treat was received at about 10:50 a.m. The TSC Manager, who was the Acting Emergency Director at that time, briefed _the staff'on the bomb threat and made it very clear the threat would be investigated but work to restore plant systems would not be diverted by an unsubstantiated crank call. The inspector noted the TSC Manager managed the bomb threat very decisively and in an appropriate manne _
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The licensee's TSC facilities and equipment were adequate to deal with the conditions described by the scenari Noise levels in the TSC were excessive due to personnel conversations, ventilation noise, and noisy video equipment. The Emerga:cy Director on at least two occasions had to call for individual conversations to
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cease in order that he might be heard. The inspector noted that the noise did not prevent the performance of any duties in the TSC but made communication more difficul No violations or deviations were identifie Operational Support Center The inspector observed the initial activation and personne response in the staffing of the OSC. The OSC was activated, promptly staffed with qualified personnel, and operational at 8:54 a.m., 27 minutes after the Alert was declare The command and control in the OSC was adequate. Adequate communications between the OSC, TSC, and emergency repair teams was demonstrated. Communication equipment, in general, functioned properly. Emergency response teams were issued portable radios which were very effective in most cases. However, some problems were identf fied with their use that were similar to problems
! experienced in the 1992 NRC evaluated exercise. The radios in some cases did not work in certain plant . spaces and some offsite ;
radio transmissions, not associated with the EP exercise were l received on some radios. The licensee identified the problems in l their critique as items needing corrective actio .HP personnel took precautions to prevent contamination of the OS The licensee placed portable survey equipment outside the OSC and posted a sign for persons entering the OSC to frisk prior to ,
entry. Frequent radiation and contamination surveys were made in !
the OSC to insure that the environment was free of radioactive contamination. The inspector noted that all personnel exiting the OSC were required to obtain dosimetry and acknowledge a review of a specific RWP. The inspector did not see the RWP and asked about its location. The RWP was obtained from an adjacent room in the OSC and posted near the dosimetry issuance station. The inspector l reported to licensee personnel that the RWP was not clearly posted I for personnel review until requested by the inspector.
- The inspector noted that priority boards listing and ranking tasks were utilized in the TSC and the EOF, however, the licensee did not have a emergency task priority board in the OSC. During the .
exercise, the Emergency Director requested the OSC dispatch-an emergency response team to investigate the problem and restore the
"B" RHR pump. This pump was critical to keepig the core covered l
and prevent overheating. An inspector followed that team through the preparation and completion of the task and noted the team was never told the task was the Number 1 priority. Licensee l
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l procedure, EPIP 91202, Activation and Operation of the Operations
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Support Center, Revision 7, dated December 4, 1991, also required a team leader be appointed for each emergency resnonse team. The
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inspector noted that none of the team members were desipated as I the team leader for that task. However, the team was able to i accomplish its mission. The 1993 EP exercise did not require the
! dispatch of numerous emergency response teams and the consequences of weak direction and control of emergency response teams did not impact the licensee's ability to get the job done. The inspector discussed with licensee management that a more complicated scenario or event could require a clearer awareness of priorities l and much more supervision of OSC activities to accomplish desired i tasks. The licensee did not commit to any specific corrective action The inspector observed that the OSC Manager' operated the facility from a small corner office. When the manager needed to discuss or
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plan a task, the appropriate personnel are called into the office.
l The inspector observed that the OSC facility arrangement appeared
- to be inefficient at best and it appeared that command and control could be enhanced if the EOF Manager was brought out of the office into the area where all event status boards could be monitored and key facility response personnel were more readily accessibl This issue was discussed with licensee management but the licensee did not commit to any specific corrective actions.
i No violations or deviations were identifie )
l I Emergency Operations Facility The EOF assumed a standby position at 9:09 a.m. following the declaration of an Alert classification at 8:27 a.m. The EOF was staffed with qualified personnel and was activated at 9:45 following the SAE declaration at 9:44 a.m.
, The EOF Manager and the Emergency Director demonstrated good command and control, appeared knowledgeable of their duties and I responsibilities, and assumed the responsibilities in a professional and organized manner. Teamwork in the E0F was very goo The E0F layout and supporting equipment were very good and i utilized accordingl '
l No violations or deviations were identified.
l l 9. Accident Assessment (82301)
The Accident Assessment area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or
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potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition
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were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
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Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The accident assessment personnel in the TSC and E0F facilities analyzed plant conditions and developed appropriate strategies for combating equipment failure The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment j of plant status and an assessment 'of radiological hazards to both onsite l and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Emergency Director concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment; to prevent release of radioactive materials; and to terminate the emergency conditio Onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence i of the simulated plume. The teams effectively demonstrated their capability to collect those data points and relay those data to the '
emergency response-facilities.
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Licensee personnel determined that there were some data transfer and calculation errors made in core damage assessments performed during the exercise.' Additionally, the licensee's processes for quick core damage assessments appeared to be very time consuming. The errors did not result in any substantial consequence in the exercire due to the~ nature of the exercise; however, it indicated an area for improvement in the licensee's performance and program. The licensee identified the activity as one requiring review and corrective actio No violations or deviations were identifie . Protective Responses (82301)
The Protective Responses area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Sectica I Following the declaration of a General Emergency, the licensee demonstrated the ability to promptly recommend offsite protective l actions that were consistent with those in the Emergency Plan. The Emergency Director in the E0F provided timely and accurate PARS to Sttte i
personnel. The PARS were routinely reevaluated for accuracy and status j updates were provided to the offsite authorities.
L Habitability was confirmed and periodically assessea by radiation protection personnel throughout the exercise through radiological surveys in the TSC, E0F, and OSC.
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Following the Alert classification, the Shift Superintendent requested
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the assembly and accountability of site personnel with a PA announcement at 8:30 a.m., in accordance with licensee procedure 91002-C, Emergency l Notifications, Revision 23, dated March 26, 1993. The licensee was able to identify missing personnel within 30 minutes as required by the licensee's Emergency Plan. At 8:57 a.m., initial accountability had been completed with seven personnel identified as missin During 'the exercise, the inspector noted that the PA announcement for
.the General Emergency was not made until 11:22 a.m.,16 minutes following the declaration of the General Emergency at 11:06 a.m. The General Emergency announcement and alarm tone, required by licensee procedure 91002-C, should have been accomplished within a few minutes of emergency classification as it had been accomplisheo for the earlier
, Alert and SAE classifications. The inspector noted that the initial offsite General Emergency Notification message was transmitted (11:16 a.m.) prior to the onsite alarm and announcement. The timeliness i
of the message was important for onsite personnel safety and for l personnel responsiveness to assist in emergency activities. The cause
- of the delay was not determined prior to the NRC exit; however, the
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issue was also identified by the licensee as an area requiring review and corrective actio No violations or deviations were identifie . Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
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The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise players immediately following the exercise termination. Licensee controllers l and observers conducted additional critiques prior to the formal I critique to management on August 6, 1993. Issues identified by the I licensee's staff during the exercise were discussed by licensee representatives during the critique. The licensee's critique process was good .vith the licensee developing a time-line of exercise events and-a review of the individual exercise objective Nearly all of the issues identified by the inspector were also identified by the licensee in the licensee's critique process. The licensee reported that all exercise objectives had.been met. The conduct of the critique was ,
consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidelines cited abov '
The licensee listed exercise problems identified in the critique process in a " Preliminary" report. It was the inspector's understanding that the identified issues in that report would be introduced into a formal corrective action program to include proper assignment of issues for root cause assessments, determination of adequate corrective actions, corrective action review and follow-up of corrective actions implemented. The more significant issues included the following:
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The adequacy of scenario data provided to players. The review and approval of scenario data needed additional technical review and management attentio Adequacy of core: damage procedures or training to cause prompt assessments of core damag '
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Establishment of specific exercise objective performance criteri The established criteria would be utilized to evaluate adequacy of performanc The inspector stated that a review of licensee evaluations. and corrective actions.for issues identified in a Preliminary report and provided to the inspectors.on August 6,1993, and any additional revisions to that report would be reviewed in a future inspection as an IF 'IFI 50-424,.425/93-19-01: Review licensee's assessments and corrective actions for problems identified during the August 4,1993 EP exercis No violations or deviations were identifie . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-424,425/92-10-01: Licensee failed to make accurate and timely notifications to State and local agencies concerning emergency classification status, release conditions, and follow-up informatio An inspector verified that the licensee's proposed corrective actions, as specified in a letter to the NRC, dated August 19, 1992 had been completed as' proposed. The inspector's findings were documented in Inspection Report 50-424,425/92-29, issued December 24, 1992. The report stated that the issue would remain open for performance assessment in the annual exercise. The Emergency Notifications completed and issued during the 1993 exercise were promptly issued and contained accurate and sufficient information for offsite agencies to make emergency decisions. All follow-up notifications were made within the licensee's-30 minute frequency. The licensee also did a good job completing NRC Event Notification Worksheets with each emergency classification. The inspector stated that this item would be close . Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on August 6, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the
- areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below. Propriety information was not reviewed during the inspectio Dissenting comment.s were not received from the licensee. Licensee management was informed that an open item (listed in Paragraph 12) was reviewed and considered closed.
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Item Number Descriotion and Reference 50-424,425/93-19-01 IFI - Review licensee's assessments and ,
corrective actions for problems identified during the August 4, 1993 EP exercise (Paragraph 11).
1 .Index of Abbreviations Used in this Report-CFR Code of Federal Regulations l CVCS Chemical Volume Control System l EAL Emergency Action Level ENN Emergency Notification Network EOF Emergency Operations Facility EP Emergency Preparedness ,
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EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures l EPZ Emergency Planning Zone
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ERF Emergency Response Facility i IFI Inspector Follow-up Item mrem _ Milli Roentgen Equivalent Man ;
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.NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSAC Nuclear Safety and Compliance -
OSC Operations Support Center PA Public Address :
RCS Reactor Coolant System rem Roentgen Equivalent Man
- RHR Residual Heat Removal RWP Radiation Work Permit l SAE Site Area Emergency SCR Simulator Control Room TSC Technical Support Center l Attachments:
Exercise Objectives, Scenario Abstract and Scenario Timeline l
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