05000272/LER-1981-035, Forwards LER 81-035/03X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-035/03X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20054G857
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/09/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20054G858	List: 05000272/LER-1981-035, Forwards LER 81-035/03X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8206220359
Download: ML20054G857 (4)

LER-2081-035, Forwards LER 81-035/03X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2722081035R00 - NRC Website

text

I g >SEG Pul>he Sr rv or Eloctnc aro! Gas Company P O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, Neu Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station June 9, 1982 Mr. R. C. Ilaynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Dear Mr. Ilaynes LICENSE NO. DP R-7 0 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-35/03X-1 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting supplemental Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-35/03X-1.

Sincerely yours,

/f, , h if< *ebra*J H. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks f,/]f.

CC: Distribution 8206220339 820609 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR Tne Energ. Peomo 6b

Report Number: 81-35/03X-1 Report Date: 06-09-82 Occurrence Date: 03-22-81 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

ECCS Subsystem - Inoperable.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1130 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

During the performance of Surveillance Test SP(O) 4. 0. 5 (V) on March 22, 1981, it was discovered that the No. 11 Safety Injection Pump Discharge Valve llSJ40 would not open. Action Statement 3.5.2.a was entered at 1445 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.498225e-4 months <br />, which requires that with one ECCS sub-system inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Investigation revealed that the control circuitry of the valve was incorrectly wired. A jumper between the operate relay and the circuit common was missing. The wire was replaced and the Action Statement terminated at 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> on March 22, 1981.

This occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Personnel Error - Tests to verify the lockout function of the valve were not performed in accordance with instructions contained in the Design Change Package for the modification of the valve's control circuit before the work order was signed off as completed.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

On October 10, 1980, Catalytic, Inc. was issued a work order to perform lEC0770 DCP to provide for specific ECCS Valve Control Power Lockout. The design change included modification to eleven of these valves, providing the ability to lockout valve operation from the Control Room which would preclude the need for local tagout of these valves during normal operation. The DCP was a TMI commitment for the refueling outage.

LER 81-35/03X-1 .

The DCP called for the installation of a new panel switch and associated wiring to the individual valve motor control centers.

Provisions were made in the DCP for wiring connection documentation for the new cable. However, this was not done for the internal panel wiring required for the modification. Catalytic, Inc. provided field instructions for the completion of the modification based on the DCP schematics.

During the Unit 1 Refueling Outage, the eleven valve modifications were completed and the work order signed off by the Catalytic supervisor and the Senior Shift Supervisor on duty on December 15, 1980. The DCP provided instructions for the retest of the valves which included restroking and verifying the lockout function. It is apparent that only the valve stroking was performed during the outage, although there is no written documentation of the valve retest performed other than the operator's valve surveillance performed for mode changes at the completion of the outage.

With Unit 1 returned to service, the DCP for the valve lockout proceeded on Unit 2. During the functional test of the modification, it became apparent there was a problem with the modification as installed, in as much as the valve lockout switch did not provide its intended function. Investigation revealed an error in field instructions for the internal panel wiring of the lockout switch.

This cast doubt on the Unit 1 lockout switches capability.

During the March snubber inspection outage, Catalytic corrected the lockout switch wiring on Unit No. 1.

On March 22, 1981, after an attempt to stroke llSJ40, an Incident Report was generated indicating that llSJ40 would not operate from the console which rendered that portion of the ECCS inoperable.

Subsequent investigation of this problem revealed the missing wire from the operate relay to the circuit common. This was corrected by installing the required jumper and the valve was returned to operable status.

All of the valves included in the DCP were retested on March 24, 1981, except the SJ44's which were tested during the March outage startup.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

In order to preclude recurrence of situations of a similar nature, the plant Administrative Procedure AP-8, Revision 5, effective January 8, 1982, requires the supervisor in charge of work completion to sign for completion of testing, and the department head to denote any special testing or surveillance procedure required, and sign when they have been performed (AP-8, Paragraph 5.9.3, 5.10.1, 5.10.2).

I LER 81-35/03X-1 . .

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable Prepared By F. Dickey bh Genefal Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. 82-58

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