05000272/LER-1981-060, Forwards LER 81-060/99X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards LER 81-060/99X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20062G651
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/28/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20062G652 List:
References
NUDOCS 8208130113
Download: ML20062G651 (3)


LER-2081-060, Forwards LER 81-060/99X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2722081060R00 - NRC Website

text

- . . .-- .

~

O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station July 28, 1982 Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 i

Dear Mr.'Haynes I

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-60/99X1 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating _ Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2.f, we are submitting supplemental Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-60/99X1.

Sincerely yours, 4

/./ Mn H. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RH:ks 4f'

'CC: Distribution 1

8208130113'820728 gDRADOCK 05000272 PDR The Energy People Ig)b l m.w n aouiu ei i

Report Number: 81-60/99X1 Report Date: 07-28-82 Occurrence Date: 6-11-81 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Fire Suppression Water System - No. 2 Diesel Fire Suppression Pump - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 81-196.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

During Surveillance Test SP (0) 4. 7.10.1.1(b) on June 11, 1981, the No. 2 Diesel Fire Pump failed to start in the automatic mode as header pressure was decreased below 135 psig. No. 2 Diesel Fire Pump was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.7.10.la was entered at 1135 hours0.0131 days <br />0.315 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.318675e-4 months <br /> on June 11, 1981. The loss of the fire pump prompted a valve line up to assure a supply of water from the Hope Creek site. The Hope Creek fire protection header supply tie valve was open and Salem fire protection header supply tie isolation Valve 1FP-30, was closed. All operating personnel were made aware of this line up, and that to receive water from Hope Creek, Valve 1FP-30 would have to be opened.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE,:

Investigation reveal 6d that the accessory drive shaft had seized, causing the drive counterweight gear to shear off of the shaft.

The manufacturer indicated that the immediate load requirement of the diesel upon starting does not allow enough time for proper lubrication, and probably contributed to the diesel failure.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

During subsequent overhaul of the diesel, it was discovered that the crankshaft was cracked at the No. 3 Journal Bearing. Because of the location of the failure it was probably not directly related to the seized accessory drive shaft, but may have been caused by metal particles in the oil.

JLER 81-60/99X1 e ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

The operability of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. Because of the readily availabic water supply from Hope Creek site, redundancy in the fire suppression system was maintained. Therefore, this occurrence involved no risk to the health and safety of the general public.

This occurrence is reportable in accordance with Specification 6.9.2f, Special Reports for Fire Suppression Systems as outlined in Technical Specification 3.7.10.1 which states: With one pump and or water supply inoperable, restore the inoperable equipment to operable status within 7 days or in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining plans and procedures to be used to provide for the loss of redundancy in this system.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, a valve line up providing a fire suppression water supply from Hope Creek was made, and all operating personnel were instructed on its use, in compliance with Action Statement 3.7.10.la.

The diesel was rebuilt by the manufacturer, and the accessory drive shaft was replaced with a new design containing more oil ports for better prompt lubrication. Investigation of the crankshaft failure showed that it was an isolated event requiring no corrective action.

No. 2 Diesel Fire Suppression Pump was declared operable and returned to service on August 28, 1981, terminating Action Statement 3.7.10.la.

FAILURE DATA:

No. 2 Diesel Fire Suppression Pump Diesel Waukesha Prepared By R. Heller /

General Ma' nager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. 82-70