05000272/LER-1981-110, Forwards LER 81-110/03X-2.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 81-110/03X-2.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20058F284
Person / Time
Site: Salem 
Issue date: 07/14/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20058F286 List:
References
NUDOCS 8207300384
Download: ML20058F284 (3)
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LER-1981-110, Forwards LER 81-110/03X-2.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2721981110R00 - NRC Website
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'O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station July 14, 1982 i

I Mr.

R. C.

Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Dear Mr. Haynes LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-110/03X-2 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2, we are submitting supplemental Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-110/03X-2.

Sincerely yours, k f H.

. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RH:ks 87 CC:

Distribution C2073OO384 820714 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S

PDR The Energy People

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% 2189 (20M) 11 M l

1 Report Number:

81-110/03X-2 Report Date:

07-14-82 Occurrence Date:

11-06-81 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Inadvertent Safety Injection.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports81-445, 81-446,81-447 and 81-449.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 3 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On November 6, 1981, while in hot standby following a reactor trip, an Inadvertent Safety Injection occurred due to loss of the lA vital instrument bus inverter.

The lA inverter was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.8.2.1 was entered at 1411 hours0.0163 days <br />0.392 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.368855e-4 months <br />.

During verification of the Safety Injection, it was discovered that the No. 11 Containment Fan Coil Unit did not start in low speed mode in response to the Safety Injection signal and that the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) inlet valves 1SJ4 and ISJ5 failed to open fully.

Subsequently, while stroking the 1SJ4 and 1SJS valves to verify proper operation, water was injected into the BIT, diluting it to below Technical Specification limits.

The BIT was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.5.4.1 was entered at 2035 hours0.0236 days <br />0.565 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.743175e-4 months <br />.

This occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.2.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The Safety Injection was caused by high steam flow indications due to the loss of vital bus lA and low-low Tavg on two loops.

The loss of the 1A inverter was associated with replacing the cabinet fan unit fuses.

A voltage transient was induced into the control wiring causing the inverter to trip off line.

The failure of the BIT inlet valves was previously addressed by LER 81-97/0lT and the failure of No. 11 CFCU to start was addressed in LER 81-111.

LER 81-110/03X

  • ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The unit was designed for 50 safety injection transients.

This safety injection transient was No. 15.

It was of less severity than the design basis transient, and, therefore, had no detrimental effect on the unit, so operation may safely continue.

Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 requires:

With vital bus lA inoperable, restore the bus to operable status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Technical Specification 3.5.4.1 requires:

With the Boron Injection Tank inoperable, restore the tank to operable status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in hot standby and borated to a shutdown margin equivalent to 1% delta K/K at 200 degrees Fahrenheit within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the tank to operable-status within the next 7 days or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The 1A vital bus was removed from the inverter and connected to the alternate Solatron power source.

The BIT was placed on recirculation with the boric acid storage tanks and a sub-sequent sample of the BIT was within specifications.

At 1807 hours0.0209 days <br />0.502 hours <br />0.00299 weeks <br />6.875635e-4 months <br /> the inverter was restored by replacing the fuses, and Action Statement 3.8.2.1 was terminated.

The BIT was declared operable and Action Statement 3.5.4.1 was terminated at 2330 hours0.027 days <br />0.647 hours <br />0.00385 weeks <br />8.86565e-4 months <br />.

The inverter cabinet fan power cable was re-routed within the cabinet to preclude any interaction with the inverter control wiring.

Design Change Request (DCR) lET-1352, installed electro-magnetic filters, circuit breakers, and improved wiring.

Testing has shown that the electromagnetic noise produced by energizing the fan, has been effectively reduced.

FAILURE DATA:

Garret Corporation Inverter Model 524038-1 Prepared By R.

Heller 6ta-V p/GeneralMafager-Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.

82-68

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