ML19339C581

Forwards LER 80-046/03L-0

ML19339C581
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	11/11/1980
From:	Finfrock I JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19339C582	List: ML19339C581 ML19339C588
References
NUDOCS 8011180636
Download: ML19339C581 (4)

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f OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION EC%. C'"7fgfj"C,,wm s- (609) 693-1951 P.O. BOX 388

• FORKED RIVER

• NEW JERSEY a o8731 November 11, 1980

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!i Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement 3

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Region I G M5),

United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission . 7;y 641 Park Avenue .

,  ;; ilg King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 g  ;-f a

Dear Mr. Grier:

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SUBJECT:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee (yent Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-46/3L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrenc'e No. 50-219/80-46/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly y urs, Ivan R. Finf ock Jr.

Vice Presi t neration IRF:dh

• Enclosures cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. William G. Mcdonald, Director (3 copies)

Office of Management Informatien and Program Control United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 8011180 6 J

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-46/3L Report Date Novemberll ,1980 Occurrence Date October 17, 1980 Identi,*ication of Occurrence The Standby Gas Treatment System was operated in a degraded mode as permitted by Technical Specifications, Paragraph 3.5.B.3.a. During surveillance testing of Standby Gas Treatment System #2 (SGTS II), the pressure drop across the upstream HEPA filter exceeded the allowable Technical Specification limit as specified in paragraph 4.5.K.l.b.1 and indicated in Figure 4.5.1.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Further investigation into SGTS II revealed that the previous surveillance test performed on the system yielded data indicating that the allowable pressure drop across the HEPA filters had been exceeded and, therefore, Technical Specifications, paragraphs 3.5.B.3.a.1, 3.5.B.3.a.2, 3.5.B.3.a.3, and 3.5.B.4 had been violated.

The additional findings resulting from this investigation are reportable as defined in the Technical Specifications, Paragraphs 6.9.2.b.2 and 6.9.2.b.3.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was operating at steady state power.

Plant Parameters at the time of occurrence were:

Power: Reactor 1930 MWt Generator 645 MWe Flow: Recirculation 59.88xig4 gpm Feedwater 7.19 x 10 lb/hr Description of Occurrence On Wednesday, October 8,1980, required surveillance testing was completed on Standby Gas Treatment System II (SGTS II). Test results yielded data whereby I the pressure drop (AP) across the upstream HEPA filter was within .08" H20 of the acceptable limit as defined by the Technical Specifications. Due to the proximity of the test data to the Tech. Spec. limit, it was decided to replace both the upstream and downstream HEPA filters. l

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6 e Reportable Occurrence Page 2 Report No. 50-219-80/46/3L On Thursday, October 16, 1980, the HEPA filters were replaced. Tests performed on the system the following day showed that the presssure drop exceeded the Tech. Spec. Limit. After investigation it was found that the filters were mistakenly replaced with a newer model supplied by the manufacturer which has a

higher AF vs. flow characteristic than the ones which were previously in place.

4 As a result new filters were procured and installed on Monday, October 20, 1980, after which SGTS II was tested and performed satisfactorily, While investigating the occurrence of October 17, 1980, it was discovered that a similar surveillance test of SGTS II perfonned on Wednesday, September 10, 1980, exhibited a pressure drop exceeding the Technical Specification limit. This information was apparently overlooked by all reviewing parties and, as such, was not recognized as a Tech Spec. violation until October 20, 1980.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence The cause of the October 17, 1980 occurrence can be attributed to personnel error. Both the old and new type filters were apparently stocked under the same stock symbol number. When maintenance requested filters using that stock symbol, they received the new filters which are supposed to be more efficient but whose AP vs. flow characterist bs put the ,ystem in a range which exceeded the existing Tech. Spec. limit.

The inc.ident of September 10, i980 can also be attributed to personnel error.

There was an apparent breakdown of administrative controls which allowed the test data to be overlooked by all of the reviewing parties.

Analysis of Occurrences The Standby Gas Treatment System is used to process the Reactor Building atmosphere, should conditions be present which require its functioning, and exhaust it through the plant stack. It should be noted that if SGTS II had initiated, the system would nave performed its function but in a slightly degraded mode. There was no adverse effect on public health or safety. The only safety concern involved was a temporary loss of redundancy _in the SGTS while SGTS II was out of service for filter replacement.

Corrective Actions When it was discovered that the wrong HEPA filters were used, new ones were procured and installed. On Tuesday, October 21, 1980, a SGTS HEPA filter AP test was performed. Test results were satisfactory and SGTS II was returned to service at 2220 hours0.0257 days <br />0.617 hours <br />0.00367 weeks <br />8.4471e-4 months <br /> on that same day.

On Tuesday, October 21, 1980, a request was submitted to the Storeroom Supervisor by the Maintenance Department asking that the stock symbol number in question

(#64-3903) indicate the proper HEPA filters to be used for system usa (Cambridge Model #lET-1000-1).

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Reportable Occurrence Page 3 Report No. 50-219-80/46/3L As a result of the plant staff reorganization a meeting was held with cognizant station personnel in order to improve surveillance testing and review methods which are expected to improve the quality of surveillance test reviews. This meeting was held just prior to the discovery of the errant surveillance review.

Failure Data SGTS HEPA filters:

Cambridge Model #1/lE-1000-1 (incorrect model)

Cambridge Model flET-1000-1 (correct model) l 1

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