ML19317G585

Tech Spec Change Request 29 Re Tech Specs 3.1,3.2,4.1 & 4.2,changing Min Contained Borated Water Vol & Boron Concentration of Concentrated Boric Acid Storage Sys & Related Bases, & Regulating Rod Group Insertion Limits

ML19317G585
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	06/06/1978
From:	FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML19317G584	List: ML19317G583 ML19317G585
References
NUDOCS 8003200630
Download: ML19317G585 (15)

Text

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g Technical Specification Change , Request No. 29 [ Appendix A]

Replace pages 3/4 1-14, 16, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, B 3/4 1-2, 3/4 2-2, 3. 11, B 3/4 2-1, 3, 5-4 with the attached revised pages 3/4 1-14, 16, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, B 3/4 1-2, 3/4 2-2, 3, 11 B 3/4 2-1, 3, 5-4.

Proposed Change .

Change the minimum contained borated' water volume and the boron concentration of the concentrated boric acid storage system and associated bases.

Change the Regulating Rod Group Insertion Limits Change the Axial Power Imbalance Envelope and associated bases.

Delete the Measurement Independent QUADRANT POWER TILT values from Table 3.2-2 and add them to the Bases for Specification 3.2.4. Also revise the QUADRANT ~

POWER TILT values in Table 3.2-2.

Delete the reference to the burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRA's) in the first cycle fuel loading.

Reason for Proposed Change Crystal River Unit #3 will operate the remainder of the first fuel cycle with no BPRA's in the reactor. As stated in BAW-1490, " Licensing Considera-tions For Continued Cycle 1 Operation Without Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies,"

certain Technical. Specifications need to be revised because of this. All of the proposed cnanges except those for the QUADRANT POWER TILT Specification are the result of this operational modification.

The measurement independent values of any parameter are the safety limit values for that parameter, e.g.112% for Nuclear Overpower Trip of Reactor Protection System. As such, the measurement independent values are not a Limiting Condition for Operation, as the values for each measurement system, i.e., Symmetrical Incore Detector System, Power Rancje Channels, and Minimum Incore Detector System, are the actual Limiting Conditions for Operations.

Therefore to avoid confusion and misinterpretation, the measuremant _-

independent values should be deleted from the Limiting Condition for Opera tion. However, to insure that the safety limit for the QUADRANT POWER TILT values are not lost, they are being added to the Bases for the QUADRANT POWER TILT.

In addition, the allowable QUADRANT POWER TILT values are being revised -

because of increased detector uncertainties as reported in LER 50-302/78-027/

OIT-0 dated 12 May 1978. This combined with detector normalization (which -

decrease the detector up.:ertainties) yield the given values.

8003200 63 0 1

x, Safety Analysis Justifying Proposed Change The licensing considerations for operation of Crystal River Unit 3 with -

the BPRA's removed has been filed with the Commis,sion in RAW-1490

" Licensing Considerations for Continued Cycle 1 Operatinn Without I;urnabli-Poison Rod Assemblies." These proposed changes will bring the fechnical Specifications into agreement with that filing. .

The proposed change of moving the Measurement Independent Qua'drant Power Tilt values has no impact on the Safety Analyses for Crystal River Unit 3. It is being proposed only to alleviate the potential for misinterpretation of this Specification.

The proposed change revising the allowable Quadrant Power Tilt values reflects both the increased detector uncertainies based upon detector operational characteristics and the decreased detector uncertainties based upon detector normalization. These' new limits ensure that Crystal River Unit 3 will be operated within the assumptions of the Safety Analyses and therefore no unreviewed safety question exists.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN ,

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.8 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. A concentrated boric acid storage system and associated heat tracing with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 5500 gallons, .

2. Between 11,600 and 14,000 ppm of boron, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 105*F.

b. The borated water storage tank (BWST) with: .

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 13,500 gallons,

2. A minimum boron concentration of 2270 ppm, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 40 F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE' ALTERAfl0N or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water source is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.8 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At .least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the boron concentration of the wate ,

2. Verifying the contained borated water volume of the tank, and CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-14 l

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BCRATED WATER SOURCES - OPE 3ATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATICN 3.1.2.9 Each of the following berated water scurces shall be OFERABLE:

a. The concentrated boric acid storage system and associated heat tracing with:

1. A minimum contained berated water volume of 5500 gallons, ~

2. Between 11,600 and 14,000 p;m cf beren, and

3. A minimum solutien temcerature ci 105'F.

b. The berated water storage tank (3W57) with:

. 1. A contained berated water vcluse of between 415,200 and 449,000 gallons,

. 2. Between 2270 and 2450 cce of baron, and

3. A minimum solution te cerature of 40*F.

AP:LICAS'LITY: MODE 5 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTICN:

a. With the concentrated beric acid storage system incperable, restore the s:crage system to OPERAELE status within 72 hcurs or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated Oc a SHUTCCWN ."ARGIN equi'ealent to li ak/k at 200*F witnin the na t 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />; restore the concentrated boric acid storage system to CPERABLE ~.

status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTOCWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />,

b. With the borated watar storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERASLE status within one hcur ce be in at least -

HOT STANOBY within the next 5 hcurs and in COLD SHUTCOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-15 i

i

(

110 Power Level Cutoff (92% (175.102) of Rated Thermal Power) o * (206,102) 100 - In; ACCEPTABLE OPERATION

, < (206,92) 90 -

(175,92)

UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION 80 - (149,80) '

E

8. '

g 70 -

(121,70) (300,yo) 5 v

, 5 60 -

] ACCEPTABLE (118,70) OPERATION l b 50 .

o 40 -

Ejected J Rod Worth

$ Limit S 30 -

20 -

(108,15) l 10 -

, , , ,(103,,0) , , , , , ,

C 50 1Q0 150 200 250 300  !

Rod Index, % withdrawn l 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 s o , , s . , . l Croup 5 Groep 7 0 25 50 75 100 -.

i i Group 6 Figure 3.1-1 Regulating Rod Group Insertion Limits for J Pump Operation from 268.S EFPD to 400 + 10 EF')D Crystal River - Unit 3 3/4 1-27 l

1

' l

110

,(263,102)

Power Level Cutof f (92% g 100 -

of Rated Thermal Power)

UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION U

(225,80) o.

- 70 -

(174,69) g

.=

" 60 -

~j UNACCEPTABLE

% OPERATION

• 50 -

(150,50) ACCEPTABLE o OPERATION n

. 40 -

I B

• • 'LO 20 -

(108,15) l 10 -

2 Ejected Rod b' orth Limit ,

,(103,0) , , , , , , ,

"~ l 0 200 25 0 300 9 50 100 150 1 Rod Index, ~. withdrawn l 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 i '

t t , ,_ , t i i t Group 5 Group 7 0 25 50 75 100 t t i I  !

Group G Figure 3.1-2 Regulating Rod Group Insertion Limits for 4 Pump Operation After 400 + 10 EFPD Crystal River - Unit 3 3/ 4 1-23 i

100 90 -

80 -

(149,77,9)

UNACCEPTABLE g 70 -

OPERATION o.

- 60 -

2 U_ (121,53), '

C 50 - ACCEPTABLE .

m OPERATION 3

0 40 -

,u (118,38)< >

U 30 -

S 20 -

10 -

(108,11)<

' ' ' 'l 0

O 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 Rod Index, % withdraw 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 e f 8 t t t I f e j Group 5 Group 7 0 25 50 75 100 t  ! t  !  ! ,

Group 6 Figure 3.1-3 Regulating Rod Group Insertion Limits for 3 Pump Operation from .268.8 to 400 ; 10 EFPD Crystal River - Unit 3 3/4 1-29 9-.--. . - , .

100-90 -

80 -

(216,77.9) t 70 UNACCEPTABLE

8. -

OPERATION

- (188,61) ACCEPTABLE g

60 OPERATION U -

~

~

m (174,52) .

3 50 -

2 40 - (150,38) et u

5 30 -

E 20 -

10 -

(103,0)

' ' ' t ' ' t 0 225 250 275 300 0 25 50 15 100 125 150 175 200 Rod Index, *. withdrawn 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 . . .  !

e i Group 5 Group 7 0 25 50 75 100

, e #

i Group 6 Figure 3.1-4 l Regulating Rod Group Insertion Limits for 3 Pump Operation after 400 ; 10 EFPD l

Crystal River -

Unit 3 3/4 1-30 I

h%,

(DELETED)

Figure 3.1-5 l

Crystal River - Unit 3 3/4 1-31

(DELETED)

Figure 3.1-6 Crystal River - Unit 3 3/4 1-32 3

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REACTIVITY C0ftTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1.4 MIfl! MUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 525'F. This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RTt1DT temperature.

3/4.1.2 BORATI0fl SYSTEMS .

The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) makeup or DHR pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid pumps, 5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE emergency busses.

With the RCS average temperature above 200 F, a minimum of two separate and redundant baron injection 3ystems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable. Allowable cut-of-service periods ensure that, minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUT 00Wil MARGIN from all operating conditions of 1.0", ak/k af ter xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F. The maximum boration capability require-ment oce .rs at E0L from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires either 5210 gallons of 12,250 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 32,536 gallons of 2270 ppm borated water ' rom the borated water storage tank. .

The requirements for a minimum contained volume of 415,200 gallons of borated water in the borated water storage tank ensures the capability for borating the RCS to the desired level. The specified quantity of borated water is consistent with the ECCS requirements of Specification 3.5.4. Therefore, the larger _ volume of borated water is specified. .

With the RCS temperature below 200 F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the CRYSTAL RIVER - UilIT 3 8 3/4 1-2

l l

(-17,102) (+15,102)

(-17,92) <

(+15,92) 0

(-23,80)' .

80 ACCEPTABLE OPERATION -

-70 >(+26 , 70)

UNACCEPTA31.E ACCEPTABLE -

OPERATION U WACCEPTABE OPERATION

@--60 c.

OPERATION

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n 8 -

-50 s

"a 3*-40 A

u T--30 N

-20 8

c

-10 t i e I e i 1 f 1 f

-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50' Axial Power Imbalance, % .-

Figure 3.2-1 Axial Power Imbalance Envelope for Operation After 268.8 EFPD I

, , i Crystal River - Unit 3 3, #,

~~ '

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l (DELETED)

Figure 3.2-3 .

Crystal River - Unit 3 3/4 2-3 y

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TABLE 3.2 QUADRANT POWER TILT LIMITS STEADY STATE TRANSIENT MAXIMUM LIMIT LIMIT LIMIT QUADRANT POWER TILT as .

Measured by:

Symmetrical Incore .

Detector System 3.61 9.11 20.0 Power Range Channels 1.96 6.96 20.0 Minimum Incore Detactor Sy: tem 1.90 4.40 20.0 CRYSTAL' RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 2-11 l l

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9 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES -

The specifications of this section provide assurance of fuel integrity .

during Condition I (Nonnal Operation') and II (Incidents of Moderate Frequency) events by: (a) maintaining the minimum DNBR in the core y 1.30 during normal operation and during short term transients, (b) maintaining the peak linear power density 118.0 kw/ft during normal operation, and (c) maintaining the peak power density 1 19.7 kw/ft during short term transients. In addition, the above criteria must be met in order to meet the assumptions used for the loss-of-coolant accidents.

The power-imbalance envelope defined in Figure 3.2-1 and the insertion limit curves, Figures 3.1-1, 3.1-2, 3.1-3 and 3.1-4 are based on LOCA analyses which have defined the maximum linear heat rate such that the maximum clad temperature will not exceed the Final Acceptance Criteria of 2200'F following a LOCA. Operation outside of the power-imbalance envelope alone does not constitute a situation that would cause the Final Acceptance Criteria to be exceeded

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should a LOCA occur. The power-imbalance envelope represents the boundary of operation limited by the Final Acceptance Criteria nnly if the control rods are at the insertion limits, as defined by Figures 3.1-1, 3.1-2, 3.1-3 and 3.1-4, and if the steady state limit QUADRANT POWER TILT exists.

Additional conservatism is introduced by application of:

a. Nuclear uncertainty factors.

b. Thermal calibration uncertainty,

c. Fuel densification effects.

d. Hot rod manufacturing tolerance factors.

The conservative application of the above peaking augmentation factors compensates for the potential peaking penalty due to fuel rod bow. ,.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations frem the basic requirements are acccmpanied by additional restrictions which ensures that the original criteria are met.

The definitions of the design limit nuclear power peaking factors as - <

used in these specifications are as follows:

F 0

Nuclear Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the maximum local fuel rod linear power density divided by the average fuel rod linear power density, assuming nominal fuel pellet and rod dimensions.

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT'3 B 3/4 2-1 Y

P0HER O!STRIBUTI0ti LIMITS .

BASES

b. .The measurement of enthalpy rise hot channel factor, pyg, shall be increased by 5 percent to account for ,

measurement error.

For Condition II events, the core is protected frcm exceeding 19.7 E!/ft locally, and frem. going belcw a minimum 0:15R of 1.30 by autcmatic protection on power, AXIAL POWER IMSALAi!CE, pressure and temoerature. Only conditions I through 3 above, are mandatory since the AXIAL POWER D:5ALAt:CE is an explicit input to the Raactor Protecticn System.

The QUADP'::T POUER TILT limit assures that the radial power distribution ,

satisfies the design values used in the power capability analysis. Radial pcwer distribution, measurements are made during startup testing and periodically during power operation. For QUADRANT PCWER TILT, the safety (measurement independent) limit for Steady State is 4.92, for Transient State is 11.07, and for the Maximum Limit is 20.0.

The QUADPANT POWER TILT limit at which corrective acticn is recuired provides ONB and linear heat generation rate protection with x-y plane po.2er tilts.

The limit was selected to provide an allowance for the uncertainty associated with the power tilt. In the event the tilt is not corrected, the nargin for uncertainty on F g si reinstEd by reducing the power by 2 percent for each percent of tilt .n excess of the limit.

3/4.2.5 D::3 PAPJMETERS The limits en the DNS related parsmeters assure that each of the parareters are maintained within the normal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the transient and accident analyses. The limits are consistent with tne FSAR initial assumptions and have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain a minimum 0 ;5R of 1.30 throughout each analyzed transient.

The 12-hour periodic surveillance of these parameters through instrument readout is sufficient to ensure that the parameters are restored within #

their limits following load changes and otner expected transient oepration.

The IS-month periedic measurer.ent of tne RCS total flew rate is adequate to detect flow degradation and ensure correlation of the ficu indication channels with measured ficu such that the indicated percent flcu will provide sufficient verification of flow rate on a 12-hour basis. .

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 0 3/4 2-3 -

1 DESIGN FEATURES DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE 5.2.2 The reactor containment building is designed and shall be maintained for a maximum internal pressure of 55 psig and a temperature of 281*F. -

5.3 REACTOR CORE FUEL ASSEMBLIES 5.3.1 The reactor core shall contair. 177 fuel assemblies with each

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fuel assembly containing 208 fuel rods clad with Zircaloy -4. Each fuel rod shall have a nominal active fuel length of 144 inches and contain a maximum total weight of 2229 grams uranium. The initial core -

loading shall have a maximum enrichment of 2.83 weight percent U-235.

Reload fuel shall be similar in physical design to the initial core loading and shall have a maximum enrichment of 3.50 weight percent U-235.

CONTROL RODS 5.3.2 The reactor core shall contain 61 safety and regulating and 8 axial power shaping (APSR) control rods. The safety and regulating control rods shall contain a nominal 134 inches of absorber material. The APSR's shall contain a nominal 36 inches of absorber material at their icwer ends. The nominal values of absorber material shall be 80 percent silver, 15 percent indium and 5 percent cadmium. All control rods shall be clad with stainless steel tubing.

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 5-4

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