ML20209D297
| ML20209D297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1999 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209D295 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9907130103 | |
| Download: ML20209D297 (36) | |
Text
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ATTACHMENT A IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES IN REDLINE / STRIKEOUT FORMAT Added text is shown as SjEligEUid Deleted text is shown as stskast.
i i
9907130103 990708 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P
CREVS 3.7.12 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)
LCO 3.7.12 Two CREVS trains iisilifi:6EICisFf6Et6iiijiliiGifi[6tillhy kiWiiiiliiiis3CCBE); shal1 be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One CREVS train A.1 Restore CREVS train 7 days inoperable.
to OPERABLE status.
OTibOIElifiiii5sFMsEdis
$71IIiOlisiWiTCCHE FIasis pMwig boundacy?
ist:KenEiiiiTfst titelljei$
hist escessTofdthElislR
$0 Required Action and CB.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion g
Time of Condition A M AND k not met in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4.
(B.2 Be in MODE 5.
36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (continued) i I
Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-24 Amendment No. 149 WE)il3CuiiItll[.Cicle21f0hly
CREVS j
3.7.12 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME DE. Required Action and C.1 ------------NOTE--------
lM associated Completion Time of Condition A Place in emergency n 'l EEi not met during recirculation mode if movement of automatic transfer to irradiated fuel emergency recirculation mode assemblies.
is inoperable.
DIY Place OPERABLE CREVS Immediately M
train in emergency recirculation mode.
DE N5.2 Suspend movement of Immediately M
irradiated fuel assemblies.
EO. Two CREVS trains EO.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.
Immediately inoperable 5ii a,
hI5iaictioi"ikisQsTthi CCHE that) exceed Condition _5 during MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
NE. Two CREVS trains
$E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable 5F irradiated fuel a
Wiitaii3iss"~ekiACIW3G assemblies.
CCHEtthatTexceed ConditionLB during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-25 Amendment No.149 NTE51ValldilidtliCiclii13 0619
CREVS 3.7.12 l
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l
\\
SR 3. 7.12.1 Operate each CREVS train for 31 days it 15 minutes.
l l
SR 3.7.12.2 Perform required CREVS filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the Testing Program.
Ventilation
)
Filter Testing Program SR 3.7.12.3 Verify each CREVS train actuates to the 24 months emergency recirculation mode on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
$Rf37Zi12MEM4R f9{CCHE"tiidsiidiFi?liski~giTd6EEToWEEEsid 2MiE6iW5 pilowabletlimitsEas; measured)bwperformance ofiamiintegratedileikagelsesti Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-26 An. enc' ment No. -149 NOTE 32ValialtJhfilIchlE13Ionly
CREVS B 3.7.12 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)
BASES BACKGROUND The principal function of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) is to provide an enclosed environment from which the plant can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity or toxic gas.
The-CREVS consists of two trains with much of the non-safety related equipment common to both trains and with two independent, redundant components supplied for each jiiij66 liiamsT6f safety related piece of equipment (Ref.1). The major equipment consists of the normal duty filter banks, I
the emergency filters, the normal duty and emergency duty supply fans, and the return fans. The normal duty filters consist of one bank of glass fiber roughing filters. The emergency filters consist of three banks each. The first bank-is a roughing filter. similar to the normal filtersI-The-second bank is--a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) l filters,4 EWd The third bank is an activated charcoal abilsorberis for removal of gaseous activity (principally iodine). The rest of the system, consisting of supply and return ductwork, dampers, and instrumentation, is not designed with redundant components.
}(diesss & fidiindist paiiijseFiTiiURiifiiif6Vid6d?f6FTsoliE%ii?Bfr the1 ventilation systemiftomithelsutroundi ng ienvi ronment2 The ventilation exhaust duct is continuously tested by radiation monitor RM-A5, which has a range of 102 to 106 counts per minute. The monitor is set to alarm and initiate the emergency recirculation mode of operation when the airborne radioactivity-and/or-area radiation level reaches IjiiiiE6Hiiinitily two times the background count rate.
I Ktsifif6FC6Eji1 EinlitiWiliil H9IEhTeT6isi"(CCHE)EiiiiTtni spacef uri.thi n Ethel Control s Compl ex Y served lyL CREV5.1 $ Thi s 3ncludessCosteollComplex[klosuse$from elesationi95?tst19 i30ifnet and M stafK en J
l festM1het elements Wh'i ch Mompromi seithdiCCHEf are sall s)
'doorsesj roof sfloors /floofEdrhi nsf penetration %eals? shd pent 11ation ni sol ationi damp'ers GTogether; ths' CCHEl and [ CREVS provide anjianclosedienvirorimentifrom'whichtthe plantican; bs opersted Tollowi ngianiuschtroUndirel easelofRadi oacti vi t9 otltoxicigasi (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-60 Amendment No. 149 1
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES DisiihT5TEUTifi66'sTdsHFmi n~eltKET EixissN7sll oWid (Tiik'igi intojthe[CCHCibelowywhichcontr60 room 1operatordose(and
. toxic;gasiconcentrationsiremainWitMn apprbvedilimitsM Int ~ei~rifed El sak~feit sI6ffthE'CCHEi~diH rmi hi7scfEs1 J eakage k iTheidi fferen~ce Thetween ? al l owed iand i actual l* eakage?is%conveet'ed(to anfallowance forj breachiareisWid e
squarehinehesk th'atleaylexistiin:the'CCHE tofaccommodate hormil s operati ng rand :Leai ntenance ? acti vi ti es" J B reaches d W
'exce'ss Lof " the ical cul ated i aFea7 rende rs3 the i Exincapable pn
' ffperformingjitsifunctionpand thereforei ndperable?
o
,R6utine7openinglandJclosing of;;theECCHE!doorsi or f
personnelipassage and5the movementfofiequipment(is
~
I accounted fo61nithefdesignicalculations? Aicontisuusi I
?
3eakageToK10 cubic)feetlper[ minute (isiassumedstolascosiis foC this;j Holdingl.or blockingidoorsiopen forfshort
'periodsoftimeldoesinotJconstitute-a:breachiof;theTCCHE as l ong i asi theldo6rs ? houl d ; be i cl dsed ;uponipoti fi cati onfof iidadiologi dallorltosingasitel ease !
l The system CREVS has a normal operation mode and recirculation modes. During normal operation, the system provides filtered, conditioned air to the control complex?-
The control complex consists of-the control room, various other offices in the area of the control room, and-a l
JE21GdiEiIE65controlledaccessarea(CA)bdItheI95Ef66f elevation.
When switched to the recirculation modes, l
3 sol stionIdiifffsTdlbiR isblitihiithE"di schiFi(Y6"thi lcontrollediaccessiatealandiisolatingitheloutside ait jntake! the system-+solates itself from outsWe air and ree+reutates filtered air through the same areas with the iyiteiffrJEiEcidiEsifiTHEidZiiEiKE6uMdthe1CCHE2 ' 3hs exception of the-controM ed-access-area IsTthii"Ebde l
BACKGROUND The control complex normal duty ventilation system is (continued) operated from the control room and runs continuously.
l During normal operation, the outside air intake damper i:
l the?atmosphefit7elfEfTdischar%eldisperliCcl6ssJ,ker is closed pEFtial19 open, the-discharge to outside air dam-the l
' ischargeitoltheiCA11sjopen"; and the system return damper is d
throttled. This configuration allows a controlled amount of outside air to be admitted to the control complex. The design temperature maintained by the system is 75 F at a relative humidity of 50%.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-61 Revision No. 16 NOTE 32 Valid OnfiliCicli!1310n19 1
1 CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES feontinued)
Three signals will cause the system to automatically switch to the recirculation modes of operation.
1 1.
Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) signal (high reactor building pressure).
2.
High radiation signal from the return duct radiation monitor RM-AS.
3.
Toxic gas signal (chlorine or sulfur dioxide)
The recirculation modes isolate the control room CCHE from l
outside air to ensure a habitable environment fer the safe shutdown of the plant. In these modes of operation, the controlled access area is isolated from the control room CCHE?
l and the remaining areas of the control ceiiplex.
l Upon detection of ESAS or toxic gas signals, the system l
switches to the normal recirculation mode. In this mode, I
damp ~eFsIfoEthe?6stifdsTai Fili htikeThHd EthRexhasstT tEth's CAiwill automaticallylc' lose,iisolatingithe;CCHEfrom but's.1dela1riexchangel the avt3ide-a+r-intake-and atmospheric relief dhcharge dampers will automat +caHy l
close, isolating the control room envelope from-the-outside atr pathsv and the system return damper will open thus j
allowing air in the control ceiiplex CCHE to be recirculated, i
Additionally, the mechanical equipment room exhaust fan, CA fume hood exhaust fan, CA fume hood auxiliary supply fan, and CA exhaust fan are de-energized and their corresponding isolation dampers close. The return fan, normal filters, l
nonaal fan, and the cooling (or heating) coils remain in operation in a recirculating mode.
Upon detection of high radiation by RM-A5 the system switches to the emergency recirculation mode. In this mode, the dampers that form the control room envelope dioTatelthe CCHE;from;the3UdoUndi#gi will automatically close. The mechan +eal-equipment room exhaust-fant CA fume hood exhaust fan, CA fume hood auxiliary supply fan, CA exhaust fan, normal supply fan, and return fan are tripped and their corresponding isolation dampers close. Manual action is required to restart the return fan and place the emergency fans and filters in operation. The cooling (or heating) coils remain in operation.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-62 Amendment No. 149
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES APPLICABLE During energency operations the design basis of the CREs/S EMl SAFETY ANALYSIS theICCHE is to provide radiation protection to the control room operators. The limiting accident which may threaten the habitability of the control room (i.e., accidents resulting in release of airborne radioactivity) is tre postulated maximum hypothetical accident (MHA), which is assuraed to occur while in MODE 1. The consequences of this event in MODE 1 envelope the results for MODES 2, 3, and 4, and results in the limiting radiological source term for the control room habitability evaluation (Ref. 2). A fuel handling accident (FHA) may also result in a challenge to control room habitability, and may occur in any MODE.
However, due to the severity of the MHA and the MODES in which the postulated MHA can occur, the FHA is the liniting
?idisl65161 accident in MODES 5 and 6 only. The CREVS 56d thelCCHE ensures that the control room will remain habitable following all postulated design basis events, maintaining exposures to control room operators within the limits of GDC 19 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A (Ref. 3).
The CREVS is not in the primary success path for any l
accident analysis. However, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System meets Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement since long term control room habitability is essential to mitigation of accidents resulting in atmospheric fission product release.
LCO Two trains of the control room emergency ventilation system are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available assuming a single failure disabling the other traire. Failure to meet the LCO could result in the control room becoming uninhabitable in the unlikely event of an accident.
The required CREVS trains must be independent to the extent allowed by the design which provides redundant components for the major equipment as discussed in the BACKGROUND i
section of this bases. OPERABILITY of the CREVS requires the following as a minimum duty fan is OpERABt-E X"C6MF6EC6ii51e5 The cmcrgency,l.iSUppl97.fiEfi"0PERABLE(
a.
EifefiiRyIDity (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-63 Amendment No. 163
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES ff3!ENIC66thblICdipliERishiIE56Iis!OREl%811EI idb.
HEPA filter and charcoal abasorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and LCO
'de.
pductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air (continued) circulation can be maintained-fi ihd IGJfitiIelCCHElisEidt'sctIss[diiEsisidlbs]6E
~
ilisFCCHE? 666HdsF9ETHElsidi silhiiiii WhiiFiY9"6fff EEs7d66Fi?
hal l s // roof,ifl oors Mf1 oor ; drai ns', /: penet rationissal s,f aid pentifati on d sol ati on idampersi must ; be mai ntai ned Lwi thi ni ths r
assumikti.ondofitheidesign) calculations?'Breachessin?thd CCHE s a ust ibeicontrol l ed i,tof proyi de 4 as surancelthatitheiCCNE hemaiMicapable20ffstformingM tsifuriction 2 If[dft"6H1 I6 psi? 6FEEE6~EFE~aTi ERh's~CCHEI5EEsidi~tEi 31 mi t Tdete'rmi ned si n i approvedf desi gn ? anal ysess(ReferenEi l
3 )Mcurrentlyi3515 "squareli nches kthel CCHE d s i r endered 2
k l
nope'rable7and E enitryli ntol LCO? Condi ti on" B Mb requi red !
""3 Jheluppersboundlofrthebreach' deaf' quar;e4 foot 1(144jsqu fer the1LCOTissthesisi of the;breachfareallinitfplusioneLs
'i nshes) i uff the : Requi red : Acti on ' off LCO : Condi ti on L B;i s hotfmettwithistheqrespective Completion:Timegthen ConditidnlCior2DJasfapplicablehmustLbetentered!
The ability to maintain temperature in the Control Complex is addressed in Technical Specification 3.7.18.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREVS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control csplex CCHE will remain habitable during and following a postulated DBA EdMdE6f. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the CREVS must be OPERABLE to cope with a release due to a fuel handling accident.
1 l
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-64 Amendment No. 149 NOTEZEWlfd[UntiliC9clell3!Only
i CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES ACTIONS M
With one CREV5 train inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREVS train is adequate to erform the mitrol room radiation protection function ' 6r, f
p_6M5]lddiIpMrT6551. However, the overall reliability is c
L reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE CREVS train could result in loss of CREVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a-DBA EnIsdidE65 occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.
O Withithi"CCHEliWisFibli'dui?Wib~FsEh~eiln f excess f6f "approvedtdesignh 1culat16ns3 butinithinithelcritehis
)tatedhoperatialYeayicontinuesfory?returniid!ths days C Restorat3o~6 pfsexces'sibFeachyfisipoB11mited:t6 openia'glt6 H ts sprie-breached ?condi ti orG but Lcan tal sEbi accasplishsd usirlptemporaryksealing" measures;as
' escribed$1hiplarttiptocidudesland/oriworklinsteuf66si?
d C6HWiE16iPSTiiffl1QliiirEftT65shiH~4 FEE 6diNii~thsICCHE?Ii6 g
'u M
- pporttmainysnAnMandimodificationito?thA{habitabildi9 senvelope hadaril %Ittal soiil17estab11 shi!arn alloniarice fo6theidiscoveryj ofibreache's Ldur:i ng i rsuti ne Lope'rati on !
knd! rovideptheT
- rtun'ityttoiepairithelbre'achlin !a P
'timsframe7consis ntiwi th dheMowlsafetiyisi gMificasesE6f
'smalEbt'enchesdni ICCHE4 C6EdfE166~8 afis"pF6ffdiiTriIo655fWKft97f6116EisiTii knsucbessfu1\\CCHE isakiratectest,ilandspe@raf a?Es2
~
lto:detafminetthe?causi foriexcessivs%1s
"#correctMt t
gge,,,qph -
~res iduring ian M ntegrated kl eakites t han?beicoGertedjto}6ved designscalculation'si TIfEths
'~Tequivalentibreachh1 resin accordance!withiappt
[ calculated!breachis$'sii sBlessithWnsoriequal M 17955 Ms7Mlthen% *"it@mancontinus whilillocadog thelsoucceiofdtheile,
'landsperformingdadestest!
~
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3. 7-65 Amendment No. 149 m!FlW13dluntiEC91TeI13 Ion 19
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES DB.1 and t0.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status 76FI6Michei?iiEt65 NOTE UCHCwhGh]3WsdIa))bwablEliiif5EdannotibeEcl osed within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
ACTIONS DE.1 and DE,2 Mnt (continued)
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status 76W6FiTchsiTiiiT 6ElCCHEMRhisResdiallswa613 IWTE t
liiiiifsHcMnotibefclosed within the associated Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREVS train must immediately be placed in the emergency recirculation mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected. Regttired Action C.1 is modified by a Note indicating to place the system itt-the emergency mode if atttomatic transfer to cmcegency mode is inoperable-An alternative to Required Action UE.1 is to immediately NDM cuspend activities that could release. rad.ioactivity and require isolation of the control rccm CCHE. This places the plant in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
R~4Dffsd?AEfi6tiW1Th~nd } DT2iiFETm6difiid 7 b~y?TN6ti e
indicatingito?plabeithe[sps. tem':inithe emergency?modelif
'au toma tic 2transferdoieme rgen cyl.model.i sii noperabl e.t
$0.1 knE If both CREVS trains are inoperable 6Eb~fi~aMeili61thi CCNEDisice~sdItHE11MiYi!HflCondftidHIS in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the CREVS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-66 Amendment No. 149 WTElvalfd~ustiECycle':13 0nl9
l CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES FE.1 MNE During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, when two CREVS trains are inoperable 6FliEiiiIthiisIlfi[t6eICCHE a
sisisiid3hiilbidfi?6ffC66dillon18, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could release radioactivity that could enter the control room CCHE.
This places the plant in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
1 1
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.12.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Since the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once every month adequately checks proper function of this system. Systems such as the CR-3 design SURVEILLANCE SR 3 7.12.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS without heaters need only be operated for 2 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy available.
j 1
SR 3.7.12.2 This SR verifies +. hat the required CREVS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CREVS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, (Ref. 4) as described in the VFTP Program description (FSAR, Section 9.7.4). The VFTP l
includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal absorber l
efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test l
frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.
l l
(continued) l I
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-67 Amendment No. 149 l
MTEIE Vil.idIdWt E Ciclin3 W 19
l CREVS l-B 3.7.12 BASES SR 3.7.12.3 This SR verifies that each CREVS train actuates to place the control complex into the emergency recirculation mode on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the typical fuel cycle length.
OT7I123 7tiiiniSR'KrH ffiliiiiWiTEfiiFEFbf7thiTCCHE"sid MNE asdeed !1alankage Nates fofd p6tenti.al l yi contfaminatiWilf2 Durjing the"energencyjmodef6f(operationdthe(CCHELis Besigne[d Vtolbelal: closed?envi ronmentinsving ilimitisd[siE
' exchange lwith d tsYsseroundi ngsN PeEformancsfofga herjiodihleskites't? vs@ffies 6tne? continuing fintgfQ976f
,thelCCHE.dThe Frequencyiof?24smonthsiisiconsirteckwitti thsitspicalifuelfcyclekleneth?
yhs"diiisiOTEFeTCCW piFi~cliidiiVsFf6Hisisi6ii[3ffth~4 commonlyrapp11edEleakttestfcharacterized by
'ijessurinati6nitolainominal%alueLand measuFiiiis6FsfMi psiakeiu$airiraquiradito maintainipraisssrization.dTh5 '
WesetfoFCCkgisTp"erformedby; operating (CREVSlinths E
.smopgency? recirculitionTeodeiwithithe AuxiMarylBuilding i
_ ilation Systemlopepating?t6 masatiinlaidifferenhial resisure betweenithe%CCHE?andithe?Auxiliaryl8uilding?
' Aux 111aryi8u11'd_1Ngiw111Lbe?atBleast)1/80inchEwnter i
gaugefnegative ?neithe il eakagef[CCHE. u TracerV gas [w relative' toitha bsedito detie'rsif rate;< 1Thi"LaEceptance
'criterisTfoOtheNest01stahieakagenteihattwould56i Fesulttinfconironroom!personne12exseedingtdose111mits descsibedfin? Reference 03)fo11owinEths' moss 11miting
'ccident W AEdetailsed7descri'tidntof;the honditions "condustlofitMhestiateiprivjdedlin!Refstence)2) if6E a
p REFERENCES 1.
FSAR, Section 9.7.2.1.g.
2.
CR-3 Control Room Habitability Evaltration Report, sttbmitted to NRC on June 30, 1987 ilifidilu1930Illi998 3.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2, 1978.
i 1
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-68 Amendment No. 149 WTEE.#slidIURtEcircisI1 Eon 19
Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6.2.11 Secondary Water Chemistry Program (continued) c.
Identification of process sampling points, which shall include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for evidence of condenser in leakage; d.
Procedures for the recording and management of data; e.
Procedures defining corrective actions for all off contel point chemistry conditions; and f.
A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events, which ie required to initiate corrective action.
5.6.2.12 Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) 1 A program shall be established to implement the following required testing of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)
Isid3MI4iikilW1918EOdihEVihfDiO66I6hilfif[5FiteERABVES) per i
the requirements specified in Regulatory Guide.1.52, Revision 2,
/
1978, W/oEssfs~psiiiltjiGiWi~d! and in accordance with ASME XNST N510-1975 and AS"E N509-1976 KSTMID3803E892RE 355E69id 1.9951 a.
Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that an inplace test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows a penetration and system bypass < 0.05% when tested in 4
accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, and
)
in accordance with ASME sNSI N510-1975 at a H i[iyifsi flowrate of bitsiss 4h500 cfm _10% 375800Eand37,8503fs.
b.
Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that an inplace test of the charcoal sishti65 adsorber shows a penetration-and j
system bypass < 0.0J % hen tested in accordance with N510-19691Mf5 at the system flowrate of liii~KNSI Regulatorp fuieu 1.52, Revision 2, and ASME ween 4h500-efm
-10% AC800.2~ add?s&850fcfii.
)
i (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-18 Amendment No. 149
l:
Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals 1
c.
Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that a laboratory test of a sample of the charcoal EsM66 adsorber, when obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, i
1978, HistiTthsilhti6Fif6FyltsiftsjJEFifEFis~6fTASTM?Dl38032 89RRs$ approved $1995)(atMtemperaturaCof j30*C!andYelativ$
hemiditymofi95$sithjmethy.lstodideipenetrationlofdessith'an M50 shows the methyl iodide penetration less than-1%-when tested-in accordance with Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.527 Revision 2 and AS"E N509-1975 at a tcmperature of 802C-and 70% relative humidity.
5.6.2.12 VFTP (continued) d.
Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that the pressure drop across the combined F6dbMhilfjlfifi, HEPA filters and the charcoal Esib55 adsorbers is s-AP=62 5((MM water Uiliii when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, and ASME ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of biiitWWid 43,500 cfm 10% 37T800lI6d37,850IEf1iii.
5 TIT #iii6hiffifsTf6FisshifFi1E~6f"tWi"ABVES tKsETah~1ApliEiTiiit 7
bfsthe7HEPAi fi l tersishows L a i penetration M1Xiwhen1 tested d n hedordance lwi th ! ANSI: N510H1975Jatjtheispstemifloivrate d of between1357253fahdi4310871cfm4 f30siiB65fFsfeTf6EETch?EFiiH"6f ~WITABVESithif[idlisjiliEi[fisif bf!the(caFbonhadsorberishowsibypassi<!1Xishen: tested?in-hecordance jeith/ANSIT N510fl9751atithelsy' stem [flowratelot between135s2532andi43,087,isfm?
EMDui6EiiFatef f6[iiEliifFsW6fEthiTABVESithiFiIli66Fif6Fy test ofia[ representative)sampleiofjtheL carbonLadso'rberhwhis l
bbtai ned f as!descri bed i i n c Regul atoryf Gui del 1. 52 % Revi sion?2,'
197,8Mmeetshthesl Aboratohy (testi ng { cri teri sfof? ASTM i D13803-j
$9 4Re-approved 91995){atsthe temperatureiofi30*Cland rel atne ;numiditylofl95Cwi th ; mithyhj odide5 penetratT6nTsf 3essithan112;5N l
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.
J (continued)
~
l Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-19 Amendment No. 149
(
r Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals (continued}
5.6.2.13 Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program This program provides controls for potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the Radioactive Waste Disposal (WD) System, the quantity of radioactivity contained in gas storage tanks or fed into the offgas treatment system.
The gaseous radioactivity quantities shall be determined following the methodology in Branch Technical Position (BTP) ETSB 11-5, " Postulated Radioactive Release due to Waste Gas System Leak or Failure".
The liquid radwaste quantities shall be determined in accordance with Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.3, " Postulated Radioactive Release due to Tank Failures".
The program shall include:
a.
The limits for concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the Radioactive Waste Disposal (WD) System and a surveillance program to ensure the limits are maintained.
Such limits shall be appropriate to the system's design criteria, (i.e.,
whether or not the system is designed to withstand a hydrogen explosion),
b.
A surveillance program to ensure that the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank and fed into the offgas treatment system is less than the amount that would result in a whole body exposure of 2 0.5 rem to any individual in an unrestricted area, in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program surveillance frequencies.
5.6.2.14 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program A diesel fuel oil testing program to implement required testing of both new fuel oil and stored fuel oil shall be established.
The program shall include sampling and testing requirements, and acceptance criteria, in accordance with applicable ASTM Standards.
The purpose of the program is to establish the following:
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-20 Amendment No. 149
f~
l Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 l
5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals feontinued) a.
Acceptability of new fuel oil for use prior to addition to storage tanks by determining that the fuel oil has the following properties within limits of ASTM D 975 for Grade No. 2-D fuel oil:
1.
Kinematic Viscosity, 2.
Water and Sediment, 3.
Flash Point, 4.
Specific Gravity API; b.
Other properties of ASTM D 975 for Grade No. 2-D fuel oil are within limits within 92 days following sampiing and addition of new fuel to storage tanks.
c.
Total particulate contamination of stored fuel oil is < 10 mg/L when tested once per 92 days in accordance with ASTM D 2276-91 (gravimetric method).
5.6.2.15 Not Used 5.6.2.16 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)
This program ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions taken.
Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists.
Additionally, other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions may be identified to be taken as a result j
of the support system inoperability and cerresponding exception to entering supported system Condition and Required Actions.
This program implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.
The SFDP shall contain the following:
a.
Provisions for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the capability to perform the safety function assumed in the accident analysis does not go undetected; b.
Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists; (coe.tinued)
Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-21 Amendment No.149
Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals kontitstred) c.
Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and d.
Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.
A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent sirigle failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed.
For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, i
and:
a.
A required system redundant to the system (s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable); or b.
A required system redundant to the system (s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or c.
A required system redundant to the support system (s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-22 Amendment No. 149
i FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 l
ATTACHMENT B IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES IN REVISION BAR FORMAT
I l
i 1
l ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.
i FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 DOCKET NO. 50-302 Revise the. Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below 'and inserting the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding *spillover pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
REMOVE INSERT 3.7-24 3.7-24 3.7-25 3.7-25 3.7-26 3.7-26 B 3.7-60 B 3.7-60 B 3.7-61 B 3.7-61 B 3.7-62 B 3.7-62 B 3.7-63 8 3.7-63 B 3.7-64 8 3.7-64 t
B 3.7-65 B 3.7-65 B 3.7-65A*
B 3.7-65B*
B 3.7-65C*
5.0-18 5.0-18 5.0-19 5.0-19 5.0-20 5.0-20*
5.0-21 5.0-21
l l
CREVS 3.7.12 3.7. PLANT. SYSTEMS 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)
LC0 3.7.12 Two CREVS trains and the Control Complex Habitability l
Envelope (CCHE) shall be OPERABLE.
i l
l APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
l ACTIONS 1
l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One CREVS train A.1 Restore CREVS train 7 days inoperable.
to OPERABLE status.
B.
CCHE inoperable due B.1 Restore CCHE 7 days I
to a breach or boundary.
breaches in excess of the limit en AND less than or equal to 1 square foot in
)
excess of the limit.
C.
Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A or AND B not met in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4.
C.2 Be in MODE 5.
36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (continued) l r
Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-24 Amendment No.
NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only 1
l
\\
CREVS 3.7.12 i
3 ACTIONS (continued)
I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. ' Required Action and
NOTE------------
l NOR associated Completion Place in emergency Time of Condition A recirculation mode if luo7g or B not met during automatic transfer to i
movement of emergency recirculation mode irradiated fuel is inoperable.
assemblies.
NOTE D.1 Place OPERABLE CREVS Immediately train in emergency recirculation mode.
QB D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately NOTE irradiated fuel assemblies.
E.
Two CREVS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.
Immediately inoperable or sorg breaches exist in the CCHE that exceed Condition B during MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
F.
Two CREVS trains F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable or irradiated fuel NOTE breaches exist in the assemblies.
CCHE that exceed Condition B during i
movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-25 Amendment No.
NOTE - Valid until Cycle 13 Only
1 CREVS 3.7.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.12.1 Operate each CREVS train for 31 days 2 15 minutes.
SR 3.7.12.2 Perform required CREVS filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the Testing Program.
Ventilation Filter Testing Program i
SR 3.7.12.3 Verify each CREVS train actuates to the 24 months' emergency recirculation mode on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
SR 3.7.12.4 Verify CCHE boundary leakage does not exceed 24 months allowable limits as measured by performance NOTE l of an integrated leakage test.
Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-26 Amendment No.
NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only i
l CREVS f
8 3.7.12 l
B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 1
B 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)
BASES BACKGROUND The principal function of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) is to provide an enclosed environment from which the plant can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity or toxic gas.
The CREVS consists of two trains with much of the non-safety related equipment common to both trains and with two independent, redundant components supplied for major items of safety related equipment (Ref.1). The major equipment consists of the normal duty filter banks, the emergency filters, the normal duty and emergency duty supply fans, and the return fans. The normal duty filters consist of one bank of glass fiber roughing filters. The emergency filters consist of a roughing filter similar to the normal filters, high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, and activated charcoal adsorbers for removal of gaseous activity (principally iodine). The rest of the system, consisting of supply and return ductwork, dampers, and instrumentation, is not designed with redundant components.
However, redundant dampers are provided for isolation of the ventilation system from the surrounding environment.
The ventilation exhaust duct is continuously tested by radiation monitor RM-A5, which has a range of 102 to 10*
counts per minute. The monitor is set to alarm and initiate the emergency recirculation mode of operation when the radiation level reaches approximately two times the l
background count rate.
The Control Complex Habitability Envelope (CCHE) is the space within the Control Complex served by CREVS.
This includes Control Complex floor elevations from 108 through 180 feet and the stair enclosure from elevation 95 to 198 feet.
The elements which compromise the CCHE are walls, doors, a roof, floors, floor drains, penetration seals, and ventilation isolation dampers.
Together the CCHE and CREVS provide an enclosed environment from which the plant can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity or toxic gas.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-60 Amendment No.
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES l
BACKGROUND Design calculations determine the maximum allowed leakage (continued) into the CCHE below which control room operator dose and toxic gas concentrations remain within approved limits.
Integrated leak tests of the CCHE determine actual leakage.
The difference between allowed and actual leakage is converted to an allowance for breach areas (in square inches) that may exist in the CCHE to accommodate normal operating and maintenance activities.
Breaches in excess of the calculated area renders the CCHE incapable NOR of performing its function, and therefore inoperable.
Routine opening and closing of the CCHE doors for personnel passage and the movement of equipment is accounted for in the design calculations.
A continuous leakage of 10 cubic feet per minute is assumed to account for this.
Holding or blocking doors open for short periods of time does not constitute a breach of the CCHE as long as the doors could be closed upon notification of a radiological or toxic gas release.
CREVS has a normal operation mode and recirculation modes.
l During normal operation, the system provides filtered, conditioned air to the control complex, including the controlled access area (CA) on the 95 foot elevation.
When switched to the recirculation mode, isolation dampers close isolating the discharge to the ccntrolled access area and isolating the outside air intake.
In this mode the system recirculates filtered air through the CCHE.
The control complex normal duty ventilation system is operated from the control room and runs continuously.
During normal operation, the outside air intake damper is partially open, the atmospheric relief discharge damper is closed, the discharge to the CA is open, and the system return damper is throttled. This configuration allows a controlled amount of outside air to be admitted to the control complex. The design temperature maintained by the system is 75 F at a relative humidity of 50%.
t (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-61 Amendment No.
NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES l
l BACKGROUND Three signals will cause the system to automatically switch j
(continued) to the recirculation modes of operation.
1.
Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) signal (high reactor building pressure).
2.
High radiation signal from the return duct radiation monitor RM-A5.
3.
Toxic gas signal (chlorine or sulfur dioxide)
The recirculation modes isolate the CCHE from outside air l
to ensure a habitable environment for the safe shutdown of the plant. In these modes of operation, the controlled access area is isolated from the CCHE.
l Upon detection of ESAS or toxic gas signals, the system switches to the normal recirculation mode. In this mode, dampers for the outside air intake and the exhaust to the CA will automatically close, isolating the CCHE from outside air exchange, and the system return damper will open thus allowing air in the CCHE to be recirculated.
Additionally, the CA fume hood exhaust fan, CA fume hood l
auxiliary supply fan, and CA exhaust fan are de-energized and their corresponding isolation dampers close. The return
)
l fan, normal filters, normal fan, and the cooling (or heating) coili, remain in operation in a recirculating mode.
)
Upon detection of high radiation by RM-A5 the system switches to the emergency recirculation mode. In this mode, the dampers that isolate the CCHE from the surroundings will automatically close. The CA fume hood exhaust fan, CA fume hood auxiliary supply fan, CA exhaust tan, normal
~
supply fan, and return fan are tripped and their corresponding isolation dampers close. Manual action is required to restart the return fan and place the emergency fans and filters in operation. The cooling (or heating) coils remain in operation.
I N
i (continued) l l
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-62 Amendment No.
I I
1 CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES l
APPLICABLE During emergency operations the design basis of the CREVS and SAFETY ANALYSIS the CCHE is to provide radiation protection to the control room operators. The limiting accident which may threaten the habitability of the control room (i.e., accidents resulting in release of airborne radioactivity) is the postulated maximum hypothetical accident (MHA), which is assumed to occur while in MODE 1. The consequences of this event in MODE 1 envelope the results for MODES 2, 3, and 4, and results in the limiting radiological source term for the control room habitability evaluation (Ref. 2). A fuel handling accident (FHA) may also result in a challenge to control room habitability, and may occur in any MODE.
However, due to the severity of the MHA and the MODES in which the postulated MHA can occur, the FHA is the limiting radiological accident in MODES 5 and 6 only. The CREVS and the CCHE ensures that the control room will remain habitable following all postulated design basis events, maintaining exposures to control room operators within the limits of GDC 19 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A (Ref. 3).
The CREVS is not in the primary success path for any accident analysis. However, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System meets Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement since long term control room habitability is essential to mitigation of accidents resulting in atmospheric fission product release.
LCO Two trains of the control room emergency ventilation system are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available assuming a single failure disabling the other train. Failure to meet the LCO could result in the control room becoming uninhabitable in the unlikely event of an accident.
The required CREVS trains must be independent to the extent allowed by the design which provides redundant components for the major equipment as discussed in the BACKGROUND section of this bases. OPERABILITY of the CREVS requires the following as a minimum:
a.
A Control Complex Emergency Duty Supply Fan is OPERABLE; (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-63 Amendment No.
CREVS B 3.7.12 i
BASES LCO.
b.
A Control Complex Return Fan is OPERABLE; l
(continued) c.
HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively l
restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; l
d.
Ductwork and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained; and e.
The CCHE is intact as discussed below.
The CCHE boundary including the integrity of the doors, walls, roof, floors, floor drains, penetration seals, and ventilation isolation dampers must be maintained within the assumptions of the design calculations.
Breaches in the CCHE must be controlled to provide assurance that the CCHE remains capable of performing its function.
If the total open breach area in the CCHE exceeds the limit determined in approved design analyses (Reference 2), currently 35.5 square inches, the CCHE is rendered inoperable and entry into LCO Condition B is required.
WTE The upper bound of the breach area for the LC0 is the sum of the breach area limit plus one square foot (144 square inches).
If the Required Action of LCO Condition B is not met within the respective Completion Time, then Condition C or D, as applicable, must be entered.
The ability to maintain temperature in the Control Complex is addressed in Technical Specification 3.7.18.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREVS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the CCHE will remain habitable during and following a postulated accident. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies-the CREVS must be OPERABLE to cope with a release due so fuel handling accident.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-64 Amendment No.
NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only
[
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES ACTIONS A.1 With one CREVS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREVS train is adequate to j
perform the radiation protection function for control room personnel. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE CREVS train could result in loss of CREVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an accident occurring I
during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide tne required capability.
B.1 With the CCHE inoperable due to breaches in excess of approved design calculations, but within the criteria stated, operation may continue for 7 days.
Restoration of excess breaches is not limited to returning the opening to its pre-breached condition, but can also be accomplished using temporary. sealing measures as described in plant procedures and/or work instructions.
Condition B will permit opening breaches in the CCHE to support maintenance and modification to the habitability unt envelope boundary.
It also will establish an allowance for the discovery of breaches during routine operation, and provide the opportunity to repair the breach in a time frame consistent with the low safety significance of small breaches in the CCHE.
Condition B also provides an opportunity, following an unsuccessful CCHE leak rate test, to determine the cause for excessive leakage, correct it, and perform a re-test.
Excessive leakage measured during an integrated leak test can be converted to an equivalent breach size in accordance with approved design calculations.
If the calculated breach size is less than or equal to 179.5 square' inches then operation may continue while locating the source'of the leakage and performing a re-test.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-65 Amendment No.
NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or breaches in the MNE CCHE which exceed allowable limits cannot be closed within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
D.1 and 0.2 WTE During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or breaches in the CCHE which exceed allowable MnE limits, cannot be closed within the associated Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREVS train must immediately be placed in the emergency recirculation mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.
l An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately MMI suspend activities that could release radioactivity and require isolation of the LCHE. This places the plant in a l
condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
Required Action D.1 and D.2 are modified by a Note indicating to place the system in the emergency mode if automatic transfer to emergency mode is inoperable.
L_1 won If both CREVS trains are inoperable or breaches in the CCHE exceed the limits of Condition B in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the CREVS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.
(continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-65A Amendment No.
NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only
r:
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES ACTIONS E,_1 l"
(continued)
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, when two CREVS trains are inoperable or breaches in the CCHE Mnt exceed the limits of Condition B, action must be taken
-immediately to suspend activities that could release radioactivity that could enter the CCHE. This places the l
plant in a condition that minimizes the accident risk.
This does not preclude tha movement of fuel to a safe position.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.12.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Since the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once every month adequately checks proper function of this system. Systems such as the CR-3 design without heaters need only be operated for 2 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy available.
SR 3.7.12.2 This SR verifies that the required CREVS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CREVS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52,. (Ref. 4) as described in the VFTP Program description (FSAR, Section 9.7.4). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal absorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test i
frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.
SR 3.7.12.3 This SR verifies that each CREVS train actuates to place the control complex into the emergency recirculation mode on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the typical fuel cycle length.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-65B Amendment No.
NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only
1 CREVS B 3.7.12 4
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.12.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued)
This SR verifies the integrity of the CCHE and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air.
During the emergency mode of operation, the CCHE is designed to be a closed environment having limited air exchange with its surroundings.
Performance of a periodic leak test verifies the continuing integrity of l
the CCHE.
The Freq ency of 24 months is consistent with the typical fuel cycle length.
NOTE The' design of the CCHE precludes performance of the i
commonly applied leak test characterized by pressurization to a ncminal value and measurement of the make up air required to maintain pressurization.
The I
l test for CR-3 is performed by operating CREVS in the emergency recirculation mode with the Auxiliary Building l
Ventilation System operating to maintain a differential pressure between the CCHE and the Auxiliary Building.
The Auxiliary Building will be at least 1/8 inch water gauge negative relative to the CCHE.
Tracer gas will be q
used to determine the leakage rate.
The acceptance criteria for the test is a leakage rate that would not result in control room personnel exceeding dose limits described in Reference 3 following the most limiting accident.
A detailed description of the conditions for conduct of the test are provicled in Reference 2.
t REFERENCES 1.
FSAR, Section 9.7.2.1.g.
2.
CR-3 Control Room Habitability Report, dated July 30, 1998.
3.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2, 1978.
l l
1 i
Crystal River Unit. 3 B 3.7-65C Amendment No.
NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only 4
t Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6.2.11 Secondary Water Chemistry Program (continued) c.
Identification of process sampling points, which shall include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for evidence of condenser in leakage; d.
Procedures for the recording and management of data; e.
Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control point chemistry conditions; and f.
A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events, which is required to initiate corrective action.
5.6.2.12 Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)
A program shall be established to implement the following required I
testing of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust System (ABVES) per l the requirements specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, and/or as specified herein, and in accordance with ANSI l
N510-1975 and ASTM D 3803-89 (Re-approved 1995).
a.
Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that an inplace test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows a penetration < 0.05% when tested in accordance with l
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2,1978, and in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 37,800 and 47,850 cfm.
b.
Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that an inplace test of the carbon adsorber shows a system bypass < 0.05% when j
tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, i
and ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 37,800 and 47,850 cfm.
c.
Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that 7 laboratory test of a sample of the carbon adsorber, when obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D 3803-89 (Re-approved 1995) at a temperature of 30 C and relative humidity of 95% with methyl iodide penetration of less than 2.5%.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-18 Amendment No.
Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6.2.12 VFTP (continued) d.
Demonstrate for each train of CREVS that the pressure drop across the combined roughing filters, HEPA filters and the carbon adsorbers is s AP=4" water gauge when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, and ANSI N510-1975 at the system flow. ate of between 37,800 and 47,850 cfm.
e.
Demonstrate for each train of the ABVES that an inplace test of the HEPA filters shows a penetration < 1% when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 35,253 and 43,087 cfm.
f.
Demonstrate for each train of the ABVES that an inplace test of the carbon adsorber shows bypass < 1% when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 35,253 and 43,087 cfm.
g.
Demonstrate for each train of the ABVES that a laboratory test of a representative sample of the carbon adsorber, when obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, i
1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D 3803-89 (Re-approved 1995) at the temperature of 30oC and relative humidity of 95% with methyl iodide penetration of less than 12.5%.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.
5.6.2.13 Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program This program provides controls for potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the Radioactive Waste Disposal (WD) System, the quantity of radioactivity contained in gas storage tanks or fed into the offgas treatment system.
The gaseous radioactivity quantities shall be deter "ed following the methodology in Branch Technical Position (BTP, i iSB 11-5, " Postulated Radioactive Release due to Waste Ga.
ystem Leak or Failure".
The liquid radwaste quantities shall be determined in accordance with Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.3, " Postulated Radioactive Release due to Tank Failures".
The program shall include:
a.
The limits for concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the Radioactive Waste Disposal (WD) System and a surveillance program to ensure the limits are maintained.
Such limits (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-19 Amer;dment No.
l Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals l
5.6.2.13 Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program (continued) i shall be appropriate to the system's design criteria, (i.e.,
l whether or not the system is designed to withstand a hydrogen explosion).
b.
A surveillance program to ensure that the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank and fed into the offgas treatment system is less than the amount that would result in a whole body exposure of 2 0.5 rem to I
any individual in an unrestricted area, in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program surveillance frequencies.
i 5.6.2.14 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program A diesel fuel oil testing program to implement required testing of 4
both new fuel oil and stored fuel oil shall be established.
The program shall include sampling and testing requirements, and acceptance criteria, in accordance with applicable ASTM Standards.
The purpose of the program is to establish the following:
a.
Acceptability of new fuel oil for use prior to addition to storage tanks by determining that the fuel oil has the following properties within limits of ASTM D 975 for Grade No. 2-D fuel oil:
1.
Kinematic Viscosity, 2.
Water and Sediment, 3.
Flash Point, 4.
Specific Gravity API; b.
Other properties of ASTM D 975 for Grade No. 2-D fuel oil are within limits within 92 days following sampling and addition of new fuel to storage tanks.
c.
Total particulate contamination of stored fuel oil is < 10 mg/L when tested once per 92 days in accordance with ASTM D 2276-91 (gravimetric method).
5.6.2.15 Not Used (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-20 Amendment No.
l Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals l
l l
5.6.2.16 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)
This program ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions taken.
Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function i
exists.
Additionally, other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions may be identified to be taken as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Condition and Required Actions.
This program implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.
]
l The SFDP shall contain the following:
a.
Provisions for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the capability to perform the safety function assumed in the i
accident analysis does not go undetected; b.
Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists; c.
Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's l
l Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and d.
Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.
A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis j
cannot be performed.
For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:
a.
A required system redundant to the system (s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable); or b.
A required system redundant to the system (s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or c.
A required system redundant to the support system (s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-21 Amendment No.