ML20196H028
| ML20196H028 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1997 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196H022 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9707230290 | |
| Download: ML20196H028 (60) | |
Text
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. FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION.
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 i DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72
- TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NOTICE 213, REVISION 0
. STRIKEOUT / SHADOW PAGES Technical Specifications Deletions are indicated by strikeout.
Additional and replacement text are indicated by shading.
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-3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY. CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) i 3.5.3 ECCS-Shutdown
'LCO 3.5.3 One ECCS train shall be OPERABLE.
- - .i
----------------------------NOTE--------------- --------- -
may be deactivated in Highpressureinject_ accordance with* iLC0 ion (HPI"a)lowTemperatureOverpressure Protection (LTOP)~!{i3IM1@i$ MMf
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APPLICABILITY: MODE 4. ACTIONS CONDITION . REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i
'A. Required low pressure A.1 Initiate action to Immediately injection (LPI) restore required LPI subsystem inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.
B. Required HPI subsystem B.1 Restore required HPI 1 hour inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status, i C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 5, 24 hours associated Completion Time not met. Crystal River Unit 3 3.5-6 Amendment No. 449
i I l l l FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NOTICE 213, REVISION 0 STRIKEOUT / SHADOW PAGES Bases I Deletions are indicated by strikeout. 1 Additional and replaccinent text are indicated by stiading.
_. m. _ _ -. _ __ ._ ___ _. _ . _ - . _ _ _ . _ . _ . __ . _ . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ e' Pressurizer Safety Valves B 3.4.9 i h B 3.4'^ REACTOR COOLANT. SYSTEM (RCS) i . B 3.4.9 -Pressurizer Safety Valves o ; 1 BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the two spring loaded pressurizer safety valves is to provide RCS overpressure protection. Operating , e in conjunction with the Reactor Protection System (RPS), two i
- valves are used to ensure that the Safety Limit (SL) of I
- 2750 psig is not exceeded for analyzed transients during
[' operation in MODES 1, 2, and 3. For MODE 4, MODE 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor head not completely detensioned, overpressure cper: ting prc::dcr:: :nd Dect.ionisprovidedby UF9to :w Temperature Overpressure Protection ( TOP)~!y^sthdmini:tr:the i j i centrch , fer th::: ::nditica:, E E h erie:n S :iety-ef l M:ch:nic:1 Engine:r: (ASME) require::nh re ::ti:fied with 3 07,0 ::fety v;h c. l The self actuated pressuri:er safety valves are designed in . accordance with the requirements set forth in the ASME I Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,-Section III (Ref. 1). The , required lift pressure is 2500 psig i 2%. The safety valves discharge steam from the pressurizer to the reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT) located in the containment. The discharge 1 flow is ' indicated by acoustic monitors downstream of the ) safety valves and by an increase in RCDT pressure and'1evel. l The upper and lower pressure limits were originally based on 1 the i 1% tolerance requirement for lifting pressures above i 1000 psig. However, later versions of. the ASME Code allow for tolerances of up to i3%, and the use of i 2% was justified in Reference 2. The lift setting is for the ambient conditions associated with MODES 1, 2, and 3. This requires either that the valves be set hot or that a correlation between hot and cold settings be established. , The pressurizer safety valves are part of the primary. success path and mitigate the effects of' postulated accidents. OPERABILITY of the safety valves ensures that the RCS pressure will be limited to less than 110% of design pressure. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-43 Amemdment No. M9
. Pressurizer Safety Valves , B 3.4.9 BASES APPLICABILITY reactor coolant pressure less than 110% of its design value (continued) during certain accidents. The LC0 is not applicable in MODES 4_ and 5 because t-TOP l
$1Elilillil;J0MJSdM NIf5NI3ES rpressure klerpreQsefrsiqMJygigIOR 'N$$jprovidegove$
iten protection.j Overpressure pro lon is not required in , i MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head M B Q R detensioned. 1 ACTIONS /L1 With one pressurizer safety valve inoperable, restoration must take place within 15-minutes. The Completion Time of 15 minutes reflects the importance of maintaining the RCS overpressure protection system. An inoperable safety valve coincident with a design basis overpressure event could challenge the integrity of the RCS. B.1 and B.2 If the Required Action cannot be met within the associated - Completion Time or if both pressurizer safety valves are inoperable, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the
- plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The specified Completion Times i are reasonable, based ca operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly
- manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 4 and below, overpressure protection is provided by LTOP. Placing the plant in a lower MODE (3 and 4) reduces the RCS energy (thermal and pressure), lowers the potential for large ,
pressurizer insurges, and thereby removes the need for i overpressure protection by two pressurizer safety valves, j SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.9.1 REQUIREMENTS : The requirement to verify lift setpoint 1 2450 psig and
$2550 psig is implemented in the Inservice Testing Program.
$ (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-45 Amendment No. 449
. _ ._ _~ ._ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ . _ . . _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _
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-BASES-- _ --, - -. . - , _ _ . _ _ . - - _ ~ .___.__
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- B$j@Mj;][yjjThiMO@yi{ thsHiiiteggjty;ofyt irs (he}ireactoricool ahtspr@ssureibou@ndityt e }}Q? l RCPB 6mifeiidisd%yNiblithsithiippisispsiidd '
l(bniper)Ms96ty/T)$(thiitifsfiASMEfC6deass t aturil(P QCodeitisettq51pRif8MQlhEMiEt's@Vssis] lidilNi8qQpmphinisfpp[proilB$$$@yBRy$ne' h7 The reactor vessel niat'erial is less tough at redu'ced ! temperatures than at normal operating temperature. Also, as ! vessel neutron irpadiation accumulates, the material becomes less re^sistant to pressure stress at low temperatures 1 (Ref. 2);p RCS' pressure inist'bElinaintainedslow whe(~' I tempo ature'is ISu jpereased, _lo'W and'aust;be,,increas,ed_only as'tempefiilire , l The 'RCS' t4mpe'FitWis'"re~f,dinEid'thFoughout' thiiTCO'Tisd ~ Bases and cooldown are based on' the rame monitoring(Refer criteria to LCO as' isSpecificallf 3.4.3). used for heatu'p l the cold leg temperature should be used with RCPs' operating l and the decay heat,out.let1 temperature should'be used with no -
,RCPs,pperating. ;
Operit'ishal'^inin^eiinfidg" duffn'g cbold6Eni heatup7dr~'ani anticipated operational occurrence must be controlled t6 Tot violate' LCO 3i4.3',PRCS Pressure and Temperature'(P/T) ~ ^ ' ' Limits." ' Exceeding these limits could lead 'to brittle fracture of the reactor vessel. 'i.00 3.4.3 presents ! requirements for administrative centrol of RCS pressur'e'and ^ t,emperature to preven.t exceeding,,the' P/T limits. This LCO provides RCS overpressure protection in the , applicable MODES by ensuring an adequate pressure relief I capacity and a limited coolant addition capability. The i pressure relief, capacity: requires either' the power operated rel tef valve '(PORV)' lift 'setpoint(to be ' reduced and~ ~~"^'~~ pressurizer coolant' level at or below a maximum; limit (Brthe' RCS depressurized with an RCS vent of sufficient size' to~' handle, the 1imiting transient during; 2 LTOP,'. "'~' ~^ ' '~~~^' t
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' ~
- BACKGROUND
(continued)^
'" coolant " 7"'"The additionLTOP capability appioach"to allows a maximum pr'ot'ectingof onethe makvs'ssel by' limiti pump, and requires deactivating'HPI, and isolating the core flood tanks (CFTs) when CFT pressures exceed the' maxim 6m RCS
- prissure, fpy the,,ejistingJCS ter_nperature aljowed_by,,P,Tla.'~~ W n
'- ^ Sh65fd'ii6Fsthan^'o'ns' HPI^p'uinp i inject' 6n"an'HPI'actUitiBn?
- the' pressurizer level and PORV or,another RC$ ven{~cannot ~^' ' " ~ '
Preyent,overpressurizing,%t he, , RC S / '~ ~ ~' *~' ' ~^""~' i Ths~pfissiir'iYe~r^ space or cushion that:can Tei/Al"1imitipFo~vides accommodate a coolant s 'coispreis^ibls"vijioF insurge an ,d prevent a rapid pressure increase, allowing the operatof ^'~ - 1 time to stop the increase.' The PORV, with reduced lift" setting, or the RCS vent,' is the overpressure protectiod device that acts as backup t'o,the operator in terminatin{'an jncreasingspressureevent,. With:HPI deact'i'v ated',' the" ability'to provide RCS coolant
- addition'is rsstricted. ~ To balance the possible need foF coolant addition, the LCO does not require the Makeup System i to be deactivated. Due'to the lower With1.the'LTOP MODES and th's expectsd ' pressures associateddeca Makeup System can provide l flow with the OPERABLE makeuptump through the makeup, control valve. HPI can.be restored by j operatortaction.
~
j P0RV0RiaulFisistl A5 'de'iiined' f6f'th's LTOP Sfit'sii,': e th~e PORV 'is" siyWiled'^t"d open if the RCS pressure approaches a: limit set in the LTOP 1 actuation circuit. The' LTOP actuation circuit. is,the ' ' circuit which opens the PORV at the' low > pressure setpdint; I i' The LTOP actuation circuit monitors RCS pressure and " ' determines when an overpressure condition is approach ~ed ? When the monitored pressure meets or exceeds the setting,: the PORV is signaled to open'. Mair.taining the setpoint within the limits of the LC0 ensures the Reference 1 limits will be met ,in ,any, event analyzed ,for LTOP. 1 Wh'ehEEPORVhiil?5pissdsfniissisdfessingijpeisurditrinsiehti ; theWul es s e$fnool antisinissyt hsipress uPE i ndresseitsisl ou i a nd Re Ve r seM Asit hd PORVirsl e as e sio ol an tM th siRC S Tp re s s u re decreases?Ont'ilf%fsistypslssurelispeachedfasdijthelplVeis signalsd M oicloset ATherpressuretcontinuesitotdecrease;"below thdgsntippsutghjfhsplyp[{}}#sh-~~~~~~~" ~'~ FWIT6Esd); c+ . . . , , - . ~ ,~ . - . - -
$$ ' $snk , , s Ud .% e is . .
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! &m3M&uum:WEX21@dmisats&m&#MGmesatM34meMinmimSM.dSx84W:s:cihmuim!G?,3iEGaissaimmun:iei&J . BACKGROUND'"'f - L-(continued {2';';RCS Et*Rss~diFgiigMi y . y, i containment, atmosphere Will maintain the RCS4at'ambieht - containment pressure in an RCS overpressure transient, jf the reiteving requirements of the maximum credible LTOP' i transient >donotexceedthecapabilitiesofthevent.fThTis? ! the vent' path must'be capable of' relieving the' flow'of the i ! limiting LTOP transient and maintaining pressure beloi~~~' i j LTOP 11mits'. " The required V,ent_ capacity may, be providij Sj, ;
- Pne A more, vent,pathsj l n- -_n
Forran- RtsIvent ,nf.n. orm,eefst flowicapacit d ,itr ni,r.,.-, u es ' i fem 6nsstifffsissEliesysifs' lalis#fohls if1AET ~~ ' i sstsblishinginWsnQby!Psn6s isnioTSGiphiniiffisiifsisiiihs~if' i ii6fi$6 simiFyfifdsihindh61bEosi@ ohs 6thshss'ntsini~~ dstehsih@ed Etdibeissffi dishtMThshsdtlj[ pith (s)Ndstibs?itidV i I th$ When$$i51(jfgjMtMpppigdHp{lHypgjjl#Mhithj@C$- , ! ;ppeny I i - .,____,_m,__.__._,-.s
- u. s_, ~ , _ , - , _ _ m.____..__.-.--_-_,_._._
, , - - _ , _ . ~ ,
APPLICABLE'T'"'"Asilfiss~(Rsf."' 3) ~dsiichit'Fitir"th'st'thi!'rsIEt'6Fliisisi " l SAFETY AN 1YSES can be: adequately protected against overpressurizatioW
'^~ "~~~ ~' ~ ^ ""'" transients during' shutdown. : At'253*F and belowl' ' ~ '
ove'rpressure prevention is provided'by'an'0PERABLE"PORV *a'nd . a restricted coolant, level in'the pressurizer or by~a ~ ~ ye'ptes,surjze(RCS a,nd ,a_suffi,cLenisizeJCS yentj ThT'iEtiUralTeiniieFit"uTe~"it Gh*Rh~tVi"VFiisGFi"1R*th~e P/T limit curve'can fall;below the PORY setooint incFsasis as vesse1' material toughness decreases due to neut'ron embrittlement. EachtimetheP/TlimitcurvesarereVise~di the*LTOP' System will be re-evaluated to ensure that its I functional requiremsnts can'still be, met with the PORY Aid
' pressurizer,le, vel m,ethod;or the depressurized a' nd vented RCS cppditipp; Trsnsients'thatars 'ca'pablsof'osrpfe'ssurizing the RCS hsv'e been identified,and evaluated (Ref.14).'^ These' transients relate to either mass input or' heat input: actuating the ,_
HPI System, discharging the CFTs,' energizing the pressurizer heaters,' failingLthe makeup ~ control, valve open, losing 'decai heat removal,,gtarting a reactor coolant p, ump, (RCP) with a.
.___,________._ ____,__ ,_ _,_f(id.ntT60'id J- ~-
f N4M84Y&NOMfSAN.MN>iWi&A\%NNh NMVA MMMM4Ahb.k8%W.W , N$hfilfisONd.4hM & 42MW6_N dfM-NSM45%MdM%$ JiD NON).d WMMMMOSMNUMbMMMN#f.NMWiWR hiMJ'N k . [ 1
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"~$diAN
~
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bIwA%8eN s(wresw V uh4%% \/wFr/AM. N u<{ 4Kv/We Dann,ss-vud s A#AAW X % "A.w s % A/ // 't% v 4##rrw #we e^4n % #< An# wm 4A Vr a vW V < sf 6V% , d ) A '4 /4 /A 4' r#4 D.' 9d
- APPL ICABLE 7 '"'9'TaFgi^' tsmpeFit'sfe "mlimatch bstirs'eh ^ the~~ pFfmari 'a^6d" selioidaff
- SAFETY ANALYSES _ , coo 1antisy, stems;tand adding nitrogen,to the,pressuri,zerf' ~
' P"' (continued) HPI'ict'uat' ion'and CFT ~di'schafgh'~ars^the tfa'nsiintiith'at l result in exceeding P/T' limits within <,10 minutes, 'in iMidi 1 ! time:no operator' action is assumed',to'take, place'.Lin Jhe" ~ i irest ':operatoCaction/after' that time' precludes'~ "" ~~' overpressurization:/'.The analyses demonstrate tFat*th*4*tTmi j
- allowed for operator action is adequate, or the events are ' i i
.sel,--f lim _itin_g _and _do m no,- t exceed LTOP A~ m v limits., .
c Th e ^ fol l ow16g"'a^re"'i e' qui Fi~d ' dsfi n'g th~e: LTOP MODE 5'To~"en'suVe j that transients do< not occur, which either of, the LTOP'
- overpressure protection means:c'annot handle:' ,
i 1 R 3 east;iyaMpps]MSR65sjmikipppup@ j l ! C 10fa dii hih D Hi M s
.M.,wxd%Nz.
P ifclcmose . B sposit;iE6..s~;d.illiT657:t.. d s hIf6
- im v. + - e c ss nr e FTf.x..@f's.E.
v:-;. e xx .. t - f.f. Fg'hT.:v .Bl J r - i ion:a n mW th f _u PTLRi.v _.itsllis_ni egCQpres~sxeew-:..' + 2 The^' Reference' 3"inaly's^e'^s' demdnstVate'^ths PORVda6"maint'aih i RCS pressure below lim'its when only<one maksup pump'is~~'~ actuated. Consequently; the LC0 allows,(only_one makeu[pu~mp to be OPERABLE in the,LTOP MODES. j Inadvert'eht'act~uation of HPl*cah cause the RCS^p'res's5Ps'to j exceed the LTOP limits determined by Reference 3' sooner thed ' ' ' ' " ' ~ ~ i the 10 minutes allowed. Consequently, HPI'must be deactivated by assuring that an 3nadvertent HPI actUati'oh j cfn not, inject water <into the RCS,through the HPI valves. 4 The isolated CFTs must have'their discharge valves closed and the valve power breake'rs in their open positions.,,Thi
- analyses show the effect of CFT discharge is ;
j RCStemperaturerange(197'Fandbelow),than,overanarrowir . that,ofjhe;LCO l l (253*F and below). 1 i Analyses ' performed per Reference 1 established 'the temperature of LTOP Applicability at 253*F. The vessel materials were assumed to have a neutron irradiation ~~~
' accumulation equal to 15 effective full power years' (EFPYs) of operation and >lant operation is assumed to be:in ~~^'
compl,iarjee, with tie,RCS _heatup and cooldown limitatidn's',';of _ s w - ,, ms m , , _ {E6._ifi.~W.-.Uid)
- x. c .
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. 1 1 I l N08I5Eiliiii RG161H
.H. .A. sEs____ ____,__ ___ ____ ,_ _ _ ____, ,
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- APPEICABGEBENTCdME4737 1RidditlisRRiiEtiEti6liifiPUiiipK(RCPT g.(d.
5AFETYfANEYSESif i 6hti._hn_ill)C3.opnht16Ws$seassidisdit&6sWist
- fo$thnfifiR%67pl@$16d4Eii. tsBih. shp225tEfsR$liiif
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^
1r Thfi LCO' Vill"disetiyiti'tEsHPITaEtsiflih'~'shiW~thi~RCS temperature 'is's'253*F.3,The'consequenc's e of a small bre~ak LOC 4'in LTOP MODE 4 are' consistent with those discussed in ! the b'ases for LCO '3.S,~ 3';;"ECCSrShutdswn," by, having a '~""" l ' aximum ofsone makeup ~ pump,~~ OPERABLE' m for. the re, quired 'shi
" " ~ ' ^ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ^ ~ ^ " ' ^ ~ ^ ' ' ' ~ ~ * ~ ^ ' ~ ~ '
! OPERABLEECCS_trajn/ H l RifsFihEe"3'Eoritiisi'thi~aEc~ebtisie~{limiti~tiaf sat'iiff~th's ! LTOP requirements., These limits, in combination with:the^ ~ i; limitations of LCO 3,4'.3, 'and administrative restrictions"on , RCP, operation, provide the assurance that,the reactor vessel 1-is protected'from exceeding the requirements of ASME; Code ~ Case N-514.T Any~ change,to the RCS operation or design'muif l be evaluated against these analyse's to determine'^"~the' " imp'act ' 1
' f the change ori the LTOP hcccptance; limits,.'
o PORFPiff6FiiiinEs X6ilisiif(Rif$3)TihBilthiWiniliiisiiTSiipF6f3EfidNfiihW6i
'sThiiPORVdst
[pdelssM&51gniffpp{en$Ml${ge{f bbl 6withifdsriVedidi41 tjeWisvesitt 6 ~ ~ ^ ~
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Thi PORV'! fit"pii sfsil l"b'e"F'e:'i'~alv sit ~e"d T f6Fidi41 isn~c'i^ 46sh the revised P/T limits ' conflict with the:LTOP analysis ^' ' limits. ' The P/T' limits are periodically modified as ti!I l
'r eactor vessel material' toughnsss decreases due t6 " ' ^
bebrittlement induced by neutron irradiation : Revi'sid P/T limits 'are determfned using ' neutron fluence projections'and the results of examinations of the reactor vessel, material irradiation surveillance specimens;,, The, Bases for_ LCO,3,4.3 , di----scuss' the_se .exa.mi natio, n.s .- Thi : PORV i'i Einsi deVid 'aii^icii V'f' c6i$3nin t ' ' The Fi fo ri~~1 ts . failure represents the worst case LT,0P s, ingle active'~' ~ ^ fAOEh 1 i _ _ . _ _ _ - , m,e ~, --emem.-, ---me som-emm--- _m. (E.dhfiiUid)
~--m .
$0545 64/AUbVi$5sWbOk 4VekUSON'5-9.N.4AVrbS$YO?Vr-l6k+N5'N&sihe&'5VSY'55$SvNNkj505%$AbNhYS$5&S055$N055%Y?UAbO'4A*WVN b$0$EYNAbASA S'AAYYNNY YSYNSO
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' ' 'BMiM11 BA$E....s,,__ . ,, _., mm___,_.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, , , . _ . , _ _ _ ,, _ _ ,
kdOMMbitb.Uh;%'MINA+:NMov AO)$$'d'.z:DM)MSN)MN,DN5'#h t )[))>>N6$$ $. 4. 32.M"0 2'Yd; 4 $NEY6)hhMh $ / +/ d$gd')$ v = KUM.y y Mil.'M x x APPEICABELCf" !PFisinFfisFTiY61TP6Ff6FssiiEs SAFETY # ANALYSES sM(Ed6.ij_ hued)u'(man- n lslys,si,?F.,fif6li,eFit'6E,F,
- . - sip 6ases,tTsst.ihsEth.
a w s+t,sthi.['Fsi. w sUFriEB
- ~
- level,imustJ egma intained;.;sS60 3in chesyto; provider he i 10$mi n ute).a'ct i onj t i me3fosc or re cting]t ran s;i en t sh( Re f jj3 ).
The analysis shows that the pressurizer level required to. provide 10 minutes for operator action is dependent on the RCS' pressure at the start' of the' transient. f The pressurizip "' LTOP limit of 160 inches is based on th'e maximum RCS ' '^" pressure allowed b'y the plant < heatup and'cooldown' limit'i:'i The analys.is shews that with an RCS pressure of 214 psig, the pressurizer Tevel can be increased to 245 inches and still provide 10 minutes for operator' action during the' ' " ' stuck full-open makeup valve transient;
, Thsfp?bs16Mie 61si/elil inii tNi11 til s'o i bs?Fisaal ~0itiEf6?
compl i a n c ef e ac h:ht iseiP/T411 mi t sU bve s?a reirsv i s edl b5 s edia5 i thessultsnfith.elve.ssellsatAri;a]Burve.i))an el ~~~~ ^ RCSIVisFPiFf6FssREs WitTt efRCSTdsp'ressdFilsdRahalysesT:sh6Fa::vsntT6f h - 0275 f s quare s inche sii sicap'abl eTofs mi ti g ati ng sthe :Jtrassi ent
- pesn1'tihysff6inifu1M0bsnihg?6fsthe?nsk66pic6ntr61Wslys ~
WhilsstheimakeuhQ'bmpsisfprevidingsRCSimakeup$es0ltihss j 6 ffi?ibnts thitpan.sihht thi~sf.credibl.eh sss~i z eli si[dfestsNthanthsjifl bk
~~ ~ ~~ ~~ ' ~ " ~ ' ^ " ~ ^
TheiRCSWenti'sizeMillfalsdf belVeReysldatid ?f6Rd6mpilihEi each hff :iti mei P/s]Tsl theMeM imi t:fc0Fve s?arefrev~~~"~~'~ Dn(thialEj#MIMahjy~~~~ i sed dbsssdlo ntthsl I _hk _hkt _h $.R_$s_ihh k- L akh _h h _[hh._t hb h hk h.khfi.k.h - - _fki_lhF._hh i s . A a >4h h v .v a .y .M 7' brkd/ / '. X'[.%
'b k .' /NYb v V S CnstaHRijdh06it[3[
, {B(374552Eb Msshdssht96%l
i Q6Esyli~si
~~ E M ill i
j , n 84$ES M,E3sffKUTdf. - a n _ -._ _ _ _ _ _, _ ,n _ - ,., _ _ _.,_ , ,, ,n , _ _, [ wwwa-Nun maawusa m0u m uusmaumusmuuaumuwwwa:unussauzu m l LC,0((~' ~,.'Z]'?'Thf LCO^ r'eh51Fes"an'LTOP:Sfst'em"0PERABLETwith i'limitid _, t coolant; input capability 1and a pressure relief: capability ~.1 ~^ ] To limit"coolast input, the LCO requires'enly one makeup L pump OPERABLE,;the HP1 deactivated,'and the CFT dischargi isniation valves closed and immobilized. ' For pressure
^relief, it. requires'either,the pressurizer coolant,at 6
!. below a maximum levelcand the PORV OPERABLE wi setting at or below thesLTOP limit'or ,the' RCS de ressurii~e~d { pndf ven_t es t abl i shed . ' ^'~ ~ ^'" '" ~~"~~ ~ '"^ '^~~ p" ' ~ "^"~" " ' ' i ThE Riiitiffnd ,! MI@Fsifidif6.E9~nsk^ Es_F n iiiiWsif5Fiissfi'dfisTEEfi3R onwithoutitheruncertiintiesgapplj~6.d - c _-4 I ippl@pl~i6ttoperatim siisht.M. sssr.isistfu fore histe1Qnli. ed. 6Fd_ind_sfa_ttkQ1j_n66piFitthgj$diWEi.?
~ --- --.
f f.~-~6f NIN5NENNNISI$iENINEEI I TKs!POWHi!'OPERABLEGKshifi fs413ERSlilViMiffpinMili1Tif f I ist"6iht ibi. it i&[6pinishtlistEsetiointWshd%6tiseipousnji"s '~^ j Mal ldts(MjMggs{3gagg@Mygsk@gsf [@ys%ilist@itgl464fyilyliindstestiindik l ids ipfl.g..iiuEfi.w.g WEi.E.4.i,:$9.c-m. iRCsWiKfHi!dpERABEE36 int 6EsH 4 wi t. hi.a_n n a._re p .. . pg < 9:q
~
a: go f_a,,je m ..id,<.;IR.tsMih"l%pr.v a_til.e.a.s_teg0i7_5_s m - 4.y. s -- s w.+u.vmaxv.+ 4.+;+.vrom. m 4 su:.39m.,:x h::e>a v x.w i eonmemmexe 4 sm.v.w,zz - e wee.xam4 myy:wme-ma>wwymexemmewesme :a<eceuwww swwww* h,%;<W6NW' ) A iW$$%N5&i$Uk+$%,'%S%'.h Mi$ NXb$4&N;MU}AVS'* 4$$6$'NN'&NrW/MSVO4$%$:6$.b$$$;%WkO;0%$%$^0$%%%%W.'&%$%$$$$M&;4 %=h%>l%%$$&Nbkhb%%$kbk%h 1 i MMMLITY CThis^LCO' if~iiplicablf 16' MODE"4*w6en' RCS 'tempiFatufeTis"^] i i k 253'Ft in. MODE 5, and in MODE.6 when'the reactor vessel
- head is not> completely detensioned. The Applicabilityf~^' r l temperature accordance with of.Reference 253*F is established 1.'Jith the vessel byl analyses head in ~ >
- completely detensioned, overpressurization 'is not pBisibif,'
- - The' vessel.' head is' completely detensioned when the pre ~
! stress has been relieved from all of ~' the' "^ studs~ " , and ~ ~ the"'*60ts
^ " ^ ' ' '
F ar,e free; spinning; " ' ' ~ '^ '" ' a i l The~ AM1liibiliffTiFWdifiidTf~al' Hot ~e'itatihgith~atl'CFT i isolation is only required when the CFTJpressure is more
- than orEequal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existi6d ,
j' RCS> temperature, as' allowed in LCO 3.4.3. This: Note permits
- the CFT discharge' valve surveillance performedfonly under i these pressure and temperature; conditions.
1 i
! _ _ - _ _ , - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ m, ___
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' inoperable <or to required to: render'the other' pump (s)diate deactivation _
deactivate HPl. Emphasis is on imme i because inadvertent injection with one'or more HPI p6mp, L OPERABLE is the event of greatest significance, since it } causes ,the,grea_ test p_ressure, i_ncrease_in;the shortest2 timst.
~
RiiiuTrsd ~AEt io'i~ A' 1 ~1Tm6di fi e^d ~b'yT N6fi' that'4p' ~rsi fitw6 _ l pumps capable of, RCS injection, for s 15, minutes to allow for
- pump swaps.<
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! An"~udi'iolited ~CFT"rs~ qui ^fis~isoliti si'Githi'n? l~ hiur" only~'"w~hsd '~^^ l the CFT pressure,is at or gret.ter than'the maximum RCS ! ptessure for,the, existing 1 temperaturenallowed in,LCO 3l4"3E . ,_. ~ e . If;i_solatio,,n _is< neede_d and _can_not b_e accomplishe_d_i,1,h~ou,r, n ! Required Action'D.l_ and Required Action 0.2 provide two' ' ' ,. options,:either of which must'be ' performed ,in 12 hours'.^~ B9 2 increasing the RCS temperature to > 197'F,'the CFT pressure of 600 psig cannot exceed the LTOP limits if both tanks 'are
- fully injected.' Depressurizing the CFTs balow the LTOP'
j limit of,464 psig,also prevents, exceeding the, LTO,P,limiti[id the,same, event! ) E5hfisGidJ
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1 AtTidNSI ($csht.'N"h0[T*@CfRF?1?iN FI1Y2?4?filF6d4?fii' ntRt6siFFsissFir4RisvilissrrrtEssirs0NnEWirgtWagtse fo40pepstsEndt'i oninAlfAijfe ss0Feli n&PsiifsfiVeh$1s ~~'~~ FeducedMThe?postulst'edfeyentissstfaffectedsihnhdt! Top ilVsisissifdhifillis MDE$71s!fillerslof8ttisinakiuKdstrol@sy6d({fQg$dQsd jhs5fElssdhi(l6r WithM111har jeM tjjj] @ pidlj M Re 1 f 'rs s'torat l'on^ 'si t hi^n11 'h6'Or~'c Ann 6t " tie * 'icc'o mpl'1 shid i Required Actions F.1.I'and F.1;2, or F.2.1 and F.2.2', isst be performed within 12' hours. Actions' F.1.1 and,F.1.2 limif '^ ' the RCS pressure and pressurizer, level such that 'the'"~' allowable time'for operator action is'r10 minutes'with i
~
pressurizer level of (245 Jnches. Actions F J.I'and F.2.23 limit the makeup' capability by closing the makeup' control
'high valve and its' isolation pressurizer level,^ and valve,'rmit pe cooldown andwhich is not required, " ' ' ^ ' ' " ^ " "
a RCS heatup must be stopped because heat addition decreases ,. , the reactor coolant density,and increases the pressurizer ~ l level.' Operations'such as starting RC pumps and reducin decay hsat' removal shouldnot, be_ performed _when,in ,this ^g ! Egnditipa sil?WFFiii~d12 With~ihs'PORV'166)IFibl's,l'6i/eVpresi'urs fill'eilihy ^cIiiability is Icst,,and restoration of the PORV within I hourris required. If that'cannot be accomplished,,the,abilitf'5f the Makeup' System _to, ,ad,d_ _wat.e.r,mus.t be, *lim.ited .w,,ithin,,t.he _ ~
. .~ ..
If'ffstiFatis'n' Fannotbi"ciimplstidTwithid'l hou K ReW61 fed Action H,1 and Required Action' H.2 must be performed to . limit RCS' water' addition capability. Makeup is,not requir'ed . to be deactivated since it may be needed to, maintain the'RCS coolant level. ' Required Action H.1 and Regared Action H.2 require reducing the makeup tank level to 88 inches and deactivating the low low makeup tank level interlock'to"th'e borated water storage > tank.< ,This' makes' the available makeup water volume insufficient to exceed,the_LTOP , limit;by'a'~~' ' makeup control valve j full openingi ____ .______-____m____ T!E565EE!I-NAN.'N)$%dkhMd$b/2NhINIdeN $b M'MMNShI \ -bNdbNbEN b $N 'bbN Nb I N$E #N#' I ' ' #
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i ETORISiifiii
~BlE431
. BA. SE. S, , . . _ _ , _. _ . - , E$lN N/& Ahd@sYhr?'U' NYl Sb$N'Y' Nh N *N$Y. 4A hI$ f+ 4 / / l 0' S
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With ths~#essaf ffeF'le%1 'ibove'160 'in~chis~~and~ths"PORV inoperable or, the LTOP System' inoperable for any reason ~
'other than" cited in'Coridition A~through H, the system mJst be restored to OPERABLE status'within I hour,c When this is
not' possible', Rec uired Action 'I.2 requires the RCS^~ ~' ^ ^ depressurized anc vented within 12 hours;from the; time' e i t he r Cond i t i on 's t a rt ed .^~~ ^'"^~^ ~ ^^ ~^"~~' ' ~ " ^" ~^ '~ ^' ,~ One or more RCS vents may be used. A vent size of 2 0.75 square inches is specified. Such a vent keeps the pressure i from full flow of one Makeup pump with a, wide open makeup
~ ' ' ' " ' ~ '
E0A t rphyalle,withittleJC0_limitf ' ~
' ^
Th i s "s" lie ~ RCS ' Vent ~c'a'nW6t"%~ilst~a i n ' RC $ "p^Fei siif s' biYo?l' TOP limits,1f the HPI' or CFT: systems > are~ inadvertently actuated? Therefore, verification of the deactivation ' fotwo' Makeup'" pumps, HPI injection,'and the CFTs musj accompan'y,the ~ depressurizing and venting. Since these systams are required deactivated by the LCO, SR 3.4.1* ./ SR 3.4~11".2'~ , and SR 3.4.11.3 require verification of tneir deactivatied, status every 12 hours. ( ' yy.y. .y ;.; & v :cy.* vyyQ t A / .bsys WA q.$,33yjp g.gf M.yv.or'pp -y.y;g hdbf5$bd$'MMNNh5NNU8dRDNbbkhdf' EON 4NMiNNUbhb.#d3!ddbh$YhEhN60$dhkhCk+WNYgvifdkhNed '!dh'UN$bhskkhNkhNkUkbNM48@NE/Mbh$'hsh$hN$$hf);dyNU9MN;NMkIONd$$ k 'k!NkkdhbbhNYNbhMddNhhN$4$hMN) SURVEllIANCE3 F9Tfisif6116~nihiiTOWillTin&IWalidffiE6fWEs4HIElsififi?iE6WH R[WIR[!!EMSimjb$6hfat@2torregulaFlyiassesseconditions(forspotentiil[expg sufficien;t d eg rjd a t i o ngjiditQeli fy;jMratighjlth i n s t hej requpme n t s ? SRF3?4?11?l5 d$RU314I1112Fihd~SRU3?4M 1?3 Verifications must be performed that only one makeup pump is i capable of injecting into the RCS, the HPI is deactivated, and the CFT discharge isolation valves are' closed and" ~ ' ! immobilized, eThese Surveillances, ensure the minimum'66b1'aiit^ ' j input capability will,not ereate,an,RCS overpressure" i condition to challenge the LTOP System., The Surveillahde's arefeguired at 12, hour,,, intervals. N Hote" modifies SR 3.4;11'.3'by'only ' requiring' this Surveillance when CFT , isolation is r,equired,
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LTOPTSystem l B133411.1 i BA$Es ,~ ,
- - ,n.- _ ,_ _ , . _ ,. . .~,n..,,, ~ . _ , _ , , _ . - . _ . , . - o iM;Maher(& em ukes Jiw*A+ sam c:w.4 ~~ wwmW aan* di Au+4s.<# 44:4ss> emm >havreewis v d@.*MWauscWe;sAs. AN SURVEILLANCE C fSRM3?4? lit 4 REQUIREMENTS 1
Bi@$tlssdllI$$i~dfjijg6iji35thalifsisygfii@d;iVsHitM160g6Ensj[#2 other hdicationsgensuresia Edshtunio observing idtfidentWiz$scontroltroomrom@i lyFsvaill 6tintis1?us6 f
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' ooldown niust be' performed for' the LCO A~pplicability piFi6d c
When' temperature changes can cause pressurizers level variations.',This Frequency may be discontirued when~ths ends of these conditions'are satisfied, as defined in plant procedures. Thereafter, the Surveillance. is, required at 12 hour intervals. A@6[ sis 6d}fji57tfiEE$$$EIi6tREliO]hijbM$$IIEVilIllliiidy wh e.nj compMi ng]wi t hjLC0?314? l li b i SRIP37411135 ygSYfHiiWdithitiina? POREfbTBEEii10sME6)iWTsHIUVss?i
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When 'stijiulat'ed b7 LCO 3 4'.11b,7the' RCS'sintiof ^'at7 14a'stl 0.75 square inch' must be verified'open for relief ^"' ' ~ ~~
'rotection. For an unlock'ed vent opening, the Frs4066c~y*is p
every 12 hours. For a' locked vent opening in the RCS,, the required Frequency is every 31 days. j I AINdtelm6di ib@]$hginitBC0$ fi ssithii!SRibi@jfegn.iiiny"s fill
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- SURVEILLANCEb iSRW3?4?llil )
REQUIREMENTS
@MyohMuidLLA, CHANNEL' FUNCTIONAL' TEST is required wIthin'12~hou'rst b'e fore or' after' decreasing: RCS',temperatur,e'to 5 253'F and'every 4
31 days thereafter to ensure thetsetpoint is'properffor
'using the PORV for.LTOPM PORV actuation Ts,~not ~
needed,^"as
' " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " '
i it, could 'depressurize the RCS. '~~ ~ '~"~ Thi12"hou^r~ffe40eW6) 'c^ossideEs' th^ "Ohl'1 e k&11hbid ~dfl^al^;1oQ ,
,temperaturg.oyerprAssureeven,t,during;the' time {
SRW.'4?l'Is 8
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_ _ . . _ . - . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . . _ . . ~ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ i ECCS -Operating B 3.5.2 , h ! BASES 1 BACKGROUND safety valves. The LPI pumps are capable of discharging to (continued) the RCS at an RCS pressure of approximately 200 psia. When
- . the BWS7 has been nearly emptied, the suction for the.LPI j_ pumps.. is . manually transferred to the reactor building emergency semp. The HPI pumps cannot take suction directly i from the sump. If.HPI is still needed, a cross connect from
- the discharge side;of the LPI pump to the suction'of the HPI'- i
~i
[ pum)s would be opened. -This is known as " piggy backing" HPI to PI, and enables continued HPI to the RCS, if needed, after the BWST is emptied to the.switchover point. In the long term cooling period, ' flow paths ~ in the LPI . System can be established to preclude the possibility of . boric acid in the core region reaching an unacceptably high concentration. One flow path is from the hot leg through ' the decay heat suction line and then in a reverse direction l' through the reactor building emergency sum) suction line into the sump. The other flow path uses t1e gaps between
~
4 the hot leg nozzles and the reactor vessel. These. gaps F provide a flow path between the outlet annulus and the inlet
- - nozzle /downcomer region of the reactor vessel. Either flow path is capable of providing the required flow rates to
- ensure boron precipitation is not a concern.
i HPI also functions to sup)ly borated water to the reactor core following increased leat removal events, such as large
- ' SLBs.
4 Durin- low temper ture : nditi:n: in the RCS, limit:tica: , are placed en the ::xt=== nu=Ser of HPI/ Makeup pu=p: that j- Or: ::p:ble Of injecting int the RCS. Th::: .icit:ticn:
- cre p;rt ;f the pl nt
- L;w T per:ture Overprc::ure
[ Pr tecti n (LTOP) :dmini:tr:tive centr:1 .
- i. .During a large break LOCA, RCS pressure will decrease to
- < 200 psia in < 20 seconds. The ECCS is actuated upon
[ receipt of an Engineered Safeguards Actuation _ System ESAS) signal. The actuation of safeguard loads is accompli hed in i a' programmed time sequence. If offsite power is available, i the safe uard loads start immediately (in the programmed , sequence . If offsite power is not available, the engineered safety. feature (ESF) buses shed normal operating loads and are connected to the diesel generators. Safeguard loads are then actuated in the programmed time sequence. ' The time delay associated with diesel starting, sequenced loading, and pump starting determines the time required (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-10 Revi:ica M . S
l ECCS-Operating j B 3.5.2 l l 1 BASES (continued) . 1 ACTIONS ad ! With one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the inoperable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. The 72 hour Completion Time. is based on NRC recommendations (Ref. 3) that are based on a risk evaluation and is a reasonable time for many repairs. An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not ccpable of delivering the design flow to the RCS. The LC0 requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. The intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment such that the safety injection (SI) flow equivalent to 100% of a single train remains available. This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable. An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref 3) has shown the risk of having one full ECCS. train inoperable to be sufficiently low to justify continued operation for 72 hours. With one or more components inoperable such that the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is not available, the facility is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be immediately entered. This Condition dec not pply te HPI subsystem cc penents which Orc de:ctivated for the purpc::: cf cc: plying with Low Temper:turc Overprc::ure Prctcctica (LTOP) administrative centrol cc=itment:. With the: cc penent: deactivated, the HPI :ub:y:ttm still cen:idered OPEP/SLE b::cd upon guidance in NRC Ccncric Letter 91 10. Thi guid:nce :llcw; substitut4cn of ::nu;l Operatcr ;ctica for otherwisc (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-15 Rev4cica Nc. 5
i i ECCS-Operating 4 B 3.5.2 t 4
. BASES 1
ACTIONS.. =t::: tic f= ti=: f r the purp:::: Of deter =ining
' (continued)_ OPEPfa!LITY. The ::b:tituti=: :r: li;;Med .nc ==t b F eve hated :g:in:t th: :::::pti=: in ec = id=t =:1y:i:.
'In th: :::: Of d:::tiv: ting "PI f:r LTOP :t RCS t =p;r:ter:
i 1203 *F,' th: :::p==t: :r: =:ihble f r inj :ti= l' felhwhg ===1 per:ter ::ti= te r::t:r: th: :y:t= te 0?E??" ! .t .t= =d tSh =th = k ==.7,'. thd W.ith th: t!.: fr=:~:: g!r:d t: r::;::d t: th:
- tr=
- i=t/:::id=t. ,
B .1 - an' d B' . 2 - , If the inoperable components cannot be returned to OPERABLE '
- , status' within the associated Completion Times, the plant '
j must be placed in a MODE.in which the LC0 does not apply. . To achieve this status, the. plant must be placed in at least 1 MODE 3 within 6 hours and at least MODE. 4 within 12 hours, i The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on i operating experience,-to reach the required plant conditions j from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without
- . challenging plant systems, i
a i
- SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 I REQUIREMENTS .
F Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, i- and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS- l l operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are
- locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. These valves
] include valves in the main flow paths and the first norma'.ly 1 closed valve in a branch line. There are several exceptions for val.v e position verification due to the low potential for
.these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types
- which are not verified as part of this SR include vent or- y drain valves (both inside'and outside the RB), relief valves
- outside the RB, instrumentation valves (both inside and L outside' the RB), check. valves (both inside and outside the i RB), and sample line valves (inside and outside.the RB). A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided.the valve will automatically reposition'within the proper stroke time. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, (continued)
Crystal: River Unit 3 B 3.5-16 Revi:i= N . 5
ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES LCO .During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is (continued) required to provide an abundant supply of water from the BWST to the RCS, via the ECCS pumps and their respective discharge flow paths, to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles and the reactor vessel. In the long term, this flow I path may be switched to take its supply from the-reactor building emergency sump and to supply its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs. This LC0 is modified by a Note which states that HPI may be deactivatedinaccordancewith(CDMMily})jlowTemperature OverpressureProtection(LTOP) Sjl "5L ...i st rct i ve hen @ req [uiredtoinitiateHPI. ccrtrch. Operator action is t In the event of a loss of coolant accident. (LOCA) requiring HPI actuation, the time required for operator action has been shown by analysis to be acceptable. l l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the OPERABILITY requirements for the ECCS are covered by LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS-Operating." In MODE 4 with the RCS temperature below 280*F, one . OPERABLE ECCS train is acceptable without single failure l consideration, on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling l requirements, j l In MODES 5 and 6, plant conditions are such that the i probability of an event requiring ECCS injection is extremely low. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are , addressed by LC0 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE. 5, Loops Filled," I and -LC0 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." ! MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LC0 3.9.4, i
" Decay Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation-High Water '
Level," and LCO 3.9.5, " Decay Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level." l (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-21 Amendment No. 449
m.- _ - . _ _ _ ... _ - , _ . _ _ _ _ _ - . - . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . i ECCS-Shutdown ) B 3.5.3 i 1 l I y BASES-(continued) i } ACTIONS ad i If no LPI subsystem is OPERABLE, the unit is not arepared to
- respond to a LOCA or to continue cooldown using t1e DHR/LPI
. pumps and decay-heat heat exchangers.- The.immediate Completion Time ensures that prompt action is initiated-to
. restore the required cooling capacity. Normally, in MODE 4, reactor decay heat must be removed by a DHR/LPI train j F operating with suction from the RCS. _If no DHR/LPI train is
'0PERABLE for this. function, reactor decay heat must be.
j removed by some alternate' method, such as use of the steam
- generator (s) (OTSG). The alternate means of heat removal -
! must continue until the inoperable ECCS LPI subsystem can be restored to operation so that continuation of decay heat removal (DHR) is provided. j= i Bd -l l l If no ECCS HPI subsystem is OPERABLE, due to the inoperability of the HPI pump or flow path from the BWST, ^ the plant is not prepared to provide high pressure response
- j. to Design Basis Events requiring ECCS response. The I hour Completion Time to restore at.least one ECCS HPI subsystem ,
to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt-action is taken to , provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions ; 3 to place the plant in MODE 5, where an ECCS train is not l
; required.
> This Condition does not apply to HPI subsystem components l which are deactivated for the purposes of complying with 1%d ~~ I j )fsh
} .tini:tr:tiv: :=tr:1 ::=it=nt:.TGQiMLowTemperatureOverpre With these components' deactivated, the HPI subsystem is still . considered OPERABLE based upon guidance in NRC Generic i i Letter 91-18.- This guidance allows substitution of manual l 1 operator action for otherwise automatic functions for the i purposes of determining OPERABILITY. The substitutions are
! limited and must be evaluated against the assumptions in the j accident analysis. In the case of deactivating HPI in MODE
- 4, the components are available for injection following manual operator. action to restore the system to OPERABLE
, status and this action can be accomplished within the time frame required to respond to the transient / accident. F i-0 (continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-22 Amendment No. 449
f , i l FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 1 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72
- . TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NOTICE 213, REVISION 0
- REVISION BAR PAGES Technical Specifications i
l l l l
LTOP System 3.4.11 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.11 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System LC0 3.4.11 . An LTOP System shall be OPERABLE with a maximum'of one ! makeup pump capable of injecting into the RCS, high pressure in'jection (HPI) deactivated, the core flood tanks (CFTs) l isolated and: I
- a. Pressurizer level s 160 inches and an OPERABLE power operated relief valve (PORV) with a lift setpoint of _
s 464 psig; or '
- b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent of 2 0.75 square inch.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when RCS temperature is s 253*F, MODE 5, MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is not completely detensioned.
----------------------------NOTE----------------------------
CFT isolation is only required when CFT pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS temperature allowed by the pressure and temperature limit curves provided in the PTLR. E k l -Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21 Amendment No. l
. _ . - _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ .._ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . . _ . . . . . _ . . . - . ~ . _ . . . . . _ _ . - _ . _ _ . . _
l LTOP System 3.4.11 i I ACTIONS l, CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l
'A. More than one makeup A.1 --------NOTE--------- )
pump' capable of Two makeup pumps may be- . injecting into the capable of injecting )
- RCS. into the RCS during i pump swap operation for 1 s 15 minutes.
j Initiate action to Immediately 1 verify only one makeup l pump is capable of l l injecting into the RCS. i B. HPI capable of B.1 Initiate action to Immediately l actuation. verify HPI deactivated. C. A CFT not isolated C.1 Isolate affected CFT. I hour when CFT pressure is greater than or equal !
.to the maximum RCS-pressure for. existing temperature allowed.in the-PTLR. ,
i i D. Required Action C.1 D.1 Increase RCS :12 hours not met within the : temperature to > 197'F. ;
-required Completion Time. QB D.2 Depressurize affected 12 hours :
CFT to < 464 psig..
'E. Pressurizer level E.1 Restore pressurizer 1 hour
> 160 inches. level' to s 160 inches.
(continued) b Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21A Amendment-No.
LTOP System 3.4.11 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action E.1 F.1.1 Depressurize RCS to 12 hours 3 not met within the s 214 psig required Completion Time. MQ F.1.2 Maintain Pressurizer 12 hours level s 245 inches 98 F.2.1 Close and maintain 12 hours closed the makeup control valve and its associated isolation valve. MD F.2.2 Stop RCS heatup. 12 hours G. PORV inoperable. G.1 Restore PORV to I hour OPERABLE status. H. Required Action G.1 H.1 Reduce makeup tank 12 hours not met within the level to s 88 inches. required Completion Time. AND H.2 Deactivate low low 12 hours makeup tank level interlock to the borated water storage , tank suction valves. 1 (continued) l I I l Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-218 Amendment No.
LTOP System < 3.4.11- , ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l I. Pressurizer level I.1- Restore LTOP System to I hour ,
> 160 inches. OPERABLE status. '
bhD 98 PORV inoperable. I.2 Depressurize RCS and 12 hours. establish RCS vent of
- QB 2 0.75 square inch.
LTOP System inoperable for any reason other than Condition A through Condition H. , 1 l 1 Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21C Amendment No.
LTOP System 3.4.11
-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY .SR '3.4.11.1 Verify a maximum of one makeup pump is 12 hours
, capable of injecting into the RCS, SR 3.4.11.2- Verify'HPI is deactivated.- 12 hours SR 3.4.11.3 -----------NOTE-------------- Only required to.be performed. when -CFT . isolation is required Verify each CFT. isolation 12 hours valve is closed and deactivated. SR '3.4.11.4 --------------NOTE-------------- 30 minutes
- Not required to be performed during RCS when complying with LC0 3.4.11.b heatup and
-------------------------------- cooldown Verify pressurizer level is AND s 160 inches.
12 hours SR 3.4.11.5 --------------NOTE--------------- Not required to be performed When complying with LC0 3.4.11.b Verify PORV block valve is open. 12 hours
-SR- 3L.4.11.6 --------------NOTE----------------
Only required when complying with LC0 3.4.11.b. Verify RCS vent 10.75 square inch 12 hours for is open. unlocked. vent opening (s) 88Q 31 days for locked vent opening (s) (continued) Crystal-River Unit 3 3.4-21D Amendment No.
, .. -~ . - . . . . . . . - . . . . - . . . . - _ . . - . . - - - - - . _ . - . . - -
i' J
' LTOP System i 3.4.11.
- 4 i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS- (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
,SR 3.4.11.7 Perform CHANNEL FUNCl(0NAL TEST for Within 12 !
PORV. hours:before or after decreasing ; RCS temperature-to i 253*F-ANQ 31 days : thereafter SR 3.4.11.8 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for PORV. 24 months SR 3.4.11.9 --------------NOTE---------------- > Not required to be performed when ' complying with LC0 3.4.11.b , Verify PORV is selected to the low range 12 hours setpoint.
'l i
I l Crystal River Unit' 3- 3.4-21E Amendment No.
i ECCS--Shutdown 3.5.3 t l .3.5= EMERGENCY CORE COOLING. SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.3 ECCS--Shutdown LC0 3.5.3 One ECCS train shall be OPERABLE.
.......................-----N0TE-------------------------
p High pressure injection (HPI).may be deactivated in ! accordance with LCO 3.4.11, " Low Temperature Overpressure L Protection (LTOP) System." l l APPLICABILITY: MODE 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i I A. Required low pressure A.1 Initiate action to Immediately injection (LPI) restore required LPI subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE E status. , t t B. Required HPI subsystem B.I Restore required HPI 1 hour inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status. I C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 5. 24 hours L associated Completion
' Time not met.
i' l.
-Crystal River Unit 3 3.5-6 Amendment No.
$ 1 i- FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION
- CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3
- DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 9
l' i-. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE. REQUEST NOTICE 213, REVISION 0 i i l REVISION BAR PAGES Bases
Pressurizer Safety Valves B 3.4.9 'B'3.4.LREACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)' .B 3.4.9 Pressurizer' Safety Valves BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the two' spring loaded pressurizer safety valves is to provide RCS overpressure protection. Operating
'in conjunction with the Reactor Protection System (RPS), two valves are used to ensure that-the. Safety. Limit.-(SL) of- )
2750 psig is not exceeded for analyzed transients during operation in MODES 1,.2,'and 3. For MODE 4, MODE 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head not completely . detensioned, overpressure protection is provided by LC0 3.4.11, " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection.(LTOP) System." 1 The self actuated pressurizer safety valves are designed in -l accordance with the requirements set forth in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III (Ref. 1). The required lift pressure is 2500 psig i 2%. The safety valves discharge steam from the pressurizer to the reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT) located in the containment. The discharge i flow is indicated by acoustic monitors downstream of the safety valves and by an increase in RCDT pressure and level. The upper and lower pressure limits were originally based on the i 1% tolerance requirement for lifting pressures above 1000 psig. However, later versions'of the ASME Code allow
.for tolerances of up to 3%, and the use of 2% was justified in Reference 2. The lift setting is for the ambient conditions associated with MODES 1, 2, and 3. This requires either that the valves be set hot or that a correlation between hot and' cold settings be established.
The pressurizer safety valves are part of the primary success path and mitigate the effects of postulated accidents. OPERABILITY of the safety valves ensures that the RCS pressure will be limited to less than 110% of design pressure. (continued) Crystal- River Unit 3 8 3.4-43 Amendment No.
- Pressurizer Safety Valves i B 3.4.9 f BASES i-i i APPLICABILITY reactor coolant pressure less than 110% of its design value r -(continued) during certain accidents.
i 6 The LC0 is not applicable in MODES 4 and 5 because LCO 3.4.11. " Low Temperature.0verpressure Protection (LTOP) System" provides overpressure protection. Overpressure 4 protection is not required in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel
- j. head completely detensioned. I Y
i ACTIONS A.d i-l With one pressurizer safety valve inoperable, restoration i must take place within 15 minutes. The Completion Time of
- 15 minutes reflects the importance of maintaining the RCS i overpressure protection system. An inoperable safety valve i coincident with a design basis overpressure event could l challenge the integrity of the RCS.
I B.1 and B.2 f If the Required Action cannot be met within the associated
- - Completion Time or if both pressurizer safety valves are-4 inoperable, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The specified Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 4 and below, overpressure protection is provided by LTOP. Placing the plant in a lower MODE (3 and 4). reduces the RCS energy (thermal and pressure), lowers the potential for large pressurizer insurges, and thereby removes the need for overpressure protection by two pressurizer safety valves.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.9.1 REQUIREMENTS The requirement to verify lift setpoint 2 2450 psig and 12550 psig is implemented in the Inservice Testing Program. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-45 Amendment No.
LTOP System : B 3.4.11
- 8. 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) .
- B 3.4.11 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System i 1
o j BASES J BACKGROUND. The LTOP System controls RCS pressure at low temporatures so 4 the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPT!) is not compromised by violating the pressure and temperature (P/T) limits of ASME Code Section XI, Division 1, Code Case N-514 (Ref. 1). The reactor vessel is the-
- limiting RCPB component for providing such protection.
The reactor vessel material is less tough at reduced p temperatures than at normal operating temp'erature. Also, as vessel neutron irradiation accumulates, the material becomes
- less resistant to pressure stress at low temperatures
- (Ref. 2). RCS pressure must be maintained low when l- temperature is low and must be increased only as temperature
! is increased. I . The RCS temperatures referenced throughout this LC0 and
- - Bases are based on the same criteria as is used for heatup i and cooldown monitoring (Refer to LC0 3.4.3). Specifically, i the cold leg temperature should be used with RCPs operating i and the decay heat outlet temperature should be used with no j RCPs operating.
[ Operational maneuvering during cooldown, heatup, or any anticipated operational occurrence must be controlled to not [
- violate LC0 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T)
}- Limits.." Exceeding these limits could lead to brittle fracture of the reactor vessel. LC0 3.4.3 presents requirements for administrative control of RCS pressure and temperature to prevent exceeding the P/T limits. This LCO provides RCS overpressure protection in the applicable MODES by ensuring an adequate pressure relief capacity and a limited coolant addition capability. The pressure relief capacity requires either the power operated relief valve (PORV) lift setpoint to be reduced and pressurizer coolant level at or below a maximum limit or the RCS depressurized with an RCS vent of sufficient size to handle the limiting transient during LTOP. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52 Amendment No.
h LTOP'ystem S B 3.4.11 BASES. BACKGROUND The LTOP approach to protecting the vessel by limiting ' (continued) -coolant addition-capability allows-a maximum of one makeup pump, and requires deactivating HPI,'and isolating the core flood tanks (CFTs) when CFT pressures exceed the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS temperature allowed by PTLR.
.Should more than one HPI pump inject on an HPI actuation, ,
the pressurizer level and PORV or another RCS vent cannot prevent overpressurizing the RCS. , The pressurizer. level limit provides a compressible vapor , space or cushion that can accommodate a coolant insurge and .: prevent a rapid pressure increase, allowing the operator ; time to stop the increase. The PORV, with reduced lift setting, or the RCS vent, is the overpressure protection device that acts as backup'to the operator in terminating an . increasing' pressure event. l With HPI deactivated, the ability to 3rovide RCS coolant . addition'is restricted. To balance tie possible need for coolant addition, the LC0 does not require the Makeup System to be deactivated. Due to the lower pressures associated with the' LTOP MODES and the expected decay heat levels, the Makeup System can provide flow with the OPERABLE makeup pump a through the makeup control valve. HPI can be restored by 1 operator action. PORV Reauirements As designed for the LTOP System, the PORV is signaled to open if the RCS pressure approaches a limit set in the LTOP actuation circuit. The LTOP actuation circuit is the circuit'which opens the PORV at the low pressure setpoint. The LTOP actuation circuit monitors RCS pressure and. ; determineswhenanoverpressureconditionisapproached. ! When the monitored pressure meets or exceeds tae setting, i the PORV is signaled to open. Maintaining the setpoint ! within the limits of the LCO ensures the Reference 1 limits ' will be met in any. event analyzed for.LTOP. When a PORV is opened in an increasing pressure transient, the release of coolant causes the pressure increase to slow and reverse. . As_ the. PORV releases coolant, the RCS pressure decreasas until a reset pressure is reached and the valve is sign.~.ed to close. The pressure continues to decrease below th reset pressure as the valve closes. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52A Amendment No.
LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES BACKGROUND RCS Vent Reouirements (continued) Once the RCS is depressurized, a vent exposed to the cor.tainment atmosphere will maintain the RCS at ambient containment pressure in an RCS overpressure transient, if the relieving requirements of. the maximum credible LTOP transient do not exceed the capabilities of the vent. Thus, the vent path must be capable of relieving the flow of the limiting LTOP transient and maintaining pressure below LTOP limits. The required vent capacity may be provided by one or more vent paths. For an RCS vent to meet the flow capacity, it requires removing a pressurizer safety valve, or similarly establishing a vent by removing an OTSG primary side manway cover or primary side handhole cover, or other vents as determined to be sufficient. The vent path (s) must be above the level of reactor coolant, so as not to drain the RCS
.when open.
l I APPLICABLE Analyses (Ref. 3) demonstrate that the reactor vessel SAFETY ANALYSES can be adequately protected against overpressurization transients during shutdown. At 253'F and below, overpressure prevention is provided by an OPERABLE PORV and a restricted coolant level in the pressurizer or by a ; depressurized RCS and a sufficient size RCS vent. l The actual temperature at which the pressure in the P/T limit curve can fall below the PORV setpoint increases as vessel material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement. Each time the P/T limit curves are revised, the LTOP System will be re-evaluated to ensure that its functional requirements can still be met with the PORV and pressurizer level method or the depressurized and vented RCS condition. Transients that are capable of overpressurizing the RCS have been identified and evaluated (Ref. 4). These transients relate to either mass input or heat input: actuating the HPI System, discharging the CFTs, energizing the pressurizer heaters, failing the makeup control valve open, losing decay heat removal, starting a reactor coolant pump (RCP) with a (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-528 Amendment No.
LTOP System , B 3.4.11 BASES APPLICABLE large temperature mismatch between the primary and secondary SAFETY ANALYSES coolant systems, and adding nitrogen to the pressurizer. (continued) HPI actuation and CFT discharge are the transients that result in exceeding P/T limits within < 10 minutes, in which time no operator action is assumed to take place. In the rest, operator action after that time precludes overpressurization. The analyses demonstrate that the time allowed for operator action is adequate, or the events are , self limiting and do not exceed LTOP limits. The following are required during the LTOP MODES to ensure that transients do not occur, which either of the LTOP j overpressure protection means cannot handle:
- a. Deactivating all but on makeup pump;
- b. Deactivating HPI; and !
- c. Immob'ilizing CFT discharge isolation valves in their closed positions, when CFT pressure is greater than the PTLR limit. i l
The Reference 3 analyses demonstrate the PORV can maintain l RCS pressure below limits when only one makeup pump is actuated. Consequently, the LC0 allows only one makeup pump to be OPERABLE in the LTOP MODES. Inadvertent actuation of HPI can cause the RCS pressure to exceed the LTOP limits determined by Reference 3 sooner than the 10 minutes allowed. Consequently, HPI must be deactivated by assuring that an inadvertent HPI actuation can not inject water into the RCS through the HPI valves. The isolated CFTs must have their discharge valves closed and the valve power breakers in their onen positions. The i analyses show the effect of CFT discharge is over a narrower RCS temperature range (197'F and below) than that of the LC0 ' (253*F and below). Analyses performed per Reference 1 established the temperature of LT0P Applicability at 253*F. The vessel materials were assumed to have a neutron irradiation accumulation ec3ual to 15 effective full power years (EFPYs) of operation and plant operation is assumed to be in compliance with the RCS heatup and cooldown limitations of (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 3 3.4-52C Amendment No.
l,
.]
LTOP' System B 3.4.11 L I BASES-APPLICABLE' LC0 3.4'.3. In addition, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) SAFETY-ANALYSES operation is assumed to be restricted to greater than 85'F. ,
.(continued) for the first two pumps, and greater than 225*F for pump !
three. Pump _four operation is not considered for LTOP. I This LC0'wil1~ deactivate the HPI actuation when the RCS temperature is s 253*F. The consequences of a1small break LOCA in LTOP MODE 4 are consistent with those discussed in , the bases for LC0 3.5.3, "ECCS-Shutdown," by'having a : maximum of one makeup _ pump OPERABLE for the required one ! OPERABLE ECCS train. i Reference 3 contains the acceptance limits that satisfy the l LTOP requirements. These limits, in combination with the limitations of LC0 3.4.3, and administrative restrictions on . RCP operation, provide the assurance that the reactor vessel j l
.is protected from exceeding the requirenients of ASME Code
!- Case N-514. Any change to the RCS operation or design must be evaluated against these analyses to determine the impact of the change on the LTOP acceptance limits. , PORV Performance Analyses (Ref. 3) show that the vessel is protected when the , PORV is set to open at s 464 psig. The PORV setpoint at or below the derived limit ensures the requirements of ASME ' Code Case N-514 (Reference 1) will be met. _; I The PORV setpoint will be re-evaluated for compliance when ; the revised P/T limits conflict with the LTOP analysis :
' limits. . The P/T limits are periodically modified as the !
reactor vessel material toughness decreases due to embrittlement induced by neutron irradiation. Revised-P/T ; limits.are determined using neutron fluence projections and
~
the results of examinations of the reactor vessel material i irradiation surveillance specimens. The Bases for LCO 3.4.3 l discuss these examinations. ; The PORV is considered an active component. Therefore, its ' i failure represents the worst case LTOP single active failure. 4 t d I ! (continued) s
-Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52D Amendment No. ,
l i
i l LTOP System B 3.4.11 i' L BASES- , APPLICABLE Pressurizer Level Performance .;
- 4. SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) ' Analyses of operator response time'show that the pressurizer level must be maintained s 160 inches to provide the '
4 10 minute action time for correcting transients. (Ref. 3) i The' analysis shows that the pressurizer level required to' l provide 10 minutes for operator action is dependent on the RCS pressure at the start of the transient. The pressurizer : LTOP limit of 160 inches is based on the maximum RCS pressure allowed by the plant heatup and cooldown limits. i' The analysis shows that with an RCS pressure of 214 psig, , the pressurizer level can be increased to 245 inches and still provide 10 minutes for operator action during the ; j stuck full-open makeup valve transient. ; The pressurizer _ level limit will- also be re-evaluated for , i compliance each time P/T limit curves are revised based on ;
- the' results of the . vessel material surveillance. ]
'RCS Vent Performance With the RCS desressurized, analyses show a vent of ,
- i. 0.75 square incies is capable of mitigating the transient -
resulting from full opening of the makeup control valve 1
- while the makeup pump is providing RCS makeup. The capacity i
- of a vent this size is greater than the flow resulting from-l this credible transient. ,
The RCS vent size will also.be re-evaluated for compliance 4 each time P/T limit curves are revised based on the results .i
- of the vessel material . surveillance.
j .The vent is passive and is not subject to active failure. c , (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52E Amendment No. ) l l i i
o LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES -(continued) LC0 The'LC0 requires an LTOP System OPERABLE with a limited. coolant-input capability-and a pressure relief capability. To limit coolant input,-the LC0 requires'only one makeup pump OPERABLE, the.HPI deactivated, and the CFT discharge-isolation valves closed and immobilized. For pressure relief, it requires either the-pressurizer coolant at:or below a maximum level and the PORV OPERABLE with a lift setting at or below the LTOP limit or the RCS depressurized and a vent established. NOTE: The limits and . values presented in 'this LC0 are not corrected for. instrument uncertainty and should not be used for plant operation without the uncertainties applied appropriately in accordance with plant operating guidance. The pressurizer is available with a coolant level s 160 inches. The.PORV is OPERABLE when its block valve is open, its lift setpoint is set at s 464 psig and testina has proven its ability to open at that setpoint, and motive power is available to the PORV and the PORV control circuits. For the depressurized RCS, an RCS vent is OPERABLE when open with an area of at least 0.75 square inches. LAPPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in MODE 4 when RCS temperature is s 253'F, in MODE 5, and in MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is not completely detensioned. The Applicability temperature of 253*F is established by analyses in 1 accordance'with Reference 1. With the vessel head i completely detensioned, overpressurization is not possible. The vessel head is completely.detensioned when the pre-stress has been relieved from all of the studs, and the nuts are free spinning. The Applicability is modified by a Note stating that CFT isolation is only required when the CFT pressure is more- j than or equal to the n:aximum RCf pressure for the existing . RCS temperature, as allowed _ in LCO 3.4.3. This Note permits the CFT discharge valve surveillance performed only under-these pressure and temperature conditions. (continued) Crystal Riter Unit 3- B 3.4-52F Amendment No.
LTOP System B 3.4.11
. BASES-(continued)
' ACTIONS- Allowable times are specified in the LC0 to implement the actions and controls described below. These times range 1 from immediately to 12 hours. The times'are based on operational and industry experience and regulatory recommendations. The. times are intended to balance the time necessary to accomplish the actions and the likelihood of experiencing a limiting transient during the action. A.1 and B.1 With two or more makeup pumps capable of injecting into the RCS or if the HPI is activated, immediate actions are required to render the other pump (s) inoperable or to ' deactivate HPI. Emphasis is on immediate deactivation ; because inadvertent injection with one or more HPI pump l OPERABLE is the event of greatest significance, since it ; causes the greatest pressure increase in the shortest time. . Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note-that permits two pumps capable of RCS injection for s 15 minutes to allow for , pump swaps. The deactivation of HPI is accomplished by assuring that an inadvertent HPI actuation can not inject water into the RCS through the HPI valves. This may be accomplished by combinations of equipment as determined appropriate for the existing plant conditions such as, disabling all HPI valves or disabling all Makeup pumps. If powered components are . < used to accomplish deactivation, power should be ren.oved to assure positive lockout, i C.1. D.1. and D.2 An.unisolated CFT requires isolation within I hour only when the CFT pressure is at or greater than the maximum RCS : pressure for the existing temperature allowed in LCO 3.4.3. I If isolation is needed and cannot be accomplished in I hour, Required Action D.1 and Required Action D.2 provide two options, either of which must be performed in 12 hours. By
. increasing the RCS-temperature to > 197'F. the CFT pressure of 600-psig cannot exceed the LTOP limits if both tanks are .
fully injected. . Depressurizing the CFTs below the LTOP ! limit of 464 psig also prevents exceeding the LTOP limits in ' the same event. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52G Amendment No. 1
~ . .. .. - - . . - . - - - . - . - . . . . .-- - . - - - . . -
4 LTOP System
-B 3.4.11 BASES j
ACTIONS.. E.1. F.1.1. F.1.2. F.2.1. and F.2.2 l.
.(continued)
'With the pressurizer level more than 160 inches, the time
-for operator action in a' pressure increasing-event-is l reduced. The postulated event most affected in the LTOP l MODES is failure of the makeup control valve, which fills ]
the pressurizer relatively rapidly. Restoration is required ' within I hour. If restoration within I hour cannot be accomplished, . Required Actions F.1.1'and F.1.2, or F.2.1 and F.2.2, must a be performed within 12 hours. Actions F.1.1 and F.1.2 limit ! the RCS pressure and pressurizer level such that the allowable time for operator action is ;t 10 minutes with a pressurizer level of s 245 inches. Actions F.2.1 and F.2.2- , limit the makeup capability _by closing the makeup control i valve-and its isolation valve, which is not required with a , high pressurizer level, and permit'cooldown and depressurization to continue. When the. makeup is isolated, , RCS heatup.must be stopped because heat addition decreases i the reactor coolant density and increases the pressurizer level. Operations such as starting RC pumps and reducing decay heat removal should not be performed when in this condition. 7 G.I. H.1. and H.2 ? With the: PORV inoperable, overpressure relieving capability
- is lost, and restoration of the PORV within I hour is. 1 required. If that cannot be accomplished, the ability of ;
the Makeup System to add water must be limited within the next 12 hours. If restoration cannot be completed within 1 hour, Required Action'H.1 and Required Action H.2 must be performed to l limit RCS water addition capability. Makeup is not required to be deactivated since it may be needed to maintain the RCS coolant level. Required Action H.1 and Required Action H.2 > require reducing the makeup tank leve' to 88 inches and deactivating the low low makeup tank : vel interlock to the ' borated water storage tank. This mak )he available makeup water volume insufficient to exceed ths ~0P limit by a makeup control valve full opening. (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-52H Amendment No. ;
i LTOP System
- B 3.4.11
= BASES ACTIONS I.1 and I.2
-(continued)
With the pressurizer level above 160 inches and the PORV . inoperable or the LTOP System inoperable for any reason
- other than cited in Condition A through H, the system must ,
be restored to OPERABLE status within 1-hour. When this is not possible, Required Action I.2 requires the RCS depressurized and vented within 12 hours from the time either Condition started. One or more RCS vents may be used. A vent size of 2 0.75 square inches is specified. Such a vent keeps the pressure from full flow of one Makeup pump with a wide open makeup control valve within the LC0 limit.
< This size RCS vent cannot maintain RCS pressure below LTOP_.
limits if the HPI or CFT systems are inadvertently actuated. Therefore, verification of the deactivation of two Makeup pumps, HPI injection, and the CFTs must accompany the depressurizing and venting. Since these systems are i required deactivated by the LCO, SR 3.4'.11.1, SR 3.4.11.2, and SR 3.4.11.3 require verification of their deactivated status every 12 hours. ,
. SURVEILLANCE The following surveillance requirement frequencies are shown J
REQUIREMENTS by operating experience and industry accepted practice to be sufficient to regularly assess conditions for potential degradation and to verify operation within the requirements. SR 3.4.11.1. SR 3.4.11.2 and SR 3.4.11.3 ; 1 Verifications must be performed that only one makeup pump is ; capable of injecting into the RCS, the HPI is deactivated, ! and the CFT discharge isolation valves are closed and i immobilized. These Surveillances ensure the minimum coolant ' input capability will not create an RCS overpressure I condition to challenge the LTOP System. The Surveillances are required at 12 hour intervals. i A Note m ifies SR 3.4.11.3 by only requiring this . i Surveillance when CFT isolation is required. I (continued)
! j l
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-52I Amendment No.
)
LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASE 3 . t SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.11.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verification 'of the pressurizer level at's 160 inches by observing control. room or other indications ensures a 1 cushion of sufficient size is available to reduce the rate : of pressure increase from potential transients. The 30 minute Surveillance Frequency during heatup and cooldown must be performed'for.the LC0 Applicability period t when temperature changes.can cause pressurizer level variations., This Frequency may be discontinued.when the ends of these conditions are satisfied, as defined in plant procedures. Thereafter, the Surveillance is required at 12 hour intervals. A Note modifies-the SR by not requiring the Surveillance when complying with LC0 3.4.11.b. . i .1 1 SR 3.4.1111 Verification that the PORV block valve is open ensures a .. flow path to the PORV. This is-required at 12 hour L intervals. l A Note modifies the SR by not requiring the Surveillance when complying with LCO 3.4.11.b. l SR 3.4.11.6 l When stipulated by LCO 3.4.11.b, the RCS vent of at least 0.75 square inch must be verified open for relief protection. For an unlocked vent opening, the Frequency is every 12 hours. For a locked vent opening in the RCS, the required Frequency is every 31 days. A Note modifies the SR by requiring the Surveillance when complying with LC0 3.4.11.b. I i L l (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52J Amendment No. l l
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" LTOP System B 3.4.11 5 BASES 0 ; SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.11.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is required within 12 hours before or after decreasing RCS temperature to s 253*F and every 31 days thereafter to ensure the setpoint is-proper for
- using the PORV for LTOP. PORV actuation is not needed, as a it could.depressurize the RCS.
The 12 hour frequency considers the unlikelihood of a low
- temperature overpressure event during the time. >
1 i JR 3.4.11.8 f The performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION is required every ' ] 24 months. .The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the LTOP setpoint
- ensures that the PORV will be actuated at~the appropriate 7
RCS pressure by verifying the accuracy.of the instrument ' i string. The calibration can only be performed in shutdown. The frequency considers the refueling cycle. I i' ! l SR 3.4.11.9 Verification that the PORV is selected to the low range
, setpoint ensures the overpressure protection flow path -i j~ through the PORV. This is required at 12 hour intervals.
- 1
- . A Note modifies the SR by not requiring the Surveillance when complying with LC0 3.4.11.b.
l 1 i (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52K Amendment No. ! i h--- r- v- -- - nyw
I. l LTOP System B 3.4.11 i BASES (continued) : L :
-REFERENCES '1. -ASME Code Case N-514, " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Section XI,-Division 1".
L i l 2. Generic Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation ! Embrittlement of Reactor Yessel Materials and its l Impact on Plant Operations".
.3. FPC Calculation F97-0003, "CR-315 EFPY LTOP Limits". .
l_
- 4. ' B&W Nuclear Services (FTI) Document 51-1176431-01,
" Crystal River 3 Reactor Vessel- Low Temperature , Overpressure Protection (LTOP)". ,
i Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-52L Amendment No. l
LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1 l
)
1 1 l l l l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52M Amendment No. l
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ECCS -Operating - , B 3.5.2 j i [ BASES o i
' BACKGROUND - safety valves. The-LPI pumps are capable of discharging 'to .
. (continued) the RCS at'an RCS pressure of'approximately 200 psia. When L the BWST has been nearly emptied, the suction for the LPI-I' pumps is manually transferred to the reactor ~ building - ! ! emergency sump.. The HPI pumps cannot take suction directly i- from.the sump. If HPI.is still needed, a cross connect from-the discharge side of:the LPI pump to the suction of the HPI j l~ pumps would be opened. This is-known as " piggy backing" HPI.
- to LPI, and enables-continued HPI to the RCS, . if needed,
- - after the BWST is emptied to the switchover point.
- . = .
. In the long term' cooling. period, flow paths in the LPI - System can be established to preclude the possibility of ! boric acid in the core region reaching.an unacceptably. high
- concentration. One flow path is from the hot leg through 1 the decay heat suction line and then in a reverse direction through the reactor building emergency sump suction line into the sump. The other flow path uses the gaps between
the hot leg nozzles and the reactor vessel'. These gaps-provide a flow path between the outlet annulus and the inlet. ,
. nozzle /downcomer region of.the reactor vessel. Either flow path is capable of providing the required flow rates to
-ensure boron precipitation is not a concern.
HPI also functions to supply borated water to the reactor core following increased heat removal events,'such as large SLBs. During a large break LOCA, RCS pressure will decrease to
< 200 psia in < 20 seconds. 'The ECCS is actuated upon '
receipt of an. Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) signal. The actuation of safeguard loads is accomplished in a programmed time sequence. If offsite power is available, - the safeguard loads start immediately (in the programmed sequence). If offsite power is not available, the engineered safety feature (ESF) buses shed normal operating . loads and are connected to the diesel generators. Safeguard loads are then actuated in the programmed time sequence. , The time delay associated with diesel starting, sequenced l loading, and pump starting determines the tima required :
'l .
(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-10 Amendment No.
1 ECCS-Operating
-B 3.5.2 ;
j . BASES (continued) ACTIONS. 8.J
.With one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the inoperable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. The 72 hour Completion-Time is' based on NRC recommendations (Ref. 3) that are based on a risk evaluation and is a reasonable time for many repairs.- ;
An- ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of , delivering the design flow to 'the RCS. The LC0 requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent-subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity-of subsystems, the inoperability of one component ; in a train does- not render the ECCS . incapable of: performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two
-different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss'of function for the ECCS. The intent of.
this Condition is to maintain a combination.of equipment-such that the safety injection (SI) flow equivalent to 100% of a single train remains available. This allows- increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in' opposite trains are inoperable. An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of an-EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 3) has shown the risk of having one full ECCS train inoperable.to be sufficiently low to justify continued operation for 72 hours. With one or more components inoperable such that the flow equivalent to a single.0PERABLE.ECCS train 'is not available, the facility is in a condition outside the accident analyses. . Therefore, .LC0 3.0.3 must be immediately entered. u i l (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-15 Amendment No. l l l j
l ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS , (continued) I 1 l I B.1 and B.2 I l If the inoperable components cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Times, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and at least MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. , l 1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 -REQUIREMENTS
- Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, i and automatic valves in the ECCS' flow paths provides assurance that-the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since i these valves were verified to be in the correct position j prior to locking, sealing, or securing. These valves !
include valves in the main flow paths and the first normally closed valve in a branch line. There are several exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be misposi- u. The valve types which are not ve,ified as part of th S include vent or i drain valves (both inside and outsi6 .ne RB), relief valves outside the RB, instrumentation valves (both.inside and outside the RB), check valves (both inside and outside the RB), and sample line valves (inside'and outside the RB). A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition within the proper stroke time. This Surveillance i does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-16 Amendment No.
\ '
ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES 1 LCO During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is 1 (continued) required to provide an abundant supply of water from the ! BWST to the RCS, via the ECCS pumps and their respective ; discharge flow paths, to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles and the reactor vessel. In the long term, this flow path may be switched to take its supply from the reactor-building emergency' sump and to supply its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs. , This LC0 is modified by a Note which states that HPI may be deactivated in accordance with LC0 3.4.11, " Low Temperature l Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System". Operator action is I then required to initiate HPI. In the event of a loss of j coolant accident (LOCA) requiring HPI actuation, the time ! required for operator action has been shown by analysis to i be acceptable. l l 2 l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the OPERABILITY requirements for the , ECCS are covered by LC0 3.5.2, "ECCS-Operating." ) In MODE 4 with the RCS temperature below 280'F,'one ! OPERABLE ECCS train is acceptable without single failure ! consideration,-on the basis of the stable reactivity l condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements. In MODES 5 and 6, plant conditions are such that the i probability of an event requiring ECCS injection is ' extremely low. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are l addressed by LC0 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled," ' and LC0 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." i MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LCO 3.9.4, l
" Decay Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation-High Water i Level," and LC0 3.9.5, " Decay Heat Removal and Coolant I I
Circulation-Low Water Level ." l I I I (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-21 An.endment No.
ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES (continued) ACTIONS ful If no LPI subsystem is OPERABLE, the unit is not prepared to respond to a LOCA or to continue cooldown using the DHR/LPI pumps and decay-heat heat exchangers. The immediate Completion Time ensures that prompt action is initiated to restore the required cooling capacity. Normally, in MODE 4, reactor decay heat must be removed by a DHR/LPI train operating with suction from the RCS. If no DHR/LPI train is OPERABLE for this function, reactor decay heat must be removed by some alternate method, such as use of the steam generator (s) (OTSG). The alternate means of heat removal must continue until the inoperable ECCS LPI subsystem can be restored to operation so that continuation of decay heat removal (DHR) is provided. El If no ECCS HPI subsystem is OPERABLE, due to the inoperability of the HPI pump or flow path from the BWST, the plant is not prepared to provide high pressure response to Design Basis Events requiring ECCS response. The 1 hour Completion Time to restore at least one ECCS HPI. subsystem to OPERABLE status' ensures that prompt action is taken to provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions to place the plant in MODE 5, where an ECCS train is not required. This Condition does not apply to HPI subsystem components which are deactivated for the purposes of complying with LCO 3.4.11, " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System". With these components deactivated, the HPI subsystem is still considered OPERABLE based upon guidance in NRC Generic Letter 91-18. This guidance allows substitution of manual operator action for otherwise automatic functions for the purposes of determining OPERABILITY. The substitutions are limited and must be evaluated against the assumptions in the accident analysis. In the case of deactivating HPI in MODE 4, the components are available for injection following manual operator action to restore the system to OPERABLE status and this action can be accomplished within the time frame required to respond to the transient / accident. (continued) '! Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-22 Amendment No. I
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