ML20148K781

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Proposed Tech Specs Re Efw,Hpi,Emergency Feedwater Initiation & Control Sys
ML20148K781
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/14/1997
From:
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20148K774 List:
References
NUDOCS 9706180409
Download: ML20148K781 (216)


Text

.. _ - .-. - -. .- . __ - . . .

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/L7. CENSE NUMBER DPR-72 l

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION l CHANGE REQUEST NOTICE 210 i

l STRIKEOUT / SHADOW PAGES Technical Specifications Each change is indicted by a shadow box.

Deletions are indicated by strikeout. -

Additional and replacement text are indicated by shading.

Bracketed information provides reference to one of the three parts of the TSCRN. l The shadow box for each change indicates the following:

(1) A change required for the remau of Cycle 11 only is indicated in the shadow box as ' Cycle 11'.

(2) A permanent change is indicated in the shadow box as ' Permanent'.

(3) A change that may possibly be revised prior to restart of Cycle 12 depending on the Cycle 12 modifications is indicated in the shadow box as

' Reassess'.

9706100409 970614 j PDR ADOCK 05000302 l P PDR l

. -_. - .. . _ . - - . ~ . - - _ _ _ -

l l

l ECCS - Operating l 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME  !

l l

A. One or more trains XE1F"VeHfylths{tsMise~;E7M 1?h6 EFT 3370?.Ef3 l inoperable. [ ~ driven =emergencyp Jd f  ;

ifeedwaterh pump iand c --

6NQ E

%,< - , Vassociated flowf pa.th f.i.+

{ - (part 173) m

. . . s L; e.a.a are_ OPERABLE..a. ;aad Cyc1e511]J

'~, -

At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent 'ANQZ[11 2 1 217Z 2 E fd I '#REMsFM2 to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available. , Ad Restore train (s) to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> MCyc]s[11][A!2)) s'

~

OPERABLE status.

@s B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in Mode 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> i

l l

l I

i l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.5-4 Amendment No.149

I EFW System 3.7.5 3.7 Plant Systems ,

3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System l LCO 3.7.5 Two EFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

f I

_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ sic Caly sna CIW train, which includes a m,ctor driven pur.p, is l

[ pie 1[S] required to be 0l'ERACLE in "00E 3 with steam, generater '

Rermanent)) pressure 4 200 psig.

APPLICABILITY
MODES 1, 2, and 3.

l

! ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One steam supply to A.1 Restore steam supply 7 days the turbine driven EFW to OPERABLE status.

i pump inoperable. N A_ND i

10 days from discovery of failure to meet '

the LCO BRASW5[in6pirabli.TOUj Bi19"""RedirilASV25Tt67""1 !72"h6u'FiF'" " 1 Iha : E OPERABLEistatus w u;j jD

~

[Partrl;} Cp. ili ll;9 AND N- d New m . _ Action]

_ m'.aJ F ' w 4 Edays5from:. V TdiscoveEy(of 4 1 lfailu're to meetR

[Part l.i.=fCicis.l11';g -

'the!. LCO$-

~

9 New Action]n . ' a.a

- L< ,' u C./EEFV-121in6peFablel} ] ;C 1P VeHfyIthe} followiiig] ;1!;h 6 0 F2 2 3 2 C 2 are OPERABLE:E w .,j

^

h ,.

-  :; [

b QR

, F 'l.; Train;"B"1Emergencyi L -

, d m , :DieseliGeneratori 9 b EFV-13Moperable.- 7[ 12J Traini"B" ACt '~"]

1.:

E F 1-p ,

Electrical Power: a )

[.lggj% .g .# J. e MDistributioni M p 1: "7 b.w.iASV-20411noperable.iIj

.1  % . ,; *:.3l W Subsystem;Eand_ M

3.!:Trai n . ,"B"' AC Vi tal l l

@4 ,

k.u m d Bus.; Subsystem.1 .4j

.c n,, .: , .--- ~ .

l .ANQuiai. : 26 i max. w b l

l (continued) l l

I 1

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-9 Amendment No. 149

ER3 System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

- -. ~ . . . ~ .

'C."~E(c66ti6uedK2OHiid  ? Restore 4affa.. cted:,,n1, 72chor u. ys:"~ n'n ,,'

C.'21-  :

1 7equipmentto.0PERABLE? F "

2 k;" 5J"astatus,tn a u h . M.

[PaFt1?Mpcle~11Q '

j A

Ne.w..x.ction)

w. M. m t s __ .-waa b10~ d' ays: f'r'om - My discoverylof'~ 9 lfailureito meeta

.the: LCO bMMJ D'."?Turbini7 driven EFWR ,D;1"7 Verif97 hief t folloisihg]1 11hourZ!1EEiZ3 f 4 ' are OPERABLE:

l4,1 pumpforfassociated[: :fr  ; flow

' - 1.16 SWP-18,x path .inoperables]j

.... p l

h r P J 2.iTrainz"B"fof the? :q C Condition _A d d._ d d E y I.ifor.'reasonsotherithan.  ;

. Nuclear Services? h

[Part .:15_C9cli'11';,3 p7 D' i: ... Seawater? System,'. li 3bCHHEalB,'and; ~1 New w a,Action - -,]; ~..d b,i .

C4."CHP 18 F

  • d,i p ; .. m s MjAA.uS*0a.lutaaLi awiam.di

'D72 "? 7 VeHfy~ both7Waid 6f ? D ou G Z E Q

$/',MOPERABLE:5the following if j' arei 5~

h el.lECCS, 4 I N24DecayiHeatClosedd h: .f Cycle Cooling',1 j y 13 sDecay" Heat:- ]

pc ' Seawater,c .. .

f ei4.; Emergency?Diesely 1

& . JGenerators, ,

i IUf 1. AC:ElectricallPower; p '

? Distribution. . y

[ . Subsystems.-and: 3 F 46 ?AC Vital lBusL 4 Lhd.n. Subsystems.n 6 2 _ 1

.Mm.- ,, . - .w. ..~, a wm:ym-.m.

...w w .a.: a a x x a v v .....,ra, .vo

.y. . . . . .

.v ,. m .

-.;.y eu n.. s y .m D . 3 :.,,w' , Restore Turb,in.<...-c,m.m e;'.  ; .72 , ho.e,urs u s la D . driven: EFW pump; and ; J E * . associate'd flow; path 9

& 'im.to 0PF,RABLEistatusa j

'M C Cl2 T h 10fds slfrom? ?

discovery of c failure;to. meet!

,the LCO. ..e Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-10 Amendment No. 149 l

[Part01T Cpcl:fil]'E; W 1 EFW System  !

i Motor drjven> EFW pump:ory" 3.7.5 associated flow path g.4 - [ Parts'1?? ' l jnoperable.a mLAmid Cycle

~

11] E.1 f .. . . .s ACTE 0NS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME O.I Cr.e Er# traitt /

Br1 Restore EPd tr&ir, to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> '

l ireperable fsr reasers OPERABLE status.

her thar Csrditica p AN) 11]imotor3 driven; 10 days from '

EFW pump;andi  ! discovery of l _,

associated:flowel

~

failure to meet

-.~__F

{.[P,, art 1_;TC/cle,11]5"

m. m . m.m awm_A, path?. _ _ _. the LCO i

. Required Action and Be in Mode 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion [PaFtl1[Cic1F11]7M Time of Condition A AND F.1: f 3

'"~""' " " " #" " '"

oc-9 not met. -

[ParCli*CycleT11] Be in Mode 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> l bEB*dSE A L w [P stCliECicieill]fF.2  ;

B. Two EFW trains Dr1 Initiate action to Immediately inoperable, restore one EFW train to OPERABLE status.

[PAFt]1[CicleT11]IG] '

% [ Parti 1ECicleill][G;1;  !

SURVLILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 Verify each EFW manual, power operated, and 45 days automatic valve in each water flow path and in both steam supply flow paths to the turbine driven pump, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.5.2 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven EFW pump, until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reachtttg g . .

u_

'" '" '"' " " ""' " ' " ' ' " tm *

[Pa(t}1P Permanent]y R M ering )

Ela)h Verify the developed head of each EFW pump at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head.

45 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-11 Amendment No. 149

EFW System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) __

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.3 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reaching 200 psig in the steam

[Part7 1i "7 generatcrs.

Permanent] j -------------------------------------------

er.tering! . :

M00E13mE._ 1 Verify each EFW automatic valve that is not 24 months locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.5.4 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after naching 200 psig in the-steam genersters.

[PartLi.j,,Et Permanent]?s entering 5[j Verify each EFW pump starts automatically on 24 months MOREdlacuuh an actual or simulated actuation signal.  ;

SR 3.7.5.5 Verify proper alignment of the EFW flow paths Prior to by verifying flow from the EFW tank to each entering MODE 2 steam generator, whenever plant  ;

has been in MODE 5 or 6 for

> 30 days i l

I 1

I l

l l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-12 Amendment No. 149

1 u

SW System 3.7.7 F l

l i

3.7 Plant Systems i l

1.7.7 Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water (SW) System  ;

LCO 3.7.7 The SW System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Two OPERABLE emergency SW pumps; and
b. Three OPERABLE SW heat exchangers.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS r

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i

ATSWPi18?inosisfable~.9Ej 'AT1TO- --42 NOTE'TOTZT2"! -

This. Action is*not[ Cl "a  :

t_pplicable11n MODE l40

[Part il,.._dler_a, Cy

___________________"a

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

cN 4 1_1;m.ew, a.m ACTION]a a g_ ~_> _"~ _: ~VeFify _' _'he_

stu_bbin_e_; a b > 'driveni;.temergencyc ,. 9 '

i-r 1 -  ;feedwater pump."and? )!

L f associated:. flow path 9 11Thou6CSETiu22 Lx.J. id areLOPERA8LE A .,. h d t

-J at &%v ANQ a'-"/ Dy m;a'f #f if,.aecumaama AyF;f 4S]dF'?yWM?Wib 5.Wh' *=f D?ff,

[Part71f7 Cycle 11]?B5 F

'A!2TP RistsFs~SWP?l8Tt'o'P7 '721MuriTZ210 SDIAfI.d b .i.U k i $dd OPERA 8LE: status L x d I

n. v. . s .... . v s . . si - r-,e Ad Restore SW-System to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />  !

inoperable. OPERABLE st us. ,

[Part ilifCycle 1133 7 l

E [Partili N M SWP-1A an'd;SW heatj ,

One required SW heat Cycle l11];811 .

exchangeE;i_ m,d;M exchanger inoperable.

P L

i k

~

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-15 Amendment No.149

[

a.. - .

y w

i i

i SW System 3.7.7 -

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and . Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

, associated Completion [ Par 61$psle711]IC*- 1"s l Time not met. ANS l . - . . . , , .

[Part 1; c,.,,.7J,. .

Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> Cycle!.11]tCA w [Paftill!Cpsle].11]ZC."2]; I l

l l

i 1

i I

l i t

i i l \

l I i

! i l-F i

l l

e I

l l

l i l

i s I l I

! I i

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-15a Amendment No.149

-- , ~ - e- -

e

l DC System '

3.7.8 k

3.7 Plant Systems 3.7.8 Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water (DC) System LCO 3.7.8 Two DC trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One DC train M11 ,?2E! Z NOTET = '-P inoperable. This Action is not: '

l

" applicable in MODE [4 1 i

L-~~-~*--~~---~%.-----J l

t y,-7&iffE hi tirbiriel'El

\ ,

t 'llh6uC' i l2 7 .. driven [ emergency b A Q feedwater pumpL.and- .)  :

i- associated i flow. pathf.C - . . . _ . . . . . , ,

kaaa_. are 0PERABLE. J.a.c m+  : .[Part 1;4 n-

.'.,n v- n .~,

,. d vi

.NE E1 $J%.:.i a ! . ,, '

~...l

. ,~

2,2d.

/ Cycle 411]3

,- ax_

A-1 - - - - - - - - NOT E - - - - - - -

Enter applicable

.[ P_dt l..i? Cycle _11]CA.'2T -

[ Conditions and

-~ -

Required Actions of LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," for required decay heat removal loops made I inoperable by DC ,

train inoperability.

Restore DC train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

(continued) l l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-17 Amendment No.149 1

Nuclear Services Seawater System 3.7,9 3.7 Plant Systems 3.7.9 Nuclear Services Seawater System LCO 3.7.9 Two Nuclear Services Seawater System trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i

l l

A77 Train '"B" of.Tth'e? '"Il X?1U Z $ T-y2~ NOTE O 2CL JQ ,

b ' Nuclear ServicesK =[ ,This: Action,isl noti ; l f;;: Seawater System? , 'applicablefin MODE 4.j '

2 Linoperable A . uwas C. ------^ -----------s

[Part1TCyc1C 7 L 'FTVerifylthe'lirbine?"; !1! hdtiEEZ3.]

11;. New(ACTION]a  !? driven; emergency, ., y

... .feedwater pump ands 3

}J '

- associated flow. path - j CR_;;.are;.0PERABLE. a . i; l

l l

. < -- y _ m . . . . - , . . -

~ , . a .- . &, , a w 2.- n e,% u Md~4 +

[Part if Cycle,.'11]l., '_, i B. Train ."A" of : ( 'A'. 27 4

^RestoFe Traini"B"?of" l72fhobFs[ " i M l the Nuclear ,~ g J the. Nuclear' Services.

Services: Seawater' l HL Seawater System to t" Systemd n .A . -> 1 ,_ 0PERABLE status.u_ u

)

n. Ore Nuclear Services A-1 Restore Ntteitar 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> i Sea-ater System train Services Seawate inoperable. System train to i OPERABLE status.

[Part.'1FCycle 11];B.1; + > (continued)

[Part"I';* Cycle fil] TTrairi?

I'A" of the' Nuclear.: 4 ServicesmSeawater. System.

1 J

l l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-19 Amendment No.149

Nuclear Services Seawater System 3.7.9 ,

i l

B. Required Action and B-1 Be in Mode 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> l associated Completion h [PaftT1?iCycle311][C.1? l Time not met. A_NE 1

~

[Part. 1FCyile711]VC!

- c ~~ W B-2 Be in Mode 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> I

\ l

\  : [PaFtTli; Cycle!11) C'~2] .

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

JRVEILLANCE FREQUENCY j i

l SR 3.7.9.1 ---------------NOTE------------------

Isolation of Nuclear Services Seawater System flow to individual components does not render the Nuclear Services Seawater System inoperable.

P Verify each Nuclear Services Seawater 31 days J System manual valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that i is not locked, sealed, or otherwise l secured in position, is in the correct i position. l l

l SR 3.7.9.2 ---------------NOTE------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4. j Verify each Emergency Nuclear Services 24 months Seawater System pump starts I automatically on an actual or simulated I actuation signal, i

l l

4 i

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-20 Amendment No.149  ;

t

Dacay Heat Seawater System l 3.7.10 3.7 Plant Systems l 3.7.10 Decay Heat Seawater System i

1

, LCO 3.7.10 Two Decay Heat Seawater System trains shall be OPERABLE.

l t

r l

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A. One Decay Heat lA;1h u l-'72-4; NOTE";;;M C W Seawater System train This' Action is: noti. .,

inoperable. . applicable!in~ MODE l L-- r------ :------ j 4 -- 1 ?

I yto4 -:7VerifilthilturbideT ilih6s E ",I E T i3 r ' '

' driven emergencyt 'a

( .~  ;>

. :g":feedwater; associated pump 5 flow ^andc path L.. '

La m &sare;0PERABLER < a . d , ,

[Partf.1E

.?ycle 11]J

-w z W ,d5 /a

.~

._i  ;

AND : c.a.yh_b -

Ar1 - - - - - - - - N OT E - - - - - - -  !

Enter applicable

/ Conditions and Required Actions of

[Part';1llCycle1.11]~A , . 2i Q LCO 3.4.5, "RCS '

Loops-MODE 4," for  :

required decay heat removal loops made inoperable by Decay Heat Seawater System train inoperability.

l Restore t'.. cay Heat 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Seawater System train  ;

to OPERABLE status. '

1 (continued) I i

I i

I l Ci /stal River Unit 3 3.7-21 Amendment No.149 l

?

l

?

[

f

% .- ., vw. m.. m, wm & y . w. . . ..w,-- r . ~ . ~ . . . . ..

m~ .. i y ,4ss ;.~ , < g , '

e gg - - . -

n'- :og Contrul,:. Cosplqx. ,Coolin. . ..,

g System :,

n.~ p.

n

m. m.,.\ .

s . m"- ,m  :

+ r ,m. . .e ;c.u.c

. , -p,

_,,-a......umm.;

s m.m.m7m m._ n w w,

. m m . .,

a>

r L

~ ., -

[Part^1 ,; Permanen.t;;

new specificati.on)_-J m h

,,, , m. ,,,, ,

.,,yyyy , , .ym a.. . . , Sy,. . _... . 7., stems _u. m,,a . ;y,.y.uos a. _ a m2 uma muu a y .,, q 3y 7a. R1 m,m

.,y,j., ,,,,7,,

. . nt- >

w . . . _ . . - , _

,.y.  ;

,; .._G

.....- . . , , ,....,,,s, ,. ,. _ . .

3y . .7.18aControLgComple,_x Cool.in,g_ . System > _RLR; Ac f , ;m__M, Ji, . ,.. ;&, J; uj r

[

LC03377!182C' Z CondoE Compl exTCool i d Systies [shallI tE OPERABLE 31 thiMEU3 L

  • Pa p94 'f"- .

iets.w> .) .+..4A.. rJ.,.

iim) i...,3_..r._...y,-p# -. ., , g,g g l a .'[EJ 4'y-2 ;,%-0PERABLEMhille' r'ms .a'snd .1: associ,ated9p..A. pumps;candg4an?R;  !

. _ - - ., . . _ . , . , ,., , . m. , ,

b,.a..a; 2y heat exchan._.. . gers h.c... __ _ m. m, .

.an. a a &. n m m m' a -

e l

I f

. . _ . 4

. r yo ._ p ;,.., m e,,c.,g.,y,.,,.,,,, m ygg ,.,.,.-,,,ywy

~PPL1CABILITY. _r MODES..7 - r < l .' a'2." 2 .s 3,: and L4.1_. , . .

~ - -

.a.- -

_ m.~ . m . m _ . - x tx _ _ _

.o e t I

ygnn m.y.mm. g. - ,.g.

-..., , , gw._ , w a n . , ,gg,y , ,.,

m -.-..--.~m,,-,.,,..m , . . .

yd2&yL _ CONDITION b a d w;.n p.,,._ , REQUIRED ACTION w,.: . ._ n iCOMPLETIONiTIMEl A.1.,. . m a_- ,- , .,.-- NOTE ,- - ---

A.n . e _,A.

[ g CHHE-18 ,inoperab.l  ; ,. ,1 ThisTAction istnot?; d

~

m -

pA ppplicablelin{MODEi4. ;  ;

\er

. . ha......,r..,,.w.........,,A s .ww .u m e m.m n w i L

,C

,iCHP-18linoperableh . . .

_ y^ Ver1fy_the. tur ._ bin _e ,' :1,; ho._..,. ,. _ ,._ ,

hu.A.a& .a. . .. _ W. .. 4..- uts.kua ,

F Tdriven emergencyi l ,

F .feedwater pump and: y

[Pa M 1f ' k .. associated; flow: path ' '

Cycl.e 11)'J.C m .- , .

b:m.2 d are10PERABLE b . w.2 erwn.m ,

W.,m .m y rqx.n n ukL.hN.i&Q 2..~, .

e.% y r c A . 2,c< ,

' Restore CHHE-18iand m ,a m,. . , .

30; . ysam da, y.ma-.m. .,

7 1

lL. %< r :CHP-18 to OPERABLE' 1, fstatus.c Q. a

b. ,r .

C.LN; d.2 . . L.s .,,. . M.iddk.M Na d;u d i

f t

l

- . . . ~ . , , . , . - ~ . a .

.3.< q s r>

Crystali Riv,e. .,,r Unit:35 e

. . , ., , a .

M 3. 7.- 371, ..; 2. _ TCm b Amendment:No.

l 1

u. - m.m-g, _ , . . ._- w m _ . m. y m m,...n,., y - . - _ -

... ,,s

. . . , . gContr 1.. Comp 1;_x.,Co_oli_ng;.. System k l k w i ,s.,a n _- m a w., u m a w: w a s z u a s a %.T3.7.18$

...r _ _..._.._ _ m.,_

, [Partilu,PermanentianewL a m .n.a,m,a , , .

i ACTIONS (continued) i i

! r.__,_.-,_.-.-m, 4., y m._ .

l S h 1 CONDITION, n j t. d .aREQUIREDJ. ACTION ,C ,O d,.  !.COMPLETIONiTIME) I i l I i BUTCHHEf1A!3noperable'.M B 1[" ] Restbre"CHHEMA2 CHPQ l30?daisE 5 O m ,_

p + ;1ALand Control 1, L.s QRws. Ac. ----

~ -

A - ..m,' .. a ,J., [- Complex Cooling h~a e ta ..) 1 r, W _exchangeri.to;0PERAB, LEVa 1 l u.1,CHP-1Alihoperable.r,;,; k ,,.s.,2 status.b a m a s;2 .-m >

p,QR~L h

n, am-n. ,, , n N.J \  : _[ .Par 1

i

- _t_71 _C. F i l 5 ]m.,l

.c_e.-.1_1 l i

pm y.- - . . _ . -,

y ' One _... requ ~ ir.~.d e Control ^.,4 )

l [ iComplex Cooling .heatJ

  • hA.., exchanger 1noperable.j

_. m m m. .

C,.,,:Requi .. redsActi..on ,. an d, ,3 .C.y1pg:s.yBea. - n., Mode ;3 ~,..ma_da 6..h ~our ,ss w, ,Aa i

[ } associated Completionj Me-a--+m, yxm wmLu ne!-umC ,,.m, E 1.TimeLnots met; A a._ v! -

l 'C;2 M Z Be X Model5W C ZEE !36]houFi2 2 %  !

_., . 1 y . .y Din Any.,com _ bin,.._. ation _Tsf(3 a _ , D 1,u,w,,_ Enter LCOL 3.0,.3c.a,,s,,,z l , ,Immedi

,_. ate ....-.l~y2,R 1 b > components ' rendering vi I O the Control Complex s '-

[ :CoolingLSystem' '~' '

MinoperableJa,a; mud I l

i SURVEILLANCE'REQUIREMENTSP "" ~ " ^ ' "" "

" * " " V """" 9 ym7 - %. . e_.m.- - - _ . _ _ _ .~ e -- -, .m.z.m e rymm.

S - .. .-

. . . :. ; m, _.u.. _ m..._; URVEILLANCE. 73. ,m _._'_.

- J E_T,m.mi _NJ m L.a- FREQUENCYca ,a

, .. . - - y- ..-.--_,....3-y ., - - - -

. oped... 73- I, n :y, ., ..-,accordan..-ce, _.,y4 SR . ? 3. 7.18_.1.,.? ' Verify ea~ch...,,

. c hil. led,s. water pump s devel L head'atztheiflowftestLpoint is. greater thanj 'withlthe: 1 EL A - m d ors equal to ;the i requi red : devel oped L head .; ; Inservice : .

' 'j Testino4 Program 5RT 3 7;18.'2T IVerify'ths'FedundanEcapabilitf ofTthi7 "1 24Tmontiis E 2 Ly Contro1l Complex Cooling; System' to removeT ,

Us n. .. 1the: assumed;heatlload. a .

w ._ , ,u_e 4

i l

l

'CrsstalLRiver.i unh E ? 1. fT L327-385, a u _,..,.C fAmendmeht!~Nol 1

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued) f CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3 Restore required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO B. One EDG inoperable. B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for OPERABLE offsite

~~

[Part 1if ll Cycleill]- :.} Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Train u- ,. "A",

i thereafter F $ ,, , niG

.wy ' i,i.. L ,. ..k.c.a~. , > s4 j g .' 2"mf T k i NOTE T "~~' ' ~

[PaFt 1 P~1

[Part:1~;- ,' iThis Wctioniis noti' Cyclef11] 4

.: ' applicable in' MODE i 6" * * " * "

Cycle 11] 1) N (; _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,_j _ _ . _ _14 hy l

I Virifyit'hi'turbiW "; L ho0FJ,7? 7 1

' driven emergency ,

.a )

,feedwater pump and! - '

associated flow pathq.)l

.are; OPERABLE.. ..m.cm ,

AND fh-2 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from

~

/ feature (s), supported by the inoperable discovery of Condition B

[PaFt:1;ECycle}11] B.3 d EDG, inoperable when concurrent with l its redundant inoperability of required feature (s) redundant are inoperable. required l feature (s)

AND l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-3 Amendment No.149 i

l

. . - __ -. - _ . . _ . _ - . - - - . . . - - . . . - - - _ - ~ . . . . ,-. . . . . . . . _ . . - _ _

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION - COMPLETION TIME i

B. (continued) BM Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ,

EDG is not inoperable l T

due to common cause '

[Pkt 1["Cycleill]d U : failure.

B.411h i A 2.- _

DB

,Brh2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />  !

[PEflilCycli.11]l :

/ for OPERABLE EDG, B .~4.2.:....u.L h and AND

, BH Restore EDG to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />

[P&Fli". Cycle:11],? -_

/ OPERABLE status.

g ,

B ,5 ;,,w.u ..:u.aw 1 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO i

l l

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4 Amendment No.149

l AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 l

ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1 . " PerformTSRI 3'."871l1? " M !1'? hoir?'"~ " 9 j

lCPTrain?"B""EDGB li dinoperablem " d [C'1F1

(, yforOPERABLEoffsited K, 'Jl l p circuit (s).[, ,7:j AtG ; ' . ~ -j t ,  :# sj r.1 . , . . . . , y

, fj

[- '

n >

t

,Oncel per: 8: hours, u J.

r w g 1 y <

a l 7

{thereafter '

+ [Part:1T'Cy'cle?llD hND) , l [*.

f- <

l NewfAction]; a,] kC.2ia;&y--

1&p
fl lNOTEL--------j; f:< ,

l'; , i l gj ,

Ms ' Action Hs not  !

3 p: ,  :

[5pplicable;in LMODEE4.h ...;

i

! 3; 1

[.

e .: .s . 4:

erp.3 n-~-; \

. , V R..a.mm. . . . . < . , , . . 1' Si a

,Verifylthe following d !1 hour} 3"  ;

~are10PERABLE: . .

4 i l l l'.((Turbin'edriven;d F '

~

1 l semergencyn 0 y l

[ feedwater; pump?

  • k.7f f, W u j G ' and! associated! q 3 .

f $ flow.. 'pathi J '^ L.R s j

'2. :ASV-204L. S .- #iE G '?

3.M EFVv12,j andi X l/ '

i*

n-I4.:: : EFV-13 N [i 54 , 1 m,y e

c ~

~ f;.

ANDi Sj b - x

!u . .... .

  • '1 54. hours ifrom" i

.C . 3 Declarefrequired;., . J ,, discovery lofJ _

F  ;. feature (s),1 supported i Condition B' . J I (bycthelinoperable : ls concurrent with4 b EDGhinoperable.whenj jinoperability of U, 4.11ts; redundant;: . , . $ ; redundant : ,

j ~

l 1- . required feature (s)f;L 'requi red -

p y 'are inoperable'. M Ifeature(nr.,

V , e ai 7

$? .

., ; .. l\ j AND- . w.../ . . .maa (continued)  !

l i

l 1

n e

4 Crystal River Unit 3 3.8 4a Amendment No.149

t AC Sources - Optrating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)  !

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C 2 "1C ontinued)2 2 6 O C;4".1D Defe'rmise(OPERABLET 247hdud F 9 G

}3 . mEDG:;isjnot?inoperablej B . i Edue'to: common'cause,d , j@

mi M"d

{N i*i l " " '

7 h

[PaEli~Cyclefifi} i h > <

a New' Action 1 1 b ,E7- "c-J' '

%j f i  !

[A

'(continued)]1.. 1 h: 'I --

N  :

m _._ , _ .ms.o. a e . . . .. . . . , ._. ., o - ,. . i C.4.2 mcPerform SR}318il;21 9 '24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />si J G ifor! OPERA 8LE'EDG. # l "

("

l l

f: g. , .. ;y ~ y$ ,

t g

[

,y-j (y ; s3; .

4 I . ...

.<  ; J l C.5! / Restore EDG.:t'o< 4 72 4:- l i M .c 10PERABLE, status c1md! ! "hoursi .

'AlGi /d] $  !

.hl

(: ._ .. +

? \';'y 6Tdaystfronc .j i discovery.l of = l (PaFtlli'Cy'clsill]? [Part 'li' Cycle 511)) * "

"*"~""";""""

[ D.a.wmaban.J m;i. aim;.J

[ Ds1L t l

C--1 /

~

C/ Two required offsite Declare required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from [pgFt 1 *l ,

circuits inoperable. feature (s) inoperable discovery of Cycle'11]1 D-' -

when its redundant Condition E gijggj l l required feature (s) concurrent with ,

are inoperable. inoperability of I l redundant required feature (s)

? ANp -

C-2 Restore one required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

[Part"liL Cpcle 1137 ._/ offsite circuit to i D.2u a., -a a OPERABLE status.

1 (continued) t 1

I  !

t 1

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4 b Amendment No.149 t

l

. . ~ . . _ - -

-- - - . . . . . . . - - . - . . - . - - - .__ - -~ . .

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1

[Pa'ri1!!Cpclel 11];E. i ,A we l ACTION (continued) I l

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME  ;

Dr One required offsite - - - - - - - - - - - N OT E - - - - - - - - - - -

circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions l and Required Actions o [Partif1;J.

_ . _ Cpcle  ;

ANQ LCO 3.8.9, "Distri ion 11]lELaw.:A.23]

Systems Opera * ," when One EDG inoperable. Condition 0 1s entered with ,

no AC power source to one train.

[Phrtlii?Ciclel

11) Train m;.2..-
m.B_}"A -

.E;1r""N2 j n 2EINOTE7f!2252])j 8 6n is'.'not! -

" applicable (inMODE.4d

[PaFt71T?l Cycle:11]2 ,

[Pipt'1FCys ..- .l..eT11]al:

  1. h-~3~~ ' ~~N#~~~

. -. v.- ---

y T N"S}Ve'rifp?the?isWine"} l12h6uE 2 2 2 0

' driven l emergency; ,

. 1 i nfeedwater. pump'.and?' >

'e  !

associated flow.; path k a iare'0PERABLE d i a u.jh n 3 yx yg .w ,7 r3.n~,ym.7=.aam

.w u.a. . ava m Dre Restore required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

[Parfli El

/ offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

Cycl,ej 11] .,E._2]

08 Dr2 Restore EDG to OPERABLE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> status.

[Part71iC._N Cycle 11] . E.3 ; : /

L ws_wama i

1 l

l l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4c Amendment No.149

l l AC Sources - Optrating l 3.8.1 ,

t ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TI.ME

,y,-----------a,,,.

..,..,y.,,,, y 7.,7. ., m._

F .z.. One.... require

.._,. _ .. - .~d .c . offs,ite,.,..4 s r. . , , ., ,. NG, TE n q

, ,,. 7,%gw,y,.y.3,y e.

E Tcircuit inoperabl.eQ ,g Enteriappl.icable Conditions:: 2;{i$f

k. , . . . , 7' ': f .and Required Actions /of' 4; w.. 'jl ',, Mfq ffAtEtj ,

M s q%

'ij_gh, LCO 1 3.8.9, j'Distributi.on i j h,, j .f' :]N p; , .'A: Systems: Operating," wheni. z; N S- g-i: Strain "B"!gEDGi

~

L*:t Condition'F>is[enteredjwithi h; 9 L.iinoperable. 1 . m,a (no1AC.powerisourcet'o;onefi;] @ k d *1 - 1

trainWi p ,

[_ ..._...__. 2.._______ -_ W_p[i 4 , 9;

,'w:, y W7 y ,

R t % ,

F.1. hew:af--- NOTE ' 'i k(*

@ , @J

/

Q

[PaFili97 ;This Action is'notL

, %s i ,

Cycle'11; 1 New

.o Action]j;l ,---#

t pplicableVinM,^ MODE

'a W l---

c ',-------- m --

h?5 p.

M

's > W n

' 4 $[d HEN 2;1,1.J u O. gw/MA d 4 N:d:. . ,Ws 4 i. .

~

I'-r' [ i

, Verifyhthelfollowingd !1: hour % Sq hre OPERA 2 8 lei, '# $ , J: ,

  • b
1. iTurbine1diiven < d i 'D'.- <:1 Y i emerken'yci <, dd [O  %'d.W i

[ "': feedwater'. pump @t Dc c, j ,Hl!d D ?andFassociated 9 [

4 h AfloEpathh Jd [ i J;,

2.1 ASV-204 : -

d LE ' '

d g,.-

3. - EFV-12L:?andi '

~

~4.':EFV-13 7

']

q

[s ;. m.. ,

  • _ ' ('d av;

(..:

ac ,

j .r~, .;
g. s <

q p;' ,  ?,y x s lj F L. ,

3- . j K,..... ~m )

F.2 A Restore'.reqdiredT W l12 hours 1 l I- "offsiteicircuit to? d. p ,,  ; ,

W g

OPERABLE l status'

, ,3

.i n p ~

A

, i n /

'QR I .

jf ,i i

f. E . .. . .d I- . < .

F.3? LRestore.EDG to" OPERABLE ( l12; hours i.s_ ., i L M status. w m. m 2 d i

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4d Amendment No.149

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E- Two EDGs inoperable. E-1 Restore one EDG to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> OPERA E status.

[PaFtV 1fyCpelei [Partif;lCy61eI/

11]!G;A e u. ai 11]!Gil) i l WJ

[Partili[ Cycle'8 f 11]iHe d 1 =E F- Required Action and M Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ,

associated Completion [Pirt"li"Cyclei -

Time of CMitica A, 0, AND s, m, u, not met.

11]IH.1dided

[Part'liJCphle"11]~,

M e in MODE 5. --

36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />  !

Condition!A7B, C FD M [Part'::lil..Cpcle-11]i H.2icam.:j

_E i. . F , .. or. 7G i ' ' t ,' i G- Three or more required Gr1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately AC sources inoperable. i

[PaFt71FCiclil l

[Ps^rt"1?[CpElfi "-

11]sI.1 Lid  ;

11r I. 4

l i

l l

i i

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4e Amendment No.149

. -. . .=

AC Sources - Operating  !

3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)  !

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

SR 3.8.1.3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - N OT E S - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1. EDG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.
2. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.  ;
3. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one EDG at a time.
4. This SR shall be preceded by and immediately follow, without shutdown, a successful performance of SR 3.8.1.2 or SR 3.8.1.6. )

l Verify each EDG operates for a 60 minutes 31 days I at a load a 2600 kW and s 2850 kW. '

SR 3.8.1.4 Verify each day tank contains a 24? gal of 31 days U8 -

{Pff(2((jypyj{280)

SR 3.8.1.5 Verify the fuel oil transfer system 31 days operates to automatically transfer fuel oil from the storage tank to the day tank.

l (continued) 1 l

l l

I Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-6 Amendment No. 149 i

l

_ _ - . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . .l l  :

l l l AC Sources - Operating l t 3.8.1 l l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

l i

SR 3.8.1.11 -----------------NOTES----------------  ;

1. Momentary transients outside the  !

l load range do not invalidate this i test.

2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2.

However, credit may be.taken for l i

unplanned events that satisfy this >

SR.  :

Verify each EDG operates for 2 60 24 months l l l minutes at a load a MOO kW[PaFt?2$:'E'l kW.

and s H50( l mReas

._s.. e_ss) E3400;.0,

m. m

[P h tT2f~ 7 " E "i  !

.R_eas.sess]3..300L j  !

l i

l l

l 1

l t

i l

i l

l

! i 1

l Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-10 Amendment No.149

Diesel Fual Oil, Lub3 Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air LCO 3.8.3 The stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and starting air subsystem shall be within limits for each required emergency diesel generator (EDG).

APPLICABILITY: When associated EDG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS


NOTES-----------------------------------

1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each EDG.
2. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

'A. : One' EDG ' with7 stored' ' AiVerify combined ' stored 1 Xhouri ..,

L fuel . oil level )

fuel oil-level!> 45,834

, '< 22,917 gal and . gal. , ,

, >19,643 gal in storage;

- _. tank.a

[Part 2; Reassess';lNew ACTION]

A. One or more EDGs with A-1 Restore fuel oil level to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> stored fuel oil level within limits.

< 16r569 gal-and v 1.5,033 gal in M 4 [Part 2;  : [Part 2f s orage tank. Reassess]: Permanent] B.1 22,917

[Pa rt . '2, gal and 6_N  :

Permanent] B- >19,643 l Combined stored fuel ~

oil level < 3h1M %  : [Part 2; ' l gal . Reassess] 45,834 l l

1 B. One-or more EDCs with B-1 Restore lube oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> [Part'2-stored-lube oil inventory to within Permanent] '

inventory < 233-gal limits. .08" arid > 200 gal. [Part 2; Permanent] C.1 Declare-both EDCs inoperable.

(continued) )

[Part'2; Permanent] C. [Part 2,1 Reasse'ss] '280 gal 'and >L 240 With stored EDG i

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-14 Amendment No. 149

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One or more EDGs with C-1 Restore fuel oil total 7 days stored fuel oil total particulates to within particulates not limits.

within limit.

ppgg; g4.. .o

[PartT2D Pe sanent] D _Pe_rman_e.n..t..]

. - _D .O.

D. One or more EDGs with' Dr1 Restore stored fuel oil 30 days new fuel oil properties to within properties not within limits. j limits.

pg m,,

[Part'?

_ 2. _-

5 Per.m. anent]7

_ . . - El Per.m,_a,nen.._E.

t.. ]E 1._1,Y E. One or more EDGs with E.1 Restore starting air 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> starting air receiver receiver pressure to pressure < 225 psig within limits.

and > 160 psig.

[P d O 2?I " " A

[Pg{2]pfman@thp] fermanent]lij F. Required Action and I.1 Declare associated EDG Immediately associated Completion inoperable.

Time not met.

7

~

[Piihrt27~

[Par't ?2,?Psmanent]TG;'

..-.~-~. - . - ~

Pe.rmanent]7)) ,G.1;

7. .

One or more EDGs with diesel fuel oil, lube oil, or starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons -  : [Part'2, t T .13 other than Condit Permanent] JA, :B n A. D. C. D. Or C. y C, DL E or, E A 1

l Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-15 Amendment No. 149 l

,, Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 t SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.3.1 Verify each. fuel oil storage tank contains 31 days

[Ri~5tT2TP! 2 IfF,-589 gal of. fuel and combined fuel oil a ess) orage level z 37,177 .

w,n.s,-. ..ml.a.iaw.'.

SR 3.8.3.2 Verify each EDG lube oil inventory is 31 days a 233 gal.

% [PaFt'2;"Reasseis]F280M SR 3.8.3.3 Verify fuel oil properties of.new and stored In accordance fuel oil are tested in accordance with, and with the Diesel maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Fuel Oil Testing Program. Testing Program SR 3.8.3.4 Verify each EDG air start receiver pressure is 31 days 2 225 psig.

i 1

I l

l l

I l

l Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-16 Amendment No. 149

4- Distribution Systems - Optrating 3.8.9 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

! 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. I i 1 2

[PaFtT1','"CpEle79 )

4 ACTIONS / 113 5, Train 5"A" -  !  ;

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A .' AC electrical power WE1TI2FMFCC'2' NOTE'- O- O] i distribution subsystem :This" Action is-:not. S inoperable. lapplicableLin MODE)4hi; N [Part'li9

=.-----=---r--------3 ,Cyc_le)11]j VeHfp?thei"thrbihh~iddiehl 1 % E a m ;n. 2 d f amergencycfeedwater,.

.. y {.jfc}e}.1[ :

gag., 'and associated; flow? pump j path?

are.LOPERABLE,h w :a i di

.blfD, .mg 7,mg g7n.;,m.p sw=n.w.

uw.a.wu. .

A-1 Restore AC electrical 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> power distribution  ;

subsystem to OPERABLE ANQ status.

[Part'l;i.Cyde111]Ti

~

A3 21, _ Mw~ . id

/ 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LCO l

l i

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-31 Amendment No. 149

i Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.9

(

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME  :

BETFai~ n ?"BP ACTelectrical! .811E -- -------- NOTE -- ; U--i

!; power distribution!f  ; ;This'Actionjis not; L subsystem. inoperable. d lapplicablelinl MODE' 4.  ;

l L----------------------.E l

4. -*e m

[Part 1;:gy.s . . . . , . , , e .g y,9 e ) / - e,t -Q VerifyTthe" follOwin%,g arej Cycl.e 1133

.+ ( E ho,. . ..yur.ia md Ne'w" Action OPERA 8LE: f. f -W w .-. . a 12. Turbine'drivenL s '

, ,y

[ f. pump and associated }

L flow path, tj 2.S ASV-204 o . . , Di  !

3. f EFV-12,.'and. '

.'4E EFV 13.ui - .. e -

,, ; .ny,n,,., ,y ,y , - ,,

.,.idieC., ALAa m Gu.Lk id.&.C

~

8, ko. _. ,.urs & a.a s e"AC*electridl', '

,B.2" r Restor. distribution

' power .

s 1

AND, _w n,i. . s y, 4' subsystem to-OPERABLEt b astatusn _1;n.s w a .g 16" hours (from"]

' discovery:of-

, failuret to meetc LC0 k a z u s I c[Part.1;: Cycle 11]

. Strain:"A".:.m i? ,

AC vital bus 'C.GC'- L NOTE" CXYZ? .

subsystem inoperable. This Action isJnot' '

' applicable in MODE:4. i i

~ . - , - . . . ,a

~

VerifyTthe" turbine ~dFiVen" 1! houri. ~T ,

[Past 1T" emergency feedwater'pumpu Cycleill]L : ;and ~ associated flow. path: .

are_0PERABLE.s 3:.,w _ j y^

,AND & , -, W ':S Restore AC vital bus 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> subsystem to OPERABLE

[Pastili status. AND Cycle . a ,.

11] C.2 W 1.. .

16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LCO Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-32 Amendment No. 149

, i i  !

t i

Distribution Systems - Operating '

I i

3.8.9 i

l ACTIONS (continued)

DZTFain?B'PACTVitallusil D;CC- ; 1 CNOTE'H-- l--]

1 JsubsystemdnoperableL,;J ,This Actiontis.notL. 1 j applicable lin?MODEJ40 7

[ Party Cpcle"11]l h_..----- , -----:-- .---j  :'

New;Actjon i a,2;j' lVerifpMiTfollowing"ars] f.h'our] 2 J h 23 OPERABLE:: . . > . . ..

i i L Turbine 1; driven '

  • 1 L amargency;feedwater:M  :

I b ;Lpump and; associated .i" l

! l iflow; path,a ' '

2LJASV-204i ', ,

j  !

3 C. EFV-12, : and :.  !

1 a

43.EFV 13L.masaw.11; ,

e .c. . 4mc ,  !

$NQ w a s. w ,ww my,w::au.1&gn~. qaa.wu ,

1 ,

'Ol2TR6 tor 4TACTViO1TbusT~I.] 8 Miir C E '.3 i it subsystenito OPERABLE, 9  ;

il .. status,a a n ,;;;x w w a AND

[Pa'rt"1;"M .

C.. yc. l e .11..]. ;'4E g 16,hoursj.from!,ay *

(papg:1.,T"~N ' discovery ~of;_ '

Cycle w..--.. 111..]! E_.17 .a

,failuresto' meet;

((n ws

.,.a,n, .aau.s oi . a-M i

j E. One DC electrical power C-1 Restore DC electrical 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> distribution subsystem power distribution inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE ANR status.

16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LCO (continued)

I r

l 1

I t

?

I Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-33 Amendment No. 149

l l'

Distribution Systems - Oparating 3.8.9 i

l l

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

0. Required Action and D-1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND

\  : [Part.1,.yy.. : ;;,,

,.y Cycle:;,11]1f.1'

[Part;1..

- . . - ;1. -,

.l Be in MODE 5 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> Cycle 11] . F;},

l - - - ~ "

- [Partil;7 ' 71 Cycle,11]l[.j E. Two trains with -1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately inoperable distribution subsystems that result . . - ~

in a loss of function.  : [Part - 1,;',; .md . L.

Cpcle 11]s G.1~'

[Pa W 1F f !!

Cycle;11];Gj _.

l 1

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.9.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and 7 days voltage to required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems.

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-34 Amendment No. 149

-. ~. _= -

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NOTICE 210 STRIKEOUT / SHADOW PAGES Bases i

Each change is indicted by a shadow box. l Deletions are indicated by strikeout.

Additional and replacement text are indicated by shading.

Bracketed information provides reference to one of the three parts of the TSCRN.

The shadow box for each change indicates the following:

(1) A change required for the remainder of Cycle 11 only is indicated in the shadow box as ' Cycle 11',

(2) A permanent change is indicated in the shadow box as ' Permanent *,

(3) A change that may possibly be revised prior to restart of Cycle 12 depending on the Cycle 12 modifications is indicated in the shadow box as

' Reassess'.

ESAS Instrum4entation B 3.3.5 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5 Engineered Safeguc-ds Actuation System (ESAS) Instrumentation

! BASES BACKGROUND The ESAS initiates Engineered Safeguards (ES) Systems, based  ;

on the values of selected plant parameters, to protect core design and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits and to mitigate accidents.

ESAS actuates the following:

a. High Pressure Injection (HPI);
b. Low Pressure Injection (LPI);
c. Reactor Building (RB) Isolation and Cooling;
d. RB Spray; {

l

e. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Start; and )

i

f. Control complex normal recirculation.

ESAS also provides two signals to the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System. One signal initiates emergency feedwater (EFW) when an actuation of HPI Channel A and HPI Channel B is present. The other functions to trip the motor driven emergency feedwater pump when an RCS Pressure-Low Low initiation coincident with a loss of offsite power is present.

~

1 Thii*f HiTsiisal[iiaPT tsiiWiua11p"dsfsstediisNiHsfii siii~all M  !

break /LOCA3-scenarios.1FAssumingthe)singletfailureoffthei]

I turbine' driven feedwater! pump"or : associated flow?pathiini . g

[Part? 1[TP # such. circumstances,1defsatinguthisftrip; signal would:' iN 3 Cycle'.11]4 maintain: steam generator cooling withlthe1motorf dHvenm j W rgecy?feedwater; pump.: Prior;to defeatingithe.: trip 3 -

i

' signal',: sufficient l capability on sthe emergency; r diesel .11 *j!

l ' generators (toipower;thefrequired loads would belsstablishedl as . di scussedlinithe ; BASES i forJTechni cali Specifi cati on ;3. 7; 5 d (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.3-44 Amendment No. 11

PAM Instrum:ntation B 3.3.17 l

BASES LCO 18. Core Exi_t Temoerature (Backuo) (continued) following a steam generator tube rupture or small break i

LOCA. Operator actions to maintain a controlled cooldown, such as adjusting OTSG level or pressure, would be prompted by this indication. In addition, the core exit thermocouples provide input to the subcooling margin monitor, which is a Type A variable.

The subcooling margin monitor takes the average of the five highest CETs 'for 'each of the ICCM trains. Two channels ensure that a single failure will not disable the ability to determine the representative core exit temperature.

19. Emeraency Feedwater Flow i EFW Flow instrumentation is provided to monitor  ;

operation of decay heat removal via the OTSGs. The EFW l injection flow to each OTSG (2 channels per OTSG, one j associated with each EFW injection line) is determined j from a differential pressure measu emer.t calibrated to ,

a span of 0 gpm to 1000 gpm. Each di'ferential r l pressure transmitter provides an input to a control l room indicator and the plant computer. j EFW Flow is used by the operator to determine the need to throttle flow during accident or transient conditions to prevent the CI'd pumps fica cparating in i runcut conditicas cr frcm causing excessive RCS I

[Part 1;. / cooldown rates when low decay heat levels are present. i Permanent] EFW Flow is also used by the operator to verify that j the EFW System is delivering the correct flow to each OTSG. However, the primary indication of this function is provide.d by OTSG level.

These instruments are not assumed to provide information required by the operator to take a mitigation action specified in the safety analysis. As such, they are not Type A variables. However, the monitors are deemed risk significant (Category 1) and are included within the LCO based upon this consideration.

l l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.3-138 Amendment No. 11

ECCS - Operating

i. B 3.5.2 ,

l '

l l B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) J l

B 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating l

l l BASES [

i l BACKGROUND The function of the ECCS is to provide core cooling to ,

j ensure that the reactor core is protected after any of the  ;

l following accidents: l l

1. Loss of coolant accident (LOCA); }

l l 2. Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR); and

3. Steam line break (SLB). '

There are two modes of ECCS operation: injection and I

recirculation. In the injec+. ion phase, all injection is ,

initially added to the Rcactor Coolant System (RCS) from the '

borated water storage tank (BWST). This injection flow is added via the RCS cold legs and core flood nozzles to the reactor vessel. After the BWST has been depleted to s 15  !

feet but > 7 feet, the ECCS recirculation phase is entered .

as the ECCS suction is manually transferred to the reactor  !

building emergency sump.

Two redundant, 100% capacity trains are provided. Each train consists of high pressure injection (HPI) and low  ;

pressure injection (LPI) subsystems. In MODES 1, 2, and 3, 1

, both trains must be OPERABLE. This ensures that 100% of the l core cooling requirements can be provided even in the event  !

of a single active failure. ]

l l- lC&taMTiisTimalli&e~ak' LOCATiE~ehdiosTFeghiFe~emerfedEy~ 9 <

,feedwater;to.' maintain l steam generator cooling?untillcore . A I decay; heat;can-beTremoved: solely:-by'ECCS' cooling. - Further'0 ,

1

[PstF1T) : / /lwithlthe turbine inoperable, -drivenrEFW pumpLor associated

SWP-1B,
Ltraini"B"Tofithe  ; flow: pathf :

Nuclea'r:Servicesi 1 Cyclajil)'

~

SeawaterjSystem, CHHE-18Q andJCHP-1B Jas,well?as bothstrains of.,
ECCS, Decay; Heatl Closed lCyclei Cooling Water,, Decay ' Heat (. ;

Seawater, EmergencylDiesel Generators, LAC Electrical; Power'l; Di st ributi on' Subsystem',D and l AC Vi tal L Bus i Subsystems 3 are ;  ;

lrequi rediOPERABLE L(Refc5) . hwnnwm,wim36.w.4d A suction header supplies water from the BWST or the reactor building emergency sump to the ECCS pumps. Separate piping i

(continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-9 Amendment No. 149 i

i ECCS - Operating  ;

B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS .A_d

.Wi th~ohe~6irTmori? ECCSl frii n s ~i nopiFablifind " Af!1 ssi 100%"6f

,the .: fl ow saqui val enti to 'a: si ngl e l 0PERABLE1 ECCS 2traini .if  ;:j i

~' avail abl e , i prompt (acti on; wi thi n i ll hou rli s ; pecept'ary L to i Aj ensure that?the turbine driven ' emergency [feedwatera pump;andj associated'flomfpath'are OPERABLE 1forLsteam' generator W d ,

'coolinghiIf the turbine; driven 1 emergency'feedwater pump;or[

associated flowL pathlisinot.0PERABLEAthensthe6 capability to

removelsuff1cient? core decay > heat;cannot4beiassured'and A l Condition
B:isSapplicable. Con'sistentLwith;the' Bas'es(forli  ;

[part y, w Surveillancel3;0.1'7 OPERABILITY' is Lverified byl ensuringl.the {

4 Cycl.e)311]d dJ

' associated surveillance (s): has?been satisfactorily' completed within;theLrequiredifrequdncyjandi.the equipmentTis not- a

'otherwiseiknown to_belinopdrable R;d h ~. w a a u d

~

DdI 67the t Is~eue H ity of ! the "c6isedsin~ces "shoul d T inal l T bpeik LOCA1 occur;inithese' conditions,:ithe 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion 1Timedi

to verifylthei turbine' driven
emergency' feedwateri pump? and -l q rompt action  ;

will associated be; taken i to' flow' path' core" confirm aret0PERABLE ensures 1that p?capabilityW decay! heat c removal The Completion Time mininHzes:the . time-lthe: plant isi . A  ;

~potenti a11 L exposed ;to] ai LOCAli na these2condi tioni. lidLid '

fai

[PAFWiiM1 jWith one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of l

bYCI*

.m 1NM the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the inoperable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is based on NRC recommendations (Ref. 3) that are based on a risk evaluation and is a reasonable time for many repairs.

An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering the design flow to the RCS.

i i

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-15 Amendment No.149

f ECCS - Operating l B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS A-1 (continued)

[Pahtlli; The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent

Cyclel113t ,

subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the l Rbi j diversity of subsystems, the'inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily l

result in a loss of function for the ECCS. The intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment '

! such that the safety injection (SI) flow equivalent to 100%

of a single train remains available. This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable.

An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 3) has shown the t risk of having one full ECCS train inoperable to be sufficiently low to justify continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

With one or more components inoperable such that the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is not available, the facility is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be immediately entered.

This Condition does not apply to HPI subsystem components which are deactivated for the purposes of complying with Low l Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) administrative control commitments. With these components deactivated, the HPI subsystem is still considered OPERABLE based upon ,

guidance in NRC Generic Letter 91-18. This guidance allows l substitution of manual operator action for otherwise 1 l

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.515a Amendment No.149 i

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This surveillance ensures that these valves are in the proper position to prevent the HPI pump from exceeding its runout limit. This 24 month Frequency is acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment. )

i l

SR 3.5.2.6 This Surveillance ensures that the flow controllers for the LPI throttle valves will automatically control the LPI train  !

flow rate in the desired range and prevent LPI pump runout l as RCS pressure decreases after a LOCA. The 24 month l Frequency is acceptable based on consideration of the design i reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment. l SR 3.5.2.7 1

Periodic inspections of the reactor building emergency sump j suction inlet ensure that it is unrestricted and stays in i proper operating condition. The 24 month Frequency is based l l

on the need to perform this Surveillance under the l conditions that apply during a plant outage and to preserve j access to the location. This Frequency has been found to be .

sufficient to detect abnormal degradation and has been confirmed by operating experience.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.46.

1 l 2. FSAR, Section 6.1.  ;

3. NRC Memorandum to V. Stello, Jr., from R.L. Baer, )

" Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.

4. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Inservice

! [Pa E 1 C 4 Inspection, Article IWP-3000, l Cyclei ll]U

- ~ ~ - "

5: TFTI? 51;1266138101i ? SafetilAnalysiC Input 5 tolStarthii i a d Team)SafetyLAssessmenti ,u x m.s. . , m __ _ d i

i i (continued) 4 Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-18 Amendment No.149 l

l

l EFU System B 3.7.5 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System t

BASES BACKGROUND The Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System is designed to provide adequate flow to one or both steam generators (OTSGs) for decay heat removal with the generators at the maximum operating pressure of 1050 psig plus suitable margin for l post-accident pressure increase (Ref. 1, 2). The principal function of the EFW system is to remove-decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System upon the unavailability of normal feedwater supply. This is accomplished by supplying water from the emergency feedwater tank (EFT-2) to the OTSG secondary side via the high nozzles. Steam produced in the OTSGs is condensed in the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves or, if the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) or main steam safety valves (MSSVs) have actuated, discharged directly to the atmosphere.

The EFW System consists of one motor driven EFW pump and one steam turbine driven EFW pump, each having a nominal 100%

capacity (Ref. 3). The motor driven EFW pump is powered from the 4160 volt ES bus 3A. The turbine driven EFW pump receives steam from one main steam line per OTSG via connections upstream of the associated main steam isolation valve. An alternative source of steam is available from the fossil units, Crystal River Unit 1 and 2 (Ref. 1), but cannot be relied upon to consider the EFW train OPERABLE.

The diverse motive power of the two trains enhances both system availability and reliability. The preferred water source for both EFW pump trains is the Seismic Class I, missile protected dedicated EFW tank. Backup supplies of  ;

emergency feedwater are provided by the condensate storage tank and the main condenser hotwell. The pumps tie into common discharge headers providing the capability to feed either or both of the OTSGs.

,The Simps and 'OTSGi" aFeWoscEtsd ; fromTiescsisiVelylhigh^ flow i

linducedLproblems;by?cavitating.. venturis 2(EF-62-F0 and h . Es EF-63-FO)lin ;the? pump: discharge l lines,' design.ed: tollimit EFW iflow to theLsteam' generators;regardlessiof, steam generatorM pressure.(Refu7 h h _s o m.m m , its.a ;

l

~

[PaFt31;l Permainnt)) :

(continued) l l i Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-23 Amendment No. 149

l l

EFW System  ;

B 3.7.5 '

I 1

BASES ,

l l

l BACKGROUND DC powered block and control valves are actuated to feed the (continued) appropriate steam generator by the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System. The capacity of I either EFW pump is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the plant until the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and temperature are low enough to place the Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System in serv'- .

[PAft!'1j { Cycle 711]  :

service lorfunti_1.; Forf certain"smallibriak'LOCA 'scenirios "als6 invo19inga"16ssl core Ldecay.~heatL j 'of offsite power,: securing Lthe motor driven EFW; pump would S; can'be removed  ;

' provide ' capability;,on the emergency? diesel generator. to 1oad 3  !

kolelyj~ by~L ECCS. ,' ' Joads (Ref!6), a.,the.1"A" a;aa

~ " ~ ' '

train.low pressure; w: injection 2._ k.u pumpjan;

[PaEtLliLCyclel11]U I

l 1

l l

l l

l l

l i

4 (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-23a Amendment No.149

i i

EFW System B 3.7.5  ;

BASES  :

BACKGROUND Automatic actuation of the EFW System occurs on the (continued) following:

l

1. Trip of both main feedwater pumps with reactor power  ;

I greater than 20% or the NI/RPS not in shutdown bypass; l

2. Low level in either OTSG; f l
3. Low pressure in either OTSG; j
4. Trip of all four reactor coolant pumps; l l
5. High pressure injection (HPI) actuation on both  ;

Channel A and B Engineered Safeguards Actuation System  ;

(ESAS) channels; and t

6. AMSAC actuation. ,

The EFIC is a " smart" system which will feed either or both OTSGs with indications of low levels, but will isolate EFW '

to a faulted steam generator having a significantly lower steam pressure than the other.

The EFW System is designed to ANSI B 31.1 ES Seismic Class I and in accordance with General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5,19, 44, 45, and 46 (Ref. 3, 4).

APPLICABLE The EFW System is sized to provide sufficient decay heat SAFETY ANALYSIS removal capability to cooldown the RCS to the temperature and pressure at which the DHR System can be placed in service for any of the following events:

[Pdf1";7CyElE11]l oss of main feedwater (LMFW);

orf.at"which core, j pecay! heat lcanibe", . LMFW with loss of offsite power; removedisolelyl by[

ECCSjfoE L &.x A d . main feedwater line break; ,

e main steam line break; and

. small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

The EFW System is designed to remain functional following the maximum hypothetical earthquake. It will also remain (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-24 Amendment No.149

. . -- . . . . . . - - - - . - - - - - .- . ~- _. . - . .

EF%f System B 3.7.5 BASES APPLICABLE functional following a single failure in addition to any of SAFETY ANALYSES the above events with the exception of the loss of all AC j (continued) power (Ref. 3). No single failure prevents EFW from being I supplied to the intact OTSG nor allows EFW to be supplied to I the faulted OTSG. Note that in most cases of a main I feedwater break or a steam line break, the depressurization I of the affected OTSC would cause the automatic initir. bon of  !

EFW. However, there will be some small break sizes for i which automatic detection will not be possible. For these  ;

small breaks, the operator will have sufficient time in i which to take' appropriate action to terminate the event i (Ref. 1).

l The EFW System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy j Statement.

LCO Two independent emergency feedwater pumps and their associated flow paths are required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of the EFW pumps requires that each be capable of developing its required discharge pressure and flow. ,

Additionally, the OPERASILITY cf the turbine driven pump i requires that it be capable of being pc ered from an .

OPERACLE steam supply through ASV-5. ASV-204 was installed  !

c impicve ErW reliability and is act required for r OPERASILITY. The active -

The OPERABILITYJoffASVf 5hcwer fcr the turbine driven The pump ~"

~

[PaFtl1;T 'l sTaddEeised!by I CONDITION;8."? i Cycle' 11] L . . OPERA 8ILITY.of?ASV-204lis a'portioniof;EFP-2 0PERABILITYsand

,isladdressed;bytCondition;C.m i v_u u n n e a m s a d d

_ . . , , , ~ , The motive power for the turbine driven pump is steam

[Partl1;,T ' -- c4 supplied from either OTSG from a main steam header upstream  !

Permanent],; paths ; of the main steam isolation valves so that their closure  :

through(MSV-551 Ei does not isolate the steam supply to the turbine. Both Ond'MSV-563 .- , steam su W paths to the turbine driven pump are fggndjt,ionlA)(,3: required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of the associated ,

EFW flow paths requires all valves be in their correct positions or be capable of actuating to their correct positions on a valid actuation signal. ,

t I

l 4

h l l (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-25 Amendment No.149

.- - , ~ - . .

EF%/ System B 3.7.5 BASES

"~

t.C0f .

LIn"'certainEsmall break 31.0CA scenario's; Passu'mingithe' single ~ '

.(continued) failure 'ashthe'lossl of "B" train Class 1E/ direct current z powerJmanual operator l action would.be.taken[to maintain

' steam generator cooling.by' feeding the. steam' generators '

F- using thelturbineidriven EFW-pump. In.this, circumstance? -

i; ' manual operator > action would be .taken'.to close the "B"~ train'

-p 'EFW isolation valves,iand.'open the crosstie. valve, EFV-12

}f

(

-(Condition 0 ,;and'feedLthe: steam' generators;via the."A" i L .. m . train; flow path.& m _ _. 1 _ ,..e a: -mm _ m.a D I

[Paff^1V Inoperability of the EFW System may result in inadequate

-z Permanent]4 decay heat removal following a transient or accident during which main feedwater is not available. The resulting RCS heatup and pressure increase can potentially result in significant loss of coolant through the pressurizer code safety valves or the PORV.

The LCO is modified by a Nate indicating that caly cne ErW train, which incivdes a motor-driven ErW pump, is required ME 3 with OTSC seccadary side pressttre < 200 psig. At

[Part'1j. less than 200 psig, the turbine driven ErW pump is act i espable of producing the-accident analysis ficw rate. Under j Permanent]'

these conditions, the flow rate produced by the pump may l well be adequate to perform the heat removal function. l "cwever, this has act been analytically demonstrated. Thus, I the-allowance tc not have this pump OPERACLE is accepteble l based upon tne reduced-heat removal requircmcat-and-the short duration of this conditicn. Similar t-o-the concept i empicyed in LCO 3.5.2 "CCCS Systems - Operating," crcss-eennecting porticas of both trains tc produce a single OPERASLE train, is acceptable-tn-this plant condition.

1 l

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the EFW System is required to be l OPERABLE and to function in the event that main feedwater 1s I In addition, the EFW System is required to supply lost.

enough makeup water to replace the secondary side inventory lost as the plant cools to MODE 4 conditions.

In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the OTSG need not be used to cooldown the RCS. Therefore, the EFW System is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

I i l l l

l i

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-26 Amendment No.149 1

1 I

l l EFW System l B 3.7.5 l

BASES ACTIONS M With one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven EFW pump inoperable, action must be taken to restore the steam supply to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Allowing 7 days in this Condition is reasonable, based on the redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the pump and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven EFW pumps.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any

[PaFt{1E Cpi:lel combination of Conditions to be entered during any 11])other. , continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Conditions.

"~ "_"

l Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and 0 are entered concurrently. The 'AND' connector between 7 days and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

, , , , , , , , - - ., - n . , , . ,,,..,n, 5

' ^ " " ^ ' " * ^ ' * ' * * " * ' - ~^ "" #' "' '" * * ^ ' #'*

...,e. -,

.m. ,

[Part 1;'. ~

Cycle: 11i . If?ASV-57isTih6iierableTpF6mpt acti66'mUst"bEtakid7t~61 * ~l New' ACTI. ON];-.?

restore'ASV-5:to OPERABLE l status within'72; hours. 'The 72:,4 capabilities-afforded;by-the EFW-System,;timerneeded fori lr'epair's - and .the : low, probability; ofia~ DBA " occurring' during i; thisitime: period L _ m Eiswm . , mms; l

Th~e 'se'cond .Compl eti6n~ Tim 6Tf6FT Re46i fed 7 Action'. B 11T"~ ^ "7

' established a limit on' the' maximum time allowed for:any? 4 i combination'offConditions,to be! entered'during.any' 1 l continuous failure: to meet this;LCO. .;The110 day Completion 4 Time providesla Llimitationitime" allowed!inL this;specified L 1 Conditibn after discovbry!of failure'to meet;the LCO. This 3 limit is: considered reasonable :for" situations in which other, 4 Conditions- are entered l. concurrently. tThe1'MQ' connector' 4 between 72 ; hours and 10l days dictates;that:both CompletionJ TimeV apply- simultaneously and the' more ~ restrictive must, be' met. , x. ,. . - , ., ,= .:: x . .. a) i I '

i l

(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-26a Amendment No.149

_ ______.__._____._____._._..__..__...____._.m._ _

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES

'TPlG" "' '

' ACTIONS E~  ? ' " ' f'  ?"' " " 'l b (continued L . . K +

~ ' '

. . . .c .

s If'ASV-204,i EFV-12l[or EFV-13 isDinoperableh piomptl action 13 mustibe taker"within(l' hour to ensure lthe,following(arel ,f

[PaEtlliL l DPERABLE: h ,u m.a a i a s; 2 . c,i l u .u m ..2 <J Cycle 11; .g Newl ACTION]j i M@%Tfiih""B"

- nTrain1"B:"AC EmeFgEEyIDiesseliGiriieFit6Ei(TS53?811C Electrical; Power Distribution 1 Subsystem- 1 7 "!j IL-3 Train.

?(TS 3i8;9) Candi . ,_

"B", ACivitallBusiSubsystemi.'(TS 53 8.9)ht.1 l

^

, d d

_.._._. . th.m e .Ba_ses ;fo._ r Surveilla.nce;3,,0,.1y,,,,,  ; h ,~, , ,r,

.Cons

_.i s_. tent:.with... . ~

OPERABILITYii s ; veri fi ed . by L ensu ri ng l the Lassoci ated ; .Jj su rveil l ance(s) : has r been isati sfactori,1 y t completed i wi thi n , the

required frequency;and the equipment is!not otherwise knowna

.to belinoperrAle.hmlb a.% , 2,2n.am.ud  ;

Iffthe"ab6se TTrain]"B'TeqsiiimentilisFn'6EOPERABLEiniith?"E~j ASV-204,JEFV-12,for EFV-13 inoperable, the
capabilityctoy 1

' remove-sufficient icore decay heat;cannot;be assured;and 1 1 ConditioniFiis; applicable,. i .. m F k o n & L . d DUiT6~ther sesiHtyTof[the"E6nieddedii ,h6uldTaiins11? break' LOCA occur /in'theseJconditions,Lthe111hN rl Completion Timer

,to verify the(above Traini"B"? equipment!h.s OPERABLE:ensurest

,that. prompt; action willebeitaken to confirmfcoreTdecay heatj removancapability.OThe Completion? Time minimizes (theftime ?

'the Jplantsis : potentially? Exposed)to a! LOCA :ini these ; .p j lconditionsL,i L a u. L a u l u a m . m x . 3a id

m -, . --.- ~ n n g. 7m e m , .; n e m3

.wr L, k ' sad,. L .a. J a a n. hum ,dv M.k .de . ~ t w i !. w M.u G u- s - +.i a.s

... , . . , , IflASV-204 F EFV212Ior3EFVf131 W inoperable M omptTa'ction ]

[Partel; ,C must*be taken to restore 7the valvestto? OPERABLE: status 1 m t Cycle:11; 'within'72: hours. The172 hou'r Completion 1Timelibreasondbleh

~

i NewlACTION].,g* based on thec redundant 2 capabilitiest afforded byfthe'EFWL Ld System,3 time; needed for repairs,' and;theflow probability of.$

a,DBA occurring;.dur.inglthisitimel period b a. , ,_ m . i ,j (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-26b Amendment No.149

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES

'ACTIONSL;.L.l h;(continiied)21 J."1 Y Z ill m . " l,.n . &

Thefse'c6nd~Completi6n' Time Tforf ReqUi'redfActionTCs2i" ~""'

established a limit on the maximum time allowed for.any

" combination of Conditions! to~ be.' entered"during any.- ..m  :

to meetsthis;LCO.1 The10(dayCompletioni l continuous

Timei provides?.a .failureif slit tationt f imet
allowed c in this specified; j Condition after discovery'of;; failure to meet;theiLCO. fThisj ilimitLis'.conside' red reasonable" for situations inJwhich other;

' Conditions a're' entered ' concurrently. ;The L' ANQ'! connector.. ' :

between 72' hourse and~ 10. days dictates"that both Completion ..

Times / apply simultaneously, .:and(thelmore: res' trictive- must~ be met. m _ n 2.de mmasm w.maa. a K .e y, -

7, m.w y ,

7 , ,-

. m . , . w. - . s 7.~ y- .w - - . , . , . e,,

ILc a a . : .a, ,. La. u.-.2 au-~.a.m .. ~ k ,. > - . :.w :aal R Maw au. 2J:.=:sJ

~

If thei 061neidHi/en t EFW Tu~mpioIsssocisted Lflbs pith"is' 2

inoperable', prompt action mustlbe taken' within '1. hour toy i

' ens u re ;the ..foll owi ng : "St.trai n i systems i are_0PERABLE ;;, - _.

~

f^% SWPi1B T(TS13.'7!7)E T ' = " 1 T "T .

^3

<- iTrain "B"' of the Nuclear; Services' Seawater System? .l

[ _(TS 3.7.9), .

j C- CCHHE-1Biand;CHP-18.(TS1.3;7.18) w o:_u ;m;mm _ w .2.a

'Ccnsistent5ith?t hiBasef f6F SErviillince'3!071C M ' '  ;~11

[PartiliC3 ~

OPERABILITY;is verified by: ensuring,the. a' ssociatedf .. e ,

Cycle ~ 113 !

~ ~ ~'

surveillance (s) h'as:been satisfac'torilyicompleted within~ the' required-frequency a'nd thetequipmenttisinot otherwise knownf

to be; inoperable.a,m.a .a _ n c m a u ._,a .. _ _ . _.

~

Iflthe~ atioWlisted L"B" triin~c6mp6nents?iri" riot 0PERABLE~ N with the- turbine ' driven EFW pump or associated flow path ,

, inoperable. the capabilityJfor EDG load-' management to- L

, improve small breakrLOCA mitigationj cannot beJassured< andl- e Condition 11s sapplicable.m J.< ~ u a c a _ m o -ma a (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-26c Amendment No.149

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONSCO.

  • ED.12(cont'inued):2 " ' J ~ , Z "m , , ; ('"7  ;.i

[Part' lit D DUeit6 theTseverity'of the conseqiences~shouldFit small?briak Cycle 11 j LOCAL occurJin these conditions, r the.1-. hour CompletioniTimeH Newl ACTION]j to verify l the above listeda"B"> train' components as OPERABLE 4 ensures tha 3rompt action:will be'taken to, confirm EDG. load management.\ hel Completion Time::minimizesithe: time the: 3

'pl ant :ti s i potdti al l y, exposed ; to ; a: LOCA ii n ; thess ; condi ti ons R)

.. 7 7, 7- - , , , , - . - - -

, ., w, a AZ > , R& i.:dsk.w;~ +. haw,.;Lhiww wM w.d a % ;i.h < M a s, ahd

[PaFE1; 7 If theTiBr6ine" driven EFW "pumgi?6K asi6ci a tied iflosF pathT i s ?

  • Cycle .11; '

NewiACTIONU, ensure both_ trainslof_the;following!are;0PERABLE: w.m.,x.cinopera P F'ECCS (TST3!5!2), ". ' i ~P ~ . . *7" " 7 'E " ' N

[:"-t 1 Decay { Heat J Cl osed : Cycl e f Cooli ng Wate ri(TS v317. 8) , : *'s y-t Decay, Heat Seawater!(TSi3;7210)1 6 '

~

p 2 Emergency. Diesel Generator's'. (TS; 3'.8.1)' .

U ,

t- AC Electricals Power Distribution' Subsystems::(TS 3.8.9),i I and. . . _ . .

k-:JACzVitallBus:. Subsystems:(TS 3.8.9)h a .:.n ; s u m. m

'C6n si st entT hi th"the' F

OPERABILITY?is/ verifiedBasss? for? the by ensuring SuFveill associated.' amce? 3. 0 ;1',7 ' ,9 N .3 surveillance (s)iha's beenisatisfactorily ' completed within(the' required frequency; and ~ the equipment is' not~ otherwiseLKnown!

.to.be, inoperable. w. w.n:a a m _ aami;;m .% , z.s2 If'bothitraini"ofTthe"aboVe"eduipmentTaFe'notOPERABLE!with'f T

.t he. turbine: driven EFW pump or associated flow path . .

q 3 inoperable, the capability tofremove sufficient' core: decay 1) heat;cannot.be;. assured and; Condition I;is; applicable. a j Due* t6~ theleverity! of f the ~consequenceiE sh601d T'smalli break LOCA occur; in,these conditions,1.the A houriCompletion' Time >:}

to verify bothi trains _ of. the above; equipment as OPERABLEQ "2 '

ensures that prompt actionLwi1Pbe taken to confirm core': -

decay heat, removal! capabilityL The Completion Time minimizes 1 the time the plant is potentially: exposed to a; '

i LOCA in these conditions.L 'l u._ _ , ,

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-26d Amendment No.149

. _ ~ . _ - - . - . . - . . . .- - . _ - _ - . _ _ - - - _ - - . . . - - - -

1 l

EPd System B 3.7.5 -

BASES i

.,, ~

-A, C I. E N S i s . ; e .A!

g- . m_c gn. ;.ng .~e ., ,,,,.,. n. . ., ,,.,..;,.,,,,,,,,

wwwc;wshgh,;Ah,;,;,% mw&w,w Mg&,h;gg; guy

,IfMhiTtirb'i niFdri VihiEFW ) Ump!6Ffas sbcistedTf16Ephi:h'~1 sT9

[PartG1,;; inoperable,7 action must beftaken(tolrestore 'theirequirid O Cycle til; *W, N~Ag0N]i l "equipmentito OPERABLE ~ status withinL72 hours. LThe 72i hourd l CompletiohiTime.istreasonable,! based'on$the!redundantE h

' capabilities: afforded byfthe? motor:drhenLEFW pumpCtime. d l neededLfor Trepairs,'and the;10wiprobability of a1DBA1 '

l

'occurCingiducing;thisitimelperiodk._ AnnALJ, 3

JhsT siEssd lCompletioh! Time ? foK ReqUi Fed 7AEti oh~ D.13?N7]

1 establishes;allinit'on combination of Conditions;to the' be maximum' time'allowedtforTanyj entered /duringjany; 4 ;d

' continuous =failureftoimeet this LCO.iThe:10. day Completion N  !

Time'providesta limitationetime allowed (in:thisispecifiedc p Conditionafterdiscovery"of<failurecto; meet'the'LCOsThisd ^ ,

ilimit:is" considered reasonable forisituationsEinLwhich'othere '

Conditions' are entered? concurrently.:JThe}'etEl' connectorl d  ;

betweenT721 hours'andi10:daysdictates;that!both'.Completiond Timesfapplyf simul taneousl y , J and the ' moref restri cti ve ; must be met. a a h am a _a m _ m a a s s m a. w d

[Papt'li! 7 S CI*111l M i

If one of the Erd trains is insperable, action must be taken l ts restere the train to OPERACLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. '

IfT theTeotorldriVen?EFW"pssp?or7sss6ciaidediflaw 7 pathTisPT9

[Pfr_tT1{C_ycle_ill))

i equips.entito 0PERABLE.statusLwithinl72_hou'rs. w b k h a d l The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, based on the '

redundant capabilities afforded by the EFW pump, time needed

.-,.-1 for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring

[PartL1;n '

during this time period. This Condition includes the less Cycle ,.11] .m. f t e steam supply lines to the turbine driven Erd pwp. l The second Completion Time for Required Action Brly [ paw 1Fi i establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any wdy,jj

  • Nk f

[PsFtilu m continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion i

Cycle;11]>j; "

Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified other Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This Conditions mi Enntwa j limit is considered reasonable for situations in which '

caditicas A and 3 are entered concurrently. The 'AND' connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more  :

restrictive must be met.

(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-27 Amendment No. 149

I l

1 EFW System i B 3.7.5 )

BASES l

h.  : [Part Lli' Cycle'ill] Relquiped!,

.- ~ " Actions A.1p B.1,sC.1; C.2,Y3 i ACTIONS C.1 and m.2 pil,;D.2,iD.3,;or)E;1Ldbj

]

(continued) i If Required Activ, A.1 cr Required Actica Ori cannot be  !

completed within the associated Ccmpletion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.

l To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant sy. items.

ihi

[Psfilli;' "ij With both EFW trains inoperable, the plant is in a seriously Cycle l11]i 4 degraded condition with no safety related means for t R mjj conducting a cooldown. In such a condition, plant operation should not be perturbed by a forced action, including a power change, that might result in a trip. For this reason.

I I

i I

i j (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-27a Amendment No. 149 I

EFM/ System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS Bri (continued)

(Partjli[ the Technical Specifications do not mandate a plant Cycleill]li?Tj

.Exl! shutdown. Rather the ACTIONS allow the plant to dictate the most prudent course of action (including plant shutdown) for the situation. The seriousness of this condition requires that action be initiated immediately to restore at least one -

EFW train to OPERABLE status.

1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the ' correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the EFW water and steam supply flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for EFW operation. The valves verified by this SR include valves in the main flow paths and the first normally closed valve in a branch line. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since those valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. There are several other exceptions for valve position verification due i to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which are not verified as i.

part of this SR include vent or drain valves outside the RB,

, relief valves outside the RB, and instrumentation valves (both inside and outside the RB). This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. ,

, This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve j manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those i valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 45 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with the Frequency established for SR 3.7.5.2. SR 3.7.5.2 requires extensive EFW valve manipulation in order to perform the pump flow rate verification, such that a flow path verification is I necessary following each performance. ,

SR 3.7.52 2 This SR verifies that the EFW pumps develop sufficient discharge pressure to deliver the required flow at the full open pressure of the MSSVs. Because it is undesirable to I

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-28 Amendment No. 149

- ~ ~ - - . . . . . . . - . ...- -.-.-.

i

. EFW System l B 3.7.5 i BASES l .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.5 (continued)  :

-REQUIREMENTS .

of EFW flow paths must be demonstrated before sufficient i core heat is generated that would require the operation of the EFW System during a subsequent shutdown. The Frequency is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of ,

other administrative controls to ensure that the flow paths '

are OPERABLE. To further ensure EFW System alignment, flow path OPERABILITY is verified, following extended outages to '

l determine no misalignment of valves has occurred. This SR l ensures that the flow path from the EFW tank to.the OTSGs is i

, properly aligned. This requirement is based upon the l l recommendation of NUREG 0737. The Frequency was modified '

l slightly during ITS development (prior to entering MODE 2) to provide an SR 3.0.4 type exception. As written, the SR allows the plant to achieve and maintain MODE 3 conditions .

in order to perform the verification. l REFERENCES 1. Enhanced Design Basis Document for the Emergency Feedwater and Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control .

System, Revision 1, dated September 27, 1991 with Temporary Changes 156, 230, 247, and 249. ,

2. BAW-10043, " Overpressure Protection for B&W Reactors",

dated May 1972. .

3. FSAR, Section 10.5. .
4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.

~,. 5. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, (Part111]k,H Cycle li l Inservice Inspection, Subsection IWP. .

u,ua.wu .

[PUF1IP Permanent]! \ .-.i SafetylAssessment bia i i da;c M d n bm E x k i .33Md tw%:a l 7EFPC3al cul atio638750008 E Rei.T5DOJGGZEdHEIl3 i

i i

!- (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-31 Amendment No.149

SW System B 3.7.7 BASES

n , - - -

~

y BACKGROUND: .

For;certain small: break"LOCAs with'a.concurrentLloss of'- /

y, (continued [ toffsite power,-1 securing SWP-1A:and;RWP-2A provides .. ..I i .. . ;capabilityL,on'the':emergencyLdiesel generator to' load'the:"A"4 (1 *- . train Llow pressure' injection pump and other? required loads. : [

b 1.These~ pumps would:be manually:securediand; locked'out to .

L

'~

preclude? automatic reinitiation. 'In .these: situations, SWP-'n  ;

h'

~

.1B'and RWP-28;are relied upon(to, provide / continued-flow;for.i Law.:.- J" Malthe,5Wland Nucleat 5ervices. Seawater; systems t

, .a. ,_s.m J

[Papt liiCyclelll]i,]

~

P j

l i

l l

1 i

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7 36a Amendment No.149

I l

SW System B 3.7.7 BASES APPLICABILITY Three of the four heat exchangers must be OPERABLE to (continued) accommodate the design system heat load requirements.

In MODES 5 and 6, the SW System is not required to be OPERABLE due to the limitations on RCS temperature and pressure in these MODES. Additionally, there are no other Technical Specification LCOs supported by SW which are

applicable during these plant conditions. ,

1 1

ACTIONSpyreymygAy1yr wam . and7 Ag 2 py mm -43qqm7,m7y yw-m yp..x p e;. p ymm.%9 mangaw.maagdhannumAa 7 Epggg r m 'Wi tf SWP11835cipeFab1 ENF6mptlidi 66"' mis'E INik'ei"sii thi n $1l

'LJ hourstofens'ureithat2 sufficienticapabilityLislavailable?on? 9 l;

C wm m j "A"d rai n ? emergency / diesel f generator ; for! SWP-1A ti n i certai nh smell; break LOCA* scenarios; JIn Esuch circumstancesOtheA Jj lmotot driven Lemergencyffeedwaters pump (would be;secu'redrand Q

the > turbi ne dr1 von ; emergency # feedwater! pump l and Jassoci ated. l lj >
flow path would befrequired;0PERABLE:to providefsteami c h
'generatorx cooling. IfitheI turbineTdriventemergencyde 1

< ,feedwaters pumpfis notf 0PERABLELto: permit securing: motor) t1

'drhen emergency,feedwater pumpc the? capability /for:EDG' load.

4

' management:to; improve'Small break;LOCA mitigation;cannot:bej

[ assured:andConditionC$s7 applicable ~.RThe;operabilitytofd

theiturbineidriven "emergocyj feedwaterh pump .i s ;not# equi redj

, einiMODEf4. w . n w i. A m h m d u m m R k d

~

C6ssi sitsntilii th"lthhTBisif forlSEFveilliscWI3!0;f,P"'"E M OPERA 8ILITY 1s: verified: byJen' s uringlthe. associated & Mj i l surveillance (s)3 has' beenisatisfactorilyicompleted within':the .

required 2 frequency and the(equipment

to be Jnoperable w a s. a h . m u;isinotiotherwise:knownf mguuumud DuiT6Tthi.'si~ veri tE6fiths"66ssi4Gsides? sh6uld ~iTsmal lT tirsak' t LOCA occurLin?these conditions,6the'lihourf Completion Time.M .

.to, verify;turbinej driven; emergency; feodwaterJpump and e <

U

'associsted; flow pathare OPERABLE (ensuresJthat prompt action' willbeLtakentoconfirmEDGloapmanagementfcapabilityforj small; break 1LOCA .mitigationiimprovement.i;L,The Completionb j Time minimizes;the time 1the plant;is/potentiallys exposeditos -

'a i LOCA1 i n i these ^condi ti ons .' The ; 72 : hou r; Compl eti on : Ti me? fori restoring SWP-18.0PERABILITYfis' consistentLwith; other2 ECCS Q

. Specifications;foria lossiof ' redundancy' Conditioni and h hasi been shownito maintainja:su'itableilimit on(risk. :As such, j .

this! Completion ~ Time ^isLbased on engineering l judgment
and is-consistent withlindustry-acceptedtpractic'e.1 , , am AE

~

l i

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-38 Amendment No.149

SM/ System B 3.7.7 BASES

[pg p9cm3  : [PEffi!Ciclay CycleJliUad 11&d1Ab2d

+/ og [ne of the ;;;rgency SW psaps and/or one o With required heat exchangers inoperable, the heat removal capacity of the SW System is degraded. In this Condition, adequate cooling of the containment and ES equipment served by SW cannot be assured following an accident coincident i with-a worst-case single active failure. Therefore, action  !

must be taken to restore the affected component (s) to OPERABLE status. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring full SW System OPERABILITY is consistent with other ECCS Specifications for a loss of redundancy Condition and, has l been shown to maintain a suitable limit on risk. As such, i this Completion Time is based on engineering judgment and is j consistent with industry-accepted practice. l

[PUF1TT?.]

Cycles 11]Q , , , , , ,

" ^ " " " " "

C11-vand'C.2f t --,--_~ ~ .;

If the inoperable SW component (s) cannot be restored to .

OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the  !

plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not i apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36-hours. _The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions  ;

from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without  ;

challenging plant systems.  ;

I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the SW flow to individual components may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the SW System. l t

(continued) ,

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-38a Amendment No.149

= _ _ _

l DC Syst:m B 3.7.8 ,

1 l

l l

l B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System BASES BACKGROUND The Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water (DC) System l facilitates the removal of decay heat from the reactor core.

The system also removes process and operating heat from safety related components associated with decay heat removal during normal plant cooldown and following a transient or  !

accident. During plant cooldown below approximately 250*F the DC system provides core heat removal by transferring heat from the Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System to the Decay Heat Seawater System. The system is divided into two independent and redundant trains, each capable of supplying 100 percent of the required normal and post-accident cooling. Each train contains a pump, a surge tank pressurized with nitrogen for volume and pressure control, and a heat exchanger which removes heat from the DHR system and rejects it to the Decay Heat Seawater System.

The design and operation of the DC system, along with a list of the components served, can be found in FSAR Section 9.5.2.2 (Ref. 1). For normal operation the DC pumps are started manually. However, in an emergency both DC pumps start automatically upon receipt of an Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS). The DC system supports long-term reactor decay heat removal following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) when the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is recirculating water from the RB sump to.the reactor core through the DH heat exchanger. The :1; System

  • also supports post-accident containment cooling by supplying cooling water to the reactor building spray pump motor coolers and bearings. Other loads supplied by this system are the DHR (LPI) pumps and motors, DC and decay heat seawater pump motors and two of the three make-up and purification (HPI) pump motors. The DC System supplies cooling to these pump motor heat exchangers, lube oil coolers, gear lube oil coolers, bearings, or air handling

[Paff.'1I?"j units to prevent overheating of the associated components Cycl,ejil]j (Ref. 3).

Certain"sniall bFeak' LOCK ~schario~sTFeil Eire *em5Fgsdp? ' "E feedwater to ' maintain st'eam generator? cooling'untili core : Ji decay' heat..can be removed solely _by;ECCSl cooling. !Further,

'with;theiturbine;dtiven.EFW; pump.oriassociated zflow path G[m (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-42 Amendment No.149 i

. _._ _ _ ._ _ ___.__..~ _._ __._. . _ _. - _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _

i DC System B 3.7.8 i t

BASE l

BACKGROUND! '~73ho'perable[SWPf1BEtPain?'B'Fof 3he Nui:learE " T ' '  :

E= ServicesSeawaterSystem/CHHE-1B,'1andCHP-18,[as.well9ha : {

Q(contindeM

' ~

F iboth trainsiofL ECCS,1 Decak Hea,t* Closed CycleL Cooling , Water,0j l

(W ,' ,

L

Decay Heat; Seawater,LEmergencyiDiesel' Generators 6 AC:  ; M i

I' KElectr.ical; PoweriDistribution' Subsystems a and: AC Vi,talf Busd L.ach eam i5ubsystems}arefrequired 0PERABLE.li ,m,, a hws

-. . As a closed system, the DC System also serves as an

[PartJ1; #

intermediate barrier to radioactivity releases to the h(C)*ikk3) 2 environment from potential leaks in interfacing systems.  ;

APPLICABLE The DC system provides cooling for components essential to SAFETY ANALYSIS the mitigation of plant transients and accidents. An ESAS initiation signal will start both DC pumps. This ensures that the required cooling capacity is provided to the essential equipment following a steam line break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, or LOCA. The running pumps (100 percent capacity each), in conjunction with an associated DC heat exchanger, reject heat to the Decay Heat Seawater System to ensure the necessary cooling flow to components required for reactor decay heat removal. By cooling the RB spray pumps and pump motors following a LOCA or SLB, the DC system supports the RB Spray System by ensuring the pressure and temperature in containment are maintained within acceptable limits. The OPERABILITY of the RB Spray System is addressed in LCO 3.6.6, " Reactor Building Spray and Containment Cooling Systems".

During normal and post-accident cooldown operations, when RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to allow the alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, DC System operation facilitates core heat removal by transferring heat from the DHR System to the Decay Heat Seawater System.

The Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.  !

LCO The requirement for two DC trains to be OPERABLE assures adequate normal and post-accident heat removal from the reactor core and essential components, considering a worst case single active failure. One of the OPERABILITY considerations regarding these independent and redundant trains is that each valve in the flow path be in the correct post-accident position. Additionally, each DC pump must be j

\

l 1 i

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-42a Amendment No.149

DC Systcm B 3.7.8 BASE

. APPLICABILITY In' MODES 1, 2, and 3 the DC System is not a normally operating system, but must be capable of performing its post-accident safety functions, which include providing cooling water to components required for RCS and containment heat removal. Two independent 100 percent capacity DC trains must be OPERABLE to accommodate the design system heat load requirements and satisfy reliability considerations assuming a single failure.

In MODE 4, although RCS temperature and pressure are reduced, there remains sufficient stored energy that the occurrence of an accident would necessitate the post-accident cooling functions-of the DC System. When temperature and pressure have been reduced sufficiently to allow alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, the DC System is no longer required for post-accident component cooling, but must continue to provide cooling to the DHR heat exchangers. Therefore, two trains of the DC System must remain OPERABLE throughout MODE 4 to ensure emergency preparedness and/or decay heat removal, assuming a single active failure.

In MODES 5 and 6 the DC System is in operation performing its normal safety function of RCS decay heat removal. The various means of removing reactor decay heat in MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops ,

Filled"; LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled";  !

LCO 3.9.4, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level", ,

and LCO 3.9.5, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level". In other words, the OPERABILITY requirements for the  ;

DC System are determined by the systems it supports. l Therefore, this LCO is not applicable in MODES 5 and 6. ,

i 1

- ACTIONS ad; f

'[PDF1TP1 iH th7osel DC TtFiih31sciofable~f jWiiisitiiTeti6n siit thi s"1%FIi s Cyclaill)!! ;necessary totensure? that the?turbineidrivenj ene cy1 3? .!

A;p " AE2") ifeedwaterTpump?and; associated / flow pathiareJava able(for9d i steamgenerator!coolingMIfJthefturbinedrivenl emerge'ncy?Q  ;

feedwateKpumpTand? associated! flow lpathlare not!availableM i

)hescapabi li ty!fori core decay r l heat removal s has ; noti been/ fry )

[PEFtl1F 3' ssured(and Condition [B;islapplicableyTheioperab111tp;of f4 Cy_cle.~111)g" d Mthetturtsine driven > emergency;feedwater pumpiisinot-- req -

i niMODE;4 ' 2; mw;b1Cinamaghhad.htra (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-43 Amendment No. 149 1

i i

n-~, - _- - - - , - , - . . , , . _- ,-n- , - , ,. . - - , - - , , -

, , -,- -,,.---,---,,.n .

1 l

l DC System '

l 8 3.7.8

[Pir(1FCycli~j 1 A an A . 2'  !

BASE

/

ACTIONS hi (continued)

~

Con si s tent"wi tF the* Basies' foe Sirsei l l inde'3 : 0MTU OPERABILITY 4isiverified by;; ensuring)theJassociated u . ., j

" " "7

surveillance (s)T has been ssatisfactorily3 completed withinithi  :

requi red Lfrequency ,anda the ' equipment 31 si not  !

.to belinoperabledah AEdun,d;otherwise;known9 -

~ ud  !

[PaFtTliR i Cyclel11]j Dui7t6Mhe g severiti?6fTthe' consequences (shosidla7sma117 tireak .

i l LOCA ? occur 2in, these. conditions ,Y theilt hour; Completion ;Timefj to verifyfturbineL driven < emergency lfeedwaterepump?and s _ 9' l associated flow

  • path tare 0PERABLE; ensures (that prompt (action' l will;beitaken to;confireicore decay 1 heat capability; !Thet j  :

'Compl eti on s .Ti me mi nimi zes : the :.: timefthel pl ant Tt i s potenti all yj

'exposedito a;LOCAlinitheselconditionsk i n di a .w a i t

[Pirt?lp? Required Actio . is modif'ed by a Note indicating that l Cycle;11]! the appli - e Conditions r.nd Required ktions of LCO 3.4.5, l A , p"" . "", 1 :

"RCS L ops - MODE 4," be entered if an inoperable DC train results in an inoperable required DHR loop. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for an inoperability of a required DHR loop.

l With one DC train inoperable, action must be taken to

! restore the train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In j this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DC train is adequate l to perform the heat removal function. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring full DC System OPERABILITY is l the same as that for the ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the DC System. This Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train and the low probability of a

! DBA occurring during this period.

1 B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable DC train cannot be restored to OPERABLE I

! status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least j l MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The '

Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full  ;

puer conditions in an orderly manner and without i challenging plant systems.

l l

i (continued) I Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-44a Amendment No. 149 1

Nuclear Services Seawater System B 3.7.9

[

BASES BACKGROUND The Nuclear Services Seawater System is designed to seismic (continued) category I requirements, except for the standpipe drain line. The design and operation of the Nuclear Services Seawater System along with a list of components served by SW I during normal and emergency conditions, can be found in FSAR Section 9.5 (Ref. 2). Following an Engineered Safeguards i

Actuation System (ESAS) actuation, SW System flow paths are realigned to provide a reliable source of cooling to essential safeguards equipment which may be supplied by non-safety cooling water systems during normal operations. To

^

ensure these additional heat loads can be accommodated, both

[Partl lit} emergency pumps are started simultaneously by an ESAS signal Cycle;11]j to provide adequate cooling in the event of a single active m.-~

failure which disables one emergency pump.

ohicertain?small! breik1LOCAslTvith'a concurreht31ossI6f?" *

'offsite power,! securing:SWP-1Aland RWP-2A'would? provide) A capability. on <the . emergency diesel generatorito; load rthe1"A",

train? low pressure 1 injection' pump and other; required < loads.s!

These pumps!would be manually. secured andelocked outttof. .,f preclude automatic; reinitiation. , Inithese Lsituationsb SWP-l

'1B;and RWP.-2Blare relied upon to' provide continued Lflow to ?

the;SWfand NuclearlServices;Seawaterisystems,a m i a. d APPLICABLE The Nuclear Services Seawater System supports the SW System SAFETY ANALYSES in providing cooling for components essential to the mitigation of plant transients and accidents. The system has two separate 100 percent capacity underground intake conduits, independent emergency pumps, and underground discharge conduits to allow for a single failure while still providing the required flow. An ESAS signal will start both energency pumps. This ensures the required cooling capacity is provided to the SW System following a steam line break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, or loss of coolant accident.

The Nuclear Services Seawater System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The requirement for the OPERABILITY of the Nuclear Services Seawater System including two emergency nuclear services seawater pumps provides redundancy necessary to ensure the system will provide adequate post-accident heat removal in the event of a coincident single failure.

l l

l (continued) 1 Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-47 Amendment No.149

Nuclear Services Seawater System (PirCli[PeFniasentFOPERABILITY"off thg7 y B 3.7.9 gs,socj ated iflow; path.s;; requi resj that; eachij BASES LCO Emergency nuclear service seawater pump OPERABILITY (continued) requires that each be cap le of being powered from separate OPERABLE emergency buses. Each valve in the flow path must be aligned to permit sea water flow from the intake canal to the SW heat exchangers, and subsequently to the discharge canal. The OPERABILITY of the SW heat exchangers, required to ensure proper heat removal capability, is addressed in LCO 3.7.7, " Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water System".

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 through 4 the SW and Nuclear Services Seawater Systems are normally operating systems which must be prepared to provide post-accident cooling for components required for RCS and containment heat removal, equipment essential in providing the capability to safely shutdown the plant, and aquipment required for adequate spent fuel pool cooling. The Nuclear Services Seawater System must be capable of providing its post-accident cooling assuming a single active failure. Therefore, both emergency pumps are required to be OPERABLE during these MODES.

In MODES 5 and 6, the Nuclear Services Seawater System is not required to be OPERABLE due to the limitations oa RCS temperature and pressure in these MODES. Additionally, there are no other Technical Specification LCOs supported by the system which are applicable during these plant conditions.

m y. _ , mmm

,t a.,.m yh mA, my y~m

,m

, ACTIONS ,A d _ ;tA~.'1'and7 A.2y A gu a ,s_ ym

_1

.mmama s u Wi thT t rai d^ "Bfof[ ths' Nsci dar? Se Fvi ces' Seaiiiate N SystMT"U 7  ; inoperable,: prompt;actionsmustibeLtaken within'lthouri t oi i

[Part1mb ensure (that':sufficienticapabilityds?available on;"A" train d i SCI'$j X off emergency j dissel generator' for[RWP-2Atin 'certain(small! 'l Nbreak'LOCA. scenarios-. tin suchicircumstances, thelmotorn M d

.dH ven: emergency,feedwateripump wouldxbeisecurediandLthe b 9

[ turbine driven; emergencyefeedwaterJpumpiwould beTrequiredM OPERABLEitoiprovidefsteamigeneracor:: cooling.M IfItheiturbine ddventemergency: feedwater; pumplisi not(OPERABLEf to permit J 1

. securing-motor driven'emergencyEfeedwater:pumpdthe!' ' - Js capability /forf EDGiloadi managementitofimprove lsmal1 Lbreak3 h LOCA mitigationscannot;beiassuredfand?ConditiontC is; J M

. applicable, iThe 'operabilitysofJthe turbine? driven emergency

feedwateripumpmistnotsrequirediinm Mode 4k A _ m M i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-48 Amendment No.149

, Nuclear Services Seawater System B 3.7.9 BASES

,r j 3' Fand A.2.';(continued) Oh "

g ). 2. E _ ' , ?_ ' O . _m

[Part J 1;1 Consistsnt viith~the Bases 5for surveillance 3.0;1, ""M Cyclej ill

  • OPERABILITY..is verified by. ensuring the associated l . .. .j surveillance (s)lhas beenisatisfactorily completed within 'the required frequency and the equipment-.is.not.otherwise knownb

.to.be inoperable.na m

~

- iu . m. e , , a, ,a ue'toltheissverity?of7the? consequences lshould'aismall break i LOCA occurEin these conditions,: the 'l hour- CompletionLTime q  !

to verify. turbine driven emergency 7 eedwater f pump andi G associated flow 1pathiarey0PERABLE; ensures that' prompt (action

~

s will be' taken: to confirm 4EDG load management capability. I:

The Completion Time minimizesithe' time.the' plant is;  ;

potentially. exposed to acLOCALin'these conditions. LThe<72.L; 4

j hour Completion Time' forJrestoring. full: Nuclear' Services : 9  :

Seawater. System OPERABILITY;1s' consistent with that for: ECCS Systems,;whoselsafety functionsiare supported:by'the" system.i

,This-Completion Time .is based on engineering judgment and;is consistentLwithlindustry-accepted. practice. m . u.o _

- [Part IF Cycle 11]Itrain""B" of'th'e : '

~

l hi Nuclear Services;Seagater' System

, 1

[Part 1'; E

^

. With er,e of the a;crgercy r,uclear servi-ces-seawam y ....r ,

Cycle -11] LL inoperable, action must be taken to restore the pump to 1 OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring full Nuclear Services Seawater System l OPERABILITY is consistent with that for ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the system. This Completion Time is based on engineering judgement and is consistent with accepted industry-accepted practice.

m , __; n ,

pg. u.1 oi,u u.m Cycle 11] i If the inoperable emergency nuclear services seawater pump l C.1 and C.2j cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant m2st be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-48a Amendment No.149

i Decay Heat Seawater System B 3.7.10 BASES  ;

BACKGROUND!E . JCertsifsmallSb'reakVLOCK7scenir'iss?reqiHre'emergencpT

{ !(continued)1 ifeedwaterLtoLmaintain2 steam generatoricooling.untilecore):

g ' ; [ decay (heaticanL bewemoved solelyg by*ECCS coolingi j Further,;  :

6 1:with:the:tlurbine drivenTEFWTpump!and associated flowTpathi ~  !

)inoperableM SWP-15 Atrain.l"B7/of2theT Nuclear @ervicesi ..

g" LSeawater:: System;LCHHE-18:and;CHP-1B4as wellTasiboth trainst ioffECCS;4DecayrHeat! Closed Cycle { Cooling.; Water.1De_ cay:Heati i g (SeasMer ? Emergency; Dj eseiL Generators ,7 ACi Electricalx Poweri i p iDistribution SubsystemsdaydlAC VitaljBus4Subsystessiare;~ '

u< - ..

~ irequ. ired;0PERA6LEn a n , , / ~% . 2+

APPLICABLE The Decay Heat Seawater System supports the DC System in SAFETY ANALYSIS providing cooling for components essential to the mitigation of plant transients and accidents. The system has two separate 100 percent capacity underground intake conduits, independent pumps, and underground discharge conduits to provide for a single failure while still providing required flow. An ESAS initiation signal will start both decay heat  :

seawater pumps upon low Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and/or high containment pressure. This ensures

that the required cooling capacity is provided to the DC System for cooling of components required for reactor heat removal following a steam line break, steam generator tube

! rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, or loss of l coolant accident.

During normal and post-accident cooldown operations, when RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to allow the alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, the Decay Heat l

Seawater System is placed in service to support decay heat removal.

l The Decay Heat Seawater System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCOs The requirement for OPERABILITY of both decay heat seawater trains provides redundancy necessary to ensure the system will provide adequate post-accident heat removal in the event of a coincident single failure. l l

The OPERABILITY of the decay heat seawater pumps requires that they each be capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus. Each valve in the flow path must be in its

correct position for permitting sea water flow from the l intake canal to the DC heat exchangers, and subseque,tly to i the discharge canal . The OPERABILITY of the DC System, (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-52 Amendment No. 149

)

i Dacay Heat Seawater System l B 3.7.10  ;

1 l

l BASES (continued) l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3 the DC and Decay Heat Seawater Systems l l

may not be operating, but must be prepared to perform post- '

accident safety functions, which include providing cooling  :

water to components required for RCS and containment heat i removal. The Decay Heat Seawater System must be capable of I providing its post-accident cooling assuming a single failure. Therefore, both pumps are required to be OPERABLE ,

l during these MODES.

In MODE 4, although RCS temperature and pressure are reduced, there remains sufficient stored energy that the >

occurrence of an accident would necessitate the post-  !

accident cooling functions of the DC and Decay Heat Seawater Systems. When temperature and pressure have been reduced ,

sufficiently to allow alignment of the DHR System to the i RCS, the Decay Heat Seawater System is no longer needed for i post-accident component cooling, but must provide cooling to  ;

the DC heat exchangers for cooldown and holding operations.

Therefore, two trains of the Decay Heat Seawater System must remain OPERABLE throughout MODE 4 to ensure emergency preparedness and/or decay heat removal, assuming a single failure. ,

In MODES 5 and 6 the DHR, DC, and Decay Heat Seawater Systems are in operation performing their normal safety function of RCS decay heat removal. The various means of i removing reactor decay heat in MODES 5 and 6 are addressed I in LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 5. Loops Filled"; LCO 3.4.7, )

"RCS Loops - MODE 5 Loops Not Filled"; LCO 3.9.4, "DHR and )

Coolant Circulation - High Water Level"; and LCO 3.9.5, "DHR 1 and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level". In other words, the OPERABILITY requirements for the DC System are determined by the systems it supports. Therefore, this particular LCO is not applicable in MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS arl With7one i1'and"Aj isnecesslDefayTHea't SeawaterfdainlinoperableIpromptTaction ary Lto ensure; that the: turbine .dr,1ven~ emergencyf ;

feedwater pump;and' associated flow; path are OPERABLELfor:

steam: generator ' cooling'.vIfa the! turbine driven: emergency J '

feedwater pump:and-' associated flow; path arsinot OPERABLE,

/[the capabilityC ot remove core decay; heat'cannot be: assured ,

and Condition 8 sis applicable. ;The; operability,of.thet 1

_ _ _ , turbine' driven emergency'feedwater/ pump 11s ~not. requiredi inD '

le 3 :

~ ~ "

l l l

! l l (continued) ]

I Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-53 Amendment No. 149

l l

t l Decay Heat Seawater System l

B 3.7.10 l , BASES (continued) l l ACTIONS &zi (continued)

I '

[Pa rt ' 1'- ~ ^

Consis' tent with ?the"Basss'~for'Surv'eillance^ 3.'0;17 _

~

Cycle 11]L i A1 and A.21 OPERABILITY is > verified by ensuring the associated- , . ,

e

. surveillance (s) has been satisfactorilyLcompleted withinithe

[Part 1; '

required frequency and the; equipment'.is not otherwise known/

Cycle;11] h to be; inoperable.i. m 2. m ._ ,. _.u aa d

~

~

Due t'o theleverity of the~ Eorisequenceslsho'ldu La"small' b~reak LOCA ~ occur in these conditions, the IL hour ~ Completio'n Time

,to verify turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and; .$

associated flow-' path are OPERABLE ensures that: prompt action'

, will be taken to confirm core decay. heat removal. capability 2 l The' Completion' Time minimizes /the time the plant'is. A l 'potenti all y;exposedi to c a : LOCA li n tthese condi ti ons . m a_M l Required Action A-1 is modified by a Note indicating that

[Part'1;' the applica Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.5, l "RCS Lo - MODE 4," should be entered if an inoperable Cycle'11]L , decay heat seawater train results in an inoperable required A.2 -

DHR loop. This is an ex:eption to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the l proper actions are taken for an inoperability of a required DHR loop.

1 If one of the decay heat seawater trains is inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring full Decay Heat Seawater System OPERABILITY is the same as that for the ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the Decay Heat Seawater System. This Completion Time is reasonable,

based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

l B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable decay heat seawater train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion '

Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner

, and without challenging plant systems.

)

i d

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-54 Amendment No. 149

i CREVS  !

B 3.7.12 BASES (continued)

LCO c. ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air (continued) circulation can be maintained. ,

[Part /1E Perm _a,ne_nt],U The ability to maintain temperature in the Control Complex is act addressed in this Technical Specificatica. It--is addressedi ini , .A addressc-d ad.T,inistratively outside of Technical Technical.s Specification:3;7.18 A M Jc$ gc3t$333, p

couu~-saa nwar- ~-~.a APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREVS must be OPERABLE to I ensure that the control complex will remain habitable during and following a postulated DBA. During movement of t irradiated fuel assemblies, the CREVS must be OPERABLE to  !

cope with a release due to a fuel handling accident.

i ACTIONS eul With one CREVS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREVS train is adequate to  ;

perform the control room radiation protection function.  ;

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE CREVS train could result in loss of CREVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the '

low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability. j l

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot j be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in  !

MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an l orderly manner and without challenging plant systems, l I

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-63 Amendment No. 149

i i

l p em.3pwmq ' " " 7"FP""P "7 Ca t M C6mpidx7Co61ifg'Spitsm I h.h,&.a am a alshhams.m.a.uod u.x -.u d8.13.7218 B~3!7.!18E. PLANT.FSYSTEMS BF ~m _ _ C.m". "- m"T. *.. ".mP "m. ""'~

7 ." _2" _T Eam m  ; "M  ;

S. M* .*ae.* -ve . d n .L ts--- : . Pry ,3 g ,,,wa.eg g ,e-p_q.w,.-

4 / g / . g  ; g s .4, p g, q g 8.3.7i18EContirol;.Com'w'pl ex.+%1 Cool i n.s-vg.' System,,, mas ama ,cn act.m maim ,

[PartiliTPermahent;Znesispecificati6n]

BASES i

' BACKGROUND F 7The'CohtFoil'CoiplixTCooling" Spit'eir p F6VidisTt'empeFaisri 9 i E Econtrolifor4the controliroom and lotner: portions:of'the; M Eba.mM cControl;Complexicontainingi safetyirelated .eg'uipmentZb dd iThe?C6htrol'"ComplixiC6olihiSpitiaTconsisti~of Yiio Feduhdant' T chillers and. associated. chilled:waterepumpsithat provide; q

' cool i ng ; of E reci rcul ated i cont rol s compl ex ( ai r . Redundant ,5

'chillersf and chilledLwaterypumpsfaresprovided forfsuitableM temperature conditions)1nJthe' control complex!for; operating?

personnel Jand ' safety"relatedicontrol. equipment. c Dampers and

.two pairsiofLheat;exchangersEa1solform part oflthe;.systemM The Control l Complex Cooling System maintainsj theinominali j temperature between;70?Fiands80!F.2. s m a m a.:.s,i d

'ATsi ngliTchilleF7and 'isi6Ei ated Tchill ed Twater @Unfiil lE'G

' provide thefrequireditemperatureicontrol:forl,either heat C 1 t

exchangers. Lithe Con. trol Complex Cooling 1 System; operation.to in1thet 4

'mai ntain 4 control! complex 1i temperature FSAR,iSection19.71(Ref.il).d h m .b.w. di s ; di scussed  ?.MLid

[Part 1;" ,] Foricert'aiifsmallTreakiLOCAs?withTcondsfrentTlosfof59 Cycle;11)' i ~

.offsite lpower,,ittis necessary, to: provide' capabilitylon/the?

emergency dieself generator to: load- thel"A"itrain .1 owl i requiredLloads'. DInithesee situations,;CHNE-18;and1CHP-18 wou

'pressuret provide required njection coolingo 3pump-;and[other)ld'be' relied

~

m n aus an c .m ,usm_ mummAammwa}  ;;

- s (APPLICABLE P 'E 7 The Control?Complix 7 Cooling"SystimTEonsi'itsTof feddEdant? 7 '

SAFETY. ANALYSES 1safetyirelated: components..with;some" common piping'.; Thel .3 -

E y

Control Compl ex ; Cooli ng : Sys tem' mai ntai ns t the . temperatu re / Mi

[ ,

' between 70*FJand '80*FL L A' single active l failure ~ of' a Control ^

p , .

1 Complex Cooling: System' component doestnottimpair?the' ability; p M p, 'of; the : system t to : perform . as ; designed . 3 The ' Control) Complex U p ,( ,f l Cooling;SystessisJdesigned in accordanceEwith Seismict Y ri po M . Category I; requirements. LThe Control 2 Complex Cooling System p 1isicapable of; removing heat:1oads;from the"controlLroom.and9 L.m. 2 a.2 0ther portions _ ofithe ; Control mCompleGa.z .' & aj (continued)

Crystal River' Unit 3 8 3.7-85 Amendment No. 149

. . . . _ ___._m. _._ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ .

l e fe y . -

m *

,,7

  • h M C @ x Cooling? System

~

[Part!1; erm bent;f new'spe'cNication]} ;

BASES [- P <

'^

,"5". f" ' '~" ~'~ ~"

'7

'APPLICA8LE C T SAFETY ANALYSES : contai ni ng ; safety! rel ated ! 'egili pment , Ih:l udi ng (consi de rati on p J(contin'ued).- of equipment heat loads' and. personnel' occupancy; '

,J i

Ch m 2 ; requirements,ato.ensurefeguipment 0PERABILITY. i ~.-.:1 i d The~ Control! Complex ~ Cooling"

the NRC.PolicyiStatement. a a . .;. system u , usat'isfieslCEiterionT3"ofd]

,_ uu: ,

~" ' ~

LCO' 'Two'.?edundant; heat e dhangersi and[two"redu6 dant" chillers?and

[

i

  1. TassociatedpumpsoftheControl1ComplexCooling;: System laregt t required;to be-OPERABLE 2 oTensure thatLat-:least:one t .

of'each l F< -

=is available, assuming ~'a:singleJfail'ureLdisablesone; .

l

redundant component.<
Totalf system: failure could resultin?i

[<s l

!abai - . ..the. equipment operating ~ temperature exceeding;11mits'..e n uJ '

The ConfroFCompleFCdolisfSystemTisionsideFid'0PERABLE7 7 ,

'when theLindividual redundant. components;thatiare necessary i  !

to maintain control) complex temperature are OPERABLE..LThese i components Linclude;the s cooling. coils,' water cooled 1 . :, l

' condensing. units, Land' associated ~temperatureicontroli M  :

instrumentation. In' addition,c the Control
Complex CoolingIl )

System;must be OPERABLE to the. extent-that; air circulation 1 can..be_ maintained;(Seelspecificationi3.7;12). u.a u.m. m .

^

APPL.ICABILITY/ "In"MODESTIT273;Jiand 14E thel Cont rol TCompl eiCool i 6g? Sistem ?

[ q f must. be OPERABLE:to ensuree that the controlicomplex'

-temperature)will not exceed equipment:0PERABILITY; y?

.m _. . l requirements. . _ , au
em. .i 2J _. i:xs2 m u.& j

.w ., . ,- , ,y. ,,m , , - . _ , ,

m sas , J w -_;m_J, _. 7 , ,

ACTIONS. x,' . r A.l ...d7Al~

an sw ,_ o .. .n

~

~ ~

Withi he t CHHE-18'orjCHP-1BMnope~rablef pr'ompt action ~must be' taken within lthourLto verify.the turbine: driven! emergency j "

feedwater pump and; associated flowpath ..is 0PERABLE; to:

. . . - . ., ' provide: steam generator cooling.m If the~-turbine-driven !1

[Part 1;: '

emergency feedwater pump.and associated flow path are not '

Cycle 11; i

0PERABLE, the: capability toiprovide:EDG load management' for i  !

few ACTION]j, smallLbreak LOCA mitigation improvement cannot be assured. i and - Condition;C' is : applicable. TheLoperability of;thet a

. turbine; driven ~emergencyfeedwaterpumpis.notrequiredJin']

MODE;4'. . ,

m.~.o_.l. A ..ai.& _ ,. &J s.. J l

\

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-86 Amendment No. 149

4

"' *i W *( . t m P? l' *

'@.[*^ (**

  • T 'tWl % W m ._,'*W:"'

4 i "C' a ihn. .. s -

. . - . - 1' . . . . . acu e, _ i a iBL3.7.18

[Part 1;; Permanent;Newispecification];9 :

BASES- * ^ ~ " " " ' " ~

O j

i j _+.*Q s y  % r . c -

v- 9 + gA% u q gm 1"y v my * ~ tan <n99

. ' ACTIONS 2n a mgepiswAll a' rid yA. 2'!u[(cn monti~nu~e* >dhy3 ..h wca m w w & a  : 1-

.J

[ParC1F7 DUi~tolthe"ssGe fi tp Tof Fth^shc6nsequencesT shoul d Wssall "b~reak' Cycle l11;' . LOCA'Loccuriin these1 conditions,a the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion:TimeM NeWMCTION]} ito verify; turbine l driven l emergency feedwateripump i Hand 1 i

~ associated' flow path 2are OPERABLEiensures 7thatLpromptiaction;

"willlbeitakenLto ' provide the capability for
EDG load; e i

1 l management - for ? small break. LOCA' mitigation -improvement. SThe Completion Time minimi'zesttheitime the' plant .is potentially?

'exposeditoia LOCAL:in;these conditions.iidu2b J.J

~

Consistent withTthe"Bisis;f6E"Surveillante M 0:1!?W:V 7 1

OPERABILITY- is-liverified by' ensur.ingithe: associa~ted1. . . .lj l surveillance (sF has been:satisfactorilpicompleted within the'

, required frequency; and ?thel equipment d s notL otherwi'selknown j

.to;belinoperable & 1 6 a n we Agwa.dua WitOCHHEf18~oFCHPh185156perabli,Tsction7msst6eltakes~t'2 2 o

restoreiits'0PERABLE' status within~30l days M In this" 1w l Condi tion U the 1 remai ni ng (OPERABLE l Control Compl ex' Coo 11 ngi 9 l System redundant: component's are? adequateXto maintaini the ,

1 i l control (complex 1 temperature within111mits.J However, the4 M

overallf reliabi11tyEisfreducedlbecause af failurelinythef j OPERABLE Control Complex. Cooling System components:couldy j result'dn -a loss [of ControliComplex' Cooling System function [

.The(30 day: Completion:TimeTis baseds on the slow probability?

of an eventLoccurring requiring:the Control ComplexiCooling 1 System'and the consideration'that thesremainingfredundantS 11 componentsican.provideathe;rsquiredLcapabil.ities h # a

., m-77,p 7g- yy

~ :.a a7 u.m .wa.us77 sa nu & n w -w c-. . ~+mm WithfCHHEJ1A","CHP-1A'6r~one"ContFalf Cosple[ Cooling heat" O exchanger' inoperable, Taction must be(taken to:: restore > L' OPERABLE; status:withinL30 days'c In.this' Condition,- the! s Q

" remaining ' OPERABLE ~ Contro1l Complex Cooling System .equipoent D  !

isfadequate to maintain
the 'contro1Lcomplex temperaturef l withinilisits. However,(theoveralMreliabilityjis" reduced? l because:a~ failuralin;the OPERABLE: g Control Complex: Cooling; .

System redundant i components?could result  ? in ia:1oss of ' " i Control Complex Cooling System furiction. !The%30; day) a Completion . Time is.basedson..the. low probability lof anieventi

'occurringl requiringithe Control Complex. Cooling System and! 9

'the consideration.thatcthe remaining l components can provideH theJ. required capabilities . m , JO_ , . EF4 i

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-87 Amendment No.

g m. .,m- ,, ,o..., ,

..m z _~ . . . _ _ . ,

m... ,, .

Contrhl' Complc,x, . Cooli_g, n System m

% .~ -;;, . j u M L < _ an . :m , xp M , ,. . !B13.7.18 t{1h PWeanentFneif specificatioh]M .

~

, ,, _..,., , y ., ,

~~"

MS I"' '

7 C: 1"ind ' C W " ,7" ~, "" " T " ' .'.. ..'"'P'~"

in (continued h m

.,. 4. . .. .. .. < j In MODE 10 2 W 3,:;od 4~,' if 2thed noperabis ControliComplex~ l Cooling: System component.cannot be restored.tolOPERABLE; lj ,

statustwithintthe required CompletioniTimek the: unit must be '

'placediin ~a MODE in'.which theJLCO does not!applyMTo: 9 achieveithisistatusF the;un.it must.be placed41n Tat leastL Q

. MODE 3 t within 61 hour7.060185e-4 days <br />0.0169 hours <br />1.008598e-4 weeks <br />2.32105e-5 months <br />sFand hin' MODE :5L within '36l hours.~ : Theb

! 'al l owed ; Compl eti on ;Ti mes i are reasonabl e J based ion ; operati nn l 'experienceh to reach thel required' unit,conditionsifrom fulld l 'powerf condi tions s i n ? ani orderly l manner wi thout lchal.lenging ; j  ;

l ~unitisystems. b 1 o.dah;di b u ._m.h.m d w a m b i d '

muu f.w.gm.mee.,

w.a m as gy .n amemyy.m.w;

-.w.a.n~ a.-. n yy.

mw 7aom  ;

l

...s.

,_,x j.

. . . - s any combinationfof ~:c_ompon.. - _ - ha. _,. ._ld_r.en.de_rith e-If.._. ents;t t,wou i

Control: Complex.CoolingfSystem not" capable"offperforming.the

, intended function,;the unit Listin a' condition outside the y accident- analyses 6 LThereforef LC0i3s0;3
must be enteredc fj 2
immediatelyGwe , , a,w. ' b.1 c mA c.w.whad l

I 1 l

SURVEILLANCE' ' " i SR 53 2 7.18.17 ~ ~ <

.u. ant'SQ*~"""'?"""dnadaj FM" l ,

. REQUIREMENTS;.. m .uce m . . .can.wia.22ha.a, '

~

yerifyidf th^at each" Condo 1TCompliniFCooling~chillePsB"" 7 l

' developed head.at the flowitest' point > is greater;than orn . 3  !

equal i to : the requi red developed j head ' ensures ; that s chiller'st l

' performance has not' degraded during1thejcycle.BFlow'and.J j 1 j differentialj pressure are; normal ' tests .of centrifugal: pumpi :

performance ~ required by Section XIlof;thelASME1Codei ';j

(Ref. 3). LThis test confirs.isLone point on thelpump, design?j

~

curve: and'.is ; indicative of overall' performanceM Sucht ' '

inservice' tests' confirm component' OPERABILITYV trendt ' <

performance,iand,det'ect incipientifailures by indicating; 1 abnormal .' performance' .- ThetFrequency 'ofJthiseSR 1sf in j accordance.withithe Inservice _ Testing Program a m m a. w :.

l C.Ad - i - t. a l m _ .m _ _ ,-mm_.swas - (continued).

l ' Crystal llRiveri Unitl3 1 _ .fBL.3.7-88i - _ -

.LAmendmentLNo.;._;

i

. . _- . . - . . - - . . - - . _ _ . . ...~...- -. ---. ---.-_ -.---- - -- -

4

~

l h l

p <

_ _ m _m . ~'

LCstrd1TComp1sx'Cooline System  :

e h; g _ am , ?yJ. 18,3.7.18 LPart. li, Permanent; ne v specification]? '

~

i

BASES
4 j ' SURVEILLANCE' "'T SR "3[7.8~.2 T _ ~f " "' ~ F P ^

j REQUIREMENT}. . ..

. ,, ... A

'This? SR: verifies that:the heats removalfcapability of the) .:

~

L .(continued):L cs'ystem isisufficient to' meet design requirements.-L This SR'3 L y .;

p 1

' 4' > cons.1st's of a1combinationL-of testin

' e 24l month Frequency:is appropriateP.g and calculations'.> An if ,

as
significanti .

, P .W  : degradationjof the' system?is; slow andLis,not:expdcted'over ",

L M .n..; 1 _x 4 - this.itime: period i i ,- _.. < _m mi ., _ a ,

4 J

~

':^1.E FSAR,Lf"Sektidn79.7." ~ " " " """ '

'7 REFERENCES '

E -

2.oFTI-51-1266138-01, SafetyAnalysisfInputtoStartup', i Team?

R Safety Assessment..

a ,1 .a. , c, .. 3.1 ASMEL Boilerc and Pressure LVesseliCode,.LSection XI... ,. e J l

l 1

l l

.- - . . . _ . - .._m .- .1_- m . . a . . . . . . _ . u-  %-..E_~. ..-_,_ s .~.(con ti nued)'.

Crystalj.Rher;Uniti31 1 ' '

B13.7-89:,. __ l AmendmentNo.L. : .

L AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 4

BASES f

[PaKJGycle(11))

BACKGROUND '""/:'Certainismall?breaELOCAEscedrfosTreq'uipe'emerge I '

E T(continued)i ifeedwater to maintain: steam-generatorscooling;until' core:l .

f , idecay!.heatican..be" removed solely by; ECCSlcooling.' Further,A F. . b' 2with- the: turbine:~ driven EFW pumpLoriassociatedcflow path; :)

inoperable # SWP-18,1 train:"B" of the Nuclear.: Services:

~

[ '+ '

. t.;i .

E 2. Seawater System;iCHHEilB and CHP-19, as.~well f as both[ trains 1 k ,

of'ECCS,j Decay" Heat Closed :Cyclef Cooling Water, LDecay: Heat 4

[):. y' i Seawater,c. Emergency Diesel Generators, AC Electrical .-Powerc; 4 ji . l Di stribution . Subsystems , land ACL Vital' Bus l Subsystems .are w :,j

required
OPERABLE. WithfASV-204;EFV-12Cor?EFV-13: .:

C[ - ' i noperabl e ,7T rai nsB" ' EmergencyL Di esel SGenerators bTrai s"Bi i -'  : AC Electrical: Power < Distribution' Subsystems;: and : Train "B" lj.

li m a.w_u. . j AC_ Vital;BusiSubsystems are(required .0PERABLE.m.ohada .  !

(continued) l i

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-2a Amendment No. 149 i

)

AC Sources-Oparating <

S 3.8.1 BASES 1

BACKGROUND Provided an ES signal is present, certain required ES loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the EDG in the process. Within 35 seconds after the initiating signal is received, all loads needed to recover the plant or maintain it in a safe  ;

condition are returned to service.

The service ratings of the EDG are:

0 to 2850 kw on a continuous basis '

[Paftl2EResss&s][320013 N -

2851 to 3000 kw on a cumulative 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> basis

[P'adl2E Rs isssE 32_01[toi34003 %

3001 ts 3250 kw on a cumulative 200 hour0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> basis

[Pirt:2i[ Reassess]!3401] '

Loads powered from the 4160 V ES buses are listed in Reference 2.

Stsdy Estatill sid Td6es~noEi ricl ude71oads Ximpbied T b9? tis??q s tarti ng ( ofi motors ; such ;as a duri ng block Joadi ng ;r and short?

[Pa"r03E"'a Permanent]ai ]durationiloads suchfasLeotor operated;)alvesf battiaryifd a

--- chargerisurgeskand~short duration pump surge.flowsi Loadsd deposed.by..thefstartingso f motors)are nottincludedKin(theT:]

service ratings:and are less*thanithe EDG: manufacturer W M ilimits;ofs3910ikW;,forisuchaloading' ..ws & h a a d M d APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses -

SAFETY ANALYSES in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 5),

assume ES systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical rower sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ES systems so that the fuel , RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

1 l

1 (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-3 Amendment No. 149

l l

l AC Sources-Operating i

B 3.8.1 i

(

l BASES

]

ACTIONS A_d (continued)  ;

additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which l Conditions A and B are entered concurrently.

I As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the '

allowed outage time " clock." This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time that the LCO was i initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered.

H.d To ensure a highly reliable power source in the event one i EDG-is inoperable, it is necessary to verify the i availability of the OPERABLE offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies

" perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met (Condition F).

However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional j Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.

-m. , , . , ,-nw., y ,.y7. ,

m ; m- mm mm z:Uls:.54. ws:% OLG).idAJ b ha Aih.nYa a shG +LE.G'+ . ann e i wka s Wi th i TriinM'A"f EDG Ei hoperabl e ; i oE6mpCactionTd thi n ili hoiir

. _ . ~ - -,

[Part~1; .? iistnecessary<to en'suretthat'the' turbine; driven. emergency; Q Cycle 111;1 4  ;feedwater" pump andLassociated flow!pathyare available for? 'Q

~

New ACTION]; steam generator l cool.ing'1 ]If/ thel turbine L driveniemergency )

feedwater~pumpeand: associated flow 1 path are.notf availableg

'the capabilitysfor ' core decay; heat ' removal. ! hasinot been1 j

' assured and Condition 1H(istapplicable. xThe operabilityfof 4 i the1 turbine ~. driven emergency;feedwater' pump is!not required y i ,

zin;NODEL.n.wei L 's.s:w:iLL.uaix2 l ConsidsntiithTt!heTBasest fort 5uheillince 310.1,7R  ?"1 OPERABILITYli s veri fi ed ) by; ensu ri ng l the : associ ated ,

.. , Q

' surveillance (s)! h'asi been ' satisfactorily! completed within the required frequency,and' the :equipuent Tis -not otherwise known i  :

.to.be Anoperable.i h i. ,

l~J.u i ,; . Y m <

(continued)  ;

l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-8 Amendment No.149

\

i AC Sources-Operating i B 3.8.1 BASES [

ACTION 5F~W~W~ B127-(contTnsed)?..T.uT N_"T_MWN,_M._ . ,w w a "~^~W"w.'"U u a '

[Pa rt:1g wa Dus2Wthi?isiepifyr f?tWdsWseifu^e5Ess3h6sidTifsiallf o Feak  !

,t LOCA ocduriinithese[ conditions f the'lihoursCompletion TimeN  :

Cycle =11;; 5 to',veHfy turbine driveniemergencyifeedwateripump;and! " .sh  !

MMONL 'associ ated ; flow path I are ? 0PERABLE4 ensuresi th'at promptj action.  ;

'will be takenitoiconfire:coreidecay?heaticapability. iThes 1  !

Completion 1 Time / minimizes the(time, the planttisspotent'ially, .

exposeditoJa 10CA11nLthese conditions M d a d i d d & &@ l t

g_  : [PaFtilliltyils:11]I313.1 l

/

Required Action Br2 is intended to provide assurance that a j

loss of offsite power, during the period that a EDG is - -

inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety f function of critical redundant required features. These  ;

features are designed with redundant safety related trains.  ;

Redundant required feature failures consist of inoperable l features associated with a train, redundant to the train j that has an inoperable EDG. Single train systems (from an i electrical perspective), such as the turbine driven j emergency feedwater pump, are not included. .~ -

p (Parti 1,[Cicis111]lB.3J. j .

The Completion Time for Required Action &r2 is intended to '

allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also ,

allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required )

Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both I

a. An EDG is inoperable; and j
b. A required feature on the other train is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of this Condition (one l EDG inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes i inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Declaring the required features inoperable within four hours from the discovery of items 'a' and 'b' existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8 9 Amendment No.149

n.- , . . - . . . - _ . . - - . - - .. - . - - . - . - - . - . - -

AC Sources-Operating  !

B 3.8.1 l BASES 3

j ACTIONS thf- (continued) l [P &t[1 M M In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE EDG and offsite i l @.Clil131Mj circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the l l

onsite Class 1E distribution system. Thus, on a component  ;

! basis, single-failure protection for the required feature's

~

function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the  !

OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable  !

required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time l takes into account the capacity and capability of the '

remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the  ;

low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.  ;

0.3.1 and 0.3.2 [PaMiljCyi:lR11))B14l.11]

[Pirt"1 F 7 Cycle 11];

quired Action B & 1 rovides an option to testing the I A OPERABLE EDG in order to avoid unnecessary testing. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable EDG does B . 4^.- 14 and E ' ] not exist on the OPERABLE EDG, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to B.4.2  !

~ ~ " ' " be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on the ,

other EDG, the other EDG would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E of LCO 3.8.1 would be entered.  !'

If the common cause failure evaluation is indeterminate (the cause of the initial inoperable EDG cannot be confirmed not  ;

to exist on the remaining EDG), performance of SR 3.8.1.2 is  ;

adequate to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of that EDG.

The Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE EDG is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable EDG and is based on the recommendations of Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7).

4

[Pa W 1;T W 7 According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 Cycleill]M (Ref. 6), operation with one EDG inoperable should be limited to a period not to exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE EDG and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E distribution system. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

I (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-10 Amendment No.149 i

AC Sources --Optrating B 3.8.1 t

BASES ,

[Part";1;iCpcle(1Q11 l

/ -

ACTIONS lbf (continued) [Part%1ECyclel11]!B!523 i (continued)

The second Completion Time for Required Action ih-4 b  !

i establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any  ;

combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable ,

during any single contiguous occurrence of failure to meet {

the LCO. Refer to the Bases for Required Action A.3 for additional infcrmation on this Completion Time.  !

[Part 'C 10CE27CT3NCT47%d TC:~5P'"FF"'W ""'""

Cycle?1BT'N 11;iNew o .

. . . . ~

^ a Action][

a he,fh$theBasNkfonAcd16nbB.1heA(.B.4, B33 sand!i5horL:h B

{w&"@" .. A A'

4 j .

the Action di.scussionl V. . .

Ck

,.3, 1

fory.thef corresponding

.q.

. . W:9. r

' l ~ ' ~' )

M (Base l For? ActioniC.~2',1with.rTrain"B" EDGtinoperablen promptf action'  !

ivithinsi'houriisinecessaryTto!. ensure that the turbina driven

^

emergency; feedwater; pumpa associatedsflow; path.1 ASV-204, , < j  !

EFV-12; rand EFV-13!are"av'ilable a foristeam~generatorf .

3

' cooling.;/Ifithe:; required equipmentiis;not<available.4the W1

' capability for core s decay;heatiremosalthasLnot been assuredi and Condition?Hi1siapplicableMThe operabi11tylofjthe1 ' d

turbinaldriven= emergency;feedwater) pump-isinotLrequirediinj) i

,MODEL40 . .W u -

'1% 'bf '% T ',  ;

4 - ;c a ;9 _ 7. m .. 9 ,

3 ConsistentTwith[tneIBakesNorJSuNe'111ancel3;0.1,u,' 1 '

OPERABILImis verified byfensuring7theiassociatedi . .. m j i lsu rvei ll ance(s); has ' been ! sati sfactorily L completed ; wi thi n ; the' i

" required *. frequency; andithe(equipment lis E notfotherwise known i lto beginoperable.;, a f ' 1._ i  !

V; .. .l ,. ' n c . . it?

  • ;h c 3% .

]J '

Due ; to , the f severi ty loc the . consequences ( should a ; smalli break i LOCA occur, incthese conditionshthe:1; hour Completion Time lto verify turbineMriven emergency lfeedwaterfpumpland ' J j ~

associated flow" path are OPERABLE ~ ensures that prompt action'

'will; be taken: to confirm core decayoheat' capability.1 The ?j Completion Time ! minimizes?the time tthe plant is; potentia 11yj j

' exposed,to a LOCALinithese.. conditions d u _ _ i ' d I

l (continued) t Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.811 Amendment No.149 I

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1

^

[PaftfliSCicleillEDh!and LD.2C BASES

/ " - " " " ~ " " ~ ~ ~ " ~ " ~ ~ " ~ ' ~ " "

ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 / "[Part;1;iCycle

""""' "" ""; 11] D . l""* i ",

l (continued) l Required Action Ezi, which applies when both required offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide ,

assurance that a DBA, coincident with a worst-case single i failure, will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for l declaring the redundant required features inoperable is l 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; reduced from that allowed for one train without l offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) j allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for two required )

offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that ,

two complete safety trains are OPERAB'LE. When a concurrent l l redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption 1 1

! is no longer valid, and a shorter Completion Time of l

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains. Single train features (from an-  ;

l electrical perspective), such as the turbine driven I

[Part;1_; ,

emergency feedwater pump, are not included. C cle111]g) j The Completion Time for Required Action fri ntended to blijjj allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any )

discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also 1 allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for j beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required

! Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that ,

l both.

l l

a. All required offsite circuits are inoperable; and l
b. A required feature is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition E (two offsite circuits inoperable) a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked, l

i l

(

I b l

! (continued)  ;

i )

i Crystal River Unit 3 83.812 Amendment No.149  ;

I I

l AC Sources-Operating l l

B 3.8.1 l

{ParfiUCy'cleElli '

BASES "s" " " ' ' ~ _.

Difand;D;2; ~ ~] l ACTIONS C.1 ar,d C.2  !(continued)

(continued)

According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation with two required offsite circuits l inoperable should be limited to a period not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. In this condition, the offsite electrical power i system does not have the capability to effect a safe

! shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; l

however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

l Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more EDGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation:

a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and
b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source. .

1 I

With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain tne unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, the simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources coincident with a LOCA, and a worst-case single failure were postulated as a part of the original licensing basis. Thus, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design j criteria.

If one required offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, power operation may continue in accordance with the required Actions of Condition A.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-13 Amendment No.149

. . . . _ _ _ - - - - -- - .- _ . - . _ _ - . - . - . ~ . - . . _ _ ~ . - . - - - . .

AC Sources - Operating i B 3.8.1

?

BASES  !

my s -

_. , v.m my, ,y y ,

. v nw;.ca

. m m, 4, J,e;; m a ce .u.A wi .mc;,.a ,4 c.g:s Am,ug,,we s .Ahr %gg y.,  ;

i

._ .Wi tf Trai n T"A" T EDG Ei noperabl s',? prompt 7 action ;Within (11 h6uri.; i

[Partf 1_;<, ,.

  • lis'necessary.- to ensure'that:the turbine; driven emergency < d  ;

Cycle !11; > 1 fe'edwater pump;and; associated flow path!arelavailable' fork 1

_New ACTION))

_ .- steam: generator? cooling., If thef turbine. idHvenlemergency! J ._

-;the" capabi.11ty?for; core .decayl heat removallhas not< bean 1 ot7

! assured and ConditioniH is1 applicable. tThe

the< turbine 3 1

d riven? emergency;feedwaterpumpjisinotfrequired 11n; MODE 14,s w a u.&lius h .mdwawm4huj

~

CoKsi stint'"si th~ the! Bisesl f6i 7 Su rveill aiise~3 !D!1F""*9 OPERABILITY!is; verified..by[ensuringythe: assoc'iatedjA ST . A surveillance (sUhas%n satisfactotilyLcompletedtwithin 'the

'requiredifreque'ncy 'and the(equipuent(is(not otherwise: knowni 3

to : beii noperabl e Maa.ma.J.i mma ua AG.e DuettWitheTisverit'y'of ?the?c^ onseituencesTsh6uldfsma11Pb^reak LOCAfoccurcin these? conditions,j the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> CompletiontTimeW

[t'o verify : turbine driven?emergencyjfeedwaterfpumpf andi j associated flowLpath are OPERABLE; ensures;that/ prompt ~ action willL beltakensto confirm- core: decay heat: capabilityh 5That j CompletionsTime'~minimizesithei t ime, the plant-isJpotentiallyg

.exposedsto;a_LOCAlinL.theseiconditions

L i m i i M ;.m.;a22

[PaFtj ij! Cy.d_ .l e^ 11] V E.[2 'sid_E 3.."j u.m o,~ ...

7--+ _

- [Partl1ECyhlel11]iEh ,j ,

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the distribu system ACTIONS would not be entered if the de-energizat' o the busses was due to all AC sources to them being ' erab . Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D a e modif ed by a Note indicating that when Condition D is entere with no AC sources to one train, the Conditions and Re uired Actions for LCO 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems Operati g," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition D to provide requirements for the loss of one offsite circuit and one EDG whether or not a train is de-energized. LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train.

l 1

(continued)

I Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-14 Amendment No.149

.- - . _ . - - _. _ _ - .. . =-

I AC Sources- Operating B 3.8.1 BASES f [Part?l;1 Cycle 11]" 2 ACTIONS [ . E;2 and' E.3i(continued)i 1.;- . .i i  ! 3 (continued). . . . . .

According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation with one onsite and one offsite circuit

[Partlif , inoperable should be limited to a period not to exceed l Cycle 11] s 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. -

Ei _ z j :

offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical

[Part31;l. Power system. However, since power system redundancy is

~

Cycle ' 11] q provided by two diverse sources of power it may appear the  ;

D;". . ' '

.el;&bilii e power systems in this Condition is higher '

l than that in Conditio E (loss of both required offsite l circuits). This is not necessarily the case since this

difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of I

this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, ,

reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a l DBA occurring during this period.

, , ,, , y _ . . -

7, .n. .L 1 s J%

hithTrain'"B"JEDGinoperable,7promptaction'within-1lh'our . j l [Part*1;~ lis necessary. to ensure ;that .the turbin'ei driven emergency.i 7 Cycle 11; _ feedwater pump.and associated flow' path are available for l New ACTION]"; steam generator cooling. If- the turbine l driven emergency ., !

~" "

feedwater tpump, associated flow path.. A5V-204,f EFV-12,s ando ' l l EFV-13 are not available, the? capability'for-core decay' heat 1 l removal' has not been assured;and Condition H~ is; applicable.

t The operability of theLtu'rbine' driven: emergency feedwater pump is not requiredjinl MODE 4. . , , . . m ml Consistent withdhe ' Bases;fortSurveillance 3.'O.1, .

^

C 1  ;

OPERABILITY is verified by: ensuring the associated; l surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily: completed within' the i required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known  !

to .be inoperable.

l .. . m_ , .

Due' to theTseverity of the ' consequences should a" small break' E

i LOCA occur in these conditions,Lthe.li.ourj Completion' Time 1 l to verify turbine driven emergency.feedwater pump and-

! associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that" prompt action l will be taken to confirm core decay heat capability. The l l Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is 'potentially

exposed _to a LOCA in these conditions . i ' . m n l

l l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 83.8-15 Amendment No.149 l l

l

AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES

" 'l

' ' ' ~ "

ACTIONS- " F.2^and7F.31- "

D L (continued,) w . . .

M , ..

S . . , ,

Refer to the Basest for Actions 1E.2LandiE.3; forithei ...

[Pht 1y aM ' disc'ussion for"th'eicorrespondind. Bases 'of; Required Actions ~ .;

Cycle'lij.1 Fi2 and l.3.; . _ 1,x ; h 1, mm a. _a _mi N g ACT p ]j hk With the Train A and Train B EDGs inoperable, there are no

~

[ pet It n Cycle 15] ':

qualified onsite standby AC sources. Thus, with an assumed G.1, ,

loss of offsite electrical power, there would not be

+ - - - -

sufficient standby AC sources available to power the minimum required ES systems. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time is balanced with that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). However, since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, the time allowed for continued operatitn is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

The 2 hour Completion Time is consistent with the recommendations of Reference 6.

L L acj r.2

[Part 1l~ ' If the inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be Cycle .15 ] < restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion H.1~and H.2; Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. l l

i 1

(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-15a Amendment No.149 l

_ _ _ . . _ . _ . . _ .. __ _ . . _ _ . ~ -- .

l AC Sources -- Operating (pgggyyj7,yg B 3.8.1 Cycle"11];}'

l t

I.11

- wo, 3 i

BASES ACTIONS Q11

[Pahi'1FCyaleT11]II? " Ti

" " " ~ " " " " "

(continued) j/

Condition 6 corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been l lost. At this severely degraded level, any subsequent failures in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function condition, and potentially, a station blackout.

Therefore, the unit is required to enter LCO 3.0.3 l immediately and prepare for a controlled shutdown.  ;

1 I

SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and REQUIREMENTS testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a stand'oy function. This is consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during outages (under simulated accident conditions).

Where the SRs for this LCO specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following is applicable. The minimum steady state output voltage of 3933 V is 94.5% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage. This value allows for voltage drops to motors and other equipment down through the 120 V level where minimum operating voltage is usually specified as 85%

to 90% of name plate rating. The specified maximum steady l l state output voltage of 4400 V is equal to the maximum i operating voltage specified for 4000 V motors. It ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 4000 V motors is no more than the i maximum rated operating voltages. The specified minimum and I maximum frequencies of the EDG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to 2% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations given in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). Regulatory Guide ,

1.9 requirements are satisfied by monitoring EDG output. l SR 3.8.1.1 This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its 1

i l

(continued) l i

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.815b Amendment No.149 l l

AC Sourc@s-Operating 8 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.4 [PaFt'2PPerMiheht]

REQUIREMENTS usgablejolumeggy]

(continued) This SR provides erification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is dequate. The level is expressed as an equivalent volums in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of EDG operation at ful' icad pitts-40E

[PaIrt'2i? Permanent]!

ailo~ading whichL M The 3 day Frequency 1s adequate to assure that a sufficient bounds 1thkT $ supp y of fuel oil 1s ayallable, since low level alarms are

'postulaited ' wcrs'ti j pro ided and an automatic level control system 1s included

'cagaccidentML.,2 he design.

SR 3.8.1.5 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil transfer pump operates automatically to transfer fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank.

This is required to support continuous operation of the EDG.

This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer are OPERABLE.

The design of fuel transfer systems is such that pumps will operate automatically in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day tanks during or following EDG operation. The 31 day Frequency is based upon engineering judgement and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

SR 3.8.1.6 See SR 3.8.1.2.

S 3.8.1.7 Transfer of each 4160 V ES bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the required alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the capability of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-18 Amendment No. 149

l l AC Sources-Op rating

! B 3.8.1 l

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8M (continued) 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration plant conditions needed to perform the Surveillance. Operating experience has shown the 24 month Frequency to be adequate. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.1.8 Each EDG is provided with an engine o/erspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the EDG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. For the CR-3 EDGs, the largest single load is 615 kW (!li'I pump). According to IEEE-308 (Ref. 13),

the loa rejection test is acceptable if the increase in

[ Parti 3

  • diesel peed does not exceed 75% of the difference between Permanent]! synchr nous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15%

less:than 750. above synchronous speed, whichever is lower. For CR-3, the kW. The accep ance criteria of 66.75 Hz is based on 75% of the surveillance: '

diff rence between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip test:willLhavei set int. The time, voltage, and frequency tolerances a min.imum . spe ified in this SR are derived from Regulatory Guide 1.9 rejected 1,oad j (R . 3) recommendations for response during load sequence of 750_kW. ++-1 ervals. The 3 seconds specified for voltage is equal to 60% the 5 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing of the largest load. Four seconds for frequency is likewise based on Regulatory Guide 1.9 recommendations.

SR 3.8.1.8.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.8.b and SR 3.8.1.8.c are Regulatory Guide 1.9 specific voltage and frequency values to which the system must recover to following load rejection. Regulatory Guide 1.9 specifies nominal voltage and frequency values which are 4160V and 60 Hz respectively. The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

i

! (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-19 Amendment No. 149

t AC Sources-Operating i B 3.8.1 1 i  !

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)  !

l: REQUIREMENTS .

l- This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1  !

i is to minimize wear and tear on the EDGs during testing.  ;

For the purpose of this' testing, the EDGs may be started l

from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant l and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations for EDGs. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the .

electrical distribution system, and potentially challenge {

safety systems. However, Note 2 acknowledges that should an i unplanned event occur in MODES 1, 2 or 3, following i verification that the acceptance criteria of the SR are met,  !

the' event can be credited as a successful performance of i l this SR. Note 3 is an SR 3.0.4 type allowance to place the i plant in MODE 4 for the purposes of performing this l Surveillance. This is necessary in order to establish the i pre-requisite plant configuration needed to perform the SR. i SR 3.8.1.11 This 5srveillance de...eastrates the E005 are capable of I

[PiFtT2iM synchreairing and accepting a lead greater than er equal te Permanent); the expected accidea lead. The minimum lead of 3100 kW u,* "

  • prevides margia above the predicted ast-case astematically connected accident 1 cad at ene miaste and the maximum lead of 3250 kW is the upper limit of the E00's 200 howr rating.

Tlii s75drWill aiE~e"demodsditis"tliiE EDGs [ife "EapabliTbff""3 synchronizingLandLacceptingTaiload!greaterjthanToriequaFto]

the maximum expected;steadyRstate accidentiloadsF whichiared

thefautomatica11ylconnectedLaccidentiloadsfandirequiredi y manuallyJapplied accident l loads. I However, EtheLupper! limit M
of the?200 hourJserviceJrating 21s'sti111available for:1=i4
ishortidurationloads..;LThe
testiloadband?isprovided*tolflexibility11n p

[Part 2 _;- avoid: routine' overloading lof . : thei EDGs c iR6utine overloading i tj Reasses,s)2 a w";;;

mayJ resul.t i i n more i f requent iteardown ti nspections ',di n c . J accordanc'e with vendor._ recommendations?'inlorder?to maintain '

EDG OPERABILITY.:/ .

- > '_ ^l " ,

M LMu.ada hauad.mauskm dbenned (continued) .

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-22 Amendment No. 149 l

l l

1

m - _ __ .. . _ _ _ _ _ __ _ ._ _ __ _ __ ,_. . .

I Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air i i i BASES BACKGROUND Each emergency diesel generator (EDG) is provided with a fuel oil storage tank. The combined fuel oil capacity of both storage tanks is sufficient to operate one diesel for a

[Pa W 2 C' 3; period of 7 days while the EDG is supplying the continuous g,,,,,,') h ad rating (Ref. 1). The fuel oil supply is calculated using the assumption that one EDG is available to supply bpper? limit; sufficient post accident loads. This onsite fuel oil of'it's 200d capacity ensures adequate time s available to replenish the hour: rating l

-, _.! onsite supply from outside sou es prior to the diesel running out of fuel.

[Pa r tTif Cici e "11] lIn'cei tai nTsmal l M break'LOCA scenarios, both EDGs are relied upontfor/ accident!

m .m._ _. a m.m.

mitigation.3 m e.a m . .

Fuel oil is transferred from the storage tank to the day l tank by either of two transfer pumps associated with each 1 EDG. The pumps and piping are redundant to preclude failure of one pump, or the rupture of any pipe, valve or tank resulting in the loss of more than one EDG. All outside tanks and piping are located underground to preclude consideration of the effects of missiles in their design.

For proper operation of the EDGs, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the fuel oil. CR-3 has a Diesel Fuel Oil (DFO) Testing Program which is an overall effort to ensure the quality of the fuel oil. The program includes purchasing, on-site receipt acceptance testing of new fuel, offsite analysis of new fuel accepted, and periodic testing (both onsite and offsite) of the stored fuel oil.

Additionally, the program includes water removal and biocide addition to control bacteriological growth, and performance  !

checks of the cathodic protection system for underground storage tanks. CR-3 is not committed to Regulatory Guide 1.137 or ANS 59.51 (ANSI N195), however, these standards were utilized as guidance in the development of the DF0 Testing Program.

The EDG lube oil subsystem is designed to provide sufficient lubrication to permit proper operation of its associated EDG under all loading conditions. The system is required to circulate the lube oil to the diesel engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated by friction during (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-30 Amendment No. 149

~ Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air

[PaitI1T Cyc1 sill)[In iceFtaiE7smallM B 3.8.3 .

breakLLOCAiscenar:1ossboth EDGsiare 9 l pelioWupontfor?iccident'aitigation~./

w.a  !

auua-a.-un aw 1 BACKGROUND operation. The onsite 1 e oil storage, in addition to that (continued) contained in the engine mp, is sufficient to ensure 7 days  ;

of centinesus sperstica. This supply ensures adequate time  ;

[P EtT2i F T l is available to replenish lube oil from outside sources '

Reassess]toneM p ior to the EDG running out of lube oil.  !

EDG ; suppl 9ing Lj theTupperilisi.t} ch EDG has an air start system with adequate capacity for j ofiits(200-hourj ix successive start attempts on the EDG without recharging ,

rating a M L 2 the air start receivers. A single EDG start is assured with air receiver pressure z 150 $sig. Additional evaluations have been performed which indicate there is substantial l margin included in the single start receiver pressure limit  ;

(Ref. 9).  ;

I APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and j Chapter 14 (Ref. 5), assume Engineered Safeguard (ES) l systems are OPERABLE. The EDGs are designed to provide i sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability 1 to ensure the availability of necessary power to ES systems l so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design 1 limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

Since diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and the air start subsystem support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO A sufficient combined stored diesel fuel oil supply is (PiK27 - y required to be available to ensure the capability to operate Reassess]; y a single EDG at the satinesus lead tad ng for 7 days.

M rMimitibf; During an event t requires 7 days operation before replacement f oil is obtained, manual reconfiguration of

'its"200-hour .

~

1 ads and ansferring the stored fuel oil supply from one

.r _atin.f u ^s;a tank to the other may be needed to support operation of the j

EDG. Diesel fuel oil is also required to meet specific i quality standards,

(PaFt ' 1[L C)icli '11] ? IiF ciFtai n limal l l break?LOCA: scenarios;^both~EDGsr are .: i relied uponifor accidentteitigationd '

u.anw u~-x- w. a un ,

I (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-31 Amendment No. 149

l

! Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 8 3'8'3

[PaFtEliTCpcl el11] ? In~EsFdi ri ?imall T'l l

break L LOCA . scenarios , L both; EDCs are gj

~

BASES felied spon forpaccident' mitigation.g LCO A suffic ent lube oil supply must be available to ensure the (continued) capabili y to operate -t the continuous load rating for l 7 days. EDG lube oi sump level, in conjunction with the l

7, m on-site supply and he ability to obtain replacement i

, 'p, g "

  • supplies within t e required timeframe, supports the  :

EDGNat thej availability of DGs required to shut down the reactor and singlelimit of& qA to maintain 1 in a safe condition for an anticipated upperf.-

,1 ts0200-hour- ,-

operational ccurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA with loss 1 of offsite ower. EDG day tank fuel requirements, as well ratjngh m < ' as transfer capability from the storage tank to the day tank, are addressed in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating,"

and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown."

The starting air system is required to have a minimum capacity for six successive EDG start attempts without recharging the air start receivers. As such, the air start compressors are not addressed as a part of this (or any other) LCO.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources (LCO 3'.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2) are required in order to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an A00 or a postulated DBA. Since stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and the starting air subsystem support EDG OPERABILITY, these features are required to be within limits whenever the associated EDG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 indicates

  • separate Condition entry is allowed for each EDG. This is acceptable based upon the fact each EDG is treated as an independent entity for this Specification. Note 2 indicates LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable and MODE changes while in the ACTIONS of this Specification are permitted. It could be argued this Note is not required since this Specification allows indefinite operation. However, to avoid any future confusion on the allowance, LCO 3.0.4 has been specifically excepted. This is considered acceptable since operation in accordance with this Specification still means the EDG is OPERABLE.

l i

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-32 Amendment No. 149

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES

' ACTIONS F.:wT ~..cu h C7 7 w w * ' ' '

..1 ea u

- N

.w; ?a ,"a u ,w.. . ca www - 7" -

> u x.m.ma "77?"E- . m C' u . ma W ~, :<, +9 a (continued)

[PistT2VT" yi th ?usabl e~ fuell oil ivol smeTii'onefoF moreTstbrage'tanki] 'Dj Reassess;. '

< 22,917 gallonst promptbaction must.be taken:within;1 /hourij

.to- verify that the- combined' fuel oil 7supplyV45,834L . .

L New ACTION]^! a gallons.n However,Jthe Condition is1 restricted:to fuel' oil:

1evel l reductions ' thatl maintain . at $1 east i a combi ned ;;7s day - *j supplycIn?this Condition,;alperiodJof 1 hourlis!allowedito

' ensure that; sufficient' fuelioili supply; for 17sdays 'of .EDG 0 i operation;at71tsiupper'200-hour rating;isiava11able.7:In ; ' 3

'rder toTmaintain1the abilityLto'~treatLthe EDG.as!

o j;

independent entities"fori he t ACTIONSf(from;a fuel ?oilE .

. perspective);' an' artificial. lowerq11init on' stored fuel' oil d has been established.f The minimum usable' volume;specifiedL4 for' each tank fis t equivalenti to -:3 daysi operation ~ and ,was1 set l to ensurelaiminimum combined 61 day; supply. b .u.& m .n.m  ;

TheT11mi t"on Tcbetsineds T spplyTrsEogni zes"that' whi1F'sni7tankj

,mayicontain less'than: 3.5 day supply,' the! usable volume in M z

,the other tank could be,such;that 7nday? capacity?stil1L ,

exists. i a m s a m e . m .w a x i d a. mat a n d .

~

ConiistentTirith"the" Bases foF SUirve111ance'3.0?lI" 17 l CP,dRABILITY:is.~ verified byfensuring; theiassociated . ~

...-] l surveillance (s)! has;been; satisfactorily: completed within the requiredtfrequencr and the; equipment-is?not otherwiseiknowna  !

.,_ ,.... to.beLinoperable n a a m 2 1 m m _ m a u .a;da w [

~

T Pe

-- -n t] B.

"- [PaFt2FReassess]f6peFation'atiti]f upperL200-hour a ratingm a , 2 . i

[PUE2 fl  !

[Part]2{Reasiess][45834[j ,

[ Reassess]: [

[PaEtL 2;l 7 With oil volume in one or more sto ge tank < -187589 22,917 d t Permanent]O ga ons and combined fuel oil supply < 3,,177 gal ons, l

'usable

~~~' fuel l 8'"

sufficient fuel oil supply for 7 days of EDG eperasion is not available. However, the Condition is restricted to fuel oil level reductions, that maintain at least a combined 6 day supply. In this Condition, a period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is allowed prior to declaring the associated EDG inoperable.  !

In order to maintain the ability to treat the EDG as i independent entities for the ACTIONS (from a fuel oil  ;

perspective), an artificial lower limit on stored fuel oil  :

has been established. The minimum volwr,s specified for each tank is equivalent to 3 days operatik and was set to ensure a minimum combined 6 day supply. \  : [Part'2; Permanent]R i usable. volume _ id f l

(continued) ,

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-33 Amendment No. 149

.- - . = . - - - - . .

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS A-1 (continued) [POf 2iTPermane'it)) r >

"a usable; volume u. d  !

[PartEl ' The limit on combined supply recognizes th t while one tank Permanent]y l g"""j *"

may contain less than 3.5 day supply, the icisme in the other tank could be such that 7 day capacity still exists.

l The 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Completion Time allows sufficient time for l obtaining the requisite replacement volume and performing the analyses required prior to addition of fuel oil to the tank. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the fact that action will be initiated ,

to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event

[PhtI2iF.j occurring during this brief period.

Permanent]h C.il k m i j

[ Parte 2[Resssess]E280j With lube oil inventory < B3 gallons, there is not

[PUO2w~ a sufficient lube oil to support 7 days continuous operation f ne EDG at 'sil icad conditicas. However, the Condition Reassess]t t$e > > ,

' pperilicit u ;of j is restrict to lube oil volume reductions that maintain at its?200-hourJjj least a 6 ay supply. In this Condition, a period of 48 ,

' l ' hours 1 considered adequate *o restore the required volume r s t

'ati1n-mmO ' prior to declaring the associated E00 insperable. In crder tc maintain the ability to treat the EOC as independent entities for the ACTIONS (frem a 10be cil perspective), an

[ ppg * " rq artificial lower limit en stcred 1sbe cil has been Permanent]y y established. The volume specified includes the lube oil EDGs w. . g c ntained in the sump as well as the lube oil stored onsite

[ Parti 2i[Peir;manent))Ifithef riflui red 9 stored'volumeTcannot be' restored,i 4 . .i both; EDGsImust beTdeclared(inoperablej

'ince-this: volume:.isEcommon".to both! l s ,

EDCs'. _ w - .b._ ~.aw.:u;a . . ;s l l

l (continued) 1 Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-33a Amendment No. 149

l Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES - [Part 2;

, )

Permanent)

ACTIONS M /(continued) U>

l The 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is acceptable based on the l remaining capacity (> 6 days), the low rate of usage, the fact that actions will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event occurring during this )

brief period. _

[Part 2i a[

~

Permanent]

ibl. _ .

This Condition is entered as a result of a failure to meet  :

the acceptance criterion for EDG fuel oil particulates.

Normally, trending of particulate levels allows sufficient time to correct high particulate levels prior to reaching the limit of acceptability. However, poor sample procedures (bottom sampling), contaminated sampling equipment, and errors in laboratory analysis can produce failures that do l not follow a trend. Since the presence of particulates does l not mean the fuel oil will not burn properly and given that proper engine performance has been recently demonstrated l (within 31 days), it is prudent to allow a brief period of time prior to declaring the associated EDG inoperable The 7 day Completion Time allows for further evaluation, re-

[ Par.t 2;, ., sampling, and re-analysis of the EDG fuel oil.

Permanent]

E.e15 u- a %M  !

l With the new fuel oil properties defined in the Bases for SR 3.8.3.3 not within the required limits, a period of 30 days is allowed for restoring the stored fuel oil j properties prior to declaring the associated EDG inoperable, i This period provides sufficient time to test the stored fuel )

oil to determine that the new fuel oil, when mixed with previously stored fuel oil, remains acceptable, or to I restore the stored fuel oil properties. This restoration l may involve feed and bleed, filtering, or combir.ations of l these procedures. Even if an EDG start and load was required during this time and the fuel oil properties were outside limits, there is a high likelihood that the EDG would still be capable of performing its intended function.

l I

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-34 Amendment No.149

l Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3 i B 3.8.3 I i BASES .

\

ACTIONS firl

' [PirtI2IPirsinent

u.  % A A i m = . x u].w21 I F !1 7 7 (continued) i With starting air receiver pressure < 225 psig, sufficient capacity for six successive EDG start attempts does not  ;

exist. However, as long as the receiver pressure is

> 150 psig, there is adequate capacity for at least one  ;

start attempt, and the EDG can be considered OPERABLE while i the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit.

A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is considered sufficient to complete  !

restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the  !

associated EDG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining air start capacity, the fact that most EDG starts are accomplished on the first attempt, and the low probability of an event occurring during this brief period. i

~

[Partf 2FPersahsht]PC.'1H g' #

.n.us  ; w ;a.mu..sm

_y With a Required Action and associated Completion Time not l

[Part:2 3m -

met, or one or more EDGs with fuel oil, lube oil, or i Permanent]wd starting air subsystems not within limits for reasons other -

i 8

' than addrW Csaditicas A thrsagh E, the associated EDG f u.a2.3.sj r

, must ne immediately declared inoperable. In this case, the .

ACTIONS of Specification 3.8.1 or 3.8.2, as applicable, are i entered.\ ~

l

% oil,1both

[Pift 2i?PeFasnehi:]IIn7the'cissT6Of6 EDGs mustibe declared inoperablelsince_the. red [EDG '

storedilubejoiliyolumeds,commongo;both 3 EDGsigmj

[Part"2iP3 l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8 3.1 Permanent indequateN REQUIREMENTS j This SR provides verification that there is an adequate usable h d  ;

inventory of fuel oil in each storage tank to support i operation of one EDG for 3.5 days at the centinuous lead  :

[P5Ft?2 F " rating (assuming no offsite power). The SR also verifies Reassess]il combined capacity of the two tanks to be > 7 days fuel -

upperslimit} supply. The 3.5 day period (7 day capacity provided by the of its 200d combined inventory of both tanks) is sufficient time to i hour; rating!

" ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~

place the plant in a safe shutdown condition, cross connect fuel storage tanks, if necessary, and to bring in ,

replenishment fuel from an offsite location.

  • t The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient '

j supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are ,

provided and the likelihood any large uses of fuel oil during this period would be detected.  ;

4 9

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-35 Amendment No. 149

l Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 ,

i BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.2 .E.PaQgReasses's][280]{

REQUIREMENTS (continued) This Surveillance ensures that fficient lube oil inventory ,

_ . . is available to support at leas 7 days of full icad

[Part'2;.,,..y}

passess]....

cperaticr. for each EDG. The gallon requirement is based

on the EDG manufacturer consumption values for the run time operation'ofia A of the EDG. The specified volume includes the lube oil single EDG'at- 7 contained in the sump as well as the onsite stored stock.

the'upperilimitbj As such, implicit in this SR is the requirement to verify of its:200-hour the capability to transfer the lube oil from its storage t

["*. .u..w._ li location to the EDG. When determining compliance with this i requirement, both EDGs may take credit for the same volume '

of onsite stored lube oil. ,

A 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient lube oil supply is onsite, since EDG starts and run time are closely monitored by the plant staff.

SR 3 . 8 . 3 .J.

The tests listed below are a means of determining whether new fuel oil is of the appropriate grade and has not been contaminated with substances that would have an immediate, detrimental impact on diesel engine combustion. If results i from these tests are within acceptable limits, the fuel oil l may be added to the storage tanks without concern for contaminating the entire volume of fuel oil in the storage l tanks. These tests are to be conducted prior to adding the new fuel to the storage tank (s), but in no case is the time between receipt of new fuel and conducting the tests to exceed 31 days. The tests, limits, and applicable ASTM Standards are as follows:

a. Sample the new fuel oil in accordance with ASTM D4057-88, (Ref. 6);
b. Verify in accordance with the tests specified in ASTM D975-74, (Ref. 6) that the sample has a maximum of 0.05% by volume water and sediment (using ASTM D2709-82), a Saybolt viscosity at 100*F of 2 32.6 SUS and s 40.1 SUS, and a flash point of 2125'F;
c. Verify in accordance with the test specified in ASTM D287-82 that new fuel has an API specific gravity of 28 (min); and i

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-36 Amendment No. 149

_ . - .- - - _ ._ ._. -. . - . . - _ - _ ~ . . .

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES (continued) f

[Partili}Cyclel11]) ]

~

I BACKGROUNDT  : Cert'ain7sniall ? bFeakTOCATEenarios require eme'rgen'cyT" T l r (continued). feedwater.:to; maintain steam generator' cooling until: core :? i b  : decay heatfcan~be: removed solely by.ECCS; cooling.L Further,j

}l .- with the: turbine' driven EFW pump' or associated flow ~ pathj ,

f ' inoperable,; SWP-1B,<. train :"B"ioff the Nuclear!. Services . _ . m l

j. . Seawater. System,;CHHE-1B:and CHP-18;"as welllas both trains 4 of ECCS, Decay' Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water,-Decay Heat's L

[ ' Seawater,- EmergencyLDiesel? Generators,' AC Electrical: Power. s f 46 DistributioniSubsystems..;and AC Vitali Bus Subsystems are: .1

1 . required OPERABLE. ?With?ASV-204, EFV-12, Lor EFV-131 i inoperable, . Train "B" . Emergency Diiesel J Generators, . Train ."B".

s' ' AC; Electrical l Power, Distribution Subsystems, and '; Train "B" ' .. .

f _ f, ;miAC. Vital:? Bus; Subsystemsf are. required _0PERABLE,w_uam

.?

i l

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-67a Amendment No. 149

- ~ -- . - . - - - _ _ _ _ - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - . - -

4 Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 P

BASES

[Partili?Cpile"11]M"1 ACTIONS A'. 2 0 B ' 1'. ~ and ; B . 2 %gj

)

Cdissibsiti6n""shbipsfim? 1 Wi th* TFaipromptsactionfis inoperable,f rE "A""AC[eleEUj dalW} necessaryi to ensure i thati th turbine driven' emergencyifeedwater pumpf and; associated flow t i

' path are" OPERABLE ' for) steam t generatoricool.ing . H Wi th ! Train gj

[Part'11. 79 "8" ACfelectrical" power / distribution subsystem:inoper_ableMQ Cycle 511- a]j prompt actionis necessary totensureithat:theEturbine: driven' '

emergency'feedwater?pumpiand associated; flow?pathiasi.wellfas i

'ASV-204, ; EFV- 12,c and. EFV-13 l arei OPERABLE : for? steam ^ generator,  ;

[coolingnLIf;the requiredfequipment'is,not;0PERABLE,7thei ^ >

' capability-to' remove: core!decaydheat~cannot"be assured anda^ i s

Condition:F is applicableZThe-operability.

d riven (emergencyi feedwateripump ;i si noti requi redii of the; turbine]d n : MODE .4a ]

)

1 Duif toTths ?sevdi tyT6f!~the T~c6sseqEenier shoul d fiTsaiall l bFeak l LOCA occur? in theselconditions b the' 1 hour- Completion : Time f j I to verifyf turbineL drjven! emergency feedwater; pump and - . .nj associated flow. path)are :0PERABLE ensures 7that1 prompt action'

[ps F li m l 'will be-takenito confirm core decay heatiremoval' capability 4 C_ycle'

.m 11,] "< 1 Thel Completion' Time mininiizess the1 tine lthe;plantiis; M potentially; exposed tola:LOCAlin2theselconditionsg acj With one AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystem in the other train is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. However, the overall reliability is reduced 1

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-69a Amendment No. 149 i

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS Ad (continued) b cause a single failure in the remaining power distribution

[Part.1 s bsystems could result in the minimum required ES functions Cycle 11] t being met. Therefore, the required AC buses, load A1A2 enters, MCCs, and distribution panels must be restored to B$15andB.2 PERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.  : [Part 1, ; Cyi.le'11] ~

Conditions A and,B_,

The most severe scenario addressed by E dition-A is an entire train without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the train and the associated EDG inoperable). In this condition, the plant has an increased vulnerability to a complete loss of AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining train by stabilizing the plant, and on restoring power to the '

affected train. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> time limit for restoration, prior to requiring a plant shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because of: j

a. The potential for decreased safety if the operator's attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected train to the actions associated with shutting down the plant within this time limit; and
b. The low probability of an event occurring coincident with a single failure of a redundant component in the train with AC power. [Part"1FCyclE

[Part'1,.

Cycle 11] The second Completion Time for Required Action Ad

[ 11] A.2 and

. B.2 _

Condition Ai establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any or B ' ' ~

cudu i n a t i vo vi ired distribution subsystems to be inoperable during an le contiguous occurrence of failure to meet the LCO. I synditica A is entered while, for instance, a DC bus is inoperable and subsequently restored to OPERABLE status, LCO 3.8.9 may already have been not inet for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. This could lead to a total of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the AC distribution system. At this time, a DC circuit could again become inoperable, and AC distribution restored to OPERABLE status. This could continue indefinitely.

l l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-70 Amendment No. 149

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS Att (continued)

^

[PaFt 17 "5i The Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal Cycle:15]Ja " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." )

A.1CLA 2 This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time B1'anb8.2't

_._. _ J the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition A was entered. The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.

fhi

[Part 1Tf7 5 T

Cy'clei11]L l Wi thlTraif."AfACTvi faF bis Li n65ef abl e ',"#FomWaitti 6s? i sR C .1~. L C . 2 .  ; i.1 ,necessary- to ensure that1the turbine driven,emergencyi 2 D.1.-and DL2: ,feedwater pump:anf associated flow path are 0PERABLE?for : d  ;

' ~ - - - - - " "

isteam generatorLcooling. f With3Traini"B"l AC,,vitaltbus) .. ?

inoperable, prompt action 41s;necessaryLto; ensure 1that
the? 1 turbine l driven' emergency feedwater pump'and' associated flow. i .

pathias1well:asTASV-204,LEFV-12%and EFV-13 are= OPERABLE;for! '

steam'generatoricooling.: sIftheErequired'equipuentfis}not d i OPERABLE,[the=capabilityrto removeicore. decay heat,cannotLbe l assured- and Condition F;is applicableh TheLoperability;of?O

[PiFt"i n theiturbine driven emergqcy.!feedwater pump:isf not required)

Cycleili];l

-~.w lin: NODE A.uLa: .u.a.L; *

~~ _ . . m: a .w _x OPERABILITY?is verified.byJensuring theiassociated l. .% f d 0!1TT F

'CohsistentRwith"th~e"BasesifoESUrveillance^3  !

surveillance (s)ihas been' satisfactorily completed within;the required frequency (andithe equipment-.istnot:otherwise known4

to behinoperable.J .c ,. _waa.nalstaa Due 't6 the~seveFity(off theTconsequences[ shou 1FaTsmall? b~Feak LOCA
occurLin:these conditions, the:1 houriCompletion Time R
to verify; turbine driven emergency feedwaterj pump; and f 'm "

~

' associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt. action wills be: taken to confirm core decay: heat. removal-lcapabilityi The Completion Time"minimizesithe time the plant is: '

'potenti all y; exposed . toia : LOCA si n i these.; condi ti on s h; a 3 (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-71 Amendment No. 149

i Distribution Systems - Operating l 8 3.8.9 I BASES ACTIONS (continued)

[P E 6 1T I N ith one AC vital bus inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE AC Cycle 11] l ital buses are capable cf supporting the minimum safety j C;1L C.2.'. / functions necessary to si.ut down the unit and maintain it in D.1. and D;2; the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is

" " " " reduced, however, since an additional single failure could result in the minimum required ES functions not being supported. Therefore, the AC vital bus must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

Condition B represents a condition in which potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source are nonfunctional . In this situation the plant is sigr.ificantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all non-interruptible power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses and restoring power to the affected vital bus.

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without adequate AC vital power. However, there are certain affected features Completion Times of shorter duration. The intent of the Improved Technical Specifications is to remain within this Specification only and not take the ACTIONS for inoperable supported systems. Taking this exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, that would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i .e. , requiring a shutdown) and not allowing stable operations to continue; (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-71a Amendment No. 149

l Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS (hi (continued)

~

[PaFt l'*" '

The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry l

Cycle .11]-' , .

C.1.E C~2 into numerous applicable Conditions and Required D.1.-and D.2.' Actions for components without adequate vital AC power l

.. .: and not providing sufficient time for the operators to l

^ "~' "

erform the necessary evaluations and actions for -

restoring power to the affected train; and i

c. The low probability of an event occurring coincident with a single failure of a redundant component. '

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the importance of restoring the AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, the redundant capability afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during l this period.

[P&tT* T '

C*

The second Completion Time for Required Action B-1 - '

establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any and,D.2 a m.,2 combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of j failure. Refer to the Bases for Required Actica A.1 for I

[Part 1;- i further discussion of this Completion Time. M [Part"li'Cyclf Cycle -11] 11] Actions- 1 E.11 A.2 and B.2 j l With DC bus (es) in DC electrical power distribution train  !

inoperable, the remaining train is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain '.t in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution train could result in the minimum required ES functions not being met. Therefore, the DC buses musc be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

l i

l l

t (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-72 Amendment No. 149

. _ . .. _ . . . . _ . . . _ . _ _ . . . ~ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _

1 l

l Distribution Systems - Operating I B 3.8.9 '

(

I BASES 1

'[Parf1a._x .a ~~_.-

-.um.7Cpcle? 11] M i ACTIONS (continued)

Csaditica C represents a condition in which one train is l

[PUf1MI Cycle.lil7) without adequate DC power; potentially both with the battery '

significantly degraded and the associated charger i f Condition \Ei inoperable. In this situation, the plant is significantly R:ms4 more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, I therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on l stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of i power to the remaining trains and restoring power to the .

affected train.

1 The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be

! without adequate AC vital power. However, there are certain affected features with Completion Times of shorter duration.  ;

l The intent of the Improved Technical Specifications is to  :

remain within this Specification only and not take the  !

ACTIONS for inoperable supported systems. Taking this i

exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, that would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in plant conditions (i . e . , requiring a <

while allowing stable operations to shutdown) continue; .

b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry >

into numerous applicable Conditions and Required

Actions for components without DC power and not ]

providing sufficient time for the operators to perform  :

the necessary evaluations and actions to restore power [

to the affected train; and  ;

c. The low probability of an event occurring coincident ,

with a single failure of a redundant component. '

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with j the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3).

l l.

1 i, i k  !

l (continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-73 Amendment No. 149

l i

l l Distribution Systems - Operating l

B 3.8.9 BASES

[PUt?17 Cycle ~l11]M

' " " ~ " ~ ~ " " " "

ACTIONS tinued)

[Partik 9 The second Completion Time for Required Action .1 Cycle 11] . i establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any ActionsLA.2;i combination of required distribution subsystems to be and 8.2i i inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failure to meet the LCO. Refer to the Bases for Required Actica A.1 for further discussion of this Completion Time.

0.1 and 0.2 # # [PaFtT1',"

Cycle'11]f! find F.2 If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not appl y. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

g f .[PU.-':"1;' -. t Cycl..e.'11]M:a l

'caditica E corresponds to a level of degradation in which

~ redundant safety-related trains have lost power to one or

[Part 1, '

more busses. At this severely degraded level, the plant's Cycle /11] . ability to respond to an event may be significantly reduced.

Cynditlon Gj Therefore, if it is determined that redundant trains of a necessary function are concurrently inoperable, no

)

additional time is justified for continued operation. The plant is required to immediately enter LCO 3.0.3 and begin preparations for a controlled shutdown.

1 I

l l

i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-74 Amendment No. 149 l

i l

4 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72

]

l TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

CHANGE REQUEST NOTICE 210 i

l i REVISION BAR PAGES 1

Technical Specifications l

1 e

l l

l ECCS--Operating j 3.5.2 l l

3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) l 3.5.2 ECCS--Operating l l LC0 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.

l l

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. I

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I I

l A. One or more trains A.1 Verify the turbine I hour inoperable. driven emergency feedwater pump and AND associated flow path are OPERABLE.

At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent AND AND j to a single OPERABLE I ECCS train available. A.2 Restore train (s) to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> l

l l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.5-4 Amendment No.

I

EFW System 3.7.5  ;

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS I

3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System LCO 3.7.5 Two EFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3.

ACTIONS l

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A. One steam supply to A.1 Restore steam supply 7 days the turbine driven EFW to OPERABLE status.

pump inoperable. AND 10 days from l discovery of '

failure to meet the LC0 B. ASV-5 inoperable. B.1 Restore ASV-5 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

AND 10 days from discovery of failure te meet the LC0 (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-9 Amendment No.

i EFW System 3.7.5 l

l ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. EFV-12 inoperable C.1 Verify the following I hour l

are OPERABLE:

QR

1. Train "B" EFV-13 inoperable. Emergency Diesel Generator, QB 2. Train "B" AC Electrical Power ASV-204 inoperable. Distribution Subsystem, and
3. Train "B" AC Vital Bus Subsystem AND C.2 Restore affected 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> equipment to OPERABLE status. AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LC0 (continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-10 Amendment No.

EFW System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Turbine drive EFW pump D.1 Verify the following I hour or associated ficw are OPERABLE:

path inoperable for 1. SWP-18, reasons other than 2. Train "B" of the 4

Condition A. Nuclear Services Seawater System,

3. CHHE-1B, and
4. CHP-18.

t AND l 1

0.2 Verify both trains of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> i the following are OPERABLE:

1. ECCS, l i
2. Decay Heat Closed '

Cycle Cooling,

3. Decay Heat Seawater,
4. Emergency Diesel Generators,
5. AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsy:tems, and
6. AC Vital Bus Subsys.tems.

AND D.3 Restore Turbine 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> driven EFW pump and associated flow path AND to OPERABLE status.

10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-11 Amendment No.

i EFW System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I

E. Motor driven EFW pump E.1 Restore motor driven 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or associated flow EFW pump and I path inoperable. associated flow path AND to OPERABLE' status.

10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LC0 F. Required Action and F.1 Be in Mode 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, C, D, or E not met.

F.2 Be in Mode 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> G. Two EFW trains G.1 Initiate action to Immediately I inoperable. restore one EFW train to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 Verify each EFW manual, power operated, and 45 days automatic valve in each water flow path and in both steam supply flow paths to the turbine driven pump, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.5.5 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven EFW pump, until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 3. I i Verify the developed head of each EFW pump 45 days on a at the flow test point is greater than or STAGGERED TEST equal to the required developed head. BASIS (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-12 Amendment No.

l 1

EFW System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

1 SR 3.7.5.3 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> I after entering MODE 3. l Verify each EFW automatic valve that is not 24 months locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position  !

on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.5.4 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 3. I

....___ ______......___________..._______.. );

1 Verify each EFW pump starts automatically 24 months i on an actual or simulated actuation signal. l SR 3.7.5.5 Verify proper alignment of the EFW flow Prior to paths by verifying flow from the EFW tank entering MODE 2 i to each steam generator. chenever plant has been in M'JDE 5 or 6 for

> 30 days l

[

1 I

l l

l l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-13 Amendment No.

l SW System 3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water (SW) System LC0 3.7.7 The SW System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Two OPERABLE emergency SW pumps; and
b. Three OPERABLE SW heat exchangers.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. SWP-1B inoperable. A.1 --------NOTE---------

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

AND l

A.2 Restore SWP-1B to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status i

B. SWP-1A inoperable. B.1 Restore SWP-1A and SW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> heater exchanger to QB OPERABLE status.

One required SW heat '

exchanger inoperable (continued)

I ,

i l l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-16 Amendment No.

SW System 3.7.7 i

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> I associated Completion

Time not met. AND

)

C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> I l

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l l

SR 3.7.7.1 -------------------NOTE--------------------  !

Isolation of SW flow to individual '

components does not render the SW System inoperable.

i Verify each SW manual, power operated, and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path servicing essential equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.7.2 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each SW automatic valve in the flow 24 months path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.7.3 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each SW pump starts automatically on 24 months an actual or simulated actuation signal.

l Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-17 Amendment No.

. - . - - . . . . . . . - - . - . - - . - . - . . . - . . . . - . . - . . . . ~ ..- -..-.- - .... .

i DC System l

3.7.8  :

l .

3.7 PLANT

SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water (DC) System I LCO 3.7.8 Two DC trains shall be OPERABLE.

l i

l l

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3,-and 4.

1 l

l ACTIONS )

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

A. One DC train A.1 ---------NOTE-------- l i

inoperable. This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

, Verify the turbine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path

! are OPERABLE.

AS A.2 --------NOTE--------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," for required decay heat removal loo)s made inoperable sy DC ,

train inoperability. l

.....__...__ .__.... 1 Restore DC train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> i 0PERABLE status.  ;

(continued) l l

t-1 I

i f

i

. Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-18 Amendment No.

l l

l

Nuclear Services Seawater System 3.7.9 l

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.9 -Nuclear Services Seawater System LC0 3.7.9 Two Nuclear Services Seawater System trains shall be OPERABLE. )

l l

! APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

l L ACTIONS l-l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

A. Train "B" of the A.1 --------NOTE---------

l Nuclear Services This Action is not Seawater System applicable in MODE 4.

j inoperable. ---------------------

)

Verify the turbine I hour l driven emergency i

feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

MD A . ?. Restore Train "B" of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> the Nuclear Services l Seawater System to OPERABLE status.

B. Train "A" of the B.1 Restore Train "A" of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> l Nuclear Services the Nuclear Services l

Seawater System Seawater System to j inoperable. OPERABLE status.

(continued) 1 1

i I

1 l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-20 Amendment No.

i

Nuclear Services Seawater System 3.7.9 ACTIONS { continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in Mode 3 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> i associated Completion Time not met. 6NQ C.2 Be in Mode 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.9.1 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Isolation of Nuclear Services Seawater System flow to individual components does not render the Nuclear Services Seawater System inoperable.

Verify each Nuclear Services Seawater 31 days System manual valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.9.2 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each Emergency Nuclear Services 24 months Seawater System pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-21 Amendment No.

l l

i Decay Heat Seawater System 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Decay Heat Seawater System 4

l LCO 3.7.10 Two Decay Heat Seawater System trains shall be OPERABLE. 1 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1

A. One Decay Heat A.1 --------NOTE---------

Seawater System train This Action is not inoperable. applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency i feedwater pump and '

associated flow path are OPERABLE.

AND A.2 --------NOTE---------  ;

Enter applicable  :

Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," for required decay heat  ;

removal loo 3s made inoperable ay Decay Heat Seawater System train inoperability.

Restore Decay Heat 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Seawater System train to OPERABLE status.

l (continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-22 Amendment No.

Control Complex Cooling System 3.7.18 l

l 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System l LC0 3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System shall be OPERABLE with: I

a. 2 OPERABLE chillers and associated pumps; and
b. 2 heat exchangers.  ;

i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. l 1

l ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. CHHE-1B inoperable A.1 --------NOTE---------

This Action is not M applicable in MODE 4. j

..................... 4 CHP-18 inoperable.

I Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore CHHE-1B and 30 days CHP-18 to OPERABLE status.

B. CHHE-1A inoperable. 8.1 Restore CHHE-1A, CHP- 30 days lA and Control M Complex Cooling heat exchanger to OPERABLE CHP-1 A inoperable. status.

M One required Control Complex Cooling heat exchanger inoperable.

l (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-39 Amendment No.

Control Complex Cooling System 3.7.18 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in Mode 3 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in Mode 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> D. Any combination of 0.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3 Immediately components rendering the Control Complex Cooling System inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.18.1 Verify each chilled water pump's developed In accordance head-at the flow test point is greater than with the or equal to the required developed head. Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.18.2 Verify the redundant capability of the 24 months Control Complex Cooling System to remove the assumed heat load.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-40 Amendment No.

AC Sources-0perabng J.8.1 i

ACTIONS j

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3 Restore required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> ,

. offsite circuit to {

OPERABLE status E 6 days from }

discovery of j failure to meet LCO i B. Train "A" EDG (

B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> I i inoperable. for OPERABLE of fsite  !

circuit (s). E_ j

\

Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> I thereafter  ;

E i B.2 --------NOTE---------  !

This Action is not i applicable in MODE 4. l i

Verify the turbine I hour j driven emergency i feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

AND B.3 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from I  !

feature (s), supported discovery of  ;

by the inoperable Condition B '

EDG, inoperable when concurrent with ,

its redundant. inoperability of l required feature (s) redundant '

are inoperable. required  ;

feature (s) i AND i

(continued) i t

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-2 Amendment No.

j l

1 AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1

!- ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.4.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> i EDG is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

QB B.4.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> I for OPERABLE EDG.

AND B.5 Restore EDG to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> i OPERABLE status AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-3 Amendment No. l l

2

AC Sources--Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Train "B" EDG C.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. for OPERABLE offsite circuit (s). AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND C.2 ---------NOTE--------

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the following I hour are OPERABLE:

1. Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path,
2. ASV-204,
3. EFV-12, and
4. EFV-13 AND C3 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from feature (s), supported discovery of by the inoperable Condition B EDG, inoperable when concurrent with its redundant inoperability of required feature (s) redundant are inoperable, required feature (s)

AND (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4 Amendment No.

_..__y i

AC Sources-Operating ,

3.8.1 '

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.4.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

EDG is not inoperable l due to common cause failure.

[ 98 C.4.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> j for OPERABLE EDG.

AND l

1- C.5 Restore EDG to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> l

OPERABLE status.

MD l 6 days from l discovery of failure to meet

LCO l

l D. Two required offsite 0.1 Declare required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from i

! circuits inoperable. feature (s) inoperable discovery of when its redundant Condition D I

! required feature (s) concurrent with

! are inoperable. inoperability of l redundant

{ required feature (s)

AND D.2 Restore one required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> I offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

l (continued) i 4

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-5 Amendment No.  !

_ l

I AC Sources--Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One required offsite -------------NOTE------------ I circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions arid Required Actions of ANQ LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution l Systems Operating," when l Train "A" EDG Condition E is entered with '

inoperable, no AC power source to one l  !

train.

E.1 --------NOTE---------

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

AND E.2 Restore required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

08 E.3 Restore EDG to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 1 OPERABLE status.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-6 Amendment No.

- - . ~ . - - - - - .

AC Sources--Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS' (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. One required offsite -------------NOTE-----------

circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 6ND 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems Operating," when Condition F Train "B" EDG is entered with no AC power inoperable, source to one train.

I F.1 ---------NOTE--------  ;

This Action is not '

applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the following I hour are OPERABLE:

1. Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path,
2. ASV-204,
3. EFV-12, and
4. EFV-13 AND F.2 Restore required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

QB F.3 Restore EDG to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-7 Amendment No.

{

AC Sources--Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G. Two EDGs inoperable. G.1 Restore one EDG to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />  !

OPERABLE status.

H. Required Action and H.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> I associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, C, D, E, F, or G not met. H.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> I. Three or more required I.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3 Immediately I AC sources inoperable.

1 l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-8 Amendment No.

l l

AC Sources--Operating j 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.8.1.3 -------------------NOTES-------------------

1. EDG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.
2. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.
3. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one EDG at a time. l
4. This SR shall be preceded by and immediately follow, without shutdown, a successful performance of SR 3.8.1.2 j or SR 3.8.1.6. -

Verify each EDG operates for 2 60 minutes 31 days at a load 2 2600 kW and s 2850 kW.

SR 3.8.1.4 Verify each day tank contains 2 280 gal of 31 days I fuel oil SR 3.8.1.5 Verify the fuel oil transfer system 31 days operates to automatically transfer fuel oil from the storage tank to the day tank.

(continued) i l

t i

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-10 Amendment No.

I AC Sources--Operating  !

3.8.1 .

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)  ;

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

{

SR 3.8.1.11 -----------------NOTES-------------------- l

1. Momentary transients outside the load I range do not invalidate this test.  !

.2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, ]

t credit may be.taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. l l

1 Verify each EDG operates for 2 60 minutes 24 months l at a load 2 3300 kW and 1 3400 kW. I l 1 l

1 l Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-14 Amendment No.

t l

t . . , _ - - .-.=. . - . - - - -

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS  !

1 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air  ;

LCO 3.8.3 The stored diesel fuel oil lube oil, and starting air subsystem shall be within limits for each required emergency diesel generator (EDG).

APPLICABILITY: When associated EDG is required to be OPERABLE. l l

ACTIONS


NOTES------------------------------------ l

1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each EDG. l
2. LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable.

l l

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One EDG with stored A.1 Verify combined I hour I fuel oil level stored fuel oil level I

> 45,834 gal.

< 22,643 gal in917 gal and

> 19, storage tank.

B. One or more EDGs with B.1 Restore fuel oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> I stored fuel oil level level to within

< 22,917 gal and limits.

> 19,643 gal in ,

storage tank. I i

MQ Combined stored fuel oil level < 45,834 I l

gal.

C. With stored EDG lube C.1 Restore lube oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> ,

oil inventory < 280 inventory to within l gal and > 240 gal. limits. QB Declare both i

EGGS l'

l inoperable. j r

(continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-18 Amendment No.

l

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 i

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One or more EDGs with D.1 Restore fuel oil 7 days stored fuel oil total total particulates to I particulates not within limits, within limit.

I E. One or more EDGs with E.1 Restore stored fuel 30 days i new fuel oil oil properties to properties not within within limits.

limits.

i F. One or more EDGs with F.1 Restore starting air 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> I l starting air receiver receiver pressure to i pressure < 225 psig within limits.

and 2 160 psig.

I G. Required Action and G.1 Declare associated Immediately l associated Completior. EDG inoperable.

Time not met.

Q3 One or more EDGs with diesel fuel oil, lube oil, or starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other than Condition A, B, C, D, E, or F. l l

l l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-19 Amradment No.

l

1 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.3.1 Verify each fuel oil storage tank conta'ns 31 days 2 22,917 gal of fuel and combined fuel oil storage level 1 45,834 gal. l l

l SR 3.8.3.2 Verify each EDG lube oil inventory is 31 days i l

2 280 gal. l l

1 l

SR 3.8.3.3 Verify fuel oil properties of new and In accordance stored fuel oil are tested in accordance with the Diesel  !

with, and maintained within the limits of, Fuel Oil '

the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program. Testing Program SR 3.8.3.4 Verify each EDG air start receiver pressure 31 days .

is 2 225 psig. l l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-20 Amendment No.

l Distribution Systems--Operating

  • 3.0.9 L

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems--Operating LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.  !

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

i ACTIONS ,

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Train "A" AC A.1 --------NOTE---------

electrical power This Action is not distribution subsystem applicable in MODE 4.

inoperable. ---------------------

Verify the turbine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path I are OPERABLE. l l

AND A.2 Restore AC electrical 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE AND status.

16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LC0 (continued) l L

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-35 Amendment No.

l l ~

Distribution Systems-Operating. 1 3.8.9 l  :

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i -

B. Train "B" AC B.1 --------NOTE--------- -

electrical power This Action is not  ;

distribution subsystem -applicable in MODE 4.  !

inoperable. ---------------------

Verify the following I hour j are OPERABLE I

l 1. Turbine driven j emergency 4 feedwater pump and associated flow path,

2. ASV-204,
3. EFV-12, path
4. EFV-13, j L AND B.2- Restore AC electrical 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> power distribution ll subsystem to OPERABLE MQ status.

16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LC0 (continued) i i

)

4 1  !

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-36 Amendment No.

i

- . ~ - . . . . - . . . . - - - . . - . - . . - . - - _ . . - . . ... - _ -. _ . - ..-..... ...-.. ..

Di stribution: Systems--Operating 3.8.9 -

6 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ,

C. Train "A" AC vital bus C.1 --------NOTE---------

subsystem inoperable This Action is~not t applicable in MODE 4. ,

. Verify the turbine l' hour i driven emergency  ;

feedwater pump and l associated flow path  !

are OPERABLE. ,

i

i. AND C.2 Restore AC vital bus 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />  !

subsystem to OPERABLE status. AND i

l 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from i l discovery of failure to meet '

LC0 (continued) .

l  !

l- l i  !

r t

4 l

I l

l-  :

l l i i

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-37 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems--Operating 3.8.9 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Train "B" AC Vital Bus D.1 --------NOTE---------

subsystem inoperable. This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the following I hour are OPERABLE:

1. Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path,
2. ASV-204,
3. EFV-12, and
4. EFV-13 AND D.2 Restore AC vital bus 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> subsystem to OPERABLE status. aHD 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LC0 E. One DC electrical E.1 Restore DC electrical 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> I power distribution power distribution subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE AND ,

status. 1 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of ,

failure to meet LC0 F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> I associated Completion 1 Time not met. AND F.2 B. in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> l l

G. Two trains with G.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3 Immediately I inoperable l

distribution l subsystems that result in a loss of function.

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-38 Amendment No.

I 1

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 l

l DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DP:R-72 l

l l

l TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION l l CHANGE REQUEST NOTICE 210 1

i REVISION BAR PAGES Bases i 1

i ESAS Instrumentation B 3.3.5 l B 3.3 -INSTRUMENTATION i

-B 3.3.5 Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The ESAS initiates Engineered Safeguards (ES) Systems, based .

on the values of selected plant parameters, to protect core i design and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits and to .

mitigate accidents. '

l ESAS actuates the following:

a. High Pressure Injection (HPI);
b. Low Prassure Injection (LPI);
c. Reactor Building (RB) Isolation and Cooling;
d. RB Spray; ]
e. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Start; and
f. Control complex normal recirculation.

ESAS also provides two signals to the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System. One signal initiates ,

emergency feedwater (EFW) when an actuation of HPI Channel A and HPI Channel B is present. The other functions to trip the motor driven emergency feedwater pump when an RCS Pressure-Low Low initiation coincident with a loss of offsite power is present.

This trip signal may be manually defeated in certain small break LOCA scenarios. Assuming the single failure of the turbine driven feedwater pump or associated flow path in such circumstances, defeating this trip signal would maintain steam generator cooling with the motor driven emergency feedwater pump. Prior to defeating the trip signal, sufficient capability on the emergency diesel generators to power the required loads would be established as discussed in the BASES for Technical Specification 3.7.5.

l l

i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.3-44 Amendment No.

ESAS Instrumentation B 3.3.5 i

BASES ,

i f

f f

i l

b THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1

1

? l l i' l

l (continued) i I

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.3-44B Amendment No.

, l l

l l

. ._- - . . .- - - . ~ . - .-

l l

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.17 i

l BASES i

LCO 18. Core Exit Temperature (Backuo) (continued)  ;

following a steam generator tube rupture or small ,

break LOCA. Operator actions to maintain a centrolled  !

cooldown, such as adjusting OTSG level or pressure,

! would be prompted by this indication. In addition, the core exit thermocouples provide input to the subcooling margin monitor, which is a Type A variable.

1 The subcooling margin monitor takes the average of the five highest CETs for each of the ICCM trains. Two channels ensure that a single failure will not disable ,

the ability to determine the representative core exit  !

temperature.

19. Emeraency Feedwater Flow 4

EFW Flow instrumentation is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the OTSGs. The EFW injection flow to each OTSG (2 channels per OTSG, 1 one associated with each EFW injection line) is  !

determined from a differential pressure measurement calibrated to a span of 0 gpm to 1000 gpm. Each ,

differential pressure transmitter provides an input to a control room indicator and the plant computer.

l l EFW Flow is used by the operator to determine the need ,

to throttle flow during accident or transient i conditions to prevent excessive RCS cooldown rates l when low decay heat levels are present. EFW Flow is also used by the operator to verify that the EFW System is delivering the correct flow to each OTSG. .

However, the primary indication of this function is '

provided by OTSG level.

These instruments are not assumed to provide information required by the operator to take a l mitigation action specified in the safety analysis.

l As such, they are not Type A variables. However, the monitors are deemed risk significant (Category 1) and are included within the LCO based upon this

! consideration.  :

j (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.3-138 Amendment No.

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 l B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.2 ECCS-Operating BASES BACKGROUND The function of the ECCS is to provide core cooling to ensure that the reactor core is protected after any of the following accidents: )

1. Loss of coolant accident (LOCA);
2. Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR); and
3. Steam line break (SLB).

! There are two modes of ECCS operation: injection and

! recirculation. In the injection phase, all injection is initially added to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) from the borated water storage tank (BWST). This injection flow is added via the RCS cold legs and core flood nozzles to.the reactor vessel. After the BWST has been depleted to 1 15 feet but > 7 feet, the ECCS recirculation phase is entered as the ECCS suction is manually transferred to the reactor building emergency sump.

Two redundant, 100% capacity trains are provided. Each train consists of high pressure injection (HPI) and low pressure injection (LPI) subsystems. In MODES 1, 2, and 3, both trains must be OPERABLE. This ensures that 100% of the core cooling requirements can be provided even in the event of a single active failure.

I Certain size small break LOCA scenarios require emergency feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling until core .

decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling. Further, I with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path inoperable, SWP-18, train "B" of the Nuclear Services '.

Seawater System, CHHE-1B, and CHP-18, as well as both trains of ECCS, Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Decay Heat Seawater, Emergency Diesel Generators, AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystem, and AC Vital Bus Subsystems are ,

required OPERABLE (Ref 5). j

) (continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-9 Amendment No.

1 1

ECCS-Operating 8 3.5.2 I l

l BASES 1

l l

l l

I l

I l

i l

I I

l 1

1

^

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-9B Amendment No.

l

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS M  :

With one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, prompt action within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE for steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump or associated flow path is not OPERABLE, then the capability to I remove sufficient core decay heat can not be assured and '

Condition B is applicable. Consistent with the Bases for i Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not  !

otherwise known to be inoperable. I Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and j associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat reinoval capability.

The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

M With one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the inoperable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is based on NRC recommendations (Ref. 3) that are based on a risk evaluation and is a reasonable time for many repairs.

An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering the design flow to the RCS.

The LC0 requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. The intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-15 Amendment No.

- _ - - . _ - . = _ .- _. _ .. - - .. . .-

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 BASES I ACTIONS AJL (continued) l l

l such that the safety injection (SI) flow equivalent to 100%

of a single train remains available. This allows increased i flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable.

An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the l failure of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 3) has shown the risk of having one full ECCS train inoperable to be sufficiently low to justify continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

With one or more components inoperable such that the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is not available, i the facility is in a condition outside the accident ,

I analyses. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be immediately entered.

This Condition does not apply to HPI subsystem components which are deactivated for the purposes of complying with Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) administrative control commitments. With these components deactivated, the HPI subsystem is still considered OPERABLE based upon guidance in NRC Generic Letter 91-18. This guidance allows substitution of manual operator action for otherwise l

l i

i l

4 I (continued) i L Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-15A Amendment No.

l i l

ECCS-Operating -

l' B 3.5.2  :

l BASES l 9

l t

i +

l F

l

[

i t

l i t

e r

l l

l  !

l THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  :

a i

! i i

I i

r r

E I

I I h l I i

l.

1 1 1

,i i

I (continued) l i

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-15B Amendment No. [

t I

l I, ._

l

. . . - - - - . - _ - . . - _ -..= - . _ _ _ . - .

l ECCS-Operating l

B 3.5.2 BASES l

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.5 l REQUIREMENTS l (continued) This Surveillance ensures that these valves are in the

) proper position to prevent the HPI pump from exceeding its l runout limit. This 24 month Frequency is acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.

SR 3.5.2.6 1

This Surveillance ensures that the flow controllers for the LPI throttle valves will automatically control the LPI train flow rate in the desired range and prevent LPI pump runout as RCS pressure decreases after a LOCA. The 24 month Frequency is acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.

SR 3.5.2.7 Periodic inspections of the reactor building emergency sump l suction inlet ensure that it is unrestricted and stays in

! proper operating condition. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and to preserve access to the location. This Frequency has been found to be sufficient to detect abnore.a1 degradation and has been confirmed by operating experience.

l REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.46.

l 2. FSAR, Section 6.1.

l 3. NRC Memorandum to V. Stello, Jr., from R.L. Baer, ,

! " Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.

4. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Inservice

! Inspection, Article IWP-3000.

5. FTI 51-1266138-01, Safety Analysis Input to Startup Team Safety Assessment.

i Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-18 Amendment No.

i i

EFW System B 3.7.5  !

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS .

8 3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System t

-BASES BACKGROUND The Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System is designed to provide .

adequate flow to one or both steam generators (OTSGs) for decay heat removal with the generators at the maximum operating pressure of 1050 psig plus suitable margin for ,

post-accident pressure increase (Ref. 1, 2). The principal  ;

function of the EFW system is to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System upon the unavailability of normal feedwater supply. This is accomplished by supplying water from the emergency feedwater tank (EFT-2) to the OTSG  ;

secondary side via the high nozzles. Steam produced in the i OTSGs is condensed.in the main condenser via the turbine '

bypass valves or, if the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) or  ;

main steam safety valves (MSSVs) have actuated, discharged directly to the atmosphere.

The EFW System consists of one motor driven EFW pump and one steam turbine driven EFW pump, each having a nominal 100%

capacity (Ref. 3). The motor driven EFW pump is powered l from the 4160 volt ES bus 3A. The turbine driven EFW pump receives steam from one main steam line per OTSG via connections upstream of the associated main steam isolation valve. An alternative source of steam is available from the  :

fossil units, Crystal River Unit 1 and 2 (Ref.1), but cannot be relied upon to consider the EFW train OPERABLE. l l

The diverse motive power of the two trains enhances both system availability and reliability. The preferred water source for both EFW pump trains is the Seismic Class I, missile protected dedicated EFW tank. Backup supplies of emergency feedwater are provided by the condensate storage tank and the main condenser hotwell. The pumps tie into common discharge headers providing the capability to feed j either or both of the OTSGs.

]

The pumps and OTSGs are protected from excessively high flow l induced problems by cavitating venturis (EF-62-F0 and EF FO) in the pump discharge lines, designed to limit EFW flow to the steam generators regardless of steam generator pressure (Ref. 7).

i i l'

! (continued)

.' l l

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-23 Amendment No.

l l l l _ , . . .

l

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES l

BACKGROUND DC powered block and control valves are actuated to feed the (continued) appropriate steam generator by the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System. The capacity of either EFW pump is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool

, the plant until the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure l and temperature are low enough to place the Decay Heat-i Removal (DHR) System in service or until core decay heat can l be removed solely by ECCS.

l For certain small break LOCA scenarios also involving a loss of offsite power, securing the motor driven EFW pump would provide capability on the emergency diesel generator to load the "A" train low pressure injection pump and other required l loads (Ref 6). ,

t l

I t

i l l

1 l

I i

l l ,

l 2

I l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-23A Amendment No.

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES l

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-238 Amendment No.

1. a a_- .s & 2 A h a ,.4 .

l EFW System B 3.7.5 l l

BASES BACKGROUND Automatic actuation of the EFW System occurs on the i (continued) following:

)

i

1. Trip of both main feedwater punps with reactor power '

greater than 20% or the NI/RPS not in shutdown bypass; Low level in either OTSG; 2.

3. Low pressure in either OTSG; Trip of all four reactor coolant pumps; 4.
5. High pressure injection (HPI) actuation on both
Channel A and B Engineered Safeguards Actuation System a (ESAS) channels; and j 6. AMSAC actuation.

The EFIC is a " smart" system which will feed e)ther or both ,

OTSGs with indications of low levels, but will isolate EFW '

to a faulted steam generator having a significantly lower steam pressure than the other.

The EFW System is designed to ANSI B 31.1 ES Seismic Class I and in accordance with General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5,19, 44, 45, and 46 (Ref. 3, 4).

1 4 -

APPLICABLE The EFW System is sized to provide sufficient decay heat SAFETY ANALYSIS removal capability to cooldown the RCS to the temperature

. and pressure at which the DHR System can be placed in service or at which core decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS for any of the following events:

. loss of main feedwater (LMFW);

. LMFW with loss of offsite power;

. main feedwater line break;

. main steam line break; and small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-24 Amendment No.

I EFW System i B 3.7.5 1

i BASES 4

APPLICABLE The EFW System is designed to remain functional following SAFETY ANALYSES the maximum hypothetical earthquake. It will also remain

(continued) functional following a single failure in addition to any of the above events with the exception of the loss of all AC i

power (Ref. 3). No single failure prevents EFW from being supplied to the intact OTSG nor allows EFW to be supplied to i the faulted OTSG. Note that in most cases of a main

feedwater break or a steam line break, the depressurization i of the affected OTSG would cause the automatic initiation of l EFW. However, there will be some small break sizes for i'

! which automatic detection will not be possible. For these i small breaks, the operator will have sufficient time in

which to take appropriate action to terminate the event 1

(Ref. 1).

The EFW System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Two independent emergency feedwater pumps and their associated flow paths are required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of the EFW pumps requires that each be capable ,

of developing its required discharga pressure and flow. The OPERABILITY OF ASV-5 is addressed by Condition B. The OPERABILITY of ASV-204 is a portion of EFP-2 OPERABILITY and is addressed as by Condition D.

The motive power for the turbine driven pump is steam supplied from either OTSG from a main steam header upstream of the main steam isolation valves so that their closure does not isolate the steam supply to the turbine. Both steam supply flow paths through MSV-55 and MSV-56 (condition A) to the turbine driven pump are required to be OPERABLE.

The OPERABILITY of the associated EFW flow paths requires all valves be in their correct positions or be capable of actuating to their correct positions on a valid actuation signal.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-25 Amendment No.

EFW System B 3.7.5 l

l l BASES l LCO In certain small break LOCA scenarios, assuming the single (continued) failure as the loss of "B" train Class IE direct current power, manual operator action would be taken to maintain steam generator cooling by feeding the steam generators using the turbine driven EFW pump. In this circumstance, manual operator action would be taken to close the "B" train ,

EFV-12 EFW isolation (Condition C valves, and feed and open the steam the crosstie generatorsvalve,he via t "A" train flow pa)lh.

Inoperability of the EFW System may result in inadequate decay heat removal following a transient or arcident during which main feedwater is not available. The resulting RCS heatup and pressure increase can potentially result in significant loss of coolant through the pressurizer code safety valves or the PORV. '

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2 and 3, the EFW System is required to be OPERABLE and to function in the event that main feedwater is lost. In addition, the EFW System is required to supply enough makeup water to replace the secondary side inventory lost as the plant cools to MODE 4 conditions.

In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the OTSG need not be used to cooldown the RCS. Therefore, the EFW System is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTIONS Ad With one of the two steam sup: lies to the turbine driven EFW pump inoperable, action must se taken to restore the steam supply to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Allowing 7 days in this Condition is reasonable, based on the redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the pump and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven EFW pumps.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this s)ecified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the C0. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other

% ditions are entered concurrently. The '6_N[}' connector ween 7 days and 10 days dictates that both Completion

...nes apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

i (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-26 Amendment No.

EFW Systeo B 3.7.5 !

BASES ACTIONS BJ (continued)

If ASV-5 is inoperable, prompt action must be taken to restore ASV-5 to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the EFW System, time needed for ,

repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during l this time period. j The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 established a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other Conditions are entered concurrently. The 'MfQ' connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 10 d ys dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

ful If ASV-204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 is inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to ensure the following are OPERABLE:

Train "B" Emergency Diesel Generators (TS 3.8.1)

Train "B": AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystem (TS3.8.9),and l Train "B" AC Vital Bus Subsystem (TS 3.8.9)

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable. l If the above Train "B" equipment is not OPERABLE with ASV-204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 inoperable, the capability to remove  ;

sufficient core decay heat cannot be assured and Condition F is applicable.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-27 Amendment No.

EFW Systca B 3.7.5

, BASES M (continued)

ACTIONS Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time to verify the above Train "B" equipment as OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

M If ASV-204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 is inoperable, prompt action must be taken to restore the valves to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, i based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the EFW i

System, time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.2 i established a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other Conditions are entered concurrently. The 'AND'N connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> ar.d 10 days dictates that both Completion

, Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

M If the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path is inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to ensure the following "B" train systems are OPERABLE:

SWP-1B (TS 3.7.7),

Train "B" of the Nuclear Services Seawater System (TS3.7.9),

CHHE-1B and CHP-1B (TS 3.7.18)

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-27A Amendment No.

EFW System B 3.7.5 ,

BASES i

ACTIONS M (continued)

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, l OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

If the above listed "B" train components are not OPERABLE with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path ,

inoperable, the capability for EDG load management to -

improve small break LOCA mitigation can not be assured and Condition F is applicable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break  :

LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time l to verify the above listed "B" train components as OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm EDG load 3 management. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

l M i l

If the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path is l inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to ensure both trains of the foW ding are OPERABLE:

ECCS (TS 3.5.2),

Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water (TS 3.7.8),

Decay Heat Seawater (TS 3.7.10),

- Emergency Diesel Generators (TS 3.8.1),

- AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems (TS 3.8.9),

and AC Vital Bus Subsystems (TS 3.8.9)

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

If both trains of the above equipment are not OPERABLE with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path inoperable, the capability to remove sufficient core decay heat can not be assured and Condition F is applicable.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-27B Amendment No.

~ - _ - . - - - - . - - = . - _ _ - - - . - - _ - . - - .- . - -.

2 EFW System

] B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS M (continued) l Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break i LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time to verify both trains of the above equipment as OPERABLE

ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

4 I U

l. If the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path is

! inoperable, action must be taken to restore the required equipment to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />

] Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the motor driven EFW pump, time l

, needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA i j occurring during this time period.

l The second Completion Time for Required Action D.3 l

establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any I

) combination of Conditions to be entered during any i continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion

! Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified i l Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This j

. limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other l Conditions are entered concurrently. The 'AliQ' connector

! between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 10 days dictates that both Completion ,

i Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be  !

met. I l

l i

i l l

i j

i j (continued)  !

l Crystal River U.it 3 8 3.7-27C Amendment No.

i 4

,, ,- - ., .,n- . , , -

EFW Syste]

B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS L1 (continued)

If the motor driven EFW pump or associated flow path is I inoperable, action must be taken to restore the required j equipment to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> i completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant-capabilities afforded by the EFW pump, time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during 1 this time period. I  :!

1 The second Completion Time for Required Action E.1 l l establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified i Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This l limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other Conditions are entered concurrently. The 'aHD' connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.  ;

1 F.1 and F.2 i If Required Actions A.1, B.1, C.1, C.2, 0.I, D.2, D.3, or E.1 cannot be completed within the associated Completion ,

Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO i does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 l within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an-orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. I L1 l With both EFW trains inoperable, the plant is in a seriously degraded condition with no safety related means for conducting a cooldown. In such a condition, plant operation-should not be perturbed by a forced action, including a power change, that might result in a trip. For this reason, the Technical Specifications do not mandate a plant shutdown. Rather the ACTIONS allow the plant to dictate the most prudent course of action (including plant shutdown) for the situation. The seriousness of this condition requires that action be initiated immediately to restore at least one i EFW train to OPERABLE status.

i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-27D Amendment No.

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE. SR 3.7.5.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS of EFW flow paths must be demonstrated before sufficient core heat is generated that would require the operation of i the EFW System during a subsequent shutdown. The Frequency l is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of other administrative controls to ensure that the flow paths are OPERABLE. To further ensure EFW System alignment, flow

. path OPERABILITY is verified, following extended outages to determine no misalignment of valves has occurred. This SR ensures that the flow path from the EFW tank to the OTSGs is properly aligned. This requirement is based upon the recommendation of NUREG 0737. The Frequency was modified slightly during ITS development (prior to entering MODE 2) to provide an SP 3.0.4 type exception. As. Written, the SR allows the plant to achieve and maintain MODE 3 conditions in order to perform the verification.

REFERENCES 1. Enhanced Design Basis Document for the Emergency Feedwater and Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System, Revision 2 dated September 27, 1991 with Temporary Changes 1% , 230, 247, and 249.

2. BAW-10043, " Overpressure Protection for B&W Reactors",

dated May 1972,

3. FSAR, Section 10.5.
4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
5. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Inservice Inspection, Subsection IWP.
6. FTI 51-1266138-01, Safety Analysis Input to Startup Team Safety Assessment.
7. FPC calculation 187-0008, Rev. 5.

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-31 Amendment No.

l

1 SW System B 3.7.7 ,

BASES BACKGROUND For certain small break LOCAs with a concurrent loss of (continued) offsite power, securing SWP-1A and RWP-2A to provide capability on the emergency diesel generator to load the "A" train low pressure injection pump and other required loads.

These pumps would be manually secured and locked out to preclude automatic reinitiation. In these situations, SWP-IB and RWP-2B are relied upon to provide continued flow for the SW and Nuclear Services Seawater systems.

I I

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-36A Amendment No.

1 i

SW System l B 3.7.7 l BASES  !

)

l THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK i

i

)

l

)

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-36B Amendment No.

l SW System B 3.7.7 l

l BASES l

APPLICABILITY Three of the four heat exchangers must be OPERABLE to (continued) accommodate the design system heat load requirements.

In MODES 5 and 6, the SW System is not required to be OPERABLE due to the limitations on RCS temperature and pressure in these MODES. Additionally, there are no other Technical Specification LCOs supported by SW which are applicable during these plant conditions.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With SWP-1B inoperable, prompt action must be taken within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to ensure that sufficient capability is available on "A" train emergency diesel generator for SWP-1A in certain small break LOCA scenarios. In such-circumstances, the-motor driven emergency feedwater pump would be secured and the turbine driven eir.ergency feedwater pump and associated flow path would be required OPERABLE to provide steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not OPERABLE to )ermit securing motor driven emergency feedwater pump, tie capability for EDG load management to improve small break LOCA mitigation cannot be assured and Condition C is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated

. surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is nct otherwise known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE en-ures that prompt action will be taken to confirm EDG load management capability for small break LOCA mitigation improvement. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring SWP-1B OPERABILITY is consistent with other ECCS Specifications for a loss of redundancy Condition and, has been shown to maintain a suitable limit on risk. As such, this Completion Time is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with industry-accepted practice.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-38 Amendment No.

l SW System l B 3.7.7 BASES ACTIONS JL1  !

(continued)

With SWP-1A and/or one of the required heat exchangers  !

inoperable, the heat removal capacity of the SW System is degraded. In this Condition, adequate cooling of the containment and ES equipment served by SW cannot be assured following an accident coincident with a worst-case single active failure. Therefore, action must be taken to restore the affected component (s) to OPERABLE status. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> l

Completion Time for restoring full SW System OPERABILITY is l consistent with other ECCS Specifications for a loss of-redundancy Condition and, has been :hown to maintain a suitable limit on risk. As such, this Completion Time is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with industry-accepted practice.

C.1 and C.2 l If the inoperable SW com)onent(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within tie associated Com)1etion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which tie LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the SW flow to individual components may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the SW System.

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-38A Amendment No.

i SW Syste3 B 3.7.7 j BASES l

l l

1 i

l a

i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK l

(continued) -

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-38B Amendment No.

1 1

I I DC System 4

B 3.7.8 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l

B 3.7.8 Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System l BASES

{

BACKGROUND The Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water (DC) System facilitates.the removal of decay heat from the reactor core.

The system also removes process and operating heat from safety related components associated with decay heat removal during normal plant cooldown and following a transient or accident. During plant cooldown below approximately 250*F-the DC system provides core heat removal by transferring heat from the Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System to the Decay Heat Seawater System. The system is divided into two independent and redundant trains, each capable of supplying 100 percent of the required normal and post-accident cooling. Each train contains a pump, a surge tank pressurized with nitrogen for volume and pressure control, and a heat exchanger which removes heat from the DHR system and rejects it to the Decay Heat Seawater System.

The design and operation of the DC system, along with a list of the components served, can be found in FSAR Section ,

9.5.2.2 - (Ref. 1) . For normal operation the DC ) umps are  !

started manually. However, in an emergency boti DC pumps start automatically upon receipt of an Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS). The DC system supports long-term reactor decay heat removal following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) when the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is recirculating water from the RB sump to the reactor core through the DH heat exchanger. The DC System  !

also supports post-accident containment cooling by supplying '

cooling water to the reactor building spray pump motor coolers and bearings. Other loads supplied by this system i are the DHR (LPI) pumps and motors, DC and decay heat seawater pump motors and two of the three make-up and purification (HPI) pump motors. The DC System supplies cooling to these pump motor heat exchangers, lube oil l coolers, gear lube oil coolers, bearings, or air handling units to prevent overheating of the associated components (Ref. 3).

Certain small break LOCA scenarios require emergency feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling until core decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling. Further, ,

with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-41 Amendment No.

_ _ - - _ _ _ _ . - ~ .

l DC System B 3.7.8 BASES BACKGROUND inoperable, SWP-1B, train "B" of the Nuclear Services (continued)- Seawater System, CHHE-1B, and CHP-1B as well as both trains t ofECCS,DecayHeatClosedCycleCoolingWater,DecayHeat l Seawater, Emergency Diesel Generators, AC Electrical Power L Distribution Subsystems, and AC Vital Bus Subsystems are l required OPERABLE.

As a closed system, the DC System also serves as an

intermediate barrier to radioactivity releases to the l environment from potential leaks in interfacing systems.

l APPLICABLE The DC system provides cooli n for components essential to SAFETY ANALYSIS the mitigation of plant transients and accidents. An ESAS initiation signal will start both DC pumps. This ensures that the required cooling capacity is provided to the essential equipment following a steam line break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, l or LOCA. The running pumps (100 percent capacity each), in conjunction with an associated DC heat exchanger, reject heat to the Decay Heat Seawater System to ensure the necessary cooling flow to components required for reactor l

decay heat removal. By cooling the RB spray pumps and pump motors following a LOCA or SLB, the DC system supports the RB Spray System by ensuring the pressure and temperature in containment are maintained within acceptable limits. The OPERABILITY of the RB Spray System is addressed in LC0 3.6.6, " Reactor Building Spray and Containment Cooling Systems".

During normal and post-accident cooldown operations, when RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to allow the alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, DC System operation facilitates core heat removal by transferring heat from the DHR System to the Decay Heat Seawater System.

The Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 The requirement for two DC trains to be OPERABLE assures adequate normal and post-accident heat removal from the reactor core and essential components, considering a worst case single active failure. One of the OPERABILITY considerations regarding these independent and redundant trains is that each valve in the flow path be in the correct j post-accident position. Additionally, each DC pump must be

, capable of being powered from its emergency power supply and l be capable of automatically starting on an ESAS actuation.

i L (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-42 Amendment No.

. .. .. - =_ ...,- -- -- - - --

i l DC Systee B 3.7.8 BASES (continued) l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the DC System is not a normally l operating system, but must be capable of performing its post-accident safety functions, which include providing cooling water to components required for RCS and containment heat removal. Two independent 100 percent capacity DC trains must be OPERABLE to accommodate the design system l

heat load requirements and satisfy reliability considerations assuming a single failure.

In MODE 4, although RCS temperature and pressure are reduced, there remains sufficient stored energy that the occurrence of an accident would necessitate the post-accident cooling functions of the DC System. When temperature and pressure have been reduced sufficiently to allow alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, the DC Systen is no longer required for post-accident component cooling, but must continue to provide cooling to the DHR heat exchangers. Therefore, two trains of the DC System must remain OPERABLE throughout MODE 4 to ensure emergency preparedness and/or decay heat removal, assuming a single active failure.

In MODES 5 and 6, the DC System is in operation performing its normal safety function of RCS decay heat removal. The various means of removing reactor decay heat in MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in LC0 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled"; LC0 3.4.7, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled";  !

LCO 3.9.4, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level"; I and LC0 3.9.5, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level". In other words, the OPERABILITY requirements for the DC System are determined by the systems it supports.

Therefore, this LC0 is not applicable in MODES 5 and 6. j l

1 ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 i With one DC train ino)erable, prompt action within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is necessary to ensure tlat the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are available for steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are not available, the capability for core decay heat removal has not been assured and Condition B is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

(continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-43 Amendment No.

DC System i B 3.7.8 l

FASES ALTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) i- Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, l OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated  ;

I surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the .)

required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known j

to be' inoperable.  !

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1. hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note indicating that I the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops - MODE 4," be entered if an inoperable DC train results in an inoperable required DHR loop. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for an inoperability of a required DHR loop.

With one DC train inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In -

this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DC train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring full DC System OPERABILITY is r the same as that for the ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the DC System. This Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the ino)erable DC train cannot be restored to OPERABLE  ;

status witiin the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be >1 aced in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 witiin 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly nanner and without challenging plant systems.

! (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-44 Amendment No.

l

, . .-. . . . - __ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . . . . _ _ _ . . ~ . . . .

l l

DC Syst:m i B 3.7.8 l BASES l r l l l

t l

l  !

i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1 l

l l

l l

l 1

1 (continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-44B Amendment No.

.- = . - . . - - - - - -

! Nuclear Services Seawater System B 3.7.9 L

BASES l BACKGROUND The Nuclear Services Seawater System is designed to seismic 3 (continued) category I requirements, except for the standpipe drain line. The design and operation of the Nuclear Services Seawater System along with a list of components served by SW during normal and emergency conditions, can be found in FSAR 3

Section 9.5 (Ref. 2). Following an Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) actuation, SW System flow paths are realigned to provide a reliable source of cooling to essential safeguards equipment which may be supplied by non-safety cooling water systems during normal operations. To

ensure these additional heat loads can be accommodated, both

. emergency pumps are started simultaneously by an ESAS signal to provide adequate cooling in the event of a single active failure which disables one emergercy pump.

For certain small break LOCAs with a concurrent loss of offsite power, securing SWP-1A and RWP-2A would provide capability on the emergency diesel generator to load the "A"

, train low pressure injection pump and other required loads.

i These pumps would be manually secured and locked out to preclude automatic reinitiation. In these situations, SWP-18 and RWP-2B are relied upon to provide continued flow to the SW and Nuclear Services Seawater systems.

1 APPLICABLE The Nuclear Services Seawater System supports the SW System

, SAFETY ANALYSES in providing cooling for components essential to the

mitigation of plant transients and accidents. The system i has two separate 100 percent capacity underground intake i conduits, independent emergency pumps, and underground discharge conduits to allow for a single failure while still providing the required flow. An ESAS signal will start both emerg3ncy pumps. This ensures he required cooling capacity is provided to the SW System fo~ilowing a steam line break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, or loss of coolant accident.

The Nuclear Services Seawater System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-47 Amendment No.

Nuclear Services Seawater System B 3.7.9 i

BASES (continued)

LC0 The requirement for the OPERABILITY of the Nuclear Services Seawater System including two emergency nuclear services seawater pumps provides redundancy necessary to ensure the system will provide adequate post-accident heat removal in the event of a coincident single failure.

Emergency nuclear services seawater pump OPERABILITY requires that each be capable of being powered from separate OPERABLE emergency buses. OPERABILITY of the associated flow paths requires that each valve in the flow path must be aligned to permit sea water flow from the intake canal to the SW heat exchangers, and subsequently to the discharge canal. The OPERABILITY of the SW heat exchangers, required to ensure proper heat removal capability, is addressed in LC0 3.7.7, " Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water System".

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 through 4 the SW and Nuclear Services Seawater Systems are normally operating systems which must be prepared to provide post-accident cooling for components required for RCS and containment heat removal, equipment essential in providing the capability to safely shutdown the plant, and equipment required for adequate spent fuel pool cooling. The Nuclear Services Seawater System must be capable of providing its post-accident cooling assuming a i single active failure. Therefore, both emergency pumps are '

required to be OPERABLE during these MODES.

In MODES 5 and 6, the Nuclear Services Seawater System is not required to be OPERABLE due to the limitations on RCS temperature and pressure in these MODES. Additionally, there are no other Technical Specification LCOs supported by the system which are applicable during these plant I conditions.

ACTIONS A.1 and AJ!

With train "B" of the Nuclear Services Seawater System inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to ensure that sufficient capability is available on "A" train (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-48 Amendment No.

l Nuclear Services Seawater Systes  :

B 3.7.9-

BASES l i I a

d ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

I 4

of emergency diesel generator for RWP-2A in certain small '

break LOCA scenarios. In such circumstances, the motor driven emergency feedwater pump would be secured and the i turbine driven emergency feedwater pump would be required OPERABLE to provide steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not OPERABLE to permit securing motor driven emergency feedwater pump, the capability for EDG load management to improve small break LOCA mitigation can not be assured and Condition C is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in Mode 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm EDG load :nanagement capability.

The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant f.:

)otentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions. The 72 l Tour Completion Time for restoring full Nuclear Services  !

Seawater System OPERABILITY is consistent with that for ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the system.

This Completion Time is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with accepted industry-accepted practice. '

ful With train "B" of the Nuclear Services Seawater System inoperable, action must be taken to restore the pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring full Nuclear Services Seawater System OPERABILITY is consistent with that for ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the system. This Completion Time is based on engineering judgement-and is consistent with accepted industry-accepted practice.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-48A Amendment No.

l Nuclear Services Seawater Systea l B 3.7.9 l

BASES  ;

I i

i l

l t I

i 1

l L

I l

l i

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK i

l l ,

i l

! (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-48B Amendment No.

I Nuclear Services Seawater System i B 3.7.9 l BASES i

ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 l l

, (continued) ,

If the inoperable emergency nuclear services seawater pump I cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.9.1

! REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the seawater flow to individual components may render .

those components inoperable, but does not affect the l OPERABILITY of the Nuclear Services Seawater System.

Verifying the correct alignment for manual valves in the nuclear services seawater flow path provides assurance that  !

the proper flow paths exist to support SW operation. This  !

SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or '

1 otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or ,

securing. The valves verified by this SR include valves in  !

the main flow paths and the first normally closed valve in a branch line. There are several other exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves, relief valves, instrumentation valves, and sample line valves. This SR also does not apply to valves which cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in their correct position.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-49 Amendment No.

l Decay Heat Seawater Systeo i B 3.7.10 l

!. l BASES j i

BACKGROUND Certain small break LOCA scenarios require emergency l l (continued) feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling until core ,

decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling. Further, i

l with the turbine driven EFW pump and associated flow path l l inoperable, SWP-18, train "B" of the Nuclear Services  !'

i Seawater System, CHHE-1B and CHP-18, as well as both trains l of ECCS, Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Decay Heat l Seawater, Emergency Diesel Generators, AC Electrical Power .

Distribution Subsystems, and AC Vital Bus Subsystems are  ;

required OPERABLE. .;

1 l

APPLICABLE The Decay Heat Seawater System supports the DC System in SAFETY ANALYSIS providing cooling for components essential to the mitigation J of plant transients and accidents. The system has two l separate 100 percent capacity underground intake conduits, I independent pumps, and underground discharge conduits to provide for a single failure while still providing required flow. An ESAS initiation signal will start both decay heat seawater pumps upon low Reactor Coolant System (RCS)  !

pressure and/or high containment pressure. This ensures that the required cooling capacity is provided to the DC System for cooling of components required for reactor heat removal following a steam line break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, or loss of coolant accident.

During normal and post-accident cooldown operations, when RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to allow the alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, the Decay Heat Seawater System is placed in service to support decay heat removal.

The Decay Heat Seawater System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

1 LCOs The requirement for OPERABILITY of both decay heat seawater trains provides redundancy necessary to ensure the system will provide adequate post-accident heat removal in the event of a coincident single failure.

I I

- (continued) i 1 i

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-52 Amendment No.

I

( i l

1 Decay Heat Seawater Syst a i B 3.7.10 I

)

BASES (continued)

I ACTIONS _A.1 and A.2 With one Decay Heat Seawater train inoperable, prompt action

, is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency l feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE for steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency

feedwater pump and associated flow path are not 0PERABLE, the capability to remove core decay heat can not be assured and Condition B is applicable. The operability of the  !

turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in l MODE 4. 1 Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability.

The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note indicating that I ,

the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.5, "RCS Loops - MODE 4," should be entered if an inoperable decay heat seawater train results in an inoperable required DHR loop. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for an inoperability of a required DHR loop.

If one of the decay heat seawater trains is inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE <

train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring full Decay Heat Seawater System OPERABILITY is the same as that for the ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the Decay Heat Seawater System. This Completion Time is reasonable, i

based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE l train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this l

period.

l (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-54 Amendment No.

l

Decay Heat Seawater System l B 3.7.10 t

BASES l

l 1

I THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK f

i (continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-54B Amendment No.

1 1

I CREVS B 3.7.12 ,

BASES LCO c. ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air (continued) circulation can be maintained.

The ability to maintain temperature in the Control Complex is addressed in Technical Specification 3.7.18. I APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREVS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control complex will remain habitable during

  • and following a postulated DBA. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the CREVS must be OPERABLE to i cope with a release due to a fuel handling accident. i ACTIONS Acl With one CREVS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this  ;

i Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREVS train is adequate to perform the control room radiation protection function.

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE CREVS train could result in loss of CREVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the 4 low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, '

and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot

  • be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are i reasonable, based on operating 2xperience, to reach the ,

required plant ronditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

l (continued) [

i Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-63 Amendment No.

l

i Control Complex Cooling Systca j B 3.7.18 .

l t

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling Systems BASES BACKGROUND The Control Complex Cooling System provides temperature control for the control room and other portions of the Control Complex containing safety related equipment.

The Control Complex Cooling System consists of two redundant chillers and associated chilled water pumps that provide cooling of recirculated control complex air. Redundant chillers and chilled water pumps are provided for suitable temperature conditions in the control complex for operating personnel and safety related control equipment. Dampers and two pairs of heat exchangers also form part of the system.

The Control Complex Cooling System maintains the nominal temperature between 70*F and 80'F.

A single chiller and associated chilled water pump will provide the required temperature control for either heat  ;

exchangers. The Control Complex Cooling System operation to maintain control complex temperature is discussed in the FSAR, Section 9.7 (Ref. 1). '

For certain small break LOCAs with a corcurrent loss of offsite power, it is necessary to pro ae capability on the emergency diesel generator to load the "A" train low pressure injection pump and other required loads. In these situations, CHHE-1B and CHP-1B would be relied upon to  !

provide required cooling. 1 APPLICABLE The Control Complex Cooling System consists of redundant, i SAFETY ANALYSIS safety related components, with some common piping. The Control Complex Cooling System maintains the temperature i between 70*F and 80'F. A single active failure of a (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-85 Amendment No.

Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 j i

BASES APPLICABLE Control Complex Cooling System component does not impair the I SAFETY ANALYSIS ability of the system to perform as designed. The Control (continued) Complex Cooling System is designed ir, accordance with Seismic Category I requirements. The Control Complex Cooling System is capable of removing heat loads from the control room and other portions of the Control Complex containing safety related equipment, including consideration of equipment heat loads and personnel occupancy requirements, to ensure equipment OPERABILITY.  ;

The Control Complex Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of l the NRC Policy Statement. <

LCO Two redundant heat exchangers and two redundant chillers and associated pumps of the Control Complex Cooling System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one of each is available, assuming a single failure disables one redundant component. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits.

The Control Complex Cooling System is considered OPERABLE j when the individual redundant components that are necessary I to maintain control complex temperature are OPERABLE. These components include the cooling coils, water cooled condensing units, and associated temperature control instrumentation. In addition, the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to the extent that air circulation can be maintained (See Specification 3.7.12). l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the Control Complex Cooling System I must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control complex temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY <

requirements.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With the CHHE-1B or CHP-1B inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path is OPERABLE to (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-86 Amendment No.

Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 BASES ACTIONS. A.1 and A.2 (continued) l provide steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven L emergency _ feedwater pump and associated flow path are not

OPERABLE, the capability to provide EDG load management for l small break LOCA mitigation' improvement cannot be assured and Condition C is applicable. The operability of the l turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time to verify the tu.bine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to provide the capability for EDG load management for small break LOCA mitigation improvement. The Completion Time ulnimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated i surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

With CHHE-1B or CHP-1B inoperable, action must be taken to restore its OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling System redundant components are adequate to maintain the control complex temperature within limits. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the 1 OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling System components could - '

result in a loss of control complex Cooling System function.

The.30 day Completio' Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring r e irino the Control Complex Cooling ,

System and.the consideration that the remaining redundant components can provide the required capabilities.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-87 Amendment No.

. . . . _ - - - _ - . .- - . . A

l Control Ccmplex Cooling Systea B 3.7.18 BASES ACTIONS M l (continued) l With CHHE-1A, CHP-1A or one Control Complex Cooling heat exchanger inoperable, action must be taken to restore l OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling System equipment is adequate to maintain the control complex temperature within limits. However, the overall reliability is reduced

< because a failure in the OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling System redundant components could result in a loss of Control Complex Cooling System function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring the Control Complex Cooling System and the consideration that the remaining components can provide the required capabilities.

C.1 and C.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable Control Complex Cooling System component cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. l9 achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least l MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full l power conditions in an orderly manner without challenging l unit systems.

M If any combination of components that would render the Control Complex Cooling System not capable of performing the intended function, the unit is in a condition outside the i accident analyses. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

i a

i (continued) l l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-88 Amendment No.

i i

'l Control Complex Cooling Systcu l B 3.7.18 ,

l 1

BASES (continued).

i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.18.1

! REQUIREMENTS ,

Verifying that each Control Complex Cooling chiller's I i

developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that chiller's performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and i differential pressure are normal tests of centrifugal pump l

! performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref.

3). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of the SR is in accordance with the_ Inservice Testing Program.

, SR 3.7.8.2 This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to meet design requirements. This SR ,

consists of a combination of testing and calculations. An '

24 month Frequency is appropriate, as significant degradation of the system is slow and is not expected over i this time period.

j REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 9.7.

2. FTI 51-1266138-01, Safety Analysis Input to Startup Team Safety Assessment.
3. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI.

i i

l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-89 Amendment No.

l AC Sources--Operating i B 3.8.1 BASES l

BACKGROUND Certain small break LOCA scenarios require emergency (continued) feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling until core i

decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling. Further, with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path inoperable, SWP-1B, train "B" of the Nuclear Services Seawater System, CHHE-1B and CHP-1B, as well as both trains of ECCS, Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Decay Heat Seawater, Emergency Diesel Generators, AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and AC Vital Bus Eubsystems are required OPERABLE. With ASV-204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 inoperable, Train "B" Emergency Diesel Generators, Train "B" AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and Train "B" AC Vital Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE.

1 l

l l

l 1

1 (continued)

I Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-2A Amendment No.

l l

\

l AC Sources-Operating i B 3.8.1 1 BASES TA m ,

i I

i i

t t L

l- ,

I f

I i

l I

I l

l THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1 l

I i

1 l l l

l (continued) l 1

i Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-2B Amendment No.  !

i AC Sources-Operating l B 3.8.1 l

l BASES l BACKGROUND Provided an ES signal is present, certain required ES loads l (continued) are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order  ;

to prevent overloading the EDG in the process. Within 35 seconds after the initiating signal is received, all loads needed to recover the plant or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.

The service ratings of the EDG are:

. O to 2850 kw on a continuous basis l

. 2851 to 3200 kw on a cumulative 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> basis l )

. 3201 to 3400 kw on a cumulative 200 hour0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> basis I

. 3401 to 3500 kw on a cumulative 30 minute basis. l l

Loads powered from the 4160 V ES buses are listed in l Reference 2. j Steady state load does not include loads imposed by the starting of motors such as during block loading, and short duration loads such as motor operated valves, battery  :

charger surges, and short duration pump surge flows. Loads i imposed by the starting of motors are not included in the  !

service ratings and are less than the EDG manufacturer l limits of 3910 kW for such loading.

i APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses SAFETY ANALYSES in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 5), )

assume ES systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ES systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for l Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor l Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

l l

l 4  !

l 1

(continued) i l

i Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-3 Amendment No.

l AC Sources-Operating l l B 3.8.1 i I

l BASES l

l l l

l l

1 l

l THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1

l l

l i

i i

l (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-3B Amendment No.

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS U (continued) additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently.

As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time that the LC0 was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered.

M To ensure a highly reliable power source in the event one EDG is inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the OPERABLE offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies

" perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does  !

not result in a Required Action being not met (Condition F). '

However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is .

inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional l Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered. l M

With Train "A" EDG inoperable, prompt action within I hour is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are available for .

steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are not available, l

the capability for core decay heat removal has not been assured and Condition H is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

l 1

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-8 Amendment No.

I AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 BASES- 1 l

ACTIONS M -(continued)  ;

1 Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1,  !

OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known-to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be.taken to confirm core decay heat capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

M Required Action B.3 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a EDG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required features. These features are designed with redundant safety related trains.

Redundant required feature failures consist of inoperable features associated with a train, redundant to the train that has an inoperable EDG. Single train systems (from an ,

electrical perspective), such as the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump, are not included.

The Completion Time for Required Action B.3 is intended to I allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also  !

allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for .

beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. An EDG is inoperable; and
b. A required feature on the other train is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of this Condition (one EDG inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

l-l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-9 Amendment No.

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1

! BASES  ;

l ACTIONS L1 (continued) l Declaring the required features inoperable within four hours from the discovery of items 'a' and 'b' existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE EDG ar.d offsite i circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the  !

onsite Class 1E distribution system. Thus, on a component basis, single-failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been ,

lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redendant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, ar. de low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

1 l

B.4.1 and B.4.2 Required Action B.4.1 provides an option to testing the OPERABLE EDG in order to avoid unnecessary testing. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable EDG does not exist on the OPERABLE EDG, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on the other EDG, the other EDG would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E of LCO 3.8.1 would be entered.

If the common cause failure evaluation is indeterminate (the cause of the initial inoperable EDG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining EDG), performance of SR 3.8.1.2 is  ;

adequate to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of l that EDG. l The Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE EDG is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable EDG and is based on the recommendations of Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7).

l l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-10 Amendment No.

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS D_Ji l (continued) ,

According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 l (Ref. 6), operation with one EDG inoperable should be  ;

limited to a period not to exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. j In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE EDG and offsite i circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the l onsite Class IE distribution system. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion l Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the '

remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.5 l establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable j during any single contiguous occurrence of failure to meet '

the LCO. Refer to the Bases for Required Action A.3 for additional information on this Completion Time.

C.1. C.2. C.3. C.4. and C.5 Refer to the Bases for Actions B.1, B.3, 8.4, and B.5 for the discussion for the corresponding Bases of Required Action C.

For Action C.2, with Train "B" EDG ino)erable, prompt action within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is necessary to ensure t1at the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump, associated flow path, ASV-204, EFV-12, and EFV-13 are available for steam generator coolig. If the required equipment is not available, the cap.ci' ty for core decay heat removal has not been assured ana Lonoition H is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and l associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action j will be taken to confirm core decay heat capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-10A Amendment No.

I l

i

j. AC Sources-Operating i B 3.8.1 I

BASES j l

i 1 l

l l

i j

I l

i 1

l I

i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK t

l l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-10B Amendment No.

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 I I

(continued)

Required Action D.1, which applies when both required I offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that a DBA, coincident with a worst-case single failure, will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for declaring the redundant required features inoperable is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; reduced from that allowed for one train without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is no longer valid, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains. Single train features (from an electrical perspective), such as the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump, are not included.

The Completion Time for Required Action D.1 is intended to

^

I allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. All required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
b. A required feature is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition C (two offsite circuits inoperable) a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-11 Amendment No.

l

m. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ ._ _ . . _ _ . . . _ _ _

l l

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) l According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation with two. required offsite circuits inoperable should be limited to a period not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. In this condition, the offsite electrical power l system does not have the capability to effect a safe i shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident;

however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This l 1evel of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more EDGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation:

a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and
b. The time required to detect _ and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.

With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, the simultaneous loss of offsite AC

! sources coincident with a LOCA, and a worst-case single failure were postulated as a part of the original licensing basis. Thus, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC 1 l electrical power system capable of meeting its design  ;

criteria.  ;

I l

l- 1 (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-12 Amendment No.

i I

l

- - --- - -- - - . - - - - ~ . . - . - . ~ . -

AC Sources-Operating l L B 3.8.1 i

BASES l

4 l ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) l l l

If one required offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, power operation may continue in accordance with the required  :

Actions of Condition A.

l L1 With Train "A" EDG inoperable, prompt action within I hour is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are available for i steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are not available, 1 the capability for core decay heat removal has not been assured and Condition H is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known l to be inoperable. l Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

E.2 and E.3 Pursuant to LC0 3.0.6, the distribution system ACTIONS would not be entered if the de-energization of the busses was due to all AC sources to them being inoperable. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that when Condition E is entered with no AC sources to one train, the Conditions and~ Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems-0perating," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition E to provide I requirements for the loss of one offsite circuit and one EDG whether or not a train is de-energized. LC0 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-13 Amendment No.

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS E.2 and E.3 (continued) l ,

According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation with one onsite and one offsite circuit

. ino>erable should be limited to a period not to exceed 12 Tours.

In Condition E, individual redundancy is lost in both the I offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. However, since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power it may appear the reliability of the power systems in this Condition is higher than that in Condition D (loss of both required offsite I circuits). This is not necessarily the case since this difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

f_d With Train "B" EDG inoperable, prompt action within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency <

feedwater pump and associated flow path are available for j steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency '

feedwater pump, associated flow path, ASV-204, EFV-12, and EFV-13 are not available, the capability for core decay heat removal has not been assured and Condition H is applicable.

The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated  !

surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the '

required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break l LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time ,

to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and I associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

(continued) )

1 Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-14 Amendment No. I

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 l

BASES

, ACTIONS F.2 and F.3  !

l (continued)

  • Refer to the Bases for Actions E.2 and E.3 for the discussion for the corresponding Bases of Required Actions .

F.2 and F.3.

l L1 1 ;

With the Train A and Train B EDGs inoperable, there are no qualified onsite standby AC sources. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, there would not be sufficient standby AC sources available to power the minimum required ES systems. Since the offsite electrical power I system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation  :

for a very short time is balanced with that associated with  !

an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total I loss of AC power). However, since any inadvertent generator j trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, l the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated i with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the l risk associated with this level of degradation.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is consistent with the l

recommendations of Reference 6. ,

H.1 and H.2 l If the inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion i Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly i manner and without challenging plant systems.

l 1

! (continued) j Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-14A Amendment No.

l l

l_.

.- . . . . . - ~ . . . _ - . -. . ~_ _. . .--- . . _ . . . . - -

4 AC Sources-Operating 'l B 3.8.1

! l i

l BASES

! I i

i l

l l

l l

l l

i l

1 l

l THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK {

\

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-14B Amendment No.

i

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES j ACTIONS L1 l l (continued)

Condition I corresponds to a level of degradation in which I all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any subsequent failures in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function condition, and potentially, a station blackout.

f Therefore, the unit is required to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately and prepare for a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and

, REQUIREMENTS testing of all important areas and features, especially l

those that have a standby function. This is consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). . Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during outages (under simulated accident conditions).

Where the SRs for this LC0 specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following is applicable. The minimum steady state output voltage of 3933 V is 94.5% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage. This value allows for voltage drops '

to motors and other equipment down through the 120 V level where minimum operating voltage is usually specified as 85%

to 90% of name plate rating. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 4400 V is equal to the maximum operating voltage specified for 4000 V motors. It ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 4000 V motors is no more than the maximum rated operating voltages. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the EDG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to i 2% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations given in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). Regulatory Guide 1.9 requirements are satisfied by monitoring EDG output.

SR 3.8.1.1 l This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network l

and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its I (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-15 Amendment No.

i

--.--r - - , _

, . - ., -g ,.

. . - _-. - . - . - . ~ . - - - - . - - - . . - - . -.- .- . - - - - - .

l AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES 3.8.1.4 SURVEILLANCE SR REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is adequate. The level is expressed as an equivalent usable volume in gallons, and is selected to 1 ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of I hour of EDG operation at a loading which bounds the postulated worst case accident.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and an automatic level control system is included in the design.

SR 3.8.1.5 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil transfer pump operates automatically to transfer fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank.

This is required to support continuous operation of the EDG.

This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer are OPERABLE. -

The design of fuel transfer systems is such that pumps will )

operate automatically in order to maintain an adequate '

volume of fuel oil in the day tanks during or following EDG I operation. The 31 day Frequency is based upon engineering 1 judgement and has been shown to be acceptable by operating ,

experience.

SR 3.8.1.6 See SR 3.8.1.2.

SR 3.8.1.7 Transfer of each 4160 V ES bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the required alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the capability of the alternate circuit ,

distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The i

! (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-18 Amendment No.

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS ,

24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment, taking <

into consideration plant conditions needed to perform the Surveillance. Operating experience has shown the 24 month Frequency to be adequate. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

l SR 3.8.1.8 _l Each EDG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to l prevent damage to.the ergine. Recovery from the transient l

caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine .

l overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the EDG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage l and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. -For the CR-3 EDGs, the largest single load is less than 750 kW. The surveillance test will have a  ;

l minimum rejected load of 750 kW. According to IEEE-308 l l (Ref.13), the load rejection test is acceptalle if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is ,

. lower. For CR-3, the acceptance criteria of 66.75 Hz is ~

based on 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and l the overspeed trip setpoint. The time, voltage, and

! frequency-tolerances specified in this SR are derived from

! Regulatory Guide 1.9.(Ref. 3) recommendations for response

! during load sequence intervals. The 3 seconds specified for -

voltage is equal to 60% the 5 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing of the largest load. Four seconds for frequency is likewise based on Regulatory Guide i 1.9 recommendations. SR 3.8.1.8.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.8.b and SR 3.8.1.8.c are Regulatory Guide 1.9 specific voltage and frequency values to which the system must recover to following load rejection. Regulatory Guide 1.9 specifies nominal voltage and frequency values which are 4160V and 60 Hz respectively. The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

i l (continued) j i

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-19 Amendment No.

i

AC Sources-Operating j B 3.8.1 !

l BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)  ;

REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 I is to minimize wear and tear on the EDGs during testing.

i For the purpose of this testing, the EDGs may be started i from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant l and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained

consistent with manufacturer recommendations for EDGs. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would j remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the  !

electrical distribution system, and potentially challenge '

safety systems. However, Note 2 acknowledges that should an  ;

unplanned event occur in MODES 1, 2 or 3, following i verification that the acceptance criteria of the SR are met,  !

the event can be credited as a successful performance of 1 this SR. Note 3 is an SR 3.0.4 type allowance to place the

, plant in MODE 4 for the purposes of performing this Surveillance. This is necessary in order to establish the pre-requisite plant configuration needed to perform the SR.

i SR 3.8.1.11 This Surveillance demonstrates the EDGs are capable of  !

synchronizing and accepting a load greater than or equal to l the maximum expected steady state accident loads, which are l the automatically connected accident loads and required manually applied accident loads. However, the upper limit of the 200 hour0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> service rating is still available for flexibility in post accident EDG load management, including short duration loads. The test load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the EDGs. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections, in accordance with vendor recommendations, in order to maintain l

EDG OPERABILITY.

1 The 60 minute run time is provided to stabilize the engine temperature. This ensures that cooling and lubrication are i adequate for extended periods of operation.

l The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note I states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. The reason for Note 2 is that during i

(continued) i l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-22 Amendment No.

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air l B 3.8.3 l

l l B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel 011, Lube Oil, and Starting Air BASES i

BACKGROUND Each emergency diesel generator (EDG) is provided with a ,

fuel oil storage tank. The combined fuel oil capacity of j both storage tanks is sufficient to operate one diesel for a 1 period of 7 days while the EDG is supolying the upper limit of its 200-hour rating (Ref. 1). The fuel oil supply is calculated using the assumption that one EDG is available to supply sufficient post accident loads. In certain small l break LOCA scenarios, both EDGs are relied upon for accident  !

mitigation. This onsite fuel oil capacity ensures adequate i time is available to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources prior to the diesel running out of fuel.

Fuel oil is transferred from the storage tank to the day I tank by either of two transfer pumps associated with each EDG. The pumps and piping are redundant to preclude failure of one pump, or the rupture of any pipe, valve or tank resulting in the loss of more than one EDG. All outside tanks and piping are located underground to preclude consideration of the effects of missiles in their design.

For proper operation of the EDGs, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the fuel oil. CR-3 has a Diesel Fuel Oil (DFO) Testing Program which is an overall effort to ensure the quality of the fuel oil. The program includes purchasing, on-site receipt acceptance testing of new fuel, offsite analysis of new fuel accepted, and periodic testing (both onsite and offsite) of the stored fuel oil.

Additionally, the program includes water removal and biocide addition to control bacteriological growth, and performance checks of the cathodic protection system for underground storage tanks. CR-3 is not committed to Regulatory Guide 1.137 or ANS 59.51 (ANSI N195), however, these standards were utilized as guidance in the development of the DF0 Testing Program.

The EDG lube oil subsystem is designed to provide sufficient lubrication to permit proper operation of its associated EDG under all loading conditions. The system is required to circulate the lube oil to the diesel engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated by friction during l

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-30 Amendment No.

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air  ;

j B 3.8.3 BASES ,

l BACKGROUND operation. The onsite lube oil storage, in addition to that i (continued) contained in the engine sump, is sufficient to ensure 7 days of one EDG supplying the upper limit of its 200-hour rating.

In certain small break LOCA scenarios, both EDGs are relied upon for accident mitigation. This supply ensures adequate time is available to replenish lube oil from outside sources prior to the EDG running out of lube oil. >

Each EDG has an air start system with adequate capacity for six successive start attempts on the EDG without recharging the air start receivers. A single EDG start is assured with air receiver pressure 2 150 psig. Additional evaluations have been performed which indicate there is substantial margin included in the single start receiver pressure limit (Ref. 9).

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and  :

Chapter 14 (Ref. 5), assume Engineered Safeguard (ES) systems are OPERABLE. The EDGs are designed to provide i sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability l to ensure the availability of necessary power to ES systems ,

so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design

  • limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

Since diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and the air start subsystem support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO A sufficient combined stored diesel fuel oil supply is required to be available to ensure the capability to operate a single EDG at the upper limit of its 200-hour rating for i 7 days. During an event that requires 7 days operation before replacement fuel oil is obtained, manual reconfiguration of loads and transferring the stored fuel oil supply from one tank to the other may be needed to support operation of the EDG. Diesel fuel oil is also l required to meet specific quality standards. In certain j small break LOCA scenarios, both EDGs are relied upon for

! accident mitigation.

i

(continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-31 Amendment No.

l

.- _ - ._.- . . - . ~ . . . - . . _ - - . - - - . - - . - . . - . - . - - . .

l l

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air l B 3.8.3 BASES i

LC0 A sufficient lube oil upply must be available to ensure the  :

(continued) capability to operate a single EDG at the upper limit of its '

200-hour rating for 7 days. In certain small break LOCA scenarios, both EDGs are relied upon for accident mitigation. EDG lube oil sump level, in conjunction with- l the on-site supply and the ability to obtain replacement  !

supplies within the required timeframe, supports the I availability'of EDGs required to shut down the reactor and to maintain it in a safe condition for an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA with loss of offsite power. [DG day tank fuel requirements, as well as transfer capability from the storage tank to the day tank, are addressed in LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating,"

and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown."

The starting air system is required to have a minimum capacity for six successive EDG start attem)ts without recharging the air start receivers. As suc1, the air start compressors are not addressed as a part of this (or any other) LCO.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources (LC0 3.8.1 and LC0 3.8.2) are required in order to ensure the availability of the required )ower to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe slutdown condition after an A00 or a postulated DBA. Since stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and the starting air subsystem sup) ort EDG OPERABILITY, these features are required to be wit 11n limits whenever the associated EDG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 indicates separate Condition entry is allowed for each EDG. This is acceptable based upon the fact each EDG is treated as an independent entity for this Specification. Note 2 indicates LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable and MODE changes while in the ACTIONS of this Specification are permitted. It could be argued this Note is not required since this Specification allows indefinite operation. 'However, to avoid any future confusion on the allowance, LCO 3.0.4 has been specifically excepted. This is considered acceptable since operation in accordance with this Specification still means the EDG is j OPERABLE.

i (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-32 Amendment No.

Diesel fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS M (continued)

With usable fuel oil volume in one or more storage tanks

< 22,917 gallons, promat action must be taken within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to verify that the comained fuel oil supply > 45,834 gallons. However, the Condition is restricted to fuel oil level reductions that maintain at least a combined 7 day supply. In this Condition, a period of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to ensure that sufficient fuel oil supply for 7 days of EDG operation at its upper 200-hour rating is available. In order to maintain the ability to treat the EDG as independent entities for the ACTIONS (from a fuel oil perspective), an artificial lower limit on stored fuel oil has been established. The minimum usable volume specified for each tank is equivalent to 3 days operation and was set to ensure a minimum combined 6 day supply. _ _

The limit on combined supply recognizes that while one tank may contain less than 3.5 day supply, the usable volume in the other tank could be such that 7 day capacity still exists.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, l OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the ,

required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

M With usable fuel oil volume in one or more storage tanks

< 22,917 gallons and combined fuel oil supply < 45,834 gallons, sufficient fuel oil supply for 7 days of EDG operation at its upper 200-hour rating is not available.

However, the Condition is restricted to fuel oil level reductions, that maintain at least a combined 6 day supply.

In this Condition, a period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is allowed prior to declaring the associated EDG inoperable. In order to maintain the ability to treat the EDG as independent entities for the ACTIONS (from a fuel oil pers)ective), an artificial lower limit on stored fuel oil has )een l

established. The minimum usable volume specified for each I

tank is equivalent to 3 days operation and was set to ensure a minimum combined 6 day supply.

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-33 Amendment No.

h 1

Diesel Fuel 011, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 '

4 l BASES i

j ACTIONS Ril (continued) l l

i- The limit on combined supply recognizes that while one tank i may contain less than 3.5 day supply, the usable volume in l the other tank could be such that 7 day capacity still l exists.

The 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Completion Time allows sufficient time for
obtaining the requisite replacement volume and performing
the analyses required prior to addition of fuel oil to the i tank. This period is acceptable based on the remaining
capacity (> 6 days), the fact that action will be initiated
to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event j occurring during this brief period.

! .C.d I With lube. oil inventory < 280 gallons, there is not i sufficient lube oil to support 7 days continuous operation

of one EDG at the upper limit of its 200-hour rating. l .

However, the Condition is restricted to lube oil volume i reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. In this Condition,.a period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is considered adequate to restore the required volume prior to declaring the i

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-33A Amendment No.

i Diesel Fuel 011, Lube Oil, and Starting Air  !

B 3.8.3  !

l. BASES 1.-

i r

1

( l 1

l I

i I

i i' i

1 i i

l 1

l t

i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK I

l l

l l

I l

I i

l-l (continued) l

! l l

l- Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-33B Amendment No.

L

i Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air  :

B 3.8.3 BASES  !

l

, ACTIONS M (continued) l l EDGs inoperable. The volume specified includes the lube oil L

contained in the sump as well as the lube oil stored onsite j (off-engine . If the required stored volume cannot be >

restored, bo)th EDGs must be declared inoperable since this l volume is common to both EDGs.

L i

The 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the low rate of usage, the fact that actions will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event occurring during this brief period.

l M l This Condition is entered as a result of a failure to meet  !

the acceptance criterion for EDG fuel oil particulates.

! Normally, trending of particulate levels allows sufficient time to correct high particulate levels prior to reaching the limit of acceptability. However, poor sample procedures (bottom sampling), contaminated sampling equipment, and errors in laboratory analysis can produce failures that do not follow a trend. Since the presence of particulates does not mean the fuel oil will not burn properly and given that j proper engine performance has been recently demonstrated (within 31 days), it is prudent to allow a brief period of i l time prior to declaring the associated EDG inoperable. The l' 7 day Completion Time allows for further evaluation, re-sampling, and re-analysis of the EDG fuel oil.

4 U l With the new fuel oil properties defined in the Bases for SR 3.8.3.3 not within the required limits, a period of 30 days is allowed for restoring the stored fuel oil properties prior to declaring the associated EDG inoperable.

This period provides sufficient time to test the stored fuel oil to determine that the new fuel oil, when mixed with previously stored fuel oil, remains acceptable, or to restore the stored fuel oil properties. This restoration may. involve feed and bleed, filtering, or combinations of.

these procedures. Even if an EDG start and load was L required during this time and the fuel oil properties were i outside limits, there is a high likelihood that the EDG I would still be capable of performing its intended function.

t

) (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-34 Amendment No.

l Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES l

l ACTIONS L1 1

(continued)

L With starting air receiver pressure < 225 psig, sufficient capacity for six successive EDG start attempts does not exist. However, as long as the receiver pressure is

> 150 psig, there is adequate capacity for at least one start attempt, and the EDG can be considered OPERABLE while the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit. 1 A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is considered suffic.ient to complete l restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the ,

associated EDG inoperable. This period is acceptable based i on the remaining air start capacity, the fact that most EDG starts are accomplished on the first attempt, and the low probability of an event occurring during this brief period.

I 1

L1 l With a Required Action and associated Completio: 9 te not met, or one or more EDGs with fuel oil, lube oil ..-  !

starting air subsystems not within limits for rehsens other than addressed by Conditions A through F, the associated EDG l  ;

must be immediately declared inoperable. In this casa, the  !

ACTIONS of Specification 3.8.1 or 3.8.2, as applicable, are I entered. In the case of stored EDG lube oil, both EDGs must be declared inoperable since the stored lube oil volume is common to both EDGs.

4 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR provides verification that there is an adequate usable inventory of fuel oil in each storage tank to support operation of one EDG for 3.5 days at the upper limit of its 200-hour rating (assuming no offsite power). The SR also verifies combined capacity of the two tanks to be > 7 days fuel supply. The 3.5 day period (7 day capacity provided by the combined inventory of both tanks) is sufficient time to place the plant in a safe shutdown condition, cross connect fuel storage tanks, if necessary, and to bring in replenishment fuel from an offsite location.

l The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are l

provided and the likelihood any large uses of fuel oil j during this period would be detected.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-35 Amendment No.

. _ . . - . __ - _ = - . -. - . -.

l l Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air l B 3.8.3

(

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.2 j REQUIREMENTS i (continued) This Surveillance ensures that sufficient lube oil inventory I

is available to support at least 7 days of operation of a l single EDG at the upper limit of its 200-hour rating. The l

280 gallon requirement is based on the EDG manufacturer

! consumption values for the run time of the EDG. The

! specified volume includes the lube oil contained in the sump as well as the onsite stored stock. As such, implicit in this SR is the requirement to verify the capability to transfer the lube oil from its storage location to the EDG.

When determining compliance with this requirement, both EDGs may take credit for the same volume of onsite stored leibe oil.

l A 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient lube oil supply is onsite, since EDG starts and run time are closely monitored by the plant staff. ,

i SR 3.8.3.3 The tests listed below are a means of determining whether new fuel oil is of the appropriate rfade and has not been contaminated with substances that would have an immediate, detrimental impact on diesel engine combustion. If results from these tests are within acceptable limits, the fuel oil l may be added to the storage tanks without concern for contaminating the entire volume of fuel oil in the storage tanks. These tests are to be conducted prior to adding the new fuel to the storage tank (s), but in no case is the time between receipt of new fuel and conducting the tests to exceed 31 days. The tests, limits, and applicable ASTM Standards are as follows:

a. Sample the new fuel oli in accordance with ASTM D4057-88, (Ref. 6);
b. Verify in accordance with the tests specified in ASTM 0975-74, (Ref. 6) that the sample has a maximum of 0.05% by volume water and sediment (using ASTM D2709-82), a Saybolt viscosity at 100*F of 132.6 SUS and 1 40.1 SUS, and a flash point of 2125'F; l

l c. Verify in accordance with the test specified in ASTM l D287-82 that new fuel has an API specific gravity of 28 (min); and

. (continued) r l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-36 Amendment No.

I

. _ _ .. - . - . . - - -- . . = _ _ . - . - ._. .. ..- -- ..

4 Distribution Systems--Optrating B 3.8.9 BASES l

BACKGROUND Certain small break LOCA scenarios require emergency I (continued) feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling until core l decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling. Further, with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path inoperable, SWP-1B, train "B" of the Nuclear Services Seawater System, CHHE-1B and CHP-18, as well as both trains of ECCS, Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Decay Heat 4 Seawater, Emergency Diesel Generators, AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and AC Vital Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE. With ASV-204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 inoperable, Train "B" Emergency Diesel Generators, Train "B"

AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and Train "B" 4

AC Vital Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE.

1 i

4 l

l .

i  !

l 1

l I

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-67A Amendment No.

. .- . .-. . . . . . . . _ . ~ . . . - .. _ - - - . -. . . - - ..

4 Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES i

i 4

i W

l THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK l

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-67B Amendment No.

_ . ._ _ . _ .. . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - _ ~ . . _._ __

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES LCO AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical )ower distribution (continutd) subsystems are considered OPERABLE wien.the associated I buses load centers, MCCs, and distribution panels are l

energizedtotheirpropervoltages.

In addition, tie breakers between 480 V ES bus 3A and 3B must be open. This prevents an electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem. If this were to occur it could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safet function s . If any tie breakers are closed, the j affec ed redund n electrical power distribution subsystems are no longer redundant and one train must be considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety related redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does l not, however, preclude redundant Clas.i 1E 4160 V buses from '

being powered from the same offsite circuit.

APPLICABILITY The electrical )ower distribution subsystems are required to l be OPERABLE in,400ES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that: '

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of A00s or abnormal transients; and Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment b.

OPERABILITY and other sital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.10,

" Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

ACTIONS A.I. A.2. B.1. and B.2 With Train'"A" AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable prompt action is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow gathareOPERABLEforsteamgeneratorcooling. With Train

< B" AC electrical power distribution subsystem ino erable, prompt action is necessary to ensure that the turb ne driven i emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path as well as l

ASV-204, EFV-12, and EFV-13 are OPERABLE for steam generator cooling. If the required equipment is not OPERABLE, the i

capability to remove core decay heat cannot be assured and

. Condition F is applicable. The operability of the turbine

! driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

l l (continued) l-Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-69 Amendment No.

i g -- . +-e

,-n-- .,w--p.,+- ---,-,r-

Distribution Systems-Operating .

B 3.8.9 1

BASES l

ACTIONS A.1. A.2. B.I. and B.2 (continued) l Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break l LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action

! will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability. l l

The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is  !

l potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.  !

l With one AC electrical power distribution subsystem l inoperable, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystem in the other train is capable of supporting the

, minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ES functions l not being met. . Therefore, the required AC buses, load centers, MCCs, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

, The most severe scenario addressed by Conditions A and B is l l an entire train without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to 3 the train and the associated EDG inoperable). In this '

condition, the plant has an increased vulnerability to a complete loss of AC power. It is, therefore, imperative

! that the operator's attention be focused on minimizing the  !

l potential for loss of power to the remaining train by l l

stabilizing the plant, and on restoring power to the affected train. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> time limit for restoration, prior to requiring a plant shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because of:  ;

a. The potential for decreased safety if the operator's attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected train to

! the actions associated with shutting down the plant l within this time limit; and

b. The low probability of an event occurring coincident with a single failure of a redundant component in the train with AC power.

l (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-70 Amendment No.

I Distribution Systems-Operating  !

B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS A.I. A.2. B.I. and B.2 (continued) l f

The second Completion Time for Required Actions A.2 and B.2 l i establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any l combination of required distribution subsystems to be '

inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failure to meet the LCO. If Condition A or B is entered l ,

while, for instance a DC bus is inoperable and subsequently )

LC0 3.8.9 may already have been restored not met fortoup OPERABLE to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Tstatus, his could lead to a total of i

i 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the i AC distribution system. At this time a DC circuit could again become ino OPERABLE status.perable, and AC distrlbution This could continue indefinitely. restored to l The Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal

" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."  !

This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time  !

the LC0 was initially not met, instead of the time. ,

Condition A was entered. The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the  ;

LC0 indefinitely.

C.I. C.2. D.1. and D.2 With Train necessary to "A" AC vital ensure thatbus the inoherable prompt tu bine driven action is emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE for 1 steam generator cooling. With Train "B" AC vital bus 1 inoperable prompt action is necessary to ensure that the I turbine driven emergency feedwater pum) and associated flow path as well as ASV-204, EFV-12, and E V-13 are OPERABLE for steam generator cooling. If the required equipment is not OPERABLE, the capability to remove core decay heat cannot be assured and Condition F is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance s f required freq(ue)nchas been satisfactorily completed within the to be inoperable.y and the equipment is not otherwise known Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time i to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and

, associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action 1 l will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability.

, The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is l potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-71 Amendment No.

L y , _ , , _ , , .

Distribution Systems-Operating  !

B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS C.1. C.2. D.1. and D.2 (continued) l With one AC vital bus inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE AC vital buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in

, the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is reduced, however, since an additional single failure could result in the minimum required ES functions not being supported. Therefore, the AC vital bus must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

Condition B represents a condition in which potentially both i the DC source and the associated AC source are I nonfunctional . In this situation the plant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all non-interruptible ,

power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's I attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of pcwer to the remaining vital buses and I restoring power to the affected vital bus.

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> limit is more conservative than Completion Times )

allowed for the vast majority of components that would be i

, without adequate AC vital power. However, there are certain I affected features Completion Times of shorter duration. The intent of the Improved Technical Specifications is to remain within this Specification only and not take the ACTIONS for

inoperable supported systems. Taking this exception to LC0 3.0.2 for. components without adequate vital AC power, that would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of
a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) and not allowing stable operations to continue; I

l l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-71A Amendment No.

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 i

BASES i

i l

I l

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-71B Amendment No.

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES I t

ACTIONS C.I. C.2. D.1. and D.2 (continued) l

b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry l' into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital AC power .

and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected train; and 1

c. The low probability of an' event occurring coincident j with a single failure of a redundant component. j The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the importance of restoring the AC- vital bus to OPERABLE status, the redundant capability afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The third Completion Time for Required Actions C.2 and D.2 l establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failure. Refer to the Bases for Required Actions A.2 and l

B.2 for further discussion of this Completion Time.

L1 I With DC bus (es) in DC electrical power distribution train

l. inoperable, the remaining train is capable of supporting the l minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor '

and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in.the remaining DC l electrical power distribution train could result in the minimum required ES functions not being met. ' Therefore, the DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

j i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-72 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems-Operating l B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS E.d (continued) l Condition E represents a condition in which one train is I without adequate DC power; potentially both with the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger inoperable. In this situation, the plant is significantly-more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining trains and restoring power to the affected train.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without adequate AC vital power. However, there are certain affected features with Completion Times of shorter duration.

The intent of the Improved Technical Specifications is to remain within this Specification only and not take the ACTIONS for inoperable supported systems. Taking this exception to LC0 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, that would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

l l a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in plant conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while allowing stable operations to continue;

b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required ,

Actions for components without DC power and not  :

providing sufficient time for the operators to perform  !

the necessary evaluations and actions to restore power to the affected train; and

c. The low probability of an event occurring coincident 4 with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3).

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-73 Amendment No.

l

i

! Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 i

BASES ACTIONS L1 (continued) l The second Completion Time for Required Action E.1 l establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be '

inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of t failure to r eet the LCO. Refer to the Bases for Required l Actions A.2 and B.2 for further discussion of this l Completion Time.

l F.1 and F.2 l l If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored l to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, l the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not

apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in l at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within l 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

l L1 l Condition G corresponds to a level of degradation in which l ,

redundant safety-related trains have lost power to one or l more busses. At this severely degraded level, the plant's ,

l ability to respond to an event may be significantly reduced, i l Therefore, if it is determined that redundant trains of a necessary function are concurrently inoperable, no I additional time is justified for continued operation. The plant is required to immediately enter LCO 3.0.3 and begin preparations for a controlled shutdown.

l l

l l

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-74 Amendment No.

.i

i V

P FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72

. ATTACHMENT D r F

FRAMATOME DOCUMENT FTI-51-1266138-01 l

l l

l I

i l

(

I I

l

. , - , a-n--,n.- - - - . . ... .e -, -e- - - - - - - --