Text

Proposed Tech Specs Consisting of Rev 1 to TS Change Request 210,correction of Typo & Addition of Footnotes
	ML20198S915
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	01/22/1998
From:	; FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20198S913	List: 3F0198-35, Forwards Complete Updated TS & Bases Pages to TS Change Request Notice 210 Submitted on 970614.Updated Pages Reflect Changes Identified in Licensee ,Correction of Typo & Addition of Footnotes; ML20198S915;
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AIJar ' TENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 DOCKET NO. 50-301 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding

spillover pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Reol ace iii iii vii vii 3.5 4 3.5-4 3.7-9 3.7-9 3.7-10 3.7-10 3.7-11 3.7-11 3.7-12 3.7-12

...... 3.7-12A 3.7-15 3.7-15 3.7-16 3.7-16 3.7-17 3.7-17 3.7-18 3.7-18*

3.7-19 3.7-19 3.7-20 3.7-20 3.7-21 3.7-21 3.7-22 3.7-22*

3.7-37

3.7-38 3.7-39*

3.8-2 3.8-2 3.8-3 3.8-3 3.8-4 3.8-4 i ------

3.8-4A 3.8-4B 3.8-4C 3.8-4D 3.8-6 3.8-6 3.8-10 3.8-10 3.8-14 3.8-14 3.8-15 3.8-15 3.8-16 3.8-16 3.8-31 3.8-31 l- 3.8-32 3.8-32 3.8-32A 3.8-328 3.8-320*

( 9001260342 900122 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P PDR

E ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 DOCKET NO. 50-302 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached oages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain ver'.ical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding

spillover pages are also provided te maintain document completeness.

Remove Reolact B 3.3-44 B 3.3-44

....-- B 3.3-44A*

B 3.3-44B B 3.3-138 B 3.3-138 B 3.5-9 B 3.5-9 B 3.5-9A*

B 3.5-9B B 3.3-13 8 3.5-13 B 3.5-15 B 3.5-15 B 3.5-15A*

B 3.5-15B B 3.5-18 8 3.5-18 B 3.7-23 8 3.7-23 B 3.7-23A B 3.7-238 B 3.7-24 B 3.7-24 8 3./-25 B 3.7-25 B 3.7-26 B 3.7-26 B 3.7-27 B 3.7-27 B 3.7-27A B 3.7-27B B 3.7-27C

B 3.7-27D B 3.7-28 B 3.7-28 B 3.7-31 B 3.7-31 B 3.7-36A B 3.7-36B B 3.7-38 B 3.7-38 B 3.7-38A B 3.7-388 B 3.7-41 B 3.7-41 B 3.7 B 3.7-42 B 3.7-43 8 3.7-43 8 3.7-44 B 3.7-44 B 3.7-44A*

)

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-72 DOCKET NO. 50-302- !

Replace the following sages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. T.1e revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding

spillover pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Replace

B 3.7-44B B 3.7-47 8 3.7-47 8 3.7-48 8 3.7-48

B 3.7-48A

B 3.7-48B B 3.7-49 5 3.7-49 B 3.7-50 B 3.7-50*

B 3.7 52 B 3.7-52 B 3.7-53 8 3.7-53* '

B 3.7-54 B 3.7-54

...--- B 3.7-54A*

B 3.7-54B B 3.7-63 8 3.7-63

..-..- B 3.7-85

..---- B 3.7-86

..--.- B 3.7-87

...-.. B 3.7-88

....-- B 3.7-89

...--- B 3.7-90

B 3.8-2A

B 3.8-28 B 3.8-3 B 3.8-3

B 3.8-3A*

B 3.8-3B B 3.8-8 B 3.8-8 8 3.8-9 8 3.8-9 8 3.8-10 B 3.8-10

B 3.8-10A

B 3.8-10B B 3.8-11 B 3.8-11 B 3.8-12 B 3.8-12 B 3.8-13 - B 3.8-13 B 3.8 14- B 3.8-14

-B 3.8-14A

- - . . - . B 3.8-14B

.B 3.8-15 B 3.8-15 B 3.8-18 B 3.8-18

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 DOCKET NO. 50-302 Replace the following > ages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. T,1e revised pages are idantified by amendsent number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding

spillover pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Replace B 3.8-19 B 3.8-19 B 3.8 B 3.8-22 B 3.8-30 B 3.8-30 8 3.8-31 B 3.8-31 B 3.8-32 B 3.8-32 B 3.8-33 8 3.8 ------ B-3.8-33A

B 3.8-33B B 3.8-34 8 3.8-34 8 3.8-35 B 3.8-35 B 3.8-36 B 3.8-36

B 3.8-67A

B 3.8-678 B 3.8-69 8 3.8-69 n B 3.8-70 B 3.8-70 B 3.8-71 B 3.8-71

B 3.8-71A

B 3.8-71B B 3.8-72 8 3.8-72 B 3.8-73 B 3.0-73 B 3.8-74 B 3.8-74

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued) 3.6.6 Reactor Building Spray and Containment Cooling Systems . . . . . , ......... 3.6-17 3.6.7 Containment Emergency Sump ph Control System (CPCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.7 - PLANT SYSTEMS ..................... 3.7-l' 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-1 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) ........ 3.7-4 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) ...... 3.7-6 3.7.4 Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs) . . . . . . . .... 3.7-8 3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-9 3.7.6 EmergencyFeedwater(EFW) Tank. .......... 3.7-13 3.7.7 Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water (SW) System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-15 3.7.8 Decay Hr.at Closed Cycle Cooling Water l (DC) System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-17 3.7.9 Nuclear Services Seawater System . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-19 3.7.10 Decay Heat Seawater System . . . , . . . . . . . . . 3.7-21 3.7.11 Ultimate "mt Sink (VHS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-23 3.7.12 Control % Emergency Ventilation System pdEVS) ................. 3.7-24 3.7.13 fuel Storage Pool Water Level ........... 3.7-27 3.7.14 Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration ........ 3.7-28 3.7.15 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage ............ 3.7-30 3.7.16 Secondary Specific Activity ............ 3.7-34 3.7.17 Steam Generator Level ............... 3.7-35 3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-37 l 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8-1 3.8.1 AC Sources-0)erating ............... 3.8-1 3.8.2 AC Sources-51utdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8-11 3.8.3 Diest.1 Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air .... 3.8-14 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating ............... 3.8-17 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8-21 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters .............. 3.8-23 3.8.7 Inverters-0 )erating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8-27 3.8.8 Inverters-Siutdown ................ 3.8-29 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating .......... 3.8-31 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8-33 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9-1 3.9.1 Boron Concentration ................ 3.9-1 3.9.2 Nuclear. Instrumentation .............. 3.9-2 3.9.3 -Containment Penetrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9-4 3.9.4 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level . . . . . . . . . . 3.9-6 (continued)

Crysi.al River Unit 3 iii Amendment No.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ,

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT _ SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.6.7 Containment Emergency Sump pH Control (CPCS) . . . . B 3.6-47 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-1 B 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-1 B 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) . . . . . . . . B 3.7-7 B_3.7.3 MainFeedwaterIsolationValves(MFIVs) . . . . . . B 3.7-13 B 3.7.4 _ Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs) . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-19 B 3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-23 B 3.7.6 Emergency Feedwater Tank (EFT-2) . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-32 8 3.7.7 Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water System (SW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-36 B 3.7.8 Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System . . . . B 3.7-41 B 3.7.9 Nuclear Services Seawater System . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-46 B 3.7.10 Decay Heat Seawater System . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-51 B 3.7.11 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-56 B 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System'CREVS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-60 B 3.7.13 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-66 B 3.7.14 Spent Fuel Pool Baron Concentration . . . . . . . . B 3.7-69 B 3.7.15 Spent fuel Assembly Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-72 B 3.7.16 Secondary Specific Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-77 8 3.7.17 Steam Generator Level . . . . . . . . . ._. . . . . B 3.7-81 B'3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-85 l B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.8-1 B 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.8-24 8 3.6.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air . . . . B 3.8-30 B 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.8-39 8 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.8-49 B 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.8-52 B 3.8.7 Inverters-0 )erating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.8-59 B 3.8.8 Invorters--S 1utdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.8-64 B-3.8.9 _ Distribution Systems-03erating . . . . . . . . . . B 3.8-67 B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-S1utdown . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.8-77 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.9-1 B 3.9.1 Boron Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.9-1 B 3.9.2 Nuclear Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.9-5 B 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.9-9 B 3.9.4 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level . . . . . . . . . . B 3.9-14

.B 3.9.5 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant

. Circulation-LOW Water Level . . . . . . . . . . B 3.9-18 l B 3.9.6 Refueling Canal Water Level . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.9-23 l Crystal River Unit 3 vii Amendment No.

L '}

FLC.".lDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ATTACHMENT B REVISION 1 TO TSCRN 210 REVISION BAR PAGES Technical Specifications f

e E

l

- r _.n - =

q F ECCS-Operating -

'3. 5. 2 -

A 3.5-~EMERGENCYCORECOOLING_ SYSTEMS (ECCS) ,

L3.5.2 ~ ECCS-Operating .

1 LCO:3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERA 8LE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS I I

^

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

- A. One or more trains A.1 Verify the turbine I hour inope.able. driven emergency feedwater pump and 8tiQ associated flow path une are OPERABLE.

At least 1005 of the ECCS flow equivalent AliQ 8tiQ to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available. A.2 Restore train (s)'to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion

Time not met.

AtiD B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

Crystal; River Unit 3: :3.5 Amendment No.

NOTE-ValidIJritilCycle12Onlyl

.- - . , . , . . , , . y

. .,_ . _ ..~ . - . - . . . . , _ . .,..

EFW System 3.7.5

, 3.7- PLANT SYSTEMS

~

3.7'.51 Emergency _Feedwater:(EFW)-System LC0 I3.7.5 -Two EFW trains s' hall be OPERABLE. p .;

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME f 'I

' A. One steam supply to A.1 Restore steam supply. 7 days-i- the turbine driven EFW to OPERABLE status.

. pump inoperable. E 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO B. _f.SV-5 inoperable. B.1 Restore ASV-5 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months

OPERABLE status.

M 1 NOTE 10 days from ,

discovery l of failure a to meet the '

LCO (continued) l n:

_-t' j 3

Crystal River Unit-3 3,7-9= Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only .

4 m m y

EFW System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION- REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TINE C. EFV-12 inoperable. C.1 Verify the following I hour are OPERABLE:

QB-

1. Train "B" EFV-13 inoperable. :ac9ency Diesel Generstor, QB 2. Train "B" AC Electrical Power ASV-204 inoperable. Distribution Subsystem, and unt

3. Train "B" AC Vital Bus Subsystem ,

AND C.2 Restore affected 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months equipment to OPERABLE status. ARQ 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3- 3.7-10 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

EFW System 3.7.5-ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Turbine drive EFW pump D.1 Verify the followl'M 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or associated flow are OPERABLE:

path inoperable for 1. SWP-1B, reasons other than 2. Train "B" of the Condition A. Nuclear Services Seawater System,

3. CHHE-1B, and

4. CHP-18.

88Q D.2 Verify both trains of I hour the following are OPERABLE:

1. ECCS,

2. Decay Heat closed nort Cycle Cooling,

3. Decay Heat Seawater,

4. Emergency Diesel Generators,

5. AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and

6. AC Vital Bus Subsystems.

88Q D.3 Restore Turbine 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months driven EFW pump and associated flow path AND to OPERABLE status.

10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LC0 (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-11 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

)

EFW System l 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION TIME CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION E.1 Restore motor driven 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months F. Motoe driven EFW pump mit EFW pump and or associated flow associated flow path M path inoperable, to OPERABLE status.

10 days from discovery of

failure to meet l the LCO i

F.1 Be in Mode 3, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months F. Required Action and associated Completion mit Time of Condition A, E B, C, D, or E not met. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months F.2 Be in Mode 4.

Immediately i mit G. Two EFW trains G.1 Initiate action to inoperable, restore one EFW train to OPEP.ABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE 45 days SR 3.7.5.1 Verify each EFW manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each water flow path and in both steam supply flow paths to the turbine driven pump, i. hat is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.5.2 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven EFW pump, until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

"[!$.!S!!$.S!. .b..................... I 45 days on a Verify the developed head of each EFW pump STAGGERED TEST at the flow test point is greater than or BASIS equal to the required developed head.

(continued) 3.7-12 Amendment No.

Crystal River Unit 3 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

EFW System:

3.7.5- -l l

u -

- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) -!

H SURVEILLANCE' -

FREQUENCY-SR- 3.7.5.3 ---------- --- ----NOTE--------------------

Not. required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ..

after entering MODE 3. l .

Verify each EFW automatic valve that is not 24 months locked. . sealed, or otherwise secured in

-position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuction signal.

-SR' 3.7.5.4' -------------------NOTE---------------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after entering MODE 3. l Verify each EFW pump starts automatically 24 months on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.5.5 . Verify proper alignment-of the EFW flow Prior to paths by verifying-flow from the-EFW tank entering MODE 2 '

.to each steam generator, whenever plant

. has been in MODE 5 or 6 for

> 30 days

+

Crystal' River Unit' 3 3.7-12A Amendment No.

. , .= . _,. . = . _. __ x._..

, : l SW System. l 3.7.7 7

I 3.7LPLANT-SYSTEMS 13.7.7oNuclearServicesClosedCycleCoolingWater(SW) System LLCO--3.7.7- > The SW System shall be OPERABLE with:

a, Two OPERABLE emergency SW pumps; and J-b..Three OPERABLE SW heat exchangers.

APPLICABILITY:- MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS .

' CONDITION ~- REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. SWP-1B inoperable. A.1 ------ --NOTE---------

Tnis Action 1s not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months driven emergency man feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

J AND A.2 Restore SWP-1B to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months

. OPERABLE status B. -SWP-1A inoperable. B.1 Restore SWP-1A and SW- 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months

-her'er exchanger to non 08 OPERABLE status.

.One required SW heat; exchanger inoperable

- (continued) 2*

i Crystali River Unit 3 3.7-15 . . Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only k m e -- _ m e ~ ,e - ' - - v gr --y- % g- + w w- v- --

._ . . - _ . __ . ~ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . - . _ . . _ .. _

SW System }

3.7.7 -

-ACTIONS ~ (continued)"

CONDITION; -REQUIRE 0 ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4

'Cs Required Action and- C1 Be in M00E-3.- 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months l ion -

associated Completion

iTi'me-not met. MD -

C.2 Be in MODE 5. -36 hours- lam -t s

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ,

SURVEILLANCE ~ FREQUENCY g a SR 3.7.7.1- -------------------NOTE--------------------

'Isolati3n of SW flow to individual .

components does not render the SW System inoperable.

Verify- each' SW manual, power operated, and 31 days

. automatic valve in the flow path servicin essential equipment, that is not locked, g sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.7.2 ------- ----------NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each SW automatic valve in the flow 24 months path that is not locked, saaled, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct-position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.7.3. -------------------NOTE-------------------- 1 Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each SW pump starts automatically on- 24 months:

an actual or simulated actuation signal.

_ Crystal-River Unit 3- '3.7-16 . .- - - Amendment ~No.

- NOTE - Valid Until: Cycle 12 Only

.)

j.

ti' s 4 DCISystem;

. 3.7.8 :

m

,3.7bPLANT/ SYSTEMS;

?3.7.8" Decay _HeatClosedCycleCoolingWater(DC) System LCO 7 3 718 'Two DC-trains shall-be OPERABLE.

-i

- APPLICA8ILITY:: . MODES 1, 2,.3, and 4. ;

. ACTIONS-

-r0NDITION REQUIRED ACTION ' COMPLETION TIME

'A. OneLDC train A.1 ---------NOTE--------

. inoperable. This Action is not

applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency nou

- feedwater pump and associated flow path .

are OPERABLE.

AND-A.2 --------NOTE--------

Enter -applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," fcr

. required decay heat removal loops made inoperable by DC -

6 train inoperability.

Nestore DC train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

(continued)

/

e fCrystal(River UniE3, , 3.7-17 . -- Amea.dment' No--.

-NOTE Valid Until Cycle;12 Only :

se

~

~ s ,

[ [ p.,,, . , . j , !..E, . .

DC System 3.7.8 t

ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION TIME:

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION B. Required Action and B.1 Be in Mode 3' 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion-Time not met. ANQ B.2 Be in Mode 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.1 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Isolation of DC flow to individual ccmponents does not render the'DC System inoperkble.

Verify each DC manual and power operated 31 days valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment that is not locked sealed, or otherwIse secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.8.2 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

..................................s........

Verify each DC pump starts tutomatically on 24 months an actual or simulated actuation signal.

. ??

Crystal River Unit.3' 3.7-18' Amendsent No.

' Nuclear Services.Searater System 3.7.9 .

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS-

-3.7.9 -Nucleat Services Seawater System LCO 3.7.9 Two Nuclear Services SeawaterJ System trains shall be

_ OPERABLE.

[

APPLICASILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION -COMPLETION TIME A. Train "B" of the A.) --------NOTE---------

Nuclear Services This Action is not Seawater System applicable in MODE 4.

inoperable. ---------------------

Verify the turbine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months driven emergency unt fendwater pump and associa.ted flow path are OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore Traia "B" of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months the Nuclear Services

- Seawater System to

^

OPERABLE status.

B. Train "A" of the B.1 Restore Train "A" of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Nuclear Services the Nuclear Services ERE Seawater System -Seawater System to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

(continued) l Crystal River _ Unit 3 13.7-19 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until- Cycle 12 Only_

E

.. - - . .- - . . . - . . - -. ~ . . - - . - - . -.

d . .

Nuclear Services- Seawater System :

3.7.9 ' '

- ACTIONS 1'(continued) -;

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION - , COMPLETION TIME- :

C. -Required Action and' C.12 Be in Mode 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months unt associated Completion iTime not met. Ngl C.2 Be in Mode 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . Iunt. ;

4

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS :

SURVEILLANCE- FREQUENCY SR 3.7.9.1 -------------------NOTE---- ---------------

Isolation of Nuclear Services Seawater System flow to individua1Lcomponents does not render the Nuclear Services Seawater '

System inoperable.

Verify each Nuclear Services Seawater 31 days p System manual valve-in the flow path servicing safety related equipment,'that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.9.2 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify.each Emergency Nuclear Services 24 months Seawater System pump starts automatically

' on an actual or simulated, actuation signal.

L m

i-Crystal? River Unit 3 3.7-20 . Amendment No.

NOTE Valid Until Cycle-12 Only n.

g e- 1 %4 eem-+- 4 -. 9-.--m -.w--

e- 17- er 7-

y n= p---

LDecayl Heat Seawater System. - -f 3.7.10L 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

, 3.7.10f Decay l Heat Seawater System j

LC0 =3.7.10- - Two Decay Heat Seawater System trains shall oe OPEMBLE. ,

-APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS

' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME P

. A.- One Decay Heat A.1 --------NOTE- -------

Seawater System train This Action is not

. inoperable, applicable in MODE 4. -

. Verify the turbine .I hour driven emergency non

feedwater pump and

! associated flow path are OPERABLE.

ANQ A.2 --------NOTE---------

Enter applicable Conditions and Rwquired Actions of LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," for <

_ required decay heat removal loops made inoperable by Decay

^

Heat Seawater System ~

train inoperability.

Restore Decay Heat 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months

" Seawater System train to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

Crystal:LRiver Unit:3 3.7-21 . Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until . Cycle 12 Only-

~ l

, - ,: -a . , . , . , , . - . . - . .

Decay Heat Seawater System" 3.7.101 LACTIONS (continued):

CONDITION'- -REQUIRED ACTION 1 COMPLETION TIME Bi Required Action and- B.1- Po-inMode3I 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion

Time not met. Algt '

B.2l Be in Mode 5. - 36_ hours F

-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1 Verify each-Decay Heat Seawater System 31 days -

manual valve in the. flow path servicing safety-related equipment, that is not

-locked, sealed,- or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.10.2 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each Decay Heat Seawater System pump 24 months starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal. _,

l 1

=! ,

1 1

Crystal: River Unit 3 -3.7-22 Amendment Nc.

1

=

R z .

Control Complex Cooling System 3.7.18 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS.

43.7.18- Control Complex Cooling System LCOL -3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System shall ba OPERABLE with: ,

a. Two OPERABLE chillers and associated pumps; and-

b. Two OPERABLE heat exchangers.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 During movement of Irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION. I COMPLETION TIME REQUIRED ACTION

'A. CHHE-1B inoperable A.1 --------NOTE--------- l This Action is not Qg applicable in MODE 4.

CHP-1B inoperable.

Verify the turbine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

g IIDTE A.2 Restore CHHE-1B and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months CHP-1B to OPERABLE status,

b. CHHE-1A inoperable. B.1 Restore CHHE-1A, CHP- 7 days lA and Control DE Com)1ex Cooling heat exc1 anger to OPERABLE CHP-1A; inoperable, status.

QB OnerequifedControl Com)1ex Cooling heat texc1 anger inoperable.

~

(continued)

~

.CrystallRiver Unit 3- 3.7 37 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until: Cycle 12 Oniy.

g + ,, . - , . , - - - - ,

Control Complex Cooling System 3.7.18 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION- REQUIRED ACTIOl' COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Place Control Complex Immediately associated Completion Cooling System in Time of Condition A or operation.

Cont' tion B not met during movement of QB irradiated fuel assemblies. C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

D. Required Action and 0.1 Be in Mode 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A or 8HD Condition B not met during MOCES 1, 2, 3, 0.2 Be in Mode 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months or 4.

E. Any combination of E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately components rendering the Control Complex Cooling System ino serable during MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

F. Any combination of F.1 Suspend mavement of Immediately components rendering irradiated fuel the Control Complex assemblies.

Cooling System inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-38 Amendment No.

on' trol Complex Cooling System-

' 3.7.18

' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR. 3.7.18.1 Verify each chilled water pump's developed In accordance head at the flow test point is greater than with the or equal to the required developed head. Inservice '

Testing Program SR 3.7.18.2 Verify the redundant capability of the 24 months Control Complex Cooling System to remove the assumed heat load.

N Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-39. Amendment No.

m y--, *'.n em -- -+- +rt - y- .+

A0 Sources-Operating 3.8.1 j ACTIONS - 8 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TINE .

A.- (continued)' A.3 Restore required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months offsite circuit to OPERABLE status E 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO B. Train "A" EDG B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 1 mTE inoperable, for OPERABLE offsite circuit (s). E Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter E

B.2 --------NOTE---------

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4. ,

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mit Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency

- feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

E B.3 Declars required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months I mit feature (s), supported from.

by the inoperable discovery EDG, inoperable when of Condition B its redundant concurrent with required feature (s) inoperability of are inoperable, redundant required E feature (s)

(continued)

Crystal River Unit ~3 3.8-2 Amendment No.

. NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

AC _ Sources-Operating 3 .8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

-CONDITION- REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIH6

8. (continued) 8.4.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months len EDG is not inoperable due to common cause-failure.

28 B.4.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Ien for OPERABLE EDG.

AND B.5 Restore EDG to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months lmn OPERABLE status 821Q 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO (contira%)

I 1

.- 3 Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-3 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only y , ,

i AC Sources-Operating f 3.8.1 ACTIONS (contin.ued) .

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION ~ COMPLETION TIME j l :

9 C. Train 'B' EDG C.1 Perfom $R 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable. for OPERA 8LE offsite i circuit (s). Alg) !

Once per 8 ;

hout. l thereafter Atgl :

C.2 --- --- NOTE- - - --

This Action is not 4 applicable in. MODE 4. [

Verify the following are OPERABLE: I hour ;

1. Turbine driven mit

emergency :,

feedwater pump- '

and associated i flow path, >

2. ASV-204,

3. EFV 12, and i 4. EFV-13

, AND C.3 Declare required feature (s), supported 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from .

by the inoperable discovery of '

EDG,' inoperable when Condition 8 its redundant concurrent requiredfeature(s) with I are- inoperable, inoperabilit) of redundant AND required-feature (s) ,

(continued) s I :

L' Crystal' River Unit 3 3.P.4 .

Amendment No.

. NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only; s

~_-,4 m m. _2~v w r I.- -y ,,.n,--h ' E , -,. -- n n~~~v+-,v. 4 -Er e ~ v - . . . , . . . . , . - e..~ +E .-* .. 2.-,..

AC Sources-Operatinf 3.8.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.4.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months EDG is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

08 C.4.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for OPERAB: EDG.

mit AND C.5 Restore EDG to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO .

D. Two required offe cte 0.1 Declare required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months lait circuits inoperable, feature (s) inoperable from when its redundant discovery of required feature (s) Condition D lmit are inoperable. concurrent with inoperability of redundant required AMI feature (s) 0.2 Restore one required offsite circuit to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months lmit OPERABLE status.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4A Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

i 1

AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 :

I ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TINE !

t E. One required offsite -- --- -----+ NOTE------------ l mit circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions :

and Required Actions of !

ANQ LCO 3.8.9, " Distribution l Systems Operating," when Train "A" EDG Condition E is entered with l mit inoperable, no AC power source to one train.

E.1 ------- NOTE- -------

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ;

driven emergency art t feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

AND E.2 Restore required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

QB E.3 Restore EDG to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I mit OPERABLE status.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8 4B Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources--Operating 3.8.1 -

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. One required offsite ---------- - NOTE---- ------

circuit inoperable. Enter appitcable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO AND 3.8.9, ' Distribution Systems Operating," when Condition F Train "B" EDG is entered with no AC power ,

inoperable, source to one train.

F.1 --- ---- NOTE--------

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the following I hour are OPERABLE: +

1. Turbine driven nort emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path,

2. ASV-204,

3. EFV 12, and

4. EFV-13 liiQ F.2 Restore required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

08 F.3 Restore EDG to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OPERABLE status.

(continued)

Crystal Rive? Unit 3. 3.8 4C Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12-Only _

AC Sources-Operating l 3.8,>

ACTIONS (continued) .,, , ,,

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLr' A titt

. . . ~ , . . . . . .

G. Two EDGs inoperable. G.1 xestore one EDG to OPERABLE status.

F m n- '. m a f

, _ , ., va , -

H. Required Action and H.1 Be in MDDE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I mit associated Completion Time of Condition A, MiQ B, C, D, E, F, or G mit :

not met. H.2 Be in MDOE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months

l. Three or more required 1.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediate1)( mit AC sources inoperable.

I Crystal River Unit 3 3.8 4D Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only l

l l

i

AC Sources.-Operating 3.8.1 ,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (contincod) i SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i

SR 3.8.1.3 --- --------- -- NOTES------- -- - - --

1. EDG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.

2. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.

3. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one EDG at a time.

4. This SR shall be preceded by and immediately follow, without shutdown, a successful performance of SR 3.8.1.2 or SR 3.8.1.6.

Verify each EDG o)erates for > 60 minutes 31 days at a load 2 2600 (W and s 2850 kW.

SR 3.0.1.4 Verify each day tank contains 1280 gal of 31 days I fuel oil SR 3.8.1.5 Verify the fuel oil transfer system 31 days operates to automatically transfer fuel oil from the storage tank to the day tank.

(continued)

Crystal: River Unit 3 3.8 6 Amendment No.

AC Sources-0perating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR~3.8.1.11 - ---- ------- NOTES - - ----- - -

1. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidcte this test.

2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify each EDG o)erates for 2 60 minutes 24 months I-at a load 2 3300 (W and 13400 kW.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8 10 Amendment No.

Diesel fcel 011, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air LCO 3.8.3 The stored diesel fuel oil lube oil and startin air subsystem shall be within limits for,each require! emergency diesel generator (EDG).

APPLICABILITY: When associated EDG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS

.....................................N0TES -....-..-.--.~.-- -------.---- ----

1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each EDG.

2. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One EDG with stored A.1 Verify combined I hour fuel oil level stored fuel oil level

< 22,917 al and > 45,834 gal.

> 19,643 al in storage t nk.

B. One or more EDGs with B.1 Restore fuel oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months I stored fuel oil level level to within

< 22,917 al and limits.

> 19,643 al in storage t nk.

AND Combined stored fuel oil level < 45,834 I gal.

C. With stored EDG-lube C.1 Restore lube oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months oil inventory < 280 inventory to within gal and > 240 gal. limits. QB Declare both EDGs inoperable.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8 14 Amendment No.

t

Diesel Fuel 011, Lube Oil, and Startin} Air 3.8.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One or more EDGs with D.1 Restore fuel oil 7 days I

stored fuel oil total total particulates to particulates not within limits, within limit.

E. One or more EDGs with E.1 Restore stored fuel 30 days i new fuel oil oil properties to properties not within within limits.

limits.

F. One or more EDGs with F.1 Restore starting air 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months I starting-air receiver receiver-pressure to pressure < 225 psig within limits, and 2 160 psig.

I G. Required Action and G.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion EDG inoperable.

Time not met.

QB One or more LDGs with diesel fuel oil, lube oil, or starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other than Condition A, B C, D, E, or F. l

. Crystal River Unit- 3 3.8-15 Amendment No.

Diesel fuel 011, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 l SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS SURVEILLANCE' FREQUENCY SR- 3.8.3.1 Verify each fuel oil storage tank contains 31 days f 2 22,g17 gal of fuel and combined fuel oil -l storage level 2 45,834 gal.

.1 SR -3.8.3.2 Verify EDG lube oil inventory is 2 280 gal. 31 days l i

I d

SR 3.8.3.'3 Verify fuel oil properties of new and in accordance '

, stored fuel oil are tested in accordance with the Diesel with, and maintained within the limits of, Fuel Oil the Diesel fuel Oil Testing Program. Testing Program ,

SR 3.8.3.4 Verify each EDG air start receiver pressure 31 days is 2 225 psig.

I t

Crystal River Unit'3 3.8-16 Amendment No.

Y'

-2 ~- ~ --,-e- .e ,e - . - - n .um,-em e h-- w +--- n - --+ e -e* .e v-

Distribution Sy8tems-0peratin'g 3.8.9 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating 1

LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION llME A. Train "A" AC A.1 --- -NOTC---- -- -

electrical power- This Action is not distribution subsystem appitcable in MODE 4.

1noperable. - ---------- ------

Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency art feedwater pump and associated flow path are-OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore AC electrical 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE AND status.

16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LCO (continued)

Crystal l River Unit 3 3.8 31 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Distribution Systems-0perating 3.8.9 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TINE B. Train '8" AC B.1 - - NOTE- -- ---

electrical power This Action is not distribution subsystem applicable in MODE 4.

inoperable. -- - ------- ------

Verify the following I hour are OPERABLEt

1. Turbine driven i emergency feedwater pump and associated nott flow path.

2. ASV 204,

3. EFV 12, path

4. EFV-13, AND B.2 Restore AC electrical 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE AND status.

16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LCO (continued)

' Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-32 -

Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Distribution Systems-0perating 3.8.9 !

I ACTIONS (continuee)

CON 0! LION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Train "A" AC vital bus C.1 .- - NOTE ---- ---

subsystem inoperable This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine I hour ,

driven emergency mit feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

i AND C.2 Restore AC vital bus 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months subsystem to OPERABLE status, efiQ 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LCO (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-32A -Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle ~12 Only

. . . . __ . . . . = . __

Distribution Systems--Operating 3.b.9 ACTIONS (continued) ,,

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME !

D. Train '8" AC Vital Bus 0.1 ---- - NOTE --------

subsystem inoperable. This Action is not 1 applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the following I hour -

are OPERABLE:

1. Turbine driven ;

emergency feedwater pump and associated unt flow path,

2. ASV 204,

3. EFV 12, and

4. EFV-13 AND D.2 Restore AC vital bus 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months subsystem to OPERABLE status. ANQ .

16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LC0 E. One DC electrical E.1 Restore DC electrical 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months l unt power distribution power distribution subsystem inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE ANQ status.

16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LCO

f. Required Action and F.1 Se in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months l unt associated Odepletion Time not met AND F.2 Be in MODE 5.- 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months l unt (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-32B Amendment No, NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only Jl

y. __y.-., . ~ .. . .

Distributten Systems-Operating 3.8.9 ACTIONS (continued) ,_,

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTiGW COMPLETION TIME-i I

G. Two trains with G.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately l unt i inoperable ,

distribution subsystems that result l in a loss of function. ;

I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.9.1 Verify correct' breaker alignments and 7 days '

voltage to required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution i subsystems. ;

i

}

i i

Crystal . River Unit 3 3.8-32C- Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 OnlyL -;

T

l i

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 !

DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ATTACHMENT C REVISION 1 TO TSCRN 210 REVISION BAR PAGES Bases l

l i

ESAS Instrumentation i 8 3.3.5 ,

8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 8 3.3.5 Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The ESAS initiates Engineered Safeguards (ES) Systems, based on the values of selected plant parameters, to protect core design and reactor coolant pressura boundary limits and to mitigate accidents.

ESAS actuates the following:

a. HighPressureinjection(HPI); ;

b. Low Pressure Injection (LPI);

c. Reactor Building (RB) Isolation and Cooling;

d. RB Spray;

e. Ei,srgencyDieselGenerator(EDG) Start;and

f. Control complex normal recirculation.

ESAS also provides two signals to the Emergency feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System. One signal initiates '

emergency feedwater (EFW) when an actuation of HP! Channel A and HPI Channel B is present. The other functions to trip the motor driven emergency feedwater pump when an RCS Pressure Low Low initiation coincident with a loss of offsite power is present.

This trip signal may be manually defeated in certain small break LOCA scenarios. Assuming the single failure of the turbine driven feedwater pump or associated flow path in such circumstances, defeating this trip signal would maintain steam generator cooling with the motor E driven emergency feedwater pump. Prior to defeating the i trip signal, sufficient capability on the emergency diesel generators to power the required loads would be established as discussed in the BASES for Technical Specification 3.7.5.

(continued) ,

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.3 44 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

ESAS Instrumentation >

B 3.3.5 .

i BASES f BACKGROUND The ESAS operates in a distributed aanner to initiate the (continued) appropriate systems. The ESAS does this by monitoring RCS pressure actuation parameters in each of three channels and RB pressure actuation in each of six channels (3 per actuationtrain). Once the setpoint for actuation is reached, the signal is transmitted to automatic actuation logics, which perform the two out of three logic for :

actuation of each end device. However, all automatic actuation logics receive signals from the same channels for -

each parameter.

Four parameters are used for actuation:

a. Low Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressurei ;

(continued) ,

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.3 44A Amendment No.

i ESAS-InstrumeQtation B 3.3.5 ;

f i

t BASES. t b

i L :

/

I i

t i !

W

4 !

i i

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK i

i 8

(continued) ;

. Cryst $1LRJverUnit3 8 3.3 44B Amendment'No.- -I

.; ;e

- g w

r PAM Instrumentation !

5 3.3.17 j

> BASES LC0' 18. core Exit I - rrature lanchuni (continued) !

e followine a; steam generator tube rupture or small break LOCA. Operator actions to maintain a controlled cooldown, such as adjusting OTSG 1evel or pressure, c would be prompted by this indication. ;

f Ig. rmaraancy Fandwater Flow l i

EFW Flow instrumentation is provided to monitor l operation of decay heat removal via the OTSGs. The- l i EFW injection flow to each OTSG (2 channels l

. oneassociatedwitheachEFWinjectionline)perOTSG,. is i

. determined from a differential pressure measurement i calibrated to a span of 0 gpa to 1000 gps. Each .

t differential pressure transmitter provides an input to a control room indicator and the plant computer. ,

7 j EFW Flow is used by the operator to determine the need

~

to throttle flow during accident or transient .

! conditions to prevent excessive RCS cooldown rates l !

when low decay heat levels are present. EFW Flow is ;

also used by the operator to verify that the EFW _

Systas is delivering the correct flow to each 0TSG. i However, the primary indication of this function-is J provided by 0TSG 1evel, i These instruments are not assumed to provide !

inforration required by the operator to take a ,

, mitigation action specified in the safety analysis. l As such, they are not Type A variables. However, the

" monitors are deemed risk significant (Category 1) and. ,

are included within the LCO based upon this

~

consideration.

t

i i

1

]

(continued)

Crystal River' Unit 3: B'3.3-138 - Amendment'No.

4 '$. g a P 199 3 y.-rd- g,ty8- % 4'97 g y9 wry wee--

w g-rg- - - - gw-*y ,am. y,y- 9puvy m sy rw w g,.4 y.a eay a p y,-TF 7 gs g. g eh. *e- ' m M-6 04J M r+ % Fhe t>v'a,qyt r +s4. m. d'f4 ap-pw--maa .mn ..wm-m.--*-%-ew-e*-

I

ECCS-0perati 8 3.5 [

t i

83.5-EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS) -l

/

8 3.5.2 ECCS-Operating :

i

( .

BASES.

BACKGROUND The fenction of the ECCS is to provide core cooling to ensure that the reactor core is protected after any of the :

following accidents: !

, 1. : Loss of coolant accident (LOCA)1 l i

? 2. Steamaeneratortuberupture(SGTR): and i t

3.- Steamlinebreak(SLB). ;

t There are two-modes of ECCS operation: injectionand !

. recirculation. In the injection phase, all injection is o initially added to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) from the !

borated water storage tank (BWST). .This injection flow is l added via the RCS cold legs and core flood nozzles to the i reactor vessel. After the BWST has been depleted to s 15 :

feet but > 7 feet, the ECCS recirculation phase is entered !

4 as the ECCS suction is manually transferred to the reactor !

building emergency sump. < :

Two redundant, 1005 capacity trains are provided. Each !

and low train

>ressure consists injectionof high(LPItessure subsystems.injection (HPI)1,=2, In '90 DES and 3 l

>oth trains must be OPE 8LE. This ensures that 100% of the a core cooling requirements can be provided even in the event i of a single active failure. .

i

, certain size small. break LOCA scenarios require emergency .

'feedwater to maintain. steam generator cooling until core !

decay heat can be removed solely _by ECCS cooling. ;

.Further, with.the turbine driven EFW pump or associated at flow path inoperable; SWP 18.-train 'B' of the Nuclear

- Services Seawater System,- CHHE-18, and CHP-18, as wr11 as both trains of-ECCS, Decay. Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Decay Heat Seawater, Emergency Diesel Generators, AC .

Electrical Power Distribution Subsystem, and AC Vital Bus j Subsystems are required OPERA 8LE:(Ref,5). ,

s p 14 s: ,

x-:u ~l r

~

(continued)'

Crystal: River Unit 3

.5.3.5-9 Amendment No.-

.N0TE; -Valid Until Cycle-12 Only.

-y

~

_ s;

_ _ _ . _ .. _-..-.a.__,_._._._...__..- . - - _ - . . _ . . . . _ _ . - . _ _ -

i ECCS--Operating ,

8 3.5.2 i BASES ,

BACKGROUND A suction header supplies water from the BWST or the reactor (continued) buildlig emergency sump to the ECCS pumps. Separate piping sup:11es each train. Each HPI subsystem discharges into eac'. of the four RCS cold legs between the reactor coolant pump and the reactor vessel. Each LPI subsystem discharges -

into its associated core flood nozzle on the reactor vessel ,

and discharges into the-vessel downconer area. Control i valves are set to balance the HPI flow to the RCS. This l flow balance directs sufficient flow to the core to meet the ;

analysis assumptions following a small break LOCA in one of ;

the RCS cold legs near an HPI nozzle.

The HPI pumps are capable of discharging to the RCS at an RCS pressure above tie opening setpoint of the pressurizer t G

9 r

i (continued)

-Cryst'al River Unit 3 Amendment No. i

.B 3.5-9A n =. , _ i _ z ., ._ _ _ . _

I ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 BASE 5- i i

l 1

6 6

?

k i

1 i

i r

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK '!

4 f

P L

e i

I I

i i

T F

2

-(continued).

Crystal-River Unit.3' :B 3.5-98 >

, . Amendment No.

ECCS--Operating B 3.5.2 BASES LCO Conversely, not all portions of the HPI System satisfy the (continued) independence criteria discussed above. Specifically, the !

HPI System downstream of the HP!/ Makeup pumps is not >

separable into two distinct trains, and is therefore, not independent This conclusion is based upon analysis which shows, that in the event of a postulated break in the HPI '

injection flow is required through a

injection of minimum p hree ping,(3) injection legs, assuming one pump 1 operation, or through a minimum of two (2) injection legs, <

assuming two HPI pump operation. When considering the impact of inoperabilities in this portion of the system, the same concept of maintaining single active failure protection must be applied. When components become inoperable, an assessment of the HPI systems ability to perform its safety function must be performed. If the system can continue to perform its safety function, without assuming a single active failure, then the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months loss of redundancy ACTION ,

is appropriate. If the inoperability renders the system, as is, incapable of performing its safety function, without postulating a single active failure, then the plant is in a condition outside the safety analysis and must enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, an ECCS train consists of an HPI subsystem and an LPI subsystem. Each train includes the piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the BWST upon an ESAS signal and manually transferring suction to the reactor building emergency sump.

During an event piring ECCS actuation, a flow path is provided to ensure an abundant supply of water from the BWST to the RCS via the HPI and LPI pumps and their respective -

discharge flow paths to each of the four cold leg injection -

nozzles and the reactor vessel. In the long term, this flow '

path may be manually transferred to take its supply from the ,

reactor building emergency sump and to supply its flow to the RCS via two paths, as described in the Background section.

The flow path for each train must maintain its designed -

degree of independence to ensure that no single active '

failure can disable both ECCS trains.

(continued)

Crystali River Unit 3- B 3.5 13 Amendment No.

, ,..mo y e w , ., m .r ,e-e+ s.

l ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 !

BASES (contiaued) n 1

ACTIONS M With one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, prompt action within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is necessary to enture that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and as $ciated flow path are OPERABLE for steam generator ,

cooling. If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump or associated flow path is not OPERABLE, then the capability to remove sufficient core decay heat can not be assured i and Condition B is applicable. Consistent with the Bases ;

for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by mm i ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and

, the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driver. emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability.

The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

M l With one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the inoperable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on NRC recommendations (Ref. 3) that are based on a risk evaluation and is a reasonable time for many ;

repairs.

An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering the design flow to the RCS.

The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the ;

diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train dois not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function.- Neither does~the inoperability of two -

different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. The. intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5 15 Amendment No.

. NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only l

l

l ECCS--Operating '

B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS Att (continued) Iwn such that the safety injection (SI) flow equivalent to 100%

of a single train remains available. This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable.

An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of an_EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 3) has shown the ris: of having orie full ECCS train inoperable to be sufficiently low to justify continued operation for -

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

With one or more cogonents inoperable such that the flow i

equivalent'to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is not available, the facility is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be immediately entered.

I (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-15A . Amendment'No.

NOTE - Valid Untti Cycle 12 Only

l i

ECCS-Operating 8 3.5.2 :

BASES-5 j'

w d

M i

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1

~

-: (continued)

Crystal River Unit. 3: B 3.5 158 . Amendment No.

. . . m.

l ECCS-Operating l 8 3.5.2 j l

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.5

' REQUIREMENTS (cor,tinued) This Survaillance ensures that these valves are in the proper positicn to prevent the HPI pump from exceeding its runout limit. This 24 month Frequency is acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.

SR 3.5.2.6 This St;rveillance ensures that the flow controllers for the LPI throttle valves will automatically control the LPI train ,

flow rate in the desired range and prevent LPI pump runout as RCS pressure decrt.ases after a LOCA. The 24 month Frequency is acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.

SR 3.5.2.7 Periodic inspections of the reactor building emergency sump suction inlet ensure that it is unrestricted and stays in proper operating condition. Tne 24 month Frequency is based l on the need to perform this Surveillance under the

~

I conditions that apply during a plant outage and to preserve access to the location. This frequency has been found to be sufficient to detect abnormal degradation and has been confirmed by operating experience.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.46.

2. FSAR, Section 6.1.

3. NRC Memorandum to V. Stello, Jr., from R.L. Baer,

" Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.

4. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Inservice >

Inspection, Article IWP 3000.

5. FTl 51-1266138 01, Safety Analysis Input to Startup Team Safety Assessment. E Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-18 Amendment No..

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

.I' EFW System 4

B 3.7.5-B 3.7- PLANT-SYSTEMS J

- 8 3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System.

p-

. BASES 1

BACKGROUND YheEmergencyFeedwater(EFW)Systemisdesignedtoprovide )

adequate flow to one or 1:oth steam generators (OTSGs) for I decay heat removal with the generators at the maximus '

j- operating pressure of 1050 psig plus suitable margin for

. post-accident pressure increase _(Ref.1, ~ 2). -- The principal function of the EFW system is to remove decay heat from the--

Reactor Coolant System upon the unavailability of normal feedwater supply. This is accom>11shed by supplying water from the emergency-feedwater tan ( (EFT-2) to the OTSG 3

secondary side via the high nozzles. Steam produced in the OTSGs is condensed in the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves or, if the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) or main steam-safety valves (MSSVs) have actuated, discharged directly to the atmosphere.

- The EFW System consists of one motor driven EFW pump and oise

~

steam turbine driven EFW pump, each having a nominal 1005 i capacity (Ref. 3). The motor driven EFW pump is powered ,

j- from the 4160 volt ES bus-3A. The turbine driven EFW pump

- receives steam from one main steam line per OTSG via connections upstream of the associated main steam isolation valve. An alternative source of steam is available from the fossil units, Crystal River Unit I and 2 (Ref.1), but cannot be relied upon to consider the EFW train OPERABLE.

The diverse motive power c/ the two trains enhances both-1 system availability and reliability. The preferred water source for both EFW pump trains is the Seismic Class I, missile protected dedicated EFW tank. Backup supplies of emergency feedwater are provided by the condensate storage tank.and the main condenser hotwell. The pumps tie into-common discharge headers providing-the capability to feed either or both of the OTSGs.

E

'The. pumps.and OTSGs are protected from excessively high flow induced problems by cavitating venturis (EF-62-F0 and EF ,

FO) in the pump discharge-lines, designed to limit EFW flow to the steam generators regardless of steam generator t pressure (Ref. 7),

t

+

(continued)-

i.

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-23~ Amendment No.

EFW Systeo B 3.7.5 BASES BACKGROUND DC powered block and control valves are actuated to feed the (continued) appropriate steam generator by the Emergency feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System. The capacity of either EFW pump is sufficient 60 remove decay heat and cool the plant until the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and temperature are low enough to place the Decay Heat System in service or until core decay heat Removal (DHR)d solely by ECCS.

can be remove for P.e t& all break LOCA scenarios also involving a j 9 9 e r_ driven EFW pump wouldprovidecahaflit n e emergency diesel generator to load the "A" trai i w pressure injection pump and other required loads (Ref 6).

l J

j= (continued) l l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-23A Amendment No.

l NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only l

, EfW System B 3.7.5 BASES s

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-23B Amendment No.

f EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES BACKGROUND Automatic actuation of the EFW System occurs on the (continued) following:

1. Trip of both main feedwater pumps with reactor power greater than 20% or the NI/RPS not in shutdown bypass;

2. Low level in either OTSG;

3. Low pressure in either OTSG;

4. Trip of all four reactor coolant pumps;

5. High pressure injection (HPI) actuation on both Channel A and B Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) channels;and

6. AMSAC actuation.

The EFIC is a " smart" system which will feed either or both OTSGs with indications of low levels, but will isolate EFW to a faulted steam generator having a significantly lower steam pressure than the other.

The EFW System is designed to ANSI B 31.1 ES Seismic Class I and in accordance with General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5,19, 44, 45, and 46 (Ref. 3, 4).

APPLICABLE The EFW System is sized to provide sufficient decay heat SAFETY ANALYSIS removal capability to cooldown the RCS to the temperature and pressure at which the DHR System can be placed in service or at which core decay heat can be removed solely ,

by ECCS for any of the following events:

. loss of main feedwater (LMFW);

. LMFW with loss of offsite power;

. main feedwater line break;

. main steam line break; and small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-24 . Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until-Cycle 12 Only.

l EFW System I B 3.7.5 l I

1 BA'SES l

l APPLICABLE The EFW System is designed to remain functional following I SAFETY ANALYSES the maximum hypothetical earthquake. It will also remain (continued) functional following a single failure in addition to any of the above events with the exception of the loss of all AC i power (Ref. 3). No single failure prevents EFW from being i supplied to the intact OTSG nor allows EFW to be supplied to ,

the faulted 0TSG. Note that in most cases of a main feedwater break or a steam line break, the depressurization of the affected 0TSG would cause the automatic initiation of EFW. However, there will be some small break sizes for which automatic detection will not be possible. For these small breaks, the operator will have sufficient time in which to take appropriate action to terminate the event (Ref.1).

The EFW System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Two independent emergen:y feedwater pumps and their associated flow )aths are required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of tie EFW pumps requires that each be capable of developing its required discharge pressure and flow.

The OPERABILITY OF F V-5 is addressed by Condition B. The OPERABILITY of ASV-c,4 is a portion of EFP-2 OPERABILITY "

and is addressed as by Condition D.

The motive power for the turbine driven pump is steam supplied from either OTSG from a main steam header upstream of the main steam isolation valves so that their closure does not isolate the steam supply to the turbine. Both steam supply flow paths through MSV-55 and MSV-56 (Condition A) to the turbine driven pump are required to be OPERABLE.

The OPERABILITY of the associated EFW flow paths requires all valves be.in their correct positions or be capable of actuating to their correct positions on a valid actuation signal.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-25 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

EFW System B 3.7.5~

! . BASES S

LCO- In certain small break LOCA scenarios, assuming.the single ;

(continued) failure as the loss of "B" train Class IE direct- current- i power, manual operator action would be taken to !

maintainsteam generator cooling by feeding the steam ,

generators using the turbine driven EFW pump. In this s; circumstance manual operator action would be taken to Nort-close the "B A train EFW isolation valves, and open the crosstie valve EFV-12 LCondition C and feed the. steam generators via,the "A" train flow pa)lh. s Inoperability of the EFW System may result in inadequate decay heat removal following a transient or accident during which main feedwater is not available. The resulting RCS heatup and pressure increase can potentially result in i~

significant loss of coolant through the pressurizer code safety valves or the PORV. ;

t APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2 and 3 the EFW System is required to be OPERABLEandtofunctionintheeventthatmainfeedwateris 4 - lost. In addition, the EFW System is required to supply enough makeup water to replace the secondary side inventury i- lost as the plant cools to MODE 4 conditions.

In MODES 4 5 and 6 the OTSG need not be used to cooldown L

the RCS. ther,efore,theEFWSystemisnotrequiredtobe OPERABLEintheseMODES.

ACTIONS Ad With one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven EFW pump inoperable action must be taken to restore the steam supplytoOPERAELEstatuswithin7 days. Allowing 7 days in this condition is reasonable based on the redundant i OPERABLE steam su ply to the, pump and the low probability of an event occurrin that would require the inoperable steam i supply to the tur ine driven EFW pumps.

The second Comoletion Time for Required Action A.1

!. establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any

-continuous. failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified 2 Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

This limit is considered reasonable for situations in L which other Conditions are entered concurrently. The-

AND' connector between 7 days and 10 days dictates that l NOTE b lo Completion Times apply simultaneously,.and the more ret,trictive must be met.. ;

(continued)

L . Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-26 Amendment No.- J j

NOTE ' Valid Until Cycle 12 Only a, , - .

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS -

jL1 (continued)

If ASV-5 is inoperable, prompt action must be taken to restore ASV-5 to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the EFW System, time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, ,

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 established a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other Conditions are entered concurrently. The

'6MD' connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 10 days dictates that unt both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

L.1 If ASV-204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 is inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to ensure the following are OPERABLE:

Train "B" Emergency Diesel Generators (TS 3.8.1)

Train "B": AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystem (TS3.8.9),and

- Train "B" AC Vital Bus Subsystem (TS 3.8.9) j Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency n d the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperablo.

If the above Train "B" equipment is not OPERABLE with ASV- l 204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 inoperable, the capability to remove l sufficient core decay heat cannot be assured and Condition F is applicable. ;

l 1

(continued) l

-Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-27 Amendment No, i NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only I

. _ _ . - . . , _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . __ _ _.-... _ _ _ . ~ . _ _

L EFW System

-B 3.7.5-l; I BASES q

' ACTIONS- M (continued):

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break 4-LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time-to verify the above Train "B" equipment as OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat _

3 r removal capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time '

the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

M If ASV-204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 is inoperable, pronapt action ;

must-be taken to restore the valves to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is-1 reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the EFW System. time needed for repairs, and the low ,

probability of a DBA occurring during this time period. NOTE

, The second Completion Time for Required Action C.2 c established a limit on the maximum time allowed for any

' combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion

Tin;a provides a limitation time allowed in this specified

[ Condition after discovery of failure-to meet the LCO. This i limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other Conditions are entered concurrently. The 'Algl' connector

- between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be i

met.

If.the turbine ' driven EFW pump or associated flow path is inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to-ensure the following "B" train systems are OPERABLE:

l

- SWP-18 (TS 3.7.7),

- -Train'"B" of the-Nuclear Services Seawater System (TS 3.7.9),

CHHE-1B and CHP-1B (TS 3.7.18)

_(continued) p

Crystal. River Unit 3 .8-3.7-27A- - Amendment.No.-

NOTE.- Valid Until Cycle 12 Only _

---<-e y ,,wy w- .- w s- - _ '__-- - w

+ v__ . .__m u i - _ - _ . .w , ..wy , ._,.my-

EFW Systea B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS M (continued)

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated -

surveillance (s has been satisfactorily completed within the required freque)ncy and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

If the above listed "B" train components are not OPERABLE with the turbine driven EFW pum) or associated flow path inoperable, the capability for EDG load management to improve small break LOCA mitigation can not be assured and Condition F is applicable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time to verify the above listed "B" train components as OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm EDG load management. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a "

LOCA in these conditions.

M ,

If the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path is inoperable, prompt action must be taken within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to ensure both trains of the following are OPERABLE:

ECCS (TS 3.5.2),

- Decay Heat Closed Cycle Coolin Water-(TS3.7.8),

- Decay Heat Seawater (TS 3.7.10 ,

- Emergency Diesel Generators (T 3.8.1),

- AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems (TS 3.8.9),

and

- AC Vital Bus Subsystems (TS 3.B.9)

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated ,

surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

If both trains of the above equipment are not OPERABLE with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path inoperable, the capability to remove sufficient core decay heat can not be assurs.d and Condition f is applicable.

(continued)

Crystal, River Unit' 3 8 3.7-27B Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS Qti (continued).

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time ,

to verify both trains of the above equipment as OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

Q.J If the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path is inoperable, action must be taken to restore the required equipment to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the motor driven EFW pump, time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA "HE occurring during this time period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action D.3 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other Conditions are entered concurrently. The 'AND' connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-27C Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

l

1 EFW System' ;

B 3.7.5 J

BASES

-ACTIONS U (continued). - .--

l If the motor driven EFW > ump or associated. flow. path ~-is - unit . '

inoperable, action must >e taken to restore-the required equipment to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour:

Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant 1 capabilities afforded by the EFW pump, time:needed for.

repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during- ,

this time period. l" -t

< The second Completion Time for Required Action E.1- 1N ,

i establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any .

combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition-after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which .

i other Conditions are entered concurrently. The '8tgl' lM connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 10 days dictates that both '

Coroletion Times apply simultaneously,. and the more restrictive must be met.

F.1 and F.2 mit If Required Actions A.1, B.1, C.1, C.2, D.1, 0.2, D.3, or E.1 cannot be completed within the associated Completion

~

Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at.least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating. experience, to reach.the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems, u I mit

~

With both EFWitrains inoperable, the plant is in a -

seriously degraded condition with no safety related means for conducting a cooldown. ' In such a condition, plant operation should not be perturbed by a forced action, including a power change,.that might result in.a trip...For this reason,= the Technical Specifications do not mandate a plant shutdown.- Rather the ACTIONS allow the plant to 2 dictate the most prudent' course of action: (including plant shutdown):for the situation. The seriousness of this-condition requires:that' action be initiated immediately to Lrestore at least one-EFW train to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

- Crystal River Unit 3- B 3.7-27D. Amendment No.-

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

EFW System- f B 3.7.5 i

BASES ,

-SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 i REQUIREMENTS' Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, -;

and automatic valves in the EFW water and steam supply flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist-for EFW operation. The valves verified by this SR include - i valves in the main flow paths and the first normally closed i valve in a branch line. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since those valves are verified to be in the correct ,

position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. There are -

several other exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these ty>es of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types w)ich are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves outside the RB, relief valves outtide the RB, and instrumentation valves (both inside and outside the RB). This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involvas verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 45 day frequency is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with the Frequency established for SR 3.7.5.2. SR 3.7.5.2 requires extensive EFW valve manipulation in order to perform the pump flow rate verification, such that a flow path verification is necessary following each performance.

,. SR -3.7.5.2 ;

This SR verifies that the EFW pumps develop sufficient

-discharge pressure to deliver the required flow at the full !

open pressure of the MSSVs. Because it is. undesirable to l

e !

t U

(continued).

1 Crystal ~ River Unit 3 B 3.7-28' Amendment No.

, ,2. m-. _

EFW System >

B 3.7;5 BASES ~ j i

SURVEILLANCE -SR 3.7.5.5 _(continued)-

REQUIREMENTS--

of EFW flow paths must be demonstrated before sufficient -

core heat is generated that would require the operation of

' the EFW System during a subsequent shutdown. The Frequency is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of other &&inistrative controls to ensure that the flow paths - ,

are OPERABLE.- To further ensure EFW System alignment, flow .

path OPERABILITY is verified, following extended outages to determine no misalignment of valves has occurred. This SR ensures that the flow path from the EFW tank to the OTSGs is properly aligned.- This requirement is based upon the .

recommendation of NUREG 0737. The Frequency was modified slightly during-ITS development (prior to entering MODE 2) to provide an SR 3.0.4 type exception. As written, the SR allows the plant to achieve and maintain MODE 3 conditions ,

in order to perform the verification. t REFERENCES 1. Enhanced Design Basis Document for the Emergency Feedwater'and Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System, Revision 1, dated September 27, 1991 with Temporary Changes 156, 230, 247, and 249,

2. BAW-10043, " Overpressure Protection for B&W Reactors",

dated May 1972.

-3. FSAR, Section 10.5.

4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.

b 5. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,-Section XI, Inservice Inspection, Subsection IWP.

6. FTI 51-1266138-01, Safety Analysis Input to Startup Team Safety Assessment. E l' 7. FPC; calculation 187-0008, Rev. 5. I l

l I

L " Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-31 Amendment No.

L NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only_

E a

SW System B 3.7.7 BASES ,

BACKGROUND For certain small break LOCAs with a concurrent loss of (continued) offsite power, securing SWP-1A and RWP-2A to provide capability on the emergency diesel generator to load the "A" train low pressure injection pump and other required-loads. These pumps would be manually secured and locked unt out to preclude automatic reinitiation. .In these situations, SWP-1B and RWP-2B are relied upon to provide continued flow for the SW and Nuclear Services Seawater systems.

d

+

(continued)

- Crystal River Unit-3 B 3.7-36A Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

SW System-B 3.7.7-BASES-THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal- River Unit =3 B 3.7-36B .-Amendment No.

i

SW System B 3.7.7 BASES APPLICABILITY Three of the four heat exchangers must be OFERABLE to (continued) accommodate the design system heat load requirements.

In MODES 5 and 6, the SW System is not required to be OPERABLE due to the limitations on RCS temperature and pressure in these MODES. Additionally, there are no other Technical Specification LCOs supported by SW which are applicable during these plant conditions.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With SWP-1B inoperable, prompt action must b6 taken within I hour to ensure that sufficient capability is available on "A" train emergency diesel generator for SWP-1A in certain small break IOCA scenarios, in such circumstances, the motor drive! argency feedwater pump would be secured and the turbine s lven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path would be required OPERABLE to provide steam generator cooling, if the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not OPERABLE to >ermit securing motor um tie ca) ability for EDG drivenemergencyfeedwaterpumplbreak.0CAmitigation load management to improve smal cannot be assured and Condition C is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm EDG load management capability for small break LOCA mitigation improvement. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for restoring SWP-1B OPERABILITY is consistent with other ECCS Specifications for a loss of redundancy Condition and, has been shown to maintain a suitable limit on risk. As such, this Completion Time is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with industry-accepted practice.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-38 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Untti Cycle 12 Only

SW System B 3.7.7 BASES ACTIONS L1 (continued) Nott With SWP-IA erd /.e one of the required heat exchangers inoperable, the ! aat removal capacity of the SW System is '

degraded. In this Condition, adequate cooling of the containment and ES equipment served by SW cannot be assured 4 following an accident coincident with a worst-case single active failure. Therefore, action must be taken to restore the affected component (s) to OPERABLE status. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for restoring full SW System OPERABILITY is consistent with other ECCS Specifications for a loss of redundancy Condition and, has been shown to maintain a suitabie limit on risk. As such, this Completion Time is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with industry-accepted practice.

C.1 and C.2 l woit If the inoperable SW com)onent(s) cannot be restored to

'0PERABLE status within tie associated Com)letion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which tie LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the SW flow to individual components may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the SW System.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-38A Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

SW System- :

- (- '

.B 3,7.7 t

! . - 3 BASES. -!

F

=t t

1 t

i.

P h

.THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ..

4 k, h_

i (continued)' i Cryst'lLRiver.

a Unit 3 :B'3,7-388 Amendment No.

'i

. i l

DC System 1 B 3.7.8-

?

83.7EPLANTSYSTEMS, 4,

> B:3.7.8: Decay Heat closed Cycle Cooling Water System

. j

- BASES-i

~

The Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water (DC)-System I I

BACKGROUND facilitates the removal of decay heat from the reactor core. a' The system also removes process and operating heat from -

safety related components' associated with decay heat removalt

< during normal plant cooldown and following a transient or f

-accident. During plant cooldown below approximately 250'F i the DC system >rovides core heat removal by transferring ;

heat from the Jecay Heat Removal (DHR System to the Decay 3 The system is d)ivided into two.

4

- Heat Seawater System.

, independent and redundant trains, each capable.of supplying _

100 percent of the required normal and post-accident 3 cooling. Each train contains a pump, a surge tank pressurized with nitrogen for volume and pressure control, and a heat exchanger w11ch removes heat from the DHR system i j- and rejects it to the Decay Heat Seawater System.

l The design and operation of the DC system, along with a list of the components served, can be found in FSAR Section' 9.5.2.2 (Ref. 1). For normal operation the DC pumps are -

started manually. However, in an emergency both DC pumps 1

start automaticall

?

Actuation System ESAS).(y upon Thereceipt X system ofsupports an Engineered long-termSafeguards' reactor decay heat removal following a loss of coolant

accident (LOCA) when the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is recirculating water from the RB sump to the reactor core through the DH heat exchanger. The DC System also supports post-accident containment cooling by supplying

cooling water to the reactor building spray pump motor coolers and bearings. Other loads supplied by this system are the_DHR (LPI) pumps and motors, DC and decay heat-seawater pump motors and two of the three make-up and.

purification (HPI) pump motors' The DC' System supplies .

cooling to these pump motor heat exchangers, lube oil coolers,_ gear lube. oil coolers, bearings, or air handling ,

L units to prevent overheating of the associated components (Ref. 3).- ,

Certain-small break LOCA scenarios require emergency __

feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling until core' a decay' heat can be removed solely _by ECCS cooling.

4

Further, with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated ,

flow path (continued) g , ,

O LCrysta1LRiverUnitL3i B 3.7-41 Amendment No..

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12' Only.

L

\

o i , t

' ^

' ' ' - - - ~ _ _ - Lw . . . . + . ~ . , . . ..n.. . . , a v... ~ , . . - ,, ,

l DC System B 3.7.8 y

BASES, j BACKGROUND inoperable, SWP-1B, train "B" of the Nuclear Services (continued) as well as both Seawater trains of ECCS, Systes,'CHHE-18, Decay Heat Closed and Cyc CHP-1B,le Cooling Water,

-AC= "E ;

Decay Elec;rical HeatPwer Seawater, DistribuEseg:y Diesel Generators, Subsystees, and AC Vital Bus -

o i Subsyttems are required OPERABLE. a t

!' As a closed system, the DC Ststem Elso serves as an intermediate barrier to radibactivity releases to the environment from potential 11aks in interfacing systems. ;

L i

i. i

' APPLICABLE The DC system provfdes coolino for components essential to

. . SAFETY ANALYSIS the mitigation of plant transients and accidents. An ESAS '

initiation signal will start both DC pumps. This ensures that the required cooling capacity is provided to the

- essential equipment following a s;eam line break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, -

or LOCA. The running pumps (100 percent capacity each) in conjunctionwithanassociatedDCheatexchanger,rejecf ,

heat to the Decay Heat Seawater System to ensure the n necessary cooling flow to components required for reactor decay heat removal. By cooling the RB spray pumps and pump motors following a 1.0CA or SLB, the DC system supports the RB Spray System by ensuring the pressure and temperature in 4

-containment are maintained within acceptable limits. The OPERABILITY of the RB Spray System is addressed in LCO 3.6.6 " Reactor Building Spray and Containment Cooling

. . Systems".

?

During normal and post-accident cooldown operations, when

-RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to allow the alignment of the DHR System to the RCS DC System operation F facilitates core heat removal by transferring heat from the DHR System to the Decay Heat Seawater System, c ;

The Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System satisfies

.;. Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO' The requirement-for two DC trains to be OPERABLE assures

. adequate normal and post-accident heat removal from the reactor core and essential components, considering a worst

case single ~ active failure. One of the OPERABILITY -

<4 considerations regarding these independent and-redundant trains-is that each valve in the flow path be in the correct ,

post-accident position. Additionally, each DC pump must_ be capable of being powered from its emergency power supply and c be capable of automatically. starting on an ESAS actuation.

2

.(continued)

~'

(Crystal River Un'it 3 L B 3.7-42 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only

~~

. . = - . . .- - . - - _ - . _ _ _ _ - _ _

.. - . ..-. - _ . . .- - .- - . . . - - - - . . - - . - . . .. ~ .

DC System B 3.7.8 j BASES _(continued)_

f APPLICABILITY -

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the DC System is not a normally operating system, but must be capable of performing its post accident safety functions, which include-providing cooling water to component: required for RCS and containment heat removal. Two independent-100 percent capacity DC .

trains must be OPERABLE to accommodate the design system heat load requirements and satisfy reliability ;

considerations assuming a single failure.

In MODE 4, although RCS temperature and pressure are reduced, there remains sufficient stored energy that the -

occurrence of an accident would necessitate the post-accident cooling functions of the DC System. When temperature and pressure have been reduced sufficiently to allow alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, the DC System .

is no longer required =for post-accident component cooling, ,

but must continue to provide cooling to the DHR heat ;

exchangers. Therefore, two trains of the DC System must remain OPERABLE throughout MODE 4 to ensure emergency

, preparedness and/or decay heat removal, assuming a single active failure.

In MODES 5 and 6, the DC System is in operation performing its normal safety function of RCS decay heat removal. The various means of removing reactor decay heat in MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loo)s - MODE 5, Loops ,

4 Filled"; LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops -~ MODE 5, Loops Not Filled";

LCO 3.9.4, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level"; '

and LCO 3.9.5, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level". In other words, the OPERABILITY requirements for the DC System are determined by the systems it supports.

Therefore, this LCO is not applicable in MODES 5 and 6.

- ACTIONS A d and A.2 With one DC train inoperable, prompt action within I hour -

is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are available for steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency ing feedwater pump and asscciated flow path are not aval able, the capability for core decay heat removal has not been assured and Condition B is applicable. _The operability of -

the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE-4.

- (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3. B 3.7 . . Amendment No.

NOTE . Valid until Cycle 12 Only-- .

...we- n, , -- ad.r.. E,- .-wm -. ~.,we-

DC System. <

B 3.7.8 1

i BASES) ,

IACTIONS All and Al2 (continued) consistent with the Bases for_ Surveillance 3.0.1, -

OPERA 8ILITY is verified by ensuring the associated .

surveillance :

the required (s) has been satisfactorily completed withinfrequenc j '

known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small am :

break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERA 8LE ensures'-

that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat

~

capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the ,

plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.-

Required Action'A.2 is modified by a Note indicating that l 8M ,

the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.5, "RCS Loops - MODE 4," be entered if an inoperable DC !

. train results in an inoperable required DHR loop. This is an exception _to..LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are

taken for an inoperability of a required D4R loop.

With one DC train inoperable, action must be taken to restore the-train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . In this Condition, to perform the heat removal function.the Theremaining 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE DC tra Completion Time for restoring full DC System OPERABILITY is the same as that for the ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the DC System. This Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded _ by the-0PERABLE train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period, o

B.1 and B.2

~

-If tlie inoperable DC train cannot-be-restored to OPERABLE ,

status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must l be placed. in a MODE -in which the:LCO does not apply. - To L

Lt -achieve this status 3.the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3.within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ;and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion. Times. are reasonable,- based on operating experience,-to reach the required-plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without' challenging plant systems.

j.

(continued)

L -

I Crystal _ River l Unit 3; B 3;7-44 Amendment No.

. NOTE - Valid Until Cycle.12 Only-.

Y r _. . . . ._ _. ._._ . _. . . , _

. - _ . . . . =

DC System B 3.7.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 '

REQUIREMENTS .

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation ,

of the DC flow to individual components may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY >

of the DC System.

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power o>erated valves in the SW flow path provides assurance that tie proper flow paths exist for DC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

The valves verified by this SR include valves in the main flow paths and the first normally closed va've in a branch <

line. There are several other exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves outside the RB, relief valves ottside the RB, and (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-44A Amendment No.

DC Systeel i

B 3.7.8:

-t BASES-t

- 4 ss 4

v c *

. THIS PARE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK i

4 e

(

.h (continued)'-

1CrystaliRiver Unit'3- B 3.7-44B- ,-Amendment.No.

,Y _i e

t ,

'{ J' .

t --

g $%. ,- ., c -r-.- ,

4 Nuclear Services-Searnter System B 3.7.9 BASES BACKGROUND The Nuclear Services Seawater System is designed to seismic ;

-(continued) category I requirements, except-for the standpipe drain-line. The design and operation of the Nuclear Services Seawater System along with a list of components served by SW during normal and emergency conditions, can be found in FSAR Section 9.5 (Ref. 2). Following an Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) actuation, SW System flow paths are realigned to provide a reliable source of cooling to essential safeguards equipment which may be supplied by non-safety cooling water systems during normal-operations. To ensure these additional heat loads can be accommodated, both emergency pumps cre started simultaneously by an ESAS signal to provide adequate cooling in the event of a single active failure which disables one emergency pump.

.For certain small break LOCAs with a concurrent loss of offsite power, securing SWP-1A and RWP-2A would provide capability on the emergency diesel generator to load the "A" train low pressure injection pump and other required loads. These pumps would be manually secured and locked out to preclude automatic reinitiation. In these "

situations, SWP-18 and RWP-2B are relied upon to provide continued flow to the SW and Nuclear Services Seawater systems. 3 APPLICABLE The Nuclear Services Seawater System supports the SW System !

SAFETY ANALYSES in providing cooling for components essential to the mitigation of plant transients and accidents. The system has two separate 100 percent capacity underground intake conduits, independent emergency pumps, and underground '

i discharge conduits to allow for a single failure while still providing the required flow. An ESAS signal will start both '

l emergency pumps. This ensures the required cooling capacity is provided to the SW System following a steam line break, )

- steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line i failure, or loss of coolant accident.

The Nuclear Services Seawater System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-47 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Nuclear Services Seawater System ,

1 B 3.7.9.

j

BASEST (continued)

LC0= Tha requirement for the OPERABILITY of the Nuclear Services Seawater System including two emergency nuclear l services !

seawater pumps provides redundancy necessary to ensure the system will provide adequate post-accident heat removal in' the event of a coincident single failure.

t . Emergency nuclear services seawater pump OPERABILITY requires that each be_ capable of being powered from separate OPERABLE emergency buses. OPERABILITY of the associated ,

flow paths requires that each valve in the flow path must be i aligned to permit sea water flow from the intake canal to the SW heat exchangers, and subsequently to the discharge canal.. The OFERABILITY of the SW heat exchangers, required.

L to ensure proper heat removal capability, is addressed. in LCO 3.7.7, " Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water System".

( .

In MODES 1 through 4 the SW and Nuclear Services Saawaterc APPLICABILITY Systems are normally operating systems which must be prepared to provide post-accident cooling for components required for RCS and containment heat removal, equipment

!- essential in prcelding the capability to safely shutdown the plant, and equipment required for adequate spent fuel pool cooling. The Nuclear Services Seawater System must be capable of providing its post-accident cooling assuming a single active failure. Therefore, both emergency pumps are required to be OPERABLE during these MODES.

In MODES 5 and 6, the Nuclear Services Seawater System is not required to be OPERABLE due to the limitations on RCS

. temperature and pressure in these MODES. Additionally, there are no other Technical Specification LCOs supported by

.the system which are applicable during these plant

j. conditions.

-ACTIONS' -A.1 and A.2 o

With train "B"'of the Nuclear Services Seawater System ".

inoperable, pro tpt action must be taken within I hour to-ensure that sufticient capability is available on "A".

train' ,

I

}. - -

.(continued)

,y DV LCrystal; River Unit 3 '

B 3.7-48 Amendment No.

'. "N . NOTE - Valid Until Cycle:12 Only _

H 1 iI ,

c

. - - - ,=

i

, Nuclear Services Seawater System > ;

B 3.7.9: <

! 18ASES ACTIONS- A.1-and A.2 (continued) of emergency diesel generator for RWP-2A in certain-small -

break LOCA scenaries.. In such circumstances,:the motor s driven emergency feedwater pump:would be secured and-the ,

turbine driven emergency feedwater pump would be required OPERABLE to provide steam generator cooling. If the turbine -

driven emergency feedwater wump is not OPERABLE to permit-t securing motor driven emergency feedwater pump, the o

capability for EDG load management -to improve small break -

. LOCA mitigation can not be assured-and Condition C is applicab13. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in Mode 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated g ,~

surveillance (s) has been satisiactorily completed within the required frequency and the equip =ent is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a:small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time i

to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and

- associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will'be taken to confirm EDG load management capability.

The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is poteatially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for-restoring full Nuclear Services

' Seawater System _0PERABILITY is consistent with that for ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the system.

- This Completion Time is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with accepted industry-accepted practice.

, L1

~ With train "B" of the Nuclear Services Seawater System-

- inoperable, action must be taken to restore the pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for restoring full Nuclear Services Seawater System OPERABILITY is consistent with that for ECCS Systems, whose safety. functions =are supported by the system. This

.: Completion Time is base ( on engineering judgement and is-consistent.with accepted industry-accepted practice.

3 m .(continued)-

Crystal River Unit'3 - B.3.7-48A Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only_ .

u *

,-- , -,-._r-. -w _- n--. -m-w.c,..--w -d+. -.,.4 , . , , ,.ww . ----w. v.-.,w < -~--, - - - +

Nuclear Services' Seawater System 'l

.B 3.7.9 i

BASES.

i I

e a

-THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

.i l

a

.i l

(continued) l

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-488- Amendment No. j l

-l i

. -- _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . .- .. .. .- - .. - -~

Nuclear Services Searater System B 3.7.9 BASES ACTIONS [.1 and C.2 lhelt (continued) ,

If the inoperable emergency nuclear services seawater pump cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.9.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the seawater flow to individual components may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the Nuclear Services Seawater System.

4 Verifying the correct alignment for manual valves in the nuclear services seawater flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist to support SW operation. This -

SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. The valves verified by this SR include valves in ,

the main flow paths and the first normally Llosed valve in a branch line. There are several other exceptions for. valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which ,

are not vorified as part of this SR include vent or drain vatves, relief valves, instrumentation valves, and sample line valves. . This SR also does not apply to valves which cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in .

their correct positica.

The 31 day frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve ,

operation, and ensures correct valve positions. l

}

(continued)

Crystal.. River Unit 3 8 3.7-49 Amendment No. ,

- NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only l l

l

Nuclear Services Scarater System B 3.7.9 BASES j SURVEILLANCE 1R 3.7.9.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) ThisSRverifiesproperautomaticoperationoftheemergencyl ,

nuclear services seawater pumps on an actual or simulated )

actuation signal. The RW System is a normally operating i system that cannot be fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the j conditions that apply during a plant outage and the :

potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance )

were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

The SR is modified by a note indicating the SR is not '

applicable in the identified MODE. This is necessary in order to make the requirements for automatic system response consistent with those for the actuation instrumentation. ;

REFERENCES 1. Enhanced Design Basis Document for Nuclear Services and )

Decay Heat Seawater System, Revision 2, November 21, 1991 including temporary Change 193 dated April 8, 1992.

2. FSAR, Section 9.5.

3. FSAR, Section 14.2.2.

4. Enhanced Design Basis Document for Nuclear Services

-Closed Cycle Cooling Water System, Revision 2, July 29, 1992.

.m Crystal: River Unit 3 B 3.7-50 Amendment No.

__ ____.__ ~ _ . _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ ._. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _

Decay Heat Sea:ater System !

B 3.7.10 l

BASES 4

7 CACKGROUND Certain small break LOCA scenarios require emergency (continued) feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling until core ;

decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling.

Further, with the turbine driven EFW pump and associated ;

flow path inoperable. SWP 1B, train 'B' of the Nuclear ,

Services Seawater System, CHHE-1B and CHP-18, as well as mit i both trains of ECCS, Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Decay Heat Seawater, Emergency Diesel Genera; ors. l AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and AC Vital :

Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE. ,

APPLICABLE The Decay Heat Seawater System supports the DC System in SAFETY ANALYSIS providing cooling for components essential to the mitigation cf plant transients and accidents. The system has two separate 100 percent capacity underground intake conduits, independent pumps, and underground discharge conduits to provide for a single failure while still providing required flow. An ESAS initiation signal will start both decay heat ,

seawater punps u)on low Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and/or ligh containment pressure. This ensures '

that the required cooling capacity is provided to the DC System for cooling of components required for reactor heat ;

removal following a steam line break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, or loss of coolant r:cident.

During normal and post accident cooldown operations, when RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to allow the alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, the Decay Heat Seawater System is placed in service to support decay heat removal.

The Decay Heat Seawater System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. i i

LCOs The requirement for OPERABILITY of both decay heat seawater l trains provides redundancy necessary to ensure the system !

will provide adequate post-accident heat removal in the ;

event of a coincident single failure.

A

~

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-52 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only a ), lb' y . . .. .- _ _ _ _ . __ - _o

Decay Heat Searater System B 3.7.10 BASES LCOs The OPERABILITY of the decay heat seawater pumps requires (continued) that they each be capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus. Each valve in the flow path must be in its correct position for permitting sea water flow from the intake canal to the DC heat exchangers, and subsequently to the discharge canal. The OPERABILITY of the DC System, required to ensure proper heat removal capability, is addressed in LCO 3.7.8, " Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System." 1 APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3 the DC and Decay Heat Seawater Systems may not be operating, but must be prepared to perform post-accident safety functions, which include providing cooling water to components required for RCS and containment heat removal. The Decay Heat Seawater System must be capable of providing its post accident cooling assuming a single failure. Therefore, both pumps are required to be OPERABLE during these MODES. In MODE 4, although RCS temperature and pressure are reduced, there remains sufficient stored energy that the occurrence of an accident would necessitate the post-accident cooling functions of the DC and Decay Heat Seawater Systems. When temperature and pressure have been reduced sufficiently to allow alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, the Decay Heat Seawater System is no longer needed for post accident component cooling, but must provide cooling to the DC heat exchangers for cooldown and holding operations. Therefore, two trains of the Decay Heat Seawater System must remain OPERABLE throughout MODE 4 to ensure emergency preparedness and/or decay heat removal, assuming a single failure. In MODES 5 and 6 the DHR, DC, and Decay Heat Seawater Systems are in operation performing their normal safety function of RCS decay heat removal. The various means of removing reactor decay heat in MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 5. Loops Filled"; LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled"; LCO 3.9.4, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level"; and LCO 3.9.5, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level". In other words, the OPERABILITY requirements for the DC System cre determined by the systems it supports. Therefore, this particular LCO is not applicable in MODES 5 and 6. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7 53 Amendment No.

Decay Heat Searater System 8 3.7.10 BASES (continued) . , ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With one Decay Heat Seawater train inoperable, prompt action is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLL for steam generator cooling, if the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are not OPERABLE, the capability to remove core decay heat can not be ' assured and Condition B is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4. noit Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABIL11Y is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable. Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions. Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note indicating that Inoit the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.5, 'RCS Loops - MODE 4," should be entered if an inoperable decay heat seawater train results in an inoperable required DHR loop. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for an inoperability of a required DHR loop. + If one of the decay heat seawater trains is inoperable, ' action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, in this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. The 72 hour Completion Time for restoring full Decay Heat Seawater System OPERABILITY is the same as that for the ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the Decay Heat Seawater System. This Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this l period. (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-54 Amendment No, t NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only l l

           - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _                             .__.-.__ _ _ . _ .___.._. _._ _ .m.

k. 1 h

Decay Heat Seacater System i B 3.7.10 i l 1 BASES l i

 ,              ACTIONS                  R.1 and R.2                                                                   !

l (continued) l If the incperable decay heat seawater train cannot be i restored to DPERABLE status within the associated Completion : Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO i does.not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be ! placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 l within 36 hours. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant l conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner , and without challenging plant systems, j SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual valves in the , Decay Heat Seawater System flow path provides assurance that j 4 the proper flow paths exist for )C o This SR does - not apply to valves that are locked,peration. sealed, or otherwise ' i secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing or securing. The valves verified by this SR include valv,es in the main flow paths and the first normally closed valve in a branch line. There are several other exceptions for valve position ; verification due to the low potential ~ for these types of-valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which are not , verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves, relief valves, instrumentation valves, and sample line valves. This SR also does not apply to valves which cannot ! j

(continued) { i LCrystal RiverzUnit'3- Bl3.7 54A Amendment No. ; j

   . .   .           . a . a.          -   . - -      .- .      . - .a =         .    . -      .        ..         --

l Decay Heat Seawater Systes ; B 3.7.10 l SASES f THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK r. (continued) Crystal 1 River Unit':3. B 3.7-548; Amendment No.

i

i CREVS l B 3.7.12 , 1 BASES : LCO c. ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air (continued) circulation can be maintained. The ability to maintain temperature in the Control Complex is addressed in Technical Specification 3.7.18. l i APPLICABillTY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREVS must be OPERASLE to L ensure that the control com>1ex will remain habitable during and following a postulated )BA During movement of , irradiated fual assemblies, the CREVS must be OPERABLE to cope with a release due to a fuel handling accident. ACTIONS M With one CREVS train ino>erable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPEMBLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREVS train is adequate to perform the control room radiation protection function. . However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE CREVS train could result in loss of CREVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability. B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in-

                          -MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued) Crystal River Unit 3 -8 3.7 63 Amendment No. H

Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 g l 8 3.7 . PLANT SYSTEMS l t 8 3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System

     ~ BASES                                                                                                         j BACKGROUND              The Control Complex Cooling System provides temperature control for the control room and other portions of the l  ;

Control Complex containing safety related equipment. t TheControlComplexCoolingSystemconsistsoftworedundant t chillers and associated ch.11ed water pumps that provide , cooling of recirculated control complex air. Redundant , chillers and chilled water pumps are provided for suitable ' temperature conditions in the control complex for operatin6-personnel and safety related control equipment. The Control , Complex Cooling System maintains the nominal temperature l between 70*F and 80'F. ! A single chiller and associated chilled water pump will provide the required temperature control for either heat ' exchanger. The Control Complex Cooling System operation to maintain control complex temperature is discussed in the i FSAR,Section9.7(Ref.1). l For certain small break LOCAs with a concurrent loss of offsite power, it is necessary to provide capability on , the emergency diesel generator to load the "A" train low i pressure injection pump and other required loads. In unt ! these situations, C@l8 and CHP-18 would be relied upon to provide required cooling. ! i f APPLICABLE The Control Complex Cooling System consists of redundant, SAFETY ANALYSIS safety related components, with some common piping. The Control Complex Cooling System maintains the temperature , between 70'F and 80'F. A single-active failure of a Control Complex Cooling System component does not impair the ability of the system to perform as designed. The Control - Complex Cooling System is designed in accordance with~ . Seismic Category I requirements. The Control Complex I Cooling System is capable of removing heat loads from the control room and other portions of the Control Complex l containing safety related equipment, including consideration

of equipment-heat loads and , (continued) l

     ' Crystal River Unit 3-B 3.7                            Amendment No.
                                                                -NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only i

% ,a- , a -, ;.a a..- ...-.4- a ,...., . ,u .. _ - . . , _ - . _ _ . , _ ..; _

Control Complex Cooling System 1 B 3.7.18 j BASES APPLICABLE personnel occupancy requirements, to ensure equipment SAFETY ANALYSIS OPERABILITY. (continued) The Control Complex Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO Two redundant heat exchangers and two redundant chillers and associated pumps of the Control Com> lex Cooling System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure t1st at least one of each is available, assuming a single failure disables one redundant component. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits. The Control Complex Cooling System is considered OPERABLE when the individual redundant components that are necessary to maintain control complex temperature are OPERABLE. These components include the cooling coils, water cooled condensing units, and associated temperature control instrumentation. In addition, the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to the extent that air circulation can be maintained (See Specification 3.7.12). , APPLICABillTY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control complex temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY requirements. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to cope with a release due to a fuel handling accident. ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With the CHHE-18 or CHP-1B inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path is " OPERABLE to (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7 86 Amendment No. NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

     ~ _ _ . _ _. _ _. _ _.._.__ _ ._._... _. _                                                        _

L e Control Complex Cooling System 5 3.7.18 ; i

BASES j I

I ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) t provide steam generator cooling. If the-turbine' driven I emergency feedwater pug and associated flow path are not : OPERABLE, the capability to provide EDG load management for ~ small break LOCA mitigation improvement cannot be assured

;                                                     and Condition D is applicable. The operability of the                                -

turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in ' MODE 4. Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break l LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time + to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and , associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prom >t , action will be taken to provide the capability for EDG

 >                                                    loed management for small break LOCA mitigation                           um improvement. The Completion Time minimizes the time the                              !
                                                                                                                                           ?

plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions. ; Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, ' OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be ineperable. !

>                                                     With CHHE-18 or CHP-18 inoperable, action must be taken to restore its OPERABLE status within 72 hours. in this                                 -

Condition, the remaining OPERA 8LE Control Complex Cooling - System redundant components are adequate to maintain the control complex temperature within limits. However, the ' overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the ; OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling System components could , result in a loss of Control Complex Cooling System function. i The 72 hour Completion Time is sased on the low probability l of an event occurring requiring the Control Complex Cooling : System and the consideration that the remaining redundant components can provide the required capabilities. ,

+.

I: i f (continued) Crystal' River Unit 3- 8 3.7 - Amendment'No.

                                                                                        -NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only--

.y

       <m                                                                                                                                -)
      ,y          ,~ ,         ,m      -g.-       . .g..,w,~_.,_.,_,,~_.-.a_n                     .-_.__c   ..;.._...-,__.__a.. _ . -

i Control Complex Ceoling System . B 3.7.18 j BASES i ACTIONS AJ li (continued) With CHHE 1A, CHP 1A or one Control Com>1ex Cooling heat i exchanger inoperable, action must be taten to restore : OPERABI.E status within 7 days. In this Condition, the , remaining OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling System equipment is adequate to maintain the control complex temperature ; within limits. However, the overall reliability is reduced . because a failure in the OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling . M System redundant components could result in a loss of . Control Complex Cooling System function. The 7 day ; Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event ! occurring requiring the Control Complex Cooling System and the consideration that the remaining components can provide

                                             - the required capabilities.                                                             ,

C.1 and C.2 , During movement of irradiated fuel, if the required Action i and Completion Times of Condition A or. Condition B can not-be met, the Control Complex Cooling System must be placed in i operation immediately. This action ensures that the remaining Control' Complex Cooling System components are , OPERABLE, and that any active failure will be readily detected. An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that could release radioactivity that . might require the. isolation of the control room. This : places the plant in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the move:mnt of fuel to a safe ; position. ; I

i l

l

                                                                                                                                     'I q

(continued). 1 Crystal- River Unit 3' 8 3.7-88 JAmendment No. I NOTE- - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only_ 1 i c.,.., n. . , - . . .. A . . ,,,,.;,... ,,..,,,...,,.n.-._.-,w...,,,-.~..,,,,-.....n~-,-... ._-..--.__...-...u.a_.--,D

Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 BASES : ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoparable Control Complex Cooling System component cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Com)1stion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the .00 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full : power conditions in an orderly manner without challenging i unit systems. L1 If any combination of components that would render the Control Complex Cooling System not capable of performing the intended function, the unit is in a condition outside tlie accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately. L1 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, with any combination of components inoperable that would render the Control Complex Cooling System not capable of performing the intended function, action must be taken to immediately sus >end activities that could release radioactivity that mig 1t require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3- B 3.7-89 Amendment No.

Control Complex Cooling System ! B 3.7.18 : BASES (continued)

i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.18.1 l i REQUIREMENTS Verifying that each Control Complex Cooling chiller's ! developed head at the flow test >oint is greater than or equal to the required developed tend ensures that chiller's performance has not degraded during the cycle. . Flow and : differential pressure are nomal tests of centrifugal pump performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref. ; 3). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve t and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal p formance. The Frequency of the SR is in accordance with t- Inservice Testing Program. , SR 3.7.8.2 This SR verifles that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to meet design requirements. This SR consists of a combination of test'ng and calculations. An 24 month Frequency is appropriate, as significant - degradation of the system is slow and is not expected over i this time period. j 1 FSAR, Section g.7. ~ REFERENCES 1.

2. FT! 51 1266138 01, Safety Analysis input to Startup m Team Safety Assessment.

3. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI. l Crystal ~ River Unit 3-- B 3.7-90. Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only

                .awrw ,,<- e   , ~ - + n      -  e     m          wwr   er -c -r-   a+ ~ ~ -n,e        -  r  ~ --

r w --

-n

I AC Sources-Operating 8 3.8.4 8ASES BACKGROUND-Certain small break LOCA scenarios require emergency feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling untti core (continued) Further, decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling. with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path inoperable, SWP 18, train "B" of the Nuclear Services Seawater System, CHHE-1B and CHP 18, as well as both trains of ECCS, Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Decay Heat Seawater, Emergency Diesel Generators, AC " Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and AC Vital Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE. With ASV 204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 inoperable, Train 'B' Emergency Olesel Generators, Train "B" AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and Train "B' AC Vital Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE. (continued) 8 3.8 2A Amendment No. Crystal River Unit 3 NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only

B (cont \nued) X , 3.... _ -wr a _ - -

r l AC $0urces-Operating !

                                                                                                         - B 3.8. :           !

I f BASES

i i i f t i s THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK r i { i h i t (continued) ,

Crystal River Unit 3: :8-3,8-28 Amendment-No. ;

k b[ _

4 I AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 , i BASES BACKGROUNG Provided an ES signal is present, certain required ES loads i (continued) are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order i to prevent overloading the EDG in the process. Within 35 : seconds after the initiating signal is received, all 1 cads ; needed to recover the plant or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service. The service ratings of the EDG are: ; e 0 to 2850 kw on a continuous basis

                  . 2851 to 3200 kw on a cumulative 2000 hour basis           !
                  . 3201 to 3400 kw on a cumulative 200 hour basis            I
                  . 3401 to 3500 kw on a cumulative 30 minute basis.          I Loads powered from the 4160 V ES buses are listed in Reference 2.

Steady state load does not include loads imposed by the starting of motors such as during block loading, and short , duration loatis such as motor operated valves, battery charger surges, and short duration pump surge flows. Loads imposed by the starting of motors are not included in the service ratings and are less than the EDG manufacturer limits of 3910 kW for such loading. APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses SAFETY ANALYSES in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 5), ' assume ES systems are OPERABLE. The_AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ES systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems. l (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 - B 3.8-3 Amendment No.

l

-rw

AC Sources-Operatin , B 3.8. BASES APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the AC electric 41 power sources is ! SAFETY ANALYSIS consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident (continued) analyses and the design basis of the plant. This results in maintaining at least one train of the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all_ onsite AC 1 powers and i

t (continued)' Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-3A Amendment No.

AC Sources-Operating B 3.B.1

                                                                                                'l BASES                                                                                   !

I i : I i j 1 THl$ PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK i t

                                                                                        )         ,
                                                                                          ,      i 1

F t Y (continued) y LCrystal River l Unit 3 B 3.8 38 Amendment No..- 1

[_ 6" ,

AC Sources-Operating 8 3.8.1 ! BASES I ACTIONS M (continued) additional 72 hours (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to ! complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified

condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently.

As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an : exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the ; allowed outage time " clock." This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time that the LCO was i initiall entered.y not met, instead of at the time Condition A was M i To ensure a highly reliable power source in the event one EDG is inoperable, it is necessary to verify the + availability of the OPERABLE offsite circu'ts on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies i

                  " perform." a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met (Condition F).

However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is ' inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional : Conditions and Reqqired Actions must then be entered. l i M With Train "A" EDG inoperable, prom)t action within I hour

is necessary to ensure that the turaine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are available for "

steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated tiow path are not available, the capability for core decay heat removal has not been assured and Condition H is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required 2 in PODE 4. (continued) , Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8 8 Amendment No. NOTE - Valid Until. Cycle 12 Only i

         -. t

l' AC Sources-0p. rating l

8 3.8.1 1 l

i. ',

              . BASES
                        -                                        -                                                                                  i ACTIONS                        M (continued)                                                                                        l i

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, ! = OPERASILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s)hasbeensatisfactorilycompletedwithinthe required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known i- to be inoperable. f Due to the severity of the consequences should .a small i break LOCA occur.in these conditions, the I hour Completion ! Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump l and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt- nort 1 action will be taken to confirm core decay heat capability. -j The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is i

potentially exposed to-a LOCA in these conditions, j M i

! Required Action B.3 is intended to provide assurance that a . ! loss of offsite power, during the period that a EDG-is : inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety j function of critical redundant required features. These ; features are designed with redundant safety related trains. i Redundant required feature failures consist of inoperable i features associated with a train, redundant to the train i that has an inoperable EDC. Singletrainsystems(froman ; electrical perspective), such as the turbine driven ; ^ emergency feedwater pump, are not included. The Com:1stion Time for Required Action B.3 is intended to-- l "HE allow t te operator time to evaluate and repair any i discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also -J allows for an exception to the normal ' time zero" for . beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required ! Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that i boths. !

                                              -a. An EDG is-inoperable; and                                                                   j

b. A required feature on the other train is inoperable'. ,

"                                                                                                                                                   i Ifatanytimeduring-theexistenceofthisCondition(one EDG ino>erable) a required feature subsequently becomes                                           1 inoperasle,-this Completion Time begins to be tracked, m:                                                                                                                                              _;

(continued); j l

               ! Crystal} River-Unitl3,                                     .8 3.8-9                                 Amendment No.                  .
                                                                                                     -: NOTE _-Valid Until Cycle.12 Only l
                -~        _.            m . _-              _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ ,                                     _ _ _ .a

l

  '                                                                                                               AC Sources-Operating                                  j B 3.8.;                         ;
,                         BASES                                                                                                                                      i
.                        ACTIONS             L1 (continued)                                                                                            l wit            j
 ;                                           Declaring the required features inoperable within four hours from the discovery of items 'a' and 'b' existing                                                                          I d

concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to l

                                             'ransients associated with-shutdown.                                                                                       !

4 i In this Condition, the remaining OPERA 8LE-EDG and offsite : circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E distribution system. Thus, on a compor,ent . basis, single failure protection for the required feature's ! function may have been lost however. function has not been i lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the i OPERA 8ILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable .j required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time i takes into' account the capacity and capability of the . i remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the , low probability of a DBA occurring during this period, j l B.4.1 and B.4.2 J mit Required Action B.4.1 provides an option to testing the l OPERABLE EDG'in order to avoid unnecessary testing. If it 1 can be determined that the cause of the inoperable EDG does , not exist on the OPERABLE EDG, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to : be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on the other EDG,- the other EDG would be declared inoperable upon ! discovery and Condition E of LC0 3.8.1 would be entered, if the common cause failure evaluation is indeteminate (the cause of the initial' inoperable EDG cannot be confirmed not toexistontheremainingEDG),performanceofSR'3.8.1.2is ] adequate to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of ' that EDG. ; The Completion Time of 24 hours is reasonable to confirs I

                                           -that the OPERABLE EDG is not affected by the same problem' as                                                                I the inoperable EDG and is based on the recommendations of                                                                   ;

GenericLetter8415(Ref.7). ! J i I l l

                                                                                                                                -(continued)                             l
                                                                                                                                                                    .J Crystal- River Unit 3:                       -8 3.8-10                                .

Amendment No. . NOTE ~ Valid Until Cycle 12 Only ,l 1 -, l

        ..A                                                   ___,C..                                          C         . , . . . , , . .. . , ; . ~ ; . _ , _ , ;

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS M l mt (continued) According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 JRef. 6 limited)loaperiodnottoexceed72 hours. operation with one EDG inoperab in Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE EDG and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class IE distribution system. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the a reasonable time for repairs, and remaining AC sources,f the low probability o a DBA occurring during this period. The second Completion Time for Required Action B.5 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any I *L combination ,,f required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failure to meet the LCO. Refer to the Bases for Required Action A.3 for additional information on this Completion Time. C.I. C.2. C.3. C.4. and C.5 Refer to the Bases for Actions B.1, B.3, B.4 and B.5 for thediscussionforthecorrespondingBasesofRequired Action C. For Action C.2 with Train "B" EDG ino)erable, prompt action withinIhourIsnecessarytoensuret1attheturbinedriven emergency feedwater pump, associated flow path, ASV-204, EfV-12, and EFV 13 are available for steam generator cooling. If the required equipment is not available, the capability for core decay heat removal has not been assured "E and Condition H is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4. Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance s required freq(ue)nchas been satisfactorily completed within the to be inoperable.y and the equipment is not otherwise known Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-10A Amendment No. NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 BASES l THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued):- l

            - Crystal- River Unit = 3 8 3.8-108-                  Amendment No.

I R

               -.      -        -       -      - _ - . .          ~              _         -.

i AC S:urces-Operating B 3.8.1 l BASES ACTIONS D.1 and 0.2 l mit (continued) I mit Required Action D.1, which a> plies when both required offsite circuits are inoperasle, is intended to provida assurance that a DBA, coincident with a worst case single failure, will not result in a complete loss of redundant ; required safety functions. The Completion Time for declaring the redundant required features inoperable is 12 hourst reduced from that allowed for one trein without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is no longer valid, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains. Single train features (from an electrical perspective), such as the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump, are not included. The Comaletion Time for Required Action 0.1 is intended to i "TE allow tie operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completien Time also allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. All required offsite circuits are inoperable; and

b. A required feature is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition C (two offsite circuits irioperable) a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-11 Amendment No. NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

i l AC Sources-0perating i 83.8.1-BASES l ACTIONS .D.1 and D.2 (continued) lnm , According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.g3

                                     , operation with two required offsite circuits (Ref. 6)le should be limited to a period not to exceed Snoperab                                                                                         :

24 hours. In this condition, the offsite electrical power t system does'not have the capability to effect a safe , shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; : however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This i level of degradation gener.ily corresponds to a total loss i of the immediately accessible offsite power sources. ; Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combina4 tons of two AC sources inoperable i that involve one or more EDGs inoperable. However, two ; factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of ; degradation: ;

a. The configuration of the rededant AC electrical power ;

system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and ;

b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that ,

required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source. With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the

unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a D8A or transient. In fact, the simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources coincident with a LOCA, and a worst-case single failure were postulated as a part of the original licensing basis. Thus, the 24 hour Completion Time provides a period +

of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC : electrical power system capable of meeting its design , criteria. I (continued)' i!

Crystal River Unit 3l 83.812 Amendment No. E NOTE (Valid Until: Cycle 12 Only 'j

    .                   . v .,    ,    _ _ _ _ . . - - _  .  - - _ _ _ _ _ , - . _ _ . _                _._.._..a       __

l 1 AC Sources-Operating , B 3.8.: l i BASES ,

                                                                                                                                          .j ACTIONS-                                 D.1 and D.2 (continued)                                                      l en     l' r                                                       If one required offsite source is restored within 24 hours poweroperationmaycontinueinaccordancewiththerequirk

Actions of Condition A.

L1 With is necessary1 rain "A" toEDG ensureinoperable that t $e turzine driven 6 argencypros)t action feedwater pump-and associate 6 flow path are available for - steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency ) ' feedwater p and associated flow path are not avai able, the capabil for core decay heat removal has not been assured and C ndition H is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4. Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillanca og i the required (s) has been satisfactorily completed withinfreque known to be inoperable. 4 Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Tiw to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions. E.2 and E.3 Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6 the distribution system ACTIONS would not be entered If the de energization of the busses was due to all AC sources to them being inoperable. the Required Actions of Condition E are modified en Therefore, by a Note indicating that when Condition Eris entered with no AC sources"to one train,-the Conditions and Required Actions for LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems-Operating,"- Ien must be immediately entered.; < This allows Condition E to ~

                                                     - provide reoutrements for the' loss of one offsite circuit-
                                                    " and one EDG whether or not a train is de energized.                                  I

,~ LC0 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a

                                                    ; de energized train.

t (continued)L Crystal River ' Unit 3 B 3.8 Amendment-No,'-

                                                                                               . NOTE - Valid'Until Cycle 12 only-3 6  v,-    -
                     , , . .y . .

AC Sources-0perating - .; ~ B . 3.8.1 - ; i BASES-ACTIONS- E.2 and'E.3 (continued) [ ent According: to the recommendations of Reg'ulatory Guide' 1.93- 1 (Ref. 6),: operation with one onsite and one cffsite circuit inoperable should be limited to a period not:to- ;

 !                                     exceed 12 hours.                                                                              >

l In Condition E, 'adividual redundancy is lost in both the l WTE offsite electrica power system and.the onsite AC * , electrical power ystem. However, since power system

redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power it may appear the reliability of the power systems in this--

Condition is higher than that in Condition D (loss of both I "TE i requiredoffsitecircuits). This is not necessarily the-case since this difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a ' i single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time f:r repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. f.d With Train "B" EDG inoperable, prom >t action within 1 hour - is necessary to ensure that the tur>ine driven emergency feedweter pump and associated flow path are a.ailable for steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven emergency "TE feedwater pump, associated flow path, ASV-204,: EFV-12,- and F EFV-13.are not available, the capability for core decay

heat removal has not been assured and Condition-H is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4. 3 Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY.is-verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s)hasbeensatisfactorilycompletedwithinthe required frequency and'the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.-

Due to' the. severity of the consequences should a small break - lLOCA occur lin these condittors, the I hour Completion Time to verify the turbir.e driven emergency feedwater pump and

associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be-taken to confirm core. decay heat capability. The Completion Time minimizes the-time the. plant is potentially l5 -exposed to a LOCA in-these conditions.

L h (continued)- l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8 _ _ _ Amendment No. NOTE . : Valid Until Cycle 12 Only i*

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS F.2 and f.3 (continued) mit Refer to the Bases for Actions E.2 and E.3 for the discussion for the corresponding Bases of Required Actions F.2 and F.3. L1 l mit With the Train A and Train B EDGs inoperable, there are no qualifiet onsite standby AC sources. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, there would not be sufficiant standby AC sources available to power the minimum required ES systems. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time is balanced with that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC powel). However, since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation. The 2 hour Completion Time is consistent with the recommendations of Reference 6. H.1 and H.2 l "TE If the inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without shallenging plant systems. (continued) Crystal' River Unit 3 B 3.8-14A' Amendment No. NOTE - Valtd Until Cycle 12 Only

                                     . ) () I' f                                                                 4,.'-                          }

q_y <

                                    ' [:i: b 3  -

t , .! AC- Sources-0peratin' g ! i- ' B ' 3. 8.1.. 1 o

                               - BASES                                                                                                        _,
                                                                                                                                                 +

a- , i

.}

d

                                                                                                                                              .i P

i i I k 4 E THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK , r i M F 4 .~.Y ~

  ;,          i        ~         ~"

(continued) W- - - Crysta12 River Unit 3 '

                                                                                     . B 3.8-14B               Amendment No.
  ' =-           -' (.

t

                             ?
                                                                                                                                        +

e * * *I =e-e <+ , e e v- t" 3

l l AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS- -

                   .L1                                                               l mit (continued)

Condition I corresponds to a level of degradation in which l wit all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any subsequent failures in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function condition, and potentially, a station blackout. Therefore, the unit is required to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately and prepare for a controlled shutdovn. SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and REQUIREMENTS testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function. This is consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref 8). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during outages (under simulated accident conditions). Where the SRs for this LCO specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following is applicable. The minimum steady state output voltage of 3933 V is 94.5% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage. This value allows for voltage drops to motors and other equipment down through the 120 V level where minimum operating voltage is usually specified as 85% to 90% of name plate rating. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 4400 V is equal to the maximum o>erating voltage specified for 4000 V motors. It ensures t1at for a lightly lor.ded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 4000 V motors is no more than the maximum rated operating voltages. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the EDG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to i 2% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations given in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). Regulatory Guide 1.9 requirements are satisfied by monitoring EDG output. SR 3.8.1.1 This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-15 Amendment No. NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 i BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.4 REQUIREMENTS-(continued) This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is adequate. The level is expressed as an equivalent usable volume in gallons, and is selected to I ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of I hour of EDG operation at a loading which bounds the postulated worst case accident. The 31 day frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and an automatic level control system is included in the design. SR 3.8.1.5 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil , transfer pump operates automatically to transfer fuel oil l from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. l This is required to support continuous operation of the EDG. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil : transfer ) ump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is ! intact, tie fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the l controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer are OPERABLE. The design of fuel transfer systems is such that pumps will operate automatically in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day tanks during or following EDG operation. The 31 day Frequency is based upon engineering judgement and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience. SR 3.8.1.6 See SR 3.8.1.2.

                -SR 3.8.1.7 Transfer of each 4160 V ES bus prwer supply from the normal offsite circuit to the required aiternate offsite circuit demonstrates the capability of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-18 Amendment No.

AC Sources-Operating i B 3.8.1 *

                 . BASES                                                                                                           j SURVEILLANCE                   SR    3.8.1.7 -(continued)-

REQUIREMENTS-24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration plant-conditions needed to perform the ' Surveillance. Operating experience has shown the 24 month frequency to be adequate.. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. SR 3.8.1.8 Each EDG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to-the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load'could cause diesel . engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of

!                                                 the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the EDG load

response characteristics-and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. For the CR-3 EDGs, the largest single 1 load is less than 750 kW. The surveillance test will have a minimum rejected load of 750 kW. According to IEEE-308

(Ref. 13), the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the i- difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15%'above synchronous speed, whichever is r lower. For CR-3, the acceptance criteria of 66.75 Hz is based on 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint. The tirise, voltage, and frequency tolerances specified in this SR are derived from Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) recommendations for response . during load sequence intervals. The 3 seconds specified for voltage is equal to_60% the 5 second load sequence interval

                                                - associated with sequencing-of: the largest load.-- Four                             ,

seconds for frequency is-likewise based on Regulatory Guide l'.9 recommendations. .SR 3.8.1.8.a corresponds to.the , maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.8.b and , E ' SR 3.8.1.8.c are Regulatory Guide 1.9 specific voltage and i frequency values to which the system must recover to following load rejection. Regulatory Guide 1.9 specifies nominal' voltage and frequency values which are 4160V and 60 Hz respectively. The 24 month Frequency: takes into t . consideration: plant conditions required to perform the " Surveillance and-is intended.to be consistent.with expected fuel cycle lengths. 1 (continued) i

                ' Crystal River Unit 3-                             =B 3.8-19                       Amendment.No.                 -i
                                                                                                                                   .l r

4 . ,. ., ._ .. , -_: , . , -. _ _;;,., _.__..__- __ . - _ _

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.10 (continued) REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the EDGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the EDGs may be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations for EDGs. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would j remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and potentially challenge safety systems. However, Note 2 acknowledges that should an unplanned event occur in MODES 1, 2 or 3, following verification that the acceptance criteria of the SR are met, the event can be credited as a successful performance of this SR. Note 3 is an SR 3.0.4 type allowance to place the plant in MODE 4 for the purposes of performing this Surveillance. This is necessary in order to establish the pre-requisite plant configuration needed to perform the SR. SR 3.8.1.11 This Surveillance demonstrates the EDGs are capable of synchronizing and accepting a load greater than or equal to the maximum expected steady state accident loads, which are the automatically connected accident loads and required i manually ap)1ied accident loads. However, the upper limit of the 2001our service rating is still available for flexibility in post accident EDG load management, including short duration loads. The test load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the EDGs. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections, in accordance with vendor recommendations, in order to maintain l EDG OPERABILITY. The 60 minute run time is provided to. stabilize the engine temperature. This ensures that cooling and lubrication are adequate for extended periods of operation. The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration plant

                   -conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. The reason for Note 2 is that during (continued) I Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-22 Amendment No.

   ~      __            ._         _ , . _ .                        _ _._ _ _ ___ ___. _ ._ _ _ _ _ _._ _ ._
                                                                                                                                                                                  -t l4
                                                                                      - Diesel Fuel 011, Lube Oil, Land Starting Air                                                :

B 3.8.3-B 3.8z ELECTRICAL-POWER SYSTEMS'

                  -B 3.8.3E Diesel l Fuel 011, Lube Oil, and Starting Air
                                                                                                                                                                                  ]
                  -BASES-1
                  -BACKGROUND                                                                                                    is provided with a                                 1 Each fuel oilemergency storage tank.           diesel  Thegenerator combtned-       (EDG) fuel oil capacity of                             .

4- both storage tanks is sufficient to operate one diesel for a-I period of 7 days while the EDG is supplying the upper limit of its. 200-hour rating (Ref. - 1). The fuel oil supply is- l

                                                 = calculated using the assumption that one EDG is available                                                                        ;

+ - to supply-sufficient post accident-loads. In certain small break LOCA scenarios, both ED(is are relied upon for un accident mitigation. This onsite' fuel oil capacity _. i ensures adequate time is available-to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources prior to the diesel running out of fuel. Fuel oil is transferred from the storage tank.to the day > tank by either of two transfer pumps associated with each EDG. The pumps and piping are redundant to preclude failure > of one pump, or the rupture of any pipe, valve or tank resulting in the loss of.more than one EDG. All outside-tanks and piping are located underground to preclude , consideration of the effects of missiles in their design. ! For proper operation of the EDGs it is necessary to ensure ; theproperqualityofthefueloll. CR-3 has a Diesel Fuel Oil (DFO) Testing Program which is an overall effort to ~ ensure the quality of the fuel oil. The program includes purchasing, on-site receipt acceptance testing of new fuel, offsite analysis of new fuel: accepted, and periodic testing

                                                    - (both onsite and offsite) of the stored fuel oil.

Additionally, the program-includes water removal and biocide i addition to control- bacteriological growth, and performance checks of the cathodic. protection system for underground

                                                 - storage tanks. CR-3 is not committed to Regulatory Guide 1.137 or ANS 59.51-                                                , however, these standards wereutilizedasgu(ANSIN195)hedevelopmentofthe_DF0 ndance in t

Testing Program.

The EDG lube oil subsystem 1:: designed to provide sufficient -

1ubrication to permit proper operation-of--its associated EDG under all loading conditions. The system is required to circulate' the lube oil' to the diesol' engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated by friction during.

n (continued)

Crystal River Unit"3 :B 3.8 . -

                                                                                                                                      ' Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only;

     ,s
     ,       , .,          e,o   #            m - . . - - _ .     -         -.m...                          ~     . - - _ ~              ..      - ~ . - _ + ~ - -    - _ _ . - -

Diesel fuel 011, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES BACKGROUND o >eration. The onsite lube oil storage, in addition to (continued) t1at contained in the engine sump, is sufficient to ensure 7 days of one EDG supplying the upper limit of its 200- 1 hour rating. In certain small break LOCA scenarios, both EDGs are relied upon for accident mitigation. This supply mTE ensures adequate time is available to replenish lube oil from outside sources prior to the EDG running out of lube oil. Each EDG has an air start system with adequate capacity for six successive start attempts on the EDG without recharging the air start receivers. A single EDG start is assured with air receiver pressure i 150 psig. Additional evaluations have been performed whTch indicate there is substantial margin included in the single start receiver pressure limit (Ref. 9). APPLICABLE and The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA)d an SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses Ref. 5), in the FSAR, assume Chapter Engineered 6 (Ref. 4(lES) Safeguard Chapter systems are 14 (OPERABLE.The EDGs are designed to provide sufficient to ensure the capacity,bility availa of necessary power to ES systemscapabilit so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems. Since diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and the air start subsystem support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO A sufficient combined stored diesel fuel oil supply is required to be available to ensure the capability to operate a single EDG at the upper limit of its 200-hour rating for - I 7 days. During an event that requires 7 days operation before rep!acement fuel oil is obtained, manual reconfiguration of loads and transferring the stored fuel

                     .011 supply from one tank to the other may be needed to support operation of the EDG. Diesel fuel oil is also required to meet specific quality standards. In certain small break LOCA scenarios, both EDGs are relied upon for                     mTE accident mitigation.

+ (continued) Crystal River Unit 3' B 3.8-31 Amendment No. NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

1 l Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air i B 3.8.3 BASES i LCO A sufficient lube oil supply must be available to ensure (continued) the capability to operate a single EDG at the upper limit I of its 200 hour rating for 7 days. In certain small break ,3g LOCA scenarios, both EDGs are relied upon for accident mitigation. EDG lube oil sump level, in conjunction with the on-site supply and the ability to obtain replacement supplies within the required timeframe, supports the availability of EDGs required to shut down the reactor and to maintain it in a safe condition for an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA with loss of offsite power. EDG day tank fuel requirements, as well as transfer capability from the storage tank to the day tank, are addressed in LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," and LC0 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown." The starting air system is required to have a minimum capacity for six successive EDG start attem)ts without recharging the air start receivers. As suci, the air start compressors are not addressed as a part of this (or any other) LCO. APPLICABILITY The AC sources (LCO 3.8.1 and LC0 3.8.2) are required in order to ensure the availability of the required )ower to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe slutdown condition after an A00 or a postulated DBA. Since stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and the starting air subsystem sup) ort EDG OPERABILITY, these features are required to be witiin limits whenever the associated EDG is required to be OPERABLE. ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 indicates separate Condition entry is allowed for each EDG. This is acceptable based upon the fact each EDG is treated as an independent entity for this Specification. Note 2 indicates LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable and MODE changes while in the ACTIONS of this Specification are permitted. It could be argued this Note is not required since this Specification allows indefinite operation. However, to avoid any future confusion on the allowance, LC0 3.0.4 has been specifically excepted. This is considered acceptable since o)eration in accordance with this Specification still means tie EDG is OPERABLE. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-32 Amendment No. NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only

Diesel fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS L1-(continued) With usable fuel oil volume in one or more storage tanks

                   < 22,917 gallons, prom)t action must be taken within I hour to verif that the com)ined fuel oil supply >d       45,834 gallons.y However,     the Condition is restricte to fuel oil

- level reductions that maintain at least a combined 7 day supply. In this Condition a period of I hour is allowed to ensurethatsufficientfueloilsupplyfor7daysofEDG operation at its up>er 200-hour rating is available. In order to maintain tie ability to treat the EDG as independent entities for the ACTIONS (from a fuel oil perspective), an artificial lower limit on stored fuel oil has been established. The minimum usable volume specified for each tank is equivalent to 3 days operation and was set to ensure a minimum combined 6 day supply. The limit on combined supply recognizes that while one tank may contain less than 3.5 day supply, the usable volume in the other tank could be such that 7 day capacity still exists. Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3 0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable. L1 With usable fuel oil volume in one or more storage tanks

                   < 22,917 gallons and combined fuel oil supply < 45,834 gallons, sufficient fuel oil supply for 7 days of EDG operation at its upper 200-hour rating is not available.

However, the Condition is restricted to fuel oil level reductions, that maintain at least a combined 6 d y supply. In this Condition, a period of 48 hours is allowed prior to declaring the associated EDG inoperable. Ir order to maintain the ability to treat the EDG as independent entities for the ACTIONS (from a fuel oil )erspective), an artificial lower limit on stored fuel oil las been established. The minimum usable volume specified for each tank is equivalent to 3 days operation and was set to ensure a minimum combined 6 day supply. l (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-33 Amendment No.

Diesel fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and' Starting Air ~ B 3.8.3 BASES-WCTIONS L1 (continued) l-The limit on combined supply recognizes that while one tank may contain less than-3.5 day supp y, the usable volume in l. the other tank could be such tha day capacity still-exists. The 48 hour Completion Time allows sufficient time for-obtaining the requisite replacement volume and performing-e the analyses required prior to addition of fuel oil to the-4 tank. This period is acceptable based on the remaining 4 capacity (> 6 days , the fact that action will be initiated and the low probability of an event to obtain replenis occurring ment,ief during this br period. c With lube oil inventory < 280' gallons,' there'is not sufficient lube oil to su ort 7 days continuous operation 4 of one EDG at the upper 1 it of.its 200-hour rating. However,- the Condition is restricted to lube oil volume l reductions-that maintain at least a 6 day supply. In this > Condition, a period of 48 hours is considered adequate to

restore the required volume prior to declaring the i

i^ l t l D ) (continued) l

     . Crystal River Unit 3                         =B 3.8-33A                                     Amendment No.

l (.

i. .- -- _ _ _ . - _ . -_

I

                                                       ' . Diesel Fuel 011,. Lube 011,.and Starting Air                                            :

L. B 3.8.3 - l

                                                                                                                                                  -i M SASES--l
                                                                                                                                                  .i i

t c 6. s.

f F THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

EC rystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-33B Amendment No.

            ~
    .            &  n*-      -   + - -      y-   g              6   3         ,.9i    e-            irr=9vy- t- -y  ,- yg -                   @ g

l Diesel Fuel 011, Lube Oil, and Starting Air

B 3.8.3 I

BASES ACTIONS Ed (continued) EDGs inoperable. The volume specified includes the lube oil contained in the sump as well as the lube oil stored onsite (off-engine . If the required stored volume cannot be restored, bo)th EDGs must be declared inoperable since this ! volume is common to both EDGs. The 48 hour Completion Time is acceptable based on the 6 daysh the low rate of usage the remainingcapacity(>llbeindiatedtoobtainreplenishment, fact that actions wi j and the low probability of an event occurring durIng this brief period. l l N l-i This Condition is entered as a result of a failure to meet the acceptance criterion for EDG fuel oil particulates. Normally, trending of particulate levels allows sufficient time to correct high particulate-levels prior to reaching i the limit of acceptability. However poor sample procedures ! (bottom sampling), contaminated sempling equipment, and . errors in laboratory analysis can-produce failures that do l not follow a trend. Since the presence of particulates does not mean the fuel oil will not burn properly and given that roper engine erformance has been recently demonstrated j it is prudent to allow a brief period of p(within time prior 31to ecday ),laring the associated EDG The inoperable. 7 day Completion Time allors for further evaluation, re-sampling, and re analysis of the EDG fuel oil. f.d With the new fuel oil properties defined in the Bases for I SR 3.8.3.3 not within the required limits, a period of 30 days is allowed for restoring the stored fuel oil properties prior to declaring the associated EDG inoperable. This period provides sufficient time to test the stored fuel oil to determine that the new fuel oil, when mixed with previously stored fuel oil remains acceptable, or to restore the stored fuel bleed, oil This restoration may involve feed and properties. filtering, or combinations of

                      -these procedures. Even if an EDG start and load was required during this time and the fuel oil properties were outside limits, there is a high likelihood that the EDG would still be capable of performing its intended function.

(continued) Crystal River linit 3 B 3.8-34 Amendment No. a _ _

I l " Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube 011, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 i i BASES' ACTIONS ~ L.1 lJ j

                   -(continued)                                                                                                 sufficient                      l With cLpacitystarting for six     airsuccessive receiver pressure    EDG start<.225  psig,does not attempts
                                                                                                                                                                 ~

exist. However, as long as the receiver pressure is ~

                                           > 150 psig, there-is adequate capacity for at least one                                                              ,

start attempt, and the EDG can be-considered OPERABLE while , the air receiver pressure is restored to-the required limit. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration to-the required pressure prior to declaring the

'                                          associated EDG inoperable. This period is acceptable 1)ased i                                           on the remaining air start capacity, the fact that most EDG starts are accomplished on the:first attem)t, and the low probability of an event occurring during tits brief. period.                                                         .

! l > With a Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, or one or more EDGs with fuel oil lube oil, or startingairsubsystemsnotwithinlimItsforreasonsother than addressed by Conditions-A through-F, the associated EDG > must be immediately declared inoperable. In this case, the l

ACTIONS of Specification 3.8.1 or 3.8.2, as ap>11 cable, are o entered. In the case of stored EDG lube oil, >oth EDGs must be declared ino>erable since the stored lube oil volume 'is common to both EDGs.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.1

REQUIREMENTS This SR provides verification that there is an adequate usable inventory of fuel oil in each storage tank to support.

operation of one EDG for 3.5 days at the u per limit of its 200-hour rating (assuming no offsita power . The SR'also-verifies combined capacity of the two tank to be > 7 days fuel su) ply; The 3.5 day period (7 day capacity provided by is sufficient time to 4 the com)ined place the plantinventory in a safe of both tanks) shutdown con dition, cross connect fuel storage tanks, if necessary,-and to bring in

                                          - replenishment-fuel from an offsite location.

g The 31 day Frequency is. adequate to' ensure that a sufficient L supply- of fuel oil -is. available, since-low level alarms- are provided and the. likelihood any large uses of fuel oil during this' period would be detected. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 .B 3.8-35 Amendment No.

          ,                ,..lA...            ;,!-     e          *                    --

m > - -s w w,- ~ " - ~ ' ~ - , n eau *- --

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.2 REQUIREMEN15 (continued) This Surveillance ensures that sufficient lube oil inventory is available to support at least 7 days of operation of a single EDG at the upper limit of its 200-hour rating. The 280 gallon requirement is based on the EDG manufacturer consumption values for the run time of the EDG. The specified volume includes the lube oil contained in the sump as well as the onsite stored stock. As such, implicit in this SR is the requirement to verify the capability to transfer the lube oil from its storage location to the EDG. When determining compliance with this requirement, both EDGs may take credit for the same volume of onsite stored lube oil. A 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient lube oil supply is onsite, since EDG starts and run time are closely monitored by the plant staff. SR 3.8.3.3 The tests listed below are a means of determining whether new fuel oil is of the appropriate grade and has not been contaminated with substances that would have an immediate, detrimental impact on diesel engine combustion. If results from these tests are within acceptable limits, the fuel oil may be added to the storage tanks without concern for contaminating the entire volume of fuel oil in the storage tanks. These tests are to be conducted prior to adding the new fuel to the storage tank (s), but in no case is the time between receipt of new fuel and conducting the tests to exceed 31 days. The tests, limits, and applicable ASTM Standards are as follows:

a. Sample the new fuel oil in accordance with ASTM 04057-88, (Ref. 6);

b. Verify in accordance with the tests specified in ASTM D975-74, (Ref. 6) that the sample has a maximum of 0.05% by volume water and sediment (using ASTM D2709-82)$aSayboltviscosityat100'Fof>32.6SUSand1

40. SUS, and a flash point of it 125 F;

c. Verify in accordance with the test specified in ASTM D287-82 that new fuel has an API specific gravity of 28 (min); and (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-36 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems--Operating B 3.8.9 BASES BACKGRDUND- Certain small break LOCA scenarios require emer2ency-(continued) feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling until core decay heat can be removed solely by ECCF cooling. Further, with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path inoperable, SWP-1B, train "B of the Nuclear Services Seawater System, CHHE-1B and CHP-1B, as well as "'"-- both trains of ECCS, Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Decay Heat Seawater, Emergency Diesel and Generators,l AC Vita AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems,ASV-204, Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE, With EFV-12, or EFV-13 ino>erable, Train "B" Emergency Diesel Generators, Train "B" AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and Train "B" AC Vital Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE. ' (continued)

 ~ Crystal River Unit 3                B 3.8-67A                    Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only l

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9

BASES ; f L THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK t (continued)- Crystal.' River Unit' 3 B 3.8-67B _ Amendment No.

s Distribution. Systems-0perating l g 3,g,, j BASES ~ -i - LCO: and AC vital bus: electrical ower distribution- 3 AC-DC{emsareconsideredOPERABLEw$en-theassociated subsys (continued) load centers, McCs, and distribution panels are 3

 -                                                     busesIzedtotheirpropervoltages.

energ , In addition,-tie breakers between 480 V ES bus 3A and 18 :; must be open. This prevents an electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the- ! c redundant subsystem. If this were to occur eit could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential-safety function (s). If any tie bret brs are closed the affec4ed redur. dant electrical- power distribution subsystems ;

                                                      - are no longer redundant and one train must be considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety related                                      .

F redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does F not, however, preclude redundant Class lE 4160 V buses from- ' being powered from the same offsite circuit. t APPLICABILITY The electrical >ower distribution subsystems are required to ' L be OPERABLE in 100ES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that: I 4 a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary-limits a"e not exceeded as a result l' of A00s or abnomal transtants; and .

b. Adecuate core cooling is provided and containment
'~ OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Electrical-power distribution subsystem requirements for-MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.10

                                                       " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

ACTIONS A.1. A.2. B.1. and B.2 I With Train "A" AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable prompt action is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow gathareOPERABLEfor-steamgeneratorcooling. With Train 8" AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable, um "i prompt action is necessary to ensure that=the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path as well as ASV-204, EFV-12 -and EFV-13 are OPERABLE for steam generatorcooling;-Iftherequiredequipment'isnot i OPERA 8LE,-the capability-to remove core decay heat cannot be + assured and Condition F is applicable. The operability of l

                                                      . the-turbineidriven emergency feedwater pump is not required _                                 l in MODE 4.                                                                                     !
                                                                                                                                -(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B-3.8-69 -Amendment No. i NOTE -: Valid Until Cycle 12 Only l E p --. 7,- ,.c-, q , , - , e- ..- , a -- -, - - - - - - -

l _ Distributien Systems-Operating i B 3.8,9 l r BASES ACTIONS A.I. A.2. B.1. and L 2 (continued) Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1-hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency sin feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERA 3LE , ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability. The Completion Time-minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions. With one AC electrical power distribution subsystem 4 inoperable, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystem in the other train is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining power distribution subsystems could result in- the minimum required ES functions

                  -not being met. Therefore, the required AC buses, load centers, MCCs,_and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours.

The most severe scenario addressed by Conditions A and B is l E an entire train without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to-the train and the associated EDG inoperable). In this condition, the plant has an increased vulnerability to a complete loss of AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention be focused on minimizing the potenPal for loss of power to the remaining train by stabilizing the plant, and on restoring power to the affected train. The 8 hour time limit for restoration, prior to requiring a plant shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety if the operator's attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to rutore power to the affected train to the actions associated with shutting down the plant within this time limit; and.

b. The low probability of an event occurring coincident with a single failure of a redundant component in the train with AC_ power.

1 (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-70 Amendment No. NOTE _- Valid Until Cycle 12 Only I

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 - BASES-ACTIONS A.1. A.2. B.1. and B.2 (continueo) l mit The second Completion Time for Required Actions A.2 and B.2 l m it establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any sin failure to meet the LCO. gle contiguousAoccurrence If condition of' or B is entered a DC bus is inoperable and- I "IE while, for instance,d subsequently restoreto OPERABLE status, LCO 3.8.9 may already have been not mot for up to 2 hours. This could lead to a total of 10 hours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the AC distribution system. At this time, a DC circuit could again become inoperable, and AC distribution restored to OPERABLE status. This could 4 continue indefinitely. The Completion Time allows for an exception to tFe normal

                       " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage tirie " clock."

This will result in establishina the " time zero" at the time Instead of the time the LCO was Condition initially A was not met,16 entered. The hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely. C.1. C.2. D.1. and 0.2 With Train "A" AC vital bus inoperable, prompt action is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency mit feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERAPI.E for steam generator cooling. With Train "B" AC vital'ous inoperable prompt action is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pum) and associated flow path as well as ASV-204, EFV-12, and E;V-13 are OPERABLE for , steam generator cooling. If the required equipment is not OPERABLE, the capability to remove core decay heat cannct be assured and Condition F is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4. , Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, I OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated i surveillance s has been satisfactorily completed within the required freq(ue)ncy and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable. Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour Completion Time I to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability. . The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is i potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions. ! (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-71 Amendment No. NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

l Distribution Systecs-Operating l B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS- C.1.C.2.D.I.andD.2-(continued) I non With one AC vital bus inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE AC vital buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in i the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is j reduced, however, since an additional single failure could result in the minimum required ES functions not being supported. Therefore, the AC vital bus must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. Condition B represents a condition in which potentially both the DC source aad the associated AC source are nonfunctional. In this situation the plant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all non-interruptible power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses and restoring power to the affected vital bus. The 8 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without adequate AC vital power. However, there are certain affected features Completion Times of shorter duration. The intent of the Improved Technical Specifications is to remain within this Specification only and not take the ACTIONS for inoperable supported systems. Taking this exception to LC0 3.0.2 for com)onents without adequate vital AC power, that would have tie Required Action Completion Times shorter than 8 hours if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) and not allowing stable operations to continue; (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 - B 3.8-71A Amendment No. NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only L

i

                                                                                ' Distribution Systems-Operating                 '

8 3.8.9 f BASES 4 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK. 4 a i

s; (continued) !

! m - Crystal.' River Unit 3 .B'3.8-71B . Amendment No..

l 1 Distribution Systems-Operating ; B 3.8.9 .) BASES ACTIONS C.I. C.2. D.I. and D.2 (continued)- l mit

b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital AC power .

and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected train; and ;

c. The low probability of an event occurring coincident with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 8 hour Com)1etion Time takes into account the importance of restoring tie AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, the redundant ca) ability afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and tie low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The third Completion Time for Required Actions C.2 and 0.2 l mit establishes a limit on the maxiam time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failure. Refer to the Bases for Required Actions A.2 and ant B.2 for further discussion of this Completion Time. L1 l mit With DC bus (es) in DC electrical power distributior, train inoperable, the remaining train is capable of sup)orting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down tie reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however,-because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution train could result in the minimum required ES functions not being met. Therefore, the DC-buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours. (continued)

 . Crystal River Unit 3                 B 3.8-72                    Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS L1 (continued) l mit Condition E represents a condition in which one train is I mit i without adequate DC power; potentially both with the bactery significantly degraded and the associated charger inoperable. In this situation, the plant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC. power. It is, therefore, im)erative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing tie plant, minimizing the potential for loss of - power to the-remaining trains and restoring power to the affected train. The 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times i allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without adequate AC vital power. However, there are certain affected features with Completion Times of shorter duration. The intent of the Improved Technical Specifications is to remainwithinthisSpecificationonlyandnottakethe ACTIONS for ;soperab.e supported systems. Taking this exception to 13 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, that w uld have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

a. The poter.tial for decreased safety by requiring a change in plant conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while allowing stat,le operations to

- continue;

b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions to restore power to the affected train; and

c. The low probability of an event occurring coincident with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide'1.93 (Ref. 3). (continued) Crystal River Unit 3: B 3.8-73 Amendment No. NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS L,1 (continued) I mit The second Completion Time for Required Action E.1 I mit establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of ' failure to meet the LCO. Refer to the Bases for Required Actions A.2 and B.2 for further discussion of this I mit Completion Time.

                                                                                       "IE F.1 and F.2                                                      l If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a H00E in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within                    ,

36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. y [nort 1. Condition G corresponds to a level of degradation in which Inoit redundant safety-related trains have lost power to one or more busses. At this severely degraded level, the plant's ability to respond to an event may be significantly reduced. ' Therefore, if. it is determined that redur. dant trains of a necessary function are concurrently inoperable, no additional time is justified for continued operation.- The plant is required to immediately enter LCO 3.0.3 and begin ' preparations for a controlled shutdown. (continued) Crystal River Unit'3' B 3.8-74 Amendment No. NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only}}

ML20198S915

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