ML20217F523

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Proposed Tech Specs Pages Addressing Revision to Description of Electrical Controls for Operating Reactor Building (RB) Recirculation Sys fan/cooler,AHF-IC,as Discussed in FSAR & Improved TS
ML20217F523
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/04/1997
From:
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20217F515 List:
References
NUDOCS 9710080269
Download: ML20217F523 (7)


Text

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e FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST #217, REVISION 0 FAN LOGIC MODIFICATION TO AIIF-1C MOTOR CONTROL CENTER ES-MCC-3AB 3F1097-04 ATTACIIMENT D FSAR REVISIONS Strikeout /Simdow Changes Text being deleted hd4 eat +d-t e tMkeout Text being added Indicated by'shadowirig' 7N *88eX o n88soi P ppg

TABLE 6-9 Single Failure Analysis - Reactor Building Emergency Coolina System ,

Component Mclfunction Comments

1. One of the Fails to start When any of the air handling units are not operating they are emergency or fails to automatically isolated from the system by gravity dampers. Th4 air handling start at low unit i: m:t requi. _ ... _ , , . The remaining unit will operate, units speed and in combination with the ReactoFIBJ11dinFSpray System, provide heat removal capability in accordance"with~ ths schedule analisii.
2. Cooling Rupture If a rupture or major leak is detected through indication of inlet water supply and outlet flow difference, the coil and lines can be isolated from and return the control room. Evaluation' 'oU ttiF 'donditions rident'iffid71n lines GenericHetterf 96106', " Assurance. ' of - Equipment Operability 1 and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions,*: for the ' isolated RB Recirculation System = Fan / Cooler ' indicate that

~ " ~ ' '

waterhasser or tqbase flow are not concerns? ~~"^"

3. Power Falls closed The remaining unit 4 11 operate and in combination with the Reidt W operated Building Spray Syv:em provide heat removal capability in accordance with' the schedult inalyses.

~

supply or ~ "

return valve

4. Cooling Fails to start Two 100% capacity pu:::ps in parallel have been provided.

water pump

5. Diesel power Diesel fails to In order to prevent overloading the Emergency Diesel Generator to emergency sta-t during certain accident conditions, only one air handling unit is air handling acceptable for loading on a single Emergency Diesel Generator.

unit Therefore, if one Emergency Diesel Generator is inoperative, power will be available to only one air handling unit. The Design Basis LOCA in Section 14.2.2.5 assumes this worst case power loss of a single train of emergency power.

6-49 ,

(Riv.lXX)

TABLE 6-9 (continued) -

Single Failure Analysis - Reactor Building EmeroenCY Coolino System .

Component Malfunction Comments

6. Cooling water a. . Fails to The cooling water supply is procedurally isolated to the non-discharge close due operating air handling unit,lpreventing an increase in SW flow to valve on to the air handling units. The EsisijeiE) 96sseFeiNsFite s have

~

third malfunction limitist'iinsToii~tlieiFelictricalicapacitydihisicapacity ~~~~~

non-operating specific to limitation will not; permit more than tuo coeltog coils G~bi air handling valve ' supplied by a}SW:PumpR0therwise; the SW Pumpicould' require [siiFi unit power than has ebeen accounted for ja h h ,0iesel

b. Fails to GeneratorJ1oadingicalculations.

close due to loss of DC power without a LOOP x

4

.This function of the 480V ES Bus Undervoltage lockout relay assures the redundant buses cannot be connected during a loss of offsite power coincident with an ES signal.

Since these power centers will be fed from redundant 4160 volt ES buses in accordance with standards noted in Section 8.1, transfer of power sources is inherent with transfer of 4160 volt ES buses 3A and 3B as discussed in Section 8.2.2.4.

Motor control centers, ES 3A 1, 3A 2, 3A-3, 3AB, 3B-1, 38-2 and 3B 3 are provided to feed associated safeguards equipment and are safeguards channel separated.

The 3A and 38 control centers are fed from their associated ES 480 volt switchgear. The 3AD control center is fed through a manual transfer switch, with controls located locally and in the control room, from either the 3A or 3B ES 480 volt switchgear.

Auxiliary ! contact ~sifrom the ~ Motor Cont'rol~ CrinteE ES;HCC;3AB^transfeFWitsh (MTXS 1)- are used in- permissive logic for the ES. slow s seed ' start of. Reactor Building Recirc61ation System Fan AHF-lC. .The AHF 10 Eng'neered Safeguards "A" l

train auto start signal will be enabled only when AHF-10 is,ES selected as the l *A": train; fan with ES MCC-3AB supplied from the "A" train: source. Conversely, l the AHF-1C Engineered Safeguards "B"-train auto start signal will be enabled only when'AHF lC'is ES-selected asithe;".B"_ train, fan with_ES MCC-3AB:; supplied,from th_e;"B"jtrain1 source.

The inverters VBIT-1A, IB, IC, and ID are provided with loss of voltage relays and status lights that indicate " POWER AVAIL" at the C0F panel for the operator.

8.2.2.6 250/125 Volt DC System

[

The250/125 Volt DC System provides a source of reliable continuous power for DC pump motors, control, and instrumentation. In general, DC motors are rated 240 volts and control circuits 125 volts DC.

The 250/125 Volt DC System consists of a Class lE portion and a non-lE portion.

The Class IE portion of the 250/125 Volt DC System consists of two isolated bus sections, each supplied by a battery and battery chargers. A spare 125 volt DC battery charger is provided for each battery for backup.

The battery chargers normally supply the DC System load and the float charge to the batteries. The chargers are also capable of supplying a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> equalize charge. The chargers are supplied with a high/ low voltage alarm relay to monitor the DC System. A high voltage alarm is provided to protect against battery over-charging during normal operation.

Hydrogen generation from the Class lE Batteries, and the subsequent hydrogen buildup in the Control Complex and in the Battery Rooms, was determined for various modes and operating conditions. Many factors influence the hydrogen generation rate and concentration of hydrogen (e.g. ambient temperature, cell voltage, air dilution flow rates, room / building volumes, system operating mode, etc.).

8-7 (ReKXX)

,9 ? . 2.,1 Modes of Operation _

Emergency _and normal modes of operation of the Plant Ventilation Systems are as follows:

a. ThsMisst^oFElfG'il di'6W(RB)MRhifrEUl atliWFSystimMs6nt al ssV thFsi fan /coolerJunits AHE4CIIsthek"TThese;unitsiare,desjnatedas!AHF21AMAHf61BJand

,"during"nonnai~ opera fon,1 or ~2~ React 6r~Bdilding Recirc61ation System fans fid M(sl6wispeed)To61,800 Vpm/ cooler units caerate (fastLspsed)hepsndent p k cent 4eveush at 900 T iejfan/c6ol e'r. uni t Lth atH s not iope rat i ng ' i sl elygremoved admi ni st@ rat t i,Os at t l 6 from' service byielosing a SWLSystemlmanuali s upplyivalve. >Thissaction daMtakenito L precludenloadi_ng:

r three1RB ; Recircul ationiSystemicoolini l.oilslon<one SW Pumplif;the air operated:SWfsupply?and returnWalves EailjopenionilosstofTtheMB" Train DCL(Dattery);controitpoweriduring

  1. design basisieventWThise increased flowirequires* additional! pump inotoFY horsepower thatihas; notL been ? accounted i forSnithetEmergencf Dies;eEGenerat.or; loading]calcuiationsf Whin7AHFE1CfisNsedTis??eplacetoneT5f PthWEother?finsEthETES? slow speed t automati cistart d si enabl ed i onlyiwhenti di s f ESisel ected s for; the.

samestraintasi thei powerssource ; tof ES(MotoK ControllCentepMCCL3AB3 Th@restrlbtion'is to prevent: inadvertent? loading o$twolfanluni_ts;on, thle}s_amel Emergency;DieseEGenerattwhenMCCt3ABintransferredgrom 2

onejpower a spurcet t olthelother]

' DUFlhKhifiial?6piFitl6ni the IndUstplaisCbbling_(CI) System has the EaFacity'ti~iuppifall^three '(3)^ fass fin [ cooler > units while in the

" free" cooling mode

'fss/cBbleBuniti m(only ay be cooling suppliedtower due to'in'opeiatiin)7b'ut post-LOCA EDG only 2 fans loading describediabovi.~ If the CI System is used to cool the RB in the

" mech'anicil"~m6de (chiller in operation), only 2 RB has fan 76661ef bhiti can be placed in service (maximum evaporator flow is'1473"hjim)-

fo rit he TimeWes t40C'AT EDG 41 o'ad i W9 ; co nie Fn S de sc ri bid f ab6VE7 The RB Vans ~1 fin / cooler 5 nits ^Trs"Bpsrat6d ffoin~thi E6ntr61~F66iii. Upbn EdtiVit'ionlofithe EnginsefidlSafeg0 erd"(ES)?s'iddal,5theifi6fissiinbl_tes apelautomstica1]ylifsalatedffromi h.e t CliSystem n and!switchedntofi he t SW SMStems hormiliopeFit'ioni the SW System inay?bb used to cool the RB.

00VlWF'^6nly~2~of~3~

ains fans fah/sbol3rjunitimay~be placed into service Ag$thyamij6st30CAjEDG;16adingiconcern7descrll)edfab6Vs.

fo

b. In the Reactor Buildint during emergency operation, one or two Reactor Building Recirculation System fans operate continuously at 900 rpm. Water to the cooling coils during this operating mode is supplied from the Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling (SW) System.
c. In the Reactor Building, during normal operation, booster fans supplying air to the operating floors, steam generator compartments, and reactor compartment operate continuously. Units are operated from the control room. The Reactor Building booster fans are not required during an emergent.y.

9-53 (RipyXX).

s

_ r -

l (b) High' temperature in the common discharge duct,

_(c) Loss of fan operation, or (d) Actuation of the Turbine Room intake fire dany:.. AHFD-32 or the outside air intake fire damper AHFD 33.

The Penetration Cooling System is-designed to Seismic Class 11 requirements.

1. -The Reactor -Building Cavity Cooling System is normally served by cooling water from the Cl System. Upon activation of the ES signal, CI System is isolated from the Reactor Building Cavity Cooling System.

Components within the CI System are normally designed to Seirmic Class III, while the Reactor Butiding Cavi;y Cooling System is designed to Seismic Class 11.

j. The following ventilation systems are connected to ES buses during loss of off-site power:

AHF-1A, AHF-1B, AHF-1C lin% M J Reactor Building Fan Assemblies l CHHE-1A, CHHE 1B Control Complex Chillers CHP-1A, CHP-1B Chilled Water Pumps l

AHF-19A, AHF-19B Control Complex Return Air Fans L AHF-22A,-AHF-22B, AHF-22C, AHF-220 Diesel Room Air Handling Fans AHF-17A, AHF-17B Control Complex Normal Duty Fans AHF-18A, AHF-18B Control Complex Emergency Duty Fans AHP-1A, AHP-1B, AHP-lC, AHP-lD Control Complex Air Compressors AHF-20A, AHF-20B Control- Access Area txhaust Fans AHF-8A, AHF 8B Spent Fuel Pump Area Air Handling Units AHF-15A, AHF-15B Decay Heat Pump Area Air Handling Units-AHF-44A, AHF-44B Sampling Room Exhaust Fans AHF-54A, AHF-54B EFIC Cooling System Air Handling Units

k. The battery rooms are exhausted through separate duct runs into a common exhaust main outside either battery room. The exhaust outlets from'each battery room have been provided with. automatically closing fire dampers so that fire or smoke in one room would be isolated from the adjacent room. The dampers close on high temperature in the battery rooms. The supply air for-the battery rooms is furnished from a single main but each battery room :: supplied from a separate runout from this-main so that none of the supply ductwork is common to both rooms at the battery room elevation. The supply outlets are also provided with automatically closing fire dampers for room isolation similar to the exhaust outlets. The control power to dampers for each room is supplied from separate buses.. If the fire and smoke detector in the room fails to close the fire damper, the heated air or fire passing through the fire damper would melt a backup link on the fire

-damper to close it. Physical isolation of one battery room from the adjacent battery room is provided by fire and explosion resistant construction in the common wall between the rooms.

9-58 MiiMX};

Reactor Building Spray and Containment Cooling Systems B 3.6.6

. BASES; BACKGROUND Reactor Buildina Sorav System (continued) quotes a value of 65.2% for RB volume covered by the spray, based on the location of the uppermost spray ring to the operating floor at elevation 160 feet. In the recirculation mode of operation, water in the reactor building emergency sump is mixed with trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP-C) in order to raise the pH of the sump water to at least 7.0. Heat is removed from

  • the containment sump water by the decay heat removal (DHR/LPI) coolers. Each train of the RB Spray System provides adequate spray coverage to meet the system design requirements for containment heat removal.

The RB Spray System is actuated automatically by a High-High reactor building pressure signal (30 psig) coincident with a high pressure injection start permit actuation - signal. An automatic actuation opens the RB Spray System pump discharge valves to correspond to a pre-set flowrate and starts the two RB Spray System pumps.

Containment Coolino System ~

l- '

The Containment Cooling System consists of three containment cooling units (AHF-1A, IB, IC) connected to a common duct suction header with four vertical return air ducts. Each cooling train is equipped with demisters, cooling coils, and an axial flow fan driven by a two speed water cooled electric motor. Each unit connection (two per unit) to the common header is provided with a backpressure damper for isolation purposes.

During normal operation, two containment - cooling units are  !

required to operate 'to' maintain containment average air temperature less than :130'F (Ref. 3.6.5), With two units

, operating, the plant has recorded temperatures as high as 129"F.

The third unit (cr wing unit) is on standby and isolated from units by means of the backpressure dampers. %e the

=ingoperatingii/66olshfsnitTAHFAIC uni + Fa is equipped with a transfer switch which^"^alloss"it~tE~bi manially placed to either the "A" or "B" power train to operate in case one of the operating units fails. Th6"66htil hmsh t Ec 6ol i 5gisn i t "n6tiiEbii7h a sTilianGal?$W

$9steMYiupplyM al Ves cl o s ed ed T hi s s a c t i o n hi s nt aken j becau s eiths Emergency;Di esel;Generhtors' haveRimitati6ns fo61theifelectrisal

'c ap ac i tyg hi sJ cap acityll i mi t at i on;wi l l ino t ? pe rmi timo f ei th an ttwd

" cool i ngs co11 Rto e be ' suppl i ed s byf a c SW s PumpM 0therwi se a ths3SW Pumpiconidireghire moreipowerithan1hastbeentaccountedsfor4pthe

~

- Emergen9)'3"DieselhGeneratorsloadinghcalcultationsf^~F6F~6oE5sl bpefation E6611nfWitir tTthe 6perat'ing~csils"Ts provided by the MdsifdiKCooliijJ (Cl) System.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 0 3.6-36 Amendment No.

1

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