Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re Power Operated Relief Valve Lift Setpoint TS Limit That Has Been Revised for Instrument Uncertainty
	ML20212C980
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	10/25/1997
From:	; FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20212C970	List: 3F1097-12, Provides Rev to LTOP Sys TS Change Request Notice 213, Including PORV Lift Setpoint TS Limit,Revised for Instrument Uncertainty.Calculation Encl; ML20212C980; ML20212D001;
References
	TAC-M99277, NUDOCS 9710300232
	Download: ML20212C980 (58)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:. - - - U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LTOPS TSCRN 213 Stevision 1 3F109712 i 4 i FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMHER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION CIIANGE REQUEST NOTICE 213, REVISION 1 (TAC No. M99277) STRIKEOUT /SIIADOW PAGES Technical Specifications Deletions are indicated by strikeout. Additional and replacement text are indicated by shading. k \\ ju 288R ou8lha

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p t f[. LTop? System "3.4111 ACTIONS C041 TIM RtotilREDTAC110N COMPLEY10N' TIME A~N Nore Tthsnioni"saks#' AI1SR-r NOTERG '- M 4 capable of" J " ~ T 4 aakeuplp s mapX in ect_ing_Li.n.to_:the capable,of 1 ting ' " ~ ~ pue" minutes.: swap operationjf66 Oll k =::::==:EiE55 thitistFsst'issiti ~ ' ~ ~ ~liiisdiits1P Verify only"oneinakesp pumphisLeapable of' ' jnjecti_.ng;intethe]RCSl.: B7!f"l4P!TcapsbisIsf Bili J!nitiate actionfti T Ismediately ^' acsuationi~ ~ verifyiHPlideacttva.tedj ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ^' " CMA"CFT!nstlisol'ited CVINIs61sti?sffectedCFT ~ ~~~ ^'^~~~~~~~ ~s' 1Thssi ~ ~ hen-CFT, pressure 31i ~ ~ ~ " w greater:than or: equal to the maximum'RCS ~~ pressuresforzexistih~ temperature allowwl s thofTLRf ^ "~~^^- " DERegsifid%tT667Cil D!!U~temperaturef~ts%197?Fi lnireaie?RCS 121houfi ~ ~" pot' met"within the" ' " ' ' ' ~ r' eqs{rediC_omple, tied ~' ' ' ~ ~ Use 08 s D]t20epressuriie'affscted 121hoars CfTit633571gisi; g135rinisans -Q a I'vita r 135anch6n ~ (continued) C6ilkRJVeDniti3ICZC" g [3W21A?"~i, '~21 M6dment"lNoU"d

7.,..... ).TorsFst%i ~ "3.4;11 ACT10N57Wsntinssd) C0WITION REWIRED' ACTION COMPLETION TIME ((RsinfHiifWtiWE;1 fi1OCloisPind iiainta{h] Itihesti not met withinithe' closed the?nakeup Fequired Com.pletio.vi controlJvalve:and71ti. e-O fiffifsts[RC$1psits@ lijh6Uhi G_T_P0R_V.1.Tn4pW. hb._1si E!!?_?Rist6Fs'PORV"ts .li~hba. _f. H~ERiquiFsd ?Acti6s!G!! H;1 M Redics~saksipTih k ~12:h5GFi~ potisetz:within the ~""' level to s 88._ cinch _es? . g $i^t"DistiVitiM6snlod ~12Ih60Fi "makeupttank!1 eve 1~ ~~ interlock to:tho' bo' rated!waterstoPape tank.m s~uction L valves f ~ IC.ontinupd), 4 h $4h Y ^ ...,.,y e. E' i k G'

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LYOP4Sjites ' '^'3 & l1 $bRVEttLANCE REQUIREMENTS"(sontinGed) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY $R_R3_:4!!!7.. i","" Perfo. rm. CH.._ ANN. EC_F.UNC.TI.ONA. L'l_TE_ST.._sfor Within")t~ PORVt hours 1 befofe_o.__., ra ~ ~ ~ after decreasing RCSjt erature M..kk AIS i 31"diji therea. f.._tW i .~ SR_7?,%..-._4 ^. l lI. 8,1_!! '"T,P..e_rf, o_W C.H. ANNE _LS CA.l!. B. RAT 1.0N F_fo_rE P, O..R_V ?, 24[em6thii - ~. - - m l S.R71.31.4;1.1;9..T. T.:".T. I C ;; W RNOTE ~ C C ' W m : I complying-With LCO 3.'411);b' m,~- l ~ t: * =~ ~ :,: ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~::::? ~ ~ ~ ~ ~: ::. l Ve Fi fyiPORVj] slieljestedltpithe]Rrange 12?hpdri setpoint; C.Fyin1?Riii.eEU61t?31 ":~ ~ ~ .,,. ~ 73";4:21E7'~., " J' ^"..f. Amendesnt~N6?~ .~

ECCS--Shutdown 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS) 3.5.3 ECCS--Shutdown LCO 3.5.3 One ECCS train shall be OPERABLE. ........,.................. NOTE------------------------- Highpressureinjection HPigmaybedeactivatedin accordancewithLC013?4?lj*f3 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)' System".._inistr:tiv: :: trels. l APPLICABillTY: MODE 4. i L ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required low pressure A.1 Initiate action to immediately injection (LPI) restore required LPI subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status. B. Required HPI subsystem B.1 Restore required HPI 1 hour inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status. C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 5. 24 hours associated Completion Time not met. Crystal River Unit 3 3.5-7 Amendment No. 449

U. S, Nuclear Regulatory Comrnission LTOPS TSCRN 213, Revision 1 3F1097-12 4 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50 302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION CIIANGE REQUEST NOTICE 213, REVISION 1 (TAC No. M99277) STRIKEOUT / SHADOW PAGES Bases Deletions are indicated by strikeout. Additional and replacement text are Indicated by shading. 4 .I ---r-- 7r-

Pressurizer Safety Valves B 3.4.9 8 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4.9 Pressurizer Safety Valves i BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the two spring loaded pressurizer safety valves is to provide RCS overpressure protection. Operating in conjunction with the Reactor Protection System (RPS), two valves are used to ensure that the Safety Limit (SL) of 2750 psig is not exceeded for analyzed transients during operation in H0 DES 1, 2, and_3. For H0DE 4 MODE 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor 9ehel head not completely detensioned, overpressurs protection.is provided by operet4ng-procedures-and LCO 3. 4;11, '" Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)LSystem" administrat4ve control:. For-t hese-eend +t4 ensMbe-Amedean-SoMet-y-o f Meehanfeal-incer:. (ASME) requirement; cre :et4sf4cd with one-sefe ver The self actuated pressurizer safety valves are designed in accordance with the requirements set forth in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III (Ref. 1). The required lift pressure is 2500 psig i 2%. The safety valves discharge steam from the tressurizer to the reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT) located in the containment. The discharge flow is indicated by acouqtic monitors downstream of the safety valves and by an increase in RCDT pressure and level. The upper and lower pressure limits were originally based on the i 1% tolerance requirement for lifting pressures above 1000 psig. However, later versions of the ASME Code allow for tolerances of up to 13%, and the use of i 2% was justified in Reference 2. The lift setting is for the ambient conditions associated with MODES 1, 2, and 3. This requires either that the valves be set hot or that a correlation between hot and cold settings be established. The pressurizer safety valves are part of the primary succuss path and mitigate the effects of postulated accidents. OPERABILITY of the safety valves entures that the RCS pressure will be limited to less than 110% of design pressure. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-43 Amendment No. 449

Pressurizer Safety Valves B 3.4.9 BASES APPLICABILITY reactor coolant pressure less than 110% of its design value (continued) during certain accidents. The LC0 is not applicable in MODES 4 and 5 because4 TOP d i =tre': W @rpre?M ;tiy: tiction,LC0 3:41117!?loWjliapefatsre-protection. froOverpressu,r(LTOPblyst'njprovidesoverpressure e ssure e e protection is not required in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head Ech ist M detensioned, t ACTIONS L1 With one pressurizer safety valve ino)erable. restoration must take place within 15 minutes. T1e Completion Time of 15 minutes reflects the importance of maintaining the RCS [ overpressure protection system. An inoperable safety valve coincident with a design-basis overpressure event-could-challenge the integrity of the RCS. B.1 and B.2 If the Required Action cannot be met within the associated Completion Time or if both pressurizer safety valves are inoperable, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The specified Completion Times are reasonable. -based on operating experience, to ret.ch the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 4 and 'below, overpressure protection is provided by LTOP. Placing the plant in a lower MODE (3 and 4) reduces the RCS energy (thermal and pressure), lowers the potential for large . pressurizer insurges, and thereby removes the need for overpressure protection by two pressurizer safety valves. I SURVilLLANCE SR 3.4.9.1 REQUIREMENTS The requirement to verify lift setpoint 12450 psig and 12550 psig is implemented in the Inservice Testing Program. (continued) Crystal-River Unit 3 ' B '. 4 45 Amendment No. 449

LTOP'Sist6m B 3.4.11 8 3 E REACTOR;C00LANT[SYSTEN!(RCS) [3W113cw Tempstathre10verpy; essure 1Prothetion;(LTOP);SystWm BASES. .,~ BACKGROUND' 1The~LTOP ' System contrsls RCS pressure at low temperatiiresfso ~ 'the integrity of ths reactor coolant pressure boundary' ' * (RCPB) is not-com temperature:-(P/T)promisedbyviolatingthepressureand: limits of ASM

1. Code Case-N-514 (Ref.1.. The ' reactor ves::al: is 'the' ' ^

limiting RCPB component fo)lprQuiding such; protection. r The'FeactoF~ Vessel material Is^1essiteugh"at" reduced temperatures than at-~ normal operating tem erature. Als6fd s vessel: neutron irradiation accumulates, tie material;becomes less resistant 4 to pressure stress at. low temperatures (Ref. 2). RCS pressure must be maintained-low when teinperature is low and must;be: increased _onlyL as-temperature Js; increased. The'RCS'temperatuFisT referenced throughout this LC0~ arid t Bases are based on the same: criteria'as is used for heatup l 1 'and cooldown monitoring.(Refer to LCO. 3.4.3). Specifica'ly the cold leg temperature should be"used with RCPs operating andLthe decay ~ heat outletLtemperature should be usedLwith.no_ RCPs,operatings ~ ' ~ OpeFational? maneuvering"during"cooldsn, heatup[orTany anticipated operational-oscurrence must;be controlled tinct violate 1LCO3.4.3,*RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T) Limits;" Exceeding these< limits:could lead to crittle fracture of: the reactor vessel.- '.LC0 3.4.3-presents ' ~ ' equirements forf administrative control ~ of RCS pressure [snd r ,tempe ratu re 1 tol pre yggt : exc eed i ng i t he LP/ T(l i mi t s. This^ LCO p'rovidss _RCS overpressure protectioniin the ap'plicable MODESLby ensuring an adequateLpressure relief c' apacity and a-limited coolant addition ca) ability.: The pressure relief: capacity requires ejther t1e power operathd relief valve (PORV) liftisetpoint to bet reduced and pressurizer coolant:levelvat: or:below;a! maximum limit ~op1ths RCS depressurized with an-RCS' vent of sufficient; size to handle;the;11mitjng;t_rans_i'en.tL duringiLTOP( '~ ' ~ ' f(cont' inked) CffstKRiVerlUril_t331 LB1314R52!~ ~T "Amendineri~t?NE m

LT0p*Sistem "~ Bi3,4.1.1 , BASES w__ ___ _m _ ___ x__m m -- _ m__. m RA 3 GA00 M N ?! M hf1 TOP'ippFisiE W pFotsctis E thil i ns15bf!11 sit W ~ Mc_ontinue_d. )b_2 coolant? addition capabilityiallows a'maximus-of one makesp flooO tanhi Cris)/when CFTyressures exceed the maximus RCs pressumJetJht exist ing ; RCitemperaturel ay owed; byJTLR( ' ' shbsid?moFi" thin"oni:HPITSVierlanother:RCS? vent cannok71Ejoit W ir H the:pressuriser;1evel and pmvpnt ovefpms.surizingithtRC$f~ ^-~ ~~ ~ ~ Thi"ppiiiistiiM16Ve1~11bitipfosidiiTsTiispFiisibli Tiip6?_d s'pacefor; cushion that can^accommodatesa coolant insurge!an ' revent;a. rapid. pressure 11ncrean#allowl' g theioperatoC p n time;toistop the increase o The p0RVJwithsreduced: lift' hettingh er the ACS ventFisithe* overpressure protectios device;that? acts]as; backup;,tolthe;operatot;jngerminatifiB jacmasjng;gnssu_releven.tg Wi tk HPlideact Wated F the"abi l i tfi ti~pr6 Vide

RCS ?coolint additioniisVrestrictedwTo:balanceithe possible1need;fot coolant;additionn the LC0 does;notirequire;the. Makeup;Syst'e_m to:be0 deactivated? !Due!toethelloweripressures~ associated' ^

inithtthelLTOP M00ES4andithi4 expected (decay' iheatilevelskths Makeip t $y s tem ; c an ? provide < fl ow 8 wi th ithe:0PERABLEmakeupipup .through tthel makeupicont rolival ve EHPlic an; be fe stoget by pperatogactJon! PORV'.Ridd6siinti r As diilinidif6EthiiLTOP?SiitenKthFPORV"ilDigdaliditi open?if;the?RCS! Pressure > approaches illimitjsetzinitheiLTOP, actuation circuitU iTheiLT0p ; actuation)ctFcultfisithe" ' ~ circuittwhich;opensitheiPORViatttheSlowipressuretsetpiiht? ~ The1LTOP!actu'ationicircuit' monitors RCS; pressure and ~ " determinesswhen;anioWrpressurercondition11sEspproachedQ Whenithe monitored pressure *meetsfor exceedsithefsettingi the: PORV!1s'signaleditoiopenD ? Maintainino irithindhellimitstoflthe LC0 ensuressthe Re;theisetpoint kR11beinetligianyggntlanalyzedjfoM0h (rence;1(limits f WhisTPORVtiripinidris?inYlhwussihirpFisssFiltys6sisit?s thelreleaseTof(coolant causes4the* pressure increaseitoislo 'andireversekAslthe?PORV; release'sscoolantWthelRCS decreasesfuntiliaireset!Pressurelissreachedtandithe!pressuri valve"is s ignal ed : toj cl osek;The ipre s s u re/c oht i nue sitoidec tea selbel oW thelresttlptts sutela sithejal veicl osesi M6htiNUEdf 4

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tentainmentpres'sureitaianES/everpressureitran'sientM'f theirelievingirecetrementssof the aaminus credible:LTOP ^ ~ tentLesinot enesedithe3eapabiltties;eftthe vent M TEE 7 s ' vent sth austheicapahlstef relieving 1thelflowief I . (settag;6 TOP 1 transient?:ane:aetatatnin' g'pressere beles'(thf ~ t LTOP ;11aits 7%The* feguirediventjpapacittemyibelprovidid!1R 4 W eDaere3entlpathei f6Fsi AC$NEtitiWt'ths7fliiFupiEitypit"riliiWi removingi:a* pressuriserisafety ? val ve;9 era simil arly ~diTNEi ~~ estab1shiniafvent;byiremovingianiOTS6] primary!si ~ coveh]or prmary side:handhole cover;ior;othertvents:as ~y determined ) to lbe Tsuf ficient.2Thelvent ! pith ( s )? mu sti boiabiW~ ^ ~ thelleveltoffreactorfco.olantpso asinotsto drai.n.~:the?RCS - - + - - ~ ~ - ~ t en -m n-_m.vnnwm + --m-,, n.n ,--m~-- , w u n.., n.mu nnnn,., ..,. - n -, n,, + om ~~~~. _,_-.mmm.__..______ mm _m. APPLICABLER'"P7Asilyni7(Ref'.Y3)Tds6sitFitsithitithiTFiiitiEWis41 $AfET1[A!IAL18E833pa;e.le ajegatglyiprotecta[agajnstioverpressurizatioi 959sarbitar (MisiktsTddFliifihitdoiin.s,=k ey,dn i 0PERA8LE t PORYTisd byerprsisure) psevention fis firovi i ~~ ' ~ 4 Trestrictsd iccol ant"l evel f intthei pressiritegortbyle dsprestsrfred!RCSlAnd i sufficientasizeiRC$1ventf ~ Thi~itta1%upinteWitDtihithi?iMisi~I~irthi p/s%11miticurveicanlfall below1the1PORViset 1ntiiniFussi as vesselisatorialltoughnessidecreasesidueT o? neutron ~" - 'mbrittlementMEachit neithe P/T011m1ttcurverdareTrestiid?' e thel LTOP Systen1 will f be t re-eval uated ; tot ensursith at t i ts ~ ' " fgnetion'al s rdqui rement s fees Est111 e belmet : wi th ; t he ; PORVishd i pressurizetilpvallnethodforith(depressurjredland! vented;RCS l conditioM Trss'iestif thif4FsMhpableToffsilerpfesVHFidnf thirRCS! hsii lg beinsidentifiedland!evaluateds(Ref k4) eThese Strans.lents" ' l' Pelatetto eitherlmassiipputfor; heat tinputfy Jactuating?the HPkSystem#dischirgingEthe;CFTsWenerptzfng thelpresiurish heaters 6failing the=makeupicontroF va.we"open,closinW decay' j hjatiremovaldstattinglaireactoricoolantipump!(RCP)itthia~ t . - __ _'(f, onti.WUid. )'. r ~ -- w+m m w w&w m m m m a.m m>.mnow.smsu-

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LTOP'Systsm ' ' B 3. 4.l l. BASN.ESA~l-. .,N-.L. ~ 5 APPLICABLE' laFgi-temp &aturemismitchbetwsentheprimaryand~secondarf SAFF.TY ANALYSCS coolant;systessi and.;. adding; nitrogen to the p'ressurizeri~

-(continued)

~" ~~ ~ HPl~ actuation"and CFT"dischsgea'reithi'trinsienti?thit result in exceeding P/T limits within < 10-minutes;in;the' ' in which time no operator-action is-assumed to take place.-. rest, operator. action'aiter that time precludes overpressurization. 'Ihe analyses demonstrate that"the time. allowed for operator action is adeounte,itsi ~~ ^ or the events are~ self limiting.and do not exceed.LTOP.11m The?following are rsoslEsd'dUrinaithf LTOP MODES"to eniUrs T that transients do not occur, which elther of the LTOP ~ overpressure; protection means;cann.:.t_ handle: ~'~ ~ ~ 'aE 10eact19atingiallibut'6ne~ makeup!pumpi l b'. - j 0eactivating;HPl[and EU 71mmobilizinWCFT"di'schhge isolation"v'alves in:their " closed pos'Iions, when CFT pressure is greater;thaf the PILR ljmit. ~ ' ^~ ^ The Reference 3'analvsis'dimonstrate thWPORV~can"mitntain ~ i 7 RCS. pressure below limits when only one makeup: pump isii _. actuated. Consequently the LCO allows only;one makeup; pump to_be;0PERABLEjnthe;LiOLMODES.~ '" ~' u Inidsefteht stustion?6f'HPl?can"cause the RCS? pressure 1to 2 exceed < the LTOP-limits determined by. Reference-3 sooner than the 10 minutes allowed. Consequently HP! must be~ :M deactivated by assuringIthat an inadve,rtent HPI act0ation can_notinjectiwater;1ntRthe: RCS through the;HPI,valvesj i TheTisolated CFTs~must hivFtheiFdischargsT9alVes' cloisd. ~ d the valve power breakernin their:open positions. The... an analyses > show the 'effect of tFTJdischarge is over a narrower RCStemperature; range;(197'Fiandbelowbthanithatof;theLC0 (259mahd below); o $n al y se s lp e r fo rmed Tps rl Re fe ben c'e il[es_t'a bl i s hed ? th e_ temperature of"LTOP Applicability at 253*FL AT.THE EL QUARTER-T LOCATION..IHE ENABLE TEMPERATUREo0F: s s r11NCLUDESOCORRECTION"FOR INSTRUMENTL UNCERTAINITV.CThG ve materials were assumed to have a neutron" accumulation: equal to 15 effective fulls power years EFPYj) of operation and plant operation:is assumed to be in. ~ compliance with the:RCS.heatupjand cooldown~limitati.ons 6f f(sonti:iued) Cristal:RWeFUhit:537

BT3552C't (AmendnientTNo. '

LTOP System 'B;3_.4.11 BASES w - - - ~, E g f 14G k T@kUP "H ESSELi LtA L H i .,~ IEhf l[idpshIE8 atdj This: LC0 willidea jteith'e1HPl[adtuationTwhe%ths;RCS 4 >sak( O3$$ Lbj requike815$hER i.!"ECI$I[$1h! ~ - ~ ' 1 liigFessj3"cBn'.iinighs~sgij: aylisifiCt fgihi ' an@ s8Mnis]II""gt'siE} tion l5 ' 31ta[ ion 9$f" dog 4 r0Ethe 6 I k !sE 9 cangeSn;in$eEE"keknalsesELTbaccepfance$1mi"0".m eSmh~$$k 9 da OI.Ibe.u$1 a t s.-~'~~ x PORV:PerfoIHaunt y es if.T3:sho[ijhgt 7e s f o lad hii i _fh!erivefii$It._ ens _ur [!6{e;;{requ._ rem P p o C6de'Ca.se'N-514E(Reference'i will;be' met.g T asemysp;;ngpr A ryi=ggp"nd!m:{58s>athfin.aejgaigd fJa.ssa,:#;;:mm:nir-lgg8l'v8!!jpgjsg 3 efgjrtso exy s R18"" e {I$rek!!$ fill %!dIidNN63Ni@E'** l .cWntinusdJ ( ~ . ~. - ~. ~.. COstaRRivir Urittl3}

Bl3W520'_f LAmehdment;NR

LTOP'3ystem 'B_3.4 11 BASES. . ~ tu .+.,.un+..e+ > +.:. v u:e r n ,g_.,. a x .,. y ja y APPLICABL P PressurizeELeve1EPerformane SAFETY ANALYSES" L(continued);s. JAnalyses of operator ~respo'nse time'sh6sthWthe' pres'sur.liet level must be maintained 5 160' inches to provide the 10 minute action time for correcting transients. (Ref.73)( THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL L.IMITEOrJs 135 INCHESEINCLUDES CORRECTION FORL. INSTRUMENT UNCERTAINTIES.; The pressuFizer?leiel(limit"wl11:alsoWre; evaluated fof compliance each time _P/T 11mit curvosiare revised based. ori the results;of the, vessel materialisurveillance. RCS Vent Performance Withithe RCS 'deiressUrisedFanalysesiih' waf vent of o 0.75: square.incies is capable ofc-hitipe, ting the transient resulting from full opening-of the mbkeup control valve '~ whilethemakeuppump.isproviding:RCSmakeuf.3 The capacit of a vent this size is' greater than the' flow'resulting"from th_is; credible;transie_nt.. " ' ' ~ ^ ~ ' The RCS ient1 side will!also be rskevaluated!fopLcompliancs ~ each' time P/T limit curves.are: revised based on-theLresults of.the, vessel ma.ter_ialj su.rveillance. ' ' ~ ~ ~~ Thsfvent11_s; pas'sive.Tand)isTn6tisubjectf toiactiveifallsre? 4 i yn , ~ + +, ce nn .m.,, w r ~ ~ mm aw * (c,,g ),,gg . Amendment No'. : Cfystal[RiysEUnifl3T 1"lBi3?4F52E"

LTOP' Sist'sii 'B 3.4.11 BASE,5;((contin!sd) o m th0TillE E}LC guires"agg gtem'0PERABLEV thja*1ing $Rk h"Ob'de t "F Iori pEWasogyalvegclosjga mmoEllize sure:1, hh3 E I I 'P '

d C

40 iE P M1,N tPand %al ues~ 'pr6 ht'ed "i n :Lthis?tC050R THE WUNVLLIFTJSETPOINT ENABLE TEMPERATURE,-AND?PRESShRIZER LEWEL? are corrected for instrument: uncertaintyTTHE INSTRUMENTATION TO BE USED:BY' PLANT OPERATORSDTO-ASSURE ~im - m COMPLIANCE-WITH:THESEELIMITS AND VALUES - ARE: SPECIFIED?tNz.: APPROVED RLANTn0PERATINGMPROCED.URESV ~ s AJ3iinches; TheTPORV'is.;0PERABLEw "it s ; block' valve ~ isiopen;L;'its;11ft

k y0 10 0

an NFt with.hi~denressuFifed RCS~an"RCS TentEis"0PERABLE:'When"open .anarba,0fatleast.6.,75 square _1.n.ches.- " ~ jtq-l' y,<.hgMt&L / n.y +' s # A%v4 4 w,c er c.G e y V4g ,e:& 4 4 ;. p.%e -L ).4 Ete l 7 +. A t. Am,e sE4',b ' *v% 'N OW t -/ v'M 4. Mr -! My A + b } XM l APPLICABIL.!TYJ "Tii O Lis*applicablelinf MODElsh;enlRCS JemperatijfsK ] fe i[nht;c"om k'8ekenNned eNppkic'abikyfessel kOEb*kk renc'eh."NtNeY""'lk'e'N!" gmpSe$el{5eh

- gng oned,y#grgsaurlj{ati b $s nohpossible..

"of $ sYubS,'ba$di$Enuts !'k s trefree!s f$$$n'g.ikeNd re are sp ~ ' "hegcgbiligismgdijigy(Ng{ff"ft{at:CFTxbYnj statin 9120.t gxkmgmIknrgu t.

r. or e' S

ile: W O N '!d fe$ve N [ure conbitSonserformeb.o dbE "1esepressureS mpera ~ ve c (continued)' CffitallRihr;tinitf3; J. m, iB13.4-52Fi TAmendment No'. - ~* 7

LToprsists ~~ M 4.11 s,asts l iistliuidy _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _. _ - -. _ _ _ - - - _ _ - - ~. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - MTJ0Ns2CJ2MA11aibisTitsiiiFiTiWitt@ bad ibelow M Those Ltimesi rangtsithi pcttonssand; controls descri l'rositamediatal LteltthoursWiTheKtimeseve!basedion 'sperationalt'

tadustry!expertenciland regulatory ~thilt1E

' recommendations 51 itimesiare?intendeditoSalancii 'ecessary/teraccess shtthelectionstandithallikelihood i e8Perio#Cintia11_taltingittanstengduring;thtactioni~f ~~ n l WitWits"~iFIsiskiuFpsiiii"iiisbWifNijiitisi"istsitE RCs?oritf the HP12167activatedWimmediatesacitons are~~~ poquired to;rendertholother; pump (s)Jinoperableforxte_ deactivate HPIME astsaiston{immediaterdeactivation becauseitnadvertiet injectioitwithionoforloore HpIf ~ OPERABLhisttheteitent*oflgreatestisignificanced sincel i hauses;thelgreat9st!pressureijacreaseljnthetshirtestEt1El RihBifidiAsfissTFiifiidt flid EbjT NitEt hat 4sriltif ts ~ pumpsicapablej ofiRChinjecti oniforM15imi nut _es;toj a11 owj fiij pump ltswapsj TheIdeasthiitissfifiHplitilifissip11ihid T EEsiisFi"niithif7si inadvertent? Hpi t actuation s can t not t injectf waterMato ithe 1RCS through t thef MPI8 val ves FhThi s! My ! be racciapi t sbeds bf~~FJths ~~ ' cabinat ions Tofeequipmentl ast deters t ned t approppi aterf6 c exi stinci pl anticonditionsisuchias#di sabl ing g a1U HPI; val ves bridisablingfalltMakeup?p'umpsWLIffpowered8consonintslare^" hseoitofaccomplish doistiya_tionR powe Q hould M ten 6vedits gsureippsitjvel __ utj ti1TD71Isiiid703 EsiiilitidItFTEFidilViEisilafissisitWih1EhisF~sili@~si the LCFTi pres sGrefi st atior! greaterithan!the1 maximum 1 RCS Rtes surejorJthelaxist ingitemperaturelallosedlin3C0JI4i3] If?tiilitisiUYfisidsdTiiWWnnitI637sisiiilliihidNIfl!lWiiir Soquired( Action)D;h%iGequiredi Action?O;t/ rovidef twcI~~l^ optionsReithebofwhichjaustibeperformed?1512ihoursC8) increasing;theyRC$utemperature to M 19??F dthi1CFTl pressure. of?600l s i g ? cannot? exceed i thel L TOP Al i mi t s ni ff both) t anks i are full 71 b? 0epres suri zi ngithe ? CFTs i bel ow rthel LT0R~~ limilof.. 3 p'sigialso intthena_me]oyenti ~ fp'reventsiexceeding~;thiiLTOPi~liilts ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . _ _ _ MI6hilEidy w--u--------- n ~,nw__~nu_--a f [ 4 5 +

LT0FSistii 813All .sasts _ _ _ _ _ _._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, - - - - - ~ ~ - - _ _ _ _ - - ~ _ _ _ _ _ ACT!0NS W I T 7 C 1 M I1

Q~

bcontinued[ WirtsarsFaiivFitaFri6 verr.6Frftsis135:iscusinst tima forloperator?actieaMala pressuresincreastk' reduced k Tho'postulatodieventteost affact inLthsMTOP N00EStis failureYo tthe; makeup *contro19valven whichifilli thei res2eriz kith!nMour@elativ61yjapMhiRiitoratlogfis3egfB z Wit 6 Fit 16irittWisT66sfrssisityisisspi'iihur ~~ tred! Actions!Filsandif.fleustibelperfereed withIsF11 oursMActionsjF;10and*F.2ilisitithe:sakeupJcapabt11tftij' 'losin@theTankeuptcontrol valvecandtitsMsolation?valvei c ishichts}not1requiredwith!a-highfpressurir.orflevelbsnd" makeupfisiisolatednRCSTheatup must!be!s[contihueMWhenst permitLeooldownlandidepressurization4to additionE decreasesi the freactor: cool ant (densityiand hnddeductag" decay $satir,perationstsuc the pressetzertleveliR0 RCrpumps ~ emovalis@ldJnotibe;performedgwhen initMs;co_nsition! Git?Mif?ihrMit WithTths"p0RiilispsFibliT'6ifeFFFiiisFsiFilisViHFdipibility" i s 01ost Jand Mestoration fof tthe? PORV Ni thi n t il hourd i s~~~ 'requiredhllfftheticannotTheiac&omplishedMthelab111ty?3f the Makeupl$ystenitoladtwaterlaust[belljettedlyithinitM pextiltjhoursj INssisfittinisisssi? 6s7Easis1EtsdriittKIh!!{K6Wi?Wqsfrid ActionVHiliandfReddired ActioniHitfaustibeYperformedito" l imit? RC$isaterfac ditisc hpabil'itfMMikeugGs;notiroqulFsd toibeldeadtivatsdsincetitimagbe*neededto;maistain!thelRCS tioolant Heve1 M RequipediActionl:Hilfand! Required!ActionlH;2 veqsi re f reduci ngithe f aakeup s tank sl evelituiS8714che si'and'~~~ diactivatingsthe'llowtlow makeup?tanktlevelsinterlockstoiiks irator Wolume sinsufficientitsissceedithel~iT0fil imit i by~ha borated %ater"storag'eitankMThirmakerdtheisvallable::makeu ~~~ gakeudsntroEvalvelfullippuningf~"^~ w5stihiisd) $'.%5 A4$'/#.9MN786'M7.YdFMhddh'IMiMlN.Yr #bN XNSES.NMMMAW 4hMhWMC $'8$hMOM-Mh5.'Nh4 S.Od?N%Nd4NM/5hh,M.('M-M'A945 MMuWYU'd.'M84diUSM/.4.M8 X % ? CPf.i._Ci1_TRi_ii.m._6.1tF_3BBW MWa_8F.3.!4;52_H#C-ME"*!MAEi6dmintIN6?"A: PU %shma e-am -w--- J

I LTOPISysteii ~ BA4 dl. 1 BASES w.-~u.-~~ n-- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. ~ nm.---o-n m y ACTich8P5 7 E IM N iif [ggentinuaMil utthius iFsimiiiriivitrasia:13_5 isaurisditsw0w .inoperableorf theltTOP:Systentino>erabl;e:for2any;reassa ~^"" l ether;thanWxited tatCeedition7Alttrough;Hetheisysten niif heti pessibled Ret ut red! Actioni t; 2 ; requi pesi the! RCS ~ ~isi~ti be restoredite:0PERABLEistatusltiithinglihou'reWhenith ' i Weppasserited .e.i_the._r!_Co_ndit_jan< Jvented;withinil2ihoursjfromitheitis ] ionJstartedi 1 OiiisFiiiWiTRC5NiitTEV7WilidTNGiht?ilisiif7035 i square; inches?is specified #:SuchVa(ventikeepssthe pres' sus l fremifu11Lflowlof?one Makeupt ' ump withf a wide'op~enimakeup~ honttol;n1Vegthin3h ;LC0 imi t f~~~~~" ~~- t f j! T6tEiisil RCSIsihtWissiilisiihtiWRCS IpFisisFiV61bELTOP l imi ts il f; the ? HPli ori CFil systemsi: areli nadvertentlyTactuated Q 6FifiEation1: ThereforeM{injectiongj end ithe ! CFisseust? accompany ithe ~ humpsnHPI j de'pressuri z i ngi and Wentingh iSi nce? these ? systems /ari' t het utredldeictivated byXtheSLCOBSRL3s4?ll(1pSR13i4?llit? ant ? $R(334 ~. l lt 3 ? requi relvetjfj catj onnff theirldeac tivated ~ staturevery~?ltihourn ~ _ ~ ~ S 6-@$ ck.+ iY Y S.W 43 9 h M eiG 5)rX.W M W)K WW..WhW MC#4%*=b%M.4WF YdDFj@/ $ f=>.I=%MWW SVaWhMQQ%%. Q N ply.47.%Qy._.%Qy4Y Y MWQgqWyQ.)$1(Mid-gy.'s, l.%$ QlM,$V4MY% 3 i i.---~_____--m_-~~_-- SURVERCANCEyLMm. h_e ?foll owi ng t surveill ance ? requi rement,? frequencies fife rshown . l.t_EQU_IREME_NTSadbyloper.at.ti e5regula'rly.a..nd.,findustryf..ac. -. lexperienceY m i ~ 'sufficien as ses s; conditi ons t forci potes.ti al-degradatiohjaditohgri fyloperation;pijhihitteitequLremihts] 1 i sRM STC11? tB ERW3741117tFiKFSR E 3I4711 ?3 fi Aone ma eupl pump:.pw,wsp w,.% :i. %> c t.iwu.,:.v,,s v,< ti bw-w,.s,3.: formed. ft.hw y.m, atsenlwigrewv.w.% s.- www Ve,v.mi.r fiw,a# ons;mus esper Ls s hapablelof tinjecting?intdithe RCS@the;HPItisideactivated[ f i l Wei ltheT CFTJdi s'cha'rgefi kol at i on tv al vesiWel cl osed land "~ i llmobilizedW UThesetSurve111ancishedsupeltheiminimumfiilid isputicapabi.litF willinoticreatesan!RCSCov'erpress'ure'~ - sondition;to[iatkit;houdintervalsicha116nbilthe!LTOP1SyR6Che l are: required 3 -w-~- AI. 6fimww.5d. i fiww. SRI 374fil.?3 f bow.v.3mlw;ww..w.ecy;on y requiFiwvyhsi.., s -.N mo es ngt s l Surve 11.1 anc. e fwhen.i CFTl_i s'ol. at i ont i.s areq~ui r6d 7 ~~ a d ) _ _._ - _(- t+i _nued). con =7 . - ___ s _ _ _ ~ -, ammmmmmm.~mmmmann-manwn=unannma w--a s ) y i i e h,., ~.. -. -..._.---,-n.._-_?_- ~... _ -,--,, -. ,,,,-wn.,----.,-...--,.. ,,,---,..,-,, n ~.. ,.-,n-

LTOPTSystes ~BJ.4;11 BA.SES. ~ t~m 4 m.m - -___._m ---m-- - m m ;m <m- $URVEILIANCEE' SR"3!4s1174 BEqulRESENis [i@5tinusdC"' VeFi ficitiiinsoffihs3ress0r1zer"l1eVellatv1357t ncheivix j sbserving7contro19roosior;otherLindicationsLensuresia~~~ 'cushioniofisuffirlent& size <1s7available!to reduce the7iti ) ofEessure jncrkas.elfromjotentialltran'sientu ~^" ~~ ~^ J Th'e7301'Eihuti SuFvilllisEi FFiquindifdUring'hiitUjPirid tooldown.sustibe4performedifor;thetLC0; Applicability;peFlid ishen;temperatureichanges;can 3ause pressurizerclevel Variations.H;.This! Frequency may;.be:discontin9e( whenithi ' ends f of } the' e conditions; are s s ati sfied; i as ? defined s in : plint s procedupes.;f1hereaftert:theiSurveillancejisiraquirediat ~' 1 12 hour.jtn.tler;valsi ~~ ~~ ^~ ~ " " ~ '~~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~ A~ Nste ? sodi fliilthi!SRTbyInit~Fi(Ul Fiithe [SUHs;111 shii When.. comp]ying.Lwi.th LC. O~ 3.' 4.11. b t l ERv314 fili 5 VsrificatidnNthat'thsMORV bl6WValveili~opii~lnsUrii?i flowfpath(toltheiPORVriThis;isirequirfd[atilthourf'~' int _erva]ss ( Note"miid i fissi t helSRibi? n6tTFiqGi Fi 6g7t he 7 SUWe l 11 anii ph'en{coipplying3t th;tCO 314 1.1;bj ~ ~ "-' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 SR"'3!4?llT6 WhinTiti pill ated lyi LC053 r4 111 blTthie f RCS WehtE6CitEl eist] 0'. 751 squa re sinch { sus te be' ' vert fled ' open; for frel ie f '~ " 'rotections[ForfanfunlockedventfopeningAtheFri40inEfli p every(12; houri.JFora a? locked; vent'openinglin;theJCShthe required Frequen49xis;every;31(dayss 2 (Noteimodi fiiP theTSR[byTFeqlikllngithElSu rye'11Jhndej^ithsii complying 1with1LC0f3.4.ll;.b] p sM.M v h 4v.wx -myn :- .c g g v.f g.ws -,e v s v-u_ mmm _A <W ~m m m _m. _. (fijth]{RJy g unit g JBM4}52J.5mf 1 mmmJAms;ridmentTN4j H

~~LTOP~$fitei 81 3.4.1.1 BA$rs _ _, _ _ _._ _ _, _ _ _ _ _, _ _ _ _ _ -, _.- _ _ _ _,, _ -..,__m._-__-- - - - - _s_

m. __. _ _m SURVE!LLANCE? 1 W SR"3f4?llT7

tEQUIREMENTS_

dcet i nuadCXCHANNECfuNCIl0NAliTEST3 sleqUi fedlwi thiss12]i6sFEbifoFi bFaftir"deffisiirWRCSiteiipeFatuFil tsli !CshdTiifff

31. days 4thereafter:toiensure the'setpoint is properffor;.,is itsingtthe PORV for;LTOP.1.< PORV actuatio

' ~" " '~ __ld t d.~ep_re. _ssur_iz._e' tho_' R._ CST ~~ ~ ~ ~n :is not neede it'cou TEt t ? hiUFTffiqEeHEF"EssiidiFi? tWUiil l ks1't hidd:lif 7sE13G semperature[overpressurelev.e.niduringitheiti.mei ~~^~^~ ggm3:473j;g l Ths' peirfituanciEsf T CHANNE E CALIBRAT10N 71 s?fiksi pid"eWif] 24 months D The-CHANNEL CAllBRATIONLfor:the LTOPfsetpoint l ensures;thatlthe:PORV will; be actuated;at-the1 appropriate i RCS' pressure by'vertfying the/accuracyjofLthe instrument ~ string; "The?:' calibration canionly be performed inLshutdoss? Ihe;f requency :;co_n s,i ders ;the je fuel i ng ; cycl e ( ' ;~~ " ~ ~ SR73?471'1?9 VeFificatlonithitiths"PORV3sOsilstisditb7thif1sVrang's setpoint;ensuresLtheFove'rpressure-protection:. flow path" thP i ~ o_ ugh.m_thesPORV.S T.h._is_41.s4 re uiridiat.11.2..h_ou_r61_ntervalf! --x d- 'A' No'w te,pt+=. modi fi-,e.q,-.gs1 thga..ge SR b,eA,,iyinot-,,.,. i+ agamprequ i ri4#.gs,,,,g sth,%e' S U-..ya=6* %"e,' N %u ~_ ,-g.,ip f,;j, 4 7p4ae.* ap ig A d sdA hjnLeomplyipgiwith;LC0;3&l11bf ^~~g~~" ~"~ ~~' ~ n ce h.$.S=$N.kNU 'd $aQ+4:4 (. -4 fv5 O. 154 &'v %. '4*-:-'$n',,' d -oh-' r u &,4hAr ...<k'Q, -A.n.~j y .;.- fj, 'e' wontinu. di .CFjifilERiseFI.UrilC~35 TB73?4..5.2K7.~ ~"_Z:1 sAsehdnieht_WF_h !. ~-a.,. ~ -- ~ -.

1.TOPSyst'em B _ 3. 4._11 BASES ~(E6ntished)-. u_ , --~ 4 ,.m . m. m~a. :. _ REFERENCES]'~;' j h lASMETCH e: Case'N;514;7"L6ETe'mperathse1.0verpressdts P.rotectionLSection;XI,i. Division 1"i 21" ' Generic! Letter'8811;""NRC P6siti' n ~~on Ridiation o '"~ Embrittlement-of> Reactor Vessel Materials and its ~ ~ ' ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ' ~ ' ImpacLonJ1antioperations,"{ 3C FPCJaks1 Lit 1os;19710003h]CR}3].1[EFP[LTOP,llimits"I 4! T BfENacl eaE Se^s tse's " (FT I)' D6came6tT 5121176431 01 fCsystal; River.3 Reactor Vessel Low; Temperature"? Overpressure Protection (LTOP)".. Y 4 ' + > >Y y n n ' k.. r s >c l i CfdfaERl;0erluriitl3;j l;Bll374-52t?

AinendmentlNoi

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 BASES BACKGROUND safety valves. The LPI pimps are capable of discharging to (continued) the RCS at an RCS pressure of approximately 200 psia. When the BWST has been nearly emptied, the suction for the LPI pumps is manually transferred to the reactor building emergency sump. The HPI pumps cannot take suction directly from the sump. If HPI is still needed, a cross connect from the discharge side of the LPI pump to the suction of the HPI pumps would be opened. This is known as " piggy backing" HPI to LPI, and enables continued HPI to the RCS, if needed, after the BWST is emptied to the switchover point. l In the long term cooling period, flow paths in the LPI System can be established to preclude the possibility of boric acid in the core region reaching an unacceptably high concentration. One flow path is from the hot leg through the decay heat suction lino and then in a reversa direction through the reactor building emergency sump suction line into the sump. The other flow path uses the gaps between the hot leg nozzles and the reactor vessel. These gaps provide a flow path between the outlet annulus and the inlet l nozzle /downcomer region of tne reactor vessel. Either finw path is capable of providing the required flow rates to ensure boron precipitation is not a concern. HPI also functions to sup)1y borated water to the reactor core following increased leat removal events, such as large SLBs. Due4gcced ca the-max 4 mum-number of HPyMakeup-pump; 4cw tempercture-een4M4 ens--ifetk RCS, limRat4 ens are p. ere-espaMe-ef-indeet4eg-tete-t4;c RCS. The:c limit-at4 ens sec pcrt of-the plcat: Lcw Tempercterc Overprc::uee Peeteet4en-(4-TOP) cdminhteative contteh. During a large break LOCA, PCS pressure will decrease to < 200 psia in < 20 seconds. The ECCS is actuated upon receipt of an Engineered Safeg ards Actuation System (ESAS) signal. The actuation of saf< guard loads is accomplished in a programmed time sequence, if offsite power is available, the safeguard loads start immediately (in the programmed sequence). If offsite power is not available, the y engineered safety feature (ESF) buses shed normal operating loads and are connected to the diesel generators. Safeguard loads are then actuated in the programmed ti.ne sequence. The time delay associated with diesel starting, sequenced loading, and pump starting determines the time required (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-10 Rev4+1en No. 5

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 BASES (continued) ACTIONS Ad With one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the flow equivaleat to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the inoperable components n;ust be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. The 72 hour Completion Time is based on NRC recommendations (Ref. 3) that are based on a risk evaluation and is a reasonable time for many repairs. d An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering the design flow to the RCS. The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the 4 diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing i its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. The intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment such that the safety injection (SI) flow equivalent to 100% of a single train remains available. This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable. An event acc;mpanied by a loss of offsite power and the fatlure of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 3) ht.s shown the risk of having one full ECCS train inoperable to be sufficiently low to justify continued operation for 72 hours. With one or more components inoperable such that the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is not available, the facility is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be immediately entered. Thi; Condition det; net :pply te HP! ;ub:y:te: 00:per. cat: which cr d ::tivated for the purp0::: Of 00: plying with L+w T; p:r:tur: Overpr:::ure Protection (LTOP) dministr:tive

trol

=it=nt;. With th::: 00:;0nent; de: tiv:ted, the HP : b:y:te: i: :till eca:ider:d OPER?SLE b:: d up0:

guid:r. : in NRC Cen ric Letter 01 10. Thi: guid:nt: :11ews

b;titution of :: nuel Op;r ter ;ction for Othen !:0 (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-15 Revi:10n NO. 5 2

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 1 1 BASES ACTIONS

te : tic function: for the purpo::: Of determining (continued)

OPERABILITY. The :cbstitution: :.re limited :nd :::t be enlu:ted ag in:t the :::::pti n in th: ::cident :::ly:i:. In th

Of d:::tivating liPI for LTOP :t RCS t:.p;r ture s 283*f, th: ::q :n:nt: cr: :v:il:ble for inj::tien fellering ::nr:1 Oper:t:r :: tion t; re:ter: th :y:te: te i

OPEPf3LE :t:tu: :nd thi: :: tion ::n b: :::::pli:h:d ! thin l tr:::!::ll:::!s:::. B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable components cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Times, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least i MODE 3 within 6 hours-and at least MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on I operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions i from full power conditions in an orderly manner and Mthout challenging plant systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 9 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation..This SR dnes not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position a prior to locking, sealing, or securing. These valves include valves in the main flow paths and the first normally closed valve in a branch line. There are several exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves (both inside and outside the RB), relief valves outside the RB, instrumentation valves (both inside and outside the RB), check valves (both inside and outside the RB), and sample line valves (inside and outside the RB). A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition within the proper stroke time. This Surveillance does not require a.r testing or valve manipulation; rather, (continued) { l Crystal-River l' nit 3 B 3.5-16 Revi icn M. S I

EC;S-Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES LC0 During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is (continued) required to provide an abundant supply of water from the BWST to the RCS, via the ECCS pumps and their respective discharge flow paths, to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles and the reactor vessel. In the long term, this flow path may be switched to take its supply from the reactor building emergency sump and to supply its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs. This LC0 is raodified by a Note which states that HPI may be deactivated in accordance with 1.CO N 4711 M"3 Low 7emperature l OverpressurcProtection(LTOP)Syste(squiredtoinitiateHPI. idm464strctive centrol s. Operator action is theh~F l In +.he event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) requiring HPI actuation, the time required for operator action has been shown by analysis to be accept:.ble. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the OPERABILITY requirements for the ECCS are covered by LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS-Operating." In MODE 4 with the RCS temperature below 280*F, one OPERABLE ECCS train is acceptable without single failure consideration, on the basis of the sM ble reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements. In MODES 5 and 6, plant conditions are such that the probability of an event requiring ECCS injection is extremely low. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are addressed by LC0 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LC0 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LCO 3.9.4, " Decay Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation-High Water l Level," and LC0 3.9.5, " Decay Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level." (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-21 Amendment No. 449

ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.3 EASES (continued) ACTIONS M If no LPI srbsystem is OPERABLE, the unit is not prepared to responc to a LOCA or to continue cooldown using the DHR/LPI pumps and decay-heat heat exchangers. The immediate Completion Time ensures that prompt action is initiated to restore the required cooling capacity. Normally, in MODE 4, reactor decay heat must be removed by a DHR/LPI train operating with suction from the RCS, If no OHR/LPI train is OPERABLE for this function, reactor decay heat must be removed b.v some alternate method, such as use of the steam generator (s) (OTSG). The alternate means of heat removal must continue until the inoperable ECCS LPI subsystem can be restored to operation so that continuation of decay heat removal (DHR) is provided. M If no ECCS HPI subsystem is OPERABLE, due to the inoperability of the HPI pump or flow path from the BWST, the plant is not prepared to provide high pressure respc'se to Design Basis Events requiring ECCS response. The I hour Completion Time to restore at least one ECCS HPI subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action is taken to provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions to place the plant in MODE 5, where an ECCS train is not required. This Condition does not apply to HPI subsystem components which are deactivated for the purposes of complying with Lt0.. 3 M lln " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) ~ Syst' emf 3dministrativecc+trolccmitments. With these components deactivated, the HPI subsystem is still considered OPERABLE based upon guidance in NRC Generic Letter 91-18. This guidance allows substitution of manual operator action for otherwise automatic functions for the purposes of determining OPERABILITY, The substitutions are limited and must be evaluated against the assumptions in the accident analysis. In the case of deactivating HPI in MODE 4, the components are available for injection following manual operator action to restore the system to OPERABLE status and this action can be accomplished within the time frame required to respond to the transient / accident. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-22 Amendment No. M9

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LTOPS T5CRN 213 Revision 1 3F1097-12 4 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NOTICE 213, REVISION 1 (TAC No. M99277) REVISION BAR PAGES Technical Specifications 4 5

LTOP Systea 3.4.11 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.11 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System LC0 -3.4.11 An LTOP System shall be OPERABLE with a maximum of one makeup pump capable of injecting into the RCS, high pressure injection (HPI) deactivated, the core flood tanks (CFTs) isolated and: Pres 2urizer level s 135 inches and an OPERABLE power a. operated relief valve (PORV) with a lift setpoint of s 457 psig; or b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent of 2 0.75 square inch. APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when RCS temperature is s 259'F, MODE 5, MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is not completely detensioned. ............................N0TE---------------------------- CFT isolation is only required when CFT pressure is greater than or equal to.the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS temperature allowed by the pressure and temperature limit curves provided in the PTLR. i Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21 Amendment No.

LTOP System 3.4.11 l ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME t-A. More than one makeup A.1

NOTE---------

pump capable of Two makeup pumps may be injecting into the capable of injecting RCS. into the RCS during pump swap operation for s 15 minutes. Initiate action to Immediately verify only one makeup pump is capable of injecting into the RCS. B. HPI capable of B.1 Initiate action to Immediately actuation, verify HPI deactivated. C. A CFT not isolated C.1 Isolate affected CFT. 'I hour when CFT aressure is greater t1an or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for existing temperature allowed in the PTLR. D. Required Action C.1 0.1 Increase RCS 12 hours not met within the temperature to > 197*F. required Completion Time. DB D.2 Depressurize affected-12 hours CFT to < 457 psig. E. ' Pressurizer level E.1 Restore pressurizer 1 hour > 135 inches. level to s 135 inches. (c6ntinued) Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21 A Amendment No. i

LTOP Systea 3.4.11 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action E.1 F.1 Close a:d maintain 12 hours not met within the closet the makeup required Completion control valve and its Time. associated-isolation valve. SE F.2 Stop RCS heatup. 12 hours G. PORV inoperable. G.1 Restore PORV to I hour OPERABLE status. ii. Required Action G.1 H.1 Reduce makeup tank 12 hours not met within the level to s 88 inches, required Completion Time. AND H.2 Deactivate low low 12 hours makeup tank level interlock to the borated water storage tank suction valves. (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21B Amendment No.

.i f. c LTOP System-i. 3.4.11 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION-REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 3 I.. Pressurizer level I.1 Restore LTOP System to I hour- > 135 inches. OPERABLE status. -. AliQ QB PORV inoperable.- I.2 Depressurize RCS and 12 hours establish RCS vent of QB 2 0.75 square inch. .lTOP System inoperable for any reason other than Condition A through Condition H. \\ 1 Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21C Amendment No.

LTOP System 3.4.11 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE-FREQUENCY SR 3.4.11.1 Verify a maximum of one makeup pump is 12 hours capable of injecting into the RCS. SR 3.4.11.2 Verify HPI is deactivated. 12 hours SR 3.4.11.3

NOTE--------------

Only required to be performed when CFT isolation is required Verify each CFT isolation 12 hours valve is closed and deactivated. SR 3.4.11.4

NOTE--------------

30 minutes Not required to be performed during RCS when complying with LC0 3.4.11.b heatup and cooldown Verify pressurizer level is 6NQ s 135 inches. 12 hours SR 3.4.11.5

NOTE---------------

Not required to be performed When complying with LCO 3.4.ll.b Verify PORV, block valve is open. 12 hours SR 3.4.11.6

NOTE----------------

Only required when complying with LC0 3.4.11.b. Verify RCS vent 2 0.75 square inch 12 hours for is open, unlocked vent opening (s) AND 31 days for locked vent opening (s) (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21D Amendment No.

...... -.. ~. ~ LTOP Systea 3.4.11 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.11.7 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for Within 12 PORV. hours before or after decreasing RCS temperature to s 259'F AND 31 days thereafter SR 3.4.11.8 Perform CHANNEL CAL'BRATION-for PORV. 24 months SR 3.4.11.9

NOTE----------------

Not required to be performed when complying with LC0 3.4.11.b Verify PORV is selected to the low range 12 hours

setpoint, Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21E Amendment No.

(> s ECCS--Shutdown 3.5.3 3.[3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3 ~. 5. 3 ECCS--Shutdown t LCO

3. 5. 3 _

One ECCS train shall be OPERABLE. ..-N0TE------------------------- High pressure injection (HPI) may be deactivated in accordance with LCO 3.4.11, " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System." l APPLICABILITY: MODE 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required low pressure A.1 Initiate action to Immediately injection (LPI) restore required LPI subsystem inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status. B. Required HPI subsystem B.1 Restore required HPI 1 hour - inoperable, subsystem to-0PERABLE status. C. Required Action and-C.1 Be in MODE 5, 24 hours associated Completion Time not met. Crystal River Unit 3 3.5-7 Amendment No.

i, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LTOPS TSCRN 213, Revision 1 3F1097-12 1 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CIIANGE i REQUEST NOTICE 213, REVISION 1 i (TAC No. M99277) REVISION BAR PAGES Bases 2 1 4 t

Pressurizer Safety Valves-B 3.4.9-B 3.'4 EREACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)- B 3.4.9-Pressurizer Safety Valves-BASES'

BACKGROUND

- The-purpose of the:two spring-loaded pressurizer safety. valves is to provide RCS overpressure protection. Operating; in conjunction-with the Reactor Protection System (RPS), twoj valves are used to ensure that the Safety Limit (SL) of - 2750 psig is not exceeded for analyzed transients-during operation in MODES 1, 2, and 3. For MODE 4, MODE 5, and. M00E:6 with the: reactor vessel head not completely-- detensioned, overpressure protection is provided by LCO 3.4.11, " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System." The self actuated pressurizer safety valves are designed in accordance with the requirements set forth in the ASME Boiler-and Pressure Vessel. Code,-Section III (Ref. 1). The - required lift pressure is 2500 psig 1 2%. The safety valves discharge steam from the-pressurizer to-the reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT) located in-the containment-The discharge flow is indicated by acoustic monitors downstream of the safety valves and by an increase-in RCDT pressure -and level. The upper and lower pressure limits were originally based on the i 1% tolerance requirement for iifting pressures above 1000 psig. : However, later versions of the ASME Code allow - for tolerances-of up to 13%, and the use-of 2% was-justified in Reference' 2. The-lift-setting is< for the - ambient conditions associated with MODES 1,12,.and 3. This requires-either that the valves:be set hot or that a correlation between hot and cold settings be established. ./ The pressurizer safety valves are part of the primary' 1 success path and mitigate-the effects of postulated accidents. OPERABILITY of the safety valves ensures-that-- the RCS pressure-will be limited to less than 110% of design - pressure. M (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-43 Amendment No.

Pressurizer _ Safety Valves B 3.4.9 _ BASES - APPLICABILITY reactor coolant pressure less than 110% of its design value -(continued) during certain accidents. -The LCO is _not applicable in MODES 4 and 5 because LC0 3.4.11. " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System" provides overpressure protection.. Overpressure >rotection is not required in MODE 6-with_the_ reactor vessel. 1ead completely detensioned.. I ACTIONS _ 8.d With one pressurizer safety valve inoperable, restoration-l must take place within 15 minutes. The Completion Time.of 15 minutes reflects the importance of maintaining the RCS - overpressure protection system. An inoperable safety-valve. I coincident-with a des *gn basis overpressure event could challenge the integrity of the-RCS. B.1 and B.2 If the Required Action cannot be met within the associated Completion Time or if both pressurizer safety valves are inoperable, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the - requirement does not apply. To achieve-thisDstatus, the plant must_ be placed in'at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and J -in M00E-4-within=12 hours.- The-specified CompletiontTimes i are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the . required MODES from full power-conditions in an orderly manner _ and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 4 and below, overpressure protection is provided by LTOP.- Placing the plant in a lower MODE (3 and 4) reduces the RCS energy (thermal and pressure), lowers the potential for-'large pressurizer insurges, and thereby removes the need for overpressure protection by two pressurizer safety. valves. SURVEILLANCE SR

3. 4. 9.1 -

REQUIREMENTS -The requirement to verify lift setpoint 1 2450 psig and $2550 psig is implemented in the ': service Testing Program. T (continued) trystal River-Unit 3 B 3.4-45 Amendment No. U

LTOP Systea B 3.4.11 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4.11 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System BASES BACKGROUND The LTOP System controls RCS pressure at low temperatures so the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) is not compromised by violating the pressure and temperature (P/T) limits of ASME Code Section XI, Division 1, Code Case N-514 (Ref. 1). The reactor vessel is the limiting RCPB component for providing such protection. The reactor vessel material is less tough at reduced temperatures than at normal operating temperature. Also, as vetsel neutron irradiation accumulates, the material becomes less resistant to pressure stress at low temperatures (Ref. 2). RCS pressure must be maintained low when temperature is low and must be increased only as temperature is increased. The RCS temperatures referenced throughout this LC0 and Bases are based on the same criteria as is used for heatup and cooldown monitoring (Refer to LCO 3.4.3). -Specifically, the cold leg temperature should be used with RCPs operating and the decay heat outlet temperature should be used with no RCPs operating. Operationa! maneuvering during cooldown, heatup, or any anticipated operational occurrence mtst be controlled to not violate LCO 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits." Exceeding these limits could lead to brittle fracture of the reactor vessel. LCO 3.4.3 presents requirements for administrative.ontrol of RCS pressure and temperature to prevent exceeding the P/T limits. This LCO provides RCS overpressure protection in the o applicable MODES by ensuring an adequate pressure relief capacity and a limited coolant addition cacability. The pressurereliefcapacityrequireseitherthepoweroperated relief valve (PORV) lift setpoint to be reduced and pressurizer coolant level at or below a maximum limit or the RCS depressurized with an RCS vent of sufficient size to handle the limiting transient during LTOP. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52 Amendment No. I

LTOP Syste] B 3.4.11 BASES BACKGROUND The LTOP approach to protacting the vessel by limiting (continued) coolant addition capabil?y allows a maximum of one makeup pump, and requires deactsvating HPI, and isolating the core flood tanks (CFTs) when CFT pressures exceed the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS temperature allowed by PTLR. Should more than one HPI pump inject on an HPI actuation, the pressurizer level and PORV or another RCS vent cannot prevent overpressurizing the RCS. The pressurizer level limit provides a compressible vapor space or cushion that can accommodate a coolant insurge and prevent a rapid pressure increase, allowing the operat time to stop the increase. The PORV, with reduced lii. setting, or the RCS vent, is the overpressure protection device that acts as backup to the operator in terminating an increasing pressure event. With HPI deactivated, the ability to )rovide RCS coolant addition is restricted. To balance tie possible need for coolant addition, the LCO does not require the Makeup System to be deactivated. Due to the lower pressures associated with the LTOP MODES and the expected decay heat levels, the l Makeup System can provide flow with the OPERABLE makeup pump t through the makeup control valve. HPI can be restored by operator action. PORV Recuirements As designed for the LTOP System, the PORV is signaled to open if the RCS pressure approaches a limit set in the LTOP actuation circuit. The LTOP actuation circuit is the circuit which opens the PORV at the low pressure setpoint. The LTOP actuation circuit monitors RCS pressure and determines when an overpressure condition is a)proached. When the monitored pressure 'neets or exceeds tie setting, the PORV is signaled to open. Maintaining the setpoint within the limits of the LC0 ensures the Reference 1 limits will be met in any event analyzed for LTOP. When a PORV is opened in an increasing pressure transient, the release of coolant causes the pressure increase to slow and reverse. As the PORY releases coolant, the RCS pressure decreases until a reset pressure is reached and the valve is signaled to close. The pressure continues to decrease below the reset pressure as the valve closes. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-52A Amendment No.

LTOP Systea B 3.4.11 BASES BACKGROUND RCS Vent Reauirements (continued) Once the RCS is depressurized, a vent exposed to the containment atmosphere will maintain ti.a RCS at ambient containment pressure in an RCS overpressure transient, if the relieving requirements of the maximum credible LTOP transient do not exceed the capabilities of tia vent. Thus, the vent path must be capable of relieving the flow of the limiting LTOP transient and maintaining pressure below LTOP limits. The required vent capacity may be provided by one or more vent paths. For ar, RCS vent to meet the flow capacity, it requires removing a pressurizer safety valve, or similarly establishing a vent by removing an OTSG primary side manway cover or primary side handhole cover, or other vents as determined to be sufficient. !he vent path (s) must be above the level of reactor coolant, so as not to drain the RCS when open. l APPLICABLE Analyses (Ref. 3) demonstrate that the reactor vessel SAFETY ANALYSES can be adequately protected against overpressurization transients during shutdown. At 259'F and below, overpressure prevention is provided by an OPERABLE PORV and a restricted coolant levt:1 in the pressurizer or by a depressurized RCS and a sufficient size RCS vent. The actual temperature at which the pressure in the P/T limit curve can fall below the PORV setpoint increases as vessel material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement. EP.ch time the P/T limit curves are revised, the LTOP System will be re-evaluated to ensure that its functional requirements can still be met with the PORV and pressurizer level method or the depressurized and vented RCS condition. Transients that are capable of overpressurizing the RCS have been identified and evaluated (Ref. 4). These transients relate to either mass input or heat input: actuating the HPI System, discharging the CFTs, energizing the pressurizer heaters, failing the makeup control valve open, losing decay heat removal, starting a reactor coolant pump (RCP) with a (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52B Amendment No. j ~

LTOP Systea B 3.4.11 l BASES APPLICABLE-large temperature mismatch between the primary and secondary o SAFETY ANAllSES coolant systems, and adding nitrogen to the pressurizer. (continited) HPI actuation and CFT discharge are the transients that result in exceeding P/T limits within < 10 minutes, in which time no operator-action is assumed to take place. In the rest, operator action after that time precludes overpressurization. The analyses demonstrate that the time allowed for operator action is adequate, or the events are self limiting and do not exceed LTOP limits. The following are required during the LTOP MODES to ensure that transients do not occur, which either of the LTOP overpressure protection means cannot handle: a. Deactivating all but one makeup pump; b. Deactivating HPI; and c. Immobilizing CFT discharge isolation valves in their closed positions, when CFT pressure is greater than the PTLR limit. The Reference 3 analyses demonstrate the PORV can maintain RCS pressure below limits when only one makeup pump is actuated. Consequently, the LC0 allows only one makeup pump to be OPERABLE in-the LTOP MODES. i f-Inadvertent actuation of HPI can cause the RCS pressure to exceed the LTOP limits determined oy Reference-3 sooner than the 10 minutes allowed. Consequently, HPI must be deactivated by assuring that an inadvertent HPI actuation can not inject water into the RCS through the HPI valves. The isolated CFTs must have their discharge valves closed and the valve power breakers in their open positions. The analyses show the effect of CFT discharge is over a narrower RCS temperature range (197'F and below) than that of the LC0 (259'F and below). Analyses performed per Reference 1 established the temperature of LTOP A)plicability at 253*F at the vessel quarter-t location. T1e LTOP enable temperature of s 259'F includes correction for instrument uncertainity. The vessel materials were assumed to have a neutron irradiation accumulation equal to 15 effective full power years (EFPYs) of operation and )lant o)erhtion is assumed to be in compliance with t1e RCS leatup and cooldown limitations of (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52C Amendment No.

) LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES LAPPLICABLE-- LCO 3.4.3.E ln addition, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) SAFETY ANALYSES > operation is assumed to be: restricted-to greater than 85'F-i (continued)- for the first two pumps -and greater than 225'F-for pump b three. PumpfouroperafionisnotconsideredforLTOP.--- - During plant heatup,-i;he vessel metal temperature -lags the= reactor coolant temperature. Stoppins.the Reactor Coolant . System heatup and holding for a perioc of 90 minutes-allows the vessel metal temperature-at the quarter-t - l location to stabilize to the reactor _ coolant temperature. This LCO will-dea'ctivate the llPI actuation when the RCS temperature is s 259'F. The consequences of a small; break. 'LOCA in LTOP MODE-4 are consistent with those discussed in the bases for LCO 3.5.3 "ECCS-Shutdown " by having a maximum of one makeup pu,mp OPERABLE for,the required one OPERABLE ECCS tri'n.

Reference:

3containsth'eacce$ts,incombinationwith tance-limits-that satisf the LTOP requirements.. These lim he -limitations of LCO 3.4.3, and administrative restrictions on RCP operation, provide the assurance that the reactor vessel is protected from exceeding the requirements of ASME Code Case N-514. <Any change to the RCS operation or design must be evaluated against these analyses to determine the impact of the change on the-LTOP acceptance limits. ( PORV Performance Analyses (Ref. 3) show that the vessel is protected when the PORV is set to open at s 464 psig.- The PORV setpoint:at or below the derived limit ensures the requirements of-ASME-Code Case N-514 -(Reference 1) will be met. - -The-PORVelift-setpoint limit of s-457 instrument uncertainty. psig includes correction for The PORV setp/T-limits conflict with the LTOP analysisoint will-be re-evaluate the revised-P -limits. The P/T limics are )eriodically modified as the reactor vessel material touginess decreases due to embrittlement induced by neutron irradiation. Revised P/T limits are-determined using neutron fluence projections and the results of examinations of-the reactor vessel-material irradiation surveillance specimens. The Bases for LCO 3.4.3 discuss these examinations. The PORV is considered an active component. Therefore, its failure represents the worst case LTOP single active-failure. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-52D Amendment No.

LTOP SystCm B 3.4.11 F BASES APPLICABLE Pressurizer _Lavel-Performance SAFETY ANALYSES-(continued) - Analyses of operator response time show that the pressurizer level must be paintained s 160 inches to provide the 10 minute action tine for correcting transients. (".ef. 3) The pressurizer level limit of s 135 inches includes correction for instrument uncertainties. The pressurizer level limit will also be re-evaluated for compliance each time P/T limit curves are revised based on the results of the vessel material surveillance. RCS Vent Performance With the RCS depressurized, analyses show a vent of 0.75 square inches is capable of mitigating-the transient. resulting from full opening of the makeup control valve while the makeup pump is providing RCS makeup. The capacity of a vent this size is greater than ti.e flow resulting from this credible transient. The RCS vent size will also be re-evaluated for compliance each time P/T limit curves are revised based en the results of the vessel material surveillance. The vent is passive and is not subject to active failure. k. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-52E Amendment No.

LTOP Systeo B 3.4.11

BASES (continued)

LCO The LCO requires an LTOP System OPERABLE with a limited ) coolant input capability and a pressure relief capability. To limit t.oolant input, the LCO requires only one makeup pump OPERABLE, the HPI deactivated, and the CFT discharge isolation valves closed and i mobilized. For pressure relief,-it requires either the pressurizer coolant at or below a maximum level and the PORY OPERABLE with a lift setting at or below the LTOP limit or the RCS depretsurized and a vent established. NOTE: The limits and values presented in this LCO for the PORY lift setpoint, enable temperature, and pressurizer level are corrected for instrument uncertainty. The instrumentatien to be used by plant operators to assure compliance with these limits and values are specified in approved plant operating procedures. The pressurizer is available with a coolant level s 135 inches. The PORV is OPERABLE when its block valve is open, its lift setpoint is set at s 457 psig and testing has proven its ability to open at that setpoint, and motiva power is available to the PORY and the PORV control circuits. For the depressurized RCS, an RCS vent is OPERABLE when open with an area of at least 0.75 square inches. APPLICABILITY This LCO. is applicable in MODE 4 when RCS temperature is s 259'F, in MODE-5, and in MODE 6 when the raactor vessel head is not completely detensioned. The Applicability temperature of-259'F is established by analyses in accordance with Reference 1. With the vessel head completely detensioned, overpressurization is not possible. The vessel head is completely detensioned when the pre-stress has been relieved from all of the studs, and the nuts are free spinning. The Applicability is modified by a Note stating that CFT isolation is only required when the CFT pressure is more than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS temperature, as allowed in LC0 3.4.3. This Note permits the CFT discharge valve surveillance performed only under these pressure and. temperature conditions. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52F Amendment No.

1. TOP System B 3.4.11 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS Allowable times are specified in the LC0 to implement the actions and controls described below. These times range from immediately to 12 hours. The times are based on operational and industry experience and regulatory recommendations. The times are intended to balance the time necessary to accomplish the actions and the likelihood of experiencing a limiting transient during the action. A.1 and B.1 With two or more makeup pumps capable of injecting into the RCS or if the HPI is activated, immediate actions are required to render the other pump (s) inoperable or to deactivate HPI. Emphasis is on immediate deactivation because inMvertant injection with one or more HPI pump OPERABLE i:, the event of g"eatest significance, since it causes the greatest pressure increase.o the shortest time. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note that permits two pumps capable of RCS injection for s 15 minutes to allow for pump swaps. The deactivation of HPI is accomplished by assuring that an inadvertent HPI actuation can not inject water into the RCS through the HPI valves. This may be accomplished by combinations of equipment as determined appropriate for the existing plant conditions such as, disabling all HPI valves or disabling all Hakeup pumps. If powered com)onents are used to accomplish deactivation, power should ae removed to assure positive lockout. C.1. D.1, and R An unisolated CFT requires isolation within 1 hour only when the CFT pressure is at or greater than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature allowed in LCO 3.4.3. If isolation is needed and cannot be accomplished in 1 hour, Required Action D.1 and Required Action D.2 provide two options, either of which must be performed in 12 hours. By increasing the RCS temperature to s 197'F, the CFT pressure of 600 psig cannot exceed the LTOP limits if both tanks are fully injected. Depressurizing the CFTs below the LTOP limit of 457 psig also prevents exceeding the LTOP limits in the same event. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52G Amendment No. i

. m. _r._ _ _... ._-.y.__.___. ~ LTOPjSystem B 3.4'.11 y BASES ACTIONS-E.1. F.1 Land F.2 (continued) -for operator-action in a pressure increasing event is reduced. The postulated event most affected in the~1. TOP

4

-MODES is failure of the makeup control valve, which fills - the pressurizer relatively rapidly. Restoration is required j _ ithin 1 hour. = w 7 If. restoration within I hour cannot be accomplished,. 4-Required Actions F.1 and F.2 must be performed within 12 1 hours. Actions F.1 and F.2 limit the makeup capability by-closing the makeup control valve and its isolation valve, 14 which is:not required-with a.high pressurizer level, and i permit cooldown and depressurization to continue. When-the L makeup is isolated, RCS heatup_must be-stopped because heat 4 j addition decreases the reactor coolant density cand 1 creases the pressurizer: level. Operations such-as starting RC pumps and reducing decay heat removal shoJ1d not be performed when in this condition. { G.I. H.1."and H.2-With the PORV inoperable, overpressure relieving capability. is lost, and restoration of the PORV within I hour is required _. If that cannot be accomplished, the ability of the Makeup System to-add water must-be_1_imited within the next 12 hours.. -If. restoration cannot be completed within!1-hour, Required Action H.1 and Required Action H.2 must be performed-to limit RCS. water addition capability.. Makeup is not required to be deactivated since:it may be needed to maintain the RCS coolant. level. Required Action H.1.and Required Action H.2 require reducing the makeup tank level to 88 inches and deactivating the low low makeup tank level interlock to the borated water.-storage tank. This 'makes the available makeup water volume insufficient to exceed the LTOP limit by _ a makeup control valve full opening. 4 (continued) Crystal. River' Unit 3 8 3.4-52H Amendment No. y ? m m.

LTOP Systea B 3.4.11 BASES ACTIONS I.1 and 1.2 (continued) - With the pressurizer level above 135 inches and the PORV N inoperable or-the LTOP System inoperable for any reason other than cited in Condition A through H, the system must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. When this is not possible, Required Action 1.2 requires the RCS depressurized and vented within 12 hours from the time either Condition started. One or more RCS vents may be used. A vent size of 2 0.75 square inches is specified. Such a vent keeps the pressure from full flow of one Makeup pump with a wide open makeup control valve within the LC0 limit. This size RCS vent cannot maintain RCS pressure below LTOP limits if the HPI or CFT systems are inadvertently actuated. Therefore, venfication of the deactivation of two Makeup pumps, HPI injection, and the CFTs must accompany the depressurizing and venting. Since these systems are required deactivated by the LCO, SR 3.4.11.1, SR 3.4.11.2, and-SR 3.4.11.3 require verification of their deactivated status every 12 hours. SURVEILLANCE The following surveillance requirement frequencies are shown REQUIREMENTS by operating experience and industry accepted practice to be sufficient to regularly assess conditions for potential degradation and to verify operation within the requirements.- SR-3.4.11.1. SR 3.4.11.2. and SR 3.4.11.3 Verifications must be performed that only one makeup pump is capable of injecting into the RCS, the HPI is deactivated, and the CFT discharge isolation valves are closed and immobilized. These Surve111ances ensure the minimum coolant input capability will not create an RCS overpressure condition to challenge the LTOP *i/ stem. The Surveillances are required at 12 hour intervals. A Note modifies SR 3.4.11.3 by only requiring this Surveillance when CFT isolation is required. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-521 Amendment No. ~

LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES SURVEILLANCE- -SR 3.4.11.4 REQUIREMENTS-- (continued) Verification of the pressurizer level at s 135 inches by observing control room or other indications ensures a cushion of sufficient size is available to reduce the rate of pressure increase from potential transients. The 30 minute Surveillance Frequency during heatup and-cooldown must be perforn'ed for the LCO Applicability period when temperature changes car cause pressurizer level variations. This Frequency may be discontinued when the ends of these conditions. ire satisfied, as dened in plant procedures. Thereafter, the Surveillance is cequired at 12 hour intervals. A Note modifies the SR by not requiring the Surveillance when complying with LC0 3.4.11.b. 1 SR 3.4.11.5 Verification that the PORY block valve is open ensures a flow path to the PORV. This is required at 12 hour intervals. A Note modifies the SR by not requiring the Surveillance when complying with LCO 3.4.11.b. SR 3.4.11.6 When stipulated by LC0 3.4.11.b, the RCS vent of at least 0.75 square inch-must be verified open for relief protection. For an unlocked vent opening, the Frequency is every 12 hours. For a locked vent opening in the.RCS, ine required Frequency is every 31 days. A Note modifies the SR by requiring the Surveillance when complying with LC0 3.4.11.b. (continued) Crystal River' Unit 3 B 3.4-52J AmendmentNg.

LTOP System B 3.4.11 , ; BASES SURVEII. LANCE - SR 3.4.11.7 REQUIREMENTS. (continued) A, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST-is-required within 12 hours before or after decreasing RCS temperature to s 259'F and every 31 days thereafter to ensure the setpoint is proper for using the PORY for LTOP. PORV actuation is not needed, as it could depressurize the RCS. \\ The 12 hour-frequency considers the unlikelihood of a low temrerature overpressure event during the time. SR 3.4.11.8 The performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION is required every 24 months. 'The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the LTOP setpoint ensures-that the PORV will be actuated at the appropriate RCS pressure by verifying the accuracy of the instrumer string. The calibration can only be performed in shutcown. The frequency considers the refueling cycle. ~ SR 3.4.11.9 Verification that the PORV is selected to the low range setpoint ensures the overpres.sure protection flow path through the PORV..This is required at 12 hour intervals.- A Note modifies the SR by not-requiring the Surveillance when complying with LC0 3.4.11.b. G (continued) - Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52K Amendment No.

LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES (continued)- -REFERENCES 1.: ASME Code Case N-514, " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Section XI, Division 1".

2...

Generic Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on-Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials _ and its; Impact on Plant Operations". 3. FPC Calculation F97-0003, "CR-3 -15 EFPY LTOP_ Limits". '4. B&W Nuclear Services (FTI) Document 51-1176431-01, " Crystal River 3 Reactor Vessel Low Temperature Overpressure Protection-(LTOP)". 4 .- i ,z '() Crystal. River Unit 3 B 3.4-52L Amendment No.

1 ECCS-Operating t -. 8 3.5.2 BASES ~ = BACKGROUND _-- -- --safety-valves.- The-LPI pumps-are capable-of discharging to - -(continued)~ the RCS at an RCS pressure of approximately 200 psia. When the BWST-has'been nearly emptied,-the-suction for the LPI-- pumps is manually transferred.to the reactor building emergency, sump. The HPI pumps cannot take suction directly from the-sump.- If HPI is still needed a cross connect from the discharge side of the LPI-pur;,.to the suction of the HPI pumps would be opened. This is Known as " piggy backing" HPI to LPI, and enables continued HPI-to the-RCS, if needed, after the BWST.is emptied to the switchover point. In the long term cooling period, flow paths in the LPI System can'be established to preclude the possibility of boric acid in the core region reaching an unacceptably high-l concentrt. tion. ;0ne flow path is from the hot leg-through the decay heat suction line and then in a reverse direction through the reactor building emergency sump suction line into the sump. The other flow path uses-the gaps between the hot leg nozz'les and the reactor vessel. These gaps provide a flow path between the outlet annulus and the inlet nozzle /downcomer region of the reactor vessel. Either flow path is capable of providing the required flow rates _to ensure boron precipitation is not a concern. - HPILalso functions to supply borated water to the reactor core following increased heat removal events, such as large SLBs. s During a-1arge break-LOCA, RCS pressure will decrease to - < 200 psia in < 20 seconds. The ECCS is actuated upon receipt of an Engineered Safeguards Actuaticn: System (ESAS) -signal. -The actuation of safeguard loads is accomplished in .a programmed time sequence. If offsite power is available, the safeguard loads start immediately (in-the programmed sequence).. If offsite power is not available, the ~ engineered. safety feature (ESF) buses shed normal-operating loads and are connected to the diesel generators. Safeguard loads are then actuated in the programmed time sequence. The time delay associated with diesel starting, sequenced loading, and pump starting determines the time required (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-10 Amendment No. l

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 BASES (continued) i ACTIONS Ad With one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the inoperable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. The 72 hour Completion l Time is based on NRC recommendations (Ref. 3) that are based I on a risk evaluation and is a reasonable time for many repairs. An.CCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of r delivering the design flow to the RCS. The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two I different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. The intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment such that the safety injection (SI) flow equivalent to 100% of a single train remains available. This allows increased flexibility in plant opvaticas under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable. I An event accompanied by a loss of offsite onwer and the failure of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 3) has shown the risk of having one full ECCS train inoperable to be sufficiently low to justify continued operation for 72 hours. With one or more connents inoperable such that the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is not available, the facility is in a condition outside the accident j analyses. Therefore, LCO J.0.3 must be immediately entered. (continued) Crystal Rivar Unit 3 B 3.5-15 Amendment No. n---- ,.e.- .--m y --,w-,, ,-4.~ .-yn n.ng,- , - ~, -,.

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ^ ACTIONS i (continued) L1 and B.2 If the ino>erable components cannot be returned to OPERABLE status wit 11n the associated Com)1etion Times, the plant must be placed in a MODE in whic1 the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and ac least MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the Er,CS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, scaled,=or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking,. sealing, or securing. These valves include valves in the main flow paths and the first normally closed valve in a branch line. There are several exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves (both inside and outside the RB), relief valves outside the RB, instrumentation valves (both inside and outside the RB), check valves (both inside and outside the RB), and sample line valves (inside and outside the RB). A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident )osition provided the valve will automatically reposition wit 1in the proper stroke time. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, (:ontinued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-16 Amendment No.

1 ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES LC0 During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is (continued) required to provide an abundant supply of water from the BWST to the RCS, via the ECCS pumps and their respective j discharge flow paths, to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles and the re. actor vessel. In the long term, this flow path may be switthed to take its supply from the reactor building emerpncy sump and to supply its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs. This LCO is modified by a Note which states that HPI may be deactivated in accordance with LC0 3.4.11. " Low Temperature Ov6rpressure Protection (LTOP) System". Operator action is then required to initiate HPl. In the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) requiring flPI actuation, the time required for operator action has been shown by analysis to be acceptable. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the OPERABILITY requirements for the ECCS are covered by LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS-Operating." In MODE 4 with the RCS temperature below 280'F, one OPERABLE ECCS train is accepteble without single failure consideration, on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements. In MODES 5 and 6, plant conditions are such that the probability of an event requiring ECCS injection is extremely low. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are addressed by LC0 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LC0 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." MODE 6 core cooling recuiremants are addressed by LC0 3.9.4, " Decay Heat Removal anc Coolant Circulation-High Water Level," and LC0 3.9.5, " Decay Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation 4Lew Water Level." + l (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5 21 Amendment No.

ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES (continued) ACTIONS M If no LPI subsystem is OPERABLE, the unit is not )repared to respond to a LOCA or to continue cooldown osing tie DHR/LPI pumps and decay heat heat exchangers. The immediate Completion Time ensures that prompt action is initihted to restore the required cooling capacity. Normally, in MODE 4, reactor decay heat must be removed by a DHR/LPI train operating with suction from the RCS. If no DHR/LPI train is OPERABLE for this function, reactor decay heat must be removed by some alternate method, such as use of the steam generator (s) (OTSG). The alternate means of heat removal must continue until the inoperable ECCS LPI subsystem can be restored to operatien so that continuation of decay heat removal (DHR) is provided. M If no ECCS HPI subsystem is OPERABLE, due to the inoperability of the HPl pump or flow path from the BWST, the plant is not prepared to provide high pressure response to Design Basis Events requiring ECCS response. The 1 hour Completion Time to restore at least one ECCS HPl subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action is taken to provide the required cooling ca)acity or to initiate actions to place the plant in MODE 5, w1ere an ECCS train is not required. This Condition does not apply to HPI subsystem components which are deactivated for the purposes of complying with LCO 3.4.11. " Low Tem)erature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System". With tiese components deactivated, the HPI subsystem is still considered OPERABLE based upon guidance in NRC Generic letter 91-18. This guidance allows substitution of manual operator action for otherwise automatic functions for the purposes of determining OPERABILITY. The substitutions are limited and must be evaluated against the assumptions in the accident analysis. In the case of deactivating HPl in MODE 4, the components are available for injection following manual o)erator action to restore the system to OPERABLE status and t11s action can be accomplished within the time frame required to respond to the transient / accident. (continued) Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-22 Amendment No.}}

v t e Letter Sequence Other
TAC:M99277, (Open)
Initiation Acceptance... Administration Questions 7 October 1997 Answers Results Approval... Other: 3F0997-11, Forwards Response to 970812 RAI Re Proposed License Amend for low-temp Overpressure Protection, 3F0997-25, TS Change Request Notice 213,Suppl 1 to License DPR-72, Proposing New Improved TS 3.4.11 Re Low Temp Overpressure Protection Sys, 3F1097-12, Provides Rev to LTOP Sys TS Change Request Notice 213, Including PORV Lift Setpoint TS Limit,Revised for Instrument Uncertainty.Calculation Encl, ML20212C980, ML20212D001, ML20217K709
MONTHYEAR1997-07-15 [Table View]

ML20212C980

Text

Reference:

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