ML20236V883

Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re CREVS & Ventilation Filter Test Program

ML20236V883
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/30/1998
From:	FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20236V876	List: 3F0798-15, Application for Amend to License DPR-72,changing Improved TS for CREVS & Ventilation Filter Test Program.Control Room Habitability Rept,Ts Pages & Commitments Encl ML20236V880 ML20236V883
References
NUDOCS 9808040264
Download: ML20236V883 (36)

Text

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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 1

DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 l

l ATTACIIN1ENT C

)

IMPROVED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES l

IN REDLINE / STRIKEOUT FORMAT l

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9800040264 980730 l

PDR ADOCK 05000302 P PDR L__-- _ - - - _ _ _ - - - - _ -

. 4 CREVS 1 3.7.12 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)

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LC0 3.7.12 Two CREVS trains aidTtheICostrollC6mplex? Habitability "

Envelopef(CCHE) shall'be"0PERABLE. ~ "

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREVS train A.1 Restore CREVS train 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

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B;--ECCHEEinoperable ~due to' B.li ~

!Restori CCHE  ??dsys al breach'or breachesi boundari; in; excess}of the, limit

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AND

! lesifthanTorTehual[to 1lsquareifoottin~..

excesstof- the limit.

1 (continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-24 Amendment No. M9 i

l CREVS l

3.7.12 l ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CB. Required Action CB.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and associated Completion Time of AND Condition A or B not met in MODE1, CB.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 2, 3 or 4.

DG. Required Action ------------NOTE--------------

and associated PlaceLin emergency l Completion Time of recirculation mode!if Condition A or B automatic transfer:to not met during emergency l recirculation' mode movement of is. inoperable; irradiated fuel -----------------------------

assemblies.

06.1 Place OPERABLE CREVS Immediately train in emergency recirculation mode.

DR DG.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

EG. Two CREVS trains E0.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable or breaches existLin the'CCHE:that exceed Condition B during MODE 1; 2, 3, or 4.

FE. Two CREVS trains FE.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable or irradiated fuel breaches exist"in assemblies.

the'.CCHE that i exceed Condition B '

l during~ movement ~of

! irradiated fuel assemblies.

t Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-25 Amendment Wo. 449 j l

L____________-______________ __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ .

a CREVS 3.7.12 I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I

i l SR 3.7.12.1 Operate each CREVS train for 31 days i 2 15 minutes.

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SR 3.7.12.2 Perform required CREVS filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the  ;

Testing Program. Ventilation j Filter Testing Program SR 3.7.12.3 Verify each CREVS train actuates to the 24 months l emergency recirculation mode on an actual I or simulated actuation signal.

i l-I SRf317k1274l

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(Vefi ffi CCHE): band ary El e aksgeldse F n6 t._ 24':Tmonths.

~ exceed f allowable- limitsias > measuredi by j performancetofjandintegrated;1eakagetesty t  !

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Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-26 Amendment No. 149 l

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CREVS B 3.7.12 l

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) '

BASES BACKGROUND The principal function of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) is to provide an enclosed environment from which the plant can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity or toxic gas.

The CREVS consists of two trains with much of the non-safety  ;

related equipment common to both trains and with two i independent, redundant components supplied for each m'ajor items of safety related piccc of equipment (Ref.1).' ~ The ,

major eq'uipment consists of the normal duty filter banks, j the emergency filters, the normal duty and emergency duty i supply fans, and the return fans. The normal duty filters consist of one bank of glass fiber roughing filters. The 1 emergency filters consist of three banks cac-h, The first I bank 4sr a roughing filter similar to the normal filters;+

The second bank is c high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters,'+ and The third bank is an activated charcoal abdsorbers for removal of gaseous activity (principally iodine). 'The rest of the system, consisting of supply and return ductwork, dampers, and instrumentation, is.not i designed _.with redundant components. However, redundant dampers are;providedlfor' isolation'ofithe ventilation system from the(surrounding environment.

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Theventilationexhaustductiscontinuouslytespedby 8 radiation monitor RM-AS, which has a range of 10 to 10 counts per minute. The monitor is set to alarm and initiate the emergency recirculation mode of operation when the e-irborne radic;etivity end/cr arca radiation level reaches approximately two times the background count rate.

The Control Complex HabitabilityLEnvelo' pet (CCHE)fii the space within'the Control Complex served by CREVS..--This _

includesTControl complex floor elevations from--108 through 180 feetiandLthe' stair enclosure from elevation 95 toil 98 feet. . nThe elementsgwhich compromise the: CCHE ~are.wallsi doorst a roof, floorspfloor drains,: penetration seals, and ventilation isolation' dampers; Together the CCHE and'CREVS provide an enclosed environment-from which the plant,can:be i

operated following;anfu'ncont_ rolled release of radioactivity j orit.oxic gas.

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T Design- calculatioris dstermine i the max' mum allowed leakage into the CCHE'below which control room operator dose-and (continued)

Crystal River Unit , B 3.7-60 Amendment No. 449

CREVS B 3.7.12 l BASES toxic gas concentrations f r'emain withinLapproved 1imits.

Integrated: leak tests of'the'CCHE determine actual leakage.

The' difference between. allowed' and actual. leakage is

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converted to anLallowance for breach areas (in square

. inches)--that may' exist inithe CCHE- to accommodate normal operating and maintenance activities... Breaches in; excess ~of the calculated area renders the CCHE~ incapable: of. performing its.: function, and therefore inoperable. 2 Routine opening and closing of theLCCHE doors for personnel passage'and the' movement oflequipmentris' accounted for in the _ design calculations. -A continuous leakage of 10 cubic. feet:per minute -is assumed to account for this; -Holding:or1 blocking doors open'for short periods of' time does:not constitute a breach of the CCHE as'long as the doors'could be closed upon notification 'ofLa radiological: or. toxic.. gas. release.

The system CREVS has a normal operation mode and recircul ation 'mo' des. During normal operation, the system provides filtered, conditioned air to the control complex,-

Be-centrol complex consist cf the control rocm, varicus other Off4+c in the arca of the ccatrol rocm, and ;

includingithe controlled access area (CA) on' the 95 foot elevation..'When switched _to the recirculate.on modes, l is'olation dampers close-isolating'the discharge to the controlled access area and isolating the outside airsintake.

the'sy: tem inclate: ~ itdelf 'from catside ' air and recikblate:

filtered air through the :=c arcacyith .the exceptica cf the ccatrolled acces: crea. In this. mode the system recirculates' filtered air through ,the CCHE.

i BACKGROUND The control comalex normal duty ventilation system is (continued) operated from tie control room and runs continuously.

During normal operation, the outside air intake damper is partially open, the dischar c te cutside air. damper is cle';cd the atmospheric reliefidischargeJdamper is closedi the.1 discharge to the CA is-open, and the system' return l damper is' throttled. This' configuration allows a controlled  !

amount of outside air to be admitted to the control complex. l The design temperature maintained by the system is 75'F at a l relative humidity of 50%.  !

Three signals will cause the system to automatically switch i to the recirculation modes of operation. i

! 1. Engineered Safegvards Actuation System (ESAS) signal j (high reactor building pressure).

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-61 Amendment Revision No. %

CREVS B 3.7.12 l

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BASES

2. High radiation signal from the return duct radiation monitor RM-AS.

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3. Toxic gas signal (chlorine or suifur dioxide) l i The recirculation modes isolate the sentrol recm CCHE from outside air to ensure a habitable environment for' the safe i shutdown of the plant. In-these modes of operation, the controlled access area is isolated from the centrol rec:

CCHE? :nd the remaining areas of the control compicx.

Upon detection of ESAS or toxic gas signals, the system i switches to the normal recirculation mode. In this mode, dampers foro the"ontsidf airfintakeiandlths'exh'aust;toitheECA t

isolatin the CCHETfrom outside' L will;automaticallyTcloseh~4ir"intigl ait exchanger thh cutside dhd itms:pheric re44ef ditchirge s per: Will utomatic:lly cle c, i;chting the centrcl rec envelope from cutside air paths, and the system i return damper will open thus allowing air in the ccatr:1 l ccm: lex CCHE to be recirculated. Additionally, the i mec unichT~cquipment-rcem exh:ust fan, CA fume hood exhaust fan, CA fume hood auxiliary supply fan, and CA exhaust fan are de-energized and their corresponding isolation dampers

, close. The return fan, normal filters, normal fan, and the  ;

cooling (or heating) coils remain in operation in a recirculating mode.

Upon detection of high radiation by RM-A5 the system switches to the emergency recirculation mode. In this.. mode, ,

the dampers that fcrm the control reem cnve10pc isolate the l CCHEifromTthessssoUndingRwill automatically close. ~The^ '

meehdnicdT eq0ipatnt' rec: cxhau;t fan, CA fume hood exhaust fan, CA fume hood auxiliary supply fan, CA exhaust fan, normal supply fan, and return fan are tripped and their corresponding isolation dampers close. Manual action is required to restart the return fan and place the emergency fans and filters in operation. The cooling (or heating) coils remain in operation.

APPLICABLE During emergency operations the design basis of the CREVS SAFETY ANALYSIS and1the;CCHE is to provide radiation protection to the control hom operators. The limiting accident which may threaten the habitability of the control room (i.e.,

accidents resulting in release of airborne radioactivity) is the postulated maximum hypothetical accident (MHA), which is assumed to occur while in MODE 1. The consequences of this (continued)

L Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-62 Amendment No. M9 l

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CREVS B 3.7.12

, BASES (continued) r l

l event in MODE 1 envelope the results for MODES 2, 3, and 4, and results in the limiting radiological source term for the control room habitability evaluation (Ref. 2). A fuel l handling accident (FHA) may also result in a challenge to control room habitability, and may occur in any MODE.

However, due to the severity of the MHA and the MODES in l which the postulated MHA can occur, the FHA is the limiting i

radiological accident in MODES 5 and 6 only. The CREVS and the;CCHEsensures that the control room will remain habit' able following all postulated design basis events, maintaining exposures to control room operators within the limits of GDC 19 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A (Ref. 3).

The CREVS is not in the primary success path for any accident analysis. However, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System meets Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy j Statement since long term control room habitability is j essential to mitigation of accidents resulting in 1 atmospheric fission product release.

LC0 Two trains of the control room emergency ventilation system are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available assuming a single failure disabling the other train. Failure to meet the LC0 could result in the control room becoming uninhabitable in the unlikely event of an accident.

The required CREVS trains must be independent to the extent allowed by the design which provides redundant components for the major equipment as discussed in the BACKGROUND J section of this bases. OPERABILITY of the CREVS requires l the following as a minimum:

a. Th^ .cmcrgencyju;y_ f= it0PEMBLE A'ContFblicomplei .

Emergencytutydsupp1fffanti(OPERABLE; D

Q'EAlContlFol} Complex]Rstsrn{FanjMOPERABLEi ch. HEPA filter and charcoal abdsorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their j filtration functions; and  :

(continued) .

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Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-63 Amendment No. h3

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CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES LCO de. Dductwork, va've;;, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air (continued) circulation can be maintained 4;':and4

e. The CCHE is' int'act as discu'ssed below.

The CCHE? boundary including the- integrity of Lthe ' doors,'

walls, roof, floors, floor drains, 3enetration seals, and ventilation isolation dampers must >e maintained within the assumptions'of the design calculations. Breaches in the CCHE mustibe contro11ed'to provide' assurance that~the.CCHE remains. capable of performing its,: function.

If'theTtotil open'breachEarea'in the CCHE exceeds-the limit-determinea in approved design analyse' s (Reference 2), '

currently 35.5 souare inches, the CCHE is rendered inoperable and entry into LCO Condition B is required.'

The upper bound of the breach . area for the'LCO is the tum u of the breach area limit plus one : square' foot- (144 square inches). If the Required: Action of LC0 Condition B is not met within:the respective Completion Time,: ther, Condition C or D,':asl applicable, must be entered.

The ability to maintain temperature in the Control Complex is addressed in Technical Specification 3.7.18. l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREVS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the eent+ebesgle* CCHE will remain habitable during and follcwing a postulated DBA accident. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies', the CREVS must be OPERABLE to cope with a release due to a fuel handling ~

accident.

ACTIONS Ed With one CREVS train ino)erable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREVS train is adequate to perform the centrol room radiation 3rotection function for control' room personnel. However, tie overall reliability 'is reduced because'a failure in the OPERABLE CREVS train could result in loss of CREVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a-9BA an accident l occurring during this time period, and ability of'the

! remaining train to provide the required capability.

(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-64 Amendment No. M9 l

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CREVS B 3.7.12 l

1 l BASES l

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With th'e 'CCHEiitioperable 'due t'o 'breache's'in ekcess of approved design calculations,:- but within' the criteria stated,_ operation may' continue for 7 days. Restoration of 1

' excess breaches.is'not-limited to. returning the opening to

)

its pre-breached condition . but

can also -be. accomplished '

using temporary. sealing measures as1 described in plant proceduresand/orworkinstructions.

Condition _B will permit openingLbreachoslin1the CCHE to support maintenance.and modification toLthe habitability envelopei b_oundary. :ltLalso will establish an allowance!for the discovery of breaches during' routine operation, and provide'the opportunity to repair the breach in a time-. frame consistent' with the low safety- significance of'small breaches in the CCHE.

1 Condition B also provides an opportunity,' foll_owing'.an unsuccessful CCHE leakirate test; to determine the .cause for excessive leakage, correct it, and perform a re-test.

Excessive-leakage measured during_.an1 integrated leak test j can be converted to an equivalent breach size in accordance

'with approved design calculations. If..the calculated breach size' is .lessithan or equal: to:179.S. square inches then operation _ may. continue while' locating the source of_ the l_eakage and performing a ..re-test.

l CB.1 and CB.2 l In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or-breaches in the CCHE which exceed allowable limits cannot.be closed Mithin the associated Completion ~ Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. lhe allowed l Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full

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l power conditions in an orderly manner and without {

l challenging plant systems.

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t (continued)

I Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-65 Amendment No. 449 1 '

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t CREVS B 3.7.12 t

l BASES

! ACTIONS DG.1 and DG.2 I (continued)

! During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, if the l inoperable CREVS train.cannot be restored to OPERABLE , I l status,:or.. breaches .in the CCHE which exceed allowable l

! 1imits'cannot::be' closed within the' associated' Completion l Time, the OPERABLE CREVS train must immediately be placed in l the emergency recirculation mode. This action ensures that j l the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing .

! automaticactuationwilloccur,andthatanyactivefailure will be readily detected. Required Ac-t-ica .! is modM4ed l

by-a-Note mcdc indiccting if cutomctic to plocc trcasfer to emergency the systemmcdc in theiscmcrgenc{c.

incpercb,  !

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, An alternative to Required Action DG.1 is to immediately '

l suspend activities that could release radioactivity and require isolation of the centrol rocm CCHE. This places the plant in a condition that minimizes the' accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

Req'uir'ed Action 0.1 andLD.2iareimodified by a Note indicating :to place:the system in the' emergency mode '

automatic transfer to emergency mode is inoperable. ;if l

fed If.both CREVS trains are inoperable or breaches!inTthe CCHE i exceed the limits of Condition B in MODE 1, 2, 3, or~~4',' the l' CREVS may not~ be capable of performing the intended function and the plant is in a condition outside the accident l analysis. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately. l fEl l During CREVSmovement trains are inoperable of irradiated or fuel. assemblies,.

breaches when two. .d in the. CCHErexcee the:. limits of Condition'B, action must~be'taken immediately to' suspend 'activitles' that could release radioactivity that could enter the ecatrol room CCHE. This places the plant in 4 a condition that minimizes the' accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.  !

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.12d REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Since the environment and l normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once every month adequately checks proper function of this system. Systems such as the CR-3 design I

(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-66 Amendment No. M9

I CREVS !

l 8 3.7.12 l I

BASES 1

l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.12 1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS without heaters need only be operated for ;t 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy available.

SR 3.7.12.2 This SR verifies that the required CREVS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CREVS filter tests are in accordance i with Regulatory Guide 1.52, (Ref. 4) as described in the j VFTP Program description (FSAR, Section 9.7.4). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal abdsorber l efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical '

properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. j SR 3.7.12.3 This SR verifies that each CREVS train actuates to place the control complex into the emergency recirculation mode on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the typical fuel cycle length.

SR 33!7 12.4 This1SR.ver'ifies the? integrity 6fftheTCCHE and the?assum~ed inieakage; rates' oft potentiallyicontaminated air. : During t.fie emergency mode s of operation; the CCHE1is-designed to be_ a closed environment havingLlimitedcair exchange with its surroundings.7 Performance of'a periodic.. leak testLverifies the continuingvintegrity ofzthe CCHE; The frequency of 24~

monthCis . consistent with: the; typicall fuel cycle' length.

The design Mfithe: CCHEfprecludes performance of Lthe' commonly appliedeleaK test 1 characterized by pressurization to-a nominal value-and measurement:of the make upiair: required:to l maintain pressurization The test:for CR;3 is performed by operhting CREVS in.thelemergency recirculation mode with'the Auxiliary Building Ventilation. System operating;to maintain a' differential; pressure 1between the:CCHE andJthe Auxiliary Building.1Thef Auxiliary Building will:: be at least :1/8' inch water gauge negative relative to the.CCHE. >. Tracer gas will be:used to determineLthe leakageirate. The acceptance (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-67 Amendment No. 449

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CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES 1

criteriaf for.;ths' test i'sf a? leakage rate' that would not result lin control root personnel exceeding ~ dose limits described in Referencel3j following the most limitirig l accident. A detailed description off the conditions:for t conduct of theLtest!are?provided in. Reference 2;

{

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 9.7.2.1.g. l

2. $

CR-3 Control Room Habitability Evahatten Report, {

whaRted-to-NRC-en-4ue-30,-14M dated July '30, ':;19_98. (

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3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, G3C 19. '

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4. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2,1978.

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I (continued) 1 Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-68 Amendment No. 449 l

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Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6.2.11 Secondary Water Chemistry Program (continued)

c. Identification of process sampling points, wnich shall include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for evidence of condenser in leakage;

d. Procedures for the recording and management of data;

e. Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control l point chemistry conditions; and

f. A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events, which is required to initiate corrective action.

5.6.2.12 Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)

A program shall be established to implement the following required testing of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and LthefAuxilisry Building; Ventilation' Exhaust System (ABVES) per the requirements specified in Regulatory Guide"1.52, Revision 2, 1978, and/or'as.'specified herein, and in accordance with ASME N510-1975 and A N N569-49 M ASTM.D 3803-89.((Re-approved.1995),

a. Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that an inplace test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows a penetration end ';ystem bypas < 0.05% when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2,1978, and in accordance with ASME ANSI N510-1975 at a the system flowrate of between 43 DOG <fm : 10% 37,800.and 47,850'cfm..

b. Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that an inplace test of the chaeeeal carbon adsorber shows a penetrat4em-and system bypass < 0.05%'when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ASME ANSI N510-+969 1975 at the system flowrate of between 43 DOG-cfm : M%

~

37,800 and?474850 cfm.

c. Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that a laboratory test of a sample of the chareea4 carbon adsorber, when obtained, as described in _ Regulatory G_uide 1.52, Revision 2, .

1978, meets' the' laboratory testing criteriaiof ASTM D 38032 89l{Re-approved 1995)'at"ai temperature ofx30*Ct and relative l humidity of 95% with_ methyl iodide penetration of less than I

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-18 Amendment No. 149 l

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Procedures, Programs rnd Manuals l 5.6 l l

f 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals

2. 5%. shc;;s the-eethyl-icdide penetratica less than P4-when tested-in-aeeerdanee ;;ith Table 2 of Regulatcry Cuide 1.52, Rev-i+ica 2 and AC"E N5091975 at temperature of 80*C and 70% relat+ve-hmeid+ty-5.6.2.12 VFTP (continued)

d. Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that the pressure drop across the. combined rough.ing' filters, HEPA filters and the ehareeal carbon adsorbers is 1'AP=S" i AP=4" water gauge when tested in'accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52,

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Revision 2, 1978, and ASME ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 43,-600 c'fm : 2 37,800_'and;47,850 cfm.

e. Demon' trate for each' train of- the ABVES that an.inplace test s

of the HEPA filtersishows a penetration <l1% when ' tested-in accordance with(ANS! N510-1975 at the system flowrate of '

between.35,253 and 43,087 cfm.

f. Demonstrate for'each trainof the ABVES that~an,inplace. test of the" carbon adsorber shows bypass < 1%:when tested:in accordance with' ANSI N510-1975;at the system flowrate of between 35,253 and143,087.cfm.

9 . Demonstrate'. for each trainLof th'e! ABVES ithatL a11aboratory .

test'of a representative sample of the carbon adsorber, when obtained as described-in Regulatory Guide ~1.52, Revision'2, 1978, meets the laboratory-testing criteria of: ASTM D 3803-89 (Re-approved 1995) at the temperature of 30*C-and relative humidity of 95%'with' methyl iodide-penetration of less than 12.5%.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP ,

test frequencies.

5.6.2.13 Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program This program provides controls for potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the Radioactive Waste Disposal (WD) System, the quantity of radioactivity contained in gas storage tanks or fed into the offgas treatment system. The gaseous radioactivity quantities shall be determined following the methodology in Branch Technical Position (BTP) ETSB 11-5, " Postulated Radioactive Release due to Waste Gas System Leak or Failure". The liquid (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-19 Amendment No. M9 j l

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. Procedures, Programs and Manuals

! 5.6 l

i 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals (centi = d) '

radwaste quantities shall be determined in accordance with Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.3, " Postulated Radioactive Release due to Tank Failures".

The program shall -include:

1

a. The limits for concentrations of hydroger, and oxygen in the Radioactive Waste Disposal (WD) System and a surveillance program to ensure the limits-are maintained. Such limits-l shall be appropriate to the system's design critoria, (i.e.,

whether or not the system.is designed to withstand a l hydrogen explosion).

b. A surveillance program to ensure that the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank and fed into the offgas treatment system is less than the amount that would result in a whole body exposure of 2 0.5 rem to any. individual in an unrestricted area, in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program.

surveillance frequencies.

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!~ (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-20 Amendment No. 449 L

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Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 l 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals ( = ti = d) 5.6.2.14 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program A diesel fuel oil testing program to implem'ent required testing of both new fuel oil and stored fuel oil shall be established. The program shall include sampling and testing requirements, and acceptance criteria, in accordance with applicable ASTM Standards.

The purpose of the program is to establish the following:

a. Acceptability of new fuel oil for use prior to addition to storage tanks by determining that the fuel oil has the following properties within limits of ASTM D 975 for Grade No. 2-D fuel oil:

1. Kinematic Viscosity, i 2. Water and Sediment, j 3. Flash Point,

4. Specific Gravity API;

b. Other properties of ASTM D 975 for Grade No. 2-D fuel oil are within limits within 92 days following sampling and addition of new fuel to storage tanks.

I. c. Total particulate contamination of stored fuel oil is < 10 l mg/L when tested once per 92 days in accordance with ASTM D 2276-91 (gravimetric method).

i i 5.6.2.15 Not Used l

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(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-21 Amendment No. 449 L__ - ___ _ - ____- _ _ - _ _ _ __-______ _ ____ . _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ __

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 l DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/LICFRSE NUMBER DPR-72

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l IMPROVED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES IN REVISION BAR FORMAT l

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 DOCKET N0. 50-302 Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding *spillover pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

1 REMOVE INSERT 3.7-24 3.7-24 3.7-25 3.7-25 3.7-26 3.7-26 I

B 3.7-60 B 3.7-60 B 3.7-61 B 3.7-61 I B 3.7-62 B 3.7-62 B 3.7-63 B 3.7-63 B 3.7-64 8 3.7-64 I B 3.7-65 B 3.7-65 B 3.7-65A* 3 B 3.7-65B*

5.0-18 5.0-18 5.0-19 5.0-19 5.0-20 5.0-20*

5.0-21 5.0-21 l

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l CREVS 3.7.12 l l l 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

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r 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) l LC0 3.7.12 Two CREVS trains and the Control Complex Habitability l Envelope (CCHE) shall be OPERABLE.

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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

During movement of it adiated fuel assemblies.

! ACTIONS _

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREVS train A.1 Restore CREVS train 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

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B. CCHE inoperable due to B.1 Restore CCHE 7 days a breach or breaches boundary.

in excess of the limit AND i lesr, than or equal to l 1 square foot in l excess of the limit.

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Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-24 Amendment No.

L___---_-----__--___---__- _ _ _ _

CREVS 3.7.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

l C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> l l associated Completion Time of Condition A or AND

, B not met in MODE 1, 1 l 2, 3 or 4. C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />

! D. Required Action and -------------NOTE------------

associated Completion Place in emergency l Time of Condition A or recirculation mode if B not met during automatic transfer to movement of irradiated emergency recirculation mode fuel assemblies. is inoperable.

D.1 P1 ace OPERABLE CREVS Immediately train in emergency recirculation mode.

0_B D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately l 1rradiated fuel assemblies.

E. 'Two CREVS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable or breaches exist in the CCHE that exceed Condition B during MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

F. Two CREVS trains F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable or breaches irradiated fuel exist in the CCHE that assemblies, exceed Condition B during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

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Crystal River 'Jait 3 3.7-25 Amendment No.

-_____ _ _ ______ -___-_ _ __- . _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ a

CREVS 3.7.12 ,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .

l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY  !

I SR 3.7.12.1 Operate each CREVS train for 31 days {

l > 15 minutes. J l

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1 l SR 3.7.12.2 Perform required CREVS filter testing in In accordance j accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the i Testing Program. Ventilation Filter Testing Program I

SR 3.7.12.3 Verify each CREVS train actuates to the . 24 months emergency recirculation mode on an actual l or simulated actuation signal.

l SR 3.7.12.4 Verify CCHE boundary leakage does not 24 months exceed allowable limits as measured by performance of an integrated leakage test.

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l Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-26 Amendment No.

L________.-____________ _

CREVS B 3.7.12 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)

BASES l

BACKGROUND The principal function of the Control Room Emergency l Ventilation System (CREVS) is to provide an enclosed j environment from which the plant can be operated following j an uncontrolled release of radioactivity or toxic gas.

[ The CREVS consists of two trains with much of the non-safety i related equipment common to both trains and with two I independent, redundant components su i of safety related equipment (Ref. 1)pplied for major itemsThe major equip consists of the normal duty filter banks, the emergency filters, the normal duty and emergency duty supply fans, and the return fans. The normal duty filters consist of one bank of glass fiber roughing filters. The. emergency fil'Ars consist of a roughing filter similar to the normal filters, filters, and I high efficiency activated particulate charcoal adsorbersair for(HEPA) remova l of gaseous activity (principally iodine .

supply and return du)ctwork, dampers, and instrumentation, isThe rest of not designed with redundant components. However, redundant dampers are provided for isolation of the ventilation system from the surrounding environment.

The ventilation exhaust duct is continuously tes[ed by ,

radfation monitor RM-A5, which has a range of 10 to 10 counts per minute. The monitor is set to alarm and initiate the emergency recirculation mode of operation when the radiation level reaches approximately two times the background count rate.

The Control Complex Habitability Envelope (CCHE) is the space within the Control Complex served by CREVS. This includes Control Complex floor elevations from 108 through ,

180 feet'and the stair enclosure from elevation 95 to 198 l feet. The elements which compromise the CCHE are walls, doors, a roof, floors, floor drains, )enetration seals, and ventilation isolation dampers. Toget1er the CCHE and CREVS ,

provide an enclosed environment from which the plant can be '

operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity or toxic gas. l Design calculations determine the maximum allowed leakage into the CCHE below which control room operator dose and toxic gas concentrations remain within approved limits.

Integrated leak tests of the CCHE determine actual leakage.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-60 Amendment No.

CREVS B 3.7.12 i BASES l

l l BACKGROUND The difference between allmed and actual leakage is l (continued) converted to an allowance for breach areas (in square inches) that may exist in the CCHE to accommodate normal o)erating and maintenance activities. Breaches in excess of tie calculated area renders the CCHE incapable of performing its function, and therefore inoperable. Routine opening and closing of the CCHE doors for personnel passage and the movement of equipment is accounted for in the design calculations. A continuous leakage of 10 cubic feet per

< minute is assumed to account for this. Holding or blocking l'

doors open for short periods of time does not constitute a breach of the CCHE as long as the doors could be closed upon notification of a radiological or toxic gas release.

CREVS has a normal operation mode and recirculation modes. l During normal operation, the system provides filtered, conditioned air to the control complex, including the controlled access area (CA) on the 95 foot elevation. When

, switched to the recirculation mode, isolation dampers close l isolating the di::c;iarge to the controlled access area and isolating the outside air intake. In this mode the system I recirculates filtered air through the CCHE. '

The control com) lex normal duty ventilation system is operated from tie control room and runs continuously.

l During normal operation, the outside air intake damper is l partially open, the atmospheric relief discharge damper is closed, the disc.harge to the CA is open, and the system l return damper is throttled. This configuration allows a controlled amount of outside air to be admitted to the cc. trol complex. The design temperature maintained by the system is 75'F at a relative humidity of 50%.

l Three signals will cause the system to automatically switch to the recirculation modes of operation.

1. Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) signal l (high reactor building pressure).

2. High radiation signal from the return duct radiation l monitor RM-A5.

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3. Toxic gas signal (chlorine or sulfur dioxide)

The recirculation modes isolate the CCHE from outside air to l ensure a habitable environment for the safe shutdown of the plant. In these modes of operat en, the controlled access area is isolated from the CCHE.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-61 Amendment No.

L - _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. -_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES l

L i BACKGROUND Upon detection of ESAS or toxic gas signals, the system (contir.ued) switches to the normal recirculation mode. In this mode, dampers for the outside air intake and the exhaust to the CA l l will automatically close, isolating the CCHE from outside l l air exchange, and the system return damper will open thus l l allowing air in the CCHE to be recirculated. Additionally,

the CA fume hood exhaust fan, CA fume hood auxiliary supply i

fan, and CA exhaust fan are de-energized and their

! corresponding isolation dampers close. The return fan, i l normal filters, normal fan, and the cooling (or heating)  !

! coils remain in operation in a recirculating mode. l l i

Upon detection of high radiation by RM-A5 the system 1 switches to the emergency recirculation mode. In this mode, the dampers that isolate the CCHE from the surroundings will automatically close. The CA fume hood exhaust fan, Cn fume hood auxiliary supply fan, CA exhaust fan, normal supply fan and return fan are tripped and their corresponding isolationdampersclose. Manual action is required to ,

l restart the filters return fan and in operation. Theplace the(or cooling emergency) heating coils fansremain and i in operation.

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l APPLICABLE During emergency operations the design basis of the CREVS  ;

l SAFETY ANALYSIS and the CCHE is to provide radiation protection to the i 1

! control room operators. The limiting accident which may l threaten the habitability of the control room (i.e.,  ;

l accidents resulting in release of airborne radioactivity) is the postulated maximum hypothetical accident (MHA), which is assumed to occur while in MODE 1 The consequences of this l event in MODE 1 envelope the results for MODES 2, 3, and 4,

and results in the limiting radiological source term for the i

! control ' com habitability evaluation (Ref. 2). A fuel "

i handling control accident room habita(bility, and may occur in any MODE. FHA) may also However, due to the severity of the MHA and the MODES in which the postulated MHA can occur, the FHA is the limiting radiological accident in MODES 5 and 6 only. The CREVS and the CCHE ensures that the control room will remain habitable

! following all postulated design basis events, maintaining ,

l exposures to control room operators within the limits of GDC  !

19 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A (Ref. 3).

The CREVS is not in the primary success path for any

accident analysis. However, the Control Rooia Emergency l Ventilation System meets Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy l Statement since long term control room habitability is essential to mitigation of accidents resulting in atmospheric fission product release.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-62 Amendment No.

CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES LCO Twa trains of the control room emergency ventilation system are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is

available assuming a single failure disabling the other i train. Failure to meet the LC0 could result in the control l room becoming uninhabitable in the unlikely event of an accident.

I The required CREVS trains must be independent to the extent allowed by the design which provides redundant components for the major equipment as discussed in the BACKGROUND section of this bases. OPERABILITY of the CREVS requires the following as a minimum:

a. A Control Complex Emergency Duty Supply Fan is OPERABLE;

b. A Control Complex Return Fa , is OPERABLE;

c. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions;

d. Ductwork and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained; and

e. The CCHE is intact as discussed below.

The CCHE boundary including the integrity of the doors, walls, roof, floors, floor drains, penetration seals, and ventilation isolation dampers must be maintained within the assumptions of the de.;ign calculations. Breaches in the CCHE must be controlled to provide assurance that the CCHE remains capable of performing its function.

If the total open breach area in the CCHE exceeds the limit determined in approved analyses (Reference 2), currently 35.5 square inches, the CCHE is rendered inoperable and entry into LC0 Condition B is required. The upper bound of the breach area for the LC0 is the sum of the breach area limit plus one square foot (144 square inches). If the Required Action of LCO Condition B is not met within the respective Completion Time, then Condition C or D, as applicable, must be entered.

The ability to maintain temperature in the Control Complex is addressed in Technical Specification 3.7.18.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-63 Amendment No.

l

CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the CREVS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the CCHE will remain habitable during and following a postulated accident. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the CREVS muz,t be OPERABLE to cope with a release due to a fuel handling accident.

ACTIONS A.1 With one CREVS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREVS train is adeguate to perform the radiation protection function for control room (

i personnel. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE CREVS train could result in loss of CREVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an accident occurring during l this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

8.1 l

With the CCHE inoperable due to breaches in excess of  !

approved design calculations, but within the criteria stated, operation may continue for 7 days. Restoration of excess breaches is not limited to returning the opening to its pre-breached condition, but can also be accomplished using temporary sealing measures as described ir, plant procedures and/or work instructions.

Condition B will permit opening breaches in the CCHE to support maintenance and modification to the habitability envelope boundary. It also will establish an allowance for the discovery of breaches during routine operation, and provide the opportunity to repair the breach in a time frame consistent with the low safety significance of small breaches in the CCHE.

Condition B also provides an opportunity, following an I unsuccessful CCHE leak rate test, to determine the cause for excessive leakage, correct it, and perform a re-test.

Excessive leakage measured during an integrated leak test can be converted to an equivalent breach size in accordance with approved design calculations. If the calculated breach l size is less than or equal to 179.5 square inches then operation may continue while locating the source of the leakage and performing a re-test.

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(continued)

I Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-64 Amendment No.

l CREVS i B 3.7.12 l

BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot be restored to OPEPABLE status, or breaches in the CCHE which exceed allowable limits cannot be closed within the l associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a l MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this l status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within I 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed l Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full l power conditions in an orderly manner and without I challenging plant systems.

D.1 and 0.2 l During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, if the l inoperable CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE 1 status, or breaches in the CCHE which exceed allowable j liinits cannot be closed within the associated Completion i Time, the OPERABLE CREVS train must immediately be placed in the emergency recirculation mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that could release radioactivity and require isolation of the CCHE. This places the plant in a l condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

Required Action D.1 and D.2 are modified by a Note indicating to place the system in the emergency mode if automatic transfer to emergency mode is inoperable.

L.1 If both CREVS trains are inoperable or breaches in the CCHE exceed the limits of Condition B in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the CREVS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-65 Amendment No.

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CREVS i B 3.7.12 l

BASES l ACTIONS F.1 l (continued)

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, when two CREVS trains are inoperable or breaches in the CCHE exceed the limits of Condition B, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could release radioactivity that could enter the CCHE. This places the plant in a condition I that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

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SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.12.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Since the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once every month adequately checks proper i function of this system. Systems such as the CR-3 design ,

without heaters need only be operated for 2 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy asailable.

SR 3.7.12.2 i

This SR verifies that the required CREVS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CREVS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, (Ref. 4) as described in the  ;

VFTP Program description (FSAR, Section 9.7.4). The VFTP l includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber l efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.12.3 This SR verifies that each CREVS train actuates to place the control complex into the emergency recirculation mode on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the typical fuel cycle length.

i (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-65A Amendment No.

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CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.12.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies the integrity of the CCHE and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. During the emergency mode of operation, the CCHE is designed to be a closed environment having limited air exchange with its surroundings. Performance of a periodic leak test verifies the continuing integrity of the CCHE. The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the typical fuel cycle length.

The design of the CCHE precludes performance of the commonly applied leak test characterized by pressurization to a nominal value and measurement of the make up air required to maintain pressurization. The test for CR-3 is performed by operating CREVS in the emergency recirculation mode with the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System operating to maintain a differential pressure between the CCHE and the Auxiliary Building. The Auxiliary Building will be at least 1/8 inch water gauge negative relative to the CCHE. Tracer gas will be used to determine the leakage rate. The acceptance criteria for the test is a leakage rate that would not result in control room personnel exceeding dose limits described in Reference 3 following the most limiting ,

accident. A detailed description of the conditions for l conduct of the test are provided in Reference 2. j J

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 9.7.2.1.g.

2. CR-3 Control Room Habitability Report, dated July 30,  ;

1998. l

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.

4. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2,1978.

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l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-65B Amendment No.

l Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 l

5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manual 5.6.2.11 Secondary Water Chemistry Program (continued)

c. Identification of process sampling points, which shall i include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for  !

evidence of condenser in leakage; '

d. Procedures for the recording and management of data;

e. Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control point chemistry conditions; and

f. A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of i administrative events, which is required to initiate '

corrective action.

5.6.2.12 Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)

A program shall be established to implement the following required testing of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust System (ABVES) per l the requirements specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, and/or as specified herein, and in accordance with ASME N510-1975 and ASTM D 3803-89 (Re-approved 1995).

a. Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that an inplace test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows a penetration < 0.05% when tested in accordance with l Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, and in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 37,800 and 47,850 cfm.

b. Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that an inplace test of the carbon adsorber shows a system bypass < 0.05% when l tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 37,800 and 47,850 cfm.

c. Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that a laboratory test of a sample of the carbon adsorber, when obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D 3803-89 (Re-approved 1995) at a temperature of 30*C and relative humidity of 95% with methyl iodide penetration of less than 2.5%.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-18 Amendment No.

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. l Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 1

5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals i 1

l 5.6.2.12 VFTP (continued) l

d. Demonstrate for each train of CREVS that the pressure drop across the combined roughin i carbon adsorbers is < AP=4"g water filters, gaugeHEPA whenfilters tested andin the l- accordance with ReguTatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, and l ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 37,800 and j 47,850 cfm.

I e. Demonstrate 'for each train of the ABVES that an inplace test I

of the HEPA filters shows a penetration < 1% when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-.1975 at the system flowrate of between 35,253 and 43,087 cfm.

f. Demonstrate for each train of the ABVES that an inplace test of the carbon adsorber-shows bypass < 1% when tested in i

accordance with ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 35,253 and 43,087 cfm.

~

g. Demonstrate for each train of the ABVES that a laboratory l

test of a representative sample of the carbon adsorber, when l obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2,. .

1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D 3803-  !

! 89 (Re-approved relative humidity1995)95%at of with themethyl temperature of penetration iodide 30*C and of

! less than 12.5%.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.

5.6.2.13 Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program This program provides controls for potentially explosive i mixtures contained in the Radioactive Waste Disposal (WD)gasSystem, the quantity of radioactivity contained in gas storage tanks or fed into the offgas treatment system. The gaseous radioactivity quantities shall be determined following the methodology in Branch Technical Release due Position (BTP) to Waste GasSystem Leak or Failure".ETSB 11-5, The " Postulated Radioac liquid .

radwaste quantities shall be determined in accordance with l Standard Review Plan Section 15.7.3, " Postulated Radioactive ReleaseduetoTankEailures".

The program shall include

a. The limits for concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the l Radioactive Waste Disposal (WD) System and a surveillance-program to ensure the limits are maintained. Such limits shall be appropriate to the system's design criteria, (i.e.,

I whether or not the system is designed to withstand a hydrogen explosion).

f (continued) l-l Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-19 Amendment No.

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5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals l

l 5.6.2.13 Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program l (continued)

b. A surveillance program to ensure that the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank and fed into the offgas treatment system is less than the amount that would result in a whole body exposure of 2 0.5 rem to  ;

I any individual in an unrestricted area, in the event of an i uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents.

i The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program surveillance frequencies.

5.6.2.14 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program A diesel fuel oil testing program to implement required testing of I both new fuel oil and stored fuel oil shall be established. The l program shall include sampling and testing requirements, and  ;

acceptance criteria, in accordance with applicable ASTM Standards. i The purpose of the program is to establish the following:  !

a. Acceptability of new fuel oil for use prior to addition to storage tanks by determining that the fuel oil has the following properties within limits of ASTM D 975 for Grade No. 2-D fuel oil: '

l. Kinematic Viscosity,

2. Water and Sediment,

3. Flash Point,

4. Specific Gravity API;

b. Other properties of ASTM D 975 for Grade No. 2-D fuel oil are within limits within 92 days following sampling and addition of new fuel to storage tanks.

c. Total particulate contamination of stored fuel oil is < 10 mc/L when tested once per 92 days in accordance with ASTM D 2f76-91 (gravimetric method).

5.6.2.15 Not Used (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-20 Amendment No.

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Procedures, Programs and Manuals I 5.6 1

5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals l l 1

l 5.6.2.16 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)

This program ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions taken. Upon entry into LC0 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions may be identified to be taken as a result l of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Condition and Required Actions. This program implements the requirements of LC0 3.0.6.

The SFDP shall contain the following:

a. Provisions for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the  ;

capability to perform the safety function assumed in the '

accident analysis does not go undetected;

b. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists; l

c. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and

d. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory l actions. I A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

a. A required system redundant to the system (s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable); or

b. A required system redundant to the system (s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or

c. A required system redundant to the support system (s) for the  !

supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

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(continued) i l Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-21 Amendment No. .

l L-------________

4 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER ' UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 1

ATTACIIMENT E 1

COMMITMENTS I

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment E 3F0798-15 Page 1of1  !

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ATTACHMENT E

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LIST OF COMMITMENTS l

The following table identifies those actions committed to by Florida Power Corporation in this 4 document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Florida Power Corporation. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Manager, Nuclear Licensing, of any I

questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

Commitment l

FPC will maintain the steam generator tube rupture analysis performed in accordance with j Standard Review Plan 15.6.3 current with changes that may affect the control room dose results.

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