ML20199G846

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Proposed Tech Specs Pages Involving Additional Restrictions, Editorial Clarifications & Typos
ML20199G846
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/21/1997
From:
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20199G843 List:
References
NUDOCS 9711250318
Download: ML20199G846 (29)


Text

. - _ _

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 A

ATTACIIMENT B REVISION 1 TO TSCRN 210 REDLINE / STRIKEOUT PAGES Technical Specifications Each change is indicted by a shadow box.

Deletions are indicated by strikeout.

Additional and replacement text are indicated by shading.

Bracketed information provides reference to one of the three parts of the TSCRN.

The shadow box for each change indicates the following:

(1) A change required for the remainder of Cycle 11 only is indicated in the shadow box as " Cycle 11".

(2) A pennanent change is indicated in the shadow box as " Permanent".

(3) A char.ge that may possibly be revised prior to restart of Cycle 12 depending on the Cycle 12 modifications is indicated in the shadow box as

" Reassess".

(4) A change resulting from Revision 1 of TSCRN 210 is indicated in the  !

shadow box as "Rev.1." and by revision bars in the right margin.  !

i l

l

, 9711250318 971121' l PDR ADOCK 05000302 ,

l l P PDR_ l i

1 l

Diesel Fuel Oil,_ Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3=

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

-SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.3.1 Verify each fuel oil storage tank contains 31 days (P&til2Trj 2 167589 gal of fuel and combined fuel oil

  1. 9' '# A

. ,f k (P&t!2i[Reassesi][45?834]

t, ,,,,,,,,,

'SR 3.8.3.2 Verify M DG lube oil inventory is 31 days a H3 gal.

w [P& O2i? Reassess]?2801 SR 3.8.3.3 Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored In accordance fuel oil'are tested in accordance with, and with the Diesel maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Fuel Oil Testing Program. Testing Program i

SR 3.8.3.4 Verify each EDC, air start receiver pressure is 31 days a 225 psig.

Crystal River t!nir. 3 3.8-16 Amendment No. 149 m . ,-- _

m., m .. --,m.m .

-y g e,, - _

, , g.Co. ~. l. Comple_x Cooling: System !

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- [Pa'rti1F PermasentT}

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3;7i18Z Control 2CompWCoolingES9steG . i 17% *E f"E, "ij LCOE3!718IGlControl Comple[ Cooling 3Fstem?shhllibe70PERABLEiwithk i 1 '

[Rev.~1; ,*, ,3, -m -x l

replace '2'l jTwo 0PERABLEl~ hillers _Jand associatsd; pumps;:.andw; ~ am ivithJTwo']2 - -

b.uTwo > OPERABLE =iheat ;excha= ngers.u.mw- aa-mm.. m ,N um.a l

[R'e K 1F ReplaceE'2'7; withdTwoLOPERABLE']j

~

APPLICABILITYi' 'IM00FS71,L'223PandT4.'~

" ' 7 "~ ' "T""^ """"* ""

ae ddiue t dLf 'l sm . .. .m ' K Durin movement; ofiirr  : assemblies M w; .al

[ Rey.E 1;] Epirided [applisabilj ty))

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ACTIONSP"T'

[ E SONDITIONT l l ] F~ 'REQUIREDfACTIONT ' 7 Ei (COMPLETION [ TIME!

A M CHHE41Blinopefablel AM s#-'--- Z NOTE'---- i- 7

^ <g a This'Act';cniis notL g

, IQRL L4 -f applicable-:inL MODE .4.

jT # , 1---- -------------- a

. , N CHP-1B irioperable.; % '

i.b. a . ,

O" i 1 Verify'the7turbihe' T ho0r.1 *J i- idriveniemergency? n ?

[Part"1R cfeedwater. pump:andi ~ [ReWT1;;

Cycle'11)

~~ .

associated: flow; pathh Replace w ' 4
are OPERABLE.~, -

30: days'withj

- _ . m , 72: hours]- '

mfd . 1.- _ _ 1 .

~

A '.' 2 ' Restor'e'CHHE-1B and 72 hosrs! . l CHP-1B to OPERABLE

, status.: .o i t. , a, ho& . . . .

-(continuedy Ci*yst'al L RiseUUnitl E ' . 7 13.7-37C 4 . _ D endmentDNo'.'

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[Pa rtil._.. ~,;1 Permanent: .s-1powispec

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-- {$35 E [CONDIII0ii2 E NO3 Z 71 REQUIRE 0!ACTIO C 3 (COMPLETIOCTIMEi a .

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o ., BTE' CHHEp 1Al_ inoper".a'ble".n_,-ed 5'#l'. '1r"Pg M AJ_7l "t" Re'8s ft o' *r'"e ; CHHF'd'1A'M $ECHPeAa'da' "y'""s+ed'?D-((?h.h' Y:a l P

e ' , 51AlandhContro.b +.

.s. ~ i w;a,QRannnneneseE%wnu L U Complex ~ Cochng: heath 9 .m oi:ly,m y.y k 'D

  • EA'V Mi exchangerito0PERA8LEj
' CCHP41A",idoissr~ab1(399 EAddiistatus.iddedu3 Reseyced;30 with 4 _ day ua a

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m Ee0Rmnna nnm hnhdMM

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T7 Complex; Cooling heat 9  : IR*V 31~3 gegCond{'AddEds,d s ksexchanserlinoperableg [ tjpg

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7 - e n3 ;Immediately s m.~ n C-l ;C ,.V RequiredEActio _nrand ~Q ,,C,1y~nPlace,L , n ontro_1/Compl~x 3 p,fassociated'Completiong b;y .

. Cooling Sy' stem 11n f y R ?Timetof ConditiontA or! L u n operation h a d D

waM ConditionlBinot meti 4 g -m

, g dur_ing; mo.vement' o fs~ e 0Rman- n n eimesemwumnmuss 4

M u

Es& irradiated assemblies, fcuel? n a t _ a a ,C.,2,2 , 7 5uspend mov..

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[Reh,.m1,;vAddedv._

apph.cability;tof h-M6 des!andLConditionsandHenumbered]l_

.. nat . ion o.fr, , E,.la, @_Enterf LCO ?3,0".3,ru.i ,w_ Jamediat41,y. m, E,n A ,7 ,_ nyccombi . ,

k tcomponents renderingea L Fthe-Control Complex M"

- p l Cooling System k  : [Re W 1TAdded 7 C W:' " ^

ing ij applicability 1to ModesLand;

  • kesiinoperable MODES;1,2,3for dur;%( JI . renumbered]T ' - ~...i d m A m a w a m m m _ m. m . .m _a m s (continuedD_.

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- siMxd 4CONDITIONsJ 2;i l _a;2.L E REQUIRED;4CTIONrwn;2a ,( COMPLETION;, TIME.!

n -., M. . - . nation?of> ,a

,fT.Any;com

. F .1~9 ,i Suspend' move.. mentco - .f _i ' .Immediately ,h _u D- firradiated fuel t, i p l[componentsTrendering g the Controlj: Complex; m R h _iassembliest a a d

. g yCool,ing System 7 n inoperable?during' 'dN --

jmovementlof eirradiated ER'V*IEAdd*d"**j lk;fffuel T assemb11es;;.: ,

'a Condition] a . m n.

ocawmm m.m.m.:. n w :. um...~:iaa t <

g n s-y n. W e.y?p van .+.nm '<9.py W : 9 m'~

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 5.s-

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. . =y t-L'Ve r'i fy' C.J.s j,-l1 ea' c' .1c h+O = h*ill e'date y*-N'* ~^-' r :rpump'sidevelopedy ,In Jaecordan. .. r.ce a) f head:at thelflowjtest pointiis} greater:than! Mth?the; 4 asm d- m loriequalLtoithelrequired; developed; head.LJ M srvice: 1 lestingierogram.!

SRE307;18'.21 WerifyIthe"redsndanEsapabilit Tofl.'the?

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.F '._. (Contro1~ Complex Cooling 3 System to removel

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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMilER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ATTACIIMENT B (cont.)

REVISION 1 TO TSCRN 210 REDLINE / STRIKEOUT PAGES Ilases Each citange is indicted by a shadow box.

Deletions are indicated by strikeout.

Additional and replacement text are indicated by shading.

liracketed inforination provides reference to one of the three parts of the TSCRN.

The shadow box for each change indicates the following:

(1) A change required for the remainder of Cycle 11 only is ludicated in the shadow box as " Cycle 11".

l (2) A permanent change is indicated in the shadow box as " Permanent".

(3) A change that may possibly be revised prior to restart of Cycle 12 depending on the Cycle 12 modifications is indicated in the shadow box as

" Reassess".

(4) A change resulting from Revision 1 of TSCRN 210 is indicated in the l

shadow box as "Rev.1." and by revision hars in the right margin.

a os --,,-.o -- + n n n_2- -- "-+ - L --

i ECCS- OpQrating B 3.5.2 l

BASES LCO Conversely, not all portions of the HPI System satisfy the (continued) independence criteria discussed above. Specificall, , the HPI System downstream of the HPI/ Makeup pumps is not separable into two distinct trains, and is therefore, not independent. This conclusion is based upon analysis which

[Rev 1: InsertT s hows-i nj ec tion-f-l ow-i v requi red-t h rough-a-mi nimumm f-t h ree which shows, 0 )-i n j ec ti on-l eg s -i n- t h e- even t-o f-epos t ul a ted-b re a k-i n-t h e that in the HPI-inf ection-pi ping. When considering the impact of ever$ of a .

inoperabilities i this portion of the system, the same postulated break concept of maint. ning single active failure protection most in the HPI be applied. Whe components become inoperable, an injection assessment of t i HPI systems ability to perform its safety piping;. function must b. performed. If the system can continue to injection' flow l perform its saf'ty function, without assuming a single is required active failure then the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> loss of redundancy ACTION through.a is app opriat . If the inoperability renders the system, as minimum"of thren' is, incapable of performing its safety function, without (3)Linjection. postulating single active failure, then the plant is in a legs, assuming ; condition ou side the safety analysis and must enter LCO one pump 3.0.3 immed ately.

operation,-or throughia: In MODEL 1 2, and 3, an ECCh train consists of an HPI minimum of two - sbbsystem nd an LPI subsystem. Each train includes the (2) injection ,

piping, i struments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow legs, assuming , path capa le of taking sucticq from the BWST upon an ESAS two HPI pump signal a d manually transferring suction to the reactor operation. *butiding emergency sump .

During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is provided to ensure an abundant supply of water from the BWST to the RCS via the HPI and LPI pumps and their respective discharge flow piths to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles and the reactor vessel. In the long term, this flow path may be manually transferred to take its supply from the reactor building emergency sump and to supply its flow to the RCS via two paths, as described in the Background section.

The flow path for each train must maintain its designed degree of independence to ensure that no single active failure can disable both ECCS trains.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-13 Revision No. 6

i gwyym mme wa .mu - .w m7~-m aw. wu i NMCMtp6FComp16Coolb75ystui sw . 1 x,2;;.u. a S.7a8  !

S,3,.7.>14 r PLANESY$ TENS n nnw.swn n.pn- go wwnn asa.;a usm n a m 2 m u m.a. w e,wa- , .

r m

8'.S!F;18E ControF Compis7Coolingilistes C Z TQ E J N E T 'fi M M l

[Partill Permand h new 3pecification] l BASES .

8ACKGROUNDTThe Control' Compled Coolin( Systai provides EtemperatureTcontrol Gj i p ' for the controltroom and other_' portions of'the Control: y j i m v u . d h Complex 1containing;safetyirelated equipment. h &, m z i d . l De~ Con &o1FComplex Csoliali;5pstemiconsists"of"twoTiedendant' [

M mI;' w w m ' chillers i' andl associated ch'11ed; water:pumpsithat'providet 3 DeletapageN 'co6 ling ofirecirculated'controlf complex air.L ' Redundant? 1 chiller

~

o %a " pairs - ]i l personnel' and. safety: related' control;equitemperatu The Control. l ex' changers (also4 Complex Cooling System _ maintains t <temperaturou 1- i form par _t of mammumw_ n. m.22 thej system.. n d between 70*F and;40*F.n ' > -

1

%um-3h:

fsingle?chillsrMidcassociatedTchilled?waterfpumpTwil1(""9

~

gg,yggp g.,j ec,= '"Ch*88' provide'theiroquired temperature ~ contro1r for. either heati . *

'~ :  ! ,l The Control Complex Cooling. System:operatiu% to d l

" ~

  • Q.mch' , *"C- "8'[*s "8%,i _>esgain# control:' complex TR.,$ection;g.7;(Ref 61). i _ temperature a m .snmmis< discussed in t!

naJSi For7certain"sma113 break LOCAsNith a"concurrentDloss"ofE 7

[Part"117yi loffsitepower, sit;isnecessarytoprovidecapability:.onLthej .

Cyclel11] m . emergency' diesel generator.to load the "A": train: low . A t pressure. injection pump;and other-required 1oads; Insthese '

situations :.CHHE-18 and CHPp18 would betrelied uponitoi >

provide: required cooling,s w j  ;

k . mia A . Jhs ws n , _m i . ' '.u; u  !

t

'APPLICA8LE RThe Contr61_ Complex Coolingi5ystem 7 consists"ofl redundant;T . V 4 '

$AFETY ANALY$E5' isafety related, components...with some~ common piping.LThel "

n (Control Comp 7ox Cooling: System: maintains'the, temperature:. _;

p 4 between;70*Fland 80*Fe ! A single:sctive' failure.of a Controli LCouplex Cooling System component'does not; impair theLability' lL L'ofithe system:to' perform asLdesigned.i The' Control; Complex) .

Cooling Systemiistdesigned'in.'accordance with Seismici 1- -

L  ; Category;I requirementssThe Control Complex CoolingLSystem  !

h 11s capable of; removing; heat; loads from the control- roeyand; kam ..m a d otheriportionsLofzthe ControllComplex b 2u m ;a . of d t

[Re C 1F W 1 Delete L '14g']  ;

pwy n yw ,

en .m - - m _

i Crveauiv.anismanneen rm=:mAmendmentx\;  !

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. _ - _ _ - . - . _ , . . . . _ - _ . , - . ~ . _ . _ . . - _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , - - _ . - - . . , , , _ . - . . - . , . _ . - _ . .

I f' Control; Complex Cooling System BASES (Part 1; Permanent; new specification) . -

APPLICABLE' .

1 SAFETY ANALYSE 5 containing ' safe'.y related equipment, including consideration (continued) of equipment.hf at loads and personnel occupancy 3 1 . requirements. to ensure equipment OPERABILITY..

The Control Complex Cooling System sathfies Criterion'3 of thc NRC Policy Statement.

LC01 "' Two' redundant heat 'excha'ngers and twoLredundant c',111ers' and associated pumps of.the Control Complex Cooling-System are_

required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one of each ,

is available, assuming a siagle failure disables one i

redundant-component. Total system failure could result in '

the equipment operating temperature exceeding limitsn a The Control Complex Cooling System is ' considered OPERABLE ,

when the individual redundant components /that are necessary to maintain control complex temperature are OPERABLE. These Lomponents include the- cooling coils, water cooled condensing units, and associated temperature control instrumentation. In addition, the Control Complex Cocling.

System must be OPERABLE to the extent that air circulation can bo maintained (See Specification 3.7.12). J APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2. 3,' and 4, the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control complex temperature.will not exceed equipment 0PERABILITY requirements. During movement of. irradiated fuel assemblies

. the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE .to-cope with a release due to a fuel handling accident.

ACTIONS ~ 'A.1 and A.Z.

With the CHHE-1B orlCHP-1B' inoperable, prompt l action must be

[Part 1;. taken within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to verify the. turbine driven emergency Cycle 111 feedwater pump'and associated flowpath'is.0PERABLE to New ACTION],

small break LOCA mitigation improvement cannot be assured and Condit!on C is applicable. .The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in NODE 4.

[Rev'. 1; Delete '149'); *

(conti ued)'

CrystalLRiver' Unit!3: :B 3.7-86,

\

- Amendment lNo.

1 1

Control' Complex Cooling System L

L P 3.7.18 BASES [Part li Permanent; new. specificatioh] ..

<y .

ACTIONS 1 L1_and_LZ (continued)  :

(Part 1; Due to the severity of the ~ consequences should a 'small: break Cycle 11, LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time New ACTION]; to verify turbine driven eniergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are' OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to provide t% captbility for EDG load management.for small break LOCA mitigation improvement. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is'potentially exposed.to a LOCA in,these conditions.

4 Con'sistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0;1,'

^

OPERABILITY is: verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has.been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and-the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

With"CHHE-1B or CHP-1B inoperable, action must be taken~to restore its OPERABLE status withi 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In this l

[Rev. li- Condition, the remaining OPE Control Complex Cooling. ,

P.cplace 30 System redundant compon are adequate to maintain the days with control = complex t ge. ature within limits. However, the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />._ werati rethrbf3 Tty is- reduced because a failure in the ERABLE Control Complex Cooling. System components could re it in a loss of Control. Complex Cooling System function.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is based on the low probability l of an event occurring requiring the Control Complex Cooling System and the consideration that the remaining redundant components can provide the required capabilities.

1L1' - m Wi th CHHE-1A, CHPilA~ 'or one Control Complex- Cooling ' heat exchanger inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status with 7 days. In this Condition, the l

[Rev.1; Replace remaining GPERAB ntrol Complex Cooling System equipment 30' days with is adequat intain the control complex temperature 7 days) ,

%t its. However, the overall reliability is reduced because'a fa1 u ERABLE Control Complex.' Cooling System redundant components cou a loss of Control Complex Cooling System function.. The 7 day l Completion Time is based on the low probability of an ~ event occurring requiring the Control Complex Cooling System and the consideration that the remaining components can provide:

the required capabilities,

~

(continueJ)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-87 . Amendment No.

mayg-awm " '~

-T 7" Ca t' I M 1 miCali 4 l5n t s hwa m.bama.Aci nwa mi - aL ausamt:3.7.14.

g ~ wr w y wyat wry:r e e EIIt N,I_ Ieooft),<, -w p m &v+ m*-wr -w wwmq

' ACTION 5 f"T.TF "TC;1" C1"~" "" VHWP7"71WP "" "E Tt b (continued E m ! , . . . . _ .  ; ... i f _, z L . y Ji

.During movementLof:irpadiated fuel.aif the required Actioni~

pg gpm 'and CompletioniTimesiof Condition A'or Condition 8 can not 4 Added news J be.not.7the: Control Complex Cooling System'murtibe placed;in.

Action) "g9. operationtimmediately. LThis taction iensures thatL the  ; j remaining Control. Complex; Cool!ng System componentstarez RABLE. Land that;any ac_tive5 failure:wi11ibe'readily; @ M g detected A d u i h i ssa i ~ # m d a a c e u a A An(alternathe7 6t Re6 Tied'fesion[C;171s't cRimmediate19?PN t -

' suspend activities that couldirelease radioactivhyithati j might" require:-thel1sulation ofithe controls roomh Thiso a

' places'theplantiniaiconditi4n-that:minimires<accidentT':]:5

, risk; LThis doesinot; preclude the movement of fuel:to a+ safe' position. u w a ,';a a a mu w m a: mas _ M D.,1?and D.,22_ ,,g<unnem-m--ww.www-as mm w. , ; , . mm m m c mwm ,nc , , al

~

y

'Cooling int MOPE  ? 1Fcomponent"cannotibe:restoredtts 203 I6rl4Ki f ? the" i noperabl 0PERASLED eF Cont rol "Compl a es"~", "

[ReVU1: s 4 System Renumberedh (status 1withintherequiredCompletionTime..Ltheunitmust;be

'placed in a MODE in which'the LCO:does'not apply.1;:ToJ . 'j achieve-this;ststusL the:unitimust be;placedLiniat;1easti j

< MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />', and"in MODE 5.within;36. hours.,LThe 1

'experie'nce, allowed Completion Times'required to: reach:thel are reasonable.: unit conditions based on:operatinbr from ful power conditions;inf an orderly. manner.withoutJchallenging unit systems.1 - ,a _m A um a . arm.

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.If any babination c ofscomponen.ts inoperable'that/would-a Renumbered)~;

render'the Control Compinx Cooling' System
not. capable of_'.

performing"the:: intended. function. the unitHs41n a condition outsidestheiaccident analyses. Therefore. LCOt3.0.3 must be enteredsimmediately.;, -, , w- . . ._a.a - a

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5 his % & , , N b a f,x h i &aa a-i '

.am- - -um A ;id b ;rgt(Continue-dl a

CFy~$tallRiverlUniti3IP 2 6 M, M 813;7488M T M & 7 AmendmenE No;f 3 I . . . . . . . . . . .

[ .Contfol Complex Cooling *5ystem

[ , .8 3.7.18 BASES '

- ' ,7 (Part 1; Insert]i *j ,,

ACTIONS'- ~EJ l L (continued),

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, W(th any

[RevF 1. -

Added nb i *s /Control combination of components inoperable that would render the Coinplex Cooling System not capable of performing the.

Action]

intended function, action must be taken to immediately suspend activiti_es that could release ra_dioactivity that might require isolation of the. control. room. This places

~

1 the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This

'does not. precludes the movement of fuelsto a safe. position. -

SURVEILLANCE ~ SR' 3;7.1821~ 7 REQUIREMENTS' , , ,

VerifyingJthat'each Control Complex' Cooling' chiller's P

' developed head at the flow test point is greater than or-equal to the required developed head ensures that chiller'ry performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential pressure are normal tests of centrifugal. pump :

performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code, (Ref. 3). . ..This test confirms one point.on the pump design-curve and is. indicative of overall performance. Such inservice-tests confirm component OPERABILITY -trend performance, and detect incipientsfailures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.. .i

~ ~

SR~ 3.7.8:2-This SR verifies' that' the heat' removal' capability' of' the system.is sufficient to meet design requirements. This SR-consists of a combination.of testing and calculations. An 24 Month Frequency 'is appropriate, as significant-degradation of the system is slow and is not expected over this, time period.. .

~1 . FSAR, Section 9.7.

~

~

REFERENCES ^

n 2. FTI'51-1266138-01, Safety Analysis Input to Startup Team Safety Assessment.

3. ASME, Boiler and, Pressure Vessel. Code,.Section XI. .s
, u m (continued).

CryitalLRiverLUnit'3- .' iB~3.7-891 ^/mendment No. l

i i

FLORIDA POWER CORPOR ATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 l

ATTACIIMENT C .

REVISION 1 to TSCRN 210 REVISION BAR PAGES Technical Specifications

1 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

1

- FACILITY OPERATlhG LICENSE NO. UPR 72 l DOCKET NO. 50-302 l

- Replace the following lages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. T1e revised pages are identified by amendment number and i contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding

  • spillover pages are also provided to maintain document completeness, i Remove Replace 3.5 4 3.5 4 3.7 9 3.7-9 i 3.7 10 3.7-10 i 3.7-11 3.7-11

, 3.7-12 3.7-12

...... 3.7-12A 3.7-15 3.7-15 3.7 16 3.7-16 3.7-17 3.7-17 3.7-18 3.7-18* 1 3.7-19 3.7-19 3.7-20 3.7-20 .

3.7-21 3.7 21 3.7-22 3.7-22*


- 3.7-37 - Rev. 1


3.7-38 - Rev. 1


3.7-39* - Rev. 1 3.8-2 3.8 2 3.8-3 3.8-3 3.8 4 3.8 4

...... 3.8 4A

.....- 3.8-4B

...... 3.8 4C

...... 3.8 40 3.8 6 3.8-6 3.8-10 3.8-10 3.8-14 3.8-14 3.8-15 3.8-15 3,8-16 3.8-16 - Rev. 1 3.8 31 3.8-31 ,

3.8-32 3.8-32  !

...... 3.8-32A

...... 3,8 32B

...... -3.8 32C*

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. - _ - . - - . - _ - . - -- _ _ _ . =. ..

l FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302/ LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ATTACIIMENT C (cont.)

REVISION 1 to TSCRN 210 REVISION BAR PAGES Bases

. - , - , _ . - . . . - - - - +

Control Complex Cooling System .

3.7.18 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3,7.18 Control Complex Cooling System LCO 3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Two OPERABLE chillers and associated pumps; and
b. Two OPERABLE heat exchangers.

APPLICABILITV: fiODES 1, 2, 3 and 4, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLET10t1 TIME A. chile 1B inoperable A.1 -.--- - NOTE--- -----

This Action is not M .,

applicable in MODE 4.

CHP-1B inoperable.

Verify the turbine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore CHHE-1B and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> CHP 1B to OPERABLE status.

B. CHHE-1A inoperable. 8.1 Restore CHHE.lA, CHP- 7 days IA and Control M Com)1ex Cooling heat exclarger to OPERABLE CHP-1A inoperable, status, M

One required Control Com) lex Cooling heat ,

exc1 anger inoperable.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7 37 Amendment No.

__-___--_____-_____-_--__-_--__-___-N

Control Complex Cooling System 3.7.18 ACTIONS (continued) _

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i

C. Required Action and C.1 Place Control Complex Immediately ,

associated Completion Cooling System in l Time of Condition A or operation. I Condition B not met ,

during movement of QR irradiated fuel assemblics. C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

  • D. Required Action nr.J D.1 Be in Mode '). 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associatad Cainpletion Time of Condition A or 6!fD Condition B not met during MODES 1, 2, 3, D.2 Be in Mode 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> or 4.

E. Any combination of E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately components rendering the Control Complex Cooling System inoperable during MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

F. Any combination of F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately components rendering irradiated fuel the Control Complex assemblies.

Cooling System inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-38 Amendment No..

_ _ . - . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . . . - .- ~- ._-

Control Complex Cooling System 3.7.18 50RVilLLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVE!LLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.18.1 Verify'each chilled water pump's developed in accordance head at the flow test point is greater than with the or equal to the required developed head, inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.18.2 Verify the redundant capability of the 24 months Control Complex Cooling System to remove the assumed heat load.

4 CrystaIRiverUnit3 3.7-39 Amendment No.

Diesel fuel 011 Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.3.1 Verify each fuel oil storage tank contains 31 days 2 22,917 gal of fuel and combined fuel oil storage level 2 45,834 gal.

SR 3.8.3.2 Verify EDG lube oil inventory is 2 280 gal. 31 days l SR 3.8.3.3 Verify fuel oil properties of new and In accordance stored fuel oil are tested in accordance with the Diesel with, and maintained within the limits of, fuel Oil the Diesel fuel Oil Testing Program. Testing Program SR 3.8.3.4

  • Verify each EDG air start receiver pressure 31 days is 2 225 psig.

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.8 16 Amendment No.

A1TACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

-[ACILITY OPERATING IIC @$I NO. DPR-72 DOCKET 40 50 302 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and-contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding

  • spillover pages are also provided to maintain document-completeness.

Remove EtAlEt B 3.3 44 8 3.3 44

...... B 3.3 44A*


B 3.3 44B B 3.3 138 B 3.3-138 B 3.5-9 83.59

...... B 3.5 9A*

...... B 3.5-98 B 3.3-13 B 3.5 Rev. 1 B-3.5-15 B 3.5-15

...... B 3.5-15A*


B 3.5-15B B 3.5-18 8 3.5-18 B 3.7-23 B 3.7-23


B 3.7-23A


B 3.7-23B B 3.7-24 B 3.7 24 8 3.7-25 B 3.7-25 0 3.7-26 B 3.7 26

> B 3.7-27 B 3.7 27

..-.-- B 3.7-27A >

....-- B 3.7-27B

...... B-3.7-27C


B 3.7-27D B 3.7-28 B 3.7 28 8 3.7-31 B 3.7-31


B 3.7-36A

-...... B 3.7-36B B 3.7-38 B 3.7-38


B 3.7-38A


B 3.7 3BB B 3.7-41 B 3.7-41

-B 3.7-42 B 3.7-42 B 3.7-43 B 3.7-43 B 3.7-44 B 3.7-44


B 3.7-44A*

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 f DOCKET NO. 50-302 l l

Replace the following ) ages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with i the attached pages. Tie revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding

  • spillover pages are also provided to maintain document completeness. ,

Remove Replace ,


B 3,7-44B B 3.7 47 8 3.7-47 B 3.7-48 8 3.7-48


- B 3.7-48A


- B 3.7-48B B 3.7-49 0 3.7 49 8 3.7-50 8 3.7 50 B 3.7-52 B 3.7-52 B 3.7 53 B 3.7-53*  !

B 3.7-54 8 3.7-54 '

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B 3.7-54B B 3.7 63 8 3.7-63  ;


B 3.7 Rev. 1


B 3.7 Rev. 1

--- -- B 3.7-87 - Rev. 1


B 3.7 88 - Rev. 1


B 3.7 Rev. !

...... B 3.8-2A

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...... B 3.8-3A*

...-.. B 3.8 3B B 3.8 8 8 3.8-8 B 3.8 9 B 3.8-9 8 3.8-10 B 3.8-10 ,

.....-- B 3.8-10A

......- B 3.8-10B B 3.8-11 B 3.8-11 B 3.8-12 B 3.8 12 B 3.8 B 3.8-13 B 3.8-14 B 3.8 14


B 3.8-14A i


B 3.8-14B B 3.8-15 . B 3.8-15 B 3.8 18 0 3.8 18 j

, - ~ , - . , . . . , . . . . . - - , - . - , . , . _ . _ . . , - - - . . _ , , - , ,_,-,_.i...,_._..

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. f i

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 l

DDCKET NO. 50 302 i

I 4

' Replace the following 9 ages of the' Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with j

- the attached pages. Tae revised pages are identified by amendment number and  :

contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. the corresponding i

  • spillover pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.- l gemyg Replace B 3.8-19 B 3.8-19 B 3.8-22 8 3.8-22 i B 3.8 30 B 3.8-30  ;

B 3.8 31 B 3.8 31 l B 3.8-32 B 3.8-32 8 3.8-33 8 3.8-33  !


B 3.8 33A

--- -- B 3.8 33B B 3.8 34 B 3.8 34 8 3.8 35 8 3.8-35

. B 3.8-36 8 3.8 36

--- -- B 3.8 67A


B 3.8 678 8 3.8 69 8 3.8 69

, B 3.8 70 B 3.8-70 8 3.8-71 8 3.8 71


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--..-- B 3.8 718-B 3.8-72 B 3.8-72 B 3.8 73 8 3.8-73 8 3.8-74 B 3.8-74 I

t ECCS-Operating B 3.S.2 1

BASES LCO Conversely, not all pcrtions of the HPI System satisfy the (continued) independence criteria discussed above. Specifically, the

- HPI System downstream of the HPI/ Makeup pumps is not ,

separable into two distinct trains, and is therefore, not I independent. This conclusion is based upon analysis which  !

shows, that in the event of a postulated break in the HPl {

injection piping, injection flow is r_equired through a ~  ;

minimum of three (3) injection legs, assuming one pump  !

operation, or through a minimum of two (2) injec^. ion legs,-  :

assuming two HPI aump operation. When considering the l impact of inopera)ilities in this portion of the system, the l' same concept of maintaining single active failure protection must be. applied. -When components become inoperable, an assessment of the HPl systems ability to perform its safety function must be performed, if the system can continue to perform its safety function, without assuming a single active failure, then the 72 hour-loss of redundancy ACTION is appropriate. If the inoperability renders the system, as is, incapable of performing its safety function, without postulating a single active failure, then the plant is in a condition outside the safety analysis and must enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, an ECCS train consists of an HPI subsystem and an LPI subsystem. Each train includes the piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the BWST upon an ESAS signal and manually transferring suction to the reactor building emergency sump.

During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is provided to ensure an abundant supply of water from the BWST to the.RCS via the-HPI and LPI pumps and their respective -

discharge flow paths to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles and the reactor vessel. In the long term, this flow path may be manually transferred to take its supply from the reactor building emergency sump and to supply its flow to the RCS via two paths, as described in the Background section, i

The flow path for each train must maintain its designed degree of independence to ensure that no single active f&ilure can disable both ECCS trains.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-13 Amendment No.

i

, . - - - - , . . . ..,n-- - n...,.-.. , ..,.,n _.,,,,,--,..n.lw ,,.,--,.,,.,v.w, --,.n, ,en ,...,,e c ,, - ~ - . - , . - . . , . - . - , ,- r

i Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 B~3.7 PLANT' SYSTEMS B 3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System BASES  !

BACKGROUND The Control Complex Cooling System provides temperature .

control for the control room and other portions of the  !

Control Complex containing safety related equipment.  !

The Control Complex Cooling System consists of two redundant -

chillers and associated chilled water rumps that provide cooling of recirculated control complex air. Redundant ,

chillers and chilled water pumps are provided for suitable temperature conditions in the control ccmplex for operating  :

personnel and safety related control e@ lpment. The Control  !

Complex Cooling System maintains' the nominal temperature  :

between 70'F and 80'F.

A single chiller and associated chilled water pump will

~'

provide the required temperature control for either heat exchanger. The Control Complex Cooling System operation to maintain control complex temperature is discussed in the ,

FSAR,Section9.7(Ref.1).

For certain small break LOCAs with a concurrent loss of offsite power, it is necessary to provide capability on the emergency diesel generator to load the "A" . train low pressure injection pump and other required loads. In these-situations, CHHE-1B and CHP-1B would be relied upon to  ;

provide required cooling.

APPLICt,BLE The Control Complex Cooling System consists of redundant, SAFETY ANALYSIS safety related components, with some common piping. The Control Complex Cooling System maintains the temperature '

between 70*F and 80'F. A single active failure of a .

Control Complex Cooling System component does not impair the >

ability of the system to perform as designed. Tho Control Complex Cooling System is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements. The Control Complex >

Cooling System is capable of removing heat loads from the control' room and other portions of the Control Complex containing safety related equipment, including consideration ,

of equipment heat loads and (continued) i Crystal'R'ver i Unit 3 8 3.7-85 Amendment No.

va ,e w ,---a.

i Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 BASES APPLICABLE personnel occupancy requirements, to ensure equipment SAFETY ANALYSIS OPERABILITY. ,

(continued)

The Control Complex Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of i the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 Two redundant heat exchangers and two redundant chillers and associated pumps of the Control Complex Cooling System are ,

required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one of each 1 is available, assuming a single failure disables one redundant component. Total system failure could result in .

the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits.  !

i The Control Complex Cooling System is considered OPERABLE I when the individual redundant components that are necessary to maintain control complex temperature are OPERABLE. These components include the cooling coils, water cooled condensing units, and associated temperature control instrumentation. In addition, the Control Compicx Cooling System must be OPERABLE to the extent that air circulation can be maintained (See Specification 3.7.12).

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control complex temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY requirements. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to cope with a release due to a fuel handling accident.

ACTIONS /L,1 and A.2 With the CHHE-18 or CHP-1B inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to verify the turbire driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path is OPERABLE to (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-86 Amendment No.

___.__..y t

Control Complex Cooling System .

B 3.7.18-BASES.

ACTIONS .A'.1 and A.2 (continued) provide steam generator cooling. If the turbine driven ,

emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are .not OPERABLE, the capability to provide EDG load management for  !

small break LOCA mitigation improvement cannot be assured ,

and Condition C is applicat,le. The operability of the~  !

turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

Due to the ' severity- of the consequences should a-small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action wi!1 be taken to provide the capability for EDG load mariagement for small break LOCA mitigation improvement. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated  !

surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the  :

required frequency and the equipment 1:; not otherwise known  :

to be inoperable.

With CHHE-1B or CHP-1B inoperable., action must be taken to restore its OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling System redundant components are adequate to maintain the '

control complex temperature within limits. However, the overall reliabi.ity is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling System components could -

result in a loss of Control Complex Cooling System function, j The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is based on the low probability

-of an event occurring requiring the Control Complex Cooling System and the consideration that the remaining redundant components can provide the required capabilities.

t t

. (continued)

E

' Crystal. River linit 3 8 3.7-87 Amendment No.

. . - - .. -._-...-.-:.-.=-., . - . - -. ] . _ . : - --. . . . . - , . . . - , - .

Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 I

BASES-  !

I ACTIONS ll.I (continued)  ;

With CHHE-1A, CHP 1A or one Control Complex Cooling heat exchanger inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the i remaining OPERABLE control Complex Cooling System equipment i is adequate to maintain the control complex temperature within limits. However, the overall reliability is reduced ,

because a failure in the OPERABLE. Control Complex Cooling System redundant components could result in a-loss of Control Complex Cooling System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring the Control Complex Cooling System and-the consideration that the remaining components can provide i the required capabilities.  ;

[

C.1 and_LJ During movement of irradiated fuel, if the required Action and Completion Times of Condition A or Condition B can not -

be met, the Control Complex Cooling System must be placed in operation immediately. This action ensures that the remaining Control Complex Cooling System components are OPERABLE, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.) is to immediately <

suspend activities that could release radioactivity that might require the isolation of the control room. This. ,

places the plant in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

t (continued)

{CrystalRiverUnit3- B 3.7 88 Amendment No. I

. = . - _ - _ - _ , _ _ ._._._s___

Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18-BASES l

ACTIONS 0.1 and 0.2'  :

In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable Control Complex-Cooling System component cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least '

MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full-power conditions in an orderly manner without challenging

- unit systems.

L.1  ;

if any combination of components that would render the i Control Complex Cooling System not capable of performing the .

intended function, the unit is in a condition outside the i accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

L.1 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, with.any

, combination of components inoperable that would render the

  • Control Complex Cooling System not capable of performing the intended function, action must be taken to immediately sus)end activities that could releace radioactivity that migit require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

i (continued)

Cryst d River Unit 3 8 3.7 89 Amendment No, I

i l

Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.18.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that each Control Complex Cooling chiller's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that chiller's performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential pressure are norma; tests of centrifugal pump ,

performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref.

3). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of the SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

I SR 3.7.8.2 This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to meet design requirements. This SR consie.ts of a combination of testing and calculations. An 24 month Frequency is appropriate, as significant degradation of the system is slow and is not expected over this time period.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 9.7.

2. FTl 51-1266138 01, Safety Analysis input to Startup Team Safety Assessment.
3. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI.

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-90 Amendment No.

- - . . _ _ _ ~ ._. . - . _

--