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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17355A3891999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990623,manual Rt from 100% Power Following Multiple Control Rod Drops Was Noted.Caused by Manual Action Taken by Reactor Control Operator.Inspected & Repaired Stationary Gripper Regulating Cards.With 990720 Ltr ML17354B1921998-11-18018 November 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981020,containment Purge Supply,Valve Opened Wider than TS Limit.Caused by Improper Setting of Mechanical Stops.Incorporated Improved Standard Method of Measuring Angular Valve Position Into Sp.With 981118 Ltr ML17354B1361998-10-16016 October 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980921,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by Inadequate re-correlation of Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation Reactor Trip Bistable. Enhanced Applicable Plant Procedures.With 981016 Ltr ML17354B0341998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980619,discovered That Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Was Inoperable Due to Inadequate Inservice Testing of Valves.Caused by Misunderstanding of Testing Criteria.Util Revised Procedures & Verified Operability of Valves ML17354A9841998-06-18018 June 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 970730,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Closure of B Msiv.Caused by Failed BFD22S Relay.Six Relays on 3A,3B & 3C MSIVs Were Replaced & Implemented Plant Change to Disable Electronic Trip Function on 3 AFW Pumps ML17354A9741998-06-0909 June 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980513,discovered Potential LOCA-initiated Electrical Fault Which Places ECCS Outside Design Basis. Caused by Inadequate Review of Effect on non-safety Circuit failures.Re-powered PC-*-600A Relays ML17354A8511998-03-24024 March 1998 LER 97-009-01:on 971114,discovered That CR Console Switch for 3B Sgfp Was Not in Start Position.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Revised Procedures 3/4-OP-074,informed Personnel of Event & Performed Walkdown of CR ML17354A8441998-03-18018 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980216,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Loss of Turbine Control Oil Pressure W/Steam Leak in Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Supply Piping.Auxiliary Governor Maint Instructions Will Be revised.W/980318 Ltr ML17354A7361997-12-12012 December 1997 LER 97-009-01:on 971114,identified That CR Console Switch for 3B SG Feedwater Pump Was Not in Start Position.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Procedures 3/4-OP-074,SGFP Were revised.W/971212 Ltr ML17354A6801997-10-0808 October 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970909,containment Sump Debris Screens Outside Design Basis Due to Stress Damage Was Discovered. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance & Personnel Error. Discrepancies Found on Screens corrected.W/971008 Ltr ML17354A6121997-08-29029 August 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970730,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by Closure of B Main Steam Isolation Valve.Failed W Relay & Equivalent Relays Were replaced.W/970829 Ltr ML17354A6081997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970722,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Failed Rod Control Power Supplies.Replaced Twelve Power Supplies in Rod Control Logic & Power cabinets.W/970818 Ltr ML17354A5801997-07-14014 July 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970618,RCP Oil Collection Sys Was Found Outside Design Basis.Caused Because Design Did Not Consider Component Parts to Be Potential Leakage Sources.Entire RCP Oil Collection Sys Was reviewed.W/970714 Ltr ML17354A5141997-05-22022 May 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970423,automatic Reactor Tripped.Caused by Actuation of Turbine Overspeed Protection Circuit. Administrative Procedures Governing Inadequate Work Controls Will Be Revised to Capture Lessons learned.W/970522 Ltr ML17354A5061997-05-0909 May 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970410,mode Changed W/O Meeting Requirements of TS 3.0.4 Due to Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Night Order Was Issued to Inform Personnel That S/G Blowdown Keylock Switches Were Left in drain.W/970509 Ltr ML17354A5051997-05-0909 May 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970411,auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Start Upon Trip of All Main Feedwater Pumps,Occurred.Caused by Mispositioned Valve Closing.Valves Listed as Inappropriately Positioned Were repositioned.W/970509 Ltr ML17354A4781997-04-25025 April 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970327,ECCS Recirculation Loop Leakage Was Found to Be in Condition Outside Design Basis Due to Gasket Movement During Installation During Spring 1966 Reassembly. Gasket Replaced & Pump tested.W/970425 Ltr ML17354A4581997-03-28028 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970303,manual Reactor Trip Following Rod Control Urgent Failure Alarm Occurred.Caused by Phase Failure Detection on Stationary a Circuits of 2BD Rod Control Cabinet.Air Conditioning replaced.W/970328 Ltr ML17354A4511997-03-26026 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970118,missed Surveillance on CR Position Verification Occurred Due to Inoperable Rod Deviation Monitor.Faulty Circuit Common Connection Was Corrected & Rdm Operability Was restored.W/970326 Ltr ML17354A4061997-02-0303 February 1997 LER 96-004-03:on 970107,identified Three Instances of Inadequate Surveillance Testing.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedures.Surveillance Procedures Revised ML17354A3771996-12-27027 December 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 961204,determined Containment Average Temp Being Determined Based on Only Two Temp Elements Instead of Three as Required by Tss.Caused by Log Only Requiring One Entry.Log revised.W/961227 Ltr ML17354A3261996-11-0606 November 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 961009,potential for Overpressurizing Post Accident Containment Vent Filter Housings Occurred.Caused by Improper Change Mgt.Monitoring Sys Operating Procedures revised.W/961106 Ltr ML17354A3071996-10-22022 October 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960924,manual Reactor Shutdown Occurred. Caused by Failed Rod Control Sys Regulation Card in 2AC Power cabinet.2AC Power Cabinet DC Power Supplies,Cabling & Connectors checked.W/961022 Ltr ML17353A8711996-08-27027 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960729,failed to Reflect Heavy Load Design Info in Procedural Controls.Caused by Failure to Incorporate 1982 Procedure Changes.Suspended Lifting of Heavy Loads & Took Turbine Bldg Crane OOS.W/960827 Ltr ML17353A7411996-06-18018 June 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960521,surveillance Method for Testing Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) Determined Inadequate. Caused by Personnel Error.All Four EDGs Rapid Start Tested & EDG Surveillance Procedures modified.W/960618 Ltr ML17353A7401996-06-18018 June 1996 LER 96-004-02:on 960524,identified Inadequate Surveillance Testing.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedures.Entered Tech Spec Statements,Tested Required Instruments Functions & Revised Plant procedure.W/960618 Ltr ML17353A6901996-05-13013 May 1996 LER 96-004-01:on 960220,identified Potential Tech Spec non-compliance Associated W/Surveillance Testing of AFW Actuation Circuitry on Sg.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedures.Procedures revised.W/960513 Ltr ML17353A6741996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960409,manual Rt Occurred Due to Turbine Governer Control Oil Perturbation.Disassembled & Inspected Governor Valve for Cleanliness & Corrosion products.W/960506 Ltr ML17353A6651996-04-29029 April 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960329,inadvertent ESF Actuation Occurred During Refueling Outage Due to Cognitive Personnel Error. Personnel Involved Counseled & Integrated Safeguards Test Procedures Being revised.W/960429 Ltr ML17353A6601996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960327,manual Rt Occurred Due to 3C Transformer Lockout & Loss of 3B SG Mfp.Replaced SAM Timer Relay in 3AC16.W/960425 Ltr ML17353A6491996-04-23023 April 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960326,certain Safety Injection Accumulator Filled Evolutions Resulted in cross-tied Configuration.C/A: Night Order Written & Operations Procedure 3/4-OP-064 revised.W/960423 Ltr ML17353A6051996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960222,two Arpi Inoperable & TS 3.0.3 Entered.Proposed License Amend Submitted to Revise Allowed Misalignment from +/-12 Steps to =/-18 Steps Between Arpi & Dpi at Less than 90% power.W/960318 Ltr ML17353A6041996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960220,surveillance Testing of AFW Actuation Circuitry Was Inadequate.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedures.Tested Untested Portions of Actuation Logic for AFW Automatic Start signal.W/960318 Ltr ML17353A5861996-03-0606 March 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960209,automatic Turbine Trip/Rt Occurred Due to High SG Level.Caused by Personnel Error.Replaced Both Hinge Pins on B Sgfp Discharge Check valve.W/960306 Ltr ML17353A5761996-03-0101 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960131,intake CWS Flow Rates Found W/ Potential to Be Less than Required by Design Basis.Caused by Influx of Aquatic Grass & Algae Onto Basket Strainers of Icw Flow Path.Mechanically Cleaned strainers.W/960301 Ltr ML17353A4451995-11-0909 November 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 951017,manual Rt Occurred Following Drop of Four Control Rods.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Rod Control Power Cabinet 2BD.Inspected Control Power Cabinet 2BD for Other Water damage.W/951109 Ltr ML17353A4241995-10-12012 October 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950913,analysis Showed That CCW Exchangers Susceptible to Damage Due to flow-induced Vibration.Ccw Sys Has Been Flow Balanced to Closer tolerances.W/951012 Ltr ML17353A3601995-09-13013 September 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950818,containment Pressure Testing Procedure Resulted in Inhibiting Both Trains of Containment Pressure from Initiated Esf.Revised Procedure to Require Testing of Each Train separately.W/950913 Ltr ML17353A2951995-07-17017 July 1995 LER 94-005-02:on 941103,both Units Outside Design Basis Due to Design Defect in Safeguards Bus Sequencer Test Logic. Resumed Monthly Manual Testing of Sequencer ML17352B1581995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950407,unit Being Shutdown to Investigate Recurring non-urgent Failure Alarms from Redundant Rod Control Power Supplies.Reactor Manually Tripped.All Four PS-3 Power Supplies replaced.W/950505 Ltr ML17352B1181995-04-0707 April 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950309,intake Cooling Water Flow Rate Through CCW Heat Exchangers Fell Below Assumed Design Basis. Caused by an Influx of Aquatic Grass & Algae Onto Basket Strainers.Strainers cleaned.W/950407 Ltr ML17352B0701995-03-13013 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950215,inadequate Definition of Loops Filled Resulted in Units in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Issued TS Position Statement to Define Term Loops Filled as Used in TS 6.4.1.1.4.W/950313 Ltr ML17352B0321995-02-0909 February 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941103,design Defect Found in Safeguards Bus Sequencer Test Logic,Placing Facility Outside Design Basis.Design Mods to Eliminate Software Logic Problems Will Be Implemented During Next Refueling outages.W/950209 Ltr ML17352B0101995-01-20020 January 1995 LER 94-006-00:on 941226,C Main Feedwater Control Valve Failed Closed,Causing Reactor & Turbine Trips.Caused by Loose Screw Terminal Connection.I/P Transducers Replaced W/ New Model W/Different Design Wire connection.W/950120 Ltr ML17352A9511994-12-13013 December 1994 LER 94-006-00:on 941130,Unit 4 Tripped Automatically.Caused by Failure of Flexible Link Connection Between Main Generator B Phase Bus & Associated Isolated Phase Bus Bar. All Bolts on Flexible Link checked.W/941213 Ltr ML17352A8871994-11-10010 November 1994 LER 94-005-00:on 941103,design Defect in Safeguards Bus Sequencer Test Logic Places Both Units Outside Design Basis. Caused by 3A Sequencer Failed to Respond as Expected to Opposite Unit SI signal.W/941110 Ltr ML17352A8851994-11-10010 November 1994 LER 94-004-00:on 941103,Unit 3 Outside Design Basis Due to Two of Three Required Safety Injection Pumps Inoperable. Control Switches for 3A & 3B Safety Injection Pumps Immediately Returned to automatic.W/941110 Ltr ML17352A8421994-10-21021 October 1994 LER 94-004-00:on 940923,Unit 4 Tripped Automatically from Rated Power.Caused by Faulty Regulator Transistor.Faulty Backup Power Supply Replaced & Maint History for Power Supplies reviewed.W/941021 Ltr ML17352A8431994-10-20020 October 1994 LER 94-005-00:on 940924,Unit 4 Manually Tripped.Caused by Manual Actuation.Light Bulb & Socket replaced.W/941020 Ltr ML17352B1671994-08-16016 August 1994 LER 94-003-00:on 940720 & 21,util Discovered That Several Required Valve Stroke Time Surveillances Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Reassigned & Procedures and Surveillance Tracking Software Enhanced 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17355A3891999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990623,manual Rt from 100% Power Following Multiple Control Rod Drops Was Noted.Caused by Manual Action Taken by Reactor Control Operator.Inspected & Repaired Stationary Gripper Regulating Cards.With 990720 Ltr ML17354B1921998-11-18018 November 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981020,containment Purge Supply,Valve Opened Wider than TS Limit.Caused by Improper Setting of Mechanical Stops.Incorporated Improved Standard Method of Measuring Angular Valve Position Into Sp.With 981118 Ltr ML17354B1361998-10-16016 October 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980921,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by Inadequate re-correlation of Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation Reactor Trip Bistable. Enhanced Applicable Plant Procedures.With 981016 Ltr ML17354B0341998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980619,discovered That Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Was Inoperable Due to Inadequate Inservice Testing of Valves.Caused by Misunderstanding of Testing Criteria.Util Revised Procedures & Verified Operability of Valves ML17354A9841998-06-18018 June 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 970730,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Closure of B Msiv.Caused by Failed BFD22S Relay.Six Relays on 3A,3B & 3C MSIVs Were Replaced & Implemented Plant Change to Disable Electronic Trip Function on 3 AFW Pumps ML17354A9741998-06-0909 June 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980513,discovered Potential LOCA-initiated Electrical Fault Which Places ECCS Outside Design Basis. Caused by Inadequate Review of Effect on non-safety Circuit failures.Re-powered PC-*-600A Relays ML17354A8511998-03-24024 March 1998 LER 97-009-01:on 971114,discovered That CR Console Switch for 3B Sgfp Was Not in Start Position.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Revised Procedures 3/4-OP-074,informed Personnel of Event & Performed Walkdown of CR ML17354A8441998-03-18018 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980216,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Loss of Turbine Control Oil Pressure W/Steam Leak in Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Supply Piping.Auxiliary Governor Maint Instructions Will Be revised.W/980318 Ltr ML17354A7361997-12-12012 December 1997 LER 97-009-01:on 971114,identified That CR Console Switch for 3B SG Feedwater Pump Was Not in Start Position.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Procedures 3/4-OP-074,SGFP Were revised.W/971212 Ltr ML17354A6801997-10-0808 October 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970909,containment Sump Debris Screens Outside Design Basis Due to Stress Damage Was Discovered. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance & Personnel Error. Discrepancies Found on Screens corrected.W/971008 Ltr ML17354A6121997-08-29029 August 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970730,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by Closure of B Main Steam Isolation Valve.Failed W Relay & Equivalent Relays Were replaced.W/970829 Ltr ML17354A6081997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970722,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Failed Rod Control Power Supplies.Replaced Twelve Power Supplies in Rod Control Logic & Power cabinets.W/970818 Ltr ML17354A5801997-07-14014 July 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970618,RCP Oil Collection Sys Was Found Outside Design Basis.Caused Because Design Did Not Consider Component Parts to Be Potential Leakage Sources.Entire RCP Oil Collection Sys Was reviewed.W/970714 Ltr ML17354A5141997-05-22022 May 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970423,automatic Reactor Tripped.Caused by Actuation of Turbine Overspeed Protection Circuit. Administrative Procedures Governing Inadequate Work Controls Will Be Revised to Capture Lessons learned.W/970522 Ltr ML17354A5061997-05-0909 May 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970410,mode Changed W/O Meeting Requirements of TS 3.0.4 Due to Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Night Order Was Issued to Inform Personnel That S/G Blowdown Keylock Switches Were Left in drain.W/970509 Ltr ML17354A5051997-05-0909 May 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970411,auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Start Upon Trip of All Main Feedwater Pumps,Occurred.Caused by Mispositioned Valve Closing.Valves Listed as Inappropriately Positioned Were repositioned.W/970509 Ltr ML17354A4781997-04-25025 April 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970327,ECCS Recirculation Loop Leakage Was Found to Be in Condition Outside Design Basis Due to Gasket Movement During Installation During Spring 1966 Reassembly. Gasket Replaced & Pump tested.W/970425 Ltr ML17354A4581997-03-28028 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970303,manual Reactor Trip Following Rod Control Urgent Failure Alarm Occurred.Caused by Phase Failure Detection on Stationary a Circuits of 2BD Rod Control Cabinet.Air Conditioning replaced.W/970328 Ltr ML17354A4511997-03-26026 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970118,missed Surveillance on CR Position Verification Occurred Due to Inoperable Rod Deviation Monitor.Faulty Circuit Common Connection Was Corrected & Rdm Operability Was restored.W/970326 Ltr ML17354A4061997-02-0303 February 1997 LER 96-004-03:on 970107,identified Three Instances of Inadequate Surveillance Testing.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedures.Surveillance Procedures Revised ML17354A3771996-12-27027 December 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 961204,determined Containment Average Temp Being Determined Based on Only Two Temp Elements Instead of Three as Required by Tss.Caused by Log Only Requiring One Entry.Log revised.W/961227 Ltr ML17354A3261996-11-0606 November 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 961009,potential for Overpressurizing Post Accident Containment Vent Filter Housings Occurred.Caused by Improper Change Mgt.Monitoring Sys Operating Procedures revised.W/961106 Ltr ML17354A3071996-10-22022 October 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960924,manual Reactor Shutdown Occurred. Caused by Failed Rod Control Sys Regulation Card in 2AC Power cabinet.2AC Power Cabinet DC Power Supplies,Cabling & Connectors checked.W/961022 Ltr ML17353A8711996-08-27027 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960729,failed to Reflect Heavy Load Design Info in Procedural Controls.Caused by Failure to Incorporate 1982 Procedure Changes.Suspended Lifting of Heavy Loads & Took Turbine Bldg Crane OOS.W/960827 Ltr ML17353A7411996-06-18018 June 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960521,surveillance Method for Testing Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) Determined Inadequate. Caused by Personnel Error.All Four EDGs Rapid Start Tested & EDG Surveillance Procedures modified.W/960618 Ltr ML17353A7401996-06-18018 June 1996 LER 96-004-02:on 960524,identified Inadequate Surveillance Testing.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedures.Entered Tech Spec Statements,Tested Required Instruments Functions & Revised Plant procedure.W/960618 Ltr ML17353A6901996-05-13013 May 1996 LER 96-004-01:on 960220,identified Potential Tech Spec non-compliance Associated W/Surveillance Testing of AFW Actuation Circuitry on Sg.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedures.Procedures revised.W/960513 Ltr ML17353A6741996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960409,manual Rt Occurred Due to Turbine Governer Control Oil Perturbation.Disassembled & Inspected Governor Valve for Cleanliness & Corrosion products.W/960506 Ltr ML17353A6651996-04-29029 April 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960329,inadvertent ESF Actuation Occurred During Refueling Outage Due to Cognitive Personnel Error. Personnel Involved Counseled & Integrated Safeguards Test Procedures Being revised.W/960429 Ltr ML17353A6601996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960327,manual Rt Occurred Due to 3C Transformer Lockout & Loss of 3B SG Mfp.Replaced SAM Timer Relay in 3AC16.W/960425 Ltr ML17353A6491996-04-23023 April 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960326,certain Safety Injection Accumulator Filled Evolutions Resulted in cross-tied Configuration.C/A: Night Order Written & Operations Procedure 3/4-OP-064 revised.W/960423 Ltr ML17353A6051996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960222,two Arpi Inoperable & TS 3.0.3 Entered.Proposed License Amend Submitted to Revise Allowed Misalignment from +/-12 Steps to =/-18 Steps Between Arpi & Dpi at Less than 90% power.W/960318 Ltr ML17353A6041996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960220,surveillance Testing of AFW Actuation Circuitry Was Inadequate.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedures.Tested Untested Portions of Actuation Logic for AFW Automatic Start signal.W/960318 Ltr ML17353A5861996-03-0606 March 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960209,automatic Turbine Trip/Rt Occurred Due to High SG Level.Caused by Personnel Error.Replaced Both Hinge Pins on B Sgfp Discharge Check valve.W/960306 Ltr ML17353A5761996-03-0101 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960131,intake CWS Flow Rates Found W/ Potential to Be Less than Required by Design Basis.Caused by Influx of Aquatic Grass & Algae Onto Basket Strainers of Icw Flow Path.Mechanically Cleaned strainers.W/960301 Ltr ML17353A4451995-11-0909 November 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 951017,manual Rt Occurred Following Drop of Four Control Rods.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Rod Control Power Cabinet 2BD.Inspected Control Power Cabinet 2BD for Other Water damage.W/951109 Ltr ML17353A4241995-10-12012 October 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950913,analysis Showed That CCW Exchangers Susceptible to Damage Due to flow-induced Vibration.Ccw Sys Has Been Flow Balanced to Closer tolerances.W/951012 Ltr ML17353A3601995-09-13013 September 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950818,containment Pressure Testing Procedure Resulted in Inhibiting Both Trains of Containment Pressure from Initiated Esf.Revised Procedure to Require Testing of Each Train separately.W/950913 Ltr ML17353A2951995-07-17017 July 1995 LER 94-005-02:on 941103,both Units Outside Design Basis Due to Design Defect in Safeguards Bus Sequencer Test Logic. Resumed Monthly Manual Testing of Sequencer ML17352B1581995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950407,unit Being Shutdown to Investigate Recurring non-urgent Failure Alarms from Redundant Rod Control Power Supplies.Reactor Manually Tripped.All Four PS-3 Power Supplies replaced.W/950505 Ltr ML17352B1181995-04-0707 April 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950309,intake Cooling Water Flow Rate Through CCW Heat Exchangers Fell Below Assumed Design Basis. Caused by an Influx of Aquatic Grass & Algae Onto Basket Strainers.Strainers cleaned.W/950407 Ltr ML17352B0701995-03-13013 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950215,inadequate Definition of Loops Filled Resulted in Units in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Issued TS Position Statement to Define Term Loops Filled as Used in TS 6.4.1.1.4.W/950313 Ltr ML17352B0321995-02-0909 February 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941103,design Defect Found in Safeguards Bus Sequencer Test Logic,Placing Facility Outside Design Basis.Design Mods to Eliminate Software Logic Problems Will Be Implemented During Next Refueling outages.W/950209 Ltr ML17352B0101995-01-20020 January 1995 LER 94-006-00:on 941226,C Main Feedwater Control Valve Failed Closed,Causing Reactor & Turbine Trips.Caused by Loose Screw Terminal Connection.I/P Transducers Replaced W/ New Model W/Different Design Wire connection.W/950120 Ltr ML17352A9511994-12-13013 December 1994 LER 94-006-00:on 941130,Unit 4 Tripped Automatically.Caused by Failure of Flexible Link Connection Between Main Generator B Phase Bus & Associated Isolated Phase Bus Bar. All Bolts on Flexible Link checked.W/941213 Ltr ML17352A8871994-11-10010 November 1994 LER 94-005-00:on 941103,design Defect in Safeguards Bus Sequencer Test Logic Places Both Units Outside Design Basis. Caused by 3A Sequencer Failed to Respond as Expected to Opposite Unit SI signal.W/941110 Ltr ML17352A8851994-11-10010 November 1994 LER 94-004-00:on 941103,Unit 3 Outside Design Basis Due to Two of Three Required Safety Injection Pumps Inoperable. Control Switches for 3A & 3B Safety Injection Pumps Immediately Returned to automatic.W/941110 Ltr ML17352A8421994-10-21021 October 1994 LER 94-004-00:on 940923,Unit 4 Tripped Automatically from Rated Power.Caused by Faulty Regulator Transistor.Faulty Backup Power Supply Replaced & Maint History for Power Supplies reviewed.W/941021 Ltr ML17352A8431994-10-20020 October 1994 LER 94-005-00:on 940924,Unit 4 Manually Tripped.Caused by Manual Actuation.Light Bulb & Socket replaced.W/941020 Ltr ML17352B1671994-08-16016 August 1994 LER 94-003-00:on 940720 & 21,util Discovered That Several Required Valve Stroke Time Surveillances Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Reassigned & Procedures and Surveillance Tracking Software Enhanced 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217L9371999-10-20020 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Proposed Alternative from Certain Requirements of ASME Code,Section XI for First 10-Yr Interval Request for Relief for Containment Inservice Insp Program ML17355A4471999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.With 991008 Ltr ML17355A4121999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.With 990909 Ltr ML17355A3981999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.With 990809 Ltr ML17355A3891999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990623,manual Rt from 100% Power Following Multiple Control Rod Drops Was Noted.Caused by Manual Action Taken by Reactor Control Operator.Inspected & Repaired Stationary Gripper Regulating Cards.With 990720 Ltr ML17355A3841999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.With 990713 Ltr ML17355A3681999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Update to Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999 ML17355A3611999-06-30030 June 1999 Refueling Outage ISI Rept. ML17355A3511999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.With 990609 Ltr ML17355A3331999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.With 990511 Ltr ML20217B9871999-04-0808 April 1999 Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period Covering 971014-990408 ML17355A2881999-04-0505 April 1999 COLR for Turkey Point Unit 4 Cycle 18. ML17355A2911999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.With 990414 Ltr ML17355A2551999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant,Units 3 & 4.With 990315 Ltr ML17355A2261999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.With 990211 Ltr ML17355A2201999-01-20020 January 1999 Refueling Outage ISI Rept. ML17355A1911998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.With 990112 Ltr ML18008A0461998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.With 981209 Ltr ML17354B1921998-11-18018 November 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981020,containment Purge Supply,Valve Opened Wider than TS Limit.Caused by Improper Setting of Mechanical Stops.Incorporated Improved Standard Method of Measuring Angular Valve Position Into Sp.With 981118 Ltr ML17354B1891998-11-0909 November 1998 Simulatory Certification Update 2. ML17354B1901998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.With 981112 Ltr ML17354B1591998-10-23023 October 1998 COLR for Turkey Point Unit 3 Cycle 17. ML17354B1361998-10-16016 October 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980921,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by Inadequate re-correlation of Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation Reactor Trip Bistable. Enhanced Applicable Plant Procedures.With 981016 Ltr ML17354B1311998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Turkey Point Unit 3 & 4.With 981012 Ltr ML17354B0971998-09-0909 September 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Machining Defect in Certain One Inch Stainless Steel Swagelok Front Ferrules,Part Number SS-1613-1.Caused by Tubing Slipping Out of Fitting at Three Times Working Pressure of Tubing.Notified Affected Utils ML17354B0981998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Turkey Points,Units 3 & 4.With 980915 Ltr ML17354B0771998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.W/980810 Ltr ML17354B0341998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980619,discovered That Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Was Inoperable Due to Inadequate Inservice Testing of Valves.Caused by Misunderstanding of Testing Criteria.Util Revised Procedures & Verified Operability of Valves ML17354B0241998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.W/980709 Ltr ML17354B0171998-06-29029 June 1998 Rev 1 to PTN-FPER-97-013, Evaluation of Turbine Lube Oil Fire. ML17354A9841998-06-18018 June 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 970730,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Closure of B Msiv.Caused by Failed BFD22S Relay.Six Relays on 3A,3B & 3C MSIVs Were Replaced & Implemented Plant Change to Disable Electronic Trip Function on 3 AFW Pumps ML17354A9741998-06-0909 June 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980513,discovered Potential LOCA-initiated Electrical Fault Which Places ECCS Outside Design Basis. Caused by Inadequate Review of Effect on non-safety Circuit failures.Re-powered PC-*-600A Relays ML20248F7441998-05-31031 May 1998 Reactor Vessel Working Group,Response to RAI Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity ML17354A9711998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4. W/980611 Ltr ML17354A9231998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.W/980511 Ltr ML17354A8821998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.W/980409 Ltr ML17354A8511998-03-24024 March 1998 LER 97-009-01:on 971114,discovered That CR Console Switch for 3B Sgfp Was Not in Start Position.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Revised Procedures 3/4-OP-074,informed Personnel of Event & Performed Walkdown of CR ML17354B0001998-03-18018 March 1998 Florida Power & Light Topical Quality Asurance Rept, Dtd June 1998 ML17354A8441998-03-18018 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980216,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Loss of Turbine Control Oil Pressure W/Steam Leak in Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Supply Piping.Auxiliary Governor Maint Instructions Will Be revised.W/980318 Ltr ML17354A8311998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.W/980311 Ltr ML17354A7871998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1998 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.W/980209 Ltr ML17354A7581997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Turkey Point,Unit 3 & 4.W/980112 Ltr ML17354A7361997-12-12012 December 1997 LER 97-009-01:on 971114,identified That CR Console Switch for 3B SG Feedwater Pump Was Not in Start Position.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Procedures 3/4-OP-074,SGFP Were revised.W/971212 Ltr ML17354A7381997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.W/971215 Ltr ML17354A7211997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1997 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.W/971114 Ltr ML17354A7491997-10-13013 October 1997 SG Insp Rept. ML17354A8851997-10-13013 October 1997 FPL Units 3 & 4 Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period Covering 960408-971013. ML17354A6801997-10-0808 October 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970909,containment Sump Debris Screens Outside Design Basis Due to Stress Damage Was Discovered. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance & Personnel Error. Discrepancies Found on Screens corrected.W/971008 Ltr ML17354A6791997-10-0606 October 1997 COLR Unit 4 Cycle 17, for Turkey Point ML17354A6811997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1997 for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.W/971009 Ltr 1999-09-30
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CATZaOHr REGULATO% INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION YSTEM (RIDS) 2 ACCESS ON 'NBR:9705190146 , DOC.DATE: 97/05/09 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250
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AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MOWREY,C.L. Florida Power & Light Co.
HOVEY,R.J. Florida Power & Light Co.
REC1P.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 97-003-00:on 970410,mode changed w/o meeting requirements of TS 3.0.4 due to inadequate procedural guidance. Night order was issued to inform personnel that S/G blowdown keylock switches were left in drain.W/970509 ltr.
DISTRISOTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECE'IVES:LTR J ENCL TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
J SIZE: j NOTES:
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-3 PD 1 1 CROTEAUiR 1 1 INTERNAL: AEODJSPDJRAB 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 IA CE 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB 1
1 1
1 R DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POOREPW. 1 1 NOAC QUEENERPDS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK"(DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 24 ENCL 24
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MAY 91997 L-97-123 10 CFR 550.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: Turkey Point Unit 3
'ocket No.'0-250 Reportable Event: 97-003-00 Mode Change Without Meeting Requirements of Technical The attached Licensee Event Report, 250/97-003-00, is being provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) (B) .
If'there are any questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, R. J. Hovey Vice President Turkey Point Plant JEK attachment cc: Luis A. Reyes, Regional Administrator, Region USNRC Thomas P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC,
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Turkey Point Plant 9705i90i46 970509 PDR ADOCK 05000250 S PDR lllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllll an FPL Gioup company
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
PACI LITY NAHE (1)
TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 1 OP 9 TITLE (4) MODE CHANGE WITHOUT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.4 DUE TO INADEQUATE PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER(6) RPT DATE (7) OTHER PACILITIES INV (8)
DAY YR PACILITY NAMES DOCKET S (S) 10 97 97 00 5 09 97 OPERATING MODE (9)
PONER LEVEL (10) 100 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
Telephone Number C.L. MOWREY, COMPLIANCE SPECIALIST (305) 246-6204 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEH NPRDS? CAUSE NPRDS?
N EXPECTED SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) NO SUBMISSION DATE (15)
(IE yee, ceetplete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE)
ABSTRACT (16)
On April 10, 1997, operators realized that the Steam Generator Blowdown system interlock bypass (keylock) switches had been left in the DRAIN/FILL position. This position blocks automatic closure signals to blowdown isolation valves CV-3-6275 A, B, and C and blowdown sampling valves MOV-3-1425, 1426, and 1427, such that these valves are open and will not close automatically. Operators immediately placed all 3 keylock switches to OFF, thereby enabling the valves to respond to automatic closure signals.
This error was caused by inadequate procedures and a knowledge level deficiency concerning the keylock switch position required for Mode 4.
The inadequate procedures are being revised. A new procedure for switch and light verifications prior to mode changes is being generated. A Night Order was issued to inform Operations personnel that the S/G Blowdown keylock switches were left in DRAIN/FILL, which bypassed the automatic closure signals, during the MODE 5 to 4 change. All licensed operators will be trained on the correct position of these keylock switches for different operating modes.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTXNUATXON FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.
TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 97-003-00 2 OF 9 I. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On April 6, 1997, Unit 3 had been cooled down to MODE 5, to repair a leak. The'leak was identified during the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
[AB] overpressure test during a refueling outage. During the cooldown process the Steam Generators (S/G) [AB:sg] were drained in accordance with 3-0P-071, "Steam Generator Blowdown Recovery System," and refilled. Section 5.1 of this procedure directs the operator (utility-licensed operator) to place the S/G Blowdown System interlock bypass (keylock) switches [WI:hs] in the DRAIN/FILL position. This switch position blocks three automatic closure signals to the blowdown isolation valves and to the blowdown sampling valves. The blocked signals are Phase A Containment Isolation, Main Steam Isolation, and Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Actuation. The valves are blowdown isolation valves CV-3-6275A, B, and C, and blowdown sampling valves MOV-3-1425, 1426, and 1427. With the switches in DRAIN/FILL, these valves can be opened and will not close automatically.
The leak was repaired and the unit entered MODE 4 at 1549 on April 9, 1997. At 0900 on April 10, 1997, operators realized that subject valves were open, and the keylock switches [WI:hs] had been left in the DRAIN/FILL position. This is a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.4, which requires that all automatic containment isolation valves be operable in MODE 4.
Operators immediately placed all 3 keylock switches to OFF and removed the keys. With the keylock switches in OFF, the automatic closure signals listed above are enabled.
The S/G blowdown system is described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) in Section 10.2.4.3:
"A steam generator blowdown recovery system is installed to assist in maintaining required steam generator water chemistry by providing a means for removal'of foreign matter which concentrates in the evaporator section of the steam generator.
The system is fed by three independentblowdown lines (one
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTXNUATXON FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.
TURKEY POINT'UNIT 3 05000250 97-003-00 3 OF 9 per steam generator) which tie into a common blowdown flash tank. The steam generator blowdown is continuously monitored for radioactivity during plant operation. A radiation monitor is provided for the steam generator blowdown sample lines in each unit. The blowdown sample lines can be isolated using the manual isolation valves downstream of the motor operated isolation valves."
Containment isolation is described in Section 6.6 of the UFSAR. Table 6.6-1 of the UFSAR indicates that, for valves CV-3-6275A, B, and C (associated with Penetrations 28A, B, and C respectively), Note 18 applies; and that, for valves MOV-3-1425, 1426, 1427 (associated with Penetrations 64C, 64B, and 64A respectively), Note 18 applies. Note 18 of Table 6.6-1 states:
"This valve is a containment isolation valve (i.e., closes on a Phase A, Phase B, or Containment Ventilation Isolation signal, is a normally closed manual isolation valve", or is a non-essential system check valve)."
Containment isolation valves are described in Technical Specification 3/4.6.4, "Containment Isolation Valves," which states in part, that for Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4:
"Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less than or equal to those required isolation times...
With one or more isolation valves inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:
- a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or
- b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic containment isolation valve secured in the isolation position, or C. Isolate each affected,.penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.
TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 97-003-00 4 OF 9 use of at least one closed'anual valve or blind flange, or
- d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />."
Technical Specification 3/4.6.1 provides more generic requirements that containment integrity be maintained at all times in Modes 1 through 4.
integrity is demonstrated in part by surveillance of R
Containment containment isolation and boundary valves.
The S/G Blowdown system is not explicitly addressed in the Technical Specifications. Because these valves are listed in UFSAR Table 6.6-1 as containment isolation valves, and because they receive an automatic closure signal (Phase A), these valves have been considered subject to Technical Specification 3/4.6.4.
Because the keylock switches were in DRAIN/FILL, the valves were not capable of closing automatically when Unit' changed from MODE 5 to MODE 4. This is a violation of Technical Specification 3.0.4, reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
II. CAUSE OF THE EVENT The primary cause of this error was an inadequate procedure. Section 5.1 of 3-OP-071 directs the operator to place the S/G Blowdown interlock bypass switches in the DRAIN/FILL position, but does not restore the switch lineup in this section, nor does it direct the operator to the procedure section which requires the switches to be returned the NORMAL position.
Contributors to the event were:
procedure 3-GOP-503, "Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby, has a step to verify that the S/G Blowdown System is aligned and ready for use using 3-.0P-071, but does not refer to the specific section of 3-OP-071 that requires the keylock switches to be in the OFF position,
- 2. a knowledge level deficiency gS on the oart of II some licensed I
0 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.
TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 97-003-00 5 OF 9 operators concerning the keylock switch position required for MODE 4
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT Safety Impact in MODE 4 At the time the event occurred, Unit 3 was heating up from a refueling outage, with RCS pressure and temperature of about 370 psig and 340'F, respectively. Accident analyses in the UFSAR for events in this mode (MODE 4, less than 350'F in the RCS, Safety Injection {SI) isolated and SI signals blocked) were reviewed. In MODE 4, the UFSAR does not consider Steam Generator Tube Ruptures (SI is isolated), Main Steam Line Breaks (no reactivity excursion possible with unit borated and rods inserted, SI isolated), Loss of Feedwater events (AFW not required), Load Excursion events (no load), Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow (no core power), Rod Ejection events (no credible force to create a missile), or other events involving control rods (all are in the core). Were any of these events to be hypothesized, operator action (including actions outside the control room) would be required for their mitigation. Fuel handling events, accidental waste gas releases, and accidental liquid waste releases are independent of this issue and are unaffected. Therefore, having the blowdown and blowdown sampling valves in "DRAIN/FILL" (keylock posit'ion so valves would not close automatically on a Phase A containment isolation signal) in MODE 4 does not affect the outcome of these events. This is because the blowdown and blowdown sample valves are the secondary closure mechanism of an already closed system inside containment.
The only accident or event which may be viewed as part of the licensing basis in MODE 4 is a possible MODE 4 loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
During such an event, with loss of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory, the operating crew would enter 3-0NOP-041.3, "Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage," to deal with high RCS leakage. If the loss of inventory in MODE 4 could not be accommodated by isolating letdown and increased charging, procedure 3-0NOP-041.7, "Shutdown LOCA," would be entered. In Step 6 of this procedure, containment phase A isolation is manually initiated. For the event being reported, manual Phase A isolation would not result in closure of the valves in question. However,. they would almost immediately be manually closed to
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.
TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 97-003-00 6 OF 9 comply with Response Not Obtained Step 6b, which would require manual closure of CV-3-6275A, B, and C and MOV-.3-1425, 1426, and 1427. Note that these valves are all considered the second barrier for these penetrations. The closed system inside containment (the steam generator and associated piping to each penetration) is considered the primary barrier inside containment.
Based on the closed system inside containment configuration for the blowdown and blowdown sample penetrations, there was no safety impact associated with having the subject valves open with their associated keylock switches in the "DRAIN/FILL" position.
Containment Isolation Features Design Bases The containment isolation features associated with Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 were reconstituted by the development of Engineering Package (EP)89-581, "Containment Isolation Features Design Basis Implementation."
Review of the technical requirements associated with containment isolation shows that the analysis for blowdown isolation provisions is essentially the same as that for main feedwater and main steam isolation.
The containment isolation design for secondary systems is that the primary, passive containment isolation boundary is the secondary system inside containment (main steam and feedwater piping and steam generator). The main steam isolation valves, main feedwater isolation valves, blowdown valves, AFW valves etc. provide a secondary barrier that is available to isolate in the event of a S/G tube rupture. This design ensures containment isolation that meets the "single active failure" design requirement.
EP 89-581 provided notes in UFSAR Table 6.6-1, to classify the different penetrations described. The main feedwater and main steam isolation provisions are identified as secondary system boundary valves that close in response to system process signals but are not "containment isolation valves" as governed by Technical Specification 3/4.6.4. Nevertheless, for consistency, valves which received a Phase A or Phase B signal, or were normally closed, were identified as "containment isolation valves." From a functional standpoint, however, the needfor blowdown isolation is primarily I V process oriented, fk" rather I
ff, I'
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTZNUAT1ON FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.
TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 97-003-00 7 OF 9 than for the purpose of containment isolation. The S/G blowdown and blowdown sampling valves were therefore listed with all other Phase A valves rather than explaining the design differences from other Phase A valves.
It is desirable in many instances to close .the S/G blowdown isolation and blowdown sampling valves, but not directly for containment isolation. Use of a Phase A signal to these valves is considered a design convenience with respect to providing closure signals (Phase A is initiated on SI) for these valves, rather than that they must close to effect containment isolation. This is supported by generic Westinghouse system design information which states:
"Piping associated with the steam generators such as main feedwater, blowdown and sampling main'team, AFW, fall within the scope of GDC (10CFR50 Appendix A systems'iping General Design Criterion) 57. These lines are typically provided with containment isolation valves capable of remote-manual operation for the purpose of containment isolation. These valves also receive automatic isolation signals for other safety requirements. (Although these signals may be generated at the same time as containment isolation, they are not considered as such)."
(taken from Westinghouse Steam Systems Design Manual, Section 3-3, "Containment Isolation Pertaining to the Steam Generators and Associated Systems," dated March, 1978) .
The primary reason these valves were not originally identified as secondary system boundary valves was .the potential confusion that could exist since they do use Phase A contacts to provide closure.. The primary closure function of these valves is to maintain steam generator inventory for AFW; AFW is not required to be operable in MODE 4. The primary actuation input of Containment Isolation Phase A is a Safety Injection signal. Safety Injection is also an input for AFW auto-start. The valves in question also close in response to an AFW auto-start, and in response to a Main Steam Isolation Signal. These closure signals are entirely consistent with the process closure requirements of the secondary systems described by the Westinghouse manual quoted above.
J LXCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTXNUATXON FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.
TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 97-003-00 8 OF 9 Since the valves which were left open do not actually serve an automatic containment isolation function, and since the primary containment boundary for these penetrat'ions (Closed System Inside Containment) was intact, this event did not compromise the health or safety of plant personnel or the general public.
IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A Night Order was issued to inform Operations personnel that the S/G Blowdown keylock switches were left in DRAIN/FILL, which bypassed the automatic closure signals, during the MODE 5 to 4 change.
- 2. Operations will revise procedures 3/4-OP-071:
~ the S/G draindown evolution will be detailed, including recommended minimum levels, blowdown tank pressure relief, and switch/valve restoration on the completion of draining steam generators.
the system alignment attachments will include the keylock switches'FF position.
signoff and independent verification will be added to the required procedure section.
- 3. Operations will develop a switch/indicating light verification procedure to, be performed prior to mode changes. This procedure will be tracked and scheduled by O-ADM-215, "Plant Surveillance Tracking Program."
- 4. Operations will revise procedures 3/4-GOP-503 to specify which sections and/or attachments of 3/4-OP-071 are to be used to verify the correct blowdown system alignment.
- 5. The UFSAR is being revised to more correctly define the role of the S/G blowdown isolation valves and blowdown sampling valves, with respect to containment isolation and system isolation.
- 6. All licensed operators will be trained on the correct position of
('
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE NO.
TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 05000250 97-003-00 9 OF 9 the interlock bypass switches for different operating modes.
V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Similar events: The last mode change in violation of Technical Specifications was in 1992, reported in LER 251/92-006. That event was caused by an error in the surveillance tracking program, and is unrelated to this event.
EIIS Codes are shown in the format [EIIS SYSTEM: IEEE component function identifier, second component identifier (i appropriate)].