ML102110259

Enclosure 3: Dominion - North Anna Presentation of July 28, 2010 Public Meeting

ML102110259
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	08/04/2010
From:	Dominion, NRC/NRR/DIRS/IHPHPB
To:
Ramey-Smith A 415-6877
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ML102110189	List: ML102110259 ML102110266 ML102110268 ML102110270
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Download: ML102110259 (14)

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Enclosure 3: Dominion Presentation Meeting Summary of July 28, 2010 Public Meeting with NEI Dated August 4, 2010

DOlllinlon

© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Region II Eric Hendrixson Fred Mladen

© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Implementation

• Modified Previous Safety Culture Binning

- Started in 2008

- Only looked at RCEs

- Only used the Leadership Team

- Informal

- Biennial Safety Culture Assessment conducted with 4 SMEs

• Formal Program

- Started in 3rd Quarter, 2009

- Developed LI-NA-1002 (Rev. 2)

- Expanded to the NEI 09-07 guidance

- Results are reviewed by MSRC

© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Safety Culture Assessment

• 71 question electronic survey provided to 1,099 site workers (included supplemental personnel)

• Survey was conducted 11/18/09 - 11/30/09

• 70.15% response rate, resulted in 55,509 data points

• Results used to focus the interviews

© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Safety Culture Assessment

• Site Assessment performed 12/14/09 - 12/19/09

• Team consisted of 21 members (11 from North Anna), as well as several observers

• 62 interviews conducted, and 12 observations, resulted in 1,282 data points

• 3 strengths, 0 weaknesses, 5 positive, 3 negative, and 7 general observations were made

• Results loaded into the Self Assessment module of the Corrective Action Program

© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Safety Culture Monitoring Panel

• Consists of Supervisors and Specialists

- Operations

- Engineering

- Maintenance

- RP/Chemistry

- Corrective Action

- Human Resources

- ECP

- HU Coordinator

• Also has attendance by OR (organizational effectiveness) Manager and NS&L Director for consistency

© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Safety Culture Leadership Team

• Consists of Senior Management

- Site Vice President

- Plant Manager

- NS&L Director

- Engineering Director

- OR Manager

- Training Manager

© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Data Analysis

• Used Guidance from NEI 09-07

- Monitoring Panel meets 1-2 times per Quarter

- Leadership Team meets once per Quarter

- Considered larger extent than previous binning

• RCEs, NRC Violations and Findings, ACEs, Oversight AFIs and PDs, CAP and HU Trend Reports, INPO AFIs and PDs, OWAs, Margin Management Issues, HR and ECP Concerns/Trends, ODEC Concerns

- 91 items considered in the current 4 quarters

- 58 Items binned, 8 doubled counted, 33 items not binned

- Bin to both INPO Safety Culture Codes and NRC Cross Cutting Aspects

© 2003 Dominion

~DOminion' NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Results Nuclear Safety Culture 1- QUilrter 2010

© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr 1st Qtr Running 4 Area Components Aspects 2008 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 Quarter Total Results 1. Decision Making

a. Safety/Risk Significant Decisions

b. Conservative Assumptions & Safe Actions

c. Communications of Decisions 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

5 1

1 4

8 1 1 Human Performance

a. Proper Maintenance Programs 1 1 2 4

b. Personnel Training & Qualifications 1 1

2. Resources

c. Complete Documentation & Labeling 1 1 1 2 1 5

d. Proper Facilities & Equipment

a. Proper Work Planning 1 2 2

3. Work Control

b. Work Activity Coordination 1 1 1 2

a. Human Performance & Error Prevention 1 1 3 1 5

4. Work Practices b. Procedural Compliance 2 1 1 3 3 8

c. Supervisory & Management Oversight 1 1 1 1 1 3

a. Proper Issue Identification

b. Trend Performance Using CAP 1 1

c. Thorough Evaluation of Identified Problems 1 2 1 4

1. Corrective Actions Program (CAP)

d. Appropriate Timely Corrective Actions (CA) 1 2 2 PI & R

e. Appropriate Timely Alternative CAP Process

a. Utilizing Operating Experiences 1 1

2. Operating Experience

b. Implementing Operating Experience 1 1 1 2 4

a. Appropriate Self-Assessment 1 1

3. Self & Independent Assessment b. Track and Trend Safety Indicators

c. Coordinates & Communicates Results

a. Free Flow of Information

1. Environment for Raising Concerns

b. Alternative Free Flow

a. Personnel Are Free to Raise Safety Concerns SCWE

2. Preventing, Detecting, and Mitigating Perceptions of Retaliation

b. Discrimination Claims Investigated & CA Taken

c. Appropriate Disciplinary Actions Taken

1. Accountability Defined lines of authority and responsibility 3 2 1 1 4 Licensee ensures that a learning environment exists

2. Continuous Learning Environment 3 2 1 3 Systematic Process for change is used

3. Organizational Change OTHER 2 2 Management

a. Policies reinforce the right to raise concerns

b. Personnel are effectively trained on safety policies

4. Safety Policies

c. Actions are consistent with safety policies 1 1 1

d. policies are periodically communicated

© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Results

• Provided Training, and other actions;

- Results tracked by PIIs or CAP

- Davis-Besse and Strategic and Action Planning leadership training

- Managing Risk and Proceeding in the Face of Uncertainty leadership training

- QVV (Question, Validate, Verify) leadership training

- Change Management (Who, What, When) leadership training

- Importance of adhering to nuclear standards and personal accountability leadership training

- Collective significance review of items binned under INPO principle #7, (Organizational Learning is Embraced)

- Passive Design Features training for the entire staff

© 2003 Dominion

NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Learnings

• Only half of the items cleanly bin into either the INPO Principles or the Cross Cuttings Aspects

• The other half are very subjective, and can easily fit into multiple categories based perspective

• Leadership Team tends to be more critical than the Monitoring Panel

• Most actions are training directed at behaviors, not changes to processes or procedures (CAP already addresses these)

• Biennial Safety Culture Assessment results are different than and complement the results of the binning

• About 20-30 bins appear to be manageable and meaningful, 8 is too few, 71 is too many for the quarterly binning

© 2003 Dominion

Questions?

© 2003 Dominion