ML102110259
| ML102110259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna |
| Issue date: | 08/04/2010 |
| From: | Dominion, NRC/NRR/DIRS/IHPHPB |
| To: | |
| Ramey-Smith A 415-6877 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML102110189 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML102110259 (14) | |
Text
Enclosure 3: Dominion Presentation Meeting Summary of July 28, 2010 Public Meeting with NEI Dated August 4, 2010
© 2003 Dominion D
Olllinlon
© 2003 Dominion NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Region II Eric Hendrixson Fred Mladen
© 2003 Dominion NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Implementation
- Modified Previous Safety Culture Binning
- Started in 2008
- Only looked at RCEs
- Only used the Leadership Team
- Informal
- Biennial Safety Culture Assessment conducted with 4 SMEs
- Formal Program
- Started in 3rd Quarter, 2009
- Developed LI-NA-1002 (Rev. 2)
- Expanded to the NEI 09-07 guidance
- Results are reviewed by MSRC
© 2003 Dominion NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Safety Culture Assessment
- 71 question electronic survey provided to 1,099 site workers (included supplemental personnel)
- Survey was conducted 11/18/09 - 11/30/09
- 70.15% response rate, resulted in 55,509 data points
- Results used to focus the interviews
© 2003 Dominion NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Safety Culture Assessment
- Site Assessment performed 12/14/09 - 12/19/09
- Team consisted of 21 members (11 from North Anna), as well as several observers
- 62 interviews conducted, and 12 observations, resulted in 1,282 data points
- 3 strengths, 0 weaknesses, 5 positive, 3 negative, and 7 general observations were made
- Results loaded into the Self Assessment module of the Corrective Action Program
© 2003 Dominion NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Safety Culture Monitoring Panel
- Consists of Supervisors and Specialists
- Operations
- Engineering
- Maintenance
- RP/Chemistry
- Corrective Action
- Human Resources
- ECP
- HU Coordinator
- Also has attendance by OR (organizational effectiveness) Manager and NS&L Director for consistency
© 2003 Dominion NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Safety Culture Leadership Team
- Consists of Senior Management
- Site Vice President
- Plant Manager
- NS&L Director
- Engineering Director
- OR Manager
- Training Manager
© 2003 Dominion NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Data Analysis
- Used Guidance from NEI 09-07
- Monitoring Panel meets 1-2 times per Quarter
- Leadership Team meets once per Quarter
- Considered larger extent than previous binning
- RCEs, NRC Violations and Findings, ACEs, Oversight AFIs and PDs, CAP and HU Trend Reports, INPO AFIs and PDs, OWAs, Margin Management Issues, HR and ECP Concerns/Trends, ODEC Concerns
- 91 items considered in the current 4 quarters
- 58 Items binned, 8 doubled counted, 33 items not binned
- Bin to both INPO Safety Culture Codes and NRC Cross Cutting Aspects
© 2003 Dominion NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Results
-~DOminion' Nuclear Safety Culture 1-QUilrter 2010
© 2003 Dominion NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Results Area Components Aspects 4th Qtr 2008 1st Qtr 2009 2nd Qtr 2009 3rd Qtr 2009 4th Qtr 2009 1st Qtr 2010 Running 4 Quarter Total Human Performance
- 1. Decision Making
- a. Safety/Risk Significant Decisions 1
1 1
1 1
4
- b. Conservative Assumptions & Safe Actions 1
1 1
5 1
8
- c. Communications of Decisions 1
1
- 2. Resources
- a. Proper Maintenance Programs 1
1 2
4
- b. Personnel Training & Qualifications 1
1
- c. Complete Documentation & Labeling 1
1 1
2 1
5
- d. Proper Facilities & Equipment
- 3. Work Control
- a. Proper Work Planning 1
2 2
- b. Work Activity Coordination 1
1 1
2
- 4. Work Practices
- a. Human Performance & Error Prevention 1
1 3
1 5
- b. Procedural Compliance 2
1 1
3 3
8
- c. Supervisory & Management Oversight 1
1 1
1 1
3 PI & R
- 1. Corrective Actions Program (CAP)
- a. Proper Issue Identification
- b. Trend Performance Using CAP 1
1
- c. Thorough Evaluation of Identified Problems 1
2 1
4
- d. Appropriate Timely Corrective Actions (CA) 1 2
2
- e. Appropriate Timely Alternative CAP Process
- 2. Operating Experience
- a. Utilizing Operating Experiences 1
1
- b. Implementing Operating Experience 1
1 1
2 4
- 3. Self & Independent Assessment
- a. Appropriate Self-Assessment 1
1
- b. Track and Trend Safety Indicators
- c. Coordinates & Communicates Results SCWE
- 1. Environment for Raising Concerns
- a. Free Flow of Information
- b. Alternative Free Flow
- 2. Preventing, Detecting, and Mitigating Perceptions of Retaliation
- a. Personnel Are Free to Raise Safety Concerns
- b. Discrimination Claims Investigated & CA Taken
- c. Appropriate Disciplinary Actions Taken OTHER
- 1. Accountability Defined lines of authority and responsibility 3
2 1
1 4
- 2. Continuous Learning Environment Licensee ensures that a learning environment exists 3
2 1
3
- 3. Organizational Change Management Systematic Process for change is used 2
2
- 4. Safety Policies
- a. Policies reinforce the right to raise concerns
- b. Personnel are effectively trained on safety policies
- c. Actions are consistent with safety policies 1
1 1
- d. policies are periodically communicated
© 2003 Dominion NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Results
- Provided Training, and other actions;
- Results tracked by PIIs or CAP
- Davis-Besse and Strategic and Action Planning leadership training
- Managing Risk and Proceeding in the Face of Uncertainty leadership training
- QVV (Question, Validate, Verify) leadership training
- Change Management (Who, What, When) leadership training
- Importance of adhering to nuclear standards and personal accountability leadership training
- Collective significance review of items binned under INPO principle #7, (Organizational Learning is Embraced)
- Passive Design Features training for the entire staff
© 2003 Dominion NEI 09-07 Pilot Program North Anna Power Station Learnings
- Only half of the items cleanly bin into either the INPO Principles or the Cross Cuttings Aspects
- The other half are very subjective, and can easily fit into multiple categories based perspective
- Leadership Team tends to be more critical than the Monitoring Panel
- Most actions are training directed at behaviors, not changes to processes or procedures (CAP already addresses these)
- Biennial Safety Culture Assessment results are different than and complement the results of the binning
- About 20-30 bins appear to be manageable and meaningful, 8 is too few, 71 is too many for the quarterly binning
© 2003 Dominion Questions?