ML102110266
| ML102110266 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/2010 |
| From: | Exelon Generation Co, NRC/NRR/DIRS/IHPHPB |
| To: | |
| Ramey-Smith A 415-6877 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML102110189 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML102110266 (10) | |
Text
Enclosure 4: Exelon Presentation Meeting Summary of July 28, 2010 Public Meeting with NEI Dated August 4, 2010
Braidwood Nuclear Safety Culture Pilot Ron Gaston Regulatory Assurance Manager July 28, 2010
2 NEI 09-07 Implementation at Braidwood Site specific procedure developed based on existing Exelon practices and NEI guidance Braidwood implemented all three phases
- 4 Monitoring Panel Meetings
- 1 Semi-Annual Senior Leadership Team (SLT) Review
- 1 Independent Nuclear Safely Culture Assessment (NSCA)
All three phases assessed data against the INPO Nuclear Safety Culture Principles and Attributes NRC observed implementation of all three phases
3 Monitoring Panel Consists of Plant Manager, Oversight Manager, HR Manager, Regulatory Manager, and Performance Improvement Manager Meetings held on a two month frequency Process inputs provided in advance for review and preliminary binning
- Condition reports tagged with Safety Culture trend code
- CAP investigations (Root Cause, Apparent Cause) and feedback
- NRC findings and violations, referred allegations
- Nuclear Oversight elevations, assessments and audits, concerns
- Offsite Review Committee minutes and findings
- Selected site performance indicators
4 Monitoring Panel Meeting involves process input reviews to identify issues at low level and provide oversight of corrective actions
- Discussion of previous actions items / trend reviews
- Collegial review of each individual input
- Bin inputs that represent a weakness in a safety culture principle
- Identify issues for short term actions Monitoring Panel provides a forum for regular reflection and assessment of safety culture health
- Aggregate review of broad scope of inputs provided oversight and engagement on safety culture
- Identified specific departments or plant issues influencing safety culture
5 SLT Semi-Annual Review Utilized Monitoring Panel data and SLT judgment to reach consensus on site's implementation of each safety culture principle Identified safety culture improvement opportunities
- Principle 3 - Organizational Trust Long-term issues not being resolved Communication challenges
- Principle 5 - Nuclear is Recognized as Special Cross-functional human performance issues
- Principle 7 - Organizational Learning Investigation and issue resolution weaknesses
6 Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment Independent assessment against the eight INPO principles Two phases: Survey (65% response) and Onsite Assessment Onsite Assessment
- 74 interviews of site personnel and 4 meeting observations
- Interview questions based on INPO safety culture principles and attributes 3 Positive Observations, 5 Negative Observations, and 4 General Observations
7 Braidwood Results Monitoring Panel identified safety culture weaknesses in specific departments and with specific site issues Monitoring Panel binning and focus areas were consistent with independent NSCA observations SLT review challenged sites actions / progress related to resolving NSCA negative observations SLT review identified Improvement Opportunity in Principle 7 - Organizational Learning
- Consistent with Oversight / Offsite Review Board feedback of recent decline in CAP performance NSCA and SLT review noted effective site action and improvements in decision making - consistent with recent NRC feedback related to existing SCCI
8 Braidwood Improvements / Lessons Learned Monitoring Panel bin process now inputs to the safety culture attribute level Insights from line organization department heads presented to Monitoring Panel Bin positive behaviors against safety culture principles to identify areas to leverage /
benchmark Periodic challenge of site disposition of SLT improvement opportunities / NSCA observations Improved communication of results to requisite levels of the organization
9 Braidwood Insights The NEI 09-07 guidance provides a structured and tiered process that drives the site to own and actively monitor / improve safety culture Use of a broad range of process inputs allows for identification of potential safety culture issues:
- As a leading indicator of performance
- At the precursor / low level
- Related to a specific department or targeted population Provides transparency
- NRC observations of all three phases
- NRC review of inputs, binning results, meeting minutes, and assessment reports
- NRC tracking of site actions through CAP