IR 05000498/1988033

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Insp Repts 50-498/88-33 & 50-499/88-33 on 880502-06. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room Observations & Followup Insp Re Unexpected Loss of Ref Temp Signal During Troubleshooting Steam Dump Controller
ML20195H297
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 06/07/1988
From: Hildebrand E, Ireland R, Murphy M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195H199 List:
References
50-498-88-33, 50-499-88-33, NUDOCS 8806280262
Download: ML20195H297 (6)


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I APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/88-33 Operating License: NPF-76 50-499/88-33 Construction Permit: CPPR-129 Dockets: 50-498 50-499 Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name: South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted: May 2-6, 1988 Inspectors: ,w/

E.7. HildelW& rid,'Reac' tor Inspector, Plant

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Systems Section, Division of Reactor Safety

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h M. E. MQrphy, ReactoY Inspector, Plant Systems Section, Division of Reactor Safety Approved: , Mc M 478[

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.f.[tiok, hec Division of Reactor SafetyIrpland, Act'Tig Chief, Plant Systems Inspectinn Summary Inspection Conducted May 2-6, 1988 (Report 50-498/88-33)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of Unit 1 control room observations and followup inspection regarding the unexpected loss of the reference temperature signal during troubleshooting the steam dump controlle Rest.l ts : Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to proviTE an adequate maintenance procedure, paragraph 1).

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Inspection Conducted May 2-6, 1988 (Report 50-499/88-33)

Areas Inspected: Review of preoperational test program and licensee's actions on the problem of dealuminization of aluminum-bronze, s : ithin the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were j

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

,HL&P

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P. Appleby, Manager Training R. Balcom, Audits and Assessments Manager 5. Head, Supervisor, Licensing Engineer T.~ Jordan, Project Quality Assurance (QA) Manager, Unit 2 D. King, Construction Manager, Unit 2 J. Kubenka, Manager, Staff. Training A. McIntyre, Manager, Operations Support Engineering K. O'Gara, Project Compliance Engineer G. Ondriska, Startup Project J. Phelps, Supervising Engineer, Project Compliance M. Polishak, Senior Engineer S. Rosen.-General Manager, Operations Superintendent J. Slabinski, Operations Quality Control (QC) Supervisor, Unit 2 L. Weldon, Manager, Operations Training B. Wellborn, Supervising Project Engineer J. Westermeier, Project Manager Bechtel R. Bryan, Field Construction Manager W. :: vans, Licensing Engineer R. Medina, QA Supervisor C. O'Neil Unit 2 Engineering Manager Ebasco R. Abel, Quality Program Site Manager W. Pardee, QASS E. Rosol, Site Manager All personnel listed above attended the exit interview conducted May 6, 198 The NRC inspectors also interviewed other personnel during the inspectio . Unex)ected Loss of Reference Temperature (TREF) Signal During Trou)leshooting - Followup During a previous inspection, the inspectors noted that a loss of TREF control signal occurred during troubleshooting of the steam dump controller, Control room personnel were not aware that TREF would be unavailable during the work. MaintenanceWorkRequest(MWR)MWR-MS-55308 was the controlling work documen .-

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h Details of this occurrence are contained in NRC Inspection l' Report 50-498/88-25, paragraph The followup inspection included a review of the controlling work document 4 l

(MWR-MS-55308) and the following station procedures:

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  • OP6P03-20-0007, "Conduct of Maintenance"

' OPMP07-ZI-0001, "l&E Troubleshooting Permanent Plant Equipment"

  • OPGP03-ZM-0003, "Maintenance Work Reouest Program" The above station procedures were found to be adequate for performing this type of maintenance activity. _The NRC inspectors concluded that administrative measures were in place to control plant maintenance during Mot 1 1 operation The above procedures emphasized formal communications between control room and maintenance personnel, delineated dctions to be taken when abnormal conditions were encountered during performance of troubleshooting activities, and specified adherence to approved, written instructions when working on quality related plant equipmen However, a review of the controlling work document (MWR-MS-55308) revealed several discrepancies:

a Environmental Qualification (EQ) was indicated as "no" in Section II, but was shown "yes" on page 5 of 40. The applicable instrument loop is EQ relate *

Independent restoration was verified for the instrument cards pulled during the troubleshooting. However, instrument card TY-660A was not listed as needing independent verification. Instrument card TY-660A was pulled by Step 5.2.5 of the WR work instructions. This resulted in the unexpected loss of TREF control signa * The independent restoration verification on page 5 of 40 was signed e by the same person who signed for initial restoration on page 30 of 40. Licensee management personnel stated that separate personnel had perfonned the independent verification for restoration, but the signature requirements were not clear on the verification forms and were located on different pages of the MWR, The licensee stated that action would be taken to clarify the verification form * TREF was not listed on page 5 of 40 as being a system or component which would be unreliable or erratic during performance of troubleshooting. This contributed to an inadequate briefing of the control room personnel by the technician controlling the work. The MWR did recognize other control systems and corrponents that would be unreliable or erratic during work performanc .. .

The STP TS, Sections 6.8.1.a and 6.8.2, require that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained for naintenance activities and that these procedures shall be reviewed prior to implementatio The fact that the MWR did not recognize that TREF would be unavailable during work rformance is considered an apparent violatio (498/8833-01 Unit 1 Operation - Control Room Observations During this inspection period, Unit 1 control room activities were observe The reactor plant was shutdown in Mode Conduct of operations personnel was formal and professional. Control room logs were well maintained and thorough. Control room access was adequately controlled by the u.11t superviso No violations or deviations were identifie . Unit 2 Preoperational Test Program Status Review The purpose of this part of the inspection was to review the status of the preoperational test program. A review of the following schedules, provided by the licensee, was performed by the NRC inspectors: "Unit 2 Startup Sumary Schedule All-Discipline," Revision 4, dated March 31, 1988; "Unit 2 Startup System Summary Schedule NSSS," Revision 1, dated March 31,1988; "Unit 2 Startup System Sumary Schedule HVAC," Revision 1, dated March 31,1988; "Unit 2 Startup System Sumary Schedule B0P,"

Revision 1, dated March 31, 1988; and "Unit 2 Startup System Summary Schedule I&C," Revision 1 dated March 31, 198 This review determined that all tests scheduled to date had been completed on or ahead of schedule. A discussion with a licensee representative revealed that there were no significant problems with the schedule, but there were three items of schedular concern that could affect the start of hot functional tests. These items were timely receipt of parts and completion of the PORY refurbishment, timely receipt back from the vendor of the refurbished auxiliary feed pump parts, and the extent of the aluminum-bronze dealuminization problem in the Essential Cooling Water System (ECW).

There were no violations or deviations identified in this portion of the inspectio . Dealuminization of Aluminum-Bronze Material The licensee first identified the problem in early April 1985, as what appeared to be casting porosity evidenced by a thru-wall leak on a valve

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6-body in the ECW. Subsequent metallurgical analysis revealed that it wa dealuminization of the alloy matri .The licensee has comprehensively addressed this problem in separate correspondence with.the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatio . Exit Meeting An exit meeting was held May 6, 1988. At this meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee did not indicate that any of the material discussed was proprietary.

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